FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE

(Applications nos. 22964/11, 50441/13 and 57993/13)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

24 October 2019

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 1

In the case of Sirenko and Others v. Ukraine,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President,
Yonko Grozev,
Lado Chanturia, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 1 October 2019,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in three applications (nos. 22964/11, 50441/13
and 57993/13) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Ukrainian nationals, Mr Dmitriy
Mikhaylovich Sirenko (“the first applicant”), Mr Svyatoslav Yuryevich
Tsypin (“the second applicant”) and Mr Sergey Andreyevich Gnatenko
(“the third applicant”), on 1 April 2011, 22 June and 6 September 2013
respectively.
2. The first applicant was granted leave to represent himself. The second
applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was initially represented by
Mr E. Markov, a lawyer admitted to practice in Odessa. He was succeeded
by Mr T. Kalmykov, a lawyer practising in Kharkiv. The third applicant was
represented by Mr M. Tarakhkalo, a lawyer practising in Kyiv.
3. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, most recently Mr I. Lishchyna from the Ministry of Justice.
4. The first applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention of
the unlawfulness of his arrest and detention, its unreasonable length and the
impossibility of properly challenging his pre-trial detention and receiving
compensation for the above violations. On 3 March 2014 the above
complaints were communicated to the Government and the remainder of the
application was declared inadmissible, pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules
of Court.
5. The second applicant complained under Articles 5 and 13 of the
Convention of the unlawfulness and length of his detention, and the lack of
reasoning of the domestic courts’ decisions extending his detention. On
24 August 2015 the above complaints were communicated to the
Government and the remainder of the application was declared
inadmissible, pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.
6. The third applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention that
his detention had been unlawful and unreasoned, that there had been no
2 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT

meaningful review of the lawfulness of his detention and that it had been
impossible to receive compensation for the above-mentioned violations. On
6 October 2015 the above complaints were communicated to the
Government and the remainder of the application was declared
inadmissible, pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

A. Application no. 22964/11 (Sirenko v. Ukraine)

7. The first applicant, Mr Dmitriy Mikhaylovich Sirenko, is a Ukrainian

national who was born in 1981 and lives in Yevpatoria, Ukraine.
8. On 8 February 2008 the applicant was charged with violating rules
related to the protection of mineral resources and with abuse of power.
Since March 2008 he has been subject to an undertaking not to abscond.
9. On 24 March 2009 the applicant was arrested on the premises of the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. It was noted in
his detention report that if he was not detained he could try to abscond from
justice, obstruct the investigation and influence witnesses in the
proceedings.
10. On 27 March 2009 the Kyivskyy District Court of Simferopol (“the
District Court”) extended the applicant’s detention until 7 April 2009 in
order to check whether he had any prior convictions.
11. On 3 April 2009 the District Court ordered the applicant’s initial
pre-trial detention, stating: “Given that the accused does not plead guilty,
there are grounds to consider that he could obstruct the determination of the
truth. Therefore, he should be placed in pre-trial detention.” The District
Court did not indicate a time-limit in respect of the applicant’s detention.
Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (as in force at the
material time), the maximum term of a suspect’s initial detention on remand
was two months – that is to say (in the applicant’s case) until 24 May 2009.
On 14 April 2009 that decision was upheld following an appeal by the
applicant.
12. On 18 May 2009 the criminal case against the applicant, together
with the relevant bill of indictment, was transferred to the court for
consideration on the merits.
13. On 4 June 2009 the Saky Town Court (“the trial court”) committed
the applicant for trial and authorised his further detention, having noted that
there were no reasons for him to be released.
 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 3

14. On 24 September 2009 the trial court convicted the applicant as

charged and sentenced him, inter alia, to five years and two months’
imprisonment. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 8 December 2009
that sentence was quashed and the case was remitted for fresh investigation.
The Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s further detention, without
providing any reasons or indicating a time-limit for it.
15. On 20 January 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s
pre-trial detention until 10 March 2010. The court noted that the
investigation in respect of the case was still pending and that there were no
grounds for the applicant’s release.
16. On 26 February 2010 the criminal case against the applicant,
together with the bill of indictment, was transferred to the court for
consideration on the merits.
17. On 29 March 2010 the trial court committed the applicant for trial
and authorised his further detention, having noted that there were no reasons
for him to be released.
18. On 13 September 2010 the same court convicted the applicant as
charged and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment.
19. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 22 February 2011 that
sentence was quashed and the case was remitted for fresh investigation. The
Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s further detention, without providing
any reasons or indicating a time-limit for it.
20. On 31 March 2011 the case file reached the investigators;
subsequently the criminal case against the applicant, together with the bill of
indictment, was transferred to the court on 31 May 2011.
21. On 19 July 2011 the trial court referred the case back for further
investigation. It furthermore ordered that the applicant’s pre-trial detention
be continued, as there were no reasons for him to be released. That decision
was upheld following an appeal by the applicant on 20 September 2011.
22. On 19 December 2011 the applicant was released, subject to an
undertaking not to abscond.

