|RECEIVED| | | 17 APR 2018 AUCKLAND CoUNciL_| SENTRETable of Contents 1 HOW TO READ THIS REPORT 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2.1 _ Fire engineering approach 2.2 Fire engineering solutions 3. GENERAL 3,1. Introduction 3.2 Regulatory Framework 3.3 New Zealand Building Code 3.4 Brief Requirements 3.5 Relevant Stakeholders 3.6 Revision History 3.7. Fire and Emergency New Zealand Commission Review 4 BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS 41 Building Description 42 Occupant Load Assessment 43 Dominant Occupant Characteristics 5 FIRE EGRESS 5.1 Overview of the Evacuation Principles 5.2 Height of Escape Routes 5.3. Travel Distances 5.4 Escape Width - Doors 5.5 Escape Width - Stairs 5.6 Evacuation / Assembly Points 5.7 Doors 5.8 Exit Signage 5.9 Emergency lighting 5.10 Fire Egress for Mobility impaired Occupants 6 FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS 6.1 Detection and Alarms 6.2 _ Fire Suppression Systems 6.3 Hand-held Appliances 6.4 Fire Hydrant System 6.5 Gas Shut Off Valves/Solenoid Valves 7 SMOKE CONTROL & MECHANICAL SYSTEMS 7. Smoke Exhaust Fans 7.2 Emergency Power 7.3 Motorised Dampers 7.4 Level 3 “Extended Pre-Function” Mode ~ Areas North of Halls 1 and 3 7.5 _ Level 5 Icon Space Meeting Room Area 7.6 Make-up Air ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Report pine | 61 | Gapri8 | WA AACAIOOFEDL Reps l2 008 sevaaanw 10 18 18 19 19 20 20 20 22 24 25 25 28 28 29 29 32 32 32 33 33 35, 36 36 36 7 37 37 7 38 38 38Table of Contents 7.7 Electrical installation for Safety Systems 78 Fire Mode Cause & Effect Matrix 7.9 Smoke Exhaust Rates 8 COMPARTMENTATION & STRUCTURE 8.1 Fire Resistance Ratings 8.2 Steel elements Fire Engineered 8.3. Exitways 8.4 Smoke Rated Separations 8&5 Fire Curtains/Shutters 8.6 Fire Doors and Smoke Control Doors 87 Tiered Seating 88 Intermittent Activities 8.9 Protected Shafts 8.10 Floors 8.11 Closures in Fire and Smoke Separations 8.12 External Surface Finishes 8.13. Internal Surface Linings 9 FUEL BURNING EQUIPMENT AND APPLIANCES. 9.1 Gas Burning Appliances 9.2 Oilfired Appliances 9.3 Downlights 110 FIRE SERVICE ACCESS AND FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES 10.1. Fire Service Vehicular Access 10.2 Fire Service Facilities 10.3 Fire Fighting 111 TESTING, MAINTENANCE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 11.1 Testing and Commissioning of Life Safety Systems 11.2. Building Management 12 STRUCTURAL FIRE ENGINEERING 12.1. Description of Structure 12.2. Structural Design Objectives 12.3. Structural Fire Endurance Calculation Methods 12.4. Structural Fire Endurance Calculation Models 12.5. Time step Member Temperatures from FOS models 12.6 Time step Member Temperature from Assumed Adiabatic Surface Temperatures 12.7. Equivalent Time of Fire Exposure Calculations 12.8 Time step Member Temperatures from Eurocode Parametric Temperature-Time Curves 12.9 Wall Fire Ratings Using the Cumulative Radiant Energy Method 13 ASET MODELLING 13.1 Software 13.2 FDS Model Parameters "New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fe Engineering Report, Updte [6 | Spe | WHER AASZIOROESA Rp 027008 101 103 108Table of Contents 13.3, Design Fires 13.4 Tenabilty and Failure Criteria 13.5. Fire Modelling Results 13.6. ASET 13,7 Fire Brigade Tenability 114 FIRE EGRESS ~ ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS 14.1. Introduction 142 Acceptable Solutions design 15 EVACUATION MODELLING 15.1 Means of Egress 15.2 Time to Detection and Alarm 15.3 Recognition and Response (Pre-movement time) 15.4 Time to Travel and Queuing Time 155. Pathfinder 15.6 Basement Evacuation Scenarios 15.7 Base Evacuation Scenarios 15.8 Occupancy Numbers for Pathfinder 15.9. Laneway Bridge Link Egress 16 HAND CALCULATION RESULTS 16.1 RSET 17 PATHFINDER RESULTS 7A RSET 17.2. International Guideline 118 ASET VS RSET ANALYSIS 18.1 ASET/RSET Comparison 18.2 Conclusion 19 HORIZONTAL FIRE SPREAD 20 LIMITATIONS & LIABILITY 1.1 Limitations 20.4. Liability 21 APPENDICES [APPENDIX A - FIRE SAFETY & COMPARTMENT PLANS. ‘APPENDIX B - MINUTES [APPENDIX C - ARCHITECT'S MAKE UP AIR SKETCHES [APPENDIX D - SAFE PATH/EXIT SIGN LOCATIONS [APPENDIX E - ROBUSTNESS CHECK 21.1. Introduction 21.2. Robustness Scenarios ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre_| Fire Engineering Report update | 62 | Sapri8 | WARM EAODIFEDA Rept SNS 106 12 3 116 116 17 a7 117 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 139 140 141 az 142 143 144 144 14s 146 151 151 151 157 158 158Table of Contents ‘APPENDIX F - STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS RESULTS ‘APPENDIX G - FIRE MODE CAUSE & EFFECT MATRIX AND ZONE DIAGRAMS. APPENDIX H - EVENT MODE DIAGRAMS. APPENDIX | - REQUIRED DOOR WIDTHS ‘APPENDIX J - RELEVANT BOUNDARY ‘APPENDIX K - FIRE HYDRANT SYSTEM ‘APPENDIX L- FEB (LESS APPENDICES) ‘APPENDIX M - ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION PLANS ‘APPENDIX N - PLENARY VISIBILITY RESULTS APPENDIX O - SPINE FDS AND PYROSIM SCREENSHOTS AT ASET APPENDIX P - CONFIRMATION OF FRR REQUIREMENT ON FOR THE SKYCITY TUNNEL ON B1. REFERENCES ‘New Zealand international Convention Cenze_| Fir Engineering Report, 159 214 215 216 27 218 219 220 221 252 253 254% 1 HOWTO READ THIS REPORT This report contains both regulatory and design information, which is sub-divided as relevant to the reader, as follows: Section: Intended Audience Glent Design Team Peer Reviewer —Certifier Sections 5~11 Desien x x x x Requirements ‘New Zealnd international Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Report Updte | 62 | Gage | WABDtAS2TAOIOFED Rep SQNTO8% 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ‘This Fire Engineering design has been undertaken to show the suitability of the proposed fire safety systems Within the building and compliance with the nominated Performance Requirements of the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC). 2.1 Fire engineering approach ‘The fire engineering approach to develop a holistic alternative solution has enabled a fundamental and ‘economic fire safety solution to achieve a of code compliance in this complex building. This was achieved by undertaking specific design using a performance based approach, with key parameters taken from a range of ‘sources including established first principles, international guidance and the Acceptable Solutions, as applicable. ‘The specific design aspects designed through an alternative solution were generally focussed on public access areas, with more prescriptive guidance used for back of house areas. 2.2 Fire engineering solutions Fire engineering solutions have been developed for the following aspects of the building: * Fire rating of fire cells, smoke zones and structure. smoke hazard management systems. = Means of escape. ‘New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 6 Update | 6 | Aor 18 | WAZ AASLIONOODFEDA ec 30273 GENERAL ‘This report covers the fire engineering design for the proposed New Zealand International Convention Centre (NZICC), which is a large mixed use scheme bounded by Hobson Street, Wellesley Street and Nelson Street in ‘Auckland. The development presents some fire safety challenges, due to both the restrictive nature of the sloping site (for both pedestrian access/egress and fire service vehicular access), the large population on multiple storey levels and the various proposed event modes. ‘The fire safety strategy detailed within this report is intended to demonstrate a reasonable level of fire & life safety in accordance with NZ building codes, based on principles that have been adopted through a specific fire engineering design approach. The fire safety design is subject to review by the Peer Reviewer, Auckland, City Council and Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ).. ‘The project is required to consider the requirements of the Agreement between SKYCITY Entertainment Group Limited and The Crown. The Crown Design Brief contained within the Agreement will be discussed along with the regulatory and design requirements. e ‘The validity of the following fire safety design is based on the amalgamation of the following property titles into a single ttle: * Title no. NA 1041/140 (Lot 1 DP 39058) Title No. NA 1874/26 (DP 1293) + Title No. NA 2034/37 (Lot 1 DP 4977) ‘+ Title No, NA 839/214 (Lot 1 DP 32654) + Title No. NA 162/57 (Part Allotment 8 Section 23 City of Auckland) ‘+ Title No. NA 95C/235 (Lot1 DP 67298) ‘+ Title No. NA 1270/190 (Lot 1 DP 198988) ‘+ Title No. NA 1270/191 (Lot 2 0P198988) '* Title No. NA 127D/192 (Lot 3 DP 198988) e ‘+ Title No. NA 88/600 (Lot 4 Allotment 12 of Section 23 City of Auckland) ‘+ Title No. NA 67/827 (Part Allotment 12 Section 23 City of Auckland) ‘+ Title No. NA 77/220 (Lot 2 Allotment 12 Section 23 City of Auckland and defined on DP1507) ‘+ Title No.713475 (Lot 1 0P 195519) ‘© Title No, NA 343/182 (OP 14489) ‘© Title No. 713541 (Lot 1 DP 60273 and Part Allotment 11 Section 23 Auckland City) "New Zealand intemationa Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report 7 Updite | 62 | Gap | WHEE ARZIOOREFER Rap 5071083.1 Introduction ‘The objectives of the performance assessment (specific design) were to: * Asa new building, all aspects of the works must comply with section 17 of the Building Act 2004 which requires that all works comply with the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) as per Schedule 1 of the Building Regulations 1992, 10" April 2012. In operation the building is required to comply with Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 2006. 3.2 Regulatory Framework In terms of fire safety, the main regulatory requirements are derived from: ™ The Building Act 2004 and the New Zealand Building Code for the construction of the building; and = The Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017 in the form of the Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 2006 for the safe and expeditious evacuation of the occupants. Where relevant, the design will comply with the Acceptable Solutions (i.e. back of house areas), which were used as the basis of meeting the Performance Requirements. Thus the specific design aspects to be designed through an alternative solution are generally limited to public / circulation areas. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 8 Update | 61 | 6Apri8 | WIA2LAASDIORODFEDA Regis‘The method of analysis for various parts of the development is illustrated below. Accoplable Solution Specific Design Levels 84, 83, B2, 81, Level 01 & Level 02 Level 03, Level 04 Level oom. ‘New Zealand interational Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Report Uplate [61 | age | WH AACIOROOOFEDA Rapp SN7DOSLevel 05 3.3. New Zealand Building Code 3.3.1 New Zealand Building Code C Clauses To demonstrate that compliance with the NZBC has been achieved, the fire safety design demonstrated ‘compliance with the Building Code clauses C1-C6 ‘Protection from Fire’, as per Table 1 below. The detail of how compliance with the NZBC has been demonstrated and moreover key parameters for the design of the building has been discussed and approved as part of a series of stakeholder meetings, involving relevant key Stakeholders. Notes or minutes from meetings are provided in APPENDIX B of this report. Table 1 New Zealand Building Code Objectives seen tere Prevention of fire occurring C1_ Objectives of clauses C2 to C6 (protection from fire) Fire affecting areas beyond the fire source (a) safeguard people from an unacceptable risk of injury or illness caused by fire, Movement to a place of safety (b) protect other property from damage caused by fire, Access and safety for fire fighting and operations (c) Facilitate fire fighting and rescue operations. Structural stability F6.1 The objective of this provision is to help safeguard Visibility in escape routes people from injury in escape routes during failure of main lighting, F7.1 The objective of this provision is to safeguard people Warning Systems from injury or illness due to lack of awareness of an ‘emergency. Signs F8.1 The objective of this provision is to: "New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report, 10 Update | 6 | 6AGr 8 | ASRAMEDIONOEERA ec 02 TosNew Zealand Building Code Objectives {a) safeguard people from injury or illness resulting from inadequate identification of escape routes, or of hazards within or about the building, (b) safeguard people from loss of amenity due to inadequate direction, and (c) ensure that people with disabilities are able to carry out normal activities and processes within buildings. Table2 Clause C2—Prevention of fire occurring n Sol Functional requirement 2.1 Fixed appliances using controlled combustion and other fixed equipment must be designed, constructed, and installed in buildings in a way that | Refer to Section 9 reduces the likelihood of illness or injury due to fire occurring. Performance (2.2 The maximum surface temperature of | Combustible building materials close to fixed appliances using controlled combustion and other | Refer to Section 8.13 and 9 fixed equipment when operating at their design level must not exceed 90°C. | 2.3 Fixed appliances using controlled combustion | and other fixed equipment must be designed, constructed and installed so that there is a low probability of explosive or hazardous conditions ‘occurring within any spaces in or around the building that contains the appliances. Refer to Section 6.5 Table 3 Clause C3—Fire affecting areas beyond the fire source Functional requirement 3.1 Buildings must be d that there is a low probability of injury or illness to Refer to Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 persons not in close proximity to a fire source. C3.2Buildings with a building height greater than 10 m where upper floors contain sleeping uses or other property must be designed and constructed NO Upper floors contain sleeping uses or 30 that there is a low probability of external vertical “ther Property fire spread to upper floors in the building. (C3.3Buildings must be designed and constructed so that there is a low probability of fire spread to other _ Refer to Sections 8 and 19 property vertically or horizontally across a relevant | ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report u dpdate | 61 | Apr t8 | WR ALIONOODFED Rati 127 ANSEee ee ees boundary. Table 4 Clause C3 (continued)—Fire affecting areas beyond the fire source Performance 3.4(a) materials used as internal surface linings in the following areas of buildings must meet the performance criteria specified below: Performance determined under conditions a described in ISO 9705: 1993 Buildings not | Buildings protected protected with an with an automatic automatic fire fire sprinkler sprinkler system system Wall/celling materials in sleeping areas where care | Material Group Material Group or detention is provided Number 1-5 Number 1 or 2 Wolfesing materalsnextwas Manat Soe Mam) co Wall/celling materials in all occupied spaces in | Material Group | Material Group importance level 4 buildings Number 1-5 Number 2 or 2 Internal surfaces of ducts for HVAC systems eng | Nake Ceiling materials in crowd and sleeping uses except - household units and where care or detention is | Material, «Group. Material Group provided lumber 1-5 or lumber 1 or Wall materials in crowd and sleeping uses except ; Material Group | Material Group household units and where care or detention is provided Number 1-Sor 2-5 Number 1, 2, or3 \Wall/ceiling materials in occupied spaces in all other | Material Group | Material Group locations in buildings, including household units. | Number 1, 2, or 3 Number 1, 2, or 3 Material Group Material Group External surfaces of ducts for HVAC systems | aaa eee Naser taees Acoustic treatment and pipe insulation within | Material Group | Material Group airhandling plenums in sleeping uses | Number 2, 2, or3 Number 2, 2, 0r3 TableS __Clause C3 (continued)—Fire affecting areas beyond the fire source 3.4 (b) floor surface materials in the following areas of buildings must meet the performance criteria specified below: Minimum critical radiant flux when tested to ISO 9239-1: 2010 Buildings not protected with _ Buildings ‘Area of building "New Zealand intemational Convention Cenre_| Fire Erginering Report Unite [62 | 6-18 | WIASDAAEQIONIOFEDA PagersSleeping areas and exitways in buildings where care or detention is provided Exitways in all other buildings Firecells accommodating more than 50 persons All other occupied spaces except household units 3.4(c) suspended flexible fabrics and membrane structures used in the construction of buildings must have properties resulting in a low probability of injury or illness to persons not in close proximity toa fire source. ‘an automatic fire sprinkler | protected system with an automatic fire sprinkler system 4.5 kW/m? 2.2 kW/m? 2.2 kW/m? 2.2 kW/m? 2.2 kW/mé 1.2 kW/m? 1.2 kW/m? 1.2 kW/m? Refer to Section 8.13 Table 6 3.5 Buildings must be designed and constructed so that fire does not spread more than 3.5 m vertically from the fire source over the external cladding of multi-level buildings. 3.6 Buildings must be designed and constructed so that in the event of fire in the building the received radiation at the relevant boundary of the property does not exceed 30 kW/m? and at a distance of 1 m beyond the relevant boundary of the property does not exceed 16 kW/m?. 3.7External walls of buildings that are located closer than 1m to the relevant boundary of the property on which the building stands must either: be constructed from materials which are not combustible building materials, or for buildings in importance levels 3 and 4, be constructed from materials that, when subjected to a radiant flux of 30 kW/m2, do not ignite for 30 minutes, or for buildings in Importance Levels 1 and 2, be constructed from materials that, when subjected to 2 radiant flux of 30 KWW/m2, do not ignite for 15 minutes. 3.8 Firecells located within 15 m of a relevant boundary that are not protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and that contain a fire load {reater than 20 TJ or that have a floor area greater than 5,000 m2 must be designed and constructed "New Zealand interational Cention Centre | Fie Engineering Report Clause C3 (continued)—Fire affecting areas beyond the fire source Refer to Section 8.12 Refer to Section 19 Refer to Section 8.12 ‘The building is protected by a compliant fire sprinkler system throughoutee ee eee so that at the time that firefighters first apply water to the fire, the maximum radiation flux at 1.5 m above the floor Is no greater than 4.5 kW/m2 and ‘the smoke layer is not less than 2m above the floor. 3.9. Buildings must be designed and constructed with regard to the likelihood and consequence of failure of any fire safety system intended to control fire spread. Refer to Section 12.2 Table7 Clause C4—Movement to place of safety Functional requirement 4.1 Buildings must be provided with: effective means of giving warning of fire, and Visibility in escape routes complying with clause F6. 4.2 Buildings must be provided with means of escape to ensure that there is a low probability of occupants of those buildings being unreasonably delayed or impeded from moving to a place of safety and that those occupants will not suffer injury or iliness as 2 result. Performance 4.3 The evacuation time must allow occupants of a building to move to a place of safety in the event of a fire so that occupants are not exposed to any of the following: (a) fractional effective dose of carbon monoxide greater than 0.3: (b) a fractional effect greater than 0.3: (c) conditions where, due to smoke obscuration, Visibility is less than 10 m except in rooms of less than 100 m? where visibility may fal to 5 m. 4.4 Clause C4.3(b) and (c) do not apply where itis not possible to expose more than 1 000 occupants in a firecell protected with an automatic fire sprinkler system. C45 Means of escape to a place of safety in buildings must be designed and constructed with regard to the likelihood and consequence of failure of any fire safety systems. dose of thermal effects "New ealandinterational Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report Update | 62 | Apr 18 | Wet ACRCIOFED Rey Se 708 Refer to Section 6.1 Refer to Section 5 Refer to Section 18 Refer to APPENDIX ETable 8 Clause C5—Access and safety for firefighting operations Functional requirement 5.1 Buildings must be designed and constructed so that there is a low probability of firefighters or other emergency services personnel being delayed in or impeded from assisting in rescue operations and performing firefighting operations. Refer to Section 10 5.2 Buildings must be designed and constructed so that there is a low probability of illness or injury to firefighters or other Refer to Section 10 ‘emergency services personnel during rescue and firefighting operations. Performance C5.3 Buildings must be provided with access for fire service vehicles to a hard-standing from which there is an unobstructed path to the building within 20 m of: (2) the firefighter access into the building, and (b) the inlets to automatic fire sprinkler systems or fire hydrant systems, where these are installed. Refer to Section 10 (5.4 Access for fire service vehicles in accordance with clause C5.3 must be provided to more than 1 side of firecells greater than | Refer to Section 10 5,000 m2 in floor area that are not protected by aan automatic fire sprinkler system. 5.5 Buildings must be provided with the means to deliver water for firefighting to all parts of the _ Refer to Section 10, building 5.6 Buildings must be designed and constructed in a manner that will allow firefighters, taking into account the firefighters’ personal protective equipment and standard training, to: {a) reach the floor of fire origin, (b) search the general area of fire origin, and (c) protect their means of egress. 5.7 Buildings must be provided with means of Biving clear information to enable firefighters to: (a) establish the general location of the fire, (b) identify the fire safety systems available in Refer to Section 10 the building, and (c) establish the presence of hazardous substances or process in the building. 5.8 Means to provide access for and safety of | Refer to Sections 5 and 10 Refer to Section 10 New Zealand intemational Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report Update [63 | apr | WoPEDTASDIFOOAFED Rep SZTOSee firefighters in buildings must be designed and constructed with regard to the likelihood and consequence of failure of any fire safety systems. Table 9 Clause C6—Structural stal Functional requirement 6.1 Structural systems in buildings must be constructed to maintain structural stability during fire so that there is: (a) a low probability of injury or illness to occupants, service personnel during rescue and firefighting operations, and (c) a low probability of direct or consequential damage to adjacent household units or other property. Performance 6.2 Structural systems in buildings that are necessary for structural stability in fire must be designed and constructed so that they remain stable during fire and after fire when required to protect other property taking into account: {a)the fire severity, (b) any automatic fire sprinkler systems within the buildings, (©) any other active fire safety systems that affect the fire severity and its impact on structural stability, and (d) the likelihood and consequence of failure of any fire safety systems that affect the fire severity and its impact on structural stability 6.3 Structural systems in buildings that are necessary to provide firefighters with safe access to floors for the purpose of conducting firefighting and rescue operations must be designed and constructed so that they remain stable during and after fire. €6.4 Collapse of building elements that have lesser fire resistance must not cause the consequential collapse of elements that are required to have a higher fire resistance. Refer to Sections 8 and 12 (b) a low probability of injury or illness to fire Refer to Sections 8 and 12 Refer to Sections 8 and 12 Refer to Sections 8 and 12 New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report Update | 61 | Gora | WHR AE2IOIOFED Rec S083.3.2. Fire Safety System Failure Matrix FEB Table 15 provides a qualitative analysis of the failure of fire safety systems affecting the means of escape and access for and safety of firefighters (Building Codes C4.5 and C5.8) Table 10 Likelihood and failure matrix for fire safety systems “deleted — refer to FEB Table 15* Table 11__ Authority Engagement Schedule Pre-2014 14/06/14 11/02/15 05/03/15, 24/04/15, 19/06/15, 30/07/15, 31/03/16 12/04/16 19/10/2016 Peer reviewer (Geoff Merryweather) FENZ FENZ ‘Auckland Council Peer reviewers FENZ ‘Auckland Council & Peer Reviewer Peer Review Discussion Peer Review Comments ‘Auckland Council & Peer Reviewer A series of meetings and workshops during the establishment of the FEB to agree principles and approach. Presentation of the FEB documents. Subsequent written in-principle approval for approach received post meeting. Update and overview of fire protection services equipment and locations, FENZ provided no objection to proposed design. Workshop to present the FEB documents. Verbal in-principle approval indicated. Meeting with Geoff Merryweather and Charles. Clifton, together with the structural engineer to present and agree the methodology for the structural fire engineering. Update for FENZ to take them through the revised design and its impact on the FEB. Update for the Council and Geoff ‘Merryweather to take them through the revised design and its impact on the FEB, Workshop with Geoff Merryweather to discuss FER status. Comments from Geoff Merryweather on the FER. Presentation of final FEB for approval 3.3.3. Risk Groups and Acceptable Solutions The back of house (BOH) and office areas have been assessed under the Acceptable Solutions C/ASS ‘Acceptable Solution for Buildings used for Business, Commercial and Low Level Storage (Risk Group WA). 3.3.4 Building importance level ‘As described in the Building Code clause A3, the building importance level is IL 3; ‘Any other building with a capacity of $000 or more people’. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report wt AIDALODFEDA Rep p NSLS ”% 3.4 Brief Requirements ‘The following paragraph has been taken from the Design Brief, included in the agreement between SKYCITY and the Crown. “Fire services shall be designed and installed in compliance with the following standords and regulations: + New Zealand Building Code; + Fire Safety and Evacuation of Building Regulations; + The relevont New Zealand Standards; + Allother regulations of authorities having jurisdiction over the works.” 