American Association for Public Opinion Research

Public Opinion du Jour: An Examination of the Spiral of Silence

Author(s): Carroll J. Glynn and Jack M. McLeod
Source: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter, 1984), pp. 731-740
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion Research
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 Public Opinion du Jour:
An Examination of the Spiral of Silence
CARROLL J. GLYNN AND JACK M. McLEOD

"PUBLIC OPINION," as a concept and as a process, has been considered a

key factor in the outcome of political and social issues for centuries.
Theorists such as Allport (1937) and Almond (1950) regarded public
opinion as a transitory phenomenon, but recent evidence indicates that it
may not be as volatile or transitory as some critics claim, and that when
changes do occur, they are not random or capricious (Page and Shapiro,
1982). However, during short-term events such as elections, there may be
substantial changes in opinion because people are continually receiving
new information about political candidates, information that helps them
adjust their voting decisions.
It is in this context of high public uncertainty combined with an increase
in the flow of communication that Noelle-Neumann's "spiral of silence"
research (1977) is important. The theory of the spiral of silence states that
one's perception of the distribution of public opinion motivates one's
willingness to express political opinions. This act of self-expression then
changes the "global environment of opinion, altering the perceptions of
other persons and, ultimately, affecting their willingness to express their
own opinions" (Taylor, 1982). Individuals who notice that their own
personal opinions are spreading will voice these opinions self-confidently
in public; those who notice their opinions are "losing ground" will be

Abstract This study investigates the spiral of silence theory using perceived vote outcomes
as well as actual vote behaviors. The first major hypothesis-that those who see their
position as gaining support will be more likely to discuss while those who see their position
as losing support will be less likely to discuss-was supported by the data. Some support was
also found for the hypothesis that individuals perceiving support for a certain candidate
would be more likely to express a preference for the candidate. Results also seemed to
justify the Noelle-Neumann distinction between the resistant hardcore and other types of
citizens. The relative independence of perception of opinion judgments from own prefer-
ences also was investigated and support was found for this difference.
Carroll J. Glynn is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Arts,
Cornell University. Jack M. McLeod is Baier-Bascom Professor in the School of Journalism
and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin.

Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 48:731-740 C) by the Trustees of Columbia University

Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362X/84/0048-731/$2.50
732 CARROLL J. GLYNN AND JACK M. MCLEOD

inclined to adopt a more reserved attitude and remain silent. Noelle-

Neumann labels this process the "spiral of silence." The basic premise of
Noelle-Neumann's work is that through social interaction, people influ-
ence each other's willingness to express opinions. That is, she believes
that to the individual "not isolating himself is more important than his
own judgment" (Noelle-Neumann, 1977).
Taylor (1982) states that the four variables in Noelle-Neumann's re-
search are: "one's opinion on an issue; one's perception of the predom-
inant public opinion; one's assessment of the likely future course of public
opinion; and one's willingness to support one's opinion with action,
verbal statements, or other signs of commitment." One's opinion and
one's assessment of the predominant public opinion are both assumed to
influence one's judgment of the future course of opinion. Willingness to
express one's opinion depends on an interaction between one's opinion
(majority or minority) and one's perception of the future trend in public
opinion.
We investigated Noelle-Neumann's spiral of silence theory in the pres-
ent study, using perceived vote outcomes as well as actual vote behaviors.
Noelle-Neumann states that the tendency for some individuals to speak
up and for others to remain silent starts a "spiraling process" which
increasingly establishes one opinion as the prevailing one. In addition,
she notes that in relation to election campaigns, this spiraling process of
opinion expression (measured with the question "Who do you think will
win the election?") can lead, in the final phase of the campaign, to an
increase in the number of supporters of a political party and "thus the
decisive margin for the election victory" can become obvious (Noelle-
Neumann, 1977:148).
Improved measures (described below) from the 1980 presidential elec-
tion campaign were used to operationalize some of Noelle-Neumann's
major variables in order to study, more thoroughly, some of the basic
premises of the spiral of silence. Two major hypotheses were tested and
the following predictions made:
Hi: Those individualswho believe there is a trend in supportof their
position are more likely to expresstheir opinionspubliclythan are those
who do not.
H2: The more individualssee a candidateas winningan election, the
more likely they will be to expresspreferencefor that candidate.
In addition, the present study attempted to investigate a briefly men-
tioned distinction in the Noelle-Neumann spiral of silence theory-the
"hardcore" opinion holders. Noelle-Neumann (1974:48) states that the
hardcore are "not prepared to conform, to change their opinions, or even
to be silent in the face of public opinion." Yet, Noelle-Neumann does not
employ this concept when analyzing her data. In the present study, the
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE 733

hardcore variable is investigated as a control variable, as a main effect,

and as an interaction term. In this way it is possible to analyze Noelle-
Neumann's assumption that hardcore individuals are not influenced by
the prevailing "climate of public opinion" or by the "spiral of silence" in
the same way as the majority of individuals.

