Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social
Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions
and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim
that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is limited to
businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff, the
Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections,
requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request, however, was denied by the
Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of
section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.

Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall be
compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been
for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that
the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall
have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for
membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for
membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six employees x x x." The term
employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who
carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses
the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations
owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person
who performs services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used
and who receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment", according to
paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly
enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government,
domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.

1
From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is
predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature
and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.

Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should — following the principle
of ejusdem generis — be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the
element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any
kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking." The
contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It
is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and
defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of
the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable
institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning. This is made
more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not
included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities
organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the
Government and yet make an express exception of it.

It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the
employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of
said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law,
however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957.
This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions
within the scope of the law.

In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment for
profit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its
brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question of
whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the said discussions
dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the
plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact that the
majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are
established primarily for profit or gain.

Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, following the
rule laid down in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29,
1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and gain. The
cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involved expressly limits its
application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .

Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republic of
the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act No.
1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection
to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional
provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living
conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the extent of its provisions to
relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.
2
There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of the
Social Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds for
the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds contributed
to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the members which are
merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the
character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disability benefits would not constitute
a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest
not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.

Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairs appellant's
right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to make monthly
contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to
appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together with the contributions
imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for the protection of said
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional
mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the Social
Security Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26298 September 28, 1984

CMS ESTATE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondents.

Sison Dominguez & Cervantes for petitioner.

The Legal Counsel for respondent SSS.

CUEVAS, J.:

This appeal by the CMS Estate, Inc. from the decision rendered by the Social Security Commission in
its Case No. 12, entitled "CMS Estate, Inc. vs. Social Security System