3.5 Relevant Stakeholders Table 12 Fire Engineering Stakeholders Role rg ores Em Principal | zice Sarah Ballantyne Sarah.Ballantyne@skycity.co.nz Principal's Representative BECAPM The Fletcher Gient Construction Company Ltd Warren and Architecture | Mahoney, Woods | Bagot, Moller Architects Structural / Civil Beca Fire Engineering | Norman Disney & Young, Fire Protection geca Mechanical Beca Electrical Beca Territorial | ayedtand Cty Authority Fire Service | FENZ Geoff Wicks Daniel Bosher Richard Archbold Richard Built Ben Ferguson Robert Peart (verification) Simon Widjaja Charles Roos Kristian Johnson Ed Claridge ‘Amy Harpur Geoff Purcell Geoff.Wicks@beca.com DanB@fec.co.nz Richard.archbold@wam.co.nz Richard.Built@beca.com b.ferguson@ndy.com r.peart@ndy.com s.widjaja@ndy.com Charles.roos@beca.com Kristian Johnson@beca.com Ed.Claridge@aucklandcouncil govt.nz Amy.Harpur@fireandemergency.nz Geoff Purcell @fireandemergency.nz "New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report I WesateinceZeOneFED Repos a8Fete Anvil Fire | | | Geoff Merryweather Geoff@anvilfireconsultants.co.nz Reviewer Consultants Structural Fire | yp, aH University of Peer Reviewer | Canterbury Dr. Tony Abu anthony.abu@canterbury.ac.nz 3.6 Revision History Table 13 Revision History: Pa eed Peer 05 May 2015 | 10 Final Draft FEB ~ Revised Design 01 Oct 2015 - Draft FEB documents — Preliminary Design 30 August 2016 20 Updated FEB 12 October 2016 23 Final FEB ‘Note: Auckland Cound and FENZ confirmed that they were happy to proceed tothe FER stage after version 1.0 ofthe FEB Table 14 Revision History: Fire Engineering Report a fomod Pea (03 August 2015, 10 Developed Design Draft 06 August 2015, Zon Developed Design Draft 31 August 2015 3.0 Developed Design 3 February 2016 40 Detailed Design 13 May 2016 5.0 Detailed Design (Oraft Consent) 29 June 2016 51 Detailed Design 30 September 2016 52 Detailed Design Update 21 December 2016 53 Update for FCC 24 February 2017 54 Coordination Update 21 April 2017 55 Building Consent Issue 15 December 2017 60 | Updated Building Consent Issue capi anil “a Updated Building Consent issue following the coordination process 3.7 Fire and Emergency New Zealand Commission Review ‘Compliance with clause C1 to C6 will involve an alternative solution to the acceptable solutions and verification methods. Consequently, @ copy of the building consent application must be provided to Fire and Emergency New Zealand Commission as required by section 46(i) of the Building Act 2004 and the notice published in the New Zealand Gazette No. 49, 3 May 2012. ‘New Zealand intemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 1» pdt | 61 | gr 18 | WIE AB2LACDO FER Rept 70008e. 4 BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS 4.1 Building Description The New Zealand international Convention Centre (NZICC) is a large mixed use scheme bounded by Hobson Street, Wellesley Street and Nelson Street in Auckland. The development presents some fire safety challenges, due to both the restrictive nature of the sloping site (for both pedestrian access/egress and fire service vehicular access), the large populations on multiple storey levels and the different event modes ‘occurring at the same time. The development includes the following accommodation: Table 15 Building Layout Description Level 85, Lift Pits Level B4-B1 Basement car parking; temporary storage ‘Nelson St entry lobby, truck loading dock, kitchen, car parking, Level 1-2 temporary storage, meeting rooms, retail food & beverage, Nelson Street offices Level 3 Exhibition halls, circulation spine, Hobson St entry, Wellesley Gallery Level 4 Circulation spine mezzanine, Plant Level 4M Plant, BOH eal Circulation spine upper level, Plenary, pre-function, meeting rooms & BOH Level 5M Plant, (Plenary upper tier) Level 6 Plant, Roof Plant Level 6M Plenary & stage technical gallery 4.2 Occupant Load Assessment ‘The table below details the occupancy loads for each space and floor. This is based on thr proposed floor space factors from C/VM2 as defined in the FEB. Table 16 __ Occupant Load Assessment Greece coe Deer cay Dred yin 84 Car park 50 200 [Bs Car park 50 200 B2 Car park 50 200 Car park 50 7 Bi Workshops 3 198 a ar park 50 ae Drop off area : : 10 "New zeslndintemationa Convention Cente | Fre Engineering Report » Update 162 | 6418Floor space factor Floor peer) TC) Cr egeeCLy ‘Kitchen Canteen Wziec Office Nelson St retail a SARE ~ Mieting room L1-0i ‘Meeting room L1-02 Car park Event office B 2 a8 Fire Control Room / Security | “ a Rooms Total (2 a2 Wellesley Gallery _ 575. — oS Exhibitions has oe AS per Table 17 ‘4500 B Servery 292 10 30 Hobson St F&8 46 125 37 ‘Total Level 3 5142 u Meeting Room 30 25 32° um BOH Storage 992 100 10° Plenary ‘As per Table 17 2850 As per Table 60 6 193 os 2a 340 | 0a a each es eee onererenser ference : 430 ot occupied when 7 Meeting Room 15-01 ” 2s seu he sahil Meeting Room 15-02 6s 25 2S (ny oes eer aagnchins a wesmsaa sesssseunsee{..Plenary fully, o¢é Mecingoomtsas | 128 23 BS ik ates | __ Meeting Room 15-03 120 25 peepee gee ce uly ea iM Plant rooms 700 30 2a" 6 intermittent activities ° ism Intermittent activities 0 TOTAL 3982 ‘Note I Some figures difer slighty in some instances from the mechanical services designer, however mest the NZBC. ‘Note 2: Some figures difer slighty in some instances from section 14 because allowance has been made for double counting in staff areas mainly, ‘New Zealand intemational Corwention Centre | Fir Engineering Report a Update | 61 | Ger 1 | WASPInSDIAOIIFER Reps TADS‘The use of a specified design occupancy load in some areas was considered reasonable given the use and function of the areas in the table below. These figures have been produced by Skycity and represent higher ‘occupant numbers than the WC and mechanical ventilation design criteria and are therefore considered conservative. Therefore we do not expect these numbers to be exceeded. ‘When the exhibition halls and plenary are fully occupied, we have assumed no occupant is present in meeting rooms or pre-function areas on these levels, or in the spine. ‘When the exhibition halls and plenary are not fully occupied we have assumed the spine, the meeting rooms and pre-function spaces are occupied in accordance with area/density calculated numbers. Table 17 __ Occupancy Loading - Specific Design Loads Bernd i Seay cr Hall1 | Hall2 | Hall3 | Plenary West | Plenary East Hall 1,2, 3 1,500 per hall (4,500 total) simultaneous pent i Hall 1 occupied only 2,000 Full Plenary i Half Plenary Hall 1, 2, 3 occupied on Levels 3.and5 | Level 3 and full plenary on Level 5 4.3 Dominant Occupant Characteristics ‘The building occupants have been categorised within two primary groups: ™ staff who will be awake and familiar with the building; and ® Visitors to the building who will be awake but may be unfamiliar with the building. ‘The occupant characteristics of the building are outlined below: 43.1 State ‘The occupants of the building are expected to be awake at all times, however a number may be under the influence of drugs such as alcohol. 4.3.2 Physical and Mental Attributes Occupants are considered to be representative of the general public. Occupants are expected to have a level of understanding where they can recognise an emergency situation. ‘The occupants are expected to have the ability to take and implement decisions independently and the potential emergency behaviour is generally expected to be rational and constructive to the emergency situation "New Zealand interational Convention Cetre_| Fie Engineering Report 2 Update | 62 | GApei8 | WIA otASD26OERA ReneS% 4.3.3. Building Familiarity Occupants are expected to be familiar with the primary access and egress routes from the building. It is unlikely that occupants will be familiar with all the evacuation routes. Visitors may be unfamiliar with the building, while staff will be familiar with the building. ‘The majority of the occupants are expected to prefer to evacuate via the same route that they entered. 1 D Bennetts eta Fre Safty in shopping Centres Final Research Report Projet 6, Fire Code Reform Centre Lt, ul 998, pp 59-72 "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Roport, a Uplite 61 | Gapri8 | WAZIRiAQTAOIEFES Reps S1705 FIRE EGRESS Alll escape routes shall generally be designed in accordance with clause D1 of the NZBC and NZS 4121:2001. 5.1 Overview of the Evacuation Principles ‘The NZICC building is a large development over multiple floor levels, with a high population density. A staged evacuation strategy is proposed, which is in line with international benchmarking, ‘Smoke hazard management and fire separation of various areas has been used to contain smoke/fire and allow the staged evacuation. 5.1.1 Staged evacuation Staged evacuation, based on the principle that all persons within the building will not evacuate at the same time and thus significantly reducing the occupancy loadings to exits and stairs during evacuation of the different zones. A staged evacuation requires certain parts of the building to be separated into specific EWIS zones (refer APPENDIX G ) and evacuation in accordance with the fire matrix (also APPENDIX G ), depending on the fire location. In the event of fire detection, the specific EWIS zones associated with the area of fire origin will evacuate in the first instance. The automatic cascade to the remaining areas will occur after a period of S minutes (ie. no manual intervention 5 minutes after the fire zone commences evacuation). Each EWIS zone is separated from adjacent groups by fire rated compartment construction and a smoke control system. Therefore staged evacuation zones align with fire cell boundaries. 5.1.2 Evacuation time The evacuation time for the main crowd areas has considered the UK Green Guide (for design of sports stadia) with regards to total evacuation times. An 8 minute evacuation time (from the time occupants ‘commence moving) has been recognized in the Guide to Safety at Sport Grounds, through experience and research, as a period within which occupants are less likely to become agitated, or experience frustration or stress. These times have been used as a guide to assess appropriate evacuation times for the main crowd areas in the convention centre: Ce Rocca Dern Circulation Spine Level 03~ Exhibition - floor plate Evacuation s the point at which all occupants are ina place of Level 05 — Plenary Pre-function ‘safety (outside or ina means of egress sal), Level 05 — Plenary level floor plate Creulation Spine Level 03 — Exhibition Hall —fie cll Evacuation is the point at which all occupants ae ina relative Level 05 ~ Plenary place of safety (outside the fie cell or smoke zone or instal. ‘The car park, truck dock, and any ancillary and BOH areas have not been designated an evacuation time, these areas have been designed as per the guidance of the Acceptable Solutions (refer below). [New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report * Update | 61 | GAor18 | WHSDIAALOTAOFEOA Repti ToS& 5.2 Height of Escape Routes Escape routes have a clear height of no less than 2100 mm across the full width. Isolated ceiling fittings (not ‘exceeding 200 mm in diameter) may project downwards to reduce this clearance by no more than 100 mm. ‘Any door opening within, or giving access to, any escape route has a clear height of no less than 1955 mm for the required width of the opening 5.3. Travel Distances 5.3.1 General ‘The two key areas for moving people horizontally through a fire cell wall are the Exhibition Halls and the Plenary. The smoke exhaust system is designed to provide an ASET > RSET with an appropriate safety factor, a detalled in the occupant evacuation assessment in Sections 17 to 18 of this report. The required exit width dimensions from the areas of high occupant load including the Spine, Exhibition Hall {including within the removable partitions) and the Plenary fire cells are summarized as per drawing shown in APPENDIX |. The minimum width for doors is an unobstructed opening width of no less than 760 mm (single-leaf doors) ‘and multi-leaf doors have no single leaf less than 500 mm wide. Both doors are required for egress. Based on the distribution of exits around the space, the travel distances within occupied spaces was shown to be a secondary factor compared to cueing and is therefore acceptable. Any future fit-out or works will be acceptable based on maintaining exit widths and occupant numbers. 5.3.2 Fire Egress from Plenary ‘The design basis for the Plenary and seating layouts has been undertaken by the architects. NDY has undertaken a comparison of the design against the guidance in the UK Green Guide: Table 18 Maximum Travel Distances Reena es mee Pee ae ie P ree No spectator in any part of a seated area should have to travel more than 30 m from their seat in order to enter an exit system, measured along the line of the seating row and gangway. The max travel distance from a seated area to a doorway leading out of the plenary is up to 33 m for a person in the middle plenary and up to 42 m for N min the upper plenary, eer Note 1 ekaysemisdetnedasasetor | 2BenONInthe upper plana refer | different types of exits, such as stairway, of the RSET vs gangway, passageway, doorway etc, linked | Where this is not achieved, a RSET VS SET analysis) to form a means of passage for spectators. ASET assessment has been undertaken. Note 2:n tans with voritoristhis | Uistance would be measured rom the seat to the entrance of the vomitory Gangways in seated areas should be a Approximately 1200 mm for the Y minimum of 1.1m wide (1.2 m gangway. "New Zeslandintemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report (apr B | WARE tAAGDRUORFEDA Rept S02 TINEWee eas Feil eae Penney coeur) i rea pean ied recommended for new construction) | Seating row depth for new construction 700- | Approx 1000 mm for the seating row 760. mm depth. Minimum clearway (depth of row minus space occupied by fixed seating) should be 400 mm. This may be reduced to 305 mm. where there are not more than seven seats | Approx 400 mm for the clearway. ina row served by a gangway on one side, or ‘not more than 14 seats in a row served by gangways on both sides. Figure 1 ‘Maximum travel distance from fixed seating to a doorway leading out of the plenary The extended travel distances with respect to the recommendations in the UK Green Guide were assessed as part of the ASET vs RSET analysis in Section 18. 5.3.3 Egress from the Hobson St Hotel across the Laneway Bridge ‘The Hobson Street Hotel will be provided with two sky bridges, one linking to the NZICC via the Laneway Bridge and the second linking to the existing SKYCITY site via the Hobson Bridge. Egress is required from the Hobson St Hotel level H4 Promenade space across the Laneway Bridge into the NZICC. The fire separation of NZICC from the Hobson St Hotel at NZICC level 4 (Hobson St Hote! level H4) will be at the junction of the Laneway Bridge and the NZICC facade. "New Zealand interationl Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 6 Update [62 | Ger 18 | WED eA AOOOFER Rept STI% Proprietary Fireguard Won-doors are to be used as part of the fire separation to allow for egress into NZICC. ‘These doors are electrically driven retractable “accordion” style doors. ‘The Won-doors providing egress from the Laneway Bridge will function as follows: ‘+ Close upon smoke detection in the NZICC spine. * Close upon activation of a smoke detector located within 1.5m of the Won-door within the Laneway Bridge. * Allow an occupant to operate a push plate to automatically open to a width of at least 1 m wide to permit egress for 10s and then close automatically, unless the push plate Is pressed again allowing the door to open. ‘Additionally, the following is required: ‘* The Won-doors shall be power operated and shall be capable of being operated in the event of power failure. +The doors shall be openable by a simple method from both sides without special knowledge or effort. @ ‘+ The force required to operate the door shall not exceed 133 N to set the door in motion and 67 N to close the door or open it to the minimum required width ‘+ The door shall be openable with a force not to exceed 67 N when a force of 1100 Nis applied Perpendicular to the door adjacent to the operating device. * The door assembly shall comply with the applicable fire protection rating (FRR -/60/60 and shall be self-closing or automatic closing by smoke detection as specified, shall be installed in accordance with NZS 4520 and shall comply with Section 716 (NZS 4520, NZ Building Code for FRR). The door assembly shall have an integrated standby power supply. ‘© The door assembly power supply shall be electrically supervised. ‘© The door shail open to give a clear opening of 1000 mm within 10 seconds after activation of the operating device. ‘© The door shail have a vision panel. ‘+ Allsecurity doors along the path of egress from the Laneway Bridge must either release in direction of escape or have local override to allow free egress. Refer to sections 6.1, 8.6, 15.9 and APPENDIX G for additional details on the requirements for the Won- doors. 5.3.4 Egress from area enclosed by movable walls When the meeting rooms to the north of Exhibition Hall 1 form two enclosed spaces by movable walls as. shown in Figure 2, each enclosed space will be provided with an aggregate egress width of 4.5 m. Refer to APPENDIXA.. "New Zealandinteratinal Cowention Centre| Fire Engineering Report 2 Update | 63 | Gap | WASPiMAE2TCONUFER ResaepSI2708When the meeting rooms to the north of Exhibition Hall 1 form a single enclosed spaces by movable walls as ‘shown in Figure 3, the enclose space will be provided with an aggregate egress width of 9 m. Figure 3 Provision of horizontal egress to a single enclosed space ‘An aggregate egress width of 9m will be provided to the enclosed ‘The same egress provisions shall also be provided to the meeting rooms to the north of Exhibition Hall 3, should these rooms be enclosed by movable walls. 5.4 Escape Width - Doors ‘The means of escape strategy is based on the minimum door widths outlined in APPENDIX | . ‘Any door not included in APPENDIX | is in an area of low occupant load where travel time to the exit dominates queuing time. These doors shall be a minimum clear width of 760mm (except for toilet doors which can be narrower if architecturally acceptable), with the exception of basement fire stair doors, that require a minimum clear width of 900mm, 5.5 Escape Width - Stairs ‘The four no. exit stairways serving upper levels will be 1.5 m wide each, arranged in a scissor stair ‘configuration (3 m wide per core). 5.5.1 Handrails and Limitations to Stairway Widths Stairway handrail will comply with NZBC D1. Additionally, the projection of each handrail from the wall will be no greater than 100 mm. "New Zealand intemational Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report B Update [62 | GAB | WaRetAEDTaROIOFEDK Repo S2ToO2. Fire Egress from the Basement Means of egress from the basement is provided via four basement stairs. Each stair is provided with @ width of 1.5 m, to suit the core size for the upper levels. This is greater than the 1.2 m width minimum design requirement. ‘The NW, NE and SE stairs do not have separation between rising and descending star flights and a smoke lobby shall be provided at each below-ground level. The SW stair will Incorporate a smoke door to separate rising and descending stair flights. 5.6 Evacuation / Assembly Points ‘The two primary assembly areas, as shown in Figure 4, are: "City Works Depot. ™ Skycity Auckland Bus Station. ‘Traffic control measures will be developed by SkyCity as part of the emergency management procedures. Figure 4 Assembly Areas 5.7. Doors 5.7.1 Doors Subdividing Escape Routes Doors on escape routes meet the following requirements: "= are hinged or pivoted on one vertical edge only, except that sliding doors may be used where they are programmed to spring open in fire alarm and power failure. Roller shutter doors or tilt doors shall not be used as escape route. "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Report 2 Updte [62 | 6Ape18 | WAACHeAROOIOF EO Rep a8Fire and smoke control doors are self-closing and the self-closing device shall either be: * active at all times, or " activated by releasing a hold-open device in response to operation of a smoke detector. 5.7.2 Plenary and Ex! in Halll Doors and Operable Wall Panels (Hall 2) Normal Mode In normal mode, Exhibition and Plenary doors will be manually opened and provided with hold open devices. Doors will be provided with key locks (or electric strikes) to secure the doors from the outside but are ‘openable internally such that the doors are always available for egress without the need for a handle or other lock release mechanism in non-fire mode situations. Door opening force will be less than 100 N. A push button to release (or test) the door hold open devices shall be provided. Fire Mode Plenary and Exhibition Hall doors and operable wall panels required for make up air shall be driven open with ‘mechanical openers (held open with hold open mechanisms) to provide make up air. The doors shall open following activation of a smoke detector in the Plenary or Exhibition Hall only (refer APPENDIX G for cause & effect matrix). ‘A manual push button door release is provided to close the doors by staff following evacuation. In the event that 2 detector activates in the Spine, the doors shall close or remain closed if already closed. In power failure, the mechanical door openers shall be provided with local battery back up to remain in the open position. Doors and operable wall panels will be openable internally such that the doors are always available for egress without the need for a handle or other lock release mechanism in non-fire mode situations. Door opening force will be less than 100 N. 5.7.3. Door Locking Devices Fire, smoke or egress doors that are required to be normally secure are fitted with simple fastenings that can be readily operated from the direction approached by people making an escape, and they have door handles which satisfy the requirements of Acceptable Solution D1/ASI for use by people with disabilities (where handles are provided), and they are constructed to ensure that the forces required to open these doors do not exceed those able to be applied in fire mode (i.e. with smoke exhaust fans running a force of less than 100 N shall apply). ‘Typically fire egress doors are not be fitted with any locking devices unless these comply with the following requirements set out below. ™ Be clearly visible, located where such a device would be normally expected and, in the event of fire, designed to be easily operated without a key or other security device, and allow the door to open in the normal manner. If the operation of a locking device is unusual, such as the pressing of a button close to the door, it shall have signage that complies with NZBC F8.3.1, and ™ Not prevent or override the direct operation of panic fastenings fitted to any door, and "New Zealand interational Convention Centre| Fire Engineering Report Ey Update | 6 | GApr18 | WADA AEOEAOTAFED Rep 7008If they are of an electromechanical type, in the event of a power failure or door malfunction, they either: = automatically switch to the unlocked (fail-safe) condition, or ~ be readily opened by an alternative method satisfying the requirements. Panic bars are provided to areas of high occupant loads (i.e. Exhibition Hall, Plenary, Function Spaces, final discharge door of stairs) unless the locking device will disengage in fire mode in all cases to provide free swing AND the force to open the door is less than 100 N, and External perimeter doors will remain locked from the outside only, however free egress is required from inside. Note, sliding doors required to open for make-up air will open upon activation of a fire alarm in the respective smoke zone. 5.7.4 Direction of Opening Doors on escape routes are hung to open in the direction of escape where the number of occupants that would use the door is more than 50, Where more than 50 people are located in a space, at least two doors that swing in the direction of egress shall be provided. 5.7.5 Vision Panels Vision panels are provided on the following doors: © Exit doors in regular use such as BOH kitchen, servery areas; Within the exitways, all doors leading into or one the path of discharge from the fire stairs (except the final exit door to the street). . All doors that swing in two directions. 5.7.6 Revolving Doors Revolving doors are provided on the final exit at the Hobson Street entry as in the event of a fire, power failure or malfunction, the doors access control systems continue to provide a safe means of escape from fire without reducing the required width by: = automatically opening and remaining open (fail safe open on power failure); or ™ being readily pushed to the outward open position by the building occupants in an emergency in a manner that is obvious to occupants. Additional swing doors are provided as exits immediately adjacent to the Nelson Street entry revolving doors. 5.7.7 Automatic Doors and Access Control Systems ‘Automatic (sliding doors) are not permitted on egress paths, with the exception of the final exit doors located on the building perimeter. ‘Access control on an escape route, into or within an exit way shall automatically open/release in fire mode or power failure to permit free egress. Alternatively, sliding doors that are able to be pushed open in an emergency may be provided. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fe Engineering Report a Updte | 61 | Gaprse | WAAR TRCDBFER Rape SOOKE5. 8 Hold Open Devices Detector-activated hold-open devices will be fitted to fire doors and smoke control doors that are in high use areas (where there is a risk of doors being wedged/chocked open). Architect may also nominate fire/smoke doors that are required to be held open in normal operation. Detectors for releasing hold-open devices shall be smoke detectors which are part of an automatic smoke detection system on both sides of the doorset. 5.7.9 Fire Doors to Exhibition Halls and Plenary Fire Doors that are driven open for make up air will be provided with a local heat detector (set at 93°C) immediately above the door, which will close the door upon activation. 5.8 Exit Signage Signage is provided in accordance with clause F8 of the Building Code. Exit signage locations are shown in the fire safety plans in APPENDIX A. In addition to exit signage above doors, the following signage is painted or fixed to the wall in the stairs that have a connection between rising and descending stair flights (nb they are not required to be F8 compliant): "Additional signage on the back of the final exit door stating “GROUND LEVEL — EXIT DOOR” "Additional signage shall be provided to the stair leading down to basement stating "BASEMENT LEVEL ONLY ~ NO EXIT” Signage shall be in a contrasting colour and be minimum 75mm high. 5.8.1 Exhibition Hall Removal Panels The removable panels in the Exhibition Halls and Plenary are continuously internally-illuminated via mains power, with a self-contained battery back-up. A management procedure will be developed by SKYCITY to ensure the exit signs are in place before the area is occupied by patrons. 