Territory, Politics, Governance

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21st century geopolitics: integration and

development in the age of ‘continental states’

Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

To cite this article: Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano (2016): 21st century geopolitics: integration
and development in the age of ‘continental states’, Territory, Politics, Governance, DOI:
10.1080/21622671.2016.1220867

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2016.1220867

Published online: 16 Sep 2016.

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TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2016.1220867

21st century geopolitics: integration and development

in the age of ‘continental states’
Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

ABSTRACT
21st century geopolitics: integration and development in the age of ‘continental states’. Territory, Politics,
Governance. There is a need, in the 21st century, to analyse the interconnection between development
and regional integration with a renewed attention to geopolitics. The aim of this paper is to explore the
links between states, the economy and the international system in an ongoing process of transformation
generating a new world order. Drawing on geopolitical theory, this study advances the argument that in
the 21st century, those states in search of increasing autonomy apply strategies of regional integration
and development-oriented policies, following a path to constructing new grossraums centred on states
that are continental in scope. For this analysis the study proposes using a geopolitical perspective – here
called ‘classical geopolitics’ – emphasizing the territorial dimension of state making, which includes
economic policies and the formation of national identities. Particular attention is given to the spatial motif
observed in international systems of promoting paths towards states of continental scope.
KEYWORDS
Development, geopolitics, regions, regional development, regional governance, territory, international
development, global

摘要
二十一世纪的地缘政治：大陆国家时代的整合与发展.Territory, Politics, Governance. 在二十一世纪中，有
必要透过更新对地缘政治的关注，分析发展与区域整合之间的相互连结。本文的目标在于探讨生产新兴
世界秩序的持续变迁过程中，国家、经济与国际系统之间的连结。本研究运用地缘政治理论推进以下主
张：在二十一世纪，寻求增加自主性的国家，运用区域整合策略和以发展为导向的政策，随后并迈向打
造以领域上的大陆型国家为中心的崭新‘大空间’。为了进行此一分析，本研究提出运用强调国家打造的
领土面向的地缘政治视角——于此称为‘古典地缘政治’，该视角包含了经济政策与国族认同的形构。本
研究将特别关注在倡议迈向大陆型国家之道路的国际系统中所观察到的空间中心思想。
关键词
发展, 地缘政治, 区域, 区域发展, 区域治理, 领土, 国际发展, 全球

RÉSUMÉ
Au 21è siècle, il faut analyser l’interconnexion entre le développement et l’intégration régionale
conjointement avec un regain d’intérêt pour la géopolitique. Territory, Politics, Governance. Ce présent
article cherche à examiner les liens entre les États, l’économie et le système international au sein d’un
processus continu de transformation qui finit par établir un nouvel ordre mondial. Partant de la théorie

CONTACT
andres.rivarola@lai.su.se
Institute of Latin American Studies, Stockholm University, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden

© 2016 Regional Studies Association

2 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

géopolitique, cette étude affirme qu’au 21è siècle, les États qui sont à la recherche de plus d’autonomie
mettent en oeuvre des stratégies d’intégration régionale et des politiques orientées vers le développement,
suivant un chemin qui mène à de nouveaux grossraums (zones métropolitaines) centrés sur des États dont
la portée s’avère continentale. Dans cette analyse, l’étude propose l’adoption d’un point de vue
géopolitique – appelé ici ‘la géopolitique classique’ – mettant l’accent sur la dimension territoriale de
l’établissement des États, qui comprend des politiques économiques et la création d’identités nationales.
On porte une attention particulière à la raison d’être spatiale notée dans les systèmes internationaux qui
prône des chemins vers des États dont la portée s’avère continentale.
MOTS-CLÉS
développement, géopolitique, régions, aménagement du territoire, gouvernance régionale, territoire,
développement international, mondial

RESUMEN
En el siglo XXI existe la necesidad de analizar la interconexión entre el desarrollo y la integración regional con
una renovada atención hacia la geopolítica. Territory, Politics, Governance. La finalidad de este artículo es
analizar los vínculos entre Estados, la economía y el sistema internacional en un proceso continuo de
transformación que genera un nuevo orden mundial. A partir de la teoría geopolítica, en este estudio se
defiende el argumento de que en el siglo XXI los Estados que buscan aumentar la autonomía aplican
estrategias de integración regional y políticas orientadas hacia el desarrollo, siguiendo una vía para
construir nuevos grossraums centrados en Estados que son continentales en su alcance. Para este análisis
el estudio propone utilizar una perspectiva geopolítica, aquí denominada ‘geopolítica clásica’, donde se
hace hincapié en la dimensión territorial de la construcción de Estado, que incluye políticas económicas y
la formación de identidades nacionales. Se presta especial atención al motivo espacial observado en los
sistemas internacionales de fomentar vías hacia Estados de alcance continental.
PALABRAS CLAVES
desarrollo, geopolítica, regiones, desarrollo regional, gobernanza regional, territorio, desarrollo internacional,
global

HISTORY Received 8 September 2015; in revised form 6 June 2016

INTRODUCTION

A main tenet of this article is to address the fact that in the shaping of a new world order, those
states that intend to be autonomous and achieve economic development need to control large ter-
ritorial spaces and build up states of continental scope. The aim is to contribute new insights
which explore the connection between development, regional integration and geopolitics.1
Even though one currently often reads of a much heralded ‘return of geopolitics’ (Russell
Mead, 2014), the concept of geopolitics is rarely defined. It is frequently used as synonym for con-
flict, generally in the areas of security, trade and foreign policy. Moreover, geopolitics it is also
often separated from issues related to regional integration or development; perhaps because
these processes are more associated with weaker countries while geopolitics is often linked to
‘great powers’ or imperialism.
This study introduces and explores an alternative theoretical perspective of the concept of geo-
politics. Without denying that a more classical notion of geopolitics is related to conflict, it is here
given a broader outlook as the ideas, strategies or policies concerned with the territorial dimension
of states. There are, of course, many ways in which to analyse the role of territory. Some choose to
focus, for example, on ‘small states’ (Cooper & Shaw, 2009; Ingenrotsem, Neumann, Gstöhl, &
Beyer, 2006). Yet my focus is the opposite; on large spaces and the different forms through which
states intend to reach a broader spatial projection. A central hypothesis of this study is that the goal