Study Design
Telephone interviews were conducted with a panel of 98 eligible voters
in Dane County, Wisconsin at three time points-two prior to and one
after the 1980 presidential election. The first interview was taken before
the initial September debate, the second in late October, and the third in
the week after the November election. The second and third waves also
included a replenishment sample of 367 additional respondents not pre-
viously interviewed. Random digit dialing procedures were used with
proportionate probability sampling stratified according to the number of
private lines at each exchange. Respondents were screened at each
selected number to ensure their eligibility to vote.
Two types of perceptions of public opinion were used to form the
critical independent variables for the study. In both the September and
October interview waves, respondents were asked to estimate what per-
centage of the vote each of the three major candidates would receive in
November (Estimated Percent). They were also asked whether each
candidate was gaining support, staying the same, or losing support (Sup-
port Change) in both the September and October waves. The data thus
included separate estimated percentage and support change measures for
each of the three candidates at two time points.
Separate measures of support change were combined into a single
index of Support Discrepancy. Each respondent's presidential choice
(Carter, Reagan, or Anderson) was compared to that person's judgment
of October support change for the preferred candidate. High discrepancy
(3) was assigned cases where the preferred candidate was seen as losing
support, moderate discrepancy (2) was given where that candidate was
judged as staying the same, and low discrepancy (1) was attributed where
the chosen candidate was perceived as gaining support.
Noelle-Neumann's conceptual distinction between the hardcore opin-
ion holders and the rest of society was also investigated despite a lack
of operationalization in her previous research. The variable was indexed
here by using the degree of vote consistency over time. For the larger
panel (N = 465), those who said in October that they were certain to
vote for a given candidate and who did in fact vote for him in November
were called Hardcore, while those less certain or who changed were
combined into a Combined Leaner and Nonhardcore category. A slightly
734 CARROLL J. GLYNN AND JACK M. MCLEOD

more sensitive index was used with the small panel (N = 98), for whom
we had September vote preference measures. Those who unequivocally
preferred a given candidate in both September and October and who
reported voting for that same candidate in November were classified as
Hardcore. Those who were leaning toward a candidate in September
and/or October and who voted for that candidate in November were
called Leaners, and those showing greater change, switching candidates
between rounds, for example, were labeled Nonhardcore.
At first glance there would appear to be a problem with conceptualiz-
ing Hardcore in this fashion; aspects of voting behavior enter into both
the contingent Hardcore variable and the dependent Vote Preference
variable. However, the confounding' is not real. The measurement of
Nonhardcore and Leaners reflects the degree of change or lability of vote
preference over time regardless of direction, whereas vote preference
and actual vote reflect direction and intensity of the intention at a given
point in time.
In order to test Noelle-Neumann's first major hypothesis of the spiral
of silence, a special set of questions was devised based on hypothetical
social situations comprised of other people, potentially congruent or
noncongruent with the respondent's vote preference, discussing these
preferences. We asked:

If you were at a social gatheringwith people you know, and they were
discussingthe presidentialcampaign,how likelywouldyou be to enterinto
the conversationif they were Reagansupporters?Wouldit be very likely,
somewhatlikely, not very likely, or not at all likelythatyou wouldjoin the
conversation?

The question was repeated for the situation where the social gather-
ing consisted of Carter supporters. For respondents supporting either
Reagan or Carter in October, the Reagan and Carter social gathering
questions were identified as either congruent or noncongruent according
to the vote preference (or nonpreference) of the respondent. For sup-
porters of the two leading candidates, then, the dependent variable could
be assessed by comparing the likelihood of entering the discussion in the
two types of social gatherings. Time limitations prevented the use of this
question for a gathering of Anderson supporters. Anderson backers were
thus excluded from this analysis because a congruent situation could not
be analyzed for them. Sample size limitations led us to use the larger
panel only for this analysis.
The major dependent variable, Vote Preference, was measured in
September and October by creating an index for each of the three major
candidates using a five-point scale: sure of voting for the given candidate
(5), leaning toward the candidate (4), undecided (3), leaning toward
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE 735

