Central Philippine University vs.

Court of Appeals
by Maki
CENTRAL PHIL UNIV. vs. Court of Appeals
246 SCRA 511

FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the following
conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any income from that land shall be put in the
fund to be known as “Ramon Lopez Campus Fund”.

However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of
donation, reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also
argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned
by the latter.

Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.

ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioner’s
certificate of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO

HELD:

1)
Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss of
those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a
school is such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If
there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be
revoked & all rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.

More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the
opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor
forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a
term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve
no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time
of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has
slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to
declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee
should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of
reconveyance.

2)
Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature & circumstance it can be
inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith &
such period has arrived. However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different
set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50yrs has already been allowed to
petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no
need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality & would serve no
purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee
may seek rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the
absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for
the court to decree recission.

BORROMEO, ET AL. VS. CA ET AL.

FERNANDO, September 28, 1972
NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals
FACTS
Before 1933, defendant [Jose A. Villamor] was a distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller who was
the agent of the Insular Lumber Company in Cebu City. Defendant being a friend and former classmate of
plaintiff [Canuto O. Borromeo] used to borrow from the latter certain amounts from time to time. On one
occasion, defendant borrowed from plaintiff a large sum of money for which he mortgaged his land and
house in Cebu City to pay some pressing obligation with Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller filed a civil action against
the defendant and attached his properties including those mortgaged to plaintiff, inasmuch as the deed
of mortgage in favor of plaintiff could not be registered because not properly drawn up. Plaintiff then
pressed the defendant for settlement of his obligation, but defendant instead offered to execute a
document promising to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten years. Liquidation was made and
defendant was found to be indebted to plaintiff in the sum of P7,220.00, for which defendant signed a
promissory note therefor on November 29, 1933 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, agreeing to pay as soon
as I have money'. The note further stipulates that defendant 'hereby relinguish, renounce, or otherwise
waive my rights to the prescriptions established by our Code of Civil Procedure for the collection or
recovery of the above sum of P7,220.00. * * * at any time even after the lapse of ten years from the date
of this intrument'. After the execution of the document, plaintiff limited himself to verbally requesting
defendant to settle his indebtedness from time to time. Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the
defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there was no property registered in
defendant's name, who furthermore assured him that he could collect even after the lapse of ten years.
After the last war, plaintiff made various oral demands, but defendants failed to settle his account
CFI: Villamor ordered to pay Borromeo (represented by his heirs) the sum of P7,220.00 within ninety
days from the date of the receipt of such decision with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
expiration of such ninety-day period.
-CA: reversed CFI ruling
ISSUE
1. WON the CA erred in reversing the ruling of the CFI in finding the lack of validity of the stipulation
amounting to a waiver in line with the principle "that a person cannot renounce future prescription"
HELD
1. YES
Ratio
Between two possible interpretations, that which saves rather than destroys is to be preferred. It is a
fundamental principle in the interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the literal sense of the words
employed is to be followed, such is not thecase where they "appear to be contrary to the evident intention
of the contracting parties," which"intention shall prevail." The terms, clauses and conditions contrary to
law, morals and public order (in this case the contested stipulation)should beseparated from the valid and
legal contract when such separation can be made because they are
independent of the valid contract which expresses
the will of the contracting parties.
Reasoning
There is nothing implausible in the view
that such language renouncing the debtor's right to
the prescription established by the Code of Civil
Procedure should be given the meaning, as noted in
the preceding sentence of the decision of respondent
Court, that the debtor could be trusted to pay even
after the termination of the ten-year prescriptive
period. (so CA should have interpreted the stipulation
based on the context of the friendship between the
two parties)
-'Where an agreement founded on a legal
consideration contains several promises, or a
promise to do several things, and a part only of the
things to be done are illegal, the promises which, can
be separated, or the promise, so far as it can be
separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule
is that a lawful promise made for a lawful
consideration is not invalid merely because an
unlawful promise was made at the same time and for
the same consideration, and this rule applies,
although the invalidity is due to violation of a
statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or
by necessary implication declares the entire contract
void.
- the first ten years after November 29, 1933 should
not be counted in determining when the action of
creditor, now represented by petitioners, could be
filed. From the joint record on appeal, it is undoubted
that the complaint was filed on January 7, 1953. If
the first ten-year period was to be excluded, the
creditor had until November 29, 1953 to start judicial
proceedings. After deducting the first tenyear period
which expired on November 29, 1943, there was the
additional period of still another ten years.29 Nor
could there be any legal objection to the complaint
by the creditor Borromeo of January 7, 1953
embodying not merely the fixing of the period within
which the debtor Villamor was to pay but likewise the
collection of the amount that until then was not paid.