G.R. No.

194061, April 20, 2015

EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND DIGNA MATALANG COCHING, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the October 30, 2009 decision2 and the October 1, 2010 resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.'SP No. 100616.

The CA affirmed the decision4 of the Office of the President setting aside the resolution5 of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary. The DENR Secretary earlier affirmed the orders dated December 1, 20036 and July 26, 20047 of the DENR
Regional Executive Director (RED), Region IV-B-MIMAROPA.8
The Antecedents9

The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan, which are parts of a six-hectare
timberland.

On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 for a
bathing establishment. According to the petitioner, the lots are covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her father, the late
Arturo Besaga, Sr. who allegedly occupied the land during his lifetime.

On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses) also applied for SLUP for a bathing establishment
over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. According to the respondent spouses, they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through a March 19, 1998
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Maranon, a registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of
Waiver of Rights, executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.,10 and Digna Matalang Coching (another respondent in this case), also registered
survey claimants.

On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner's SLUP application before the DENR. On December 1, 2003, the RED
issued the order giving due course to the petitioner's SLUP application and rejecting the respondents' SLUP application. The RED later
denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2004.

The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They tiled on. August 25, 2004, through registered mail,
an Appeal Memorandum to the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy furnished the petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED. The
appeal fee was paid on September 10, 2004. Respondent Digna Matalang Coching received the July 26, 2004 order on August 30,
2004 and filed her appeal (which adopted the appeal of the respondent spouses) on September 16, 2004.

While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate of Finality 11 declaring the December 1,
2003 and July 26, 2004 orders final and executory for failure of the respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.

On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) issued the SLUP12 to the petitioner covering
Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514. On November 18, 2005, the SLUP was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT).

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED; (ii)
amending the coverage of the SLUP of the petitioner to cover Lot No. 4513 only; and (iii) giving due course to the SLUP of the
respondent spouses to cover Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration13 filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary reversed his August 6, 2006 decision on October
17, 2006 and held that the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED have attained finality because: (i) the respondent
spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum, instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with the DENR
Secretary and not with the RED; and (iii) the respondent spouses failed to pay the required appeal fees within the reglementary period.

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.

The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CA's ruling.
The DENR's Findings

The RED, relying mainly on the report14 prepared by the chief of Forest Management Services ruled in favor of the petitioner.

The report gave credence to Tax Declaration No. 048,15 which purportedly showed that Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 are parts of the six
(6) hectare timberland occupied by the petitioner's father during his lifetime. The RED also gave weight to the statements of two former
Barangay Captains of Port Barton and the document signed by the alleged occupants of the said six (6) hectare timberland
supporting the petitioner's claim.

The DENR Secretary reversed the orders of the RED in his decision dated August 6, 2006.16

He ruled that the petitioner cannot claim preferential right to apply for an SLUP over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 in view of her sweeping
allegation that the said lots are part of the six (6) hectare timberland, which his father possessed in his lifetime and whose possession
she tacked. The DENR Secretary asked: if indeed the petitioner tacked the possession of his father and she was the actual occupant
over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514, why was she not made the survey claimants of the said lots?

The DENR Secretary found that the respondent spouses have a preferential right over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. Rogelio Maranon, the
registered survey claimant and occupant of Lot No. 4512, waived and transferred his right over the lot in favor of the respondent
spouses in a duly-notarized Affidavit of Waiver of Rights. The respondent spouses derived their right over Lot No. 4514 from Arturo
Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching, the registered survey claimants, who executed a duly-notarized Joint-Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights over the said lot. The DENR Secretary held that these are the legal and vital documents (disregarded by the chief of Forest

1
Management Services) which support the preferential rights of the respondent spouses over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

The DENR Secretary, however, reversed his August 6, 2006 decision in a resolution17 dated October 17, 2006. He ruled that the
respondent spouses failed to perfect the appeal because they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal contrary
to Section 1(a) of DENR Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 87, series of 1990.18
The Office of the President's Ruling19

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

It held that the orders of the RED did not become final because there is no law, rule or regulation prohibiting an appellant to file an
appeal memorandum, instead of a notice of appeal, to the office concerned. It further held that the appeal memorandum itself
serves as a sufficient notice of the party's intention to elevate the case to a higher authority. The Office of the President observed that
in a plethora of cases, notices of appeal are filed directly with the DENR, rather than with the RED, which practice has not since been
prohibited nor made as a ground for the outright dismissal of the appeal. Finally, it found that the respondent spouses paid the appeal
fees. All of these negate the finding that the respondent spouses did not perfect their appeal to the DENR Secretary.

As to the merits of the case, the Office of the President found that Tax Declaration No. 048 did not cover Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514
but Lot No. 4741, which is entirely different and distinct from the contested lots. It gave credence to the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights
executed by Rogelio Maranon and the Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights jointly executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang
Coching in favor of the respondent spouses. No countervailing proof was presented by the petitioner to impugn these affidavits.
The CA's Ruling

The CA sustained the Office of the President. Citing decisions of this Court, it held that rules of procedure are construed liberally in
proceedings before administrative bodies. They are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to
hold secure and not to override substantial justice.

The CA ruled that the orders of the RED have not attained finality.
The Petition

The petitioner seeks reversal of the CA decision and resolution for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. She submits that the
respondent spouses failed to perfect an appeal in the administrative proceedings. She argues that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and that failure to conform to the rules will
render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. She adds that the liberal interpretation of the rules has no clear
application in the present case because the respondents failed to adequately explain their non-compliance therewith.

As is proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner does not raise any factual questions.
Respondent's Comment20
The respondent spouses ask for the petition's dismissal for lack of merit. They submit that the CA acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence in upholding the ruling of the Office of the President.

They argue that to dismiss the case on the mere ground of technicalities would mean to dispense with the determination of the party
having preferential right on the disputed lots and could cause the perpetuation of a wrong. They maintain that the cases cited by the
petitioner, where procedural rules were strictly enforced by this Court, involved violation of the rules either before the trial court, the CA
or before this Court, and not before an administrative agency like the DENR. In sum, the respondent spouses contend that the orders of
the RED have not attained finality, thus, said orders are still subject to reversal, amendment or modification on appeal.
Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:21

I. WHETHER THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS CORRECTLY FILED TO THE DENR SECRETARY AND NOT TO THE
REGIONAL OFFICE AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS' APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE DENR SECRETARY WAS PERFECTED DESPITE OF THEIR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;
III. WHETHER THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL INVOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WAS CORRECTLY
APPLIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE CASE OF RESPONDENTS;
IV. WHETHER THE ASSAILED ORDERS, ISSUED ON DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 26, 2004, OF THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OF DENR REGION IV-MIMAROPA IN DENR CASE NO. M-003-03-F, WERE ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY;
V. WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990 IS NOT ONLY
MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL; AND
VI. WHETHER THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 23, 2014 CAN STILL BE MODIFIED AND SET ASIDE BY THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS.

The resolution of these issues hinges on whether the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 have attained finality
because the respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of Appeal to the RED.
The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

The petitioner insists that the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal was fatal to the respondent spouses'
case.

We are not convinced of the merits of this position.

The crux of the dispute is Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87. It provides:
Section 1. Perfection of Appeals. - a) Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, appeals from the decisions/orders of the
DENR Regional Offices shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy of the decision/order complained of by the

2
party adversely affected, by tiling with the Regional Office which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon
the prevailing party and Office of the Secretary, and paying the required fees. [Emphasis ours.]

According to the petitioner, this provision is mandatory and jurisdictional. She argues that respondents filed a defective appeal
because: (i) they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) directly to the DENR and not to the Regional
Office, which adjudicated the case; and (iii) no docket fee was paid.22

The petitioner cites jurisprudence to bolster her argument that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not oniy mandatory but also jurisdictional.

We accordingly review the cited cases to determine the correctness of the petitioner's submitted position.

In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista,23 the CA dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to file his brief within the time provided by
the Rules of Court. The appellant not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time
based on a cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. In sustaining the CA, we held that liberality in the
application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the
administration of justice.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,24 we affirmed the trial court when it considered a motion for reconsideration pro forma for
not containing a notice of hearing. We held that a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere
scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding
judge.

In Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA,25 the Regional Trial Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible 15-day period to file a Petition
for Review from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The petitioner failed to file the petition despite the extension. We held that
the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.

In MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC,26 we affirm the CA when it denied due course to the petitioner's appeal because of its failure to
explain why another mode of service other than personal service was resorted to. We held that an affidavit of service is required
merely as proof that service has been made to the other parties in a case. It is a requirement totally different from the requirement that
an explanation be made if personal service of pleadings was not resorted to.

Finally, in Artistica Ceramica v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,27 the issue was whether the petitioner properly filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We held that as a rule, the
remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The failure to file the appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period under Rule 45 is not an excuse to use Rule 65. Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal,

In sum, all these cases strictly applied the rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory right and the party who avails of such right
must comply with the law. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.

To reiterate, these involved violations of the Rules of Court while the cases were pending in the trial court, the CA or before this
Court. They do not involved violation of administrative rules of procedure. They are not strictly applicable in the present case.

The Nature of Administrative

Rules of Procedure

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. This has been
consistently held in relation to non-observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to offer a valid and acceptable
excuse for non-compliance.

Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always been liberality.

Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law.28 Administrative rules of procedure should
be construed liberally in order to promote their object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
their respective claims and defenses.29

In Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.,30 we held:
It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A
strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to
enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities, x x x This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by
technical rules of procedure. [Emphasis supplied.]

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the requirements of due process.31

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor.32
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due
process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical
rules of procedure are not strictly applied. [Emphasis supplied.]

Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained.33

3
Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial and expedite justice, we are
keenly aware that liberal construction has no application when due process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving
violation of administrative rules of procedure is whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the
gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the
rules are liberally construed.

Liberal Construction as
Applied in the Present Case

It is undisputed that the respondent spouses, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal to the RED, filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the
DENR Secretary within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. They paid the appeal fee, although beyond the fifteen (15)-day
period. These violate Section 1 (a) of DAO No. 87 which requires the filing of a Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee
within the reglementary period.

Do these errors breach due process so as to call for the strict application of administrative rules of procedure? Is there basis for the
liberal construction of the rules?
We uphold liberality.
First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply Section l(a) of DAO No. 87
may violate the respondent spouses right to due process as this would result to a denial of their right to appeal.
We stress that the respondent spouses appealed within the reglementary period. The appeal was timely filed, albeit not directly to the
office which issued the order sought to be reviewed. They also paid the full appeal fees although beyond the 15-day period.
We hold that these procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The petitioner's right to due process was not
breached.
Notably, both the petitioner and the RED were furnished copies of the Memorandum of Appeal, a fact that the petitioner did not deny.34

We agree with the observation of the Office of the President that the Memorandum of Appeal essentially served the purpose of the
Notice of Appeal. The filing of the Memorandum of Appeal had the same practical effect had a Notice of Appeal been filed: inform
the RED that his order is sought to be appealed to the DENR Secretary.

