STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRELIMS
postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery,
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
a) Philippine Legal System
1. Common Law
i. Not codified; collection of cases and statutes; cumulative
ii. Does not emanate from express will of a lawmaking body
2. Civil Law
i. Codified, Enacted
ii. Promulgated by a lawmaking body
3. Shariah Law
i. Code of Muslim Personal Laws
a. PD1083, Feb 4, 1977
b) Definition of Statutory Construction
1. CALTEX vs PALOMAR (GR L-19650, September 29, 1966)
i. Statutory construction – the art or process of discovering
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its application to a given case, where
that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason
of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in
the law (Black Interpretations of Laws, p. 1)
ii. Declaratory relief – any person xxx whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action xxx to determine
question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Rule 63,
Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court)
iii. ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee
is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein
a. Postal Law, chap. 52, Rev. Admin. Code, using almost
identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983
thereof, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and
empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders
against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or
of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind".
b. Lottery: consideration, prize, chance
(i) No requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise
be bought, any service be rendered, or any value
whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. No
discernible consideration which would brand it as
a lottery.
c. Noscitur a sociis – vis-à-vis gift enterprise
(i) In the Postal Law the term “gift enterprise” is used in
association with word “lottery”. Consonant to the
principle of noscitur a sociis, it is only logical that the
term be accorded no other meaning than that
which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited
only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term
“gift enterprise” be so construed. no slightest indicium
in the law of any intent to eliminate the element of
consideration from the “gift enterprise” therein included.
c) Importance of Statutory Construction
1. Because of infirmities of language and the limited scope in
legislative drafting, inevitably there enters into the construction of
statutes the play of judicial judgment within the limits of the
relevant legislative materials1
d) Are construction and interpretation the same?
1. Interpretation is the art of finding the true meaning and sense of
any form of words, while construction is the process of drawing
warranted conclusions not always included in the direct
expressions, or determining the application of words to facts in
litigation2
1
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 104
2
Ibid. p. 104-105
1
 2. One who interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in
the statute itself, while one who constructs makes use of extrinsic
aids or those found outside of the written language of the law3
3. One must interpret first before he construes4
e) Object and Purpose
1. All rules of construction or interpretation have for their sole object
the ascertainment of the true intent of the legislature.5
i. Legislative intent – the essence of the law; purpose and
object of the law
a. Where a statute is susceptible of more than one
construction, that construction should be adopted which
will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
legislature
b. “purpose,” “meaning,” “intent,” “spirit” are oftentimes
interchangeably used by the courts but NOT entirely
synonymous
ii. Legislative purpose – reason why a particular statute was
enacted by the legislature
a. Legislation – an active instrument of government which,
for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends
to be achieved; and statutes should be so construed so as
not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes
iii. Legislative meaning – what the law, by its language, means;
what it comprehends; what it covers or embraces; what its
limits or confines are
a. Does the language of the law reflect what the legislature
intended?
b. If there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute, its
purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and
lead to what the legislative intent is
3 company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Suarez Introduction to Law p. 16-17
4
Ibid. p. 17
5 6
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 108-109
2. The object of the inquiry is not only to know what the legislature
meant by the language used, but also to determine whether the
language used sufficiently expresses that meaning
i. Originates in intention and is perfected by expression.
Failure of the latter may defeat the former.6
f) Legislative intent
1. AIRSPORNA vs CA (GR L-39419, April 12, 1982)
i. ISSUE: Whether or not a person can be convicted of having
violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
without reference to the second paragraph of the same section
a. Par. 1 - No person shall act as agents xxx without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the
Insurance Commissioner
Par 2. - Any person who for compensation xxx shall be an
insurance agent within the intent of this section
b. Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the
agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a
compensation by the agent is an essential element for
a violation of the first paragraph
c. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole.
d. That every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment, not separately and
independently.
e. Noscitur a sociis – a word’s or phrase’s true meaning
may be made clear and specific by considering the
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 111
2
 2. CHINABANK vs ORTEGA (GR L-34964, January 31,1973)
i. ISSUE: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse
to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of
a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of RA 1405
a. The lower court did not order an examination of or
inquiry into the deposit of B & B, as contemplated in
the law. It merely required petitioner to inform the court
whether or not the defendant B & B Forest had a deposit in
the China Bank only for purposes of the garnishment
issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
b. The prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a
bank deposit under RA 1405 does NOT preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.
Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the
existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is
purely incidental to the execution process.
c. [It is NOT the] intention of Congress to enable debtors
to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by
the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets
into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
g) Nature of the Rules of Statutory Construction
1. PCFI vs NTC (November 25, 1983)
i. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it approved the Revised Subscriber
Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of
specific rules and regulations implementing PD 217. Petitioner
claims that these implementing rules and regulations are
mandatory pre-requisite for the approval of said SIP rates.
a. Sec 2. PD 217 – xxx shall see to it that the herein declared
policies for the telephone industry are immediately
implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and
regulations MAY be promulgated xxx
b. The SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial
viability of public telecommunications companies which in
turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum
cost the benefits of a telephone facility
c. At any rate, there is no justification for the rate increase of
the revised schedule of PLDT's Subscriber Investment
Plan. It is to say the least, untimely, considering the
present economic condition obtaining in the country.
2. PCFI vs NTC (GR L-63318, August 18, 1984)
i. [The Court] cannot subscribe to the view that the National
Telecommunications Commission should or must
promulgate "pertinent rules and regulations” because the
existing substantive and procedural laws as well as the rules
promulgated by the Public Service Commission under and
pursuant to the Public Service Law, otherwise known as CA
No. 146, as amended, are xxx more than sufficient for a
proper determination of such amounts of investments of
individual subscribers and the profitability of the venture.
a. Index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent)
b. A verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of
the statute there should be no departure)
ii. J. Abad Santos dissenting
a. Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of
statutory construction march in pairs of opposite.
b. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire – words
ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the
intent to the words
c. The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not
prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent
intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the
legislative intention. The intention prevails over the
letter, and the letter must if possible be read so as to
conform to the spirit of the act.
d. Where the statute provides for the doing of some act
which is required by justice or public duty, or where it
invests a public body, municipality or officer with power
and authority to take some action which concerns the
3
 public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive
language will be construed as mandatory and the
execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty.
h) Propriety of Construction
1. NFL vs Eisma (GR L-61236, January 31, 1984)
i. ISSUE: Whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can
pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer
a. It is to be noted that BP 130 made no change with respect
to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters
with respect to money claims of workers or claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations.
b. Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed
to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the
interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor
matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of
determining what essentially is a factual matter,
namely, the damages that may be incurred by either
labor or management as a result of disputes or
controversies arising from employer-employee
relations.
2. PAAT vs CA (GR 111107, January 10, 1997)
i. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies – before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him
ii. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence
iii. ISSUE: Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
a. It is, thus, clear from Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended, that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and
7
forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or
other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to
dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of
forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The
only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter."
b. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a
way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the
statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of
the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction
as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
secure the benefits intended.
3. People vs MAPA (GR L-22301, August 30, 1967)
i. ISSUE: whether or not a secret agent of the governor is not
required to get a license for his firearm.
a. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(i) The express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others7
(ii) No provision is made for a secret agent.
(iii) The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
law. Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them.
4. DAOANG vs MUNICIPAL JUDGE (GR L-34568, Mar. 28, 1988)
i. ISSUE: Whether or not “grandchild” or “grandchildren” are
included in Art. 335 of the Civil Code
a. That a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not
be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subject of statutory construction
(i) A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more
possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 318
4
 upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to
interpret the law according to its true intent.8
5. PARAS vs COMELEC (GR L-123169, November 4, 1996)
i. ISSUE: Whether the SK election should be considered a
regular election in accordance with Sec. 74 of the Local
Government Code (LGC)
a. Presumption of effectivity - An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative
or nugatory.
b. Sec. 78(b) of the LGC – No recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election.
c. If the SK election (set by R.A No. 7808) to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the
purview of the phrase "regular local election", as
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election
can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision
of the LGC.
i) Power to Construe as a Judicial Function
1. The Supreme Court construes the applicable law in controversies
which are ripe for judicial resolution.
i. It refrains from doing so where the case has become moot and
academic
a. Moot and academic – when its purpose has become stale
or where no practical relief can be granted or which can
have no practical effect
(i) EXCEPTION: if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review, esp. where public interest requires its
resolution or where rendering a decision on the merits
would be of practical value
8
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 125
b. It construes or applies the law as it decides concrete and
controverted cases based on the facts and the law
involved.