5.9 Emergency lighting Emergency lighting is provided throughout the building in accordance with clause F6 of the Building Code. 5.10 Fire Egress for Mobility Impaired Occupants The fire safety strategy is based on evacuation of occupants from public areas horizontally into adjacent safer spaces before the need for them to evacuate vertically. The Plenary has been designed to accommodate wheelchairs within the cross-aisle and the width of exit doors has been designed accordingly. ‘New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 2 Undite | 63 | 6Apet8 | WIRSDLASETAAMOFED Rai Te6 FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS 6.1 Detection and Alarms Provide Detection and Alarm System to NZS 4512, with modifications as follows: ™ A Type 7 fire safety system comprising of sprinklers generally complying with NZS 4541:2013, and smoke detection and manual call points complying with NZS 4512:2010 and AS 1670.4 for the EWIS. Below celling smoke detectors with a sensitivity of minimum 5% obs/m. Where multi-criteria detectors with smoke, heat and CO sensors are used with the smoke sensor isolated (ie. during theatrical events), activation of either the heat OR the CO sensor will send an alarm signal to security as per 7.1.1 below (note if both heat AND CO sensors are activated, this will constitute a double knock effect sounding the EWIS). Car park levels provided with a multicriteria detector located within 1.5 m of the lifts protected by smoke curtains (refer APPENDIX A} to close the smoke curtain, The lft curtain detectors will only close the adjacent smoke curtain, not activate the occupant warning nor call FENZ. e ‘Smoke detector activation within the Level 01 Gallery space are to initiate the deployment of: + The Level 01 escalator smoke curtain, + The Level 03 horizontal smoke curtain over the Level 01 Gallery entry, and +The fire roller shutter on grid K separating the Secure Drop Off space from the Level 01 Gallery space. Provide multi-criteria Photo, Thermal & IR detectors (4) over the Level 01 fire rated roller shutter doors on grid D between grids 6 and 10; and also C1 and C2 lift door smoke curtains on grids D and C. if any one of the 4 detectors activates then the roller shutter doors and the smoke curtains are to deploy. Provide a local heat detector set at 93 dec.C in the operable wall panel between Exhibition Hall 2 and the Circulation Spine at a height of 2.5 m, which if activated will drop the fire curtain to the floor ‘Mechanical smoke exhaust activated by smoke detection as per the Fire Matrix. ‘An aspirated air samp i and laser/beam type detection system, provided in the following spaces: + Aspirated below and above ceiling of Level 5 Circulation Spine (min. 5% obs/m sensitivity). e + Beam detectors across atrium void at level 3 floor (part of Level 1 Nelson Street entry smoke zone (15% sensitivity). + Beam detectors across atrium voids in the circulation spine (15% sensitivity) ‘System design incorporates provisions to minimise spurious alarms to prevent unwanted evacuation and ability to isolate smoke detection systems to cater for some special effects (e.g. smoke machines) ‘The main fire control panel located in the fire control room, with a mimic panel located adjacent to the Nelson Street entry. 'NZICC fire pane! will be networked with the Hobson Street Hotel and the Skycity main site panels. Provide an interface to the Level 4 Laneway Bridge NZICC Link Won-door controller. There are to be two signals to the Won-door controller to close the Won-door. One from NZICC and one from the Hobson St Hotel. A signal from either source shall close the door. For NZICC, activation of a smoke detector within ‘the NZICC Spine (Grids L to N) from level 3 to level 5 shall results in the Won-door being signalled to close. ‘New Zealand International Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 3 pate | 61 | 6-18] ASDA TRODIFE Reps= Provide monitoring of the Won-door controller power supply. Any defect signal from the Won-door controller shall result in a fire alarm system defect signal. Refer to sections 5.3.3, 8.6, 15.9 and APPENDIX G for additional details on the requirements for the Won- doors. 6.1.1 Occupant Warning ‘The EWIS system is to comply with the requirements of AS 1670.4:2015 as provided for in NZS.4512:2010 clause 406.8, including horn-type speakers to external areas (i.e. roof and nelson street roof deck). The EWIS system is to interface with and overrides the PA system, Upon activation of a single device (smoke detector), a silent alarm to security will occur initially (refer to the fire matrix in APPENDIX G ), with the alarm/occupant warning programmed to sound upon activation of: ™ a sprinkler head, to sound throughout all EWIS zones located within the sprinkler zone; or ® any two devices (i.e. two smoke detectors, a multi-criteria device with any two sensors activating, Le. heat and CO, or a manual call point and a smoke detector], or = manual activation by the Chief Fire Warden. (Owner isolation facilities are provided to prevent a remote alarm being signalled from smoke detectors on 2 ‘Type 7 system due to predictable false alarms from specific occupant activities. ‘The activation of a single smoke detector will be managed by Skycity through an investigation time similar to the current procedures for other parts of the Skycity precinct. Upon expiration of the investigation time (10 minutes), the system will automatically revert to alert/evacuation mode. Activation of a break glass alarm (manual call point) will immediately activate the evacuation tones unless NZICC has procedures to investigate an activation as per a single smoke detector above and a RED flashing light is provided at the manual call point to indicate to the user that the alarm has been acknowledged. 6.1.2 Concealed Spaces Detection in concealed spaces is to comply with NZ4512, with the exception of the car park wet wall cavity. 6.1.3 Mechanical interface ‘The fire alarm system interfaces with the mechanical system to provide the required signals and monitoring. to effect the control functions given in the Fire Mode Cause and Effect Matrix in APPENDIX G . ‘The fire mechanical interfaces are located in each mechanical control centre where the respective signals are tobe effected. This arrangement provides for active fault monitoring of the life safety communications network, ‘The interface communications shall meet the requirements of: "AS/NZS 1668.1:2015 including sections 4.9 to 4.11, and 4.13 to 4.15, ® AS1670.1:2015 section 7.1 to 7.3, 7.8, 79, 7.11, 7.12, 7.15 to 7.19. ‘The Fire Alarm System addressable loop will distribute critical fire information to appropriate field devices located in fire rated rooms. The addressable loops utilize diversified routes around the site so that each interface module has two separate information routes to provide system redundancy. "New Zealand itemational Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report u Updte | 62 | 6A 18 | WIAZteIACIREODIFEA Repti TAS% 6.1.4 Fire Fan Control ‘The Fire Fan Control Panel (FFCP) installation is in accordance with AS/NZS 1668.1:2015 and AS1670.1:2015. ‘The FFCP will be located in the NZICC Fire Control Room on Wellesley Street. The FFCP shall include an air schematic diagram on the FFCP in a manner such that the operation of any override switch is readily and instantly identifiable with the relevant component on the air schematic. The operation of the FFCP will be intuitive and not require referencing of information away from the FFCP. 6.2 Fire Suppression Systems 6.2.1 Automatic Fire Sprinklers ‘A sprinkler system throughout all areas, compliant with NZS 4541 and not be modified by Appendix B of compliance documents AS. The following clarifications apply: = No sprinklers under the retractable seating and partial coverage of the void under the stage. = Flush sprinklers heads are not used in any area. All heads are fast response below ceiling sprinkler heads. = Sensitivity studies were undertaken, assessing the effectiveness of sprinklers in some of the tall spaces and ceiling configuration, to validate the use of the specified design fires. ™ Plant rooms with sprinkler protection. Gas suppression and 2 hr FRR compartmentation is noted within this report. ™ Sprinkler activation within the car park areas will shut down the jet-fans. = wall wetting sprinklers provided to the stage side of the fire curtain separating the stage from the seating. ‘Basement carpark wet walls are not be sprinkler protected. Sprinklers designed in accordance with NZS 4541 relative to the hazard classification of each area, or as specifically specified by the fire protection services engineer. Note the basis of the fire modelling was as. follows: ight hazard spacing for 13 Wellesley Gallery, and L5 meeting rooms and. Ordinary hazard spacing for other modelled areas including L3 Exhibition Hall, LS plenary and e circulation spine. Sprinkler zones to be no greater than 1 floor. EWIS zones within the sprinkler zones to activate (refer to APPENDIX G ). ‘AClass C water supply as the un-subdivided floor areas used by crowd occupancy does not exceed 11,000 m?. It is noted that the reliability of the system is comparable to Class A, i.e. two supplies from town main and tank, and redundancy in the pumps are provided, but the second of the two pipes connecting the valve room to the vertical main serving the above ground levels was removed by the designer due to the spatial considerations. ‘New Zealand intemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report a Ip | 61 | Apr | WARAATRRODIFERA Rap 276.2.2 Gaseous Suppression Gaseous suppression may be provided in lieu of fire sprinklers to areas nominated by the services engineer. ‘Such systems must be part of the building consent process and included on the Building Warrant of Fitness (Bwor). The rooms will be bound by construction achieving an FRR of 120 minutes. 6.3 Hand-held Appliances Portable fire extinguishers shall be certified as meeting the requirements of AS/NZS 1841 and installed in accordance with NZS4503. Where extinguishers may be subject to misuse, they are located in centralised, monitored areas. 6.4 Fire Hydrant System A Type 18 building fire hydrant system is required as the escape height is between 10 and 25 m and the Fire Service hose run is greater than 75m. The proposed hydrant system is generally in compliance with NZS 4510:2008. The following areas are not covered by standard hose-lengths and will require an additional length of hose, as discussed and agreed with FENZ; Basement carpark; = Level 3 Ex n Halls; and = External/roof areas. 6.5 Gas Shut Off Valves/Solenoid Valves Gas shut off valves provided to areas with gas fired equipment as follows: * Plant (e.g. boilers) "kitchens Shut off valves programmed to close in the event of a sprinkler activating in that zone. This reduces the extent of gas shut down and potential down time to recharge the lines. In addition to the above, the standards require shut off valves to be interlocked with kitchen exhaust (to be confirmed/designed by mechanical and hydraulic engineers). Where the exhaust drops below a certain limit, r fails, the valves shall close.7 SMOKE CONTROL & MECHANICAL SYSTEMS For the smoke control system, the components of the ‘life safety system’ sections. re detailed in the following ‘Smoke control system must be designed in accordance with AS/NZS 1668.1:2015. 7.1 Smoke Exhaust Fans ™ smoke control system associated mechanical and electrical systems to a life safety standard. Temperature rating of fans in accordance with AS/NZS 1668.1:2015. "The number of fans serving any one smoke zone are greater than one. Fans to handle the design volumetric air flow rate at the installed system resistance. 7.2 Emergency Power ‘The NZICC Design Brief requires provision of Emergency Power (via emergency generator). Emergency Power (via emergency generator) provided for all components associated with the smoke control system. Life Safety Main Switch Board (LS MSB) fed from both mains power and emergency generator, with a single sub-main cable provided to each life safety component. The emergency generator programmed to start automatically on power failure and feed power to critical systems via an Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS). 7.2.1 Fire Rated Cabling Cabling for components of the smoke control system will be fire rated as required by AS/NZS 1668.1:2015. Wiring to make up air mechanisms that fail safe upon loss of power to the OPEN position, do not need fire rated cabling. ‘Switchboards, controls and associated cabling for smoke exhaust fans are located outside the area being protected. 7.2.2. Car Park Ventilation Fans In the event of a fire in the car park, the car park ventilation fans have the functionality to be used (under ‘manual control) for smoke clearance. Control will be provided in the Fire Fan Control Panel (FFCP). Under fire mode, car park supply and exhaust fans operate at 100% in the event of fire alarm signal in the car park. The car park jet-fans will shut down automatically upon activation of a smoke detector (integrated within the jet fan or located within 1m of the fan inlet). The smoke detector shall shut down the floor jet-fans only and not be connected to the building alarm system. let fans will also shut down on activation of a sprinkler within the car park. 7.3. Motorised Dampers Motorised dampers that are required to operate under fire mode (on loss of power or control signal) must after a fire event remain in last position actuated at power failure. Update | 61 | Gage | WASDIAS2 TROUPE ReptDampers required to operate in more than one mode (ie. open in one cond backed up by the emergency generator, to provided security of operation. In and close in another) are 7.4 Level 3 “Extended Pre-Function” Mode ~ Areas North of Halls 1 and 3 ‘Smoke exhaust from these areas (nominated as Zones 12a, 12b and 12c in APPENDIX G ) is not required based on the exit widths from this area as per APPENDIX | 7.5 Level 5 Icon Space Meeting Room Area The southwest meeting rooms on Level 5 and the adjoining Icon Space are two separate smoke zones, nominated as zones 31a and 31b as per APPENDIX G . Zone 31a and 31b are each provided with at least Sm*/s of smoke exhaust (not simultaneously, one zone operating only). 7.6 Make-up Air ©, | rcrnatewpairtrtnemotecantetstensindined sowie tnoning at doesnot Total make-up air areas have been identified in Table 19. Sketches developed by the architect to show the extent and location of make-up air for the smoke control system are provided in APPENDIX C. Louvres, doors and roller shutters used as part of the mark-up air path programmed to open on a fire alarm in that zone. Whilst the current design does not use supply air in fire mode, any future supply air fans that are designed as part of the smoke control system require fire rated cabling where required by AS/NZS 1668. 7.6.1 Plenary Level 5 Make-up air into the pre-function spaces is via the circulation spine and automatic opening louvers/windows. 7.6.2. Exhibition Level 3 @ _ Wake-up air for the Wellesley gallery is via the Wellesley Street door openings. Make-up air for the exhibition halls comes from auto-opening doors (5 doors sets opening to the Spine and 1 door set opening to the Gallery], supply air shafts to the south of hall 1 and hall 3 and openings on the east and west facades. A fire curtain will be provided on the Hall side of the operable wall panels, leading from Hall 2 into the Circulation Spine. The fire curtain will incorporate side guides and will deploy before the operable wall panels open, to 2m above floor level. A local heat detector set at 93°C will be located in the operable wall panel at a height of 2.5 m, which if activated will drop the fire curtain to the floor. 7.6.3 Circulation Spine Make-up air for the atrium exhaust is via openings at low level, using doors at level 1 Nelson Street entry, level 3 Hobson Street entry and laneway entry and other facade openings as required. ‘New sland Intemational Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 8 pte | 61 | GAB | WADI RIARDAOTSFER Rag S27o0087.6.4 Automatic Opening Louvres, Windows and Doors Louvres, windows and doors used as part of the make-up air system are interfaced with the smoke detection system and set to open in fire mode. Motorised louvres, windows and doors installed for the make-up air system open on loss of power or alternatively with a battery back-up with compliant power supply protection to AS/NZS 1668.1:2015. ™ Louvres and windows on the facade fail safe open and thus no battery back-up is required, ™ Doors, louvers, windows that cannot fail safe open shall have battery back-up, and "The Level 3 truck dock door to have back-up power rather than fail safe open mode. 7.7 Electrical Installation for Safety Systems The electrical installation associated with the smoke extract installation is designed and installed in accordance with Part 2 of AS/NZS 3000 Electrical installations (Safety Systems). The electrical design and installation includes the following: e = Cabling for components of the smoke control system will be fire rated where required by AS/NZS 1668.1:2015. Alife safety main switchboard installed for smoke extract, sprinkler only, as per the requirements of ‘AS/NZS 3000. Each service detailed above is independently controlled and isolated with all isolation switches clearly labelled with their operation. Isolation of the general electrical installation will not isolate the life safety main switchboard, ‘The Life safety board will derive its supply from two sources, with each supply cable de systems equipment only. ted for safety ‘Supply cable one, originates from the LV side of the transformer, ‘Supply cable two, originates from the Generator main switch board and provide essential back up in the event of a transformer or supply authority outage. The generators are designed and installed to provide 100% back up of the safety service equipment. e ‘An automatic changeover is provided on the life safety board to automatically transfer from mains supply to generator supply as required ‘All mechanical control panels supplying smoke extract equipment provide separation from general ‘mechanical control panels. Variable speed drives associated with the smoke extract installation incorporate a fire mode input and shall run to destruction upon activation of the fire alarm system. 7.8 Fire Mode Cause & Effect Matrix A fire mode matrixis provided in APPENDIX G for development by the mechanical designer / contractor. ‘Smoke Zone diagrams are shown in APPENDIX G . Operation Mode (events) diagrams are shown in APPENDIX H . ‘New Zealand International Convention Centre_| Fire Engineering Report Fy Update | 61 | 6Apr8 | WAS TACDOFEDK Rapp& 7.9 Smoke Exhaust Rates The minimum smoke exhaust rates for the various building parts and the ventilation directly to outside required to accommodate the smoke extraction are summarised in Table 13, with the indicative locations of smoke exhaust points shown in Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7. The size and location of the make-up air openings are indicated in APPENDIX C. Table 19 ‘Minimum Smoke Exhaust Rates and Make-Up Air Spine® Level 3 Swing Space 1 30 v n Level 3 Exhibition Hall 1 | north, meeting rooms to the north and Exhibition Hall 1 a | ss ae we ee south | Level 3 Exhibition Hall 1 30 10 Se wat tae north and meeting rooms | Level 3 Exhibition Hall 1 at 30 10 12b Level 3 Exhibition Hall 2 | Sanadioue 30 10 da and 146 30 10 44a 30 10 ab Level 3 Exhibition Hall 3 | north, meeting rooms to the north and Exhibition Hall 3 = apacleO ated Tee south | Level 3 Exhibition Hall 3 | north and meeting rooms a | 2 aber Level 3 Exhibition Hall 3 ae 30 | 10 16b Level 3 Gallery 30 | 10 20 Level 3 Swing Space 4 30 10 7 Level 5 Plenary 1 and 2 5 | an eae combined | Level 5 Plenary 1 40 | a7 24 Level 5 Plenary 2 40 | 147 26 New Zealan international Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report « Ute | 61 | Gage | WED AED AOE Regi CTAPoh et ng CMs id Peel eee an Opening (m?) Level 5 Pre-function East Level 5 Pre-function West {excluding ICON) Level 5 ICON and meeting rooms to the south 35 (partitions removed) 16 29 ws | The Level 5 Plenary smoke extract is to provide for full extract rate for each side of the Plenary allowing for redundancy of one fan in each bank. i.e. provide for 40 m?/s smoke extract from any three of the four fans extracting from each side of the Plenary. ""The FDS modelling for the spine was based on 54.25m? make-up air area (taking into account the fact that people will be escaping through the doors, and therefore obstruct the free area). Subsequent design changes resulted in the make-up air area being reduced to 53.75m?. The change in make-up air speed is minor (8.32m/s to 3.35m/s). WE do not consider re-running the models will alter the outcome. "New Zealand interational Convention Centre| Fire Engineering Report Upcte | 6 | Gap | ASD mASZtAOIDFEDE Reps 708Figure S Indicative Locations of Smoke Exhaust Points (Level 3) ‘New 2ealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fite Engineering Update | 6:1 | Apr | WED teASDAOOOFED Rept 178Figure 6 Indicative Locations of Smoke Exhaust Points (Level 5) "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report a Unite | 62 | 6-18 | HASDHASDIONOFED RassFigure 7 Indicative Locations of Smoke Exhaust Points (Level SM) cy Plenum exhaust fans e Y a6 miseach ‘The current mechanical design of ten fans (28m'/s each) connected to the plenum achieve the overall exhaust rate that was modelled 7.9.1 Pressure and Door Forces ‘The pressure differential between two compartments complies with AS/NZS 1668.1:2015, is less than 60 Pa so that occupants can open doors and the system is designed so that the force on the door handle shall not exceed 100 N. It is noted that the New Zealand Building Code (C/AS4— Appendix C6.1.3) requires a maximum force of 133N to set the door in motion. Furthermore, the NZBC requires a force of 67N to release the latch and 67N to ‘move the door to the open position (i.e. once the door has been set in motion). The mechanical system is in accordance with these requirements. ‘New 2alandintematlonal Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report “a Update | 62 | S:Ap-18 | WAG2AABRINOOOFEDA Reps8 COMPARTMENTATION & STRUCTURE 8.1 Fire Resistance Ratings Structural elements have a fire rating as shown in Table 20. Critical elements such as exitways, unit title separations or elements supporting rooms with life safety equipment have sometimes been identified as having fire ratings higher than the rating calculated (noted “additional allowance” in the table below), to provide a better factor of safety. Refer to APPENDIX A for Fire Compartment Drawings for the FRR of walls. Doors in fire and smoke walls have a FRR equivalent to the wall. Table 20 __ Fire Resistance Ratings for Elements of Construction structur 30min integrity and Semen Carpark intermediate floors (Except insulation for floor slabs Acceptable Solution the areas mentioned elsewhere in | Beamsdesigned as per | Acceptable Solute that table) slab panel method with ce Sa ne meted witY | insulation ratings of et the floor slabs Structure above car park caged | storage areas (permanent and temporary) or stacked cars (above Levels 1 and 2, between gridlines 10 and 16 and C and N) ‘Note storage limits as per mechanical ventilation requirement Structural fire analysis (Section 12) with 60 minutes protected beams identified by Beca for slab panel method apply Based on structural ‘Above and supporting car park ie eel ar 83, B2, 81, LI, cleaners storerooms 12 Floors | adaitonalatlowance | gy B1 Workshop | Equivalent fire ity calculati * Note no dangerous goods or 120 minutes tials feral (Section 12) with additional allowance | Structural fire analysis (Section 12) with Structure around ramp openings 60 minutes protected beams identified by Beca for | slab panel method hazardous materials shall be stored | Minimum FRR same as the wall the structure To ensure fire rated supports (i.e. fire stairs, walls would provide Structure supporting fre rated walls | eae eee all he eee separating the car park separation from adjoining areas) Structure supporting fire egress 120 minutes Evacuation analysis "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engincering Report «6 CPFEDA Raprspt21708eee or Fire Ratin (Section 15) ‘passages on L1 and L2 Diesel tanks are fire Structure above diesel storage 120 minutes rated 240min. Room | to be rated 120min. Based on structural Structure providing supporting to : 120 minutes fire analysis with a additional allowance | Based on structural | truciure above end browieane 120 minutes fire analysis with | support to electrical plant rooms WUntal ge ates, Equivalent fire | Structure above the Kitchen 90 minutes severity calculations | (Section 12) | Equivalent fire @ json se ei otesend 60 minutes severity calculations | meeting rooms | ie | Structure above Level 1 office and | nisi meaner as | 60 minutes per acceptable ‘canteen solton Equivalent fire Stra sb Lal dhekon st Somintes | seventy elelations (Section 12) | ] Equivalent fire Level tanewayretai | azo minutes seventy ealeuations (Section 12) | | Equivalent fire Level 2Laneway etal SOminutes every ealesiations (Section 12) | Based on equivalent fire severity Structure supportngthe Fe Conta | sao minutes |. calelatons(ectton e 12) with additional ‘alowance To ensure fire rated ‘Structure supporting the walls of the walls would provide Fire Control Room AaDeninitas the intended fire | |___ separation To ensure fire rated Structure supporting 2 hour /2 hour ; walls would provide fire walls above ] Seéaeataintees the intended fire separation Other structure that is deemed by | Tobe rated to the same the structural engineer toneed | ratingasthe structure Rested by NZBC protection requiring stability in fre newer || ta Floors 120 minutes Structural fire analysis | Adore vehie are annus a New Zsa teat Conventon entre | Fr neg Report « Updte | 61 | Gor 8 | Wend tAERINGTOFEDE Rest S17I003ee ee Based on structural fire analysis (Section Structure supporting L3 circulation spine floor beg 12) with additional allowance ; Evacuation analysis Supporting ire egress passages on L3 120 minutes oo All other areas GOminutes | Structural fire analysis (Section 12) 4, L4M, LS, LSM, 16, LEM, Based on equivalent fire severity ee Structure above Plenary Stage 90 minutes Gkat ees | 12) Based on equivalent | , fire severity Structure above Plenary 90 minutes | seeneT Ash 12) | Based on equivalent fire severity Structure supporting Level SM 90 minutes caleulations (Section 12) with additional | atlowanee Based on structural Level 4M structure supporting ae fire analysis (Section | generators (grids Ato C, Sto 2) 12) with additional | allowance Structure above plant rooms with Based on Acceptable 90 minutes fuel burning appliances solutions | Based on structural Level 5 pre-function/Icon spaces 90 minutes fire analysis with additional allowance Structure above all other areas, including exhibition halls, circulation 60 minutes aoe | ; ire analysis spine, back of house, serveries Rooms with ife safety equipment 120 minutes Industry standard bere Protected shafts/risers |_Asshown on drawings Industry standard areas) — ‘Access hatches to protected _-/X/30 smoke seals where shaft/risers Xisthe shaf/riser rating __'Ndusty standard ‘The drawings provided in Appendix A show ratings equivalent or greater than the required ratings presented in Table 20. 8.1.1 General Requirements for FRR’s Refer to the architect's compartment drawings in APPENDIX A of this report. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report o Upiate | 61 | Gapr i | WAEDIeeORORDFED RepepiSI08% When different firecell ratings apply on each side ofa fire separation, the higher firecell rating applies to the fire separation. Floors have an FRR for exposure from the underside. The fire rating of any structural element that could affect the stability of a fire separation is to have a fire rating no less than the fire rating of the fire separation. With-the exception-of structural elements above the coche anatedintie tobe gO ghove ‘Areas of external wall required to be protected areas are rated for fire exposure from both sides equally where: = walls are within 1.0 m of the relevant boundary; or ® the building height is more than 10m. Structural framing members connected to building elements with an FRR are rated at no less than the building elements to which they are connected, or alternatively their connections and supports are designed so that their collapse during fire will not cause collapse of the fire rated elements. Structure provide full load bracing against deflection and are not providing stability in fire mode, are not required to be fire rated. 8.1.2 Glazing in Fire Separation Glazing in fire separations (Level 1 window between the “tasting room” and the office) are fixed fire resisting lazing / framing systems having the same FRR integrity value as the fire separation. No insulation rating is required due to sprinkler protection of the building. There is no restriction on the area of glazing in smoke separations (including smoke lobbies). Non-fire resisting glazing may be used if it is toughened or laminated safety glass. Glazing shall have at least the same smoke-stopping ability as the smoke separation. 8.1.3 Cavity barriers ‘Any concealed space which may be a path for fire spread within internal walls or floors which are fire separations, or within external walls, shall have cavity barriers or be fire stopped, at all common junctions. Cavity barriers shall: ™ Not reduce the FRR required for the element within which they are installed = Where practical, be tightly fitted and mechanically fixed to rigid construction, but if this is not possible -aps shall be fire stopped, and Be fixed in a way that avoids impairment of their fire separation function as a result ~ building movement due to subsidence, shrinkage or thermal change, or ~ collapse or failure of their components or fixings, or of abutting materials and any penetrations during a fire. Cladding cavities must be fire stopped at the junction between external walls and fire separations (vertical and horizontal). For the spine cladding (terracotta cladding), given that the cavity does not contain any combustible materials, the fire stopping of the cavity will be limited to the firecell separation lines, i.e itis not required along the intermediate floors of the spine. [New Zealand International Convention Cantre | Fire Engineering Report a Unde | 62 | 68 | WASLASCTMOIBFED RerS1TA0O88.2. Steel elements Fire Engineered Beams justified using a slab-panel method are designed to meet the following performance criteria, " Deflection of an unprotected structural element due to fire shall not cause disproportionate or Progressive collapse of other structural elements nor compromise the integrity of the fire rated floor slab. ‘The data given for the following steel elements is only valid between the minimum and maximum shape factors (heated perimeter/member cross section area) listed in the respective analysis in this report. ‘The following data should be used in determining structural adequacy. 8.2.1 Basement Levels B4 to B1 8.2.1.1 Beams Figure __ Basement levels B4 to B1 3 Car Structural fire temperature prediction locations for beams Based on the member temperature curves in APPENDIX F the following design temperatures should be used in the basement levels B4 to B1 structural adequacy calculations. "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report coTable 21 ___Basement Levels B4 to B1 Stee! Temperatures Poors 360U851 200 360U851 200 360U851 300 360U851 250 360UB51 250 360U851 500 360UB51 600 360U851 550 360UB51 350 360U851 250 360UB51 650 eet red ture (°C) 9-3 360U851 900 a4 360U851 700 360UB51 400 9b-1 360U851 | 250 9b-2 360UB51 «650 9b-3 360UBS1 | 900 9b-4 360U851 | 650 9b-5 360U851 400 10-1 360U851 250 10-2 360U851 | 500 10-3 360U851 600 10-4 360U851 500 10-5 360UB51 350 1oa-2 | 360U851 300 1023 | 360UB51 300 10b-2 | 360U851 250 10b-3 | 360U851 200 D1 460U882 200 2 460UB82___200 03 460uBs2_ | 200 El 460UB82__ 450 22 460UB82 650 3 460U882 | 450 FL 4eouBs2 | 350 2 460uB82 450 3 460uB82 350 "New Zealond Intemational Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report. Update | 6: | Age | WIRED AEDIOODFEDA Ra STA- ed 82.1.2 Columns The fire rating of the basement carpark columns is based on the cruciform columns. We amended the FDS model for fire scenario $1 to add a cruciform column and move the 3 car fire to be hard. against the column, Figure 9 _ Arrangement of 3 car fire and cruciform column Figure 10 _Cross section of cruciform column used for member temperature analysis Based on the member temperature curves in APPENDIX F the following design temperatures should be used in the basement levels B4 to B1 structural adequacy calculations. ‘New Zealand Inemational Convention Cente | Fre Engineering Report stTable 22 _Level B4 Fire Rated Cruciform Column member Temperatures Location feed Ca Co ny Cee AST_FN_£9_2375, AST_FN_£9_2375 We expect that the member temperatures calculated to be conservative as no allowance has been made for heat conduction to the cooler parts of the column. Additionally, we also assumed a 4-sided exposure to the maximum effects of the fire. Parts of the perimeter of the section under consideration would be receiving a lesser dose of thermal exposure. 8.2.2 Level 01 Truck Fire ‘A truck fire on Level 01 can expose several different beam types and sizes to a fire. From the Level 03 structural drawings we have considered the following beams: = $30UB92 = 610UB125 = 6oocwe253 = 750cwB137 = goocws4oo + 1000cws138 We have modelled a single truck fire located as shown in Figure 11. The Adiabatic Surface Temperature (AST) results have been applied to each beam type to determine the expected beam temperatures. Due tothe mesh size used for the CFD model, the floor to underside of the beam distance was rounded to 6.25 m, and the floor to underside of the slab distance was rounded to 7.25 m. + The effect of the sprinklers and jet fans was discounted, * The fire was assumed to involve a truck over a 8 x2.5 m area at an elevated height of 3 m. + The location of the fire with respect to the steel beams (blue lines) is shown in Figure 11. ‘New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 5 Unde | 6 | 6 Age 18 | WIAZIRAALTOCODIFED! Rept IZ 7AOEFigure 11 Truck FDS Model Fire Location In the FOS model, devices were used to measure the adiabatic surface temperatures on the beam webs and flanges. The web devices in some case gave higher values and as such the web device data was used as the input into the time step temperature models. For each beam we have calculated the expected beam temperature with the respective beams fire rated in accordance with the Beca Structural Fire Protection Drawing SE80131, The results shown in Table 23 are derived for the curves in APPENDIX F . Table 23 - Level 03 Intumescent Painted Beam Temperatures Fire Rating (Beca drawing SE80131) 530UB92 F12U - 120 minutes - Unprotected Structure s30uB92 F12P - 120 minutes - Intumescent Paint 610U8125, F12P ~ 120 minutes ~ Intumescent Paint GOOCWB253 | F12P-120 minutes ~ Intumescent Paint 7S50CWB137 —__-F12P- 120 minutes - Intumescent Paint ‘800CWB400 _—_—F:12P - 120 minutes — Intumescent Paint 1000CW8138__| F12P~120 minutes ~ Intumescent Paint oes 100°C 434°C a3arc 436°C 433°C 436°C 434°C 8.2.3 Level 01 Car park storage fire storage fire on Level 01 (above Levels 1 and 2, between gridlines 10 and 16 and C and N) can expose several different beam types and sizes to a fire. From the Level 02 structural drawings we have considered the following beams: = 2000830 3100840 = 360UB51 ‘New Zealardinterational Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Report Updite [64 | Gage d8 | WARD AAEGHINEF EA Rapp S217008% + 3600857 + 360cwE87 ‘We have modelled a storage fire located as shown in Figure 5. The Adiabatic Surface Temperature (AST) results were applied to each beam type to determine the expected beam temperatures. = Due to the mesh size used for the CFD model, the floor to underside of the beam distance was rounded to 3.75 m, and the floor to underside of the slab distance was rounded to 3.5 m. + The effect of the sprinklers and jet fans was discounted. The fire was assumed to involve storage materials over a 4 x 5 m area at an elevated height of 1.5 m. The location of the fire with respect to the steel beams (yellow lines) is shown it igure 12. Figure 12 _L01 Storage fire locationThe heat release rate versus time profile of the design fire is as per the storage fire detailed in FEB revision 2.3, refer Figure 6 below Figure 13 Car park storage fire Level 01 Car Park Storage Fire 20000 ¥ 15000 © 0000 000 | — o ° 10 20 30 40 Time (min.) 25000 — storage Fire Table 24 ~ Level 02 Beam Temperatures over Storage Fire Location | Beamsize | B€4™ Design Temperature co | 360UB51 | 360uss1 | 3600851, 3600851 360U851 360U851 3600851 | 360UB52 360UB51 | 360UB51 | 360U851. 360UB51 New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report Unite [6 | G#or8 | WARD ATIORBFED Repro TSWZ17008Table 25 — Level 02 Intumescent Painted Beam Temperatures on Rata peas aCe ni ata} 200UB30 FO6P 60 minutes—Intumescent Paint | 243°C 310UB40 FOGP—60 minutes~Intumescent Paint | 243°C 360CWB87 —|FOGP—6Ominutes—intumescent Paint | 244°C 8.2.4 L03 Halls From Table 37 in section 12.5.4 the maximum temperature of any 60 minute fire rated member in the truss structure has a maximum temperature of around 520°C. The 60 minute fire rated floor beams for the Level 05 slab will have a maximum temperature of 400°C. However for the unprotected floor beams, 650CB-1a, the worst case design temperature is 700°C at the beam mid-point and 600°C for the floor beam extrey 8.3. Exitways Exitways, unless external and separated by distance, comprise safe paths which are fire cells. ‘The safe path is separated from adjoining fire cells by fire separations throughout its length. ‘Any services passing through exitways are enclosed in a fire rated bulk head. 8.4 Smoke Rated Separations ‘Smoke lobbies are provided to the fire-isolated stairways serving the basement levels to prevent smoke ingress to the stairs. No smoke lobby is provided to the southwest fire-isolated stairway as there is no direct connection to the stair serving the upper levels. ‘The locations of smoke barriers are shown in the APPENDIX A to this report. Where smoke barriers are required, these will comprise: smoke walls: construction tested to resist 200°C for 1 hour, typically: ‘+ One layer of fire rated plasterboard/GIB on metal framing. * Glazing, minimum 6mm heat strengthened safety glass (and laminated if required for impact safety) "Fixed smoke baffles: + One layer of fire rated plasterboard/gib on metal framing. + Glazing, minimum 6mm heat strengthened safety glass (and laminated if required for impact safety). = Automatic smoke curtains (refer to Section 8.4.2 for locations) = Programmed to release upon activation of a smoke detector, or multi-criteria detector or loss of power. "New Zealand international Convention Cane | Fire Engineering Report, 56 Unde | 61 | Aor | WEAED Rez CONFER Renee+ Overlapping joins with ends built into “side-guides” to minimise deflection and are provided with local battery backup. "Automatic smoke curtains are designed to fail safe in the “down/released” position upon loss of ‘emergency (local battery backup) and mains power. All smoke curtains are to be capable of many deployments and of being retracted, without specialist contractor reset. 8.4.1 Smoke Baffles Fixed downstands/baffles are provided in the Spine to assist in channelling smoke into the atrium/void to be exhausted: * Level 3 and Level 4: 1m deep (beneath the ceiling) baffles provided around the escalator void "Level 4: 600mm deep (beneath the ceiling) baffles provided either side of the escalators (Grid 6 and Grid 10) to channel smoke to the void. 8.4.2 Smoke Curtains ‘Automatic smoke curtains (vertical and horizontal), are provided to provide smoke separation of individual e areas. ‘Smoke curtains provided as follows: ™ Ahorizontal and a vertical fire curtain, to separate the Level 1 and 2 Nelson St Entry from the Level 3 Circulation Spine. ® Provide smoke curtains in front of lift doors for lifts $1 and $2 in levels B4, 83, B2, B1, L1. Provide smoke curtains in front of lift doors for lifts C1 and C2 in level L1 as shown on the fi drawings. rating ‘Smoke curtains at Level 5 between the Spine and pre-function areas (Grid l). Curtains shall descend to 2m above finished floor level. = Smoke curtain at Level 5 to separate the east/west pre-function spaces (Grid 9). Curt shall descend ‘to 2m above finished fioor level 8.5 Fire Curtains/Shutters e Fire curtain and shutters are shown on the fire ratings drawings. Specific details for some of the fire curtains/shutters are outlined below. All fie curtains incorporate side guide tracks and are provided local battery backup. ‘Automatic fire curtains are designed to fail safe in the “down/released” position upon loss of emergency (local battery backup) and mains power. All fire and smoke curtains are to be capable of many deployments and of being retracted, without specialist contractor reset. 8.5.1 Level 01 Gallery/Secure Drop Off Fire Rated Roller Shutter Provide a FRR -/120/- fire rated roller shutter on Grid K. The roller shutter is to deploy on a signal from the ‘automatic fire detection system on the operation of either a Level 02 sprinkler or, the operation of a Level 01 Gallery space smoke detector. ‘New Zealandinterational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 7 Upiate [62 | apr | W#S2tAIDAAOOOFE Repo TNS& 8.5.2 Levels B1 and 01 Fire Rated Roller Shutters On Level 81: "Provide FRR -/120/- fire rated roller shutters between Grids C and D (as shown on fire rating drawings) as part of the fire separation separating the car park from the workshops. "Provide a FRR -/60/- fire rated roller shutter on Grid 16 (as shown on fire rating drawings) as part of the fire separation separating the car park from the Skycity Tunnel On Level 01: Provide FRR -/120/- fire rated roller shutters on Grids D (as shown on fire rating drawings) as part of the fire separation separating the Loading Dock from the BOH Circulation and Waste spaces. ‘The roller shutters are to deploy on a signal from the automatic fire detection system on the operation of either a sprinkler on the same level or, the operation of a multi-criteria detector located near the shutter (on both sides of the shutter). 8.5.3 Stage Fire Curtain A fire curtain is provided to separate the Stage from the Plenary seating. Itis required to descend to the plenary floor. ‘The curtain is fire rated to 90 minutes and provided with drencher protection onto the stage side of the fire curtain (to control temperature). ‘The curtain is programmed to descend upon activation of a smoke detector, or multi-criteria CO and heat detector above the stage. 8.6 Fire Doors and Smoke Control Doors Glazing in fire doors shall be fire resisting glazing having the same integrity value as the door. Where vision Panels are used they shall comply with NZS 4520 (i.e. -/60/-, showing the ratings for stability/integrity/insulation).. Glazing in smoke control doors shall meet the requirements for smoke separations. The Fireguard Won-door shall be installed in accordance with the relevant paragraphs in section 5, Installation of fire-resistant doorsets, of NZS 4520. A vision panel is required in the Won-door. Refer to sections 5.3.3, 6.1, 15.9 and APPENDIX G for additional details on the requirements for the Won- doors. 8&7 Tiered Seating The area beneath the permanent fixed seating is required to be sprinkler protected unless compliance with the sprinkler standard AS/NZS 4541:2013, clause 208.1(d) can be achieved. The supporting structure for the permanent tiered seating shall be FRR(90)/90/90. ‘Temporary and retractable tiered seating does not require to be fire rated nor sprinkler protected, provided the space beneath the seating is not to be used for any purpose (no storage, no igniting source, no motors, etc) and access is barred. Signs are to be provided on each side of the retractable seating so that they are visible when the seating is in the extended position. The signs shall be as shown below: 2 ERR requirement on Skycity tunnel side confirmed by Beca on 01/03/18, see APPENDIX P. "New Zealand Intemational Convention Cenze_| Fie Engineering Report 8 Unite | 6 | Apr 38 | WME AABZIOSOOUFEDA Reps SO1708NO STORAGE UNDER THE SEATING! Fire and Lite Safety Requirement ‘Any deviation from the above will have to be agreed by the sprinkler system certifier. Senegal ba acy Tab 32 ‘New Zealand International Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report. Update | 61 | Apr8 | WA eAALIOROOOFEDA Rept 270088.8 Intermittent Activities 8.8.1 Support Activities Intermittent activities providing direct support to a primary activity of another risk group may be included with the other risk group and does not require fire or smoke separation, unless they are provided for enclosed waste storage. ‘The fire safety systems required for each risk group shall also apply throughout these spaces. If these spaces are required to be separate firecells, they shall have fire separations with the required FRRs. 8.8.2 Solid Waste Storage Solid waste storage areas shall be enclosed when located adjacent to occupied spaces; in other situations these areas may be unenclosed. Enclosed solid waste storage areas within any firecell shall themselves be a separate firecell separated from adjacent firecells by fire separations having an FRR of no less than 60 minutes, as per the Acceptable Solutions. 8.8.3 Plant, Boiler and Incinerator Rooms The boiler room on Level 5M, which uses gas as the energy source will be a separate firecell with a FRR of 120 minutes. The plant will have: = Two alternative internal access points via smoke lobbies, which will be sprinkler protected. "Its floor level will be above ground level. 8.9 Protected Shafts 8.9.1 Lifts, Conveyors and Services Lifts, conveyors and services that pass from one fire cell to another are enclosed within protected shafts unless fire separated at floor level. 8.9.2. Fire Separation Every protected shaft is a separate fire cell within the fire cell or fire cells in which it is located. The shaft walls between each floor has a FRR of no less than that required by the life rating of the risk group for that, level. ‘The FRR of the shaft wall applies to both sides equally. Electrical risers are fire rated at each floor level, unless located in a fire rated shaft. Protected shafts which do not extend through the roof or lowest floor are enclosed at top and bottom by construction which satisfies the relevant NZBC requirements for fire stopping. 8.9.3 Openings in Protected Shafts ‘There are no openings in protected shafts except for: ‘New Zealand intemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report o Unite | 61 | GAB | WA etAEeAOKBFED Regs SZh‘There are two circumstances of access into a services shaft from a fire stair (the North West stair and Level 3 ‘access panels having an FRR of no less than that required for the shaft, as per 8.8.4 below; doorsets providing access to lifts and complying with smoke control requirements; ‘openings for lift ropes passing into a lift motor room, which shall be as small as practicable; fire dampers serving a ventilation duct and complying with requirements for fire resisting closures; Penetrations which satisfy the fire stopping requirements of C/AS4; or fittings with a FRR of no less than that required for the protected shaft. of the South west stair egress corridor). These are protected and designed as follows: fire rated shaft; = nodoors; ™ access panels (fire rated) with key locks; = only water filled metal pipes, or mechanical duct. No other services; and = NWstair riser sealed at each floor level 8.10 Floors Floors in buildings shall be fire separations except where the floor is an intermediate floor within the fire cell orf the floor isthe lowest floor above an unoccupied subfloor space, in whi case the FRR of that floor is designed to meet the ‘life’ rating requirement. Floors only need to be rated from the underside. The FRR of a floor is that rating applicable to the fire cell directly below the floor. 8.10.1 Concealed Spaces within Fire cells ‘An upper concealed space may be used as an air handling plenum if the following requirements of C/AS4, Section 4.15.2 are satisfied as follows: the upper concealed space does not extend into another firecell; the ceiling and its supports and surfaces within the concealed space are non combustible; electrical wiring is supported clear of the ceiling members and other equipment; any material used, such as pipe insulation or acoustic insulation, complies with the surface lining requirements; here the air handling plenum is used as an air supply path, a Type 4 system is installed with detectors in all return air ducts, and where the air handling plenum is used as an air supply path, detector activation causes the ventilation system to switch from circulation to extract. "New ealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report T 61 | 6Aori8 | WAI AAIREORIFESA Rapp S2758.11 Closures in Fire and Smoke Separations If activities within a building require openings in fire or smoke walls (e.g., for the passage of people, goods or for light), closures to those openings shall have an FRR of the greater of half the FRR of the wall or -/60/-, as the buildings are sprinklered (this does not apply to services shafts or risers) 8.11.1 Doorset Markings Doorsets shall be clearly marked to show their FRR and, if required, to show their smoke stopping capability. Markings and labelling shall in all other respects comply with NZS 4520. 8.11.2 Smoke Control Doors ‘Smoke control doors are provided: ® at smoke control separations in safe paths; "where a corridor or an escape route passes through a smoke separation; and "between an open path and a smoke lobby. 8.11.3 Fire Doors Fire doors are provided: ™ between an open path and a safe path (safe path is defined in Acceptable Solutions as “That part of an exitway which is protected from the effects of fire by fire separations, external walls, or by distance when exposed to open air”; ™ between a smoke lobby and a safe path; = where the escape route passes through a fire separation; and ™ in fire separations between vertical and horizontal portions of internal safe paths. 8.11.4 Protected Shaft Access Panels Access panels to protected shafts have the required fire resistance performance and shall: be capable of being opened only with a special tool; and "if smoke seals cannot be provided, be tight-fitting with a maximum total gap of 8 mm around the panel. 8.11.5 Lift Landing Doors Doorsets for lft-landing doors opening into lft shafts which are protected shafts are fire rated (1 hour). Basement lft openings protected by smoke curtains, as shown in APPENDIX A compartment drawings, are specified with the smoke curtain (there are some built into the lft frame and others built into the ceiling/wall in front of the lifts ~ i.e. car lifts) and also the device that activated the curtain (heat detector) as there are no smoke detectors within the car parks to interface with. The lift curtain detectors will only close the local smoke curtains, not activate the occupant warning nor call FENZ. ‘New Zealand interational Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report. a Update | 1 | Aor | AED etASDTRCIOPED ReprenS7008% 8.11.6 Fire Dampers ‘Any duct (unless fully enclosed by construction with an FRR no less than required for the fire separation) that passes through a fire or smoke separation shall not reduce the fire resistance and/or smoke separating function of the construction through which the duct passes. Where a fire damper is used to maintain the required fire resistance it: = complies with AS/NZS1668.1:2015; and = hasafir tegrity rating no less than that of the fire separation. Where a smoke damper is used to maintain the smoke separating function it: * complies with AS/NZS 1668.1:2015; and is actuated on alarm activation. Fire dampers and smoke dampers are capable of being readily accessed for servicing, |8.11.7 Fire Shutters sous |The tie shutteris automatically activated by asigaat froma. smoke detector, Nzice 481} connection to the main Skycity site under Hobson Street wilt incorporat feted roller shutter 420-5 8.12 External Surface Finishes 8.12.1 External Wall Cladding within 1m of the Boundary External wall claddings within 1 m of the boundary are non-combustible. 8.12.2 External Wall Cladding further than 1m from the Boundary The external wall cladding system has been tested in accordance with the relevant standard test in 8.12.3 and shall satisfy the following requirements: For external wall claddings greater than 1.0 m from the boundary, the peak heat release rate does exceed 100 kW/m? and the total heat released shall not exceed 25 Mi/m?, and The above requirements do not apply if: 4) Surface finishes are no more than 1 mm in thickness and are applied directly to a non-combustible substrate, or b) The entire wall assembly has been tested at full scale in accordance with NFPA 285 and has passed the test criteria. 