Significantly, the respondent spouses notified the petitioner of the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. The petitioner subsequently
filed her opposition thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor of the respondent spouses, the petitioner tiled a motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.

Clearly, the petitioner participated in every stage of the administrative proceeding. Her right to be heard was not compromised
despite the wrong mode of appeal.

As to the late payment of the appeal fee, suffice it to say that this Court has disregarded late payment of appeal fees at the
administrative level in order to render substantial justice.35

Second, the liberal construction of DAO No. 87 would serve its purpose, i.e., grant a party the right to appeal decisions of the Regional
Offices to the DENR Secretary in order for the latter to review the findings of the former. To disallow appeal in this case would not only
work injustice to the respondent spouses, it would also diminish the DENR Secretary's power to review the decision of the RED. It would
deny the DENR Secretary the opportunity to correct, at the earliest opportunity, "errors of judgment" of his subordinates. This is obviously
not the intent of DAO No. 87.

Finally, the petitioner failed to convince us why liberality should not be applied. The petitioner does not claim that her right to due
process was violated as a result of the wrong mode of appeal. The petitioner merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No. 87 and
affirm the orders of the RED, which according to her, have attained finality.

Between strict construction of administrative rules of procedure for their own sake and their liberal application in order to enhance fair
trials and expedite justice, we uphold the latter. After all, administrative rules of procedure do not operate in a vacuum. The rules
facilitate just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes before administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply these rules in a
manner that would give effect rather than defeat their intended purpose.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the October 30, 2009 decision and October 1, 2010 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100616, affirming the August 13, 2007 decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 06-
K-398.

SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED-NONE

4
 G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003
EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, Petitioner, v. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the President, AND
GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 18,
2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioners dismissal as Regional
Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth.
Petitioners dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private respondent LUIS
BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-
Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los
Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that petitioners in-laws who were living in California
had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner
and his wife. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents:
a) a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco granted the subject property to petitioner
and his wife;
b) a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California appointing petitioners sister-in-law
Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and execute all documents and requirements to complete the purchase of the
subject property; and,
c) an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled Beatwatch, where it was reported that a
low-ranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled to Europe and the U.S. with his family, purchased an expensive house in
California, appointed a woman through an SPA to manage the subject property and had hidden and unexplained wealth in the
Philippines and in the U.S.
Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of San Francisco,
California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)[1] for investigation. Petitioner, represented by counsel,
submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela
Fajardo. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable condition of government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in
the U.S. about their possible emigration to the States. They were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if
they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California,
but could not do so at that time as there was a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property
pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and
put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent
the prohibition in her mortgage contract.
Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman.[2] He
attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report[3] of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for
insufficiency of evidence.
From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While petitioner participated in
the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, private respondent-complainant could not be
located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required
petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet.
Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. He likewise adduced in evidence the checks allegedly issued
by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in Burbank, California. When the PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
to furnish it with copies of petitioners SALN from 1992-1994, it was informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years.
After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following findings: Petitioner purchased a
house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the exchange rate prevailing in 1993). The sale was evidenced by a
Grant Deed. The PCAGC concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual income
of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It likewise found petitioners explanation as unusual, largely unsubstantiated,
unbelievable and self-serving. The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioners counsel exerted more effort in filing
pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. It also took against petitioner his refusal to submit his SALN and ITR
despite the undertaking made by his counsel which raised the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it
has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioners dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019.
On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC, issued
Administrative Order No. 12,[4] ordering petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed.[5]
Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: first, whether he was denied due process in the
investigation before the PCAGC; second, whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence; and, third, whether the earlier dismissal
of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic.
On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due
process when it relied on Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-affidavit should have been given more
weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC
failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the hearings before
the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein.
We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[6] In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the
complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located.[7] Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that
he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to
the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-
affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued
by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation
effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now
be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.[8]

5
Neither can we sustain petitioners contention that the charge against him was unsupported by substantial evidence as it was
contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the
complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form
or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency
is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to
act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court Administrator of this Court
investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for
violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if
not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service.
It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the
chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.[9] This was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar.
On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the
complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.[10]Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[11] Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive
branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions
in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These
principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if
originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative
agency concerned.[12]
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela
Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by Fajardo as payment for the
amortizations of the property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us. First, the record is bereft of evidence to prove the
alleged internal arrangement petitioner entered into with Fajardo. He did not submit her affidavit to the investigating body nor did she
testify before it regarding her ownership of the Burbank property. Second, the checks allegedly issued by Fajardo to pay for the
monthly amortizations on the property have no evidentiary weight as Fajardos mere issuance thereof cannot prove petitioners non-
ownership of the property. Fajardo would naturally issue the checks as she was appointed by petitioner as attorney-in-fact and the
latter would naturally course through her the payments for the Burbank property. Third, petitioners own evidence contradict his
position. We cannot reconcile petitioners denial of ownership of the property with the loan statement[13] he adduced showing that he
obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan Association for $195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the
property. Then, three (3) years later, on May 30, 1996, petitioner and his wife executed a Quitclaim Deed[14] donating the Burbank
property to his sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his non-ownership of the property. It is obvious that the
Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been executed only after a complaint for unexplained wealth was lodged against
petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was only Estela Fajardo who allegedly owned the property was not
explained on the record. Petitioners evidence failed to clarify the issue as it produced, rather than settled, more questions.
Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the existence and due execution of the
Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with respect to the acquisition of the Burbank property.
With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this
Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the
Courts power to do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the
administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not
operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.[15]Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal
liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
For the same alleged misconduct, Petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the
administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.
Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioners dismissal from service as the complaint and its supporting
documents established that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income in the government service, unless he
has other sources of income which he failed to reveal. His liability was proved by substantial evidence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED- NONE

6
 [G.R. No. L-29274. November 27, 1975.]

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and
the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), Petitioner, v. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of
Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Respondents.

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, and Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo, Assistant Solicitor General
Isidro C. Borromeo & Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico de Castro and 1st. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali, for Petitioners.

SYNOPSIS
The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO), created by the President pursuant to his special powers
duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code to forestall nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service and vested
with the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the same Code, issued to respondent Manalastas, then
Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the
Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS . . . then and there to declare and testify in a
certain investigation pending therein." Instead of obeying the subpoena respondent Manalastas assailed its validity and filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the PARGO and/or other
persons acting in its behalf from further issuing subpoenas to Respondent. When the respondent court granted the petition, the matter
was elevated to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, set respondent court’s order aside and held that the disputed subpoena is well within the legal competence of
the Agency to issue.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES MAY CONDUCT PURELY INVESTIGATORY PROCEEDINGS; WITNESS MAY BE REQUIRED
TO ATTEND PROCEEDING. — It has been essayed that the lifeblood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the
organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making,
adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. An
administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and
may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils
calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS; PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO); SUBPOENA
POWER; POWER EXTENDS TO INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS. — The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO), created to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service, draws its subpoena power from the
Executive Order creating it. Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the agency and is not bordered by nor is
it merely exercisable in its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. To hold that the subpoena power of the agency is confined to mere
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function would imperil or inactive its investigatory functions. More than that, the enabling authority itself
fixes no distinction when and in what function should be subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, there is no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTRICTION ON JUDICIAL SUBPOENA NOT APPLICABLE TO ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA. — The proviso in Section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code that the subpoena power of an administrative agency shall be "subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" could refer to restraints against infringement of
constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things
does not appear. The strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court, namely, that a specific case must be pending before a
court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court’s judicial or adjudicatory
functions, cannot apply to a non-judicial subpoena issued by an administrative agency. An administrative subpoena differs in essence
from a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIFIC CHARGE OR COMPLAINT OR VIOLATION OF LAW NOT NECESSARY FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA. —
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and
whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant,
that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA IS TO DISCOVER EVIDENCE. — The purpose of an administrative subpoena is
to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its
obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SUBPOENA. — An administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is
not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but an investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being
violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigate and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. In sum, it may be stated
that subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too
indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; EXTENSION OF PRIVILEGE TO WITNESS IN FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION. UNWISE.
— The privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings.
Thus, in an administrative charge of unexplained wealth under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it was held that since the
proceedings is criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon

7
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. This same approach was later followed in an administrative proceedings against a
medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, where the
person cited in the subpoena is not facing any administrative charge, but is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-
finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in a government office with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the
President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would be unwise since the
only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action. Anyway, by all means, the person so cited may contest any
attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-discrimination.

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY IMPEACHED. — For reasons of public
policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes cannot be
collaterally impeached. Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the lower court as to be acceptable for adjudication in
a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court. The settled rule is that the Supreme Court will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF A PERSON IN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. — The constitutional rights of a
person who may be involved in an administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the
administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the
Constitution affords a person who may find himself cited to appear as a witness in a fact finding investigation conducted by a
regulatory or administrative agency.

2. ID.; RIGHT AGAINST REASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURES; RIGHT CANNOT BE RENDERED MEANINGLESS BY ADMINISTRATIVE POWER OF
INVESTIGATION. — The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. The board sweep
of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with
such a reading that the pronouncement in US v. Morton Salt Co. that "it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency,
the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant", on which reliance is placed in the opinion of
Justice Martin, should be viewed. Such pronouncement has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudication.
The Morton Salt Co, case, however, involves a corporation and it suffices to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson that
"corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy" to remove any doubt as to the
pronouncement’s lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible. The landmark
Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure still speaks authoritatively. The Supreme Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. The
opinion of Justice Martin should therefore be read as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation
of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned.

3. ID.; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; RIGHT SHOULD EXTEND TO PROSPECTIVE RESPONDENT BEING CITED AS "WITNESS" IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. — The right not to incriminate oneself is deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more,
the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. A re-examination of the pronouncement
in the instant case involving the calling of a witness in an investigation being conducted by the PARGO, that "Since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise" is,
therefore, desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenous if the realities of the situation be fully
considered. The force of the Cabal and the Pascual, Jr. decisions upholding the right against self-incrimination of a respondent in an
administrative complaint may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled to testify.
Concurrence with the opinion of the Court in the instant case is not ruled out, however, in view of the caveat that "Anyway, by all
means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination."

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; RESPONDENT BEING SUBPOENAED AS "WITNESS" IN ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATION ENTITLED TO PRIVILEGE. — Where, contrary to the finding of the main opinion that the person cited in a subpoena issued
by an investigating agency "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as a witness in connection with the
fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila . . .", it is a fact shown by the very petition
itself and its annexed sworn statements that said person is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as respondent or one
directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the
investigating agency’s alleged "fact-finding investigation", said person is justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and
in securing the respondent court’s injunction against enforcement of the agency’s subpoena. The person cited was unquestionably a
party respondent, who, under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent
expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was
a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect.

2. ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE STRENGTHENED BY 1973 CONSTITUTION. — The 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and
extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its
inadmissibility in evidence.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE MUST RESPECT INDIVIDUAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN INVESTIGATION OF WRONG DOINGS. — The State with its
overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrong doing, graft and corruption and at the
same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual’s right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-
incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through
the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner’s executive charter and the
evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to

8
 the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other
appropriate offices such as the Fiscal’s office, like what was done in other cases."

DECISION

MARTIN, J.:

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul
and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas v. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners] their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other
persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private
respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code." (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3

"b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical),
lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

"e. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to
establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth . . .

"h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of
any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency."cralaw virtua1aw library

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando
Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as
witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS . . . then and there to declare and
testify in a certain investigation pending therein."cralaw virtua1aw library

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case
No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other
persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private
respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised
Administrative Code." (Stress supplied)

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental
submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis
of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more
specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to
make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain
information upon which future action of a legislative or Judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction and to report findings to
appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an
effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the
authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to
all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely

9
exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions
enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the
very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To
hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or
inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself
(Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We
see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its
application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the
authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the
same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in
respondents’ formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial
and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court’s judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-
judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an
administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one
procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and
qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of
constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things
does not appear. 15

Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved,
and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a
warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough
that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a
pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value
of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness
be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon
evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing
that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of
inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that
the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are
delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the
law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the
agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain
public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency’s sphere of authority and that the
information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably
relevant to the investigations.

We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth
against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was
followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice
the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any
administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities
in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the
corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary
extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt
in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue
subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive
Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of
executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much
more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the
Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando
Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED
Evangelista v. JarencioNovember 27, 1975Martin,
Doctrine:
Administrative may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or
not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a

10
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose
.Facts:
The President of the Philippines under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966 created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO). He charged the agency with the responsibility to investigate all activities involving or affecting
immoral practices, graft and corruption, smuggling, lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government.The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.On June
7, 1968, pursuant to the powers vested in the Agency, petitioner Quirico Evangelista as Undersecretary of the agency, issued to
respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to
be and appear as witness at the office of the PARGO. Instead of obeying the subpoena, Manalastas filed a Petition for prohibition
and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order which was granted by the CFI of Manila, hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the Agency enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Held:
YES. Manalastas lost.
Ratio:
An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also
in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken
and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature.The petitioner draws its subpoena power
in EO No. 4 and the enabling law fixes no distinction when and in what function the subpoena power should be exercised. The Court
finds no reason to depart from the established rule, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.Nor could the court find merit in
the argument that the subpoena power granted by Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code is restricted under the Rules of
Court to abridge its application. The Rules of Court require that the subpoena may be issued only when a specific case is pending
before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the courts judicial or
adjudicatory functions before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued. However, a distinction must be made that an administrative
subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. To an extent, the restrictions and qualifications referred to in Section 580 of the
RAC could mean that the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive
and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear.Administrative may enforce subpoenas issued in the
course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the
issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be
pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The
purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in
order to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance
that it is not.The subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is:1. Within the authority of the agency;2. The demand
is not too indefinite; and3. The information is reasonably relevant.For the case at bar, the anomalous transaction in question fall within
the authority of the Agency, and that the information sought to be elicited from Manalastas is reasonably relevant to the
investigations.The court is not unmindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations. However,
the court finds that in the present case, Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in
connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President or to file the corresponding charges. Since, the only purpose of the investigation is to
discover facts, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.The respondents would also challenge the
constitutionality of EO No. 4 collaterally. However, the constitutionality of executive orders cannot be collaterally impeached. Much
more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now.WHEREFORE, Order of
respondent Judge is SET ASIDE.Fernando, J., Concurring:United States c. Morton Salt Co., penned by Justice Jackson, It is sufficient if the
inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably
relevant.Moreover, Justice Fernando states that if he [Manalastas] could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate
on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.Teehankee, J., Dissenting:While the subpoena commands Manalastas to appear as
witness it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar that the respondent is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a
respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements.Therefore, respondent correctly
invoked, Cabal vs. Kapunan, wherein the court through C.J. Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the
witness stand against the Presidential Committee investigating since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one,
and that his position is virtually that of an accused and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination. Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Examiners, is also in point where the accused has the right to refuse not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand.

11
G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS,
and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors for assistance
in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so.
Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor
refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her
and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings.
The background of this case is as follows:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated
rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal
Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were
docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.
The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facie evidence and
accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon.
Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with
attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court.2
Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the
case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of
Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G.
Lastimosa.
It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed.4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an
information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5
In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to
any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor
Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.6
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27,
1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for
"refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7
For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994
within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.
It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for
violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10 and another one was a criminal complaint for
violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the
alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted
rape.
In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued an order on
August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive
suspension for a period of six (6) months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo
Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two cases, directing petitioner
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and controverting evidence.
On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice:
(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related orders,
referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled
Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted Rape)
with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.
(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner and
Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt why
they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and
failing . . . to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
(c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a
charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of
said Office.
(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman Conrado
Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros Kintanar
and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for
a period of six (6) months, without pay.
(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated August 15,
1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension.

12
 (f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are stated in the petition.
I.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to
assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the
Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when
the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became
the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by filing the information in
court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of
the information were part and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing
of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her
actuations in conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to
delegate the filing of the case to her office.
In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because
the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to
follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and
prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was
committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is
within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
(Emphasis added)
It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all
that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the
preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the
offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of
the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman
which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed
by the Ombudsman.
II.
The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for attempted
rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that he had committed
only acts of lasciviousness.
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with
the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the
argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose
out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in
another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in
character.
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful
process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of
Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the
contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.
III.
Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of
grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime
under preventive suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:
§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or employee under
his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but
not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office
of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
A.

13
Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not
strong as required by §24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not
being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before
the opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added).
It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public official, the evidence against
him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving
capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that
case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. . .
. 19
In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar on the following grounds:
A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records pertaining
thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to the
conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of
respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the
lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478
and in print and broadcast media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the
prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office
will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents
[Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.
Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive suspension of
petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them were done in the
course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution
of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the
matters alleged in determine whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose
of placing them under preventive suspension.
Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be
hampered.20 In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and
neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in
ordering their preventive suspension.
B.
Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it should only be for ninety (90)
days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or
expressly limits the period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga
v. Sandiganbayan 21 that —
To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act
3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth
the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum
period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in
Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose
positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807,
and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in
the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which
case the period of delay shall both be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated;
provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall
be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.
On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant to §24 of the
Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without
pay is thus according to law.
C.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any action in the
administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There is simply no

14
 basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be
heard before the other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTED
Lastimosa v. Vasquez
April 6, 1995
Mendoza

Topic: The Ombudsman

Provision: §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770):
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator
or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
Doctrine: When a prosecutor is deputized by the ombudsman, he becomes under the supervision and control of the latter.

Facts:
- On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated
rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal
Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Intially, the deputy ombudsman found no prima facie evidence. After review, Omb.
Vasquez reversed and directed that the mayor be charged with a criminal case in the RTC.
- The case was referred to provincial prosecutor Lastimosa. She conducted her own preliminary investigation and found that
only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. She filed a case for acts of lasciviousness with the MCTC.
- As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27,
1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for
"refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.
- Petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime
involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman
has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders
and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.

Issues:
1. WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case
for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Yes!
2. WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to suspend the prosecutor. Yes!

Ratio:
Issue 1:
- The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a
public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty.
- It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all
that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the
preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the
offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of
the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman
which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by
the Ombudsman.
Issue 2:
- §15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with
the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the
argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose
out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman.
- Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful
process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of
Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing.

Concurring Opinion, Regalado:

- The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was evidently induced by a desire
to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and
employees in order to serve as a deterrent against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part. As the
agency mandated by the Constitution to undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable it to
perform its mission. Significantly, it is the only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by impeachment.
- The Court in Buenaseda:
The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task
committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with
procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objective of the Constitution.
Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.

15
 A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for Department of which it was created.

G.R. No. 186502, December 13, 2017

CARLOS R. SAUNAR, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA AND CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN, CHAIRPERSON OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 20 October 2008 Decision1 and the 17 February 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157 which affirmed the 19 January 2007 decision3 of the Office of the
President (OP) dismissing petitioner Carlos R. Saunar (Saunar) from government service.
THE FACTS
Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which he joined as an agent in 1988. Through the
years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division. During his time as chief of the said division,
Saunar conducted an official investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and involving then
Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada. President
Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate crimes included in his indictment for
plunder.4
In Special Order No. 40035 dated 27 August 2004, Saunar was reassigned as regional director for Western Mindanao based in
Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he received a subpoena ad testificandum from the Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in
the plunder case against President Estrada. After securing approval from his immediate supervisor Filomeno Bautista (Bautista), Deputy
Director for Regional Operation Services (DDROS), Saunar appeared before the Sandiganbayan on several hearing dates, the last
being on 27 October 2004.6
On 29 October 2004, then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special Order No. 0050337 informing Saunar that he was
relieved from his duties as regional director for Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further instructions.
Pursuant thereto, he reported to Bautista on the first week of November 2004. Bautista informed Saunar that an investigation was being
conducted over his testimony before the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for the developments in the investigation. In the
meantime, Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be available at any time whenever he would be needed. He made
himself accessible by staying in establishments near the NBI. In addition, he also attended court hearings whenever required. 8
On 6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) requiring him to answer the
allegations against him in the PAGC Formal Charge dated 3 October 2006. The charge was based on a letter, dated 19 August 2005,
from Wycoco recommending an immediate appropriate action against Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24 March 2005,
without approved leave of absence for four (4) months.9
On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29 January 2007, he received a copy
of the OP decision dismissing him from service.
The OP Decision
In its 19 January 2007 decision, the OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, and dismissed him from service. It pointed out that Saunar failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself
admitted when he explained that he did not report for work because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility. The
OP highlighted that he was clearly instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so. It added that it would have been more
prudent for Saunar to have reported for work even if no duty was specifically assigned to him, for the precise reason that he may at
any time be tasked with responsibilities. The OP, however, absolved Saunar from allegedly keeping government property during the
time he did not report for work, noting that he was able to account for all the items attributed to him. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by PAGC, Atty. Carlos R. Saunar, Regional Director, NBI, for Gross Neglect of
Duty under Section 22(b), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 in relation to Section 4(A) of RA 6713 and for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is hereby DISMISSED from government service with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave
credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification for re-employment in the government service.10
Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the OP in its 12 June 2007 resolution.11 Undeterred, he appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed 20 October 2008 decision, the CA affirmed in toto the OP decision. The appellate court ruled that Saunar was not
deprived of due process because he was informed of the charges against him and was given the opportunity to defend himself. It
expounded that the absence of formal hearings in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due process.
On the other hand, the CA agreed that Saunar was guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty as manifested by his being on Absence Without
Leave (AWOL) for a long period of time. The appellate court disregarded Saunar's explanation that he stayed in establishments nearby
and that he had attended court hearings from time to time. In addition, the CA found that Saunar violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 because public interest was prejudiced when he continued to receive his salary in spite of his unjustified absences. Thus, it ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for review filed in this case is hereby DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED
for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision of the Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita dated January 19, 2007 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.12
Saunar moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed 17 February 2009 resolution.
Hence, this appeal raising the following:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENTS
DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION; AND
II
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAELS GRAVELY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF
RESPONDENTS THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, HAD ABANDONED HIS POST AND WENT ON AWOL FOR HIS
ALLEGED FAILURE TO REPORT FOR WORK FROM MARCH 24, 2005 TO MAY 2006.13
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is meritorious.
Administrative due process
revisited

