PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS y Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
CORDOVA, accused-appellant
 well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his
G.R. No. 102207.      September 2, 1994 criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of.

FACTS: Urbano v. IAC

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due
to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the
death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused
claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Castillo,   civil   liability   is
extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his   conviction   extinguish
his civil liability.
RULING:
The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the
Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused
occurred before the final   judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that   civil   liability   is
extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be
no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident
that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the
same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.
In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states
that civil liability will only survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of
Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused
while his   conviction   is on appeal. The Court also   gave   a summary on which cases
should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found
the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano
went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and
Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel
ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the
back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano
paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to
the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be
caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following
day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of
the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON urbano can be held criminally and civilly liable?
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death
HELD:
Copy from the case

1
 ABERCA v. VER
FACTS
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses,
employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant
of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and tortures. A
motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas   corpus   was suspended;
2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no
cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted
plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge
Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only
modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said
complaint.
ISSUES
them from responsibility.

2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming
damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking
judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release
from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause
of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.

3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights
stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the
superior officers are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible.
It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who directly and indirectly participated
in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint
Nicasio vs Bohol
https://pdfslide.net/documents/case-digest-bernaldes-vs-bohol-land-transpo.html
Dyogi vs Yatco
https://www.scribd.com/document/326908721/Dyogi-vs-Yatco-100-Phil-1095

YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND SALVADO vs. CA et al

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the G.R. No. 91856
constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable? October 5, 1990

HELD
GANCAYCO, J.:
1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the
constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The
rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders FACTS: a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente
of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult
therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official duties”. Article 32 speaks of any Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.
public officer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional rights does not exempt