8.12.3 Fire Properties of External Wall Cladding Systems Fire properties of external wall cladding systems shall be determined in accordance with: New Zealand Interatianal Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report a te | 63 | SA 18 | WASLIRIAREMOOIFER Rape C2 TI% 150 5660 Reaction-to-fire tests - Heat release, smoke production and mass loss rate ~ Part 1: Heat release rate (cone calorimeter method). In addition to meeting the general requirements of ISO 5660 Part 1, testing shall be in accordance with the following specific requirements: a) An applied external heat flux of 50 kW/m2, and b) Atest duration of 15 minutes, and ) The total heat release measured from start of the test, and 4) Sample orientation horizontal, and ¢} Ignition initiated by the external spark igniter. Claddings incorporating a metal facing with a melting point of less than 750°C covering a combustible core or insulant shall be tested as described in Paragraph C7.1.2 without the metal facing present. Aluminium facings have a melting point of less than 750°C. 8.13 Internal Surface Linings 8.13.1 Internal Surface ings Surface finish requirements shall be as specified in Table 26 below. Table 26 __ Surface Finishes ruc act ak he ee ts x eee cd Fire egress stairs, fire and smoke lobbies, and corridors/concourses from the escape stairs to the 2 building exterior. All public spaces including meeting rooms, exhibition halls, pre-function spaces, plenary, 3 (wall linings) canteen, gallery, retail and any other spaces where 2 (ceiling linings) people gather for participation in activities All other occupied spaces 3 Internal surfaces of ducts for HVAC systems 2 External surfaces of ducts for HVAC systems 3 8.13.2 Exceptions to Surface Finish Requirements ‘Surface finish requirements do not apply to: ™ small areas of non-conforming product within a firecell with a total aggregate surface area of not more than 5.0m’; ™ electrical switches, outlets, cover plates and si lar small discontinuous areas; pipes and cables used to distribute power or services; New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report ry Update | 62 | GAp-18 | WALAIGACDOFEA Rept STZOOOhandrails and general decorative trim of any material such as architraves, skirtings and window ‘components, including reveals, that do not exceed 5% of the area of the surface to which it is attached; damp-proof courses, seals, caulking, flashings, thermal breaks and ground moisture barriers; timber joinery and structural timber building elements constructed from solid wood, glulam or laminated veneer lumber. This includes heavy timber columns, beams, portals and shear walls not more than 3.0 m wide, but does not include exposed timber panels or permanent formwork on the underside of floor/ceiling systems; "individual doorsets; and ‘continuous areas of permanentiy installed openable wall partitions not more than 3.0 m high and having a surface area of not more than 25% of the divided room floor area or 5.0 m?, whichever is less. 8.13.3 Foamed Plastics and Exposed Combustible Insulating Materials Typealy famed plastics bullding materials or combustible insulting materials shall not form partofa wall gy or ceiling system. Any proposed system shall be advised to NDY and shall as a minimum achieve a Group Number as specified in Table 26 and the foamed plastics shall comply with the flame propagation criteria as specified in AS 1366 for the material being used. 8.13.4 Flooring Flooring shall be either non-combustible or, when tested to 1S0 9239-1, shall have a critical radiant flux of not less than that specified in Table 27 below. Table 27 _Critical Radiant Flux Requirements for Flooring eed Minimum critical radiant flux when tested to ISO 9239-1:2010 Fire egress stairs, stair lobbies, Lobby | 102.336, Lobby L03.462 aaa ‘All other occupied spaces | 1.2 kW/mt 8.13.5 Suspended Flexible Fabrics (including curtains) @ ‘When tested to AS 1530 Part 2, suspended flexible fabrics shall, within all occupied space: ™ havea flammability index of no greater than 12; and = when used as underlay to roofing or exterior cladding that is exposed to view, have a flammability index of no greater than 5. New Zealand iterational Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report. 6 Updite | 61 | apr | WADDLAAC RODDED Repti S2089 FUEL BURNING EQUIPMENT AND APPLIANCES The building has the following areas that contain fixed appliances that involve controlled combustion: = Level 1 main kitchen; Levels 3 and 5 servery areas; = Level 4M diesel generator space; and = Level SM boiler plant room, The level B1 diesel storage room is covered by the requirements for Building Code Clause F3 ~ Hazardous substances and processes. Compliance of Building Code F3 is outside the scope of this report and will be handled by others. 9.1 Gas Burning Appliances For gas-burning appliances AS/NZS 5601.1 sections 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 and Appendix H are Acceptable Solutions for the construction and installation of flues and sections 5.11, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.10 are Acceptable Solutions for the installation of appliances, with the following modification: 9.1.1 Modifications to AS/NZS 5601.1. Delete paragraph 6.2.11 and substitute the following: "6.2.11 Seismic restraint Seismic restraint of appliances installed in buildings shall be designed in accordance with 81/VM1 Paragraphs 2.0and 13.0." ‘Add a Note to 6.4 as follows: “Ventilation requirements are contained in Acceptable Solution G4/AS1. The ventilation requirements of this Standard may exceed the performance requirements of NZBC G4.” 9.2 Oil-fired Appliances ‘AS 1691, with the modifications given in Paragraph 7.3.2, is an Acceptable Solution for the installation of domestic oll-fired appliances. 9.2.1. Modifications to AS 1691, Delete paragraph 2.2.3 and substitute the following: "2.2.3 Electrical equipment Electrical equipment shall comply with Acceptable Solution G9/AS1 or Verification Method G9/ VM1." Delete “CSIRO durability Class 2 or better" from paragraph 3.1.2 (b) and substitute "HS treatment” Delete the Note to paragraph 3.1.2 (d). Delete paragraph 3.1.4 and substitute the following: "3.1.4 Stability ‘The appliance shall be mechanically fixed to the building. NewZean intatons mvnton Cee. | re Ege Report 6 Update | 6 | 6438 | WAS‘The test seismic force on the fuel tank shall be taken as the application of a horizontal force in kilograms ‘numerically equal to 0.40 times the tank volume in lites acting at the centre of the tank. The test seismic force on the appliance shall be taken as the application of a horizontal force equal to 0.40 times the appliance operating weight acting at the centre of the appliance. The appliance and the fuel tank shall resist their respective seismic forces with no significant movement.” Delete the words “without specific approval” from paragraph 3.2.8 (b). Delete paragraph 5. Add Note to 5.2.2: “Note: Refer to Acceptable Solution G4/ASI for ventilation requirements.” 9.3 Downlights Recessed luminaires shall be installed with clearances from building elements (including insulation) of e 100 mm. ‘New Zealand nterational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report o Update | 81 | nor 8 | WHEDAAEDAONDFEA RaptgteNO810 FIRE SERVICE ACCESS AND FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES 10.1 Fire Service Vehicular Access The fire service access routes are shown in the diagram below. The main fire service access point is via Wellesley Street. Figure 14 Service access route i 10.2 Fire Service Facilities "Fire hydrant system ‘A Type 18 building fire hydrant system shall be provided throughout the building with deviations from the hydrant standard NZS 4510:2008 approved by the NZ Fire Service. Refer Appendix M. ™ Fire extinguishers ~ Portable extinguishers shall be provided throughout the building. " Afire and security room is provided, wit = Direct access to outside. = Good access into the building and its vertical transportation. = 2 hr FRR from the remainder of the building, = Located in close proximity to sprinkler control valves. 10.3 Fire Fighting Vehicular access hard standing for fire appliances are provided on Nelson, Wellesley and Hobson Streets. New Zea iteration Comenton Cee | Frege Report oe Updte | 6 | Aor 8 | WAS ASDC a8The hard standings shall: ™ be able to withstand a laden weight of up to 25 tonnes with an axle load of 8 tonnes or have a load- bearing capacity of no less than the public roadway serving the property, whichever is the lower; * be trafficable in all reasonably expected weather conditions; havea minimum width of 4.0 m; "provide a clear passageway of no less than 3.5 m in width and 4.0 m in height at site entrances, internal entrances and between buildings; and ® provide access to a hard-standing within 20 m of: = _anentrance to the building; and = any inlets to fire sprinkler or building fire hydrant systems. ‘New Zealand iterations Convention Centre| Fire Engineering Report e Update | 62 | 6Apr8 | WAR eARSRTRODRFESA Rapti TOTO11 TESTING, MAINTENANCE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 11.1. Testing and Commissioning of Life Safety Systems The following testing and commissioning shall be undertaken during the construction phase: ™ all tests required by relevant Standards; = smoke exhaust rate at intakes and fans; = pressure differential tests in areas with smoke exhaust; ™ door opening force tests; airflow through doorways between fire cells, with smoke exhaust operating; ™ velocity tests through make-up air openings; ™ sound pressure level testing of smoke exhaust vs occupant warning; and . a full function fire test for the following areas, against the fire mode C&E matrix: = Level 1 Nelson Street entry; = Level 3 to 5 circulation spine; = Exhibition Halls (swing spaces and 6 zones); ~ Wellesley gallery; = Level 5 pre-function; = Level 5 meeting rooms with smoke exhaust; and = Plenary, including stag “Hot smoke” tests shall be carried out for the following areas. Note: the tests are for information purposes only to observe smoke spread and smoke control cascading effects. The tests do not include acceptance criteria for smoke temperature, density, layer height nor are they to be considered representative of the design fire CFD results: = Level 3 circulation spine; = Exhibition Hall 1 - North compartment; = Exhibition Hall 1 ~full Hall 1; - el Hall 1-all halls open; ~ Level 5 prefunction (West) with no partitions to the North or South in place); ~ Plenary half mode; and ~ Plenary full mode. All hot smoke tests shall be arranged to be carried out over no more than 2 consecutive days. 11.2 Building Management ‘Where any building feature that is part of this report is modified, such modification shall not adversely affect, the requirements of this report. "New Zealand intemational Convention Centre| Fie Engneering Report ” Undte | 6 | Gapr8 | WEMEDEAMEDIONOEOL ROADS% 11.2.1 Maintenance Periodic inspection, testing and maintenance of all fire safety systems including fire sprinklers, fie detection, fire hydrants, emergency lighting and exit signage, emergency warning, lift system, fire/smoke/exit doors, fire resistance, portable fire extinguishers, etc. must be implemented in accordance with the relevant Standards for each system. Smoke Hazard Management (including fire/smoke curtains) shall be maintained in accordance with requirements of AS 1851. Under all circumstances it is important to keep as much of the systems fully operational as is practical. Should any building works extend over a number of days, the system shall be re-instated as far as practical at the end of each day. ‘Maintenance contracts should be in place and supplemented by building management on a regular basis. 11.2.2 Non-specified Maintenance and Management Considerations "Furniture and Finishes — low fire load to be maintained in the Level 1 Nelson Street entry (circulation space with metal rubbish bin and limited furniture) and the Level 3 circulation spine (limited to furniture, small exhibitions and one vehicle, located at least 10m apart); "Storage limitations in the basement storage areas (not to exceed sprinkler design) and storage in BOH areas is not to obstruct exit ways; ™ Emergency procedures to be developed and maintained by SKYCITY. NDY would welcome the ‘opportunity to be part of SKYCITY's emergency control organisation, to meet annually to review fire safety procedures; . ‘Any pyrotechnics as part of an event or show in the Halls/Plenary must be appropriate and shall be reviewed and installed by an appropriately qualified expert with respect to the type and potential ignition of surrounding combustibles; and * Lift smoke lobbies to be maintained. ‘The reliability of fire safety systems should be enhanced by the design of the sprinkler system and the implementation of strict management practices. Some items listed here are repeated in the Fire Safety Management section of this report. Any change to any point listed will require formal approval by an approved Fire Engineer. The following measures are required to provide the building with the enhanced level of safety that has formed the basis of this report: "strict management procedures requiring formal approval by a responsible Building Manager for any automatic fire sprinkler system isolation; = the presence of water should be confirmed during commissioning and, in the case of tenancy ‘modifications or building refurbishment, also confirmed at test valves affected by any isolation or sprinkler alteration; "Isolation of the sprinkler system should not occur on two adjacent levels at the same time, when there is a fire load present. Only one sprinkler control valve should be isolated at any one time; ™ in the case of tenancy modifications—use of sprinkler work practices which minimise isolation times and ‘which require de-isolation of the system on a daily basis; = if works are required involving extended sprinkler isolation (i.e. overnight without being monitored), the fire load should be removed as far as practicable; New Zealand titeratonal Convention Cente | Fire Engineering Report n& if'a proposed fire load is substantially greater than that permitted by the sprinkler system design, the fire-safety measures in the building must be re-assessed to the satisfaction of the regulatory authority; the implementation of a comprehensive essential services management system; and overall storage heights do not exceed specified limits. A minimum 500mm clear space should be ‘maintained below the level of the sprinkler deflectors and the top of the storage. 11.2.3 Fire Safety Management A formal fire safety management policy must be developed and include: ™ keeping unnecessary combustible loads to a minimum; ™ regular housekeeping, including the removal of random storage and accumulated debris; "maintaining clear and accessible exit paths at all times; and ™ ensure fire and smoke doors are closed where appropriate at all times. 11.2.4 Fire Service Plans Fire plans shall be provided at the Fire Control and Indicating Equipment Panel in the Fire Control Room comprising floor plans indicating the location of the following equipment: fire hydrants and portable extinguishers; * fire alarm indicators; ® fire and Mimic Panels; fire (including fire resistance level) and smoke walls; ™ fire service isolation valves; sprinkler control valves; and ™ Fire Brigade booster connections. 11.2.5 Evacuation Plans Evacuation plans shall be developed by SKYCITY or their emergency planning representative and placed in ‘prominent locations comprising floor plans indicating the location of the following, ™ portable extinguishers; ™ egress paths, exits and “You Are Here” signage; and fire (including fire resistance level) and smoke walls. 11.2.6 Incendiary Activity Implementing the following policy may control fire lighting behaviour: "maintain fire safety and non smoking poli ies; and "provide counselling and monitoring to any staff found smoking indoors. "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report n Updte | 62 | Gor | WAS AAD DFED Reps% 11.2.7 Emergency Procedures Manual ‘An Emergency Procedures Manual must be developed by SKYCITY or its representative in accordance with Authority requirements to set out action plans, essential phone numbers, procedures and responsibilities in the event of Fire/Smoke, Evacuation, Bomb, Internal and External Emergency. Permanent (full time) staff shall receive at least 12 monthly emergency procedures training and training in the use of emergency equipment, fire detection and alarm system, occupant warning system, fire panels, occupant evacuation and any other specialised equipment that may be provided. ‘The Emergency Procedures Manual will incorporate but not limited to: ™ evacuation and people movernent strategy, including a plan to assis ‘mobility impaired occupants; instructions to assist any person in immediate danger if safe to do so; search and rescue if safe to do so; closure of room doors to isolate fire; and ‘assembly areas and any required traffic management. 11.2.8 Record Keeping and Documentation SKYCITY's existing emergency documentation shall be updated to include the fire safety manual defining the fire safety strategy for the site, all fire protection systems present and a description of how they operate. ‘The manual will also include maintenance requirements and inspection procedures. Records must be kept of: evacuation and trai g exercises; maintenance and testing undertaken; inspection and checks carried out by staff; details of fire safety issues and incidents; all penetrations through fire and smoke walls, including details of dampers/collars etc; and false alarms. ‘The manual shall be developed and maintained by SKYCITY or its representative. 11.2.9 Emergency Response Team ‘An Emergency Response Team (ERT) must be available to respond to an alarm within a designated time period in the event of an emergency. Fire alarm signals should be transmitted to the ERT via radio paging. systems interfaced to security and the main fire panel. ‘An Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) shall oversee all aspects of fire safety management on the site and meet regularly to ensure adequate systems and processes are in place. 11.2.10 Limitation of Fuel in Circulation Spine Building management shall maintain the circulation spine in sterile condition. Isolated areas where displays and limited furniture are permitted are indicated in Appendix A. Building management shall consult with the fire safety engineer if they intend to provide additional displays, furniture or the like in the circulation spine. ‘New Zealand international Convention Cente | Fre Engineering Report a mine | 61 | Apr i8| WAAR AACERODIEESA Rapti 1217008Fire Engineering Analysis "New Zealand International Convention Conze_| Fie Engineering Report Unde | 62 | Aor | MAIDA OOFEDA Ree‘New Zealand intemational Convention Centre Update | 82 | G#or8 | WASDieSDIAOOOFE Repay 217NS12 STRUCTURAL FIRE ENGINEERING 12.1 Description of Structure The building structure is predominantly a composite structural steel and concrete solution, comprising steel beams, columns and trusses, with concrete floor slabs and pre-cast concrete walls, with glazed curtain walls. The circulation areas such as the Circulation Spine atrium and Pre-function areas will comprise extensive areas of glass and steel-framed external walls. 12.2 Structural Design Objectives The functional and performance requirements for the structure are contained in Table 9. Essentially the structure is required to remain stable during and after a fire. To this end a variety of structurs fire endurance rating calculations have been done. 12.3 Structural Fire Endurance Calculation Methods Four main methods of structural fire endurance calculations have been used: 1. Time step member temperature calculation based on adiabatic surface temperature readings from FDS models. 2. Time step member temperature calculation based on modified Eurocode parametric compartment temperature calculations. 3. Time step member temperature calculation based on conservative assumption of adiabatic surface temperatures. 4. Equivalent time of fire exposure calculations. 12.3.1 FDS Adiabatic Surface Temperature Modelling Conservative FDS fire models were run with WALL TEMPERATURE (WT) and ADIABATIC SURFACE TEMPERATURE (AST) devices located on the structural members to be analysed. The structural members were generally modelled as close to the structural member dimensions as the model grid would allow. Adiabatic surface temperature (AST) is a quantity that is representative of the heat flux at a solid surface and is thus most suitable for input to member temperature thermal models (FDS Users Guide v6.5.3 section 17.106). 12.3.2 Modified Eurocode Parametric Compartment Temperatures The method outlined in Buchanan (2002) modifies the Eurocode 1 Parametric temperature-time curve to align with fire compartment temperature predictions calculated using the COMPF2 routine. The method is validated in Feasey and Buchanans paper, Post-flashover fires for structural desi 12.3.3 Time Step Member Temperature Calculation ‘The time step member temperature calculation is used to predict the temperature of a lumped cross section ‘area mass element based on the temperature of the surrounding hot gasses. The method for both protected and unprotected steel! members is documented in Buchanan (2002), Both the FDS adiabatic surface temperature (AST) data and the Eurocode Parametric temperature time data are used as the input temperature data for the calculat "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report % Upste | 62 | GApe18 | WAS2IAASLIANOFCDA RST% 12.4 Structural Fire Endurance Calculation Models ‘The following table depicts the various methods used for each design scenario. Table 19 in section 11.5.4 of, the FES listed the proposed methods. For some scenarios we have deviated from the FEB and the final design methods are listed in Table 28. Table 28 Structural Design Fire Summary FDS + Time step 3arfire L “evo Tsk Dock 108 Tie tp To iret | awl ob arp wor F08Tieste Tt 2000 = tenlOivels |S eTimestep | Tk ew az 1 | LewloRipnecarfre | —_—AsumedASToTime sep | car 100CAST 552 evlOSSpnelioskFre | ——AsumedASTTime sep Kes GUAT S53 |_evlOtSpne Kink Fre | AsumedASToTine sep | Kes GUAT | lel OBWeleeyGaley Tine este : 5 Ue OSSene | Euicde uanerTine ep : st | telosPrefinion | veal ramet Tne ep : 8 Level 05 Plenary Time equivalence 12.5 Time step Member Temperatures from FDS models WT and AST devices were collocated on the underside of flanges and on the webs of the structural beams. 12.5.1 $1- Level B4 Multi-Car Fire 12.5.1.1 Beams ‘The BA structural car fire was modelled with the following considerations: + Based on the beam sizes given in the Level B3 Primary Structure Plans two typical structural beams were modelled: + 360UB51 -no fire protection coating * 4600882 -no fire protection coating + The fire was assumed to occur over a 7.25 x 1.5 m area, at an elevated height of 1.0m, + The design fire was the 3 car fire as discussed in section 11.2.1 of the FEB (Rev 2.3). The resultant input HRR curve for the fire model is shown in Figure 15. New Zealandinteratioral Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report Update | 62 | 6Ape18 | eASDiARDTXOOUFED! Reps 2170003Figure 15 HRR vs Time curve for the car park fire HRR 3 Car He 3 car 100 Figure 16 FDS model for the Level 84 3-car structural fire The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 53 to Figure 72. The results are summarised in Table 29 below. "New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fire Engineering Report nTable 29 ey 82-2 823 8b-2 &b-3 o1 92 93 94 Sat 9a-2 9a-3 9a-4 95 9b-1 9b-2 9b-3 9b-4 9b-5 10-1 10-2 103 10-4 105 103-2 102-3, 10b-2 10b-3 pb. D2 D3 EL 22 3 FL F2 FB Beam Size 360U851 —AST_W_8a_9850 360U851 —_ AST_W_8a_13350 360U851 __AST_W_8b_9850 360UB51 —__AST_W_8b_13350 360UB51 __ AST_W_9_4850 360UB51 __ AST_W_9_9350 360UB51 | AST_W_9_11350 360UB51 | AST_W_9_13350 3600851 | AST_W_9_17850 360UB51 __AST_W_9a_4850 3600851 AST_W_9a_9350_| 3600851 | AST_W_92_11350 360U851 __ AST_W_90_13350 360U851 __ AST_W_90_17850 | 360UB51, AST_W_9b_4850 360U851 | AST_W_9b_9350 | 360UB51 AST_W_9b_11350 360U851 | AST_W_9b_13350 360UB51 /AST_W_9b_17850 360851 | AST_W_10_4850 360UBS1 | AST_W_10_9350 360U851 | AST_W_10_11350 360U851 —_AST_W_10_13350 360U851 — AST_W_10_17850 360U851 __ AST_W_10a_9850 360U851 —_AST_W_102_13350 360UB51 _AST_W_10b_9850 360UB51 _ AST_W_10b_13350 460UB82 ‘460U882 4ous82 460u882 460u882 460U882 460882 pW 460U882 ___ AST_W_E_12100 460U882___ AST_W_E_16050 Basement Levels B4 to B1 Steel Temperatures Pee Sea) i) Cece Scored ¢) 200 200 300 250 250 350 250 650 300 700 400 250 650 900 650 250 00 600 500 350 300 300 250 200 200 200 200 450 650 450 350 450 350 "New_Zealandinternational Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report WA ARIE ep 2Drms | 12.5.1.2 Columns We amended the FDS model for fire scenario $1 to add a cruciform column and move the 3 car fire to be hard against the column. The resultant data from the adiabatic surface temperature devices on the column was used in the Buchanan temperature time step model to determine predicted steel temperature for a protected column. Certain conservative calculation methods were adopted. The model results confirmed that the flange closest to the fire received the most heating (slightly obvious). Consequently, we only considered the hottest quarter of the cruciform column and neglected any conductive heat transfer to cooler elements of the column, ‘The time step model is based on four-sided exposure to a quarter T element of the cruciform column to the worst case adiabatic surface temperature results from the FDS model, um thermal insult to the cruciform column Figure 17 _ Location of device recording the ma e@ Table 30 ~ Ratio of heated perimeters to cross sectional areas for the cruciform columns 0.0475 41,05263 | 42.10526 0.0384 r 1.04167 | 52.0833, 0.024375, 81.02564 | 82.05128 0.021375 7134503 | 72.51462 "New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report 0o4 jos7s |oo2s | 0.025 oos7s | 1s25 | 155 | 81.3333 | 92.6667 o4 jos |oosz | 0032 030976 | 1.968 | 2 63.5306 | 64.56612 ‘The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 74 to Figure 77. ‘The results are summarised in Table 31 below. Table 31 — Level B4 Fire rated Cruciform Column member temperatures ation Peg Cd Cee ey arene core AST_FN_£9_2375 AST_FN_£9_2375 ‘We expect that the member temperatures calculated to be conservative as no allowance has been made for heat conduction to the cooler parts of the column. Additionally, we also assumed a 4-sided exposure to the maximum effects of the fire. Parts of the perimeter of the section under consideration would be receiving a lesser dose of thermal exposure. 12.5.2 $2— Level 01 Loading Dock Truck Fire The Level 01 structural truck fire was modelled with the following considerations: + based on the beam sizes given in the Level 03 Primary Structure Plans seven typical structural beams could be affected by the truck fire: + $30U892-no fire protection coating: + 530UB92- 120 minute fire protection coating; + 600CWB253- 120 minute fire protection coating: ‘+ 610UB125- 120 minute fire protection coating; + 750CWB137- 120 minute fire protection coating; + 800CWB400- 120 minute fire protection coating; and + 1000WB138- 120 minute fire protection coating. + the effects of the sprinklers were discounted; + the fire was assumed to occur over a 8 x2.5 m area, at an elevated height of 3 m; ‘the fire was located centrally underneath one steel beam, for maximum affect on that steel beai and the design fire was the 8 tonne truck fire as discussed in section 11.2.2 of the FEB (Rev 2.3). The resultant input HRR curve for the fire model is shown in Figure 18. Update | 61 | 6-18 | WARD ASRTROOFERS Raptepl2Figure 18 HRR curve for the Truck Dock Structural Fire HRR 42 MW Truck Fire 147 GJ Fire Load - 8 T Truck | s — Truck HRRmax, t = 30min. 20 18 10 Heat Release (MW) ° 20 40 60 80 100 Time (min.) For the purposes of assessing the member temperatures we have assumed that the truck could be located centrally beneath and member. Figure 19 FDS model for the Level 01 truck structural fire Et hd TT ey 5 pees The results are summarised in Table 32 below. "New Zealand Intematonsl Convention Centre| Fire Engineering ReportTable 32 ~ Level 03 Intumescent Painted Beam Temperatures '530UB92 530UB92 610UB125 ‘s00cw8253 750CW8137 ‘s00cws400 ooocws138 Pre ‘AST_W_Fa_7625 AST_W_Fa_7625 AST_W_Fa_7625 AST_W_Fa_7625 ‘AST_W_Fa_7625_ AST_W_Fa_7625 AST_W_Fa_7625 Perce) ee Beer) eee) Pataca) eae) Additionally, it is possible for a truck to be located close to an opening in the level 2 mezzanine parking floor —say close to grid 10 between grids D and E or F and G. The effect of the truck fire on the structure above the Level 02 Floor needs to be checked to confirm the adequacy of the 60 minute rating. ‘To this end the worst-case AST data for the beams in the S2 model on grids 7 and 9 should exceed the thermal insult to the beams on grids D, €, F, and G from a relocated truck fire. So, the worst-case AST data from beams on grids 7 and 9 (AST_W_7_2375) was applied to the beam type on Level 03 Grids D, E, F, and G beams (530UB92). ‘The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F on Figure 92 and Figure 93. 