(i) The circumstances of time, place, event, person, and
particularly attendant circumstances and actions
before, during and after the operative fact should all
be taken in their totality so that justice can be
rationally and fairly disposed.
2. PERFECTO vs MEER (GR L-2348, February 27, 1950)
i. Income tax law of the Federal Governments
a. First Period. No attempts was made to tax the
compensation of Federal judges
b. Second Period. The judiciary is to be perfectly
independent of the two other departments, and in order to
place it beyond the reach and above even the suspicion of
any such influence, the power to reduce their
compensation is expressly withheld from Congress,
and excepted from their powers of legislation.
c. Third Period.
(i) Evans vs Gore – the primary purpose of the
prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the
judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to
attract good and competent men to the bench, and to
promote that independence of action and judgment
which is essential to the maintenance xxx of the
constitution xxx
(ii) Miles vs Graham – reaffirmed the Evans decision;
also, that Congress had power "to impose taxes which
should apply to the salaries of Federal judges
appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute."
(The law had made no distinction as to judges
appointed before or after its passage)
d. Fourth Period.
(i) O’Malley vs Woodrough – To subject them to a
general tax is merely to recognize that judges also are
citizens, and that their particular function in government
5
 does not generate an immunity from sharing with their
fellow citizens the material burden of the government
whose Constitution and laws they are charged with
administering.
ii. ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon
the salary of members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts amount to a diminution thereof
a. The 16th Amendment — has no counterpart in the
Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it
b. When the Income Tax Law was first applied to the
Philippines in 1913, taxable "income" did not include
salaries of judicial officers when these are protected
from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief
in the United States, which must be deemed to have
been transplanted here;
c. When the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved
(in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges'
compensation, the Federal principle was known that
income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans
vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding
doctrines; and the inference is not illogical that in
restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the
Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of
the same.
d. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens
in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and
in the establishment of the compensation upon a
permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be
prudently accepted by those who are qualified xxx but are
not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an
assured salary an object of personal concern.
e. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid
consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the
valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted
is received in the place of the tax.
9
3. ENDENCIA vs DAVID (GR L-6355-56 , August 31, 1953)
i. Judicial construction cannot be overruled by legislative
fiat9
ii. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13, RA 590 is unconstitutional
for enunciating that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
a decrease of compensation
a. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment
of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the
salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is
an invasion of the well-defined and established province
and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
4. NITAFAN vs CIR (GR 78780, July 23, 1987)
i. The interpretation of a statute or a constitutional provision by
the courts is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or
nullification. The Supreme Court itself may, in an
appropriate case, change or overrule its previous
construction.
ii. ISSUE: Whether or not any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries
a. Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution "(d)uring their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED”
b. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices
and Judges are properly subject to a general income
tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does
not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease
of their salaries during their continuance in office.
c. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 121
6
 true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of
the Judiciary taxable.
d. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution.
II. Statutory Construction vs. Judicial Legislation
a) Principle of Separation of Powers
1. Rationale
i. It is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one
person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible
error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican
institutions10
ii. According to Justice Laurel, the doctrine is intended to secure
action, to forestall over-action, to prevent despotism and to
obtain efficiency11
2. Checks and Balances
i. What makes the doctrine of separation of powers especially
workable is this corollary system, by means of which one
department is allowed to resist encroachments upon its
prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed
by the other departments12
ii. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the
Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe
the law.13
a. Precludes one department from encroaching upon the
power of the other
b. Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice, or
expediency of legislation as.