B. Application no. 50441/13 (Tsypin v. Ukraine)

23. The second applicant, Mr Svyatoslav Yuryevich Tsypin, is a

Ukrainian national who was born in 1975 and lives in Slovyansk.
24. On 15 November 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of
kidnapping, extortion, carjacking, and unlawful possession of ammunition.
25. On 17 November 2012 the Leninskyy District Court of Donetsk
remanded the applicant in custody “for the period of the pre-trial
investigation”. By way of reasoning the court stated that since not all
witnesses of the alleged offences had been identified and interviewed, the
applicant could threaten them or collude with them if he was left at liberty
4 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT

and could thus interfere with the investigation. Following an appeal by the
applicant, on 29 November 2012 that decision was upheld.
26. On 27 December 2012 the criminal case against the applicant,
together with the relevant bill of indictment, was submitted to the court. The
applicant argued that the period of his authorised pre-trial detention had
expired on that date.
27. On 12 February 2013 the Artemivsk Court (“the trial court”)
returned the indictment to the prosecutor for corrections and extended the
applicant’s detention until 15 March 2013. By way of explaining its
decision to extend the detention the court stated that the applicant had been
accused of serious offences involving repeated unlawful acts against several
victims, which, the court believed, demonstrated that he was likely to
continue in his unlawful activity, evade justice and interfere with
proceedings. Both the applicant and the prosecutor appealed.
28. On 14 March 2013 the Court of Appeal, sitting in camera, scheduled
a hearing of the applicant’s and the prosecutor’s appeals and extended the
applicant’s detention until 15 April 2013 on the grounds that the applicant
had asked to be present in person at the hearing.
29. On 21 March 2013 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the
presence of the applicant and the prosecutor, quashed the ruling of the trial
court of 12 February 2013 in relation to the part concerning the decision to
return the indictment to the prosecutor, and upheld the decision concerning
the applicant’s detention.
30. On 11 April 2013 the trial court extended the applicant’s detention
until 13 June 2013, stating that the applicant had been accused of several
violent offences, that the victims had supported the extension of his
detention, and that no other preventive measure would ensure that the
applicant would comply with his obligations as a defendant and prevent him
from influencing the victims and other witnesses.
31. On 7 June 2013 the trial court extended the applicant’s detention
until 7 August 2013, stating that the parties had failed to identify any new
circumstances not previously examined by the trial court and the Court of
Appeal.
32. On 7 August 2013 the trial court extended the applicant’s and his
two co-defendants’ detention by sixty days, stating that if they were to be at
liberty they could influence the victims and other witnesses.
33. On 1 October 2013 the trial court refused the applicant’s and his
co-defendants’ requests for release and extended their detention by sixty
days. In refusing the defendants’ requests for release the trial court stated
that no new circumstances warranting release had been identified.
34. On 31 October 2013 the trial court extended the applicant’s and his
co-defendants’ detention by sixty days, stating that the circumstances that
had led to the decision to place the defendants in detention pending their
 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 5

trial persisted; in particular, certain evidence against the defendants

remained unexamined.
35. On 25 December 2013 the trial court refused a request lodged by the
applicant for release, and extended his and his co-defendants’ detention by
sixty days, until 27 February 2014, on the same grounds as those given in its
decision of 31 October 2013.
36. On 25 February 2014 the trial court refused a request lodged by the
applicant for release, stating that no evidence had been provided indicating
that the circumstances that had led the court to remand the applicant in
custody had changed. The court extended the applicant’s and his
co-defendants’ detention by sixty days, until 26 April 2014, giving the same
reasons as those given for its decisions of 31 October and 25 December
2013.
37. On 23 April 2014 the trial court held a hearing at the detention
facility where the applicant was being held, in the presence of the applicant
and his lawyer. At the close of the hearing it extended the applicant’s and
his co-defendants’ detention by sixty days, until 23 June 2014. In dismissing
the applicant’s request for release the court stated that the applicant had a
permanent address at a shop in Slovyansk that was the scene of anti-terrorist
operations and that for this reason any non-custodial preventive measure
would not be enforceable. The court also stated that there was no evidence
that there had been a change in the circumstances that had led to the initial
decision to remand the applicant in custody.
38. On an unspecified date the applicant was released from detention
and placed under house arrest.