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

 21st century geopolitics 3

of creating a continental state is related to an old ideal of autonomy, which was highlighted by
classical geopolitics, and continues to be a strong ideal in the 21st century. However, in classical
geopolitics, geography and size are not independent variables, but linked to other dimensions from
which the state can be analysed. One example of this is political economy, which in my study falls
within the area of development.
The relationship between the concepts of development and geopolitics is often used in the
study of dichotomies such as ‘developing/underdeveloped’ countries, core/periphery or north/
south; for example, to understand the interaction between great powers or industrialized countries
(the ‘core’) and less developed countries (the ‘periphery’). Following Gunnar Myrdal (1956, 39), I
see development as related to all countries aiming to achieve sustained growth through a cumu-
lative process. It is a political-economy dimension of the state, aiming to overcome the gap
with what Raúl Prebisch (1959, p. 267) called the ‘dynamic centre(s)’ of the international econ-
omic system. This catching-up, however, is not only related to economic variables. In line with
classical geopolitics my point is that it is linked to a political dimension of state action, where
power, state and territorial control of resources (and consumers) play a central role in the making
of development-oriented strategies.
Regional integration is of pivotal importance for my study since I see it as an interconnection
between geopolitics and development. This happens, for example, when a state needs to compensate
for its shortcomings in terms of size and control of resources through territorial expansion. Such
expansion is not a new issue in human history, and there is much written about conquest and imperi-
alism (e.g. Kennedy, 1988). Yet, the characteristics of this expansion are changing along with the
transformation of the international system. As this article explores, in the making of a new world
order modern regional integration can be regarded as a different form of territorial expansion,
applied by weaker states; and for this reason it is generally related to the geopolitics of the weak.
However, as part of new patterns of systemic shifts regional integration is also being increasingly
adopted by the great powers. In fact, it could now be regarded as a geopolitics of the ‘not so strong
any more’ as well as of the ‘still not strong enough’. Within this framework of analysis, the under-
lying hypothesis presented here is that for states intending to achieve autonomy and development,
systemic pressure compels them to control large territorial spaces and, ultimately, build up states of
continental scope. Regional integration might be regarded as a path towards that end.
In the next part I expand further on my conceptual framework by outlining what I mean by
classical geopolitics and its relation with the concept of territory. In the following section I turn
to an analysis of geopolitics and regional integration where I explore how the territorial element
has been dealt with in analyses of regional integration. Particular attention is given here to the role
attributed to the size of states, which I here outline through what has been known as the conti-
nental dimension. Finally, in the third part, the study turns to an analysis of development and the
linkage between economics, industrialization, integration and geopolitics.

GEOPOLITICS AND TERRITORY

There are many vantage points from which geopolitics is defined and analysed. In this study, my
focus is on analytical contributions made by the founding fathers of the concept, Friedrich Ratzel
and Rudolf Kjellén; whose perspective I identify as classical geopolitics. To start with, let me raise
a caveat. I am aware of the critique of these scholars and of the concept of geopolitics in general. As
further outlined below, there is some validity in this, but there are also issues that should be dis-
cussed, such as the label of Kjellén as an ‘imperialist thinker’ (Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 1998,
p. 1) and the association of Kjellén and Ratzel to national-socialist ideas. Moreover, the view of
geopolitics as part of the realist tradition of international relations (Taylor, 1996, p. 53) is another
issue that I analyse further in this text.

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

4 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

Geopolitics and other ideas from Ratzel and Kjellén did indeed inspire imperialists and con-
servatives, in Germany and beyond. However, as my study shows, classical geopolitics has also
inspired what I call the ‘geopolitics of development’ in peripheral states, and from this vantage
point, it was also framed in anti-imperialist arguments. Such concerns notwithstanding, a deeper
study of classical geopolitics and its broader implications falls outside the scope of this study. The
focus here is on a particular aspect of classical geopolitics, which I regard as (still) useful for ana-
lysing the current shifts in the international world order,2 namely the ideal that a state requires a
large space to increase its autonomous position in the international system. I refer here to auton-
omy as the ideal goal of a state, which is achieved when it can make decisions without considering
‘either spontaneously or obligatorily the global strategic interests of the dominant power’ (Puig,
1987, p. 116).
It was Kjellén, largely influenced by Ratzel’s political geography who coined the concept geo-
politics in 1899. In Kjellén’s view, geopolitics was regarded as land and territory, and in this sense
it concerned the ‘geographic consciousness’ of the state (Kjellén, 1916, p. 32, 39). At the center of
this view was the desire to deepen the understanding of the state and its birth, growth, struggle for
survival, autonomy and eventual death. In spite of later state-centric or deterministic geopolitical
views, the classic perspectives of Ratzel and Kjellén pointed in a different direction. In Ratzel’s
case, a main concern was understanding issues such as the spatial motif, where states integrate
and disintegrate in a process that, in the long term, might cause growth or fragmentation. Due
to this spatial motif, Ratzel claimed that ‘states are never at rest’ since populations are in continu-
ous internal motion (Ratzel, 1969, p. 23), which is something that leads to a constant redefinition
of what Ratzel called lebensraum. This is a concept that could be translated as living space or habi-
tat and might be inspired by Thomas Robert Malthus’s idea of the ‘struggle for room and food’
(Bashford, 2014, p. 12). It points to the control of the optimal territorial space that is needed
for the survival of a state.
Ratzel’s theories were very influential in the academy and among policymakers in different
parts of the world; outside Europe this included, for example, Brazil and the United States
(US). In the US, geographers such as Isaiah Bowman were inspired by Ratzelian ideas of huma-
nized landscapes and the vision that ‘all human groups and institutions – nations, states, peoples –
were intimately tied to the land they occupied and had to grow to survive’ (Smith, 2003, p. 38).
Along this line of thinking, Ratzel contributed to a deepened understanding of the relation
between humans and nature and how geography influences human organization. Like many scho-
lars from this period of time, he used analogies from the natural sciences in his analyses of human
organization and nature. Other issues that played an important part in his model were social and
economic forces, such as the constant and rapid progress in technology and trade. His belief in the
long-term pervasiveness of these elements led him to a deterministic idea, which was that even if
history had demonstrated that states and powerful empires break down, the historical tendency of
states is towards an ‘expansion of geographical horizons’ (Ratzel, 1969, p. 18). In other words,
states have a propensity towards territorial expansion.
An ultimate expression of such expansion was in his view, related to the emergence of ‘conti-
nental powers’ as an optimal size for modern powerful states (Weigert, 1972, p. 105). Neverthe-
less, Ratzel lacked a theory of the state that could function as a guide concerning how to govern
within the new (global) systemic coordinates, particularly in a period when boundaries changed
from being mere frontiers to borders, when bureaucracies substituted theocracies, when commu-
nities were replaced by nations and when territory was equal to sovereignty (Giddens, 1985). As
Kasperson and Minghi (1969, p. 8) rightly pointed out, this empty spot was filled by Kjellén. Call-
ing out against ‘universal’ liberal norms, Kjellén wanted to lead the ‘science of the state’ (statsve-
tenskap)3 away from a view of the state as mere agent of preserving individual rights (Kjellén, 1916,
p. 6).4 Along this line, he envisaged a theory of the state that had as a major concern the assurance
of a state’s sovereignty.