10
Cruz Political Law p. 133
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid. p. 135
13
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 155
c. As long as laws do not violate the Constitution, the courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary
b) Overlap of Government Functions
1. It is often necessary for certain powers to be reposed in more than
one department, so that they may better collaborate with and, in
the process, check each other for the public good.14
c) Status of Supreme Court Rulings
1. Part of the law of the land
i. Art. 8, New Civil Code
a. Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet – the construction of
law obtains the force of law
(i) by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its
enactment
(ii) since the court’s interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
statute thus construed intends to effectuate15
2. Stare decisis vs Ratio Decidendi
i. Stare decisis et non quieta movere – to stand by decisions
and not to disturb settled matters16
a. The decision of the SC applying or interpreting a
statute is controlling with respect to the interpretation
of that statute and is of greater weight than that of an
executive or administrative officer in the construction of
other statues of similar import
b. A ruling of the SC as to the construction of a law should be
followed in subsequent cases involving similar questions
(i) Reipublicae ut sit finis litium – the interest of the
State demands that there be an end to litigation; to
protect society from the improvidence and wantonness
wrought by needless upheavals in such interpretations
and applications.
14
Cruz Political Law p. 134
15
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 140
16
Ibid. p. 202-203
7
 c. A ruling must be categorically stated on an issue expressly
raised by the parties; it must be a direct ruling
d. Obiter dictum – does not fall within this doctrine. It has
been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon
some question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it
ii. Ratio decidendi – reason for deciding
a. Is the holding of the principle of law on which a case was
decided; it is that sets the precedent and is binding on
courts in the future17
3. Principle of Prospectivity
i. Lex prospicit, non respicit – the law looks forward, not
backward
a. Judicial ruling cannot be given a retroactive effect if to do
so will impair vested rights18
b. Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not
adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially
those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof19
d) Judicial Legislation
1. FLORESCA vs PHILEX MINING (GR L-30642 April 30, 1985)
i. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can claim compensation
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the same time
sue them for a separate civil action for damages
a. [The Court] hold[s] that although the other petitioners had
received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of
the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act.
17
Rodriguez Legal Research p. 165
18
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 140
19
Sta. Maria Persons and Family Relations Law p. 15
b. Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the
Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court
merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social justice
c. Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the
New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the
court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must
legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the
mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite
and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to
which the law may apply nor has the human mind the
infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
ii. Justice Melencio-Herrera’s dissent
a. By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special
law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the
complaint involved in the instant case. That "special
law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than
the Workmen's Compensation
b. Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is
entitled to an election of remedies, as the majority rules,
both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and
the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the
other. The petitioners had already exercised their option to
come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they
have already received compensation payable to them
under that Act.
c. When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance
with the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably
legislating.
III. Subjects of Construction
a) The Constitution
1. A constitution is a fundamental law which sets up a form of
government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and
those of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary
sovereignty
8
 i. Primary Purpose of Constitutional Construction20
a. To ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the
constitution as expressed in the language of the
fundamental law, and thereafter to assure its realization
b. The interpretation of the Constitution should be done with
a view to protect and enhance the peoples interests, as a
nation collectively and as persons individually
ii. How the Constitution Should be Construed
a. Verba legis – the plain meaning rule dictates that
wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning
(i) except where technical terms are employed, in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
b. Ratio legis est anima legis – the reason of the law is
the soul of the law
(i) Where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words should
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers
(ii) They must be examined in light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances
surrounding the framing of the Constitution
(iii) Courts should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional
provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or
remedied
(iv) The intent of the framers and the people ratifying the
constitution, and not the pandering of self-indulgent
men, should be given effect
c. Interpretatio Fienda Est Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam
Pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
Literally, the construction is to survive rather than
perish
(i) that no one provision is to be separated from all others,
to be considered alone, but that all provisions bearing
20
Agpalo Statutory Construction p. 581
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument
(ii) the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render
every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory
iii. Cases
a. SARMIENTO vs MISON (GR 79974 December 17, 1987)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs made by
Pres. Aquino without the confirmation from the
Commission on Appointments is valid
1) Four groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:
i. The heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution
ii. All other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law
iii. Those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint
iv. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President
alone
2) In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad
part of our political history that the power of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that
9
 commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-
trading" and similar malpractices.
