Presented by: Fabienne Salimi @

BEYOND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE, MAKING SAFETY SECOND NATURE

2010 Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center International Symposium
October 26-28, 2010

Challenges with
Fire & Gas detection and Emergency Shutdown
systems for the modern LNG plants
 LNG Codes
LNG plants are top tier installation according to SEVESO II
(COMAH) classification and their design shall comply at least
with one of the following codes:

EN 1473 (European code)

NFPA 59A (American code)

AS-3961 (Australian code)

Hazardous Materials in LNG Plant
• Condensate
• Methane (Natural gas & LNG)
TNT efficiency: 10%

• Ethane (gas & liquefied)

• Propane (gas & liquefied)
TNT efficiency: 100%

• Butane (gas & liquefied)

• Mixed Refrigerant (gas & liquefied)
Hazardous Material Release
Hazardous Material Release
• 2D Gas dispersion model

• Open door simulation without any

congestion

• Gas and pressurized liquids (>4 barg)

releases in form of directional jet gas or fine
aerosol clouds
 AS-3961
2.5.1 Where required an emergency shutdown system shall be
incorporated into any installation that:
(a) includes an atmospheric tank; or
(b) exceeds 300 m3 total capacity; or
(c) includes LNG pumps, compressors or liquefaction plants; or
(d) involves the loading of LNG into tankers.
When operated, such a system shall isolate, shut down, depressurize or otherwise
make safe any equipment whose continued operation could add to or continue an
emergency.

2.5.2 Exceptions
Where the shutdown of particular equipment could:
• introduce further hazards, or
• cause damage,
the shutdown of such equipment may be omitted from the emergency shutdown
system provided that the effects of continued release of flammable or combustible
fluids.
 EN 1473

Shutdown Requirement
ESD activation shall be automatic from the fire and gas system with
supplementary activation from local ESD station or central panel.

Exception
ESD activation shall neither cause a new hazard situation nor damage a
machine or other equipment.
How to interpret?
 ESD-3
ESD-2
ESD-1
ESD-0

Open Equipment BDV's

(as relebvant and if any)
PB
ESD

UPS Battery Low

Open/Close SDV's

PB
PB

PSS
ESD
volage (4)

Equip. Fault

PSD-2 Unit Shutdown

Equipment Shutdown
PB

PSD-3 Equipment Shutdown

ESD-0 Total Black Shutdown
Through telemetry

Other Faults
Process fault
Essential Utilities if any
ESD-1 Fire Zone Emergency Shutdown

OR
SD-2 of all units in fire zone

Power failure
SD-3 of all eauipment in unit

Electrical Shutdown of Fire Detection

Equipment (specific equipment)

PSD-3 Gas
To ESD-1 (6) LSHH Flare drum (5)

Close Dampers and

OR
Shutdown HVAC Fire Detection
PSD-3 Fire (specific equipment)
PSLL Fuel gas (3)

Activate Fire-fighting on
OR
Equipment
PB
PSS

Unit depressuration
PB
ESD
T
PB

Unit Shutdown and Trip all

PSLL / LSLL (7)
Equipment
T

Permissive to Blowdown (+
(2

Partial BD are relevant)

Abandon

PB
F&G

OR

Open BDV's
OR
PB

ESD-1 Gas

OR

Close ESDV's
PB

ESD-1 of all fire zones

Electrical Isolation (Normal Gas detection

& essential consumers) in Fire Zone
Center

Total Electrical Isolation

Gas detection
(except cons. Suitable for
zone1) (1)
in Tech. Room
T
Emergency Control

Fire detection
in Fire Zone
Activate Fire-figthing in fire
OR

zone
ESD-1 Fire
PB
F&G
link

Installation Black out

(except Emergency light)
Loss of Communication
 Unit depressuration
ESD-1 is NOT require because:

LSHH Flare drum (5)

PSLL Fuel gas (3)

PSLL / LSLL (7)

Power failure
Process fault
PB PB
ESD
PB ESD

PSD-2 Unit Shutdown

• Safety concept of LNG plants is based on prevention. SD-3 of all eauipment in unit

(specific equipment)

(specific equipment)
•

To ESD-1 (6)
Safety distance and Passive fire protection are the most

Equip. Fault

Fire Detection

Fire Detection
PB
PSS
PB

effective measures to protect against BLEVE.