another candidate (2), and sure of voting for another candidate (1). In the
postelection survey, voting was measured by reports of having either
voted for or not voted for a given candidate.
Hierarchical least-squares regression was the basic method used in the
analysis of vote preferences. The control variable, party affiliation, was
introduced as the first predictor. The main effects of the two perception
of opinion variables (Estimated Percent and Support Change for the
given candidate) were then entered as a second predictor block. The third
block was Hardcoreness as a main effect. Finally, a fourth block com-
prised of the two interactions of Hardcoreness with the perception of
opinion variables was introduced. Significance tests (Fvalues) were used
for individual Betas and for blocks of predictor variables.
Two relatively stable political variables, Party Affiliation and Political
Interest, served primarily as control variables. Party affiliation was in-
dexed as a seven-point scale as follows: strong affiliation with the Re-
publican party, 7; Moderate (not strong) Republican, 6; Independent
Republican, 5; Independents without a leaning, 4; Independent Demo-
crats 3, and so forth. Political interest was measured by asking: "Gener-
ally, would you say you are very interested in politics, interested in poli-
tics, somewhat interested in politics, or not at all interested in politics?"
In order to examine various communication sources for their potential
influence on perceptions of public opinion, respondents were asked:
"We're interested in which source you use most for political information.
Would you say you use newspapers, friends or family, television, maga-
zines or some other source most for current events and political informa-
tion?" After choosing which they used most, the respondents then ranked
the other sources. The rankings provided data for three indices: Tele-
vision Reliance, Newspaper Reliance, and Interpersonal Reliance.

Results
PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF OPINION
The first hypothesis was tested by examining the effects of support
discrepancy on the likelihood of entering into a political discussion with
people with similar (congruent) or dissimilar (noncongruent) viewpoints
in hypothetical social situations (Table 1). As noted previously, support
discrepancy was measured on a three-point scale.1

1
Noelle-Neumann traditionally has used a hypothetical situation where respondents
assume they are sitting next to a stranger in a train. However, because trains are not a
primary mode of transportation or a common method for meeting individuals in the United
States, the authors felt it was preferable to use a hypothetical social gathering for the present
study. In this fashion, respondents could be placed in a situation where they are faced with
individuals with similar opinions and in situations with individuals with opposite opinions.
736 CARROLL J. GLYNN AND JACK M. MCLEOD

Table 1. Likelihood of Entering into a Campaign Discussion at a Congruent

and Noncongruent Social Gathering, by Level of Support Discrepancy Among Hardcore,
Combined Leaner and Nonhardcore Group and All Panel Respondents

Social Gathering

Support Congruent Noncongruent

Discrepancy Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Diff. N
Hardcore High 3.36 (1.57) 3.00 (1.59) +.36 (28)
Medium 3.81 (1.16) 3.45 (1.39) +.36 (86)
Low 3.93 (1.27) 3.60 (1.34) +.33 (95)
3.80 (1.28) 3.46 (1.36) +.34 (209)
Combined leaner High 3.74 (1.29) 3.26 (1.24) +.48 (19)
and nonhardcore Medium 3.43 (1.34) 3.05 (1.34) +.38 (40)
Low 3.85 (1.06) 3.47 (1.26) +.38 (68)
3.70 (1.15) 3.31 (1.29) +.39 (127)
All panel High 3.51 (1.42) 3.11 (1.43) +.40 (47)
respondents Medium 3.69 (1.18) 3.33 (1.37) +.36 (126)
Low 3.90 (1.17) 3.55 (1.30) +.35 (163)
3.76 (1.23) 3.40 (1.33) +.36 (336)
NOTE: High Support Discrepancy are those seeing their preferred candidate as losing
support. Medium Support Discrepancy are those seeing their candidate as staying the
same, while those seeing a gain in support are categorized as Low Support Discrepancy.

As expected, respondents (N = 336) were more likely to say they

would enter into a congruent political discussion than into a noncon-
gruent one (3.76 vs. 3.40 for all panel respondents, F = 16.60, p = .001).
Those with lower levels of support discrepancy were also more likely
than others to want to express their point of view (3.72 vs. 3.51 vs. 3.31,
F = 4.58, p < .05). The Hardcore did not differ from other respondents
in this respect (3.63 vs. 3.50, F = 1.74, n.s.) and no combination of these
three variables produced a significant interaction.