3) On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution,
consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it
was molded and remolded by successive
amendments, placed the absolute power of
appointment in the President with hardly any check
on the part of the legislature.
4) Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935
Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution,
it is not difficult for the Court to state that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by
requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the
President, without such confirmation, the
appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the
fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
5) After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, RA
1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with
Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the
appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is one that devolves on the President, as
an appointment he is authorizedby law to make,
such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
b. FRANCISCO vs HoR (GR 160261 November 10, 2003)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the 2nd
impeachment complaint against CJ Davide Jr. with
the House of Representatives is constitutional
1) Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The
Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its
rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase
"to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene
the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. It is
basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law.
2) Having concluded that the initiation takes place by
the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section
3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
c. CHAVEZ vs JBC (GR 202242, July 17, 2012)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than
one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC?
1) The majority holds the view that allowing two
members of the Congress to sit in the JBC would
undermine the Constitution’s intent to maintain the
balance of power in that body and give the
legislature greater and unwarranted influence in the
appointment of members of the Judiciary.
2) No mechanism is required between the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers.
Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean
the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext
of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic
scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness,
that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single
representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal
branches of government.
10
 3) It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. Thus, any inclusion of another member,
whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes
against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal
voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is
explicit.
d. CHAVEZ vs JBC (April 16, 2013)
(i) In the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the
Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the
Framers mean what they say. The language used in
the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose.
(ii) As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to
use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of
Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat
in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided, as can be read in its other provisions. Thus,
to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section
8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision
to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not
persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean
on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable
to them.
(iii) According to the rule of casus omissus "a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted." The
principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from
a legislative enumeration. Pursuant to this, the Court
cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have
resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated. The
Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would
have supplied had its attention been called to the
omission, as that would be judicial legislation.
(iv) J. Abad’s dissent
1) The mere fact that adjustments were made in some
provisions should not mislead the Court into
concluding that all provisions have been amended
to recognize the bicameral nature of Congress.
2) Under the Senate rules, the Chairperson of its
Justice Committee is automatically the Senate
representative to the JBC. In the same way, under
the House of Representatives rules, the
Chairperson of its Justice Committee is the House
representative to the JBC. Consequently, there are
actually two persons in Congress who hold
separate offices or positions with the attached
function of sitting in the JBC. If the Court adheres
to a literal translation of Section 8(1), no
representative from Congress will qualify as "ex
officio" member of the JBC. This would deny
Congress the representation that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended it to have.
e. MACALINTAL vs PET (GR 191618, November 23, 2010)
(i) ISSUE: Whether the constitution of the PET,
composed of the Members of this Court, is
unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1) On its face, the contentious constitutional provision
does not specify the establishment of the PET. But
neither does it preclude, much less prohibit,
otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations
which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not
include his restrictive view – one which really does
not offer a solution.
11
 2) Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the
provision under scrutiny, should be read with other
related provisions of the Constitution such as the
parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
3) The PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but
not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the
Supreme Court
iv. Role of the Preamble
a. AGLIPAY vs RUIZ (GR L-45459, March 13, 1937)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, in issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-
third International Eucharistic Congress, violated
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution
1) When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence," they thereby manifested reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.
The elevating influence of religion in human society
is recognized here as elsewhere.
2) Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is
not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.
3) Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in
view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government."
4) The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit
of the Roman Catholic Church but “to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist to this country.”
The officials concerned merely, took advantage of
an event considered of international importance "to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people"
b. ESTRADA vs ESCRITOR (AM P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003)
(i) The preamble all reveals without doubt that the Filipino
people, in adopting these constitutions, did not intend
to erect a high and impregnable wall of separation
between the church and state.
(ii) The Filipinos manifested their adherence to the
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the
religion clauses, an approach that looks further than
the secular purposes of government action and
examines the effect of these actions on religious
exercise.
(iii) Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature
of the Filipino people and the elevating influence of
religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges
that government must pursue its secular goals.