PSS

PSD-3 Equipment Shutdown PSD-3 Gas PSD-3 Fire

OR OR OR

• F&G detection coverage is not effective and less than 60%

Permissive to Blowdown (+
Unit Shutdown and Trip all
gas releases are detected.

(as relebvant and if any)

Open Equipment BDV's

Activate Fire-fighting on

Partial BD are relevant)

Electrical Shutdown of
Equipment Shutdown

Close Dampers and

Open/Close SDV's

Shutdown HVAC
Equipment

Equipment

Equipment
• Instrumented based safety systems are complicated and operator
may not be able to understand them well.
• Spurious trips are frequent with gas detectors specially when they are exposed to sun or
welding.
• Maintaining F&G system is a headache and we have a steady stream of false alarms despite
our best efforts. IR3 and LOS detectors are more reliable but they are expensive and need
high maintenance.
• Spurious trips are costly and hazardous.
• LNG plants need to time to come down and get back up safely due to the wide temperature
differences between the process and the ambient. Too many shutdown and start-up will
introduce equipment fatigue stresses due to (thermal cycling) and potential failures.
• Quick closure of ESD valves and stop pumps processing the liquefied gas may lead to high
surge pressure and vacuum. Normal relief valves are not quick acting and cannot relief such
pressures. This may lead to further catastrophic ruptures.
• Well trained Operator is reliable. With a good coverage of CCTV operator can respond to fire
in less than 3 minutes or so.
• Operators are always present in plant on 24/7 basis.
 • F&G detection
• Material Selection (9% Nickel SS alloy) • ESD (minimization of isolatable
• Seismic classification section)
• Separation of fuel and ignition Sources • Blowdown
• Minimal congestion • Passive Fire Protection
• Minimization of flanges • Active Fire protection
• Impounding basin
• Hazardous area classification/ATEX compliance
• Process trips
• Pressure relief
 PB
Through telemetry PB Abandon PB Emergency Control Loss of Communication
ESD
Center link

ESD-1 is a MUST because: ESD-0 Total Black Shutdown

ESD-1 of all fire zones

Essential Utilities if any

UPS Battery Low

in Tech. Room
Gas detection

Gas detection

Fire detection
Other Faults

in Fire Zone

in Fire Zone
volage (4)
•
PB
PB

There is statutory obligation

F&G PB
F&G

ESD-1 Fire Zone Emergency Shutdown ESD-1 Gas ESD-1 Fire

SD-2 of all units in fire zone T

OR

OR

• LNG plant works under high pressure and large T

Unit depressuration
LSHH Flare drum (5)

PSLL Fuel gas (3)

PSLL / LSLL (7)

Power failure
Process fault
inventories. If ESD-1 is not activated on confirmed medium PB
ESD
PB PB
ESD
T
(2
OR

OR

and large releases then gas cloud certainly which reach a

)
PSD-2 Unit Shutdown

SD-3 of all eauipment in unit

source of ignition and cause explosion.

(specific equipment)

(specific equipment)
To ESD-1 (6)
Equip. Fault

Fire Detection

Fire Detection
PB

•
PSS
PB

If ESD-1 is not activated on confirmed medium and large

PSS

PSD-3 Equipment Shutdown PSD-3 Gas PSD-3 Fire

releases then jet fires will damage the unprotected OR OR OR

Permissive to Blowdown (+
equipment and structures in less than 15 min and cause

Electrical Isolation (Normal

Activate Fire-figthing in fire

Unit Shutdown and Trip all

(except cons. Suitable for

(except Emergency light)

(as relebvant and if any)

Total Electrical Isolation

Open Equipment BDV's

Activate Fire-fighting on

Partial BD are relevant)

& essential consumers)