C. Application no. 57993/13 (Gnatenko v. Ukraine)

39. The third applicant, Mr Sergey Andreyevich Gnatenko, is a

Ukrainian national who was born in 1983 and lives in Kyiv.
40. On 11 January 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against the
applicant on suspicion of kidnapping committed in a group. Subsequently
additional charges of attempted aggravated fraud, aggravated violent
robbery, theft of important documents, and endangerment with grave
consequences (залишення в небезпеці, що спричинило тяжкі наслідки)
were brought against the applicant.
41. On 3 February 2011 the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court (“the
District Court”) issued a warrant for the applicant’s arrest.
42. On 24 October 2012 the applicant was arrested.
43. On 2 November 2012 the District Court ordered the applicant to be
detained until 1 December 2012. The court stated that it had taken into
account the fact that the applicant did not have a permanent residence in
Kyiv or the Kyiv region, did not live at his registered address in the
Lugansk region, was accused of a serious offence, and had a prior criminal
6 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT

record. In view of those facts the District Court considered that, if at liberty,
the applicant might interfere with the investigation or abscond.
44. On 30 November 2012 the criminal case against the applicant,
together with the relevant bill of indictment, was submitted to the District
Court.
45. On 6 December 2012 the District Court, at the close of a preliminary
hearing, returned the indictment against the applicant to the prosecutor,
finding that it contained certain omissions. Given that the parties had not
lodged any requests for the preventive measure to be changed or revoked,
the District Court ruled that the applicant’s detention should be deemed
extended. The District Court did not indicate a time-limit in respect of the
applicant’s detention. Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, as worded at the time in question, the term of validity of a ruling
by an investigating judge or a court ordering an accused’s detention or
continued detention could not exceed sixty days (see Ignatov v. Ukraine,
no. 40583/15, § 25, 15 December 2016) – that is (in the applicant’s case)
until 3 February 2013.
46. On 14 January 2013 the District Court again returned the indictment
to the prosecutor. By the same ruling the court refused a request lodged by
the applicant for release, stating that the applicant had failed to prove that
the risks on which the court had relied in remanding him in custody had
ceased to exist – in particular that he had failed to provide documents
proving his assertions as to his place of residence, family and dependants.
The court made no other order concerning the applicant’s detention.
47. On 14 March 2013 the District Court again returned the indictment
to the prosecutor. It also decided to extend the applicant’s detention until
1 May 2013.
48. On 30 April 2013 the District Court again returned the indictment to
the prosecutor and extended the applicant’s detention until 31 May 2013.
By the same ruling the court refused a request lodged by the applicant on an
unknown date for release, stating that the applicant was accused of serious
crimes involving violence, had a criminal record, and prior to his arrest had
been on the list of wanted persons. The court stated that that meant that
there was a risk that he might abscond, reoffend or interfere with the
investigation.
49. On 30 May 2013 the District Court returned the indictment to the
prosecutor. Given that the parties did not lodge any requests for the
preventive measure to be changed or revoked, the court ruled that the
applicant’s detention should be deemed extended until 5 July 2013.
50. On 1 July 2013 the case against the applicant, together with the bill
of indictment, was again resubmitted to the District Court.
51. On 4 July 2013 the District Court extended the detention of the
applicant and his three co-defendants until 12 July 2013, stating that in
reaching this decision it had taken into account (i) the defendants’ personal
 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 7

characteristics, (ii) the gravity of the charges, (iii) the lack of any guarantees
and verified social relationships that would outweigh the existing risk that
they would abscond, and (iv) the lack of any information indicating that
their state of health was incompatible with detention.
52. On 12 July, 3 September, 28 October and 24 December 2013 and
17 February, 16 April, 13 June, 19 June, 18 August and 15 October 2014
the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 September,
1 November, 3 and 30 December 2013 and 21 February, 17 April, 16 June,
19 June, 19 August, 18 October and 15 December 2014, respectively, citing
the same reasons as those contained in its rulings of 30 April and 4 July
2013.
53. On 8 December 2014 the District Court convicted the applicant and
sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