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

 21st century geopolitics 5

For Kjellén, geopolitics was concerned with the state as land, territory, domain or realm
(Kjellén, 1916, p. 39), yet it was only one of several dimensions of his theory of the state. Others
were, for example, political economy (ekonomi-politik), to which I will return to below, and ethno-
politics (etno-politik), which was the study of the population and its relation to the geographic
habitat in which human communities were created. Kjellén’s search for ethno-political homogen-
eity was not based on race determinism (Holdar, 1992, p. 313).5 It was more aimed at understand-
ing how people could become homogeneous enough to develop ‘economic solidarity’ or a national
feeling (Kjellén, 1916, p. 136). However, ethno-politics might also matter for the opposite reason:
the fragmentation of states. Although the word race was much used at that time, including by
Kjellén, the central element for him was nation and nationalism (Edström, Björk, & Lundén,
2014, p. 19). There is no place for me to deepen my analysis of this issue here, but it is interesting
for me to link it to the territorial dimension of geopolitics.
Beyond all similarities in relation to space, the concept of territory has specific connotations.
As also acknowledged by modern scholars, the idea of a territory is related to a bounded space
under the control of a group of people with fixed boundaries and exclusive internal sovereignty
(Elden, 2013, p. 18). In short, territory becomes geopolitical when it is related to the control
and management of terrain. However, even if territory might seem a material, measurable and
concrete entity, it should be remembered that it can also become what Jean Gottmann called a
‘psychosomatic phenomenon of the community’. This explains the link between territory and
the notion of sovereignty, where territory is regarded as the indispensable attribute of independent
nations and ‘the very basis on which national existence rests’ (Gottman, 1973, p. 15). This, in
other words, is what Kjellén’s ethno-politics is all about.
Another interpretation of Kjellén’s point might be that the history of states is also the tale of
the construction of legal, cultural and mythical sources of legitimacy that connect nation(s) to
territory and state. If successful, these foundations of state power might survive the passing of
time, and even attempted conquest. There are, of course, examples in history where nations
have grown without states, but it is likely that in most cases it has been the other way around.
Up to the current period, as argued by Eric Hobsbawm (1992, p. 177), states, capitalists, elites
and different kinds of movements with territorial claims often use people’s ‘hunger to belong’ by
linking the ‘politics of identity’ with the ‘hunger for law and order’ and associating all this to
certain territorial boundaries. Even if this is difficult for all states, the challenge is even greater
for those of great territorial (and demographic) size. From a classical perspective, this is a geo-
political challenge.
Although geopolitics as a concept has often been regarded as descriptive, geographically deter-
minist and lacking a compass of orientation (Cahnman, 1942, p. 154), it has never really disap-
peared. It remained strong in Latin America throughout the second half of the 20th century
(Rivarola Puntigliano, 2011), and there was a revival of geopolitics among pundits from ‘developed
states’ during the 1980s (Hepple, 1986). In the case of the latter, this generally occurred in associ-
ation with analyses of conflict, global tensions, conservative thinking or great power foreign policy.
In this sense, little differs from the new so-called return of geopolitics (Russell Mead, 2014 or
Guzzini, 2012), where geopolitics is fundamentally associated with the failure to create a border-
less world, ruled either by the world proletarian class or by self-regulating markets. In both visions,
the maintenance of the main borders was to be supervised by the dominating superpowers: the
Soviet Union and/or the United States. The latter managed to survive and during the 1990s
pushed forward its vision of creating a globalized ‘economic lebensraum’ (Smith, 2003, p. 28) in
a unipolar world. However, by the end of the 2010s it became clear that this project could no
longer be sustained. The new rise of former ‘periphery’ countries made it difficult to speak in
terms of an ‘American empire’ surrounded by world of ‘porous regions’ (Katzenstein, 2005),
and we are now seeing instead the emergence of a new ‘multipolar world order’ (Kupchan, 2003).

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

6 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

It is in this context that states are repositioning themselves, seeking new territorial platforms
from which to assure their autonomy and economy. In what has been described as the revenge of
geography (Kaplan, 2009), geopolitics and geography are back, with regions and continents as
increasingly important geographic frameworks for the construction of new forms of state. Geopo-
litics is here mostly related to conflicts, but it is also about territoriality, new outlooks for lebens-
raum, and the making of new forms of statehood. My point is that, in order to understand the new
geopolitical framework, we need to go beyond conflict or great powers. An analysis of the connec-
tion between geopolitics, development and regional integration might provide a different vantage
point that might contribute to the analysis of shifts in the international system. Let us now turn to
a more specific outline of these connections.