530UB92 Devi LAST_W_7_2375, 12.5.3 Level 01 Storage Fire Peed Cd Rarseyt) 60. Table 33 ~ Level 03 intumescent Painted Beam Temperatures from $2 over LO2 ee) DLC ieuetad ‘The Level 01 structural car park storage fire was modelled with the following considerations: based on the beam sizes given in the Level 02 Primary Structure Plans four typi could be affected by the storage fire: + 360U851-no fire protection coating; + 200U830- 60 minute fire protection coating; + 310U840-60 minute fire protection coating; and + 360CWB87- 60 minute fire protection coating. the effects ofthe sprinklers were discounted; the fire was assumed to occur over a 5x5 m area, at an elevated height of 1.5 m; and the design fire was 16 GI storage fire as discussed in section 11.2.4 of the FEB (Rev 2.3). The resultant input HRR curve for the fire model is shown in Figure 20. | structural beams In accordance with the request from the structural engineer, AST and WT device results were provided for adjacent non-fire protective coated beams at 3 locations per beam: New Zealand international Convention ss meaty+ directly above the centre-line of the fire; and = ateach end of the beam. Refer to Figure 94 in APPENDIX F for device locations. Figure 20 ~ Level 01 Storage Fire HRR ae | HRR Level 01 Storage Fire 25000 RR (kW) ar © 5 1 1% 2% 2 30 35 | Time (min.) | Figure 21 FDS model for the Level 01 storage area structural fire ee The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 95 to Figure 106. The results are summarised in Table 37 below. "Now Zsondematonal Conversion Genz. Fre Ergoering Report a Joe | 62 | Apr 8 | WAZ Aa rst aleTable 34 ~ Level 02 Beam Temperatures over Storage Fire ern iy Pee Oe eee ey co) co) 3600851 | AST_W12_0375 360UB51 | AST_W12_2375 | 360UB51 | AST_W12_8875 360UB51 | AST_W12a_0375 360UB51 | AST_Wi2a_2875 360UB51 — AST_W12a_8875 | ‘360UB51 | ‘AST_W12b_0375 | 360UB51 | AST_W12b_2875 360U851 | AST_W12b_8875 3600851 | AST_Ww13_0375 3600851 | AST_W13_2375 3600851 AST_W13_8875 Table 35 ~ Level 02 Intumescent Painted Beam Temperatures ed Reta) ry AST Device Creat a Tune ie 12b2 2000830 | AST_W12b_2875 | 60 243"c 122 310UB40 AST_W12b_2875 60 2a3"c 1262 360CWB87 AST_W12b_2875 60 12.5.4 S4-LO3 Halls Truck Fire ‘The Level 03 Halls structural truck fire was modelled with the following considerations: + the trusses were constructed from the following members: * 600CWC243 bottom chord —_60 minute fire protection coating; * OOCWC243 vertical member 60 minute fire protection coating; © GO0CWC306 diagonal brace. 60 minute fire protection coating; = GOOCWC382 diagonal brace. 60 minute fire protection coating; © 00CWC306 top chord. 60 minute fire protection coating; + 600CWC471 top chord. 60 minute fire protection coating ‘New Zealand intemational Convention Centre_| Fie Engineering Report= 6O0CWC471 — diagonal brace. 60 minute fire protection coating; = 6OOCWCS82 — diagonal brace. 60 minute fire protection coating; = sooczi2 diagonal member 60 minute fire protection coating; = aoocai2 vertical member 60 minute fire protection coating; = ao0ci73 diagonal member 60 minute fire protection coating; = 6S0CB-1a FOGP LOS Floor Beam 60 minute fire protection coating; and = 6S0CB-1a FOU LOS Floor Beam no fire protection coating. the effects of the sprinklers were discounted; the fire was assumed to occur over an 8 mx 2.5 m area, at an elevated height of 3 m; the fire was located centrally beneath the truss on grid H; and the design fire was the HGV truck fire as discussed in section 11.2.5 of the FEB (Rev 2.3). The resultant input HRR curve for the fire model is shown in Figure 22. Figure 22 _ Level 03 Halls Truck Fire HRR Curve Heat Release (MW) HRR L03 42 MW HGV Truck Fire 245 GJ Fire Load - HRR Peak at 30 min. —Hrrmax.t= 30min, ° 20 40 60 20 100 Time (min.)igure 23 _ FDS model for the Level 03 Halls truck structural fre as — ead is a wee a —— — The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 108 to Figure 130. Figure 24 _Level 05 Floor Beam 650CB-1a For the purposes of estimating the cell beam temperatures we have considered a beam element through the centre line of the beam hole. This will give a thermal cross section in the shape of an inverted Tee as shown in Figure 25,Figure 25 Worst Case Thermal Section for Level 05 Floor Beam 650CB-1a 96 < 150—1 4 at = $$$ 2943» ‘The results are summarised in Table 36 and Table 37 below. Table 36 — Level 05 Unprotected Floor Beam Temperatures over the Truck Fire Cec Perr) Sere ct Te) eet ee eg Pope Mid point | 650CB-1aASTEL 636 700 End point | 650C8-1a_ASTS3 | 520 600 End point — 6S0CB-1a—AST65 | 386* = * For the purposes of determining the end beam temperature the AST6S result is discounted. Table 37 — Level 04-05 intumescent Painted Truss Member Temperatures Oe ey Peer et) Deed Location Pg fomen | am lane |e ld asri0 aoowe212 | 60 | 518 mn, easels Pe ssri9__ soocwea | 60 oe ‘New ealand International Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report Unde | 6 | GAori8 | WAEDAASCI2NOEFECA RgCo eee ae een ad Soe ences Teta) Pecan Location * 30 minute fire rating is not included in the structural drawings information provided for e consideration. 12.6 Time step Member Temperature from Assumed Adiabatic Surface Temperatures ‘The Spine levels 03 to 05 structures are modelled as follows: + alevel 03 reference car fire exposed to the structure (columns and bracing) on Grid L (S5-1); + allevel 03 reference car fire exposed to the structure (beams) on the underside of level 04 suspended floor ($5-2); + allevel 03 kiosk fire exposed to the structure (columns) on Grid N (S5-3); + alevel 04 kiosk fire exposed to the tension elements (tubes) supporting the spine levels 04 and 05 (85-4); and + alevel 04 kiosk fire exposed to the structure (beams) on the underside of level 05 suspended floor (555). The relevant structural elements are listed in Table 38. Table 38 _ Spine Structural Elements Modelled e ary Cee Drea scoa | suana2.7 cH concrete rid L Columns filled Reference Car Fire . 103 Grid L Columns Pelee | ssa BRE6 | 406x12.7 CHS SCO2 | 610x12.7 CHS concrete filled L03.Grid NColumns | SC1S. | 310UC158 ne 2AST (Figure | 65 5 sc6s | 200UC46 scé7 | 410UB60 ‘New Zealand inerational Convention Centre | Fie Enginoerng Report 9 Update [64 | 6Acr8 | WAZA CO FERA Rap S208Peete) Ca Pes I 750CWB137 6108101 | saouss2 Reference Car Fire 104 Floor Beams AST (Figure 26) | 95-2 | a10uB60 250831 LOS to Roof Tension | HA-1 to Members HA-S Kiosk 2 AST (Figure 219.1%8.2 CHS 2 55-4 750CWB137 | | seousss } | 610UB101 5300892 Kiosk 2 AST (Figure 4100860 ca 360851 LOS Floor Beams 55-5 250UB31 12.6.1 $5-1 and $5-2 - Level 03 Spine Car Fires The Level 03 structural car fire was modelled with the following considerations: + the adiabatic surface temperature experienced at the surface of the structural members is 1100°C for the duration of the fire over 1 MW. Refer to Figure 26; + the effects of the sprinklers were discounted; * the fire was located immediately adjacent to the structural members. The following structures were considered: + columns and bracing on Grid L; and + floor beams on the underside of the level 4 suspended structure. "New Zealand International Convention Cente | Fe Engineering Report 0 Update | 621 | GApr8 | WEASD MASZTORORIFEDA Rep TNFigure 26 _$5-1 Reference Car AST to structure Reference Car Fire Adiabatic Surface Temperature (AST) Model > 1200 1000 800 g soo & § —reeaw) 400 & =—ASTI'C) 200 0 10 2 30 4 so 60 70 80 Time (min.) The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 131 to Figure 138. ‘The results are summarised in Table 39 below. Table 39 ~ Spine Level 03 Car Fire Member Temperatures tee host) Peace (ce) Fire Rating ia crn) 914x12.7CHS 60 Geaceal a ‘530UB92 60 ‘7S0CWB137 60 12.6.2 95-3 to $5-5 - Levels 03 and 04 Kiosk Fires ‘We have departed from the proposed fire model for the LO4 tension members given in the FEB (section 11.2.7). The duration of the Kiosk fie is significantly longer than the furniture fire and the proposed design AST temperature is the same (110°C). So the Kiosk fire model poses a greater insult to the structure. ‘New Zealand International Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report Unite | 61 | Ape | WASLRARIONOFEDA RepsThe Levels 03 and 04 structural Kiosk fire was modelled with the following considerations: + The adiabatic surface temperature experienced at the surface of the structural members is 100°C for the duration of the fire over 1 MW. Refer to Figure 27; * The effects of the sprinklers were discounted; + The fire was located immediately adjacent to the structural members. The following structures were considered: + Columns on Grid N (Model $5-3); + Tension Members above Level 04 (Model $5-4); and + Floor beams on the underside of the level 5 suspended structure (Model 5-5). Figure 27 _ Kiosk Fire Flame Temperature Model (S7-2 to $7-5) Kiosk 2 Adiabatic Surface Temperature (AST) Model 200 3000 800 g | 600 ne 0) EB —astrey | a0 | 200 | ° ° s 10 18 20 Fo Time (min) ‘The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 139 to The results are summarised in Table 40 below. ew elon tational Coneten Cnr, Fr Ender Report 2 Update | 61 | Gor 8 | WME tACDTROOOFEDE RaeTable 40 ~ Spine Levels 03 to 05 Kiosk Fire Member Temperatures ed iva (min.) 610x 12.7 CHS | 60 219x8.2CHS | 60 250U831 60 310UCis8 | 60 4100860 60 7socwe137 | 60 12.7 Equivalent Time of Fire Exposure Calculations 12.7.1 PD 6688-1-2:2007 Methodology The equivalent time of fire exposure method given in Annex F to Eurocode BS EN 1991 the Annex E fire load densities assessment have been removed from use for applications in the UK. The National Annex document (UK) NA to BS EN 1991-1-2:2002 lists the UK Published Document, PD 6688-1-2:2007 — Background paper to the UK National Annex to BS EN 1991-1-2, as providing the replacement calculation methods for BS EN 1991-1-2 Annexes E and F, effectively known as the Eurocode time equivalent method. :2002 along with For time equivalent calculations, the methods given in Annexes A and B to PD 6688-1-2:2007 will be used. 12.7.2 Fire Load Energy Density Different Fire Load Energy Density (FLED) were proposed forthe different occupancies, taking into account @ the various international fire engineering guidance documents. The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) quotes a 95% fractile fuel load density for offices of ‘760Mi/m*. As a conservative assumption, 800MJ/m? has been used for office areas. For retail areas, the IFEG quotes a 95% fractile amount of 1300MJ/m? for retail shops. This would include densely loaded discount stores and the like which are not appropriate for the tenancies in this building. The retail tenancies are expected to be cafe/restaurant or fashion shops which have a lower fuel load more in line with an average fuel load for a shop (i.e. 600Mi/m? as outlined in IFEG). As a conservative assumption, a fuel load density of 900 MJ/m? for the retail tenancies will be used for the purposes of calculating the required fire resistance ratings. This equates to an 80% fractile amount and is inline with recommendations of PD7974 for the purposes of design. For the workshops on Level B1, the IFEG quotes average values of 300MJ/m? (chemical store), SOOMI/m? (contractor room), 600MJ/m: (electrical workshop), 700 MJ/m? (carpentry workshop) and 1200 Mi/m* (consumable stores). Considering an average 95% fractile amount of 1200Mi/m? for all of them is a conservative assumption. The workshop firecell also comprises a large lobby area (259m? of the 434m?firecell) and staff amenities where the fire load is considered as 400M1/m?. The weighted average 95% fractile amount is 723MJ/m?. A conservative value of 800Mi/m:is considered. 12.7.3 Methodology The methodology given in PD 6688-1-2 Annexes A and B is described as follows: ‘The FLED calculation is: Me = aumd; Where: qua = Effective FLED ux = characteristic FLED given in section 12. m = Combustion factor (1.0) &: = sprinkler protection factor (0.61). The equivalent time of standard fire exposure calcul tea = Oherky we Where: tea = Equivalent time of standard fire exposure (minutes) ky = Conversion factor accounting for building materials wy = Ventilation factor ‘And wy = (6.0/4)22[0.62 + 90(0.4-0,)4/(14b,a4}] >= 0.5 Where: a = A/Assuch that 0.025 < a, <= ay = AYA by = 125(1+10a,-a2)>=10 25 12.7.4 Input Parameters The Input Parameters of each scenario for the Equivalent Fire Severity calcul following tables. ions are presented in the In accordance with PD 6688. the combustion factor, m = 1. :2007 Annex A.5 referenced combustion data is not available and therefore In accordance with PD 6688. :2007 Annex A.1 the sprinkler protection factor 8; =0.61. "New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fire Engineering Report Update | 63 | 618 | WAS tAAEDINCIOFEDE Regt S27Table 41 _ Time Equivalent Calculation Results ec Com) Cy Level 81 Workshops so | 34 ase 065 90 | 120 Level 01 Ret \90 73 469309 31 60 Level OL retail Laneway 900 | 35 30816309 uz | 120 LevelO2retalLaneway 9003.5 318413 | 09 6 | 90 leveloinziccoffice 800 «73380 | 61509 2 o |@ LevelO1 Main Kitchen 7007.3 60 0 09 87 | 90 Level03 Wellesley Gallery | 800 10.8 [eos [eras | 00 |25 60 eeelosPienary—doors | aon 363, 199s a7 | 09 7% 90 } revels Plenary=doors | gog 163 a995 0.09 78 | 90 Level05 Plenary Stage 800s 16.3 208-0 0 78 | 90 Level 05 BOH 40049 1226 | 116.6 08 33 60 Level 05 Servery West | 400 55 180 09 54 | 60 e | Level 0S Servery East 400 5.9 ws 0 09 53 | 60 12.8 Time step Member Temperatures from Eurocode Parametric Temperature-Time Curves ‘The Eurocode Parametric temperature time curves are applied to the following spaces: + The Level 05 Spine area; and +The Level 05 Icon/ space. Buchanan (2002) confirms that the Eurocode Parametric Temperature Time approach is reasonably accurate for small room sizes (6 m x 6 m x 2.4 m high). Buchanan goes on to state that the use of the Eurocode method for larger firecells will be conservative. Hence the following results are considered as conservative. ‘New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report % Update | 63 | 6Apr- 8 | WAZ HSDTRCDOFEDK Repos TTS% 12.8.1 S7- Level 05 Spine Space ‘The Level 05 Eurocode parametric temperature-time model was formed with the following considerations: = the fire was assumed to be constrained to the Level 05 Spine floor area. le no fire spread was ‘assumed to occur to the Pre-Function spaces as there is a large gap without an effective fire load (travel paths) between the 2 spaces (Refer to Figure 28); = the effects of the sprinklers were discounted; + the floor beams on the underside of the level 6 roof structure were considered; * the activities on the Level 05 Spine floor is comprised of 2 meeting rooms and circulation space that may include perhaps 1 or 2 Kiosks. For such activities both the MBIE document C/VM2 and the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) indicate FLED’s between 300 and 400 MJ/m? (Cinema, Display or other large open spaces; or spaces of low fire hazard...). We have used a FLED of 400 M/m? for this area; and + the ventilation area is 25% of the glazing area of the Level 05 Spine space. We have included 25% of e the skylight area as part of the vertical openings in the calculation. Figure 28 _Level 05 Spine Parametric Temperature Time Model Extents 7T"|- yellow highlight PL 7 seen] H ‘Assumed boundary of arametric fire calculation, Blue dashed lin ‘New ealandinterational Convention Contre | Fire Engineering Report 9% Update | 61 | 6Aor-18 | WPEDiAeTONODDFERA Repure 29 Level 05 Spine Parametric Temperature NZICC - Level 5 Spine Space (25% —T1S0 834 Temeprature Curve Glazing Breakage) 1200 = £ z —rModied eurocode zg Parametric E Temperature Curve 2 Time (min.) ‘The members supporting the Level 06 roof over the Spine are listed in Table 42. The F/V value, ratio of surface area to cross sectional area (also known as Hp/A), ranges between 70 mr! for '800CWB330 to 236 m* for 250UB31. We have calculated the member temperature response for the ‘members at the F/V extremes plus the mid range point, F/V - 156 m" for460UB75. From previous analysis we have found that through the range of F/V values for a given temperature curve, the calculated member peak temperatures vary no more than 5°C. The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 151 to Figure 156. ‘Table 42 — Spine Level 06 Roof Member Temperatures pees cen ny Ces raat acti) (min.) iy 200 PFC 250UB31 310U840 3600851 4100860 460U867 4600875 ‘New Zeland international Corwertion Centre | Fire Engineering Report 7 Updte | 6: | Apr 38 | WARIAZ2OTDFED RapAnat} Ce Sacae nd co er ieee '530UB82 61008101, 61008125 70OCWB136 800CWB330 g50cWB161 1500cwa411 12.8.2 $8 — Level 05 Icon/Pre-function Space ‘The Level 05 Icon space Eurocode parametric temperature-time model was formed with the following. considerations: the fire was assumed to be constrained to the Level 05 Icon space floor area. Ie no fire spread was ‘assumed to occur to the Spine as there isa large gap without an effective fire load (travel paths) between the 2 spaces (Refer to Figure 30); the effects of the sprinklers were discounted; the following structures were considered: * lower level trusses over the level 05 floor level (excluding the high level trusses over the Plenary); and * other structural elements at the lower truss levels. the activities on the Level 05 Icon/Pre-function space is comprised of meeting rooms, potential display space and dining functions. For such activities both the MBIE document C/VM2 and the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) indicate FLED’s between 700 and 800 MJ/m: (Seating areas with upholstered furniture.) We have used a FLED of 800 Mi/m? for this area; and the ventilation area is 25% of the glazing area of the Level 05 Icon/Pre-function space plus an 8 m wide allowance for the opening into the spine. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 8 Unde | 621 | 6Apr 8 | Wet T2AODAFE Rap roeFigure 30 _ Level 05 Icon/Pre-function Space Parametric Temperature Time Model Extents No effective fire load in cloudedFigure 31 _ Level 05 Icon/Pre-function Space Parametric Temperature Level 05 Icon/Pre-function Space (25% Glazing Breakage) Eurocode Parametric Temperature Time Curve 1400 | 1200 +, £ 1000 2 T Modified Ex # 200 | —T Modified Eurocode g Parametric Temperature E600 curve 1 ios —T150 834 Temeprature Curve Time (min.) ‘The members supporting the truss structures over the Icon/Pre-function areas are listed in Table 43. The F/V value, ratio of surface area to cross sectional area (also known as Hp/A), ranges between 70 m' for ‘800CWB330 to 236 m'* for 250UB31. We have calculated the member temperature response for the members at the F/V extremes plus the mid range point, F/V ~ 156 m* for460UB75, From previous analysis we have found that through the range of F/V values for a given temperature curve, the calculated member peak temperatures vary no more than 5°C, The resultant member temperature graphs are shown in APPENDIX F from Figure 157 to Figure 162. Table 43 — Level 05 Lower Truss Structure Temperatures en) Ree ace tiy (ya) cod Ce) Id CE} 250UB37 231 360UB51. 217 200x6.0SHS 172 ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report Upste | 62 | Gor | WASP ASzAFORFER Rags tTrenee at acuity to, ed (min.) Ce 250UC73 530U892 310UC37 610uB125 150x16 EA 310UC118 250x9.0 SHS 310UC137 327HCC165 355,6x12.7 CHS 350CW8-BOX-2 350CW8-BOX-1 ‘ss! 12.9 Wall Fire Ratings Using the Cumulative Radiant Energy Method ‘The Level 3 Halls southern wall facing the Albion Hotel has its fire rating determined by the Cumulative Radiant Energy (CRE) method (Barnett, 2007). ‘The CRE data for the fire separations is based on the worst-case AST data for the Halls structure supporting e the level 5 floor. Refer to section 12.5.4. The worst case Adiabatic Surface Temperature (AST) data was recorded by device AST10 which was located on the bottom flange of the bottom truss chord immediately ‘over the truck fire, ‘The CRE data based on the AST10 device shows that 60 minute fire separations for the Level 3 Halls walls and floors over will meet the requirements for “burnout”. Refer to Figure 32 and Figure 33, New Zealand international Conwention Centre| Fire Engineering Report 101 Update | 62 | Gor | NARS iASDIACNBFEDE Repo IZ17a8Figure 32__Level03 Exhibition Halls firecell - Worst Case AST vs Time Temperature versus 1200 Temperature (*C) 8 ge ed ° 20 40 60 80 100 120 Time (minutes) Temperature (ASTIO) | ——180 Temperature Figure 33 Level 03 Exhibition Halls Firecell - Worst Case Cumulative Radiation Energy CRE versus Time Time (minutes) — cumulative Radiant Energy (AST10) — Cumulative BO 834 Radiant Eneray 150 60 minute radiant energy ‘New Zealand itemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report, Update | 61 | Aor | WAAR ACODER Rg TNDS13 ASET MODELLING Fire modelling analysis has been undertaken to estimate ASET (Available Safe Egress Time). 13.1 Software ‘The modelling software used in the design of this building w + Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) Versions 6.1.1, and 6.3.2. The software used to set up the FDS input files is Pyrosim Version 2014.1.0331; and + B-Risk Versions 2015.07, Refer to Table 47 for summary of scenarios. 13.1.1 Mesh Sizing ‘The accuracy of the CFD modelling is affected by the number of grid cells. A finer grid increases the ‘computational time, although typically provides more favourable (.. less conservative) results for smoke prediction. ‘According to the FDS User's Guide, 2 measure of how well the flow field is resolved is given by the non- dimensional expression: pe ox Where 2” is the characteristic fire diameter (m) and 5 is the nominal size of a mesh cell (m). 2” can be calculated as follows: Where © heat release rate (kW) = ambient density = 1.205 kg/m? ambient specific heat = 1.005 ki/kg. ambient temperature = 293 K gravity = 9.8 m/s? ow Based on research completed by NUREG as referenced within the FDS user Guide?, a ratio of between 4 and 16 for D*/dx was used to accurately resolve fires in various scenarios, (ur design basis was to achieve a D*/dx in the vicinity of 10 as summarised in Table 47. 13.1.2 B-Risk Model Parameters Where the room sizes fall within the limits of acceptable use for zone modelling, B-Risk has been used to ‘model these spaces. 8-Risk model validity is based on the non-dimensional heat release parameter, Q* and the dimensionless shape factor which are calculated as follows: 3 Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications. NUREG 1824, United ‘States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007 ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 103 Inde | 61 | Agr 4B | WADIARALIRODPFEDA Rapp S2TEONEjr 111043” Where: Q*= non-dimensional heat release parameter Q = Peak heat release rate (kW) He = Height of the enclosure Where: SF = dimensionless shape factor Ay = Floor area (m2) H, = Height of the enclosure (m) In order for an enclosure to be within the limits of zone modelling, 0.002 < Q* < 0.03 and 0.4 < SF < 69 Refer to Table 47 for summary of scenarios. 13.2 FDS Model Parameters 13.2.1 Building Geometry The building geometry was constructed using Pyrosim, based on the architectural drawings received during the developed design phase. Minor architectural adjust ments during detailed design have not been continually updated within models as they will not result in significant changes to modelling results. 13.2.2 Smoke Exhaust Smoke exhaust within the various FDS models has been generally located in accordance with the mechanical drawings. Smoke exhaust has been modelled with the following parameters: + Volume Fluxes ~ Refer to Table 19; + Vent velocities - 5 m/s; ‘+ Activation - Refer to APPENDIX G ; and + Plenary ~ silence alarm facility to account for theatrical smoke. 13.2.3 Make Up Air Make up air has been modelled as follows: + Locations - based on the vent sizes shown in architectural drawings (refer APPENDIX C ); Door opening area — half the area beneath 2m assumed blocked by occupants; + Velocity through doors - approximately 3m/s. In instances where the final make-up air locations are slightly different from the modelled locations, results will not be significantly impacted and do not require re-modelling. [New Zealand Intemational Convention Cente | Fee Engineering Report 108 Update | 62 | Gor 18 | AEDIAAEDI ANF etsy S0713.2.4 Smoke Detection ‘Smoke detection for point type detectors have been modelled with the following characteristics. Table 44 FDS Smoke Detector Characteristics Cleary Photoelectric | SH obs/m Lo. 08 pha c Table 45 _B-Risk Detector Characteristics The activation threshold of point type smoke detectors is set to 5% obs/metre. Two detectors were required to activate (i.e. double knock) before smoke detection was assumed to occur. The results of the second detector activation (i.e. double knock) are summarised in Table 57. The 5%/m obscuration is a median setting for a typical smoke detector setting. The sensitivity of the smoke detectors can be adjusted from this setting to up in the vicinity of 10%/m obscuration. The FDS modelling results show that a 10%/m threshold is typically reached within 1 timestep (1 ~ 2 seconds), occasionally 2 timesteps. The implication is that the RSET could be 1 to 3 seconds less than the tabular results presented if the detectors thresholds have been deliberately altered for a particular reason. 13.25 Sprinklers Sprinklers were modelled with the following characteristics. Table 46 Sprinkler Characteristics ‘New Zealand International Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 105, Ute | 6 | Apr | WAS tAE2TAOIBFED Rags TDS13.3 Design Fires 13.3.1 Design Fire Locations A total of 22 design fires have been proposed; their respective locations are shown in the figures below. Note fire scenarios associated with the Level 1 Gallery proposed in the FEB have been removed, The Level 1 Gallery no longer needs to be assessed in detail due to the provision of horizontal smoke curtains to smoke separate it, Figure 34 Level B4 Design Fire [New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 106 Update | 6: | GApr8 | WeAED APEDTAROEGA Rec STNFigure 35 Level 01 Design Fires ‘New Zealandinterational Convention Cetre_| Fie Engineering Report 07 Update 163 | G#pr8 | WADIA OIFE Rape@ Figure 36 Level 02 Design Fires [New Zealand itemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report Update | 6:1 | 6Agr-8 | WEASR ASD TONBFEOA Resi S2170008Figure 37___Design Fires On Level 3 Figure 38__Design Fires On Level 4 ‘New Zealandinterational Convention Centre | Fe Report 09 [ Fre Engineering FEM Reptip ZTE Update | 62 | Gage | eaazieFigure39__Design Fires On Level 5 F10A FA1A, F118 13.3.2 Fire Growth Rate and Heat Release Rate (HRR) The design fires have been determined and agreed in the Sections 11.3 and 11.4 of the FEB (refer APPENDIX L ). Design fires are generally t? growth curves with the exception of the Spine as outlined below. 