54. The provisions of the 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure concerning

pre-trial detention can be found in Yeloyev v. Ukraine (no. 17283/02, § 35,
6 November 2008); Makarenko v. Ukraine (no. 622/11, § 50, 30 January
2018); and Shavel v.Ukraine ((dec.), no. 25486/03, 8 January 2007).
55. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 28 December 1960 was repealed
with effect from 19 November 2012, when the 2012 Code of Criminal
Procedure came into force. The relevant provisions of the new Code
concerning pre-trial detention can be found in Ignatov v. Ukraine, cited
above, § 25).

THE LAW

I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

56. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the
Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

57. The applicants complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention

that their detention on remand had been unlawful and unjustified. The first
applicant furthermore complained under the same provision that his arrest
on 24 March 2009 without a court warrant had been in breach of the
domestic law, and that his pre-trial detention had been too lengthy.
The applicants also complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the
Convention that their detention on remand had been unjustified. Being
8 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT

master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see
Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114
and 126, 20 March 2018), and having regard to the substance of the
applicants’ complaints, the Court decides to examine them under Article 5
§ 3 of the Convention.
The relevant provisions of Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention read as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1
(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power, and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable
time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear
for trial ...”

A. Admissibility

58. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It furthermore
notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must
therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. Article 5 § 1 of the Convention

59. The first applicant submitted that his detention from 24 May until
4 June 2009 (see paragraphs 11-13 above), from 10 until 29 March 2010
(see paragraphs 15-17 above) and from 22 February until 19 July 2011 (see
paragraphs 19-21 above) had been arbitrary, as it had not been authorised by
a court order.
60. The second applicant submitted that his detention from 27 December
2012 until 12 February 2013 (see paragraphs 26-27 above) had been
arbitrary, as it had not been covered by a court order.
61. The third applicant submitted that his detention from 1 until
6 December 2012 (see paragraphs 43-45 above) and from 3 February until
 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 9

14 March 2013 (see paragraphs 45-47 above) had been arbitrary, as it had
not been covered by a court order.
62. He furthermore submitted that his detention from 6 December 2012
until 3 February 2013 (see paragraph 45 above) and from 31 May until
4 July 2013 (see paragraphs 48-51 above) had been based on a court order
that had contained no reasoning whatsoever.
63. The Government disagreed and submitted that the applicants’
detention had been lawful and that there had been no breach of their
Convention rights.
64. The Court observes that the basis of the applicants’ being held in
custody during the periods of time indicated in paragraphs 59-61 above was
based on the fact that a bill of indictment had been submitted to the relevant
trial court. In that connection, the Court notes that it has previously
examined similar situations in other cases against Ukraine and found them
to be incompatible with the principles of legal certainty and protection from
arbitrariness under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see Kharchenko
v. Ukraine, no. 40107/02, § 71 10 February 2011).
65. The Court furthermore observes that the situation regarding the third
applicant’s detention during the periods of time indicated in paragraph 62
above, is similar to that examined by the Court in the case of Ignatov (see
Ignatov v. Ukraine, cited above §§ 35-37). In that case, the Court found that
the fact that the judicial authorities had not given any grounds for their
decisions authorising detention for a prolonged period of time had been
incompatible with the principle of the protection from arbitrariness (ibid.).
66. The Court does not see any reason to depart from its earlier findings
in the present case. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1
of the Convention.

2. Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (application no. 22964/11 Sirenko

v. Ukraine)
67. The applicant complained that his arrest on 24 March 2009 without a
court warrant had been in breach of the domestic law and the Convention.
68. The Government contended that the applicant’s arrest had been in
compliance with both the domestic law and the Convention.
69. The Court notes that the investigator justified the applicant’s arrest
by making a general reference to Article 106 of the CCP and stating that the
applicant could try to abscond from justice, obstruct the investigation, and
influence witnesses in the proceedings (see paragraph 54 above). No further
specific reasons for the applicant’s arrest on the basis of the
above-mentioned provision of the CCP were indicated in the detention
report.
70. The Court notes that under Ukrainian legislation, deprivation of
liberty without a reasoned court decision was possible only in a limited
number of situations defined with sufficient precision (see paragraph 54
10 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT

above). However, the Court observes that there appears to be no indication

that any of those conditions were met in the applicant’s case; it thus did not
fall within the scope of those exceptional situations affording investigators
with the power of arrest without a court decision first being delivered (see,
for example, Makarenko v. Ukraine, cited above, §§ 73-74).
71. It is also of relevance that the applicant was arrested in connection
with an event that had taken place more than a year and two months
previously. It could not therefore be claimed that, in the absence of clear
indications concerning any attempts by the applicant to abscond from
justice, obstruct the investigation, and influence witnesses in the
proceedings, the authorities faced the possibility of an urgent situation such
as, for example, a situation of catching the applicant in flagrante delicto.
Overall, there is nothing to suggest that the general requirement that a
preliminary arrest warrant be issued by a court could not or should not have
been adhered to.
72. The Court notes that it has examined similar situations in a number
of cases against Ukraine in which depriving applicants of their liberty
without a judicial warrant had contravened the domestic legislation and had
thus been incompatible with the requirements of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Strogan v. Ukraine, no. 30198/11, § 88,
6 October 2016, with further references therein, and, as a most recent
authority, Korniychuk v. Ukraine, no. 10042/11, §§ 48-52, 30 January
2018).
73. The Court does not see any reason to depart from its earlier findings
in the present case. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 1
of the Convention.

3. Article 5 § 3 of the Convention

74. The applicants submitted that their pre-trial detention had not been
based on sufficient grounds. The first applicant furthermore submitted that
his detention had been excessively long.
75. The Government contested the applicants’ arguments, stating that
the applicants’ detention had been justified and reasonable.
76. The applicable general principles are set out in Buzadji
v. the Republic of Moldova ([GC], no. 23755/07, §§ 84-91 and 102, 5 July
2016).
77. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes
that the first applicant was detained, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c)
of the Convention, from 24 March until 24 September 2009, from
8 December 2009 until 13 September 2010 and from 22 February until
19 December 2011. His pre-trial detention therefore lasted for a total of two
years, one month and one day.
 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 11

78. The second applicant was detained, within the meaning of Article 5
§ 1 (c) of the Convention, from 15 November 2012 until 23 April 2014. His
pre-trial detention therefore lasted for one year, five months and eight days.
79. The third applicant was detained, within the meaning of Article 5
§ 1 (c) of the Convention, from 24 October 2012 until 8 December 2014.
His pre-trial detention therefore lasted for two years, one month and
fourteen days.
80. The Court furthermore observes that the seriousness of the charges
against the applicants and the risk of their absconding or interfering with the
respective investigations were mentioned in the initial orders for their
detention (see paragraphs 11, 25 and 43 above). Those reasons remained the
main grounds for the applicants’ detention until their conviction or release,
with the exception of the decisions of 24 September 2009, 22 February 2011
and 6 December 2012 and 30 May 2013 taken in respect of the first and
third applicants, which contained no grounds whatsoever (see
paragraphs 14, 19, 45 and 49 above). The Court notes that the decisions on
the applicants’ detention were couched in general terms and contained
repetitive phrases. They did not suggest that the courts had made an
appropriate assessment of facts relevant to the question of whether such a
preventive measure was necessary in the circumstances at the respective
stages of proceedings. Moreover, with the passage of time, the applicants’
continued detention required further justification, but the courts did not
provide any further reasoning. Furthermore, with the exception of the
decision of 11 April 2013 (see paragraph 30 above), the domestic authorities
did not consider any other preventive measures as an alternative to detention
(see Osypenko v. Ukraine, no. 4634/04, §§ 77 and 79, 9 November 2010).
81. The Court has often found a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention in cases against Ukraine on the basis that even in respect of
lengthy periods of detention the domestic courts referred to the same set of
grounds (if there were any) throughout the period of the respective
applicant’s detention (see, for example, Kharchenko v. Ukraine, cited
above, §§ 80-81 and 99, and Ignatov v. Ukraine, cited above, §§ 41-42).
82. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that by failing to
address specific facts or consider other measures as an alternative to
pre-trial detention and by relying essentially and routinely on the
seriousness of the charges, the authorities extended the applicants’ detention
pending trial on grounds that cannot be regarded as “sufficient” and
“relevant” to justify its duration.
83. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention.
12 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT

III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

84. The applicants also complained under Article 5 § 4 of the

Convention that their right to a review of the lawfulness of their detention
had been breached. The first applicant furthermore complained, under
Article 5 of the Convention, that the court’s decision of 27 March 2009
extending his police custody in order to determine the nature of his
personality had been in breach of the Convention. Lastly, the first and the
third applicants complained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that they
had had no enforceable right to compensation for their arbitrary detention.
85. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties,
and its findings under Article 5 of the Convention (see paragraphs 66, 73
and 83 above), the Court considers that it has examined the main legal
questions raised in the present application, and that there is no need to give
a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the other complaints
mentioned in the preceding paragraph (see, for example, Centre for Legal
Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08,
§ 156, ECHR 2014).