Electrical Shutdown of
Equipment Shutdown

Installation Black out

Close Dampers and
Open/Close SDV's

Shutdown HVAC

Close ESDV's
Open BDV's
Equipment

Equipment

Equipment

zone1) (1)
escalation including BLEVE.

zone
• ESD-01 includes numerous executive actions with proper
order and time delays. These actions include isolating the
ignition sources, close the valves, stop machineries and
activate the fire protection systems.
• Due to the low probability of emergency events operators
can have little familiarity with the tasks that they have to
perform. This results in increased likelihood of error. Stress
also increases the likelihood of error.
• Data on human behaviour in fires in buildings shows that
80% - 90% of people assume a fire alarm to be false in the
first instance
• Efficiency of F&G can be improved by better design
including fire & gas mapping, use of diverse detectors and
voting system.
 It's better to be Safe rather than
Sorry !
Can gas detection get better can better using:
• 3D Gas mapping
• IR Camera
• Acoustic gas detectors
• Cold detection
• Low pressure detection at process
• Diversity, voting system and quantitative SIL
assessment
• Risk based inspection and maintenance
3D Gas Mapping

IR fixed Camera

3D Gas mapping
From Shell Global Solution

FLIR Infrared Camera

http://www.flir-press.com
 Acoustic gas detectors

Cold detectors

Gassonic ultrasonic (acoustic) gas leak detectors

http://www.gassonic.com

Sensornet Cold detection

http://www.sensornet.co.uk/
 Gas detection

Initiates ESD-1 Alarm in CCR

Operator initiates ESD-1

Initiation by operator ≠ No need for ESD-1

 ESD-1 actions
• Isolate quickly sources of ignition
• Close ESD valves to isolate source of fuel
• Open the Blowdown valve to send fuel to safe location
• Activate fire protection systems (deluge, CO2, etc.)

A
Release Rate (kg/sec)

Release Time (sec)

A = Continuous release by the time that ESDV close the inlet and out lets of isolatable section.
B = Release to accident area between the closure time of the ESDVs and activation of blowdown valve.
C = Release to accident area and release to safe location via vent/flare when
both ESDVs and Blowdown valves are activated
 Relief calculation according to
API 521
Fire

Fire

Fire
Fire

9.6 kW/m2 Thermal Radiation

Contour
API 521 provides guidelines for pressure relief when vessel is exposed to pool
fires.

Liquid pools can be formed by all hydrocarbon products containing pentane

and heavier components but also by butanes/butenes at sub-zero ambient
temperature and low pressures (<4 bara).
 Jet fire & Escalation
• Intensity of jet fires is much higher Confined Jet fires

Fire type and severity

than pool fires.
Open Jet fires

• For jet fires impingement is the

main concerns and not thermal Large or confined pool
fires

radiation.
Open pool fires

• Jet fires are directional. . .

100
.
200 300
. .
400
Total incident Heat flux (kW/m2)
 Receiver Contains Liquefied Gas

Fire case
To Flare
Relief Valve
BDV
To Flare

Receiver
Source

9.6 kW/m2 Thermal Radiation

Contour
Step 1- Fire case relief valve on Receiver opens to protect against
overpressure
 Receiver Contains Liquefied Gas
Fire case
To vent
Relief Valve
BDV
To Safe location

Receiver
Source

9.6 kW/m2 Thermal Radiation

Contour

Step 2- Following relief liquid level decrease in receiver and vapour part
of vessel is exposed to jet fire.
 Receiver Contains Liquefied Gas
To Flare Fire case
Relief Valve

To Flare
BDV

Source

Step-3: If Receiver is not protected by passive fire protection it will fail in

less than 15 min and cause BLEVE.
 Need Analysis based on Medium Release
(20 mm)
• Safety distance: distance
between the source & receiver >
jet fire length @ 15min

• Duration of jet fire < 15 min

• Blowdown content of source to

safe location in 15 min

• Relief valve on receiver relief

pressure to reach at 7 bar in 15
min

• Passive fire protection on

receiver to increase the failure
rate of receiver to more than
duration of fire
 Thank you for
your kind attention!
For more information contact: fabienne@adepp.com

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