GEOPOLITICS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

In an attempt to link geopolitics with regionalism, Peter Jay distinguished between ‘good’ and
‘bad’ regionalism. The latter referred to US global alliances with regimes in order to hold off
the Soviet Union and ‘Red China’ by military force and, often, political repression (Jay, 1979,
p. 488). The ‘good regionalism’ was, in contrast, about catching ‘the regional tides that lead on
to geopolitical success, by winning the geopolitical battle for hearts and minds in emerging
nations, promoting freedom’, human rights and democracy (Jay, 1979, p. 500). This perspective
is somewhat constructivist but within the framework of a typically realist inspired view on geopo-
litics, which Jay defined as managing global rivalry and success by ‘consolidating the strength and
cohesion of the group of nations which form the core of one’s power position, while preventing the
other side from extending the area of its domination and clientele’ (Jay, 1979, p. 486). There is no
territory here, just powers consolidating their position in the ‘good’ ways, through values and
norms. Ultimately, this position is an antithesis of regionalism. Not even Europe really exists,
just the US, with the West and ‘good regionalism’ as the bedrock of its global interests.
Geopolitics without geography reminds us of David Harvey’s (1985, p. 141) statement that
‘geography is a sadly neglected stepchild in all social theory’. It might appear strange but there
are many geopolitical studies without a consideration of geography, something that Guzzini
(2012, p. 13) describes as a ‘denaturalization’ of geopolitics. One might get even further from clas-
sical geopolitics when adding a denaturalization of the state and power, as it is made in some criti-
cal, subaltern or post-modern perspectives (see Agnew, 2003 or Radcliffe, 2007). In recent years,
however, there have been increasing mentions of the need to give more attention to geography and
to have a better understanding of the post-Cold War international system. One example of this is
Henry Kissinger, who speaks of a ‘multipolar order’ led by ‘continental structures’, referring to
‘America, China, and maybe India, Brazil and Europe, if it manages to handle its transition
towards a regional unit’ (Kissinger, 2014, p. 94). Kissinger is not, however, saying much new
regarding this point. What he actually does is return to Ratzel and Kjellén’s perspective by arguing
that even economically advanced states, such as those of Western Europe, have little chance of
occupying an influential position in the world system without unification (large size). That is
also true, vice versa, for countries that possess a continental dimension but lack an advanced econ-
omy, such as India, Brazil and Russia. Hence, from a geopolitical point of view, integration, or
what Kjellén saw as the formation of state-blocks, can be regarded as a way to compensate for
economic and other limitations.
A question is how to be more precise about size. Two examples are the concepts continent and
region. Both are geographic dimensions that have become increasingly dominant in the language
regarding studies on international relations. To be sure, geographic dimensions are human cre-
ations and, as such, subjective and at times even mythological. This is also true for regions and
continents (Lewis & Wigen, 1997, p. 46), although the latter contains a stricter geographical
(territorial) attachment. The concept ‘continent’ provides a more precise outline for the ideal

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

 21st century geopolitics 7

type and size of future dominant states. One attempt to do so was made by the Ratzelian geopo-
litician Alberto Methol Ferré (2013). Along a classical geopolitical perspective, he referred to the
age of continental states as a more accurate way to describe the framework of powers that would be
the backbone of the emerging global order. In other words, the continental state is an ideal type of
optimal geopolitical size for those states that intend to occupy a dominant position in the emer-
ging global system. So far, there are only states with continental scope aiming to control continen-
tal spaces through different forms of regional integration.
One example is Brazil, which together with other countries of the region, is leading a process of
South American integration (Buzan & Wæver, 2003) through initiatives such as the Common
Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).
Another is Russia, which is leading the creation of the Eurasian Customs Union. The European
states are also a good example, with intentions to consolidate their path of unification in the Euro-
pean Union (EU). Moreover, even a great power with hegemonic aspirations, such as the US,
seeks increasing integration through continental initiatives such as the Free Trade of the Americas
(FTAA) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and even bi- or transconti-
nental initiatives such as the Trans-Atlantic Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Paci-
fic Partnership Agreement (TPP). China is doing the same through the Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with a focus on grouping the
Eurasian continent.
Regional integration is, of course, not a particularity of the 21st century, but it might have
some specific features: (1) it is not only the patrimony of smaller or weaker states, as part of the
geopolitics of the weak, but also of great powers; (2) one feature of the new regional initiatives,
such as those mentioned above, is their size. In some cases, they are close to a having a clear con-
tinental scope. In other instances, they consist of various trans- or intercontinental combinations,
what are today referred to as mega-regions (CEPAL, 2013); (3) war is not an option as before.
Hence, great powers increasingly turn to regional integration as a form of controlling territory
and expansion, since experiences of direct occupation (since the end of the Cold War) have usually
ended badly (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Contrary to what Jay argues, integration should not be regarded as a normative issue, as that of
‘good’ or ‘bad’ forces, nor should it be seen as a western issue, if by that one means the US and its
Western European allies. The seeds of modern integration are to be found, in fact, before the con-
ception of the modern notion of West or Western Europe. Nevertheless, it is still an open question
as to when regional integration began. It is said that it took its first steps during the late 18th and
early 19th centuries with the creation of the US (Buzan, 2012, p. 31), but one might also add here
the German Empire. In both cases, one can speak of geopolitical processes leading, initially, to the
creation of what Kjellén called a state-block (Kjellén, 1916, p. xx). In the case of the US, the Brit-
ish subjects of the North American colonies created their first sovereign institution, which was
later transformed into the First Continental Congress of 1774, the first sovereign institution of
what was to become the United States of America.
A particularity of the North American case was its forthright continental approach: a territorial
scope that was even indicated in its very inception as the Continental Congress. Surrounded and
threatened by big powers, with a strong will to survive and become autonomous, size and expan-
sionist motif became a cornerstone in the construction of a state that adopted a very peculiar name.
‘United States’ pointed out the integration of separate states, while ‘America’ indicated the geo-
political and territorial lebensraum needed for ‘the enlargement, the enrichment, and the strength-
ening of the Union’ (Burnett, 1941, p. 223).
No different than other states in the past, the expansion sustained by the ‘manifest destiny’ had
to do with survival. Yet in the case of the US, there was an innovative mix between the regional
integration of the uniting states and expansive continentalist imperialism, labelled as the ‘repub-
lican empire’ (Perkins, 1993). Continentalist scope, and integration, was also a matter of the