(iv) In pursuing these goals, however, government might
adopt laws or actions of general applicability which
inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent
neutrality gives room for accommodation of these
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause.
c. ESTRADA vs ESCRITOR (June 22, 2006)
(i) Religious Freedom
1) Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice
2) Establishment Clause prohibits government from
inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious
beliefs and practices.
(ii) Standards of separation
1) The Strict Separationist believes that the
Establishment Clause was meant to protect the
state from the church, and the state’s hostility
towards religion allows no interaction between the
two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an
absolute barrier to formal interdependence of
religion and state needs to be erected.
12
 i. The Strict Neutrality approach is not hostile to
religion, but it is strict in holding that religion
may not be used as a basis for classification for
purposes of governmental action, whether the
action confers rights or privileges or imposes
duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may
be the basis of government action. It does not
permit, much less require, accommodation of
secular programs to religious belief.
2) Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
recognizes that religion plays an important role in
the public life. In the ideal world, the legislature
would recognize the religions and their practices
and would consider them, when practical, in
enacting laws of general application. But when the
legislature fails to do so, religions that are
threatened and burdened may turn to the courts for
protection.
i. Mandatory accommodation would result if the
Court finds that accommodation is required by
the Free Exercise Clause.
i. is particularly necessary to protect
adherents of minority religions from the
inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which
include ignorance and indifference and
overt hostility to the minority.
ii. If the Court finds that the State may, but is not
required to, accommodate religious interests,
permissive accommodation results
i. the political branches could shield religious
exercise through legislative accommodation
3) Compelling State Interest Test
i. Has the statute or government action created a
burden on the free exercise of religion?
ii. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest
to justify this infringement of religious liberty?
iii. Has the state in achieving its legitimate
purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state?
d. IMBONG vs OCHOA (GR 204819, April 8, 2014)
(i) Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."
1) ISSUE: Whether or not RA 10354 is
unconstitutional for contravening religious
freedom
i. The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of
Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes
with respect the influence of religion in so far
as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality. Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935,
1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent
and accommodating provisions towards
religions
ii. The following are unconstitutional:
i. Section 7 and the corresponding provision
in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
13
 operated by a religious group to refer
patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to another health facility
which is conveniently accessible
ii. Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.
iii. Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;
iv. Section 23(b) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
e. Gamboa vs Teves (GR 176579, October 9, 2012)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the Court erred in
construing the term “capital”
1) The preamble embodies the ideals that the
Constitution intends to “conserve and develop our
patrimony.”
2) Consistent with these ideals, Section 19, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution declares as State policy
the development of a national economy "effectively
controlled" by Filipinos (Sec. 19, Art II)
3) The FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a
"Philippine national" as a Philippine citizen, or a
domestic corporation at least "60% of the capital
stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is
owned by Philippine citizens.
4) This is precisely because the right to vote in the
election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective
control of a corporation.
5) Any other construction of the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
contravenes the letter and intent of the Constitution.
Any other meaning of the term "capital" openly
invites alien domination of economic activities
reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals.
f. Narra Nickel vs Redmont (GR 195580, April 21, 2014)
(i) Control Test or liberal rule: "shares belonging to
corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be
considered as of Philippine nationality"
(ii) Grandfather rule: Shares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of
Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than
60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as of Philippine
nationality.
14
(iii) ISSUE: Whether the “grandfather rule” must be used to
determine the nationality of petitioners
1) "Corporate layering" is admittedly allowed by the
FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution
and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal.
2) MR. NOLLEDO: With respect to an investment
by one corporation in another corporation, say,
a corporation with 60-40 percent equity invests in
another corporation which is permitted by the
Corporation Code, does the Committee adopt the
grandfather rule?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, that is the understanding of
the Committee.
MR. NOLLEDO: Therefore, we need additional
Filipino capital?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.
3) Elementary in statutory construction is when
there is conflict between the Constitution and a
statute, the Constitution will prevail. In this
instance, specifically pertaining to the provisions
under Art. XII of the Constitution on National
Economy and Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will
have no place of application.
i. “The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens.”
(iv) Leonen’s Dissent
1) The so-called "Grandfather Rule" has no statutory
basis. It is the Control Test that governs in
determining Filipino equity in corporations. It is this
test that is provided in statute and by our most
recent jurisprudence.