16
Saunar bewails that he was deprived of due process, pointing out that no real hearing was ever conducted considering that the
clarificatory conference conducted by the PAGC was a sham. In addition, he asserts that he was not notified of the charges against
him because he was only made aware of the allegations after the PAGC had formally charged him. Further, Saunar highlights the
delay between the time PAGC received Wycoco's letter-complaint and when he received the formal charge from the PAGC.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution is similar with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution in that it
guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. While the words used in our Constitution
slightly differ from the American Constitution, the guarantee of due process is used in the same sense and has the same force and
effect.14 Thus, while decisions on due process of American courts are not controlling in our jurisdiction, they may serve as guideposts in
the analysis of due process as applied in our legal system.
In American jurisprudence, the due process requirement entails the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.15 Likewise, it was characterized with fluidity in that it negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation.16
In Goldberg v. Kelly (Goldberg),17 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court ruled that due process requires the opportunity for welfare
recipients to confront the witnesses against them at a pre-termination hearing before welfare benefits are terminated, to wit:
The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. It is not enough that
a welfare recipient may present his position to the decision maker in writing or second hand through his caseworker. x x x Moreover,
written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues
the decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many
termination proceedings, written submissions are wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.
In Goldberg, the U.S. Supreme Court went on to highlight the importance of confronting the witnesses presented against the
claimant, viz:
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. x x x What we said in Greene v McElroy, 360 US 474, 496-497, 3 Led 2d 1377, 1390, 1391, 79 S Ct 1400 (1959),
is particularly pertinent here:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings the evidence used to prove the Government's
case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of
documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be
faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice or jealousy. We have
formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression
in the Sixth Amendment . . . This Court has be zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases,
but also in all types of cases where administrative actions were under scrutiny.
Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the department.18
In subsequent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that a lack of formal hearing in the administrative level does not violate
procedural due process. In Arnett v. Kennedy (Arnett),19 a case involving the dismissal of a non-probationary federal employee, the US
Supreme Court ruled that a trial-type hearing before an impartial hearing officer was not necessary before the employee could be
removed from office because the hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the actual dismissal is a sufficient
requirement of the Due Process Clause.
In Mathews v. Eldridge (Mathews),20 the U.S. Supreme Court explained that an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of disability
benefits is not indispensable, to wit:
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was
emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence:
The crucial factor in this context x x x is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. x x x
xxxx
All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the "capacities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assessing what process is
due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the
administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of
individuals. This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process for
asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial
review, before the denial of his claim becomes final.21
It is true that in both Arnett and Mathews, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that due process. was not violated due to the lack of a formal
hearing before the employee was dismissed and welfare benefits were cancelled in the respective cases. Nevertheless, in both cases it
was recognized that the aggrieved party had the opportunity for a hearing to settle factual or evidentiary disputes in subsequent
procedures. In our legal system, however, the opportunity for a hearing after the administrative level may not arise as the reception of
evidence or the conduct of hearings are discretionary on the part of the appellate courts.
In our jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact definition.22 It is flexible in that it depends
on the circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. 23
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations,24 the Court eruditely expounded on the concept of due process
in administrative proceedings, to wit:
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82
Law. ed 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80
Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when

17
directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanate from the more fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law ed 965.) "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v.
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15;
Ballston-stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) ... The statute provides that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S.
25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct. 185,
187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565, 569, 68 Law. ed. lola; Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any
matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official
in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such
powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is
such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies coming
before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.25 (emphases supplied)
From the pronouncements of the Court in Ang Tibay, the fluid concept of administrative due process continued to progress. In In Re:
De Borja and Flores,26 the Court ruled that there was no denial of due process when the Public Service Commission cancelled the
certificate of Jose de Borja to operate an ice plant without prior notice or hearing because a hearing was conducted after the
applicant filed a motion for reconsideration. In Manila Trading Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union,27 the Court ruled that due process
was observed even if the report of the investigating officer was not set for hearing before the Court of Industrial Relations because
during the investigation stage, the parties were given the opportunity to cross-examine and present their side to the case. It is
noteworthy that in both cases due process was observed because the parties were given the chance for a hearing where they could
confront the witnesses against them.
In Gas Corporation of the Phils. v. Minister Inciong,28 the Court explained that there is no denial of due process when a party is afforded
the right to cross-examine the witnesses but fails to exercise the same, to wit:
1. The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural due process is inversely
proportional to the merit of this certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite evident from the Comment of the office of the Solicitor
General. It is undoubted that the due process mandate must be satisfied by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it was
announced by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. That is still good law. It follows,
therefore, that if procedural due process were in fact denied, then this petition must prosper. It is equally well-settled, however,
that the standard of due process that must be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long
as the element of fairness is not ignored. So the following recent cases have uniformly held: Maglasang v. Ople, Nation Multi
Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, and Montemayor v. Araneta
University Foundation. From the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General, it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness
can be justified. The opportunity to present its side of the case was given both parties to the controversy. If, for reasons best known
to itself, petitioner did not avail of its right to do so, then it has only itself to blame. No constitutional infirmity could then be imputed
to the proceeding before the labor arbiter.29 (emphasis supplied)
Again, there was no denial of due process in the above-mentioned case because the parties were ultimately given the chance to
confront the witnesses against them. It just so happened that therein petitioner failed to promptly avail of the same.
In Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission (Arboleda),30 the Court expounded that administrative due process does not
necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, to wit:
The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous
cases decided by this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to
propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for
since it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon.31 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, while the Court in Arboleda recognized that the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the due process
guarantee, it did not however regard the formal hearing as a mere superfluity. It continued that it is a procedural right that may be
invoked by the party. It is true that in subsequent cases,32 the Court reiterated that a formal hearing is not obligatory in administrative
proceedings because the due process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to explain their respective sides
through position papers or pleadings. Nonetheless, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable should not be hastily thrown
around by administrative bodies.
A closer perusal of past jurisprudence shows that the Court did not intend to trivialize the conduct of a formal hearing but merely
afforded latitude to administrative bodies especially in cases where a party fails to invoke the right to hearing or is given the
opportunity but opts not to avail of it. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay, the Court explained that administrative bodies are free from

18
a strict application of technical rules of procedure and are given sufficient leeway. In the said case, however, nothing was said that
the freedom included the setting aside of a hearing but merely to allow matters which would ordinarily be incompetent or inadmissible
in the usual judicial proceedings.
In fact, the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for administrative bodies to exhaust all possible means to ensure that the
decision rendered be based on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court reminded that administrative bodies have the
active duty to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. As such, it would be more in keeping with administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the general rule
rather than the exception.
The observance of a formal hearing in administrative tribunal or bodies other than judicial is not novel. In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Company,33 the Court opined that in illegal dismissal cases, a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory when
requested by the employee in writing, or substantial evidentiary disputes exists, or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar
circumstances justify it.
In Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres (Joson),34 the Court ruled that the respondent was denied due process after he was deprived of
the right to a formal investigation with the opportunity to face the witnesses against him, to wit:
The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at
the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would
be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded several rights
under the law, to wit:
xxxx
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position
papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that
administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the
Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and
hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations
of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation
can make the discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal
investigation applies to appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government
officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local officials are
separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the Local Government Code
itself.35 (emphases and underlining supplied)
Thus, administrative bodies should not simply brush aside the conduct of formal hearings and claim that due process was observed by
merely relying on position papers and/or affidavits. Besides, the Court in Joson recognized the inherent limitations of relying on position
papers alone as the veracity of its contents cannot be readily ascertained. Through the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, administrative bodies would be in a better position to ferret out the truth and in turn, render a more accurate decision.
In any case, the PAGC violated Saunar's right to due process because it failed to observe fairness in handling the case against him. Its
unfairness and unreasonableness is readily apparent with its disregard of its own rules of procedure.
The procedure to be observed in cases of clarificatory hearings is set forth under the PAGC rules of procedure. Rule III, Section 3 of its
2002 New Rules of Procedure states:
SECTION 3. Action After Respondent's Response.— If, upon evaluation of the documents submitted by both parties, it should appear
either that the charge or charges have been satisfactorily traversed by the respondent in his Counter-Affidavit/verified Answer, or that
the Counter-Affidavit/verified Answer does not tender a genuine issue, the Commissioner assigned shall forthwith, or after a clarificatory
hearing to ascertain the authenticity and/or significance of the relevant documents, submit for adoption by the Commission the
appropriate recommendation to the President.
The Commissioner assigned may, at his sole discretion, set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses
if he or she believes that there are matters which need to be inquired into personally by him or her. In said hearing, the parties shall
be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If they so desire, they may submit written
questions to the Commissioner assigned who may propound such questions to the parties or witnesses concerned. Thereafter, the
parties be required, to file with the Commission, within an inextendible period of five (5) days and serve on the adverse party his verified
Position Paper. (emphasis and underlining supplied)
On the other hand, the 2008 Rules of Procedure amended the said provision to read as follows:
SECTION 7. Clarificatory Hearings and Position Papers. - After the filing of the Answer, the Commission may, at its discretion, conduct
Clarificatory Hearings, in which case, subpoenas may be issued for the purpose. Should a Clarificatory Hearing be conducted, all
parties relevant to the case shall be notified at least five (5) days before the date thereof. Failure of a party to appear at the hearing is
not necessarily a cause for the dismissal of the complaint. A party who appears may be allowed to present evidence, even in the
absence of the adverse party who was duly notified of the hearing.
During a Clarificatory Hearing, the Commission or the Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall ask clarificatory questions to further
elicit facts or information. The parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present and shall be allowed the assistance of counsel, but
without the right to examine or cross-examine the party/witness being questioned. The parties may be allowed to raise clarificatory
questions and elicit answers from the opposing party/witness, which shall be coursed through the Commission or the Hearing Officer, as
the case may be, for determination of whether or not the proposed questions are necessary and relevant. In such cases, the
Commission or the Hearing Officer, as the case may be, shall ask the question in such manner and phrasing as may be deemed
appropriate. (emphasis and underlining supplied)
xxxx
Under the PAGC rules of procedure, it is crystal clear that the conduct of clarificatory hearings is discretionary. Nevertheless, in the
event that it finds the necessity to conduct one, there are rules to be followed. One, the parties are to be notified of the clarificatory
hearings. Two, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present in the hearings without the right to examine witnesses. They,
however, may ask questions and elicit answers from the opposing party coursed through the PAGC.
To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process requirement before administrative
bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the
parties must be given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be invoked by
the parties to thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the rules itself of the administrative body
provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily result in the deprivation of due process, it should be
acceptable only when the party does not invoke the said right or waives the same.