TERRITORY, POLITICS, GOVERNANCE

8 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

former American Spanish-speaking colonies, which attempted to create a continental confedera-

tion in the Amphictyonic Congress of Panama in 1826 under the leadership of Simon Bolivar.
Continentalism returned again, in 1889, with an initiative from the USA to create a truly conti-
nental, American zollverein, as a step further towards the ‘block-building’ of a Pan-American
Union (Kjellén, 1916, p. 67; Johannesson, 1922). Although both initiatives (observed by Kjellén
and Ratzel) failed, they should be regarded as the first wave of proposals towards the promotion of
continental states. It is also important to note that this went hand-in-hand with ethno-politics and
the spread of new forms of continental nationhood such as the ‘Pan’ identities, of which Pan-
Americanism was one of the first.
In the case of Europe, with some inspiration from the North American processes, the forbear
of modern regional integration might be the German-speaking states and their creation of the
German Customs Union (the zollverein) in 1834, which became the base in a process that culmi-
nated with the creation of the German Empire in 1871. In this case, however, it lacked a clear
continental scope, even though there were voices calling for the creation of a united Europe (Pag-
den, 2002). Two European states with a continentalist outlook were France and Russia. In the
case of the first, it was expressed, for example, through Napoleon Bonaparte’s attempt to create
a European continental system. In Russia, continentalism had been, and continues to be, part
of a manifest destiny projection towards the Eurasian continent.
As Alexandre de Toqueville pointed out, whilst the attention of mankind was directed else-
where, Russia and the US ‘suddenly assumed a most prominent place amongst the nations; and
the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time’ (de Toqueville,
2006). The great expansion of these states, not forgetting Brazil, showed the way towards what
Ratzel saw as the historical ‘drive toward the building of continually larger states’ (Ratzel, 1969,
p. 28).6 In the case of Brazil and Russia, it was through an imperial outlook, and in the case of
the US by a mixture of integration (such as the original states) and imperialist expansion.
The US’s model of expansion was an innovation in the making of great powers, together with a
third element that played a decisive role: the combination of size with a dynamic industrialized
economy. In the framework of the new capitalist world economy geography mattered, but it
was not enough. The US was the first to come closer towards the ideal type of future great powers,
with combination of continental scope and an advanced industrialized economy. In this sense this
state could take advantage of the new conditions of the international economic system, with an
increasingly globally oriented commerce, new forms of economies of scale and rapid technological
progress. Relatedly, the particularity of the US was to become what Methol Ferré called the first
continental industrial state, or more accurately, the first industrial state of continental scope. The
US succeeded in combining regional integration, development and geopolitics to become a fore-
runner of the coming age of continental states. I will further explore the link between development
and the economy below, but allow me to first make a brief overview of the issue of continentalism
and integration during the 20th century.
The idea of continentalism was, temporarily, set aside during the Cold War, due to the pre-
dominance of two superpowers with global ambitions. Yet, it persisted as part of regional inte-
gration perspectives in both Europe and Latin America. The most remarkable example here
was the process of European integration that started in the 1950s, with the creation of a new zoll-
verein in the European Economic Community (EEC). Continentalism was, indeed, in the minds
of its founding fathers. For example, Jean Monnet, whose arguments for continentalism went
hand-in-hand with the age of continental states, advocated that ‘the world of today is the
world of the great sets; we move at continental scale and what is imposed is a dialogue between
continents’ (Monnet, 2008, p. 117).7 There were also initiatives with continentalist orientation
in Latin America, such as Spanish-speaking countries and Brazil, each with their own particular
vantage point on the issue (Rivarola Puntigliano, 2011). Thus, even if the two superpowers, the
US and the Soviet Union, did not foster this line (for other countries), the trend towards thinking