2) The 1987 Constitution is silent on the precise
means through which foreign equity in a
corporation shall be determined for the purpose of
complying with nationalization requirements in each
industry. If at all, it militates against the supposed
preference for the Grandfather Rule that, its
mention in the Constitutional Commission’s
deliberations notwithstanding, the 1987 Constitution
was, ultimately, inarticulate on adopting a specific
test or means.
3) It is not proper to insist upon the Grandfather
Rule as enshrined in the Constitution – and as
manifesting the sovereign people’s will – when
the Constitution makes absolutely no mention
of it.
4) The intention of the framers of the Constitution,
even assuming we could discover what it was,
when it is not adequately expressed in the
Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when
they did not say it, surely that has no binding force
upon us.
5) The application of the Control Test is by no means
antithetical to the avowed policy of a "national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."156
The Control Test promotes this policy.
6) By owning 60% of B’s capital, A controls B.
Likewise, by owning 60% of C’s capital, B controls
C. From this, it follows, as a matter of transitivity,
that A controls C; albeit indirectly, that is, through
B.
7) This "control" holds true regardless of the
aggregate foreign capital in B and C. As explained
in Gamboa, control by stockholders is a matter
15
 resting on the ability to vote in the election of
directors
c. UMALI vs COMELEC (GR 203974, April 22, 2014)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the term “qualified voters
v. Principle of Constitutional Supremacy
a. It is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.
b. TAWANG vs LA TRINIDAD (GR 166471, March 22,
2011)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not a public utility, such as the
respondent, may be exclusive in character
1) Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when
the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left
with no alternative but to apply the same according
to its clear language.
2) 1987 Constitution expressly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. They
uniformly command that "nor shall such franchise x
x x be exclusive in character." This constitutional
prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception.
On the other hand, PD No. 198, as amended,
allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section
47 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to
any other person or agency x x x unless and except
to the extent that the board of directors consents
thereto x x x subject to review by the
d. ORDILLO vs COMELEC (GR 92649, February 14, 1991)
Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring
exception to the absolute prohibition in the
Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.
therein” refers only to those in Cabanatuan City
1) Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase
"by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should
be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict
with the Constitution.
2) The changes that will result from the conversion are
too substantial that there is a necessity for the
plurality of those that will be affected to approve it.
3) It is observed that the conversion of a
component city into an HUC is substantial
alteration of boundaries. Conversions were
found to result in material changes in the
economic and political rights of the people and
LGUs affected.
4) As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of
boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a
change in the geographical configuration of a local
government unit or units. However, the phrase
"boundaries" should not be limited to the mere
physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of
the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also
connotes a modification of the demarcation lines
between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s
exercise of corporate power ends and that of the
other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must
be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the
constitutional provision. Hence, all the registered
voters in the province are qualified to cast their
votes in resolving the proposed conversion of
Cabanatuan City.
16
 (i) ISSUE: Whether or not Ifugao can validly constitute the
CAR
1) The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities
and geographical areas connote that "region" is to
be made up of more than one constituent unit. The
term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two
or more provinces.
2) From Sections 1 & 2 of Art. III of RA 6766, it can be
gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region.
Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area.
vi. Principle of Relative Unconstitutionality
a. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional
and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and
the constitutional portion upheld.21
b. CB EMPLOYEES vs BSP (GR 148208, Dec. 15, 2004)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of RA 7653 is unconstitutional
1) A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Bangko Sentral's human
resource development program: xxx Provided,
however, That compensation and wage
structure of employees whose positions fall
under salary grade 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed under
Republic Act No. 6758.
2) Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank
21
Sta. Maria Persons and Family Relations Law p. 12
in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who
have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment
3) They represent the more impotent rank-and-file
government employees who, unlike employees in
the private sector, have no specific right to organize
as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for
better terms and conditions of employment, nor the
power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor
practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor
unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is
almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated
them from the other GFI rank-and-file in
compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees
represent the politically powerless and they should
not be compelled to seek a political solution to their
unequal and iniquitous treatment.
vii. Self-executing vs Need for Implementing Legislation
a. GAMBOA vs FINANCE SEC (GR 176579 June 28, 2011)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or no Section 11 of Article XII of the
Constitution is self-executing
(ii) Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other
provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to
Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the
development of natural resources and ownership of
land, educational institutions and advertising business,
is self-executing.