13.3.2.1 Spine (beneath void) ‘A.double sofa fire (Figure 40) and fast fire proposed in the FEB have been modelled at the base of the spine. ‘NewZealand intemational Convention Centre | Fe Engineering Report 110 Update | 62 | 6-18 | WADetABDIROTOFEDERepriFigure 40 HRR reference curve for double sofa fire at base of Spine Sofa F32 x 2 HRR 7000 «ooo sooo = 4000 F 2000 2000 1000 ‘ : of 4 6 8 wm oR we we 2 ‘Time (mins) 13.3.2.2 Summary ‘The growth rate, calculated sprinkler activation time and maximum HRR of the design fires are summarised in the below table. It is noted that following the calculation of peak heat release rates below, the fire services designer has provided ordinary hazard sprinkler spacing to all areas to provide future flexibility. Where light hazard spacing has been used in the sprinkler activation calculations below, the calculated sprinkler activation will be conservative when compared to actual activation on a reduced spacing grid. Table 47 _ Fire Scenario Summary ies ee ee co Cece paral eso acl yee ootaezh oh ee) Bd) apelin) (SF) Level B4 Car Park Level 0 Truck Dock | Level 1 Cr Park | Fo Level 02 Car Park FOS Fast | Ordinary 180 asi9 | 9a | NA FIA | Level3Spine below sab) | FOS Fast | Ordinary 185 v0 | 95 | NA 5A Level3Spine below void) | FOS Sofa |N/A NIA 700 | 84 | NA 3B | Level3Spine(elow void) | FOS Fast | NA | NA 00 |e [ wa Fea | tevel3 Galery aRisk | Fast | ght 285 ss | WA | 89 F5A | _Level 3 Swing Space 4 FOS | Fast | Ordinary | __309 ae | 8 | WA | evel als to won | lrmigiaitica ros | fan |ormy) 20 | am | as | A Level 3 Hall 3 | ros ur ros | Fax | Ondnay | 340 sin | a6 | WA roc | UEI3 Meeting Room West 2 in| f= . Op. wall made 7" 60 Level 3Hal2South | FS_| Fast Ordinary | 35 s7m_| aa | WA New Zsa nteationalConvertion entre Fre Engineering Report m Upaite | 61 | 64918] CPAOTAFE Raperrr a a ee Shape Ae emai Pe cae Cc Time (5) = (sF) (Op. wall mode 15 Level 4 Spine : | : | : tees Penta) | FOS | fat Oday) | sm | 77 | WA LeveSPenarivicie) | 08 | Fo Ontmay «55 | gross | WA Level 5 Stage FOS | Fast | Ordinary 2a | (3800 | G6 OUN/A essa” | ems | ren | um | am |e | wa | 32 Level 5 Meeting Rooms | | Society | om | Fen | vane 28 m8 | NA 96 tewlsPretucton | fOs | fan Ory | ane | ss | 92) WA teetsmetemoweon | anax | ron tet | ot | ss | wa aa Level 5 Meeting Room | a pase | fot ue ss | as) WA | a8 # Level 4 Spine agreed with Peer Reviewer as not being required as Level 3 Spine generated more onerous conditions + Meeting rooms designed as per Acceptable Solutions so have not been modelled. 13.3.3 Combustion Chemistry and Soot Yields The inputs developed in Sections 11.5.6 of the FEB (refer APPENDIX L ) for FDS are summarised in Table 48. It is noted that the CO yield was generally increased from 0.025 g/g to 0.04 g/g to align more closely with the C/VM2 criteria to be more conservative. Table 48 Combustion and Yields i. El ol acd ml pe ect ar) ry 75% plastic and ] ee 1 155 039 0.058 0.025 01 184 13.4 Tenability and Failure Criteria Three criteria for means of escape have been assessed in order to demonstrate that the occupants of the building are able to evacuate effectively without risk. As outlined in Section 10.1 of the FEB (refer APPENDIX L), the acceptance criteria are as follows: + FED¢o- 0.3; + FEDnenui-0.3; and + Visibility—10m, 13.4.1 Fire Service Tenability Due to sprinkler protection in the building, the Fire Brigade tenability limits outlined in the FEB (i.e. service temperatures) will not be reached, ‘New Zealand itemational Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report. uz Update | 6: | 6Apri8 WAS AASLINBFEDA Rasy 517 0813.5 Fire Modelling Results Based on the fire scenarios outlined above in Table 47, the results of the FDS models have been reviewed and summarised within this section. The time (from the ignition of the fire) taken for conditions to become untenable are as follows for various building parts under different fire scenarios based on the various tenability criteria outlined in Section 13.4. 13.5.1 FEDrwenwat FEDryema: has been reviewed for all scenarios. Based on |S013571:2012, where radiation is less than 2.5 kW/m?, it can be discounted from the FEDryemai calculation, In all cases, the radiation on evacuating ‘occupants from the hot layer is less than 2.5 kW/m?. Therefore, FEDriemaa: Considers convective heat transfer from the smoke only. ‘The FEDrexwa will be determined based on lightly clothed occupants. Based on a worst case exposure time of 8 minutes (refer Section 17.2), occupants can withstand a temperature of 64°C before FEDryenmatis exceeded (this also accounts for the 25% variation in results). Therefore, 64°C has been used as the criteria for FEDrvesma- All FDS scenarios were shown to have temperatures less than 64°C for evacuating occupants and therefore FEDrvenna Will not be exceeded on the egress path for allfire scenarios. ‘The following fire scenarios were modelled by B-RISK where untenable conditions in the small space (low ‘occupant numbers with short distance to exit) are defined by the FEDrxenua (in lieu of visibility). The below figures are considered conservative based on BRANZFIRE not considering the cooling effect of the sprinklers after activation. in 2 sprinkler protected building, itis unlikely that FECrenwa WOuld be exceeded for ‘evacuating occupants. Table 49 - B-RISK Results rear eee ers FAA Wellesley Gallery >600 FLA Level 5 Meeting Room (L5-14) 214 Level 5 Meeting Rooms Combined ie (15-12, 13, 14) ‘iid Fa34 Level 5 Pre-function/icon Space | >600 F138 Level 5 Meeting Room (L5-18) 326 13.5.2 FEDco FEDeo remain tenable (i.e. < 0.3) along critical paths under all of the fire scenarios. 13.5.3 Visibility Due to the fire safety systems provided, visibility does not become untenable throughout a building until the late stages of the fire. However, conditions in the area of fire origin must be reviewed. The time to untenable conditions in the below tables was taken as the time when an exit or a main egress path generally becomes enclosed or blocked by areas of low visibility. This is conservative as there are other egress paths on that floor level for the occupants to safely reach an alternat New zzlandtenatiorl enventin Cee | Fre rgneaing Report m3 Unde | 61 | 6Apr18 | WARZDAAEZI2RCOFED Rep% For car park scenarios (less than 1000 people), visibility is not a tenability criteria. However, the visibility in the stairs was considered to ensure that egress for the occupants using the stairs from the upper levels is not adversely impacted. In all scenarios, the visibility in the stairs was less than 10m and therefore remained tenable. For the plenary the FDS model results showed the upper tiers being immersed in smoke before the occupants had cleared the area. ASET was determined using the method outlined by Klote et al (2012) for determining visibility in non- uniform smoke. Visibility, S, was calculated from: Kx log,(1 2/100) Where: S = Visibility distance k Proportionality constant (K = 8 for internally illuminated signs, K = 3 for reflected signs and building components in reflected light) path distance (10 m for FOS Beam Detector device) 2. = Percent obscuration over the path distance (FDS beam detector device results) ‘The d (percent obscuration) data was obtained from beam detector devices located in each aisle on each upper plenary level as shown in Figure 41. All the beam detector devices are 10 m long, Generally, K= 3 for all the visibility calculations except for locations within 10 m of the exit sign over the west cross-aisle exit. ility calculations for locations within 10 m of the west cross-aisle exit use K = 8 for internally illuminated signs. Results for the visibility calculations are given in APPENDIX N Figure 41, FDS Beam Detector Devices on the Upper Plenary Aisles ‘Now Zealand international Convention Cente | Fie Engineering Report. ua‘The following visibility results were extracted from the FDS modelling results for the remainder of the scenarios. Table 50 Time (s) to reach untenable visibility con jons (<10 m) due to a fire in Spine eee ees feo eee Ce Spaces >750 Screenshots of the FDS scenarios at ASET are provided in APPENDIX O . Table 51 Time (s) to reach untenable visibility conditions (<10 m) due to a fire on Level 3 eo een B etme LiSpine | 13 spine ferret emery ‘3 ie) ee) ts g vex | sas | ontoo [ vaso | suo | suse | bus [ son | outo r= | sas | ssapo | s1s00 | sumo | s1z00 | sto0o | stom | sumo FeD___>1800 | >1800 | >1800 __>1800 | >1800 | >1800 | >1800 __>1800 Table 52 Time (s) to reach untenable visibility conditions (<10 m) due to a fire on Level 5 Time (s) to reach untenable visibility conditions fore eng Fire err ead Reames ed Cond fe Seenari | rr acu ea meee ca ° ie eee Cr eee igo POL Cc iC Cc) F8A | >1800| 325, 203 720 | >1800 | >1800 | >1800 9A | s1g00 557221800 | ase | 361 | 900 FI0A >1800 | >1800 >1800 | ->1800 | >1800 | >1800 >1800 | 220 | >1800 | >1800 FI2A | >asa0_ >1sao | >1s40 | >1540 | >1s4o | >1540 | >1540 | >1540 | >1s40_ >1540 Untenable visibility figures are taken from the minimum ASET-RSET calculations ‘New Zealandinterational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report us Update | 61 | Aor | WAR nARG2AIOOFEDE Rapp 5217008,13.6 ASET Based on the FED¢o and FED;yena Not exceeding the tenabilty criteria, the visibility criteria generally dictates ASET for each scenario. It is noted that the car park contains less than 1000 occupants and therefore visibility and FEDryequa. Were not considered asa tenability criteria in line Building Code C4.4, As FEDco did not exceed ‘the tenability criteria for the duration of the simulations, the car park scenarios have tenability >1800seconds. Itis noted that occupants can still navigate through areas of lower visibility, albeit at @ reduced speed. As the ‘temperature and radiation conditions and fractional effective dose are all expected to remain tenable throughout occupant evacuation, it can be concluded that occupants will not be subjected to conditions that will incapacitate them, 13.7 Fire Brigade Tenability ‘At the end of the modelled period of 1800 s, the highest temperature reached as a result of the hot smoke layer does not exceed 60°C away from the fire. This is expected in a building with sprinkler protection, This temperature level is significantly lower than the routine conditions of 100°C. Further the provision of a compliant automatic sprinkler system will protect the fire brigade personnel as they engage in fire fighting land search and rescue activities. Therefore itis expected that the routine condition for the fire brigade personnel would remain indefinitely, and the risk to their life safety is low. "New Zealand intemationl Convention Contre | Fie Engineering Report us Update | 6 | 6Aor18 | WEMERbAEZTAUTBFED Rage14 FIRE EGRESS — ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS 14.1. Introduction tas has been agreed with the stakeholders that some areas of the Performance Based Design (PBD) can incorporate the Acceptable Solutions. The areas and levels identified in this assessment are considered to be less complex to be using a PBD; however the Acceptable Solutions assessment in some areas will form an Input to the PBD. The design will primarily involve in the assessment of the means of escape from fire which will be in the assessment of Occupant Load, Available Escape Routes, Travel Distances and Egress Capacity. In order to simplify the design the following fire engineering safety features have not been assessed due to: + The fire safety system requirements for the building have already been assessed at the FEB stage. * The internal fire spread including fire separations have been calculated to either equal or exceed the Acceptable Solutions * The material surface finishes and the floor surface materials of the Acceptable Solutions being @ identical to NZBC Clause C3.4, 14.2 Acceptable Solutions design 14.2.1. Areas that are under the Acceptable Solutions The following levels and areas have been identified to use Acceptable Solutions (C/AS4 and C/ASS) to assess the means of escape from fire, refer to Table 53 below. For each of the areas, the building will use the most onerous or primary risk group. Refer to the FEB Appendix E for the sketches that highlight the regions that will be assessed under the Acceptable Solutions. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fire Engineering Report 7 Update [ 63 | Apr 8 | WIA AACIREOOREERE Rept 2ATable 53__Occupant Load for each level and each area 02 03 04 aM. 5M. eter CocntTy jenny Main cleaners room Workshop Diesel storage tanks Retail FaB Store BOH Office we a1 ‘Commercial Kitchen 63 Cool Storage 2 F&B Lane cA 252 Office we 27 FeB cA 37 Servery we 30 Plant Room we 5 BOH Storage we 10 Plant Room we 24 Table 53 should be read in conjunction with the sketches in APPENDIX M which highlight the areas that require to be assessed under the Acceptable Solutions. 14.2.2 Available Escape Routes In accordance with the Acceptable Solutions section 3.2.1and 3.2.2, every occupied space in a building shall be served by two or more escape routes from a floor level, except in those situations where single escape routes are permitted in accordance with Section 3.13. Single escape routes shall only be permitted if: ‘The open path length does not exceed the limits and The total occupant load from all firecells on each level served by the escape route is no greater than, ‘50 people and The escape height is no greater than 25m, sprinklered building and In buildings with two or more floors, the vertical safe path is preceded by a smoke lobby on all floors except the top most floor and ‘There are no more than 2 basement levels below ground and the vertical safe path from the basement levels is preceded by a smoke lobby. Table 54 below, is an assessment of the available escape routes and comply with Acceptable solutions. New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report us Update | 62 | SAp-38 | Wscrieeeartanay 24 e178Table 54 Numbers of Escape Routes ee eee Cee et ee eee ee) Main cleaners room, 1 Foy B1 | Workshop Z a Diesel storage tanks 2 2 office [a a kitchen, HV/LV transformers, waste storage A 2 02 | F&B Lane, Office, Kitchen 2 [2 03 | FRB, Servery 2 2 04 | Spine Mezzanine, Plant Room 1 101 4M___ Back Of House (80H), Plant Room Z 2 5M___| Plant Room, Spine Roof [a wi _| @ Notes: ‘Single escape route is permitted and meets the requirements of Section 3.13 of the Acceptable Solutions. ‘Therefore the minimum requirements of available escape routes for each floor are in compliance with the C/AS4 and C/ASS. 14.2.3 Travel Distances ‘As per Section 6 of this report, the building will have the following Fire Safety Systems installed: + Automatic Fire Sprinkler System in accordance with NZS 4541 throughout; + Smoke Detection and Alarm System in accordance with NZS4512 to nominated spaces; and + Emergency Warning and Intercom System in accordance with AS1670.4 and NZS4512, Depending on the Primary Risk Group and the type of fire system installed, each level have different permitted Dead End Open Path (DEOP) and Total Open Path (TOP) lengths. Table 55 below, is an assessment of the measured travel distance (DEOP and TOP) against the Acceptable Solutions. ‘New Zealand interational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report no peace | 61 | pr | ASDA ¢ORFEDE RepsTable 55 Travel Path Lengths pes i on ee rd Peres peice Al be Permitted Pe) ne sora Rta) ec) Main cleaners room, ex [iets we freee [so [ae [am | Diesel storage tanks kitchen, HV/WV transformers, waste Types 50 220 ot | ce we | 49 at Office Type 7 5 150 on | FAB Lane,Kitchen LTypeé 0 40 39 | 100 Office | Type7 | 14% | 0 sot! | 120 03 | F&B, Servery A \Type6 9 | 40 97 100 Spine Mezzanine, | | ee nea we Type6 | 23, 50 23 | 120 Back Of House (BOH), 4M | Bacroom we Typeé 44 50 a2 | 120 Plant Room, Spine Notes: In accordance with C/ASx section 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, intermediate floor path lengths shall be 1.5 times the measured length and stair path lengths shall be 1.2 times the measured length. ‘Therefore the minimum requirements of the travel distances for each floor are in compliance with the ‘Acceptable Solutions. 14.2.4 Egress Capacity In accordance with section 3.3.2, the width requirements of escape routes shall be based on the total combined width of all available escape routes. This will be based on 7mm/person for horizontal travel only, vertical travel down the safe path stairs have been assessed using Pathfinder (Egress Model) as part of the Performance Based Design. Refer to sketches in - Acceptable Solution Plans APPENDIX M for the markings of the limiting egress width and capacity. New Zealand iterational Convention Centre| Fre Enneering Report 20 Jods | 6 | Agr | WZIRARIIACODFERA Rei 28Table 56 Egress Capacities Horizontal Egress i oe Ceca core beer (People) en) Main cleaners room 2 3 Yes 81 Workshop: 228 32 Yes Diesel storage tanks 342 2 Yes warms te serge | S28 s s Pa Retail som 39 Yes | Fas | 429 250 Yes | Office 14ari 27 Yes | Fas Lane jan 252 Yes e 03 Servery 300 30 Yes ra, «as 7 ver 04 Plant Room 50 ial | Yes 4M Back Of House (BOH), Plant Room 328 10 | Yes SM Plant Room, Spine Roof 357 24 Yes Notes: ‘Area only has single means of escape therefore limited to only 50 people ‘Combined occupant load for this level considering the space is only a plant room with a low occupant density ‘Therefore the minimum requirements of the egress capacity for each floor are in compliance with the ‘Acceptable Solutions. 14.2.5 General Requirements + Intermediate floors and stairs used as access and their supporting primary elements within the firecell shall have Fire Resistance Rating of at least 30 minutes. + Intermediate floors satisfy the following conditions as specified in section 413.5 and 4.13.60fthe @ ‘Acceptable Solutions: + If there are two or more separate intermediate floors, the levels of these floors above the firecell floors differ by no more than 1.0m, and ‘+ The total combine occupant load on the intermediate floors is no greater than100, and + The total combined area of the intermediate floors within the firecell shall be 40% of the area of the firecell floor not including the area of the intermediate floors if the intermediate floors are either: + completely open; or * if enclosed or partitioned, a Type 4 system is installed; or + the area that allows up to 100 occupants on the intermediate floors. + Inaccordance with the C/ASx clause 3.15.7 automatic doors of all types and access control systems shall: + Not be allowed across an escape route at any point leading into or within an exitway, but ‘New ealand international Convention Cenze_| Fire Engineering Report a Upste [6 | 638 | WAI AGZI2SODIFEDA Rati 12708= Be allowed in an open path or at a final exit provided that, in the event of a power failure or ‘malfunction, the doors or access control systems continue to provided a safe means of escape from fire without reducing the required width by: + Automatically opening and remaining open, or = Being readily pushed to the outward open position by the building occupants in an emergency. ‘New Zealand itemational Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report eta date | 62 | 6Ap-18 | WHIRIAASTERODOFEDK Rapp S2AU% 15 EVACUATION MODELLING ‘The Evacuation Modelling Scenarios have been compared with the worst case design fires for the spaces in question. The results of the fire and smoke modelling determined the availability of exits. It was assumed that the occupants will use distributed available exits as required. ‘The RSET has been based on results of the evacuation modelling. Detection systems were modelled as part of the CFD analysis based on smoke detection to the various areas. This was included in the calculated Required Safe Egress Times (RSETS). The robustness inherent in the design is summarized below: ™ Generally the smoke control system provided in the main circulation and crowd spaces shall be designed to maintain smoke levels at 2m above floor level for the duration of egress. — Margin of safety was defined through the — ASET vs RSET. * smoke control design ire size have been based on detalled sensitivity analysis appropriate to each of the spaces, allowing for robust design fires. - Note, design fires have been specified for the base of the voids spaces based on expected fuel load . ‘Smoke control system and associated systems has been designed such that single points of failure are considered through the sensitivity analysis. = This includes smoke modeling of scenarios for failure of key elements such as fans and dampers to demonstrate that conditions are tenable for egress and a clear layer is maintained. A single stair or exit has been discounted in the calculation of the evacuation time for egress for specific fire scenarios as part of the sensitivity analysis. As recognized in the BRANZ study report on Means of Escape in Multi-Storey Buildings, ‘in an engineered ‘approach to means of escape design, the maximum permitted clearing time may not be fixed at all. Provided the time taken to evacuate the occupants to a place of safety does not exceed the time required for untenable or life-threatening conditions to develop, which could take into account fire suppression measures, then the life safety objective has been achieved.’ e 15.1 Means of Egress {An analysis of the total time to evacuate both the affected parts and all of the building has been conducted. This analysis was based on the identification and quantification of the individual time elements which contribute to the overall escape time. These elements include time periods related to the fire safety systems (eg. time to detection and alarm), occupant pre-movement time (e.g. recognition and response time), and the time taken to actually travel out of the building. These are represented in the time line shown in the figure below. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report wa Ups | 6 8 | We 26COUFERS iy 12 AOEFigure 42 Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) etn te Al r Evacuation Tens ‘eat, banda as e - or uy 15.2. Time to Detection and Alarm For the purposes of calculating RSET, the detection time is considered to be the earliest of either of the following: + activation of two smoke detectors, or + activation of a beam detector; or + activation of the automatic fire sprinkler system. Alarm time is considered as the activation time of the occupant warning system whichis triggered by the detection systems after a 30 s polling/verification time. Table 57 Detector Activation Time Len (including 30 1" Detector Peres a @) cond detector rk FOS 107 (sprinkler) N/A 37 Level B4 Car Level 01 Truck Dock Fos 198 (sprinkler) N/A 228 Level 01 Car Park Fos 180 (sprinkler) N/A 210 Level 02 Car Park Fos 180 (sprinkler) N/A 210 F2A | _Level 3 Spine (below slab) Fos 3s 55 85 Fa Level 3 Spine (below void) Fos 28 (beam) WA cy FB Level 3 Spine (below void) Fos 26 (beam) A 56 FAA Wellesley Gallery BRISK st 31 a FSA Level 3 Swing Space 4 Fos 82 7s 105 Level 3 Halls 103 FEA | 0p. wail modes 02, 10 ee s ” am Level 3 Hall3 FB ocuea Fos 7” 7s 105 rec Level3 Meeting Room West 1 . 7 (Op. wall mode 07° | Feo Level 3 Hall 3South Fos 6 ss a "New ealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report aa Upiate [62 | GAar18 | WAI AALLTROLAPER RepotergTZaNNme Pe da 01 BURL pee p0 ra (ieee ove ete a noe : : : FBA | Level Plenary (hal) Fos 45 4s 6 F2A | _Level 5 Plenary (whole) Fos 46 46 6 Fro | vl Stage 0s a e a inal strine foam | rua | _StS te wn | ee m rata Fup ‘cue | ease | a = n Fiza Levels Pre-unction os | a ee) e ince spe me E Level 5 Meeting Room | ws vin ot = > > Totes # Level 4 Spine agreed with Peer Reviewer as not being required as Level 3 Spine generated more onerous conditions + Meeting rooms designed as per Acceptable Solutions so have not been modelled For occupants in the Level 05 Plenary space affected by fire, the detection time is considered at the earlier of: + Fire size = 500 kW (103 seconds); or + Second smoke detector operation. Refer to FEB Rev 2.3 Section 12.1.3 (APPENDIX L) ‘The Spine is provided with below ceiling smoke detection and beam detection to the void areas. For the Spine fires beneath the slab/ceiling (F2A and F2B), point type detection at the ceiling was used as this is the detection closest to the fire. For the fire scenario beneath the void (F3A and F3B), beam type detection was provided within the void (modelled in FOS). Aspirated smoke detection has been provided to the ceiling space of Level S within and below ceiling above the void in lieu of point type. This is due to access issues for maintenance and potential stratification issues at high level from affecting smoke detection times. 15.3 Recognition and Response (Pre-movement time) From the FEB Rev 2.3 Section 12.1.3 (APPENDIX L) the following pre-movement criteria are used: For pre-movement time propose using the methodology outlined is BS 7974-6:2004. The following factors will be used to determine the pre-movement time Occupant Category B1 (general) Awake, Unfamiliar, High occupant density, 82 (plenary) Awake, Unfamiliar, High occupant density, one enclosure with focal point Alarm Quality Az ‘Automatic detection with pre-alarm to management. Building Comples 82 Simple multi-enclosure Bi Car parking levels%Y Fire Safety Management M2 Highly trained staff, low ratio staff to visitors, independent certification of procedures, independent audits. Table C.1 (PD 7974-6:2004) pre-movement times All spaces except car parking levels, B: awake and unfamiliar M2B2A1-A2 —Atyretstsemenie) tyre ooen percent) Plenary B: awake and unfamiliar = M2B2A1-A2 — Atyretu perce) Omin Car parking levels B: awake and unfamiliar M2B1A1-A2 — Atyecasgencerte) 1.0 min Atyre(oompecente) 4.0 min Figure 43 Pre-Movement Times ~ (BS 7974-6) Reenavia category and wot MiB —B2 At -Az Mo Bi — 2 At — AZ Ma Bt RO ALAS Fer BS, odd 08 for wayfnding Si would normally require vice alara/PA if unl like tobe present ventana iia viitorn 15.4 Time to Travel and Queuing Time ‘The time to travel is based on a walking speed 1.2m/s where travel is considered to be unaffected by smoke (taken from BS 7974-6) and 0.3m/s for escape through irritant smoke at reduced visibility. The location of fire origin affects occupants’ choice of egress routes, which consequently impacts the queuing time and travel time. This is discussed in more detail in Section 15.8. It is noted that the entire convention centre is modelled for the majority of evacuation scenarios to obtain more realistic queuing times, particularly within the stairs. The exceptions are F13A and F13B. These models investigate occupant evacuation from the enclosed space only in isolation of the other areas in the building. 