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 21st century geopolitics 9

in terms of the gradual enlargement of states as geopolitical units continued among the weaker
ones (Debabrata, 1975, p. 93), a category where I also include the post-imperial Western Euro-
pean countries.
During the 1960s, most regional integration theories were inspired by the European experi-
ence, and to some extent by the wave of Latin American integration agreements. Nevertheless,
few of them were related to geopolitics or continentalism. In the developed countries, aside
from a few exceptions, geopolitics survived in the realist perspective within the field of inter-
national relations, but it was regarded as a ‘pseudoscience’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 178). However,
even if realists did not show much interest in regional integration, the advance of the European
process demanded answers. Concerning this, Kenneth Waltz pointed out the need to consider
the role of size, where he concluded (although without any mention of geopolitics) that, ‘to com-
pete at the great-power level is now possible only for countries of continental size’ (Waltz, 1979,
p. 146). In his view, probably with the European case in mind, those states without size or econ-
omic means should for their own survival prefer amalgamation with other states (Waltz, 1979,
p. 92). To mention just one more influential (Cold War) pundit, the territorial dimension can
also be found in the analysis of George F. Kennan, pointing out what he called ‘monster countries’
as the key units of the international system (speaking of the USA, China, India, the Soviet Union
and Brazil) (Kennan, 1993, p. 143).
With the end of the Cold War, there was a return of focus on regional integration, now with
the more active involvement of former superpowers in their respective regions. This was the begin-
ning of the return of the territorial and geopolitical perspective, and with it the issue of size and
continental framework. One example of this is the realist John H. Mearsheimer who, analysing
current great powers, defines the continental state as, ‘a great power located on a large body of
land that is also occupied by one or more other great powers’, where China or Russia would be
two examples. He distinguishes this from the insular state, which he defines as a ‘great power
on a large body of land that is surrounded on all sides by water’ (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 126).
Mearsheimer’s definition can be criticized from a geographic and Ratzelian point of view, in
which natural frontiers were regarded as the ‘clearest boundary for a state’, and the sea was con-
sidered an ‘ideal frontier’ (Backheuser, 1948, p. 99). This then implies that if size is an important
variable, the optimal insularity of states would be obtained by continental states, or what Martin
W. Lewis and Wigen (1997, p. 33) would call, ‘world islands’. However, since there is as yet no
truly continental state, regional integration seems to be a way forward for this territorial ideal type.
In other words, regional integration might lead to autonomy and in this way regional powers or
the world of regions could be regarded as a step towards the age of the continental states.
With the risk of diverging from the territorial focus proposed for this paper, it is also important
to point out that the size issue has also been a major theme among scholars who did not focus on
states or regions as the central units of the system. Back in the mid-20th century, that was the case
with Arnold Toynbee and Ferdinand Braudel, who regarded civilizations as the ‘grandfather, the
patriarch of world history’ (Braudel, 1984, p. 65). A similar argument was later used by Samuel
Huntington to explain the formation of a new post-Cold War global order in which civilizations
were defined as ‘the biggest “we” within whom we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all
the other “thems” out there’ (Huntington, 2002, p. 43).
However, even if civilization was mostly defined along cultural lines, there was also a geopo-
litical/territorial dimension. In Braudel’s world of civilizations, for example, there was an inter-
action with what he called world economies, where geographic spaces, such as the
Mediterranean (a region), were the framework of spatial organization. Braudel did, in fact,
point to ‘geographical space as a source of explanation that affects all historical realities, all
spatially-defined phenomena; states, societies, cultures and economies’ (Braudel, 1984, p. 21).
In the case of Huntington, territoriality appeared through what he called the core state, that is,
a predominant territorial state that ‘is the source of order within a civilization’ (Huntington,

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10 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

2002, p. 156).8 This definition reminds one of Saul Bernard Cohen’s geopolitical region (Cohen,
1969, pp. 178–9; Cohen, 2003, p. 40), which implies the need to find a spatial-cultural equili-
brium, which Huntington sought by combining civilization and the concept of the core state.
As explained by Mark Bassin (2007, p. 367), in Huntington’s view regions ‘were possible to
the extent that geography coincides with culture’. A contemporary example of this can be
found in the rise of China as a great power, where the concept civilization is unified with core
state through what the Chinese call a civilization-state (Xia, 2014). This opens the door for a
new kind of mix between geopolitics and culture that gives much to think about in terms of
the emergent units of a new world order.
To sum up, in spite of differences among authors concerning the conformation of a new world
order, there seems to be a growing opinion that contemporary national-states show limitations ‘as
bases for social order in a complex, integrated and globalized world’ (Hurrell, 2005, p. 53). Ter-
ritory is one dimension of that, but it needs to be linked to the economic dimension that con-
ditions the formation of new kinds of geopolitical units. Let me now turn to a deeper analysis
regarding the linkage between geopolitics and development.

GEOPOLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT

Trade and the economic dimension were of great importance in classical geopolitics. For some
geopoliticians, such as Karl Haushofer, economics was merely a special aspect of politics that
should not be addressed for its own sake (Dorpalen, 1942, p. 223). Nevertheless, that was not
the position of his forbears in classical geopolitics. With the German (and surely also the US’s)
experience in mind, Ratzel held, for example, that the ‘advancement of political boundaries is pre-
ceded by that of the customs frontier’ (Ratzel, 1969, p. 22). Geography was, of course, of great
importance for him, but he also understood that every new commercial route served the unification
of the state.
Kjellén went even further in this direction, pointing out political economy (ekonomi-politik) as
one of the dimension in his theory of the state. Contrary to the geographic determinism attributed
to his work, he argued that this dimension assisted the state in counterbalancing its geographic
weakness and, ‘transform[ing] its land into something more natural than it basically is’ (Kjellén,
1916, p. 61). Kjellén advocated that one way of doing so was by following the autarkic principle,
but he also raised a caveat on transforming autarky into a ‘fetish that closed the eyes for the need of
economic interaction among people’ (Kjellén, 1916, p. 133). His notion of autarky did not, how-
ever, imply isolation from the system, but sovereignty and autonomy; in the case of political econ-
omy, this was related to industrialization balance in trade and financial transactions with other
states. Kjellén’s theory of the state took into account the position of the units in the framework
of the international system, in relation to both political and economic structures. In his view,
there was a difference concerning the policies of territorial (and market) control by an industrial-
ized state (at that moment, Great Britain) and an agrarian state. An expression of such difference
was that the agrarian ‘household’s desire to overcome its limitation is a political factor that is not
less real, than the industrial household needs to mitigate its risk’ (Kjellén, 1916, p. 132). In other
words, industrialization was a form of breaking with what he called the colonial model, an idea
that also laid behind the customs union initiatives in both Germany and the US.
This makes Kjellén one of the precursors of international political economy (IPE) as well as of
development studies, framed in a broader geopolitical outlook on how to compensate the state’s
vulnerabilities in an unequal international system. In relation to an IPE dimension, another pio-
neering work came from Vladimir Ilich Lenin who, inspired by the research of John Atkins Hob-
son, held that a feature of the stronger countries is that many of the firms and much of the capital
are from these countries. In his view, the power of these states and those economic interests were

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 21st century geopolitics 11

interconnected. From a global systemic perspective, Lenin identified this connection of economy
and territory as imperialism, arguing that in the epoch of modern capitalism:

certain relations are established between capitalist alliances, based on the economic division of the world;
while parallel with this fact and in connection with it, certain relations are established between political
alliances, between states, on the bases of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies,
of the ‘struggle for economic territory’. (Lenin, 1996, p. 75)

