DANILO VILLANUEVA vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO. 199042, November 17, 2014

FACTS:

A complaint was filed by Bryan Resco against accused-appellant Danilo Villanueva for allegedly
shooting the former. Thereafter, the police officers together with Resco proceeded to Villanueva’s house
and invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a
plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from Villanueva’s pants.

Villanueva was charged of violating RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In his defense, Villanueva testified that at the time of the incidence, he was at home when the police
officers arrived and invited him to the police station where he was frisked and detained.

The RTC convicted Villanueva and the CA affirmed. Villanueva claims that his arrest does not fall within
the purview of a valid warrantless arrest, hence, to “invite” him to the precinct without any warrant is
illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently, inadmissible. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in affirming Villanueva’s conviction despite the illegality of the arrest.

RULING:

Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Accused-appellant was
arrested without a warrant and the arrest is not considered as a lawful warrantless arrest. Nevertheless,
records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest. Thus, he is
considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court
and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.

While the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to
have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search. A waiver of an illegal arrest is not a
waiver of an illegal search. Records have established that both the arrest and the search were made
without a warrant.

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted. The search
made was not among those instances allowed by law. While this type may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that “consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown
by clear and convincing evidence”. Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion. In this case, accused-appellant was “ordered”.

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot be
sustained.

Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

 JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 213847, August 18, 2015

Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the PDAF. Petitioner
requested to post bail which was denied on the ground of prematurity considering that Enrile was not yet
in the custody of law at that time. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile’s arrest and Enrile
voluntarily surrendered. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Motion to Fix Bail, which was later denied.
Likewise, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner insists that these denials
were made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Hence, in this petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that before judgment of conviction, an
accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances –
his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not shown that his guilt is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account his age, his medical condition, and his social
standing.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted;
and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner is granted bail on the following grounds:

1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. In criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This is rooted in the
guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.

2. Prior to conviction, bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion as enshrined in Section
13, of the Constitution and in Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court.

3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is

subject to judicial discretion. But, such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty.

4. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail.

In granting the petition, the Court is guided by the principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful
of the Philippines’ responsibility arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. As stated in the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, this national
commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not
be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
indicate that the risk of his flight or escape is highly unlikely. With his solid reputation in his public and
his private life, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should
be granted bail.

Further, bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed. This will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. On the other
hand, to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had
is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as
well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such,
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.