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

86. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.”

A. Damage

87. The first applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-
pecuniary damage. The Government considered this claim unsubstantiated
and excessive.
88. The second and the third applicants claimed EUR 20,000 and 80,000
respectively, in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Government did not
comment on those claims.
89. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards each
of the applicants EUR 6,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any
tax that may be chargeable.

B. Costs and expenses

90. The first applicant did not request any sum in respect of costs and
expenses. Therefore, the Court is not called upon to make an award under
this head.
 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 13

91. The second applicant claimed EUR 500 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 1,992 for those incurred
before the Court. He asked that they be paid directly into his
representative’s bank account. The Government did not comment within the
established time-limit on the applicant’s claims.
92. The third applicant claimed UAH 125,000 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 5,532.8 for those incurred
before the Court. He asked that they be paid directly into his
representative’s bank account. The Government did not comment on the
applicant’s claims.
93. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown
that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as
to quantum.
94. Regard being had to the documents in its possession, to the legal aid
granted to the second applicant in the amount of EUR 850 (see
paragraph 2 above) and the fact that the representative of the second
applicant intervened in the proceedings at the communication stage only,
the Court awards the second applicant EUR 150 for the proceedings before
the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him. The award is to be
paid into Mr T. Kalmykov’s bank account, as indicated by the applicant
(see, for example, Belousov v. Ukraine, no. 4494/07, §§ 116-17,
7 November 2013, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12,
§ 288, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).
95. As regards the third applicant’s claims, regard being had to the
documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the
third applicant EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court, plus any
tax that may be chargeable to him. The award is to be paid into
Mr Tarakhkalo’s bank account, as indicated by the applicant (see, for
example, Belousov, cited above, §§ 116-17, and Khlaifia and Others, cited
above, § 288).

C. Default interest

96. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Decides to join the applications;
14 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT

2. Declares admissible, under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the

complaints of the first applicant, Mr Dmitriy Mikhaylovich Sirenko,
regarding the unlawfulness his arrest on 24 March 2009 and the
arbitrariness of his detention from 24 May until 4 June 2009, from
10 until 29 March 2010 and from 22 February until 19 July 2011, as
well as the lack of reasonableness of his detention on remand;

3. Declares admissible, under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the

complaints of the second applicant, Mr Svyatoslav Yuryevich Tsypin,
regarding the arbitrariness of his detention from 27 December 2012 until
12 February 2013, as well as the lack of reasonableness of his detention
on remand;

4. Declares admissible, under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention, the

complaints of the third applicant, Mr Sergey Andreyevich Gnatenko,
regarding the arbitrariness of his detention from 1 December 2012 until
14 March 2013 and from 31 May until 4 July 2013, as well as the lack of
reasonableness of his detention on remand;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention

in respect of all the applicants;

6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention

in respect of all the applicants;

7. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the admissibility and merits of

the first applicant’s complaints under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention
regarding the extension of his police custody, in breach of the
Convention requirements; the applicants’ complaints under Article 5 § 4
of the Convention regarding the trial courts’ failure to carry out a proper
examination of their applications for release; and the first and the third
applicants’ complaints under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention regarding
the lack of an enforceable right to compensation for their arbitrary
detention;

8. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the
following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent
State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros) to each of the applicants, plus
any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary
damage;
 SIRENKO AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE JUDGMENT 15

(ii) EUR 150 (one hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may
be chargeable to the second applicant, in respect of costs and
expenses, to be paid into the bank account of the second applicant’s
representative, Mr T. Kalmykov;
(iii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the third applicant, in respect of costs and expenses,
to be paid into the bank account of the third applicant’s
representative, Mr M. Tarakhkalo;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a
rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period, plus three percentage points;

9. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 October 2019, pursuant to

Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Milan Blaško Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer

Deputy Registrar President