19
The Court finds that Saunar was not treated fairly in the proceedings before the PAGC. He was deprived of the opportunity to appear
in all clarificatory hearings since he was not notified of the clarificatory hearing attended by an NBI official. Saunar was thus denied the
chance to propound questions through the PAGC against the opposing parties, when the rules of the PAGC itself granted Saunar the
right to be present during clarificatory hearings and the chance to ask questions against the opposing party.
Even assuming that Saunar was not deprived of due process, we still find merit in reversing his dismissal from the government service.
Gross neglect of duty negated
by intent of the government
employee concerned
It is true that the dropping from the rolls as a result of AWOL is not disciplinary in nature and does not result in the forfeiture of benefits or
disqualification from re-employment in the government.36 Nevertheless, being on AWOL may constitute other administrative offenses,
which may result in the dismissal of the erring employees and a forfeiture of retirement benefits.37 In the case at bar, Saunar was
charged with the administrative offense of gross neglect of duty in view of his prolonged absence from work.
The OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because he was on AWOL from
March 2005 to May 2006. He, however, bewails that from the time we was directed to report to the DDROS, he was never assigned a
particular duty or responsibility. As such, Saunar argues that he cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty because there was no "duty"
to speak of. In addition, he assails that he had made himself readily available because he stayed in establishments near the NBI.
Gross Neglect of Duty, as an administrative offense, has been jurisprudentially defined. It refers to negligence characterized by the
glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and
intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected.38
When Saunar was relieved as regional director of Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS, he was obligated to
report to the said office. He, however, was not assigned any specific task or duty and was merely advised to make himself readily
available. Saunar often stayed in establishments near the NBI because he was also not provided a specific station or office. The same,
nonetheless, does not establish that he willfully and intentionally neglected his duties especially since every time he was required to
attend court hearings through special orders issued by the NBI, he would do so. Clearly, Saunar never manifested any intention to
neglect or abandon his duties as an NBI official as he remained compliant with the lawful orders given to him. In addition, when he
received the order reassigning him as the regional director for the NBI Bicol Office, he also obeyed the same. Saunar's continued
compliance with the special orders given to him by his superiors to attend court hearings negate the charge of gross neglect of duty as
it evinces a desire to fulfil the duties and responsibilities specifically assigned to him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, argues that Saunar's attendance at several court hearings pursuant to special
orders does not exculpate him from the charge of gross neglect of duty. As highlighted by the OSG, the certificate of appearances
Saunar presented account only for fourteen (14) days.39
Notwithstanding, Saunar's conduct neither constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In order to be liable for violating the
said provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.40 As discussed above, Saunar's action was not tantamount to inexcusable or gross
negligence considering that there was no intention to abandon his duty as an NBI officer.
Illegally dismissed government
employees entitled to full back
wages and retirement benefits
On 11 August 2014, Saunar reached the compulsory age of retirement from government service.41 In view of Saunar's retirement,
reinstatement to his previous position had become impossible. Thus, the only recourse left is to grant monetary benefits to which
illegally dismissed government employees are entitled.
In Campol v. Balao-as,42 the Court extensively expounded the rationale behind the grant of full back wages to illegally dismissed
employees, to wit:
An employee of the civil service who is invalidly dismissed is entitled to the payment of backwages. While this right is not disputed,
there have been variations in our jurisprudence as to the proper fixing of the amount of backwages that should be awarded in these
cases. We take this opportunity to clarify the doctrine on this matter.
Ginson and Regis also involved the question of the proper fixing of backwages. Both cases awarded backwages but limited it to a
period of five years. Ginson does not provide for an exhaustive explanation for this five-year cap. Regis, on the other hand,
cites Cristobal v. Melchor, Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II, 32 Laganapan v. Asedillo, Antiporda v. Ticao, and San Luis v. Court of
Appeals, in support of its ruling. We note that these cases also do not clearly explain why there must be a cap for the award of
backwages, with the exception of Cristobal. In Cristobal, a 1977 case, we held that the award of backwages should be for a fixed
period of five years, applying by analogy the then prevailing doctrine in labor law involving employees who suffered unfair labor
practice. We highlight that this rule has been rendered obsolete by virtue of Republic Act No. 6175 which amended the Labor Code.
Under the Labor Code, employees illegally dismissed are entitled to the payment of backwages from the time his or her compensation
was withheld up to the time of his or her actual reinstatement.
In 2005, our jurisprudence on backwages for illegally dismissed employees of the civil service veered away from the ruling in Cristobal.
Thus, in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, we categorically declared—
An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from
the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having
been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of
her reinstatement.
We repeated this ruling in the 2005 case Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, in the 2007 case Romagos v. Metro Cebu Water District,
and in the 2010 case Civil Service Commission v. Magnaye, Jr.
Thus, the Decision, in refusing to award backwages from Campol's dismissal until his actual reinstatement, must be reversed. There is no
legal nor jurisprudential basis for this ruling. An employee of the civil service who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment
of his or her backwages during the entire period of time that he or she was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his or her
position and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never truly left the
office. Fixing the backwages to five years or to the period of time until the employee found a new employment is not a full recompense
for the damage done by the illegal dismissal of an employee. Worse, it effectively punishes an employee for being dismissed without his
or her fault. In cases like this, the twin award of reinstatement and payment of full backwages are dictated by the constitutional
mandate to protect civil service employees' right to security of tenure. Anything less than this falls short of the justice due to
government employees unfairly removed from office. This is the prevailing doctrine and should be applied in Campol's case.
This entitlement to full backwages also means that there is no need to deduct Campol's earnings from his employment with PAO from
the award. The right to receive full backwages means exactly this — that it corresponds to Campol's salary at the time of his dismissal

20
until his reinstatement. Any income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted from this amount. This
is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to find employment elsewhere during the
pendency of the case. At the same time, an employer who illegally dismisses an employee has the obligation to pay him or her what
he or she should have received had the illegal act not be done. It is an employer's price or penalty for illegally dismissing an employee.
xxxx
We rule that employees in the civil service should be accorded this same right. It is only by imposing this rule that we will be able to
uphold the constitutional right to security of tenure with full force and effect. Through this, those who possess the power to dismiss
employees in the civil service will be reminded to be more circumspect in exercising their authority as a breach of an employee's right
to security of tenure will lead to the full application of law and jurisprudence to ensure that the employee is reinstated and paid
complete backwages. (emphasis supplied)
As it stands, Saunar should have been entitled to full back wages from the time he was illegally dismissed until his reinstatement. In view
of his retirement, however, reinstatement is no longer feasible. As such, the back wages should be computed from the time of his illegal
dismissal up to his compulsory retirement.43 In addition, Saunar is entitled to receive the retirement benefits he should have received if
he were not illegally dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 20 October 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100157 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Carlos R. Saunar is entitled to full back wages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his retirement and to receive
his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

DIGESTED- NONE

G.R. No. 173590 December 9, 2013

PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated April 4, 2006 July 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88891 which reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated November 23, 20044 and January 6, 20055 of petitioner Philippine
Postal Corporation (PPC), through its then Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dario C. Rama (PG Rama), finding
that the latter gravely abused its discretion when it revived the administrative charges against respondent Crisanto G. De Guzman (De
Guzman) despite their previous dismissal.
The Facts
Sometime in 1988, De Guzman, then a Postal Inspector at the Postal Services Office,6 was investigated by Regional Postal Inspector
Atty. Raul Q. Buensalida (Atty. Buensalida) in view of an anonymous complaint charging him of dishonesty and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.7 As a result thereof, Atty. Buensalid are commended8 that De Guzman be formally
charged with twelve (12) counts of the same offenses and eventually be relieved from his post to protect the employees and witnesses
from harassment.
Since the Postal Services Office was then a line-agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication(DOTC), Atty.
Buensalida’s investigation report was forwarded to the said department’s Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES) for
further evaluation and approval. Contrary to the findings of Atty. Buensalida, however, the ISLES, through a Memorandum9dated
February 26, 1990prepared by Director Antonio V. Reyes (Dir. Reyes), recommended that De Guzman be exonerated from the charges
against him due to lack of merit. The said recommendation was later approved by DOTC Assistant Secretary Tagumpay R. Jardiniano
(Asec. Jardiniano) in a Memorandum10 dated May 15, 1990.
On February 6, 1992, Republic Act No. (RA)7354,11 otherwise known as the ― ”Postal Service Act of 1992,” was passed. Pursuant to this
law, the Postal Services Office under the DOTC was abolished, and all its powers, duties, and rights were transferred to the
PPC.12 Likewise, officials and employees of the Postal Services Office were absorbed by the PPC.13
Subsequently, or on July 16, 1993, De Guzman, who had by then become Chief Postal Service Officer, was formally charged14 by the
PPC, through Postmaster General Eduardo P. Pilapil(PG Pilapil), for the same acts of ―dishonesty, gross violation of regulations, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and the Anti-graft law, committed as follows”:
Investigation disclosed that while you were designated as Acting District Postal Inspector with assignment at South Cotabato District,
Postal Region XI, Davao City, you personally made unauthorized deductions and/or cuttings from the ten (10%) percent salary
differential for the months of January-March, 1988,when you paid each of the employees of the post office at Surallah, South
Cotabato, on the last week of April 1988, and you intentionally failed to give to Postmaster Juanito D. Dimaup, of the said post office
his differential amounting to ₱453.91, Philippine currency; that you demanded and required Letter Carrier Benjamin Salero, of the
aforestated post office to give fifty (₱50.00) pesos out of the aforesaid differential; that you personally demanded, take away and
encashed the salary differential check No. 008695317 in the total amount of ₱1,585.67, Philippine currency, of Postmaster Benjamin C.
Charlon, of the post office at Lake Cebu, South Cotabato, for your own personal gain and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the
said postmaster; that you personally demanded, required and received from Postmaster Peniculita B. Ledesma, of the post office of
Sto. Niño, South Cotabato, the amount of ₱300.00, ₱200.00 and ₱100.00 for hazard pay, COLA differential and contribution to the affair
"Araw ng Kartero and Christmas Party," respectively; that you personally demanded and required Letter Carrier Feliciano Bayubay, of
the post office at General Santos City to give money in the amount of ₱1,000.00, Philippine Currency, as a condition precedent for his
employment in this Corporation, and you again demanded and personally received from the said letter carrier the amount of ₱300.00
Philippine currency, as gift to the employees of the Civil Service Commission, Davao City to facilitate the release of Bayubay’s
appointment; that you demanded and forced Postmaster Felipe Collamar, Jr.,of the post office at Maitum, South Cotabato to
contribute and/or produce one (1) whole Bariles fish for shesami (sic), and you also required and received from the aforesaid
postmaster the amount of ₱500.00 Philippine currency; that you demanded and required Postmaster Diosdado B. Delfin to give
imported wine and/or ₱700.00, Philippine currency, for gift to the outgoing Regional Director Escalada; and that you failed to liquidate
and return the substantial amount of excess contributionson April, 1987, June, 1987 and December, 1987,for Postal Convention at MSU,
arrival of Postmaster General Banayo and Araw ng Kartero and Christmas Party, respectively, for your own personal gain and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of all the employees assigned at the aforementioned district.
In a Decision15dated August 15, 1994, De Guzman was found guilty as charged and was dismissed from the service. Pertinently, its
dispositive reads that ―”[i]n the interest of the service, it is directed that this decision be implemented immediately.” 16
It appears, however, that the a fore-stated decision was not implemented until five (5) years later when Regional Director Mama S.
Lalanto (Dir. Lalanto) issued a Memorandum17 dated August 17, 1999 for this purpose. De Guzman lost no time in filing a motion for
reconsideration,18 claiming that: (a) the decision sought to be implemented was recalled on August 29, 1994 by PG Pilapil himself; and