2
Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries
in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. Later on, a complaint for
damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult
Philippines and Larry Salvado in the RTC of Manila.
In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiff for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills, attorney’s
fees and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they
nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the CA challenging the jurisdiction of the trial
court over said civil case.
Petitioners’ thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal
negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed
unless reservation thereof is expressly made.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by
petitioners was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there
was no reservation to file a separate civil action?
HELD: the petition is DENIED. The questioned decisions of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED
YES
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party:
1. waives the civil action
2. reserves his right to institute it separately, or
3. institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxx
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
xx
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the
promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural
may apply retrospectively to the present case.
In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to
institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation
of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the
criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no
damages was awarded.
3
The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi
delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented
evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed
thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the
prosecution presents its evidence.
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering
damages twice for the same act or omission.
Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil
action brought before it.
NOTES:
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (complete)
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial. (1a)
People vs consing other doc
4
Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan, petitioners, vs. Hon. Rumoldo R. Fernandez,
Hon. Celso V. Espinosa, And Sps. Felixberto Tigol, Jr. And Rosita Taghoy Tigol, respondents
Facts: This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge
Romuldo Fernandez of RTC, Branch 54 of Lapu-Lapu City denying petitioners motion for
suspension of arraignment and  motion for reconsideration in a criminal case filed against
them. Petitioners anchor their claim on a prior case regarding ownership. Petitioners allege that
the civil case filed in 1990 seeking declaration for nullity of land title of the owner which had
been filed three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed
against them constitutes a prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether the question of ownership is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of
the criminal case against petitioners.
Ruling:   Petition to suspend Criminal Case No. 012489 based on the prejudicial question
presented was granted on basis that;
• the prejudicial question is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
• elements of prejudicial question - (1) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
• the criminal case alleges that petitioners squatted without the knowledge and consent
of the owner, which, in 1994 the civil case rendered the nullity of the title of the owner
and declared both petitioners and respondents as co-owners of the land.
• respondents argue that owners can be ejected from his property only if for some
reason, that is, he has let it to some other person. However, both case of respondents
and petitioners are based on ownership.
Te v. Choa, G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000 (346 SCRA 327
FACTS: In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. Although they did not live
together, they would usually see each other. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to their daughter.
Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage while still
married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative case for
the revocation of his and his mistress’ engineering license. Te filed a petition for nullity of
marriage. RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even the petition for annulment was
pending.
ISSUE: W/N the annulment should be resolved first before the criminal and administrative
case be decided upon.
HELD: NO. Outcome The annulment case had no bearing on Te’s guilt in the bigamy case.
The ground cited by Te for the annulment was for voidable marriage. Hence, he was still
validly married when he committed bigamy.
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL 
G.R. No. 172060,  [September 13, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for parricide.
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
5
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide,
the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before
the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the   Court of Appeals. However, The   Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of
the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,
which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v.   Court of Appeals   that “the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the   celebration   of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses
is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity
of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court
ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court
declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws
are concerned.”
6
Ardiente vs. Javier, et al
[Civil Law: human relations; principle of abuse of rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code]
Every person must, in the exercise of his right, and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Art. 19. New
Ciivil Code of the Philippines)
Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan de Oro
Water District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr., Respondents
G.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013
Facts:  A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then decision of
the RTC regarding its judgment sums of money for moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. The decision being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of
Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested by Ardiente. In this case,
Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to Pastorfide,
however, the connection of water supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of
Ardiente which  was never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became delinquent in
paying the water bill.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with Cagayan De Oro Water district
to cut off the water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already conveyed
ownership of property to Pastorfide.
Ruling:               No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned
provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply
disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such
intention. The principle of abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code
provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. 
G.R. NO. 179799               September 11, 2009
Zenaida R. Gregorio, Petitioner  vs
Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc., and Emma J. Datuin, Respondents.
Facts: August 18, 2000 , Zenaida Gregorio filed a civil suit before the RTC Branch 12, Ligao,
Albay against Sansio Philippines and Emma Datuin for filing against her criminal charges for
violation of BP Blg. 22; that respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true
identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as payment for the
various appliances purchased; and that petitioner never gave the opportunity to controvert the
charges against her, because respondents stated an incorrect address in the criminal complaint.
Gregorio was arrested, detained and released only after her husband posted a bond. In the
course of investigation Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance and subsequently the
criminal case was dismissed.  March 20, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision in the civil case
directing Sansio and Datuin jointly and solidarily to pay Gregorio damages. The RTC
expressly stated that the complaint was one for damages based on quasi-delict and not on
malicious prosecution. Aggrieved by the Decision, Sansio and Datuin appealed to the CA.
 On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered Decision granting the petition and ordering the
dismissal of the damage suit of Gregorio. The latter moved to reconsider the said decision but
the same was denied in the appellate court’s Resolution dated September 12, 2007. It was then
Gregorio filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of court assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not  the civil suit filed by petitioner is based on quasi-delict or malicious
prosecution and can claim damages?
 