As in the case of Kjellén, Lenin also had a realist bias that was highlighted by Waltz. In his view,
the Lenin-Hobson theory about capitalism and imperialism was one of the best theories in advan-
cing an understanding of the international system, even though he was critical of it. However, in
Waltz’s opinion, imperialism could not really be attributed to economic variables but to the inter-
ests of great powers: the ‘imperialism of great powers’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 26). This rejection of the
world economy, in my opinion, narrows Waltz’s understandings of states, as well as the structural
drivers that are part of the structural context in which they exist. Moreover, Waltz’s neo-realism
did not take into account how smaller or weaker states can manage to overcome their limitations in
size and territorial control. In other words, to paraphrase Edward Shils, he did not address the
dialectic tension that appears in the centre’s aspiration to rule, the periphery’s aspiration to protect
itself from being ruled, and the periphery’s creation of ‘countercenter’s with the aspiration to
‘penetrate the arcana imperium’ held by the center’ (Shils, 1975, p. xxxix).
The core and periphery dichotomy, linked to development, was a dimension where the devel-
opmentalist economist Raúl Prebisch made an insightful contribution. He did not speak of geo-
politics nor mention any geopolitician. Nevertheless, power, the territorial dimension and
economy, were central elements of his view. According to Prebisch, the core and periphery dichot-
omy was historically constructed as a result of the way in which technical progress spread in the
global economy. At the core, this concerned the creation of production methods that spread to the
entire productive apparatus over a relatively short period, while the periphery suffered from what
was called an initial backwardness. This led to a widening gap where some countries commanded
the most productive and efficient segments of the world economy, while others maintained what
Kjellén called the colonial model with a concentration on the production and export of primary
goods.
For Prebisch, who was close to a realist vantage point, the use of power in international
relations was partly responsible for the maintenance of this divergence. Prebisch understood
that small countries counted for little among world powers and that ‘the currency of international
trade was power, and the market concealed the power relationships that stratified the global system
into a core of dominant subjects with a broad band of heterogeneous peripheral objects’ (Dosman,
2008, p. 81). However, he did not see this as a natural or permanent order since there was, in his
opinion, always mobility across centre and periphery. The territorial scope was, however, not
absent from his model, for example when he argued that

countries with large dimensions and markets, or with abundant natural resources that are of scarcity in the
world, are in a better position to circumscribe the penetration of the centers to certain areas of activity and
negotiate the conditions under which this is made. (Prebisch, 1981, p. 205)

However, Prebisch also differed from realism (or realist-oriented geopolitical perspectives)
through his work around strategies and theories related to what Stephan Haggard (1990) called,
‘pathways from the periphery’. In this sense, Prebisch’s developmentalist IPE was in fact closer to
Kjelléns development geopolitics. According to Prebisch, although the systemic framework of
dichotomies such as core/periphery might be related to impositions from big powers (the core),
the periphery could overcome the relations of dependency. To do so, he advocated avoiding

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12 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

fragmentation and promoted ‘regional integration’ (Prebisch, 1981, p. 206, 239) as the territorial
dimension to optimize the autonomous potential of peripheral forces. Prebisch did not believe that
economic development was related to the invisible hand of the market but to the highly visible
hand of the state through different forms of persuasion, such as the following: commercial con-
cessions, financial resources through bilateral or multilateral ways, military aid or different
forms of influencing public opinion. In his view, the goal of the centre is to, in different degrees,
constrain the peripheral countries ‘to make decisions that they otherwise would not take’ (Pre-
bisch, 1981, p. 203).
As it had been done in the framework of realism and classical geopolitics, Prebisch identified
hierarchies in the international system by speaking of dynamic centre, secondary centres and per-
iphery. An important point here is that the system is not fixed, nor monolithic. In fact, there is
constant movement, fragmentations and convergences, all pushed by forces representing capital
and territory. Realist elements such as the survival and hierarchies of states play an important
role in understanding this framework, but it cannot be dissociated with the increasing expansion
of capitalist interstate-competition for mobile capital. It cannot either be dissociated with the fast
process of technological change, its impact on territorial shifts and its effect on a state’s expansio-
nist motif.
Within the field of international political economics, this issue was further analysed by Gio-
vanni Arrighi, who pointed out the existence of a capitalist-territorial logic and the need to create
‘political structures endowed with ever-more extensive and complex organizational capabilities to
control the social and political environment of capital accumulation’ and act increasingly on a
world scale. In Arrighi’s view, the process of capitalist and technological advance creates a frame-
work in which states that control the most abundant sources of surplus capital also have ‘to acquire
the organizational capabilities needed to promote, organize and regulate a new phase of capitalist
expansion of a greater scale and scope than the preceding one’ (Arrighi, 2006, p. 14). From this
point of view, the state can be regarded as a territorial ‘container of power’ (Arrighi, 2006, p. 217)
and, in this sense, a creator of markets (Polanyi, 1957). Still, there is a constant tension here in the
ambivalent relation between the (territorial) state and the capitalists, who at times intend to free
themselves from the control of territorial states and at other times embrace its protection. Harvey
refers to this as one of the central contradictions of capital:

that it has to build a fixed space (or ‘landscape’) necessary for its own functioning at a certain point in its
history only to have to destroy that space (and devalue much of the capital invested therein) at a later point
in order to make way for a new ‘spatial fix’ (openings for fresh accumulation in new spaces and territories) at
a later point in its history. (Harvey, 2001, p. 25)

All differences among the above mentioned scholars notwithstanding, there are interesting con-
nections in their work that are worthwhile exploring further in order to allow for a better geopo-
litical understanding of the shifts among state units, regional integration and development within
a systemic framework.
I agree with the argument that ‘capitalism should be taken seriously’ (Cox, 2013, p. 59), but
without leaving aside geopolitics. As I have tried to show in this paper, the globalization of capital
and the advance of technology have not eliminated the territorial dimension, something that is not
only important for states but also for agents of capital, such as firms (Krugman, 2009). Although
individuals or corporations might own land and economic assets, states still control territory; if not
directly (as those of the periphery) then indirectly by the action of stronger states. Development
and economic policies do not take place in an empty space. There are hierarchies and power struc-
tures in the international system that can been seen in the form of core and periphery, with strong
states intending to expand their control beyond their borders and weaker ones trying to gain suf-
ficient autonomy to formulate their own development policies.