21
(b)since the decision had been dormant for more than five (5)years, it may not be revived without filing another formal charge. The
motion was, however, denied in a Resolution19 dated May 14, 2003, pointing out that De Guzman failed to produce a copy of the
alleged recall order even if he had been directed to do so.
Undaunted, De Guzman filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was resolved20 on June 2, 2003 in his favor in that: (a) the
Resolution dated May 14, 2003 denying De Guzman’s first motion for Reconsideration was recalled; and (b) a formal hearing of the
case was ordered to be conducted as soon as possible. After due hearing, the PPC, through PG Rama, issued a Resolution21 dated
November 23, 2004, finding De Guzman guilty of the charges against him and consequently dismissing him from the service. It was
emphasized therein that when De Guzman was formally charged on July 16, 1993, the complainant was the PPC, which had its own
charter and was no longer under the DOTC. Thus, the ISLES Memorandum dated February 26, 1990 prepared by Dir. Reyes which
endorsed the exoneration of De Guzman and the dismissal of the complaints against him was merely recommendatory. As such, the
filing of the formal charge on July 16, 1993 was an obvious rejection of said recommendation.22
De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration was denied initially in a Resolution23 dated January 6, 2005, but the motion was, at the same
time, considered as an appeal to the PPC Board of Directors (Board).24 The Board, however, required PG Rama to rule on the motion.
Thus, in a Resolution25 dated May 10, 2005, PG Rama pointed out that, being the third motion for reconsideration filed by De Guzman,
the same was in gross violation of the rules of procedure recognized by the PPC, as well as of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
which both allowed only one (1) such motion to be entertained.26 It was further held that res judicata was unavailing as the decision
exonerating De Guzman was ―”only a ruling after a fact-finding investigation.” Hence, the same could not be considered as a
dismissal on the merits but rather, a dismissal made by an investigative body which was not clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial
power.27
Meanwhile, before the issuance of the Resolution dated May 10, 2005, De Guzman elevated his case on March 12, 200528 to the CA via
a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus,29 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88891, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in that: (a) the case against him was a mere rehash of the previous complaint already dismissed by the
DOTC, and therefore, a clear violation of the rule on res judicata; (b) the assailed PPC Resolutions did not consider the evidences
submitted by De Guzman; (c) the uncorroborated, unsubstantiated and contradictory statements contained in the affidavits
presented became the bases of the assailed Resolutions; (d) the Resolution dated November 23, 2004 affirmed a non-existent decision;
(e) Atty. Buensalida was not a credible witness and his testimony bore no probative value; and(f) the motion for reconsideration filed
by De Guzman of the Resolution dated November 23, 2004 is not the third motion for reconsideration filed by him.
On June 10, 2005, De Guzman appealed30 the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 before the PPC Board, which resolution was allegedly
received by De Guzman on May 26, 2005. Almost a year later, the Board issued a Resolution 31 dated May 25, 2006,denying the appeal
and affirming with finality the Decision dated August 15, 1994 and the Resolution dated May 14, 2003. The motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed by De Guzman was likewise denied in aResolution32 dated June 29, 2006. On April 4, 2006, the CA rendered a
Decision33 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88891, reversing the PPC Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005, respectively. It held
that the revival of the case against De Guzman constituted grave abuse of discretion considering the clear and unequivocal content
of the Memorandum dated May 15, 1990 duly signed by Asec. Jardiniano that the complaint against De Guzman was already
dismissed.
Aggrieved, PPC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution34 dated July 19, 2006, hence, the instant
petition.
Meanwhile, on July 26, 2006, De Guzman filed an appeal of the PPC Board’s Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and June 29, 2006 with
the CSC35 which was, however, dismissedin Resolution No. 08081536 dated May 6, 2008. The CSC equally denied De Guzman’s motion
for reconsideration there from in Resolution No. 09007737 dated January 14, 2009.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues for the Court’s resolution are whether: (a) De Guzman unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him; (b) De Guzman engaged inforum-shopping; and (c) the investigation conducted by the DOTC, through the ISLES,
bars the filing of the subsequent charges by PPC.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an
administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of
the petitioner.38 PPC claims that De Guzman failed to subscribe to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies since he opted to
file a premature certiorari case before the CA instead of filing an appeal with the PPC Board, or of an appeal to the CSC, which are
adequate remedies under the law.39
The Court agrees with PPC’s submission.
Under Section 21(d) of RA7354, the removal by the Postmaster General of PPC officials and employees below the rank of Assistant
Postmaster General may be appealed to the Board of the PPC, viz.:
Sec.21.Powers and Functions of the Postmaster General. — as the Chief Executive Officer, the Postmaster General shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
(d) to appoint, promote, assign, reassign, transfer and remove personnel below the ranks of Assistant Postmaster General: Provided,
That in the case of removal of officials and employees, the same may be appealed to the Board;
xxxx
This remedy of appeal to the Board is reiterated in Section 2(a), Rule II of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the PPC, which
providesfurther that the decision of the Board is, in turn, appeal able to the CSC, viz.:
Section2. DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION. – (a) The Board of Directors shall decide upon appeal the decision of the Postmaster General
removing officials and employees from the service. (R.A. 7354, Sec. 21 (d)). The decision of the Board of Directors is appeal able to the
Civil Service Commission. It is well-established that the CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and, as such, is the sole
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.40 The PPC, created under RA7354, is a government-owned and controlled
corporation with an original charter. Thus, being an employee of the PPC, De Guzman should have, after availing of the remedy of
appeal before the PPC Board, sought further recourse before the CSC. Records, however, disclose that while De Guzman filed on June
10, 2005 a notice of appeal41 to the PPC Board and subsequently appealed the latter’s ruling to the CSC on July 26, 2006, the sewere
all after he challenged the PPC Resolution dated November 23, 2004 (wherein he was adjudged guilty of the charges against him and
consequently dismissed from the service) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA(docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88891).

22
That the subject of De Guzman’s appeal to the Board was not the Resolution dated November 23, 2004 but the Resolution dated May
10, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first - mentioned resolution is of no moment. In Alma Jose v. Javellana,42 the
Court ruled that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal
from the final order or judgment itself.43 Thus, finding no cogent explanation on DeGuzman’s endor any justifiable reason for his
premature resort to a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, the Court holds that he failed to adhere to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies which should have warranted the dismissal of said petition.
B. Forum-shopping.
PPC further submits that De Guzman violated the rule on forum-shopping since he still appealed the order of his dismissal before the
PPC Board, notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the CA identically contesting the same. 44
The Court also concurs with PPC on this point.
Aside from violating the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, De Guzman was also guilty of forum-shopping by pursuing two
(2) separate remedies –petition for certiorari and appeal –that have long been held to be mutually exclusive, and not alternative or
cumulative remedies.45 Evidently, the ultimate reliefsought by said remedies whichDe Guzmanfiled only within a few months from each
other46 is one and the same – the setting aside of the resolution dismissing him from the service. As illumined in the case of Sps. Zosa v.
Judge Estrella,47 where in several precedents have been cited on the subject matter:48
The petitions are denied. The present controversy is on all fours with Young v. Sy, in which we ruled that the successive filing of a notice
of appeal and a petition for certiorari both to assail the trial court’s dismissal order for non-suit constitutes forum shopping. Thus,
Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least suchparties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount
to res judicata.
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the
petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
and which eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of lit is pendentia are present
between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the same facts and
refer to the same subject matter – the RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases,
the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for,
are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial
policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags
significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not
been speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of
multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner couches it, becomes a ―precautionary measure” for the rest, thereby
increasing the chances of a favorable decision. This is the very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right.
In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is
the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage
of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid
the resultant confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the
dismissal of the case.
Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari and the petition for review (G.R. No. 157745) filed with this Court must be
denied for lack of merit.
We also made the same ruling in Candido v. Camacho, when the respondent therein assailed identical court orders through both an
appeal and a petition for an extraordinary writ.
Here, petitioners questioned the June 26, 2000 Order, the August 21, 2000 Clarificatory Order, and the November 23, 2000 Omnibus
Order of the RTC via ordinary appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 69892) and through a petition for certiorari(CA-G.R. SP No. 62915) in different
divisions of the same court. The actions were filed with a month’s interval from each one. Certainly, petitioners were seeking to obtain
the same relief in two different divisions with the end in view of endorsing which ever proceeding would yield favorable consequences.
Thus, following settled jurisprudence, both the appeal and the certiorari petitions should be dismissed.(Emphases supplied; citations
omitted)
Similar thereto, the very evil that the prohibition on forum-shopping was seeking to prevent – conflicting decisions rendered by two (2)
different tribunals–resulted from De Guzman’s abuse of the processes. Since De Guzman’s appeal before the PPC Board was denied in
its Resolutions49dated May 25, 2006 and June 29, 2006, De Guzmans ought the review of said resolutions before the CSC where he
raised yet again the defense of res judicata. Nonetheless, the CSC, in its Resolution No. 08081550 dated May 6, 2008, affirmed De
Guzman’s dismissal, affirming "the Resolutions of the PPC Board of Directors dismissing De Guzman from the service for Dishonesty, Gross
Violation of Regulations, and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service." 51
De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was similarly denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 09007752
dated January 14, 2009. On the other hand, the petition for certiorari, which contained De Guzman’s prayer for the reversal of
Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005 dismissing him from the service, was granted by the CA much earlier on April
4, 2006. It should be pointed out that De Guzman was bound by his certification53 with the CA that if he ―should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency,” he ―undertake[s]to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to [the]Honorable Court.”54 Nothing, however, appears on
record that De Guzman had informed the CA of his subsequent filing of a notice of appeal before the PPC from the Resolution dated
May 10, 2005. By failing to do so, De Guzman committed a violation of his certification against forum-shopping with the CA, which has
been held to be a ground for dismissal of an action distinct from forum-shopping itself.55
Moreover, De Guzman’s contention56 that the filing of the notice of appeal from the said Resolution was only "taken as a matter of
precaution"57 cannot extricate him from the effects of forum-shopping. He was fully aware when he filed CA-G.R. SP No. 88891 that PG
Ramahad forwarded the records of the case to the PPC Board for purposes of appeal.58 Yet, he decided to bypass the administrative
machinery. And this was not the first time he did so. In his Comment to the instant petition, De Guzman claimed 59 that in response to
the Memorandum60 dated August 17, 1999 issued by Dir. Lalanto implementing his dismissal from service, he not only filed a motion for
reconsideration but he likewise challenged the actions of the PPC before the Regional Trial Court of Manila through a petition for
mandamus docketed as Case No. 99-95442. Even when CA-G.R. SP No. 88891 was decided in De Guzman’s favor on April 4, 2006, and
PPC’s motion for reconsideration was denied on July 19, 2006, De Guzman nonetheless filed on July 26, 2006 an appeal before the CSC
from the denial by the PPC Board of his Notice of Appeal dated June 7, 2005 as pointed out in CSC Resolution No. 090077.61 While De