Ruling: Yes. The petition is granted. The decision dated January 31, 2007 and the Resolution
dated September 12, 2007 are reversed and set aside.  Gregorio’s civil complaint is a complaint
based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 , Gregorio’s right to personal
dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin.
Gregorio was acting within her right when she instituted against Sansio and Datuin an action
she perceived to be proper.
7
CBK VS CIR
In a case arising from a claim of tax credit certificates by petitioner power company due to a
BIR approval of zero-rated VAT sales to NPC, the Supreme Court affirmed the zero-rated VAT
sales, but denied the petition for failure to observe the 30-day prescription of the judicial claim
filed to the CTA. More so, the principle of solutio indebiti is inapplicable when there is a
binding and legal obligation to pay, as it were between petitioner taxpayer and the CIR
• Petitioner operated, maintained, and managed Kalayaan II pumped-storage
hydroelectric power plant, the new Caliraya Spillway, Caliraya, Botocan; and the
Kalayaan I hydroelectric power plants and their related facilities located in the
Province of Laguna.
• On December 29, 2004, petitioner filed an Application for VAT Zero-Rate with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), in accordance with Section 108 (B) (3) of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended.
• BIR approved the application. Thus, petitioner’s sale of electricity to the NPC from 1
January 2005 to 31 October 2005 was declared to be entitled to the benefit of
effectively zero-rated value added tax (VAT).
• Petitioner filed its administrative claims for the issuance of tax credit certificates for its
alleged unutilized input taxes on its purchase of capital goods and alleged unutilized
input taxes on its local purchases and/or importation of goods and services, other than
capital goods, pursuant to Section 112 (A) and (B) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,
with BIR Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 55 of Laguna, which covered the first 3
quarters of 2005.
• Petitioner alleged that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) did not act on the
claim, hence the petition for review with the CTA on April 18, 2007.
Whether solutio indebiti applies?
Whether solutio indebiti applies?
• No.
• There is solutio indebiti when: (1) Payment is made when there exists no
binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person
whor eceived the payment; and (2) Payment is made through mistake and not
through liberality or some other cause.
• Though the principle of solutio indebiti may be applicable to some instances
of claims for a refund, the elements thereof are wanting in this case. First,
there exists a binding relation between petitioner and the CIR, the former
being a taxpayer obligated to pay for that liability. Second, the payment of
input tax was not made through mistake, since petitioner was legally obligated
to pay for that liability.
G.R. No. 195549               September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:
Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for damages for
unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware Products
Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts
similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged that it is a duly
registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal
products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its
registration in 1992,   Jesichris Manufacturing Company   has been manufacturing in its
Caloocan plant and   distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive
parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture
and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of the
Jesichris Manufacturing Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical
proximity of petitioner’s office to respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that some of the
respondent’s employees had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with
respondent’s products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-
made automotive parts and to the same customers.
Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the
manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing,
shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of
the same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from respondent’s idea of using
plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all
of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs
8
and public policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits
in the amount of 2,000,000 as of the date of respondent’s complaint.
Issue:  Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
1. Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
2. Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and
attorney’s fees?
3. Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been
established?
Held:
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or
any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per
se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods which may deprive others of a fair
chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair
competition and not competition where the means use dare fair and legitimate.
FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel
(Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery
which resulted to the death of their unborn child.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.
RULING:

Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.

*insert requisites here The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code. who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss
arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but
vs.
 died subsequently.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION- The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
 has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that
G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009 the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

9
 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
“people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese
arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar
Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return
in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the
interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property
without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of
their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be
impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section
1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power”
although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs.
14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which
include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the
people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President
can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),  inevitable
to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
10
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The
supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She
has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events
and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current
problem can only be answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s
the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its
safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give
in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state
interests.
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii.
Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their
travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return
to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the
President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so
“within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines? 
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The
president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and
intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become
serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to
the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Oropesa vs Oropesa
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered by the
CA affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings which dismissed Nilo Oropesa’s,
peitioner,  petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent, Cirilo
Oropesa.
11
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.
In said petition, petitioner alleged that respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and
has been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and
memory were impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization. That due to his age
and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has
become easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly his girlfriend,
Ms. Luisa Agamata.
Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever caring and
loving) son.
During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his sister, and
respondent’s former nurse’s testimony.
After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written formal offer of
evidence.
Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not formally offered; To
expunge the documents of the petitioner from records; and to grant leave to the Oppositor to
file Demurrer to Evid. A subsequent Demurrer was filed and was granted.
MR was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA; failed, now to the SC.
Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be placed
under guardianship?
Decision: No.The only medical document on record is the Report of Neuropsychological
Screening. Said report, was ambivalent at best, although had negative findings regarding
memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained finding that supported the view that
respondent on the average was indeed competent.
Crewlink v.Teringtering, G.R. No. 166803, October 14, 2012
FACTS: Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering, and in
behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against Crewlink for the payment of death benefits,
benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages, and attorney’s fees. Editha alleged that her
husband entered into an overseas employment contract with Crewlink, had medical
examinations and was declared fit to work. On April 9, 2001, Jacinto died due to drowning.
Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by Crewlink. She claimed that the fact
Jacinto died during the term of his contract and while still on board is enough for her to claim
for compensation. She asserted that the death was not deliberate and of his own will but as a
result of mental disorder. Crewlink, on the other hand, claimed that Jacinto jumped off the ship
twice. He was just saved the 1st time. Hence, it is a clear manifestation that it was Jacinto’s will
to jump off the 2nd time.
ISSUE: W/N Jacinto was insane.
HELD: No evidence showed respondent’s claim. Depression does not equate to mental
disorder.
De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned
by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.  Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of
age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his
haircut in the said barber shop.  He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
12
relationship.   As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17,  “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the
1931.  status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status”.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.  On February
1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court  in refusing to provide damages to
name to be given to the child.  Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing
to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake.   The defendant ask his in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring
friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.  Finally, SC found no necessity to
Manila.  modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount
of P50 pesos per month.  They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.
Manila where they lived together for about a year.  When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR
LAZO, respondents.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of No. L-16439.         July 20, 1961
the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar
Syquia Jr. that was first planned. Facts:

ISSUES: 
Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her husband before
their marriage. Geluz performed an abortion on Nita Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage,
1.  Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to
she again became pregnant and since she was employed in the Commission on Elections, the
Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
pregnancy was inconvenient and she had herself aborted again by Geluz. In less than two
years, she again became pregnant and had her two-month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum
2.  Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
of fifty pesos. Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was aware and did not
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the award of damages. The trial court
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said
and Court of Appeals predicated the award of damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for
Ismael Loanco.
moral damages.
HELD:
Issue:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other
letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia.  The mere Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the physician
requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.    who caused the same.

Held:

13
The petition is meritorious.

The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that
is   not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Since
an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an
unborn child. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations.
In this case, however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his wife, clearly
indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and expectations.

The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.

14
People vs Tirol and Baldesco Article 1317 provides that no one may contract in the name of another without being

authorized or unless he has, by law, a right to represent him. Article 1919 furthers that the

death of the principal terminates the agency.

FACTS:


An SPA was executed by sisters Concepcion and Gerundia in favor of their brother Simeon for

the sale of a parcel of land co-owned by the two. Months after Conception died, Simeon sold The case at bar is also not among the exceptions whereby an agent’s acts bind the principal

the undivided shares of his sisters to herein respondent Felix Go Chan & Realty Corp. even after the latter’s death because of Simeon’s knowledge of Concepion’s death is material.

Petitioner Ramon Rallos, administrator of the late Concepcion’s estate, prayed that the sale of Hence, the sale was null and void.

the undivided share of the deceased be invalidated and a new certificate be issued in the name

of respondent corporation and Concepion’s intestate estate, plus damages. CFI ruled in favor People v. Tirol (Civil Damages)

of  petitioner and granted the payers but CA reversed the decision. Respondent’s MR was Facts: Kosain Manibpol and his family were sleeping when he heard the dog bark. When we
further denied. went to investigate, 2 persons have already come up to their house, asking if they can borrow
his land. After he gave his consent, Kulas arrived, flashed the light in his face and boxed him.
When he fell, the assailant’s companions (more than 10 armed men) came in hacked him and
his wife and 7 children. His wife died, 6 kids. Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended,
ISSUE:
 Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found guilty of the crime of murder of
Whether the sale entered into by an agent is valid although executed after death of the 7 persons, they filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died.

principal. Issue: Whether or not Baldesco will be liable for civil damages

Held: The courts dismissed the case insofar as the criminal liability of Baldesco is concerned.
However following the doctrine in People vs. Sendaydiego, the appeal will be resolved only
HELD:
 for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate is liable. Art 42 states that criminal liability is extinguished in death. The
No, the sale is void because Simeon’s authority as an agent of Concepcion was extinguished
effect of death upon rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract
upon her death. and by will. Civil liability is not extngsh’d. (NOTE: PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS — abandoned
the ruling in People vs sendaydiego)

15