PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION had abandoned the children.
The respondent judge resolved the omnibus
AIDA P. BAÑEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ
G.R. No. 132592
January 23, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20,
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation
between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of
the latter’s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations
and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent’s one-
half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children.
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court.
Petitioner however contends that an action for legal separation is among the
cases where multiple appeals may be taken. She concludes that respondent’s
appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal
within the reglementary period.
Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal
separation cases.
Ruling:
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may
allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action,
and the subject matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between
the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of
the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues
involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship
between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal
separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by
the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation.
Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may not be
subject to multiple appeals.
LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-9667
July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal
separation on the ground of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition
to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for
herself and said children, and the return of her passport. The husband opposed
the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that the wife
petition granting custody of the children to the wife and a monthly allowance of
P2,300.00 for support for her and her children.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisband’s request
that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition
contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: “ART. 103. An
action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition.”
Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed
Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103
(Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each
other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another,
and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for
dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out
legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as
the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support
pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law
expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts,
rank in justice may be caused.
Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim
of adultery by the husband in the face of express allegations under oath to that
effect, supported by circumstantial evidence consisting of letter the authenticity
of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the children are in the custody
of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is
precisely alleged in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned
the conjugal abode? Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed
that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendente lite may
be lawfully exercised.
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given
effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the
cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like
the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and
convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the
court may determine which is best for their custody.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.
G.R. No. L-34132
July 29, 1972
Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge
against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the
respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She
likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive
property, then under the administration and management of respondent
Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion based
on Article 103 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, petitioner received an order of
respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the
hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is
the order complained of in this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of
an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the
petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a
suit.
Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the
holding of this Court that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the
hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-
month period.The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is
to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded
from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower
court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction
is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by
the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself are
discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the
filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live
separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband
shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court
deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case
the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall
not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance
with the orders of the court."There would appear to be then recognition that the
question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved
even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for
the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby
eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for
the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this
response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she
accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile
continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994
Facts:
In Concepcion Alanis’ complaint, she averred that she was married to
Pacete on 30 April 1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only
on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast
property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles;
that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and
Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies.
The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file their
answers, which was granted by the judge. However, defendants still failed to file
their respective answers. Thus, Alanis asked that defendants be declared in
default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter, Alanis submitted all
evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper
Ruling:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.In case of non-appearance of
the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether
or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which
the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties themselves.
It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be
allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the
proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. Article 103 of
the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties
a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting
the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further
underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. — If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
 The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of
marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in
the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the
exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.
G.R. No. L-53880
March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete
and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her
and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint
that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita
de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979.
Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension
within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file
an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court
received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff
on March 17,1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring
petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which
decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void
the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case
of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take
care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.” The above stated
provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article
88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to
provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take
steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above
substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or
not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.”
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS
GAVIOLA-SABALONES
G.R. No. 106169
February 14, 1994
Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries
during his successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his
wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of
some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as
ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to
sell a building and lot located at #17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was
sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his
share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his
hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent
opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject
properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the
part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed
on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation
and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her
husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin
the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park
property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. The
petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint
administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive
relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated. In
support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code.
Issue:
 Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the respondent
wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
Ruling:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the
parties and finds that the petition has no merit. We agree with the respondent
court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of
conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the
evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with
his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the
conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the
Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition
for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a
written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a
third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been
made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying
the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying
him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the
Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary
injunction now under challenge.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
PELAYO vs. LAURON
G.R. No. 129295
August 15, 2001
Facts:
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a
complaint against Marelo Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October
13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called to render medical assistance to
the defendant’s daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth. After the
consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be
difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of
operating on the subject and also removed the afterbirth. The operation went on
until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed the
defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which
defendants refused to pay. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the
defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a special defense, that their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that when she
was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house
without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave
birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and
due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be
absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Issue:
Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?
Ruling:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created
by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by
those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from
law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws,
etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal
force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with
their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in
case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which the
spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every
obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and
spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question
but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical
assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he
or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party
bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all expenses, including
the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the face of the
above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the
daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, was the husband of the
patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114791
May 29, 1997
Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for
the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about
their wedding video but Nancy Go said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to
return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but
only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video
because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages.
Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the
spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages.
In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because
as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their
wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected
to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months;
that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
Ruling:
 Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong
made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after their
honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad
and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for
any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the
fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion.
Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein
recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be
cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever,
the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation
for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that
the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as
allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that
Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid.
Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this
case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with
the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded
in favor of the Ongs
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO
G.R. No. 17014
August 29, 1921
Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived
in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July
4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to
live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the
basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a
decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in
favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also
other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a
permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
Issues:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal
home
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights
or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction
Ruling:
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty
done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted
with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No
sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution in enforcing the
duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes
the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair
must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from
the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile. “When
people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become
good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties
which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the
province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may
be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland
have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration
that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty
to return. She is also not entitled to support.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER
G.R. No. 139789
May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six
children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse
when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo
City for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother
overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health
deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship
over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced age,
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending
a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition
for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that
respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to
compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person there
from if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint
of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal
or moral. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to
live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263
November 2, 1916
Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7,
1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose
Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They
established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they
had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these
refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by
word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a
complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
state a cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal
domicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation,
the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the
parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights,
duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering
its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law
provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law
will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the
defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano married Rosario Adriano, herein respondent, on November 15,
1955. The two begot 2 sons, 3 daughters, and adopted one child. Their marriage
failed. Thus, the two lived separately. A year later, Atty. Adriano found a new
love life, one of his former clients, named Fe Valino, herein petitioner, where they
live together as common law partners. Despite such situation, Atty. Adriano
continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children.
The husband died due to acute emphysema, a lung disease. At the time of
husband’s death, the first wife and children were having their Christmas
vacation in the US. Due to this, the common law wife, Valino, facilitated the
funeral of Atty. Adriano. The legal wife requested the common law wife to delay
the internment for them to pay their last respect to his dead husband.
However,her request was not heeded. They buried Adriano at the mausoleum of
the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to
attend the interment.
The legal family, having been deprived of the last chance to view the remains of
Atty. Adriano, filed a suit against the common law wife. In their claim that the
deceased did not wished to be buried in Manila Memorial Park.
In her defense, the common law wife countered that she and the deceased were
living together for more than 20 years, and claims that she has the better right
to make decisions concerning the burial of Atty. Adriano.
RTC dismissed respondents (legal wife) petition. On the ground that it would not
serve any useful purpose and so he (Atty. Adriano) should be spared and
respected.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the
remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents.
Hence, the common law wife appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
RULING:
Under the law, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements is the surviving
legal wife.
Article 30 provides:
“The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall
be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case
of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. ”
Art. 199. Also provides that whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
“No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without
the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.”

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall
devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay
the necessary expenses.

The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United
States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in
effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and
duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered
as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was
still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than
not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his
Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time
in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so
they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as
they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19,
1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately
contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request,
but to no avail