Eurika Jessa Castillon

LLB 1-E

MANALILI vs. CA
FACTS:
Policemen Pat. Espiritu and Pat. Lumabas were conducting a surveillance. The
surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the
Caloocan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the area, the policemen chanced upon the
accused-appellant, Alain Manalili, in the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. When
accused-appellant tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him. The
policemen asked the accused what was in his hands. Manalili showed the wallet and Pat.
Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. Accused, Manalili, was
charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425. After trial in due
course, the RTC of Caloocan rendered a decision convicting appellant of illegal
possession of marijuana residue. Manalili filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest?
HELD:
In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. It did
not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is
that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. This
right, however, is not absolute. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. To require the police
officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to
be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was
reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information,
rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur. Herein, Patrolman
Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that Manalili had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according
to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior
was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop Manalili to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During
such investigation, they found marijuana in his possession. The search was valid, being
akin to a stop-and-frisk.
PEOPLE vs. MALMSTEDT
FACTS:
Accused-appellant, Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was riding a
passenger bus from Sagada. The said bus was stopped at a military checkpoint for
inspection. The checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, an
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada possessed prohibited drugs was
likewise received. During the inspection, a bulge on Malmstedt's waist was noticed and
was found out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. In further inspections,
more hashish were found concealed in teddy bears that he was carrying in his travelling
bags. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act to which he was found guilty. In an appeal, the accused-appellant said in his
defense that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and he further claims that the hashish were planted by the inspection
officers.
ISSUE:
WON the decision of the RTC be reversed for unlawful search and arrest without
warrant?
HELD:
The decision was upheld. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he
was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest.
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce
his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe
that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these
circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.

PEOPLE vs. TANGLIBEN

FACTS:
In the late evening of March 2, 1982, two Patrolmen were conducting a
surveillance mission. The surveillance was aimed on persons who may be engaging in
the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. During the
surveillance, the Patrolmen noticed the accused, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling
bag and was acting suspiciously. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves. The
Accused-appellant was convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. In his
appeal, accused-appellant argued that the marijuana was a product of unlawful search
without a warrant.
ISSUE:
WON there was unlawful search and arrest without a warrant?
HELD:
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of
his arrest. Therefore, the warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is
consequently valid.
The case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not
mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who
pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure
a search warrant. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug
pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband
goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the
crimes with which these persons are associated.

People vs Valdez
FACTS:
Accused-appellant, Abe Valdez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
cultivating marijuana plants in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
witness for the prosecution, SPO3 Tipay, testified that he received a tip from an
unnamed informer about marijuana allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. A
reaction team composed of policemen was formed to verify the report. The following
day, the police operatives arrived at appellant’s place and found him alone in his nipa
hut. Upon looking around the area, they saw seven flowering marijuana plants near the
appellant's hut and said that appellant admitted to the ownership of the plants. The
police took photos of appellant standing beside the plants and then arrested him. The
appellant denied any knowledge thereof, and he contended that he only admitted
ownership of the marijuana because he was poked with a gun by a police officer.
ISSUE: Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to warrantless
search and seizure, based on the “plain view” doctrine?
HELD:
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Herein, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the
police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to
search Valdez's farm. From the information in their possession, they could have
convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But
they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the
excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not
underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.
The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that it
should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements
must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure
of evidence without further search. Herein, the police officers first located the marijuana
plants before Valdez was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid
warrantless arrest which preceded the search of Valdez's premises. The police team was
dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora.
The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent.
Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could
spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus,
cannot be made to apply.
PEOPLE vs. SUCRO
FACTS:
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. to monitor the activities of the accused, Edison
Sucro, because of information saying that Sucro was selling marijuana. Upon
monitoring, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro taking marijuana from the compartment found in
the chapel, and then handed the same to a buyer. After a while Sucro went back to the
chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. Pat.
Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer was transacting with Sucro. At
that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area to intercept the third buyer
and Sucro. When confronted, the third buyer, Macabante, readily admitted that he
bought the marijuana from Sucro. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article
II of the Dangerous Drugs Act and was found guilty. Sucro appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently,
whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible?
HELD:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances
where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace officer
or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" An
offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning
of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once
to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the
fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable
cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is
not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides
that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime
when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the
arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the
contraband. Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its
compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from
such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence

PEOPLE vs. CHUA HO SAN

FACTS:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan began patrolling the coastline with
his officers. Cid intercepted a radio call, requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat spotted in the coast. When the speedboat landed, a lone male
passenger, who was the accused Chua Ho San, alighted and was carrying a multicolored
strawbag. They became suspicious of the accused as he suddenly broke into a run upon
seeing the approaching officers. The accused was requested to open his bag. A search of
the bag yielded plastic packets which were later confirmed to be positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Chua was charged to have violated Section
15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug).
In his defense, Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong
to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that the police
arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him;
that the police inspected the bag, then proclaimed its content as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua
for transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause in the warrantless search and arrest of
the accused?
HELD:
The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without
the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the
pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that
"accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when apprehended." In
short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm
and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his
speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable
cause." None of the telltale clues accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that a foreigner
would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question.
Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the
vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did
not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search
cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was
not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did
not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all
indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated
substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining
evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chua’s conviction.
PEOLE vs. DE GRACIA
FACTS:
The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged by ultra-rightist
elements headed by the RAM-SFP against the Government. Starting November 30,
1989, a surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the Eurocar
Sales Office is an establishment being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post. On December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria and his team
were conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office wherein a crowd was then
gathered. After a while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd and
fired their guns at the surveillance team. As a consequence, in December 5, 1989, a
searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate M-
16 ammunition, C-4 dynamites, M-shells and "molotov" bombs inside a room belonging
to a certain Col. Matillano. Also in the office of Col. Mantillano, the accused, Rolando De
Gracia was found holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. As a result of
the raid, the team arrested de Gracia. No search warrant was secured by the raiding
team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder, and the
courts were closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office
is Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. De Gracia was charged
in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. During the arraignment, de
Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to possess any firearms. In 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting
de Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty of the other. De Gracia appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure?
HELD:
Under the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to
the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtained in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the
raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.