23
Guzman did inform the CSC that he previously filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, he failed to disclose the fact that the CA had
already rendered a decision thereon resolving the issue of res judicata,62 which was the very same issue before the CSC.
Verily, unscrupulous party litigants who, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, repeatedly try their luck in several
different for a until a favorable result is reached63 cannot be allowed to profit from their wrongdoing. The Court emphasizes strict
adherence to the rules against forum-shopping, and this case is no exception. Based on the foregoing, the CA should have then
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by De Guzman not only for being violative of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
but also due to forum-shopping.
In addition, it may not be amiss to state that De Guzman’s petition for certiorari was equally dismissible since one of the requirements
for the availment thereof is precisely that there should be no appeal. It is well-settled that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification
of the judgment on the merits is to appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the tribunal rendering the
judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision.64 In fact, under Section 30, Rule III (C) of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the
PPC, among the grounds for appeal to the PPC Board from an order or decision of dismissal are: (a) grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Postmaster General; and (b) errors in the finding of facts or conclusions of law which, if not corrected, would cause grave
and irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. Clearly, therefore, with the remedy of appeal to the PPC Board and thereafter to
the CSC available to De Guzman, certiorari to the CA should not have been permitted.
In this relation, it bears noting that PPC has sufficiently addressed De Guzman’s argument that an appeal would not be a speedy and
adequate remedy considering that the resolution dismissing him from service was to be "implemented immediately." 65
To elucidate, on February 24, 2005, before De Guzman filed the petition for certiorari dated March 12, 2005, the PPC Board had passed
Board Resolution66 No. 2005-14 adopting a "Corporate Policy that henceforth the decision of the Postmaster General in administrative
cases when the penalty is removal or dismissal, the same shall not be final and executory pending appeal to the Office of the Board of
Directors." Shortly thereafter, or on March 8, 2005, PG Rama issued Philpost Administrative Order 67 No. 05-05 pursuant to the
aforementioned Board Resolution, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
1. Decisions of the Postmaster General in administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal/dismissal from the
service shall not be final and executory pending appeal to the Office of the PPC Board of Directors x x x
2. Decisions of the Postmaster General in administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal/dismissal from the
service shall be executory pending appeal to the Civil Service Commission;
3. Respondents who have pending appealed administrative cases to the PPC Board of Directors are entitled to report back to
office and receive their respective salary and benefits beginning at the time they reported back to work. No back wages
shall be allowed by virtue of the PPC Board Resolution No. 2005-14;
4. Following the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, back wages can only be recovered in case the respondent is exonerated
of the administrative charges on appeal; and
5. PPC Board Resolution No. 2005-14 took effect on 24 February 2005. x x x
PPC further claimed that instead of reporting for work while his motion for reconsideration and, subsequently, his appeal were pending,
"[De Guzman] voluntarily elected to absent himself." Much later, however, De Guzman "finally reported back [to]work and thereby
received his salary and benefits in full for the covered period."68 De Guzman failed to sufficiently rebut these claims, except to say that
he was never given any copy of the aforementioned board resolution and administrative order.69 Therefore, considering that his
dismissal was not to be executed by PPC immediately (if he had appealed the same), De Guzman’s contention that an appeal would
not be a speedy and adequate remedysimilarly deserves no merit.
C. Res judicata.
De Guzman likewise failed to convince the Court of the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata for having been charged of the
same set of acts for which he had been exculpated by the ISLES of the DOTC whose recommendation for the dismissal of the
complaint against De Guzman was subsequently approved by then DOTC Asec. Jardiniano.
The Court agrees with PPC’s argument that there was no formal charge filed by the DOTC against De Guzman and, as such, the
dismissal of the complaint against him by Asec. Jardiniano, upon the recommendation of the ISLES, did not amount to a dismissal on
the merits that would bar the filing of another case.
While the CA correctly pointed out that it was the DOTC, through its Department Head, that had disciplinary jurisdiction over
employees of the then Bureau of Posts, including De Guzman, it however proceeded upon the presumption that De Guzman had
been formally charged. But he was not.
Pertinent is Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which reads as follows:
Section 16. Formal Charge. – After a finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining authority shall formally charge the person
complained of. The formal charge shall contain a specification of charge(s), a brief statement of material or relevant facts,
accompanied by certified true copies of the documentary evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of witnesses, a
directive to answer the charge(s) in writing under oath in not less than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the
respondent to indicate in his answer whether or not he elects a formal investigation of the charge(s), and a notice that he is entitled to
be assisted by a counsel of his choice. (Emphasis supplied)
The requisite finding of a prima facie case before the disciplining authority shall formally charge the person complained of is reiterated
in Section 9, Rule III (B) of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the PPC, to wit:
Section 9. FORMAL CHARGE. – When the Postmaster General finds the existence of a prima facie case, the respondent shall be formally
charged. He shall be furnished copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted by the complainant, unless
he had already received the same during the preliminary investigation. The respondent shall be given at least seventy-two (72) hours
from receipt of said formal charge to submit his answer under oath, together with the affidavits of his witnesses and other evidences,
and a statement indicating whether or not he elects a formal investigation. He shall also be informed of his right to the assistance of a
counsel of his choice. If the respondent already submitted his comment and counter-affidavits during the preliminary investigation, he
shall be given the opportunity to submit additional evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The investigation conducted by the ISLES, which "provides, performs, and coordinates security, intelligence, fact-finding, and
investigatory functions for the Secretary, the Department, and Department-wide official undertakings,"70 was intended precisely for the
purpose of determining whether or not a prima facie case against De Guzman existed. Due to insufficiency of evidence, however, no
formal charge was filed against De Guzman and the complaint against him was dismissed by Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject
matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.71
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is rendered after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.72

24
In this case, there was no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the above-stated definition.1âwphi1 The dismissal of the
complaint against De Guzman in the Memorandum73 dated May 15, 1990 of Asec. Jardiniano was a result of a fact-finding
investigation only for purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists and a formal charge for administrative offenses should
be filed. This being the case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined therein with finality. In fact, the CA, conceding that
the ISLES was "a mere fact-finding body," pointed out that the Memorandum74 dated February 26, 1990 issued by Dir. Reyes
recommending the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman "did not make any adjudication regarding the rights of the parties." 75
Hence, for the reasons above-discussed, the Court holds that PPC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it revived the case against
De Guzman despite the previous dismissal thereof by Asec. Jardiniano. Since said dismissal was not a judgment on the merits, the
doctrine of res judicata does not apply.
In fine, due to the errors of the CA as herein detailed, the Court hereby grants the present petition and accordingly reverses and sets
aside the farmer's dispositions. The Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005 of the PPC ordering De Guzman's
dismissal from the service are thus reinstated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 4, 2006 and the Resolution dated July 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88891 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005 of petitioner
Philippine Postal Corporation are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTED
CASE DIGEST: PHILPOST V. CA
G.R. No. 173590 : December 9, 2013

PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN,Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

De Guzman was charged for dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest as Postal Inspector at the Postal Services
Office and eventually was relieved from his post

Since the Postal Services Office was then a line-agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), the charge
against De Guzman was forwarded to the Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES). However, the ISLES, through a
Memorandum, Director Reyes recommended that De Guzman be exonerated from the charges against him due to lack of merit. The
said recommendation was later approved by DOTC Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.

RA 7354 orthe Postal Service Act of 1992, was passed. Pursuant thereto, the Postal Services Office under the DOTC was abolished, and
all its powers, duties, and rights were transferred to the PPC.Likewise, officials and employees of the Postal Services Office were
absorbed by the PPC.

Subsequently, De Guzman, who had by then become Chief Postal Service Officer, was formally charged and later on found guilty
byPPC, for the same acts of dishonesty, gross violation of regulations, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and the Anti-graft law thereby dismissing him from service.

He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. A second MR was filed which was resolved in his favour although he was found
guilty of the charges, since the complainant was the PPC, which had its own charter and was no longer under the DOTC. Thus, the
ISLES Memorandum which endorsed his exoneration and dismissal of the complaints against him was merely recommendatory. As
such, the filing of the formal charge was an obvious rejection of said recommendation.

De Guzmans motion for reconsideration was denied initially but the motion was, at the same time, considered as an appeal to the PPC
Board of Directors. Thus, in a Resolution dated May 10, 2005, PG Rama pointed out that, being the third MR filed by De Guzman, the
same was in gross violation of the rules of procedure recognized by the PPC, as well as of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which
both allowed only one (1) such motion to be entertained.It was further held thatres judicatawas unavailing as the decision exonerating
De Guzman was ―only a ruling after a fact-finding investigation. Hence, the same could not be considered as a dismissal on the merits
but rather, a dismissal made by an investigative body which was not clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial power.