15.5. Pathfinder The calculation of occupant RSET is performed by the egress modelling program Pathfinder‘, Pathfinder is an evacuation simulator that includes integrated user interface and 3D results visualization. The movement ‘New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report ws Unde | | Gages | WHE eAACZTANOFEDE Reps% environment is a 3D triangulated mesh designed to match the real dimensions of the building model. Pathfinder provides two primary options for occupant motion: an SFPE mode and a steering mode. The SFPE mode implements the concepts in the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering®. This is a flow model, where walking speeds are determined by occupant density within each room and flow through doors {s controlled by door width. The steering mode is based on the idea of inverse steering behaviours. Steering behaviours were first presented in Craig Reynolds’ paper "Steering Behaviours For Autonomous Characters"® and later refined into inverse steering behaviours in a paper by Heni Ben Amor’. Pathfinder's steering mode allows more complex behaviour to naturally emerge as a by product of the movement algorithms. ‘The steering mode method is considered to be more suitable for the evacuation analysis. ‘Thunderhead Engineering 2013, 5 Nelson and Mowrer, 2002 * Reynolds, 1999 7 Amor et. "New Zealand international Convention Centre_| Fire Engineering Report ww Update | 61 | Gage 8 | WAAGLI2COFEDA Raptor isZ TaDOS15.6 Basement Evacuation Scenarios ‘The basement egress was based on the following design assumptions: ‘Occupant load ~ 200 people per floor; Exit distribution ~ 50 occupants evacuate per stair; Minimum stair area per floor ~ 20m?; Stair capacity per floor ~ 50 people (i.e. 0.4m? per person); Stair door width ~ 0.9m; Door flow ~0.79 persons/sec; ‘Queuing time (50 people) ~ 63 seconds; and Longest travel time ~ 67 seconds (80m @ 1.2m/s). Based on the above, the travel time dominates the queuing time for the movement time in the basement. ‘The Basement Evacuation Scenarios are outlined below in Table 58. Table 58 Basement Evacuation Scenarios eu mc) Det Level 04 Basement | Level 01 Truck Dock Refer assumptions above. | Level o1 car Park Level 02 Car Park "New Zealand intemational Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report, Update | 61 | GAor8 | ASR ARZIOOFEDA Re 02 Tate15.7 Base Evacuation Scenarios ‘The base evacuation scenarios which correspond to the fire scenarios are liste: section. A summary of the evacuation scenarios is provided in Table 59. The means of egress, as well as the detection and pre- ‘movement times incorporated in the Pathfinder models for various locations are indicated in Figure 44 to Figure 52. Table 59 Evacuation Scenario Summary Calculation Method —_| Descrip Fire located in the Spine (FO2A and FO3A). Occupants on Level 4 and Level 5 assuming occupants are entering the 02a Pathfinder building/function (i.e. nobody within the Plenary). This maximises the number of occupants within the fire compartment. e E0SA Pathfinder Fire located in Level 3 Swing Space. Fire in Level 3 Hall 1 with single large space (i.e. halls me Pane combined) with all three exhibition halls fully occupied. Fire in Hall 1 with occupied. E068 Pathfinder viding walls installed. Halls 1 and 2 fully Fire in Hall 1 South with dividing walls installed. Other Halls 06D Pathfinder ‘empty (ie. increased occupant number in Hall 1) with ‘occupants assumed in Spine, Gallery and Swing Space. Half plenary evacuation (i.e. evacuation through internal wall FOE panied occurs). Both sides of plenary fully occupied. Ful plenary evacuation for full occupation. Applicable for eae puthingss FOSA (fll plenary) and F10 (stage fire) 2 ea slow cacuiations Level Meeting Room 15-24, single meeting room configuration. e118 Flow Calculations | Combined meeting room configuration (15 ~ 12, 13, 14) Pre-function space fire. All occupants (3000 for a full plenary e120 Pathfinder event) assumed to be inthe pre-function areas on both sides. E130 Flow Calculations _—Pre-function/Icon Space configuration, ; Level 5 meeting room L5-18. Single meeting room £138 Flow Colelations | Level S mest New Zsondrtematonl Centon Centre| Fre Eghetng Report m2 Jodie | 61 | Aer 18 | WAU AIORCODFEDA Raps& Figure 44 Evacuation Scenarios E2A — Level 3 Means of Egress, Detection and Pre-movement Times Doors assumed to be blocked by the fire ‘Occupants commence ‘evacuation after 175 s (being detection time, alarm verification time and pre- movement time) "New Zealand intemational Convention Centre| Fire Engineering Report 130 Update | 61 | G18 | WAS2AECTAOIBFEDResotptSZi7008Figure 45, Evacuation Scenarios E2A ~ Level 5 Egress, Detection and Pre-movement Times % Entrances into the Northwest stairs are blocked by smoke Occupants commence evacuation after 175 s (being detection time, alarm verification time and pre- movement time. (One occupant selected with 99% percentile pre-movement to represent delayed movement. |New 2ealand international Conwertion Centre | Fe Engineering Report Update | 61 | Age | ASR ASDTROIUFE ReptFigure 46 Evacuation Scenario ESA ~ Level 3 Egress, Detection and Pre-movement Times ‘Occupants commence evacuation after 195 s (being detection time, alarm verification time and pre- movement time). ‘One occupant selected with 99% pre-movement to represent worst case time to movement. ‘New zealand Intemational Convention Centre| Fite Engineering Report Update | 63 | 6-Ap-18 | WA2tetAT2AOOOFED Rept aO8Figure 47 Evacuation Scenarios E6A— Level 3 Egress, Detection and Pre-movement Times ‘Occupants commence evacuation after 192 s (being detection time, alarm verification time and pre- ‘movement time). (One occupant selected with 99% pre-movement to represent worst case time to movement. "New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fre Engineering Report 13 peste | 1 | 6A 8 | WASRASDIAOLOFEDE Rese 8027003Occupants commence evacuation after 195 s (being detection time, alarm verification time and pre- ‘movement time). (One occupant selected with 99% re-movement to represent worst case time to movement. [New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fie Engineering Report a4 Update | 63 | GAB | WAR tASZIAONEFED Regs SZTADSOccupants commence evacuation after 157 s (being detection time, alarm verification time and pre- ‘movement time). ‘One occupant selected with 99°% re-movement to represent ‘worst case time to movement. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report, Ups | 61 | 6Apr8 | AsDLiAeDTZeODBFEDE ReprspTS2 TIDE% Figure 50 Evacuation Scenario 8A ~ Plenary Egress, Detection and Pre-movement Times o [New Zealand Iteration Convention Cente | Fre Engineering Report Upste | 61 | Goes | WiRteeASRTROIAFED Rapa 7008 Occupants in the area of fire origin commence evacuation after 75s (being detection time and ‘alarm verification time) Occupants in east plenary commence evacuation after ‘occupants from west plenary begin evacuating through the sky fold wall. Occupants in other areas commence evacuation after 165 seconds (being detection time, alarm verification and pre- movement time). Occupants in the front rows exit the room of fire origin via doorways in the lower plenary, while the fire is still smallFigure 51 Evacuation Scenario 9A - Plenary Egress, Detection and Pre-movement Times Occupants in the area of fire origin commence evacuation after 76 5 (being detection time and alarm verification time) Occupants not in the area of fire origin commence evacuation after 166 s (being detection time, alarm verification time and pre- ‘movement time) ‘Occupants in the front rows exit the room of fire ‘origin via doorways in the lower plenary, while ‘the fireis still small "New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Report a7 Up | 63 | 6A | WASDtASZIODDFED Reps 27NDFigure 52 Evacuation Scenarios 12A - Means of Egress, Detection and Pre-movement Times Occupants commence evacuation after 158 s (being detection, alarm verification and pre-movement time) "New Zealand Intemational Corwention Centre | Fire Engineering Report Be Update | | GAgr38 | WA tAEOZAONSFED ReneS NOS% 15.8 Occupancy Numbers for Pathfinder ‘As per Table 17 in Section 4.2, the design occupancy numbers in the exhibition hall and plenary would vary depending on which functional mode is in use. For conservative reasons the exhibition halls and the plenary were considered to be fully occupied simultaneously, i.e. 1500 people in each exhibition hall/half plenary and no one in the swing spaces, except in Evacuation Scenarios EO6C, EO6D, E07A and E078 where 19 hall 1 and swing space 4 contains 2000 ‘and 357 people respectively, while the other exhibition halls and swing spaces on Level 3 are empty. When the exhibition halls and plenary are fully occupied, we have assumed no occupant is present in meeting rooms or pre-function areas on these levels, or in the spine. When the exhibition halls and plenary are not fully occupied we have assumed the spine, the meeting rooms and pre-function spaces are occupied in accordance with area/density calculated numbers. ‘The occupancy numbers in other areas of the building are determined from their respective floor area and the occupant density defined in Table 16. Table 60 Occupancy Numbers Used in Pathfinder Ce Name of Area Floor area (m*) Pre (m* per person) Level 1 Gallery 181 Level 2 Retail 338 Level 3 Gallery 375 Level 3 Servery 292 30 Level 3 Halls 1, 2 and 3 N/A 1500 per Hall Level 3 Hall 1 (half mode) N/A 1000" Level 4 Meeting Room a7 25 26 Level 5 8H N/A 6 Level 5 Stage 193 08 241 Level 5 Servery (x2) 173 10 17 each (34 total) Level 5 Scullery 217 10 2 1500 each side Level 5 Plenary N/A N/A (1425 seats per side) ‘based on 2 maximum population of 2000 for Hall 1 when only Hall 1 is occupied (.e. Hall 2 and Hall 3 empty). New Zealand international Conwention Centre | Fre Engineering Report 39 Upiate | 62 | Gage | WAS? AE2RCNOFEK Rapp15.9 Laneway Bridge Link Egress ‘We consider that in meeting the International Building Code (IBC) for fire doors on escape routes that for the ‘Won-doors the New Zealand Building Codes C4.2 and C4.5 are also met. ‘The Won-Door Fireguard doors meet the United States of America (USA) coined 2015 International Building Code (IBC) requirements for fire doors on escape routes. In particular: = 2015 IBC 1010.1.2 exception 6 — exception to door swing requirements ™ 2015 IBC 1010.4.3 — Provision for special purpose horizontal sliding, accordion or folding doors on escape routes. 2015 IBC 1010.1.4.3 reads as follows: 1010.1.4.3 Special purpose horizontal sliding, accordion or folding doors In other than Group H occupancies (IBC equivalent to NZ Building Code WH or WF use), special purpose horizontal sliding, accordion or folding door assemblies permitted to be a component of a means of egress in accordance with Exception 6 to Section 1010.1.2 shall comply with the following criteria: 1. The doors shall be power operated and shall be capable of being operated in the event of power failure, 2. The doors shall be openable by a simple method from both sides without special knowledge or effort. 3. The force required to operate the door shall not exceed 30 pounds (133 N) to set the door in motion and 15 pounds (67 N) to close the door or open it to the minimum required width, 4. The door shall be openable with a force not to exceed 15 pounds (67 N) when a force of 250 pounds (1100 N) is applied perpendicular to the door adjacent to the operating device. 5. The door assembly shall comply with the applicable fire protection rating and, where rated, shall be self-closing or automatic closing by smoke detection in accordance with Section 716.5.9.3 (equivalent to a type 4 smoke detection system), shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80 (equivalent to NZS 4520) and shall comply with Section 716 (NZS 4520, NZ Building Code for FRR). 6. The door assembly shall have an integrated stondby power supply. 7. The door assembly power supply shall be electrically supervised. 8. The door shall open to the minimum required width within 10 seconds after activation of the operating device. Refer to sections 5.3.3, 6.1, 8.6 and APPENDIX G for additional details on the requirements for the Won- doors. ‘New Zealand Intemational Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Report 40 Upsate | 6: | Ape | RED MARR AOBFECA Regia16 HAND CALCULATION RESULTS 16.1 RSET Based on the hand calculations conducted, the following RSETs were determined. The range in RSET times represents the possible range of pre-movement times (i.e. 1" to 99" percentile). The design case is taken as the lesser of the two times which assumes that evacuation occurs when the first occupant begins to move. Table 61 RSET for evacuation using hand calculations eM er EOC ae RSET (s) 60 | 68 260 EO1A, | 137 t 240 | 67 444 60 | 6 351 £018 28 240 67 535 Foc 60 63 333 210 £010 240 07 517 30 181 352 £04 a1 270 48 399 30 28 190 e11A n 270 v7 359 80 50 21 tty n 270 v7 358 80 190 367 E134 87 270 53 410 80 142 32a £138 89 270 23 382 New Zealndinteratonal Convention Centre | Fire Engineering Repot a LUpte | 6 | Gap | AED PEZTOODFEZE Rages17 PATHFINDER RESULTS 17.1 RSET Based on the results of the Pathfinder models, the total time (inclusive of detection time, alarm verification time and pre-movement time) required for occupants to fully evacuate the different building parts are summarised in the below table. The entire building was modelled for the following evacuation scenarios: Table 62 RSET for Evacuation Due to a Fire in the Spine Lee is Cee a a fee er i " see Space ea | 225 500 300 466 688 3A 192 487 268 200 720 Screenshots of the pathfinder scenarios at ASET are provided in APPENDIX O Table 63 RSET for Evacuation Due to a Fire on Level 3 Deter ien! seni eral REY CT aca ea Scenario Cr Halls Space A | 225 | 405 | «450 | «335 | 345 | 390 | 222 | 610 6A 42048566 | 396 | 3954002221 £68 4s 430555 | 400 | 4004002220 seo | 4229 | 364 | 352 | 35238287570 Table 64 SET for Evacuation Due to a Fire on Level 5 Oe eens fetes 5 Right Pee emer aC een ae 3 pee nae ee eon “ tage _| function (Upper) | (Lower) eno) ron) ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre [Fie Engineering Report a Updte | 61 | GApr8 | WAEDDGACDIONOOOFERA gt 0 7000817.2. International Guideline For crowded areas, it was previously discussed that the Green Guide for stadium design shall be used as a ‘measure of the appropriate length of evacuation (refer Section 5.1.2). A maximum time to fully evacuate from the fire cell and the floor of fire origin to outside or into stairs were 6 minutes (360 seconds) and 8 minutes (480 seconds respectively) from the time occupant start to move. Longer evacuation time may increase the likelihood of occupants becoming agitated or frustrated. The crowd areas are considered to be the circulation spine, Level 3 exhibition, Level 5 pre-function and plenary. It is noted that the time to evacuate various building parts in Table 32-34 include the detection time (typically 60 seconds or less), alarm verification time (30 seconds) and pre-movement time (180 seconds for people remote from fire origin). Hence the actual time taken to evacuate from the building areas from the commencement of movement is considerably less. With this taken into consideration, the times taken for occupants to evacuate from the Level 3 exhibition and Level 5 pre-function under the various fire scenarios are generally within the limits recommended by the International Guidelines, The Level 5 spine is an exception, whereby the evacuation model showed it would take up to 13 minutes to fully evacuate this area in the event of a fire in the Level 4 spine. The main reason for this is the level of conservatism built into the model, i.e. when the visibility levels in front of the Northeast and Northwest stairways fall below 10 m, all four stairways are assumed to be blocked and the occupants are assumed to seek alternative means of egress via the Southeast and Southwest stairways. This is effectively @ sensitivity study for blocked exits. In areal evacuation, occupants may continue evacuation via the Northwest and Northeast stairways as the temperature, radiation and toxicity conditions would remain tenable, albeit at reduced speed due to reduced visibility and queuing. Therefore itis likely that the actual evacuation time from the Level 5 will be considerably less. Based on the above conditions, the evacuation time from the various areas is in line with expected times for large populations. "New Zealand international Convention Centre| Fre Engincering Report 3 Uedte | i | GA AB | WADIA Rap S02718 ASET VS RSET ANALYSIS 18.1 ASET/RSET Comparison The ASET results (Section 13.5.3) are compared to the RSET results (Section 17.1) to determine the risk to the life safety of occupants. The value in each cell indicates how many seconds ASET exceeds RSET by in the building parts of concern under the various combined fire and evacuation scenarios. A green cell indicates ASET is greater than RSET, and occupants are expected to fully evacuate from the building part prior to the onset of visibility conditions < 10m, Table 65 ASET vs RSET Analysis for Hand Calculations ee) eo FOIA vs E1A Level B4 Car Park FOIBvsE1B | Level 01 Truck Dock FOIC vs E1C Level 01 Car Park FOIDVsEID —_Level 02 Car Park Faas E4A Wellesley Gallery F6Avs EGA Level 3 Meeting Room FLIAVsELIA Level 5 Meeting Room FI3AvsE13A Level 5 Icon Space F138 vsE13B__ Level 5 Meeting Room Table 66 ASET vs RSET Analysis for a Fire in Spine oat er ee) 5 eee ee Pe cy F2Avs E2A F3Avs E38 F3B vs 3A Table 67 ASET vs RSET Analysis for a Fire on Level 3 eect) om) re ec ane see i Scenario 5 Cece satel eee ‘New ealand Intenationsl Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report aaFSA.vs E5A FGA vs E6A F6B vs E68 F6D vs E6D Table 68 ASET vs RSET Analysis for a Fire on Level 5 eat eee CT aT eine ae ee . Eel eeciia eiedae CE pocaetia pecan uae Ce mee een cn ee CU Cc F8A vs E8A F9A vs E9A FLOA vs E9A FA2A vs £128 18.2 Conclusion Based on the fire and evacuation scenarios investigated, the calculated ASET exceeds the calculated RSET in all design cases, The detailed analysis indicate these occupants are not expected to be at risk of becoming trapped in the building due to smoke or becoming incapacitated, hence the risk to occupant life safety is low. Sufficient safety factor and redundancy has been incorporated into the design based on: * Worst credible fire sizes with sprinkler control in lieu of sprinkler suppression + Sensitivity design fires with increased growth rate or peak heat release rate (assuming second row of sprinkler activation) + Conservative soot yield values leading to worst case results + Nosoot deposition modelled leading to worst case results + Maximum occupancy inl reas e * Robustness checks on elements of the fire safety system (smoke exhaust, smoke curtains) ‘Therefore it s concluded that the various aspects of the building design outlined in this report, eg. egress provisions and fire safety systems are satisfactory. |New Zealand intematonal Convention Centre_| Fire Engineering Report19 HORIZONTAL FIRE SPREAD In the event of a fire in the building, the received radiation at the relevant boundary (Appendix L) due to openings in the external wall of the NZICC was calculated using the an in-house spreadsheet based on the method outlined in the International Fire Engineering Guidelinest. ‘The total energy received by the receiving body, in this instance a point at the relevant boundary, can be represented by: = 6 roa £.0.T* where: Eis the emitted energy (W/m?) 6 reais the configuration factor «is the emissivity of the body is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.67x10* W/m? X*) Tis the temperature (k) The calculation of the received radiation will use the following parameter values ™ Emissivity of the body is 1. = Temperature of the emitting radiator panel/window is 600°C for a sprinklered building part, on the basis that a flash over is not expected to occur. = The distances between external wall of the NZICC and the relevant boundary (Appendix l) are summarised in the below table. ™ The northern parts of the NZICC comprise the circulation spine. The worst credible height of the radiator Panel is considered to be approximately 7.4 m, which is the distance measured from the floor of Level 3 to the slab of the Level 4 floor as shown below. ™ The eastern parts of the NZICC comprise Swing Space 4 on Level 3 and pre-function space on Level 5. The worst credible height of the radiator panel is considered to be approximately 7.9 m, which is the distance measured from the floor of Level 3 to the slab of the Level 4 floor as shown below. ® International Fre Engineering Guidelines, Australian Building Codes Board, 2005, p. 2.4-7, |New zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 146 Update [61 | GAgtB | WH eA AETROTBFED Regt STOSimilar to the eastern side, the height of the ra 7.9m. stor panel on the western side is also considered to be The south parts of the NZICC comprise Wellesley Gallery on Level 3 and BOH areas on Level 4 to 5. The worst credible height of the radiator panel is considered to be approximately 10.3 m, which is the distance measured from the floor of Level 3 to the roof as shown below. The circulation spine and swing space are classified as ordinary hazard, i.e. up to 18 sprinkler heads, each covering an area of 12 m? may activate simultaneously. Hence the width of the radiator panel is. approximately 14.7 m (being V18 x 12), The Wellesley Gallery is classified as light hazard, ie. up to 6 sprinkler heads, each covering an area of 21 @ ‘m? may activate simultaneously. Hence the width of the radiator panel is approximately 11.2 m (being 6x21), The eastern wall of the generator enclosure on Level 4M is approx 6.6 m from the title boundary. "New Zealand ternational Convention Centre | Fre Engineering Report cad 161 | GAB | WAZ AIDACOIFEDL Rep ZONE"The eastern wall of the generator enclosure, as a radiator panel, is approximately 5.3 m wide and 6 m tall. ‘The calculated radiation heat flux received at the northern relevant boundary and 1 m beyond the boundary are 14.66 kW/m? and 12.43 kW/m? as shown below. The calculated radiation heat flux received at the eastern relevant boundary and 1m beyond the boundary are 1.54 kW/m? and 1.44 kW/m? as shown below. Similarly the calculated radiation heat flux received at the western relevant boundary and 1 m beyond the boundary are also 1.54 kW/m? and 1.44 kW/m?. The calculated radiation heat flux received at the eastern relevant boundary and 1 m beyond the boundary are 1.58 kW/m? and 1.47 kW/m? as shown below. ‘New Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 8 Unde | 6:1 | GAor18 | WOAERAASUTaNEOA ee STThe calculated radiation heat fux received atthe ttle boundary parallel tothe eastern wallof LA generator @ and 1m beyond the title boundary are 6.16 kW/m? and 4.88 kW/m? respectively. « ‘see eter . ‘The above results are summarised in the table below. ved os hae oe ee Cee re me a Meaubiried Reg Ee] re pales Paneer joel earn 147 m wide x7.4 14.66 12.43 North (TVNZ) North | Trhigh @ eoose | &™ | iewimt—_| kfm? 14.7 m wide x 7.4 14.65 12.43 North (Hotel) North mbigh @ core | &2™ | evi Wit East (Far side of 14.7 m wide x 79 5 ; : : 4 kw /m Hobson St) = mhigh @ gore 77°3™ Enns New Zealand internation pate | 62 | 6ape8| {Convention Conte | Fir Engineering Report OtntAC2DECIIFERA Ray 2 TABre re bias eee ma To Relevant Boundary | Extenal_| Radiator Rieu ences ea ra eevee me 14 Porn | 5.3 m wide x 6 m rT e East (Albion Hotel) | East | Kien e@ gore | 65m 6.16 kW/m? 4.88 kW/m West 14.7 m wide x 7.9 5 3 (Far side of Nelson st) | “®t | mhigh @ soon | ?75™ Es Rta | AEE South 112 m wide x (Far side of Wellesley | South | 103 m high @ | 27.0m 1.58 kW/m? | 1.47 kW/m? st) | 008c South (Albion Hotel) | South _| Fire Separation | O m* o o* *Walls abutting these relevant boundaries shall be protected in accordance with the FRR set out in ‘Appendix A. The calculated radiation levels are less than the maximum permissible level of 30 kW/m? and 16 kW/m? allowed by NZBC Performance Clause 3.6. Therefore generally the external walls do not require any fire rating ‘except for the walls around the Albion Hotel on the south-east corner of the site. The below ground level fire separations on the north-east corner separating the Hotel property from the NZICC property are rated for 120 minutes.20 LIMITATIONS & LIABILITY 1.1 _ Limitations The report does not provide guidance in respect of areas, which are used for bulk storage, processing of flammable liquids, explosive materials, multiple fire ignitions or sabotage of existing fire safety systems. In formulation of the findings contained herein, specific qualifications apply. Any application of the content of this report should be made taking into full account the following items: observations of the building fire safety systems and fire hazards listed in this report have been based on examination of documentation made available by the design team = any change in the above information to suit future re-organisation or planning will require further assessment to confirm compliance with the intent of the design objectives . specifically, the report does not consider property damage; e.g. building and contents damage caused by fire, potential increased insurance liability and loss of business continuity. Potential incendiary risks are limited in the scope of engineering design. Conventional building design can only provide limited protection against malicious attack; for example, large scale incendiary and multiple ignition sources can potentially overwhelm some fire safety systems. Strategies such as security, housekeeping and other management procedures may be more effective than additional fire protection in addressing arson events. 20.1 Liability ‘This report is applicable to the New Zealand International Convention Centre, Auckland only. The fire engineering analysis contained in this report demonstrates that the level of life safety offered by the proposed solution meets the New Zealand Building Code. The report has been developed in accordance with the procedures detailed in International Fire Engineering Guidelines. It should, however, be recognised that this does not provide a guarantee that a fire will not occur with potential to cause casualties or damage. e "Norman Disney & Young shall not be held liable for any loss or damage resulting from any defect of the building or its services or equipment or for any non compliance of the building or its services or equipment with any legislative or operational requirement, whether or not such defect or non-compliance is referred to or reported upon in this report, unless such defect or non-compliance should have been apparent to a competent engineer undertaking the assessment of the type undertaken for the purpose of preparation of this report. ‘The fire safety assessment and recommendations has been based on the building architectural layouts and discussions, agreement with relevant stakeholders. Any change in this information to suit future building ‘works or re-organisation will require further analysis to confirm compliance with the regulations and our report. ‘New Zealandinternational Convention Centre| Five Engineering Report 151 dpa | 6 | Agr | WADI etAIORCOOFEDS Rapti 2 TaD21 APPENDICES ‘Now Zealand international Convention Centre | Fie Engineering Report 332 Update | 62 | GAprI8 | WOES? TARLIANOEFER ges