PERCEPTUAL INFLUENCES ON VOTING

In order to test the second hypothesis, that individuals who see a
candidate as winning an election would be more likely to express a
preference for that candidate, regression analyses were conducted. As
shown in Table 2, vote preferences expressed in September and in Octo-
ber and actual vote in November were regressed on party affiliation, the
perceptions of opinion variables, the Hardcore variable and the interac-
tion between the perception of opinion variables and the Hardcore
variable.
As expected, party affiliation accounted for a large and significant
amount of the variance at all time points when predicting to Carter vote
preference and Reagan vote preference, and a lesser amount when
predicting to the September Anderson vote preference. The Democrats
were more likely to prefer Anderson than were Republicans.
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE 737

Table 2. September and October Vote Preferences (Perceived Outcome) and November
Vote Regressed on Party Affi'liation, Estimates of Candidates' Vote Percentages, Support
Change, Hardcoreness, and Hardcoreness-Percentage/Support Interactions (N = 78)

Carter Reagan Anderson

Simple Incr. Simple Incr. Simple Incr.
r R2% r R2% r R2%
September preference
Party affiliation - .34* 11.4* .64* 40.8* - .33* 11.0*
Estimated percent: Sept. .37* 5.7* .48* 7.9* .05 0.0
Support change: Sept. .15 0.8 .27* 0.4 .13 1.5
Hardcoreness .07 0.9 .14 0.9 -.26* 5.7*
H x estimated percent .13 5.0* .11 0.0 -.14 0.0
H x support change .22* 6.3* .12 0.3 -.23* 0.4
Variance accounted for by:
Percent/support var. (4) 17.8* 8.5* 1.9
All variables (6) 30.1* 41.3* 18.6*
October preference
Party affiliation -.55* 30.6* .63* 40.3* -.16 2.6
Estimated percent: Oct. .51* 12.0* .30* 1.1 -.04 0.0
Support change: Oct. .10 1.1 -.01 2.0 .22* 4.7*
Hardcoreness -.12 0.2 .21 0.3 -.08 0.3
H x estimated percent -.21 0.2 .13 0.2 -.08 2.3
H x support change .20 1.7 .17 0.0 -.22* 0.6
Variance accounted for by:
Percent/support var. (4) 16.0* 3.3 7.6
All variables (6) 46.8* 43.9* 10.5
November vote
Party affiliation - .59* 35.2* .68 47.1* - .11 1.1
Estimated percent: Oct. .36* 4.4* .31* 1.5 -.14 1.7
Support change: Oct. .07 0.6 .09 0.2 .13 2.0
Hardcoreness -.23* 0.7 .18 0.0 .18 3.9
H x estimated percent -.28* 1.5 .09 1.8 .20 0.3
H x support change -.24* 0.6 .10 0.1 .07 0.2
Variance accounted for by:
Percent/support var. (4) 7.1 3.6 4.2
All variables (6) 42.0* 50.7* 9.2
* p < .05

In the case of Carter, one of the perception of opinion variables

(Estimated Percent) accounted for a significant amount of the variance
at all three time points. That is, the more respondents saw Carter as
having a larger percentage of the vote, the more they preferred him. Both
perception of opinion variables accounted for a significant proportion of
the variance when predicting to Reagan vote preference, but only in
September (8.5 percent). These variables did not account for much of the
variance when predicting to Anderson vote, except in October (7.6
percent), when those seeing him as holding even or gaining were more
likely to prefer him.
The effect of the interaction of the Hardcore variable with the two
perception of opinion variables accounted for a significant proportion of
738 CARROLL J. GLYNN AND JACK M. MCLEOD

the variance in only one of the six comparisons in Table 2. In September,

Hardcore and perceptions of public opinion combined to produce a
strong vote preference for Carter. The two interactions accounted for
11.3 percent of the Carter vote preference variance.
The evidence, overall, tends to uphold the hypothesized connection
between perceived public support for a candidate and vote preference for
that candidate.