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 21st century geopolitics 13

A particularlity of the 21st century might be to consolidate the venue of the later part of the
20th century, where the path towards the construction of continental states and their lebensraum is
no longer related to annexation, but rather occurs through what Carl Schmitt called ‘spatial supre-
macy’ and the control of grossraum (Schmitt, 2003, p. 243), that is, spheres of big space that are not
yet fixed to a state’s lebensraum. The conformation of the new world order seems, in fact, to go
coincide with one of Schmitt’s alternatives (from the mid-20th century), where a combination
of several independent grossraums or blocs would constitute a balance and thereby precipitate a
new order of the earth (Schmitt, 354). In this sense, the return of geopolitics can also be regarded
as a return to the 16th and 17th century’s notion of cuius region, eius economica.9

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this article has been to explore the theoretical connection between the concepts of
development, regional integration and geopolitics. One of the issues addressed here is that geo-
politics should not simply be reduced to a kind of synonym for conflict. My suggestion is to
turn to the origins of the concept classical geopolitics, where I focus on two dimensions that
are of crucial importance for understanding shifts in the international system: regional integration
and development. While the former covers the territorial scope of state action, the latter is related
to the managing of economic resources within the area covered by the integration project.
The state’s commitment towards each of these dimensions is not uniform; it varies with the
position they have in the system. However, there are common elements that affect all states. In
this study, the focus has firstly been on how an increasing interconnection of the world economy
and the rapid advance of technology produce synergies for new and unprecedented forms of trans-
national connections. In many ways, space has been reduced, and economies of scale push the
expansion of markets forward. Secondly, there is a territorial dimension. Contrary to what
many heralded, the spatial element of territory and geopolitics was not eliminated. In fact, the ter-
ritorial scope of states is perhaps more crucial than ever, since the focus is on direct or indirect
control of increasingly larger areas. Integration and development, linked to geopolitics, are key
issues from which to understand the shifts in the international system.
One feature of the system is that, for weaker (peripheral) states, a way of integrating into the
world system is as satellites of great powers. If they choose to integrate with more autonomy, the
geopolitics of the weak might be an alternative path, such as through convergence with other per-
ipheral states in order to acquire geopolitical strength to act both locally and globally. The latter
point appears as a new imperative in an increasingly interlinked world system relative to the con-
trol of markets, natural resources and consumers. It seems, for example, unlikely to maintain
increasing levels of population (and mega-cities) delinked from the global economy, at least if
the intention is to reach higher standards of living.
With the absence of a global hegemon and the emergence of new states aiming to control mar-
kets and resources, another feature of the international system is that regional integration has also
become relevant for all great powers. Along this line, the path of expanding geographical horizons
goes through the creation of mega-regions or regional blocks. Nevertheless, the lack of territorial
fixing in most of these regional grossraums makes this a mere buying of time to contain a rising
China (Van Ham, 2013, p. 5), which has the goal of becoming a civilization-state with continental
scope. If the postulates of classical geopolitics are correct, the level of global competition and econ-
omic interlinkage makes it increasingly harder to act as a regional hegemon, unless the porous
regional boundaries are transformed into frontiers. This is a driving force towards the ideal
type of continental states.
There are many issues pointed out by classical geopolitics that have been inaccurate and could
be rejected. However, there are conceptual tools that might be useful to grasp the modern world.
One example is the idea of the expansion of geographical horizons and the geopolitical notion of

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14 Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano

continental state, which could be regarded as an optimal power container due to its insular position
and being a centralized geopolitical unit. A state of this size will also have a control of human and
natural resources that allows for priority in setting conditions on the making of a new world order.
How to reach this continental ideal type demands different geopolitical outlooks, which depend
on the level of economic development, the size of the state, or the human and natural resources
available within the state’s frontiers.
If one accepts this hypothesis, a classical geopolitical perspective would also demand an exam-
ination of the ethno-political dimension of state making, since new territorial dimensions also
embrace larger amounts of peoples and nations. There is no place in this article to expand on
this issue; it is enough to point out that this is of pivotal importance for the survival of the new
geopolitical units. To acquire leverage in the system and to persist in time, regional units,
mega-regions or civilizations need continental nationhood;10 for continental states, this is a
demand. This is the constructivist side of geopolitics, which demands the imagination of new
forms of nationhood, but there is nothing new under the sun. As at so many times in history,
to survive, states need to reinvent themselves. Thus, geopolitics might be a useful tool, not only
to understand conflicts, but also to analyse the creation and re-creation of states, a process that
will most surely continue into the 21st century.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Dr Magnus Lembke for insightful comments that helped to improve this paper.
2. For a nuanced and interesting analysis on the different dimensions of Kjellén’s work, see Edström et al. (2014).
For further discussion on the differences with other geopolitical outlooks see Rivarola Puntigliano (2011).
3. This is the Swedish and German name of the discipline, known in English as political science.
4. All references from publications in Swedish and Spanish used in this article have been translated by the author.
5. For more about this point see Sven Holdar (1992).
6. The core actors here would be, in his view, continental powers such as North America, Australia, Asiatic Rus-
sia, and perhaps even South America. If that would happen, he said: ‘Europe would be insignificant despite all its
advantages and England could not be separated from the fate of Europe’. Quoted in Weigert (1972, p. 105).
7. Authors from a text in Spanish. It is interesting to note how Monnet, in this text, points out the United States
as well as the Swiss Federation as examples for European integration.
8. According to Huntington, where these core states exist, they are the central elements of the new international
order based on civilizations.
9. To whom the region, the economy. See Schmitt (2003, p. 256) and Elden (2010, p. 23).
10. Felipe Herrera (1970, p. 95) used the concept ‘pueblo [folk] continental) referring to Latin America; Carl
Schmitt (2003, p. 53) referred to ‘continental cultures’, in relation to high cultural areas of the Classical antiquity
and the Middle Ages periods.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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