(iii) Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
17
 meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
(iv) Thus, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled
to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
present case only to common shares, and not to the
total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting
preferred shares). Considering that common shares
have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no
voting rights, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to common shares.
(v) However, if the preferred shares also have the right to
vote in the election of directors, then the term capital
shall include such preferred shares because the right
to participate in the control or management of the
corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors. In short, the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors. This interpretation is consistent with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the
hands of Filipino citizens the control and management
of public utilities.
b. GUTIERREZ vs HoR COJ (GR 193459 Feb. 15, 2011)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3(8) of Article XI of the
1987 Constitution
1)
c. TANADA vs ANGARA (GR 118295 May 2, 1997)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not Section 19, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution is self-executing
1) These principles in Article II are not intended to be
self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. The principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of
Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."
2) It is important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy
d. MANILA PRINCE vs GSIS (GR 122156 Feb 3, 1997)
(i) Ubi jus ibi remedium – where there is a right there is
a remedy
(ii) ISSUE:
1) Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put
it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable
When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
2) And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on
the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings.
18
 viii. Progressive Interpretation
a. ORCEO vs COMELEC (GR 190779)
(i) ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replica/imitation in the term “firearm” in Resolution
8714
1) The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the
term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes
of the gun ban during the election period is a
reasonable restriction, the objective of which is to
ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
2) Where a rule or regulation has a provision not
expressly stated or contained in the statute
being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative
rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by
the law.
b) Statutes
1. Definition. A statute is an act of the legislature as an organized
body, expressed in the form, and passed according to the
procedure, required to constitute it as part of the law of the land.
2. Types.
i. Public vs Private
a. Public – one which affects the public at large
b. Private – applies only to a specific person or subject
ii. General vs Special vs Local
a. General – which applies to the whole state and operates
throughout the state alike upon all the people or all of a
class
b. Special – which relates to particular persons or things of a
class or to a particular community, individual, or thing
c. Local – ordinances
iii. Permanent vs Temporary
3. Enactment of Statutes
4. Single Subject Requirement
i. Sec. 26(1), Art VI – every billed passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof
ii. LAMBINO vs COMELEC (GR 174153, October 25, 2009)
a. Section 4(4), Art XVIII. Within forty-five days from
ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions
of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
b. Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on
initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in
the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma
since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire
proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively
contains two propositions, one of which they may find
unacceptable.
c. Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative
process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule
was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an
initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity
for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-
by-initiative process.
d. The people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used to
propose an amendment mandating the interim
19
 Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.
e. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the
nature and effect of the proposed changes.
iii. REMAN vs. PRC-REC (GR 197676, February 4, 2014)
a. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9646 is unconstitutional for
violating the “one-subject, one-title” rule
(i) It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth.
(ii) The inclusion of real estate developers is germane
to the law’s primary goal of developing "a corps of
technically competent, responsible and respected
professional real estate service practitioners whose
standards of practice and service shall be globally
competitive and will promote the growth of the real
estate industry." Since the marketing aspect of real
estate development projects entails the performance of
those acts and transactions defined as real estate
service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646,
it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to
professionalize the entire real estate service sector.
5. Procedure for Passing a Bill
i. First and Second Reading
ii. Third reading
iii. Conference Committee Reports
iv. President’s approval
6. President’s approval or veto
i. When not signed within 30 days from receipt
ii. When approved
iii. When vetoed, but repassed by Congress by 2/3 vote of all
its Members, each House voting separately
7. Publication Requirements
i. TANADA vs. TUVERA (GR L-63915, April 24, 1985)
a. The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis
non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
ii. TANADA vs. TUVERA (GR L-63915, December 29, 1986)
a. the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date, without its previous publication.
b. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
c. Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere,
as a requirement for their effectivity
d. All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
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