Meanwhile, before the issuance of the Resolution dated May 10, 2005, De Guzman elevated his case on March 12, 2005 to the CA via
a special civil action forcertiorariandmandamus.

OnJune 10, 2005, De Guzman appealedthe Resolution dated May 10, 2005 before the PPC Board. Almost a year later, the Board issued
a Resolution denying the appeal and affirming with finality his dismissal from service. The motion for reconsideration subsequently filed
was likewise denied.

OnApril 4, 2006, the CA reversed the PPC Resolutions. It held that the revival of the case against De Guzman constituted grave abuse
of discretion considering the clear and unequivocal content of the Memorandum duly signed by Asec. Jardiniano that the complaint
against De Guzman was already dismissed.

Aggrieved, PPC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied hence, the instant petition.

Meanwhile, on July 26, 2006, De Guzman filed an appeal of the PPC Boards Resolutions with the CSCwhich was, however, dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether De Guzman unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him;

Whether De Guzman engaged in forum-shopping; and

25
Whether the investigation conducted by the DOTC, through the ISLES, bars the filing of the subsequent charges by PPC.

HELD: The Petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW - Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

PPC claims that De Guzman failed to subscribe to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies since he opted to file a premature
certiorari case before the CA instead of filing an appeal with the PPC Board, or of an appeal to the CSC, which are adequate
remedies under the law.

This remedy of appeal to the Board is reiterated in Section 2(a), Rule II of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the PPC, that the
decision of the Board of Directors in removing officials and employees from service is appealable to the Civil Service Commission. It is
well-established that the CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and, as such, is the sole arbiter of controversies relating
to the civil service. Olanda v. Bugayong, 491 Phil. 626, 632 (2003),

The PPC, created under RA 7354, is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. Thus, being an
employee of the PPC, De Guzman should have, after availing of the remedy of appeal before the PPC Board, sought further recourse
before the CSC.

An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order
or judgment itself.Thus, finding no cogent explanation on De Guzmans end or any justifiable reason for his premature resort to a petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, the Court holds that he failed to adhere to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies which should have warranted the dismissal of said petition. Alma Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012.

REMEDIAL LAW - Forum-shopping

Aside from violating the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, De Guzman was also guilty of forum-shopping by pursuing two
(2) separate remedies petition forcertiorariand appeal that have long been held to be mutually exclusive, and not alternative or
cumulative remedies. Young v. Sy, 534 Phil. 246, (2006).

It should be pointed out that De Guzman was bound by his certification with the CA that if he ―should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the Honorable Court. Nothing, however, appears on record that De
Guzman had informed the CA of his subsequent filing of a notice of appeal before the PPC from the Resolution dated May 10, 2005. By
failing to do so, De Guzman committed a violation of his certification against forum-shopping with the CA, which has been held to be
a ground for dismissal of an action distinct from forum-shopping itself.

While De Guzman did inform the CSC that he previously filed a petition forcertiorariwith the CA, hefailed to disclose the fact that the
CA had already rendered a decision thereon resolving the issue ofres judicata,which was the very same issue before the CSC.

The Court emphasizes strict adherence to the rules against forum-shopping, and this case is no exception. Based on the foregoing, the
CA should have then dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by De Guzman not only for being violative of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies but also due to forum-shopping.

REMEDIAL LAW - Res judicata

The investigation conducted by the ISLES, which "provides, performs, and coordinates security, intelligence, fact-finding, and
investigatory functions for the Secretary, the Department, and Department-wide official undertakings,"was intended precisely for the
purpose of determining whether or not aprima faciecase against De Guzman existed. Due to insufficiency of evidence, however, no
formal charge was filed against De Guzman and the complaint against him was dismissed by Asst. Secretary Jardiniano.

In order thatres judicatamay bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject
matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or when the judgment is rendered after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.Encinas v.
Agustin, Jr., G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013.

In this case, there was no judgment on the merits, the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman in the Memorandum of Asec.
Jardiniano wasa result of a fact-finding investigation only for purposes of determining whether aprima faciecase exists and a formal
charge for administrative offenses should be filed. This being the case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined therein
with finality.

Hence, the Court holds that PPC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it revived the case against De Guzman despite the previous
dismissal thereof by Asec. Jardiniano. Since said dismissal was not a judgment on the merits, the doctrine ofres judicatadoes not apply.

In fine, due to the errors of the CA as herein detailed, the Court hereby grants the present petition and accordingly reverses and sets
aside the farmer's dispositions. The Resolutions dated November 23, 2004 and January 6, 2005 of the PPC ordering De Guzman's
dismissal from the service are thus reinstated.

The petition is granted.

26
G.R. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986
FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees.
Jose Batiquin for petitioner-appellant.
Fausto F. Tugade for private respondent-appellee.

CRUZ, J.:
Stripped of irrelevant details and impertinent incidents that have cluttered the voluminous record, the facts of this case may be briefly
narrated as follows:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18,
1983. 1 The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final
action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending
administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that
will adversely affect the approval of the appointment." 2 On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not
have to be decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the
Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked."3 The
private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. 4 The petitioner, invoking his earlier
permanent appointment, is now before us to question that order and the private respondent's title.
The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
The Solicitor General, rather than face the question squarely, says the petitioner could be validly replaced in the instant case because
his appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or without cause. Having accepted such an
appointment, it is argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and consequently ran the risk of an abrupt separation from his
office without violation of the Constitution.5
While the principle is correct, and we have applied it many times,6 it is not correctly applied in this case. The argument begs the
question. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The
appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service
Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly
described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. 7 What was temporary was
the approval of the appointment, not the appointment it sell And what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made
to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case:
It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official vested by law
with the appointing power and not the Civil Service Commission. The Commissioner of Civil Service is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the
appointee is qualified, as in this case, the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not authorized to curtail
the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind of the appointment to be extended. 8
Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to
which he has been named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a
check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.9
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval of another officer or body, like the
Commission on Appointments under 1935 Constitution. 10 Appointments made by the President of the Philippines had to be confirmed
by that body and could not be issued or were invalidated without such confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments was then considered part of the appointing process, which was held complete only after such confirmation. 11
Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the wisdom of the appointment and had the power to refuse to concur with
it even if the President's choice possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. No similar arrangement is provided for in the Civil
Service Decree. On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether
or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says
the Commission has the power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the Commission shag have
inter alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to positions in the civil service, except those
presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards,
and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications. (emphasis supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the Commission is actually
allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If
he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the
Commission when it acts on--or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities.
Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the
position in controversy. 12 That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon
except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply
because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

27
In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner, the Commission was probably applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil Service
Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are two or more employees who are next-in-rank,
preference shall be given to the employee who is most competent and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service eligibility."
This rule is inapplicable, however, because neither of the claimants is next in rank. Moreover, the next-in-rank rule is not absolute as the
Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement, re-employment, or appointment of
outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility. 13
There are apparently no political overtones in this case, which looks to be an honest contention between two public functionaries who
each sincerely claims to be entitled to the position in dispute. This is gratifying for politics should never be permitted to interfere in the
apolitical organization of the Civil Service, which is supposed to serve all the people regardless of partisan considerations. This political
detachment will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in the Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service
are revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Commission on Civil Service dated March 22, 1984, is set aside, and the petitioner is
hereby declared to be entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment thereto dated February 18, 1983. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTED
Luego v. CSC
August 5, 1986
FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees.
Cruz, J.:

NATURE: Exact nature not stated. Action to question an order of the CSC in an appointment protest

FACTS
 Feb. 18, 1983 - Felimon LUEGO was appointed Administrative Officer II for the Office of the Mayor, Cebu City by then-Mayor
Florentino Solon.
o The appointment was described as PERMANENT.
o But the CSC approved it as TEMPORARY because of a protest filed by Felicula TUOZO and another employee
against Luego’s appointment.
 Mar. 22, 1984 – CSC found that Tuozo was better qualified for the Administrative Officer II position. Luego’s appointment was
revoked.
 June 28, 1984 – Then-Mayor Ronald Duterte appointed Tuozo to the position.
 Luego filed the present petition to assail the CSC order revoking his appointment.

ISSUE (HELD): W/N the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified
than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? (NO)

RATIO
LUEGO’S APPOINTMENT WAS PERMANENT IN NATURE
 OSG: Luego’s appointment was temporary and could thus be withdrawn at will. By accepting temporary appointment,
Luego should be deemed to have waived his security of tenure.
 SC: While the OSG correctly stated the rule on temporary appointments, the rule has no application here since Luego’s
appointment is PERMANENT.
 The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly
described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Luego’s appointment paper (CS Form 33).
 What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself. And what made the approval
temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the
qualifications of the appointee to the position.
CSC NOT EMPOWERED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF AN APPOINTMENT
 The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind of nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
 When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
 The approval is more appropriately called an attestation of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which
he has been named. Such attestation is required merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service laws. (In re
Arcega)
 The power of the CSC to “approve” and “disapprove” appointments under Art. V, §9(h) of the old Civil Service Decree only
pertains to the function of the CSC to check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or
the required qualifications.
 If the appointee has the qualifications, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by
law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment
made by the proper authorities. In this respect the provision is rather misleading.
 “Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.”
o EXCEPTION: When the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval of another office or body,
e.g., the Commission on Appointments. In such cases, the appointment is completed only after confirmation or
approval from the approving entity.
o The CoA can even review the wisdom of the appointment and can refuse to concur even of the appointee has all
the requisite qualifications under the law.
o The CSC has no such power under the Civil Service Decree. Its authority is limited to a non-discretionary one, i.e., to
determine if the appointee meets all the conditions required by the law.
 CAB: By admitting that Luego and Tuozo were both qualified for the Administrative Officer II position, the CSC has rendered
itself functus officio. It had nothing else to do but affirm the validity of Luego’s appointment. CSC had no authority to revoke

28
 Luego’s appointment simply because it thinks Tuozo is more qualified. That would constitute encroachment of the discretion
vested in the City Mayor.
 Rule V, Section 91, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies is inapplicable because neither Luego nor Tuozo
is next-in-rank. Moreover, the rule is not absolute and the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be filled by transfer of
present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.
 The political detachment of the civil service will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in the
 Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the civil service are revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and
even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.

DISPOSITION: Granted. Assailed CSC Order set aside.

29
 4TH SET OF CASES

1
EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND
DIGNA MATALANG COCHING, Respondent.

5
EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, Petitioner, v. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents.

7
Evangelista v. JarencioNovember 27, 1975Martin,

12
G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.

16
CARLOS R. SAUNAR, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA AND
CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN, CHAIRPERSON OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, Respondents.

21
G.R. No. 173590 December 9, 2013
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

27
G.R. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986
FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees.

30