Discussion
It is obvious from the results of this study that the nature and develop-
ment of public opinion is a complex cognitive and societal process. The
first major hypothesis-that those who see their position as gaining
support will be more likely to discuss while those who see their position as
losing support will be less likely to discuss-was supported by the data.
Some support was also found for the second major hypotheses-that
individuals perceiving support for a certain candidate would be more
likely to express a preference for that candidate. In the present study
these perceptual variables were found to influence not only vote prefer-
ences for Carter in September and October, but also reports of actual
vote for him in November. They also predicted to vote preferences for
Reagan in September and for Anderson in October. The interaction of
Hardcoreness with the two perception of public opinion variables signifi-
cantly affected vote preferences for Carter but not for Reagan or Ander-
son. While this is somewhat surprising (we would have expected percep-
tual variables to influence Anderson votes), perhaps for the relatively
well-informed liberal voters in this sample it was a matter of estimating
whether Carter had a chance because they knew Anderson did not.
Although such substantial connections between perceptions of public
opinion and personal vote preferences have been uncovered, it is impor-
tant to be wary in asserting the direction of causation. Vote preference
may lead to holding distorted estimates of public opinion, although panel
analyses in previous research make a case for treating vote preference as a
dependent variable (Glynn and McLeod, 1982). The lack of relationship
between party affiliation and perceptions of opinions also argues for this
casual direction.
The results seem to justify the Noelle-Neumann distinction between
the resistant Hardcore and other types of citizens. Interactions of Hard-
coreness with other variables were frequent enough to argue for this
distinction. In addition, other analyses not shown here have found the
Hardcore to be different from other respondents in their higher level of
campaign discussion, in their reports of lesser influence of this discussion
on their voting decisions, and in their attribution of more importance to
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE 739

candidates' issue stands and personal qualities. They also were less likely
to see the candidates' chances of winning as a factor in their choice,
providing some validation to our findings reported here.
Most of the variance in voting preferences was not accounted for by the
perception of public opinion variables. That is, the perceptions of public
opinion seem to operate with relative independence from the individual's
own position. To illustrate this further we have compared the aggregation
of individual opinion (Own Preference) to five other aggregated expres-
sions of opinion: individual perceptions of current opinion (Perceived
Opinion); perceptions of vote outcome (Perceived Outcome); current
national Gallup poll data (Poll Data); panel respondents' November vote
(Own Vote); and national vote in November (Actual Vote) (Table 4).
Table 4 does provide support for the separation of perceptions of opinion
from aggregated individual opinion (usually known as "public opinion").
In September, for example, while the aggregate of individual responses
gave Carter a clear lead over Reagan (41 percent vs. 32 percent) with
Anderson a close third (27 percent), respondents perceived the current
opinion (Perceived Opinion) as being close between Carter (42 percent)
and Reagan (40 percent), and placed Anderson a more distant third (18
percent). All three estimates were within 3 percent of the most recent
September Gallup poll prior to the first interview wave, considerably
closer than to the aggregate of the respondents' own preferences.
The relative independence of perception of opinion judgments from
own preferences also is seen in the results for the respondents' percep-

Table 3. Vote Preferences, Perceptions of Current Opinion, Perceptions of November

Outcome and Gallup Poll Data in September and October, and Panel Vote
and National Vote in November (N = 90)

September October November

Own Perceiv. Perceiv. Poll Own Perceiv. Poll Own Actual
Candidate Pref. Opinion Outcome Data Pref. Outcome Data Vote Vote
Carter 41% 42% 46% 41% 46% 45% 46% 45% 42%
Reagan 32 40 43 43 36 45 45 41 51
Anderson 27 f8 11 16 16 10 9 14 7
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NOTE: Undecided and other candidates are excluded from the table. Own Preference
is the aggregate of individual opinions of the panel. Perceived Opinion is the mean of
respondents' judgments of what proportion each candidate had at the time of interview
(September only). Perceived Outcome is the mean proportion the respondents thought
each candidate would receive in November (asked in September and October). Poll data
are the aggregated individual opinions of national samples reported in the Gallup polls
closest in time to the September and October interviews. Own vote is the aggregate of
panel respondents' votes as reported after the election. Actual vote is the national vote in
November for the three candidates.
740 CARROLL J. GLYNN AND JACK M. MCLEOI

tions of what public opinion would be in November (Perceived Out

come) (Table 4). Respondents' judgments of the outcome differed fron
the aggregate of their own preferences by an average of 11 percent ir
September and 5 percent in October. At both time points, the perceivec
outcome for Anderson was much less than the aggregation of own prefer
ences (11 percent vs. 27 percent, 10 percent vs. 16 percent), while the
perceptions of the vote for Reagan were higher than the aggregatec
preferences of the panel (43 percent vs. 32 percent, 45 percent vs. 3(
percent).
These findings are especially intriguing because the sample represent,
an area known for its liberal viewpoints and highly educated population
The fact that such respondents could reflect the national poll trend so wel
in their perceptions of the outcome of the election race, and the fact thal
the expressions of preference could begin to slide in the direction of these
perceptions does suggest a direct and perhaps very powerful influence ol
perceptions of opinions on expressions of own opinion and on actua
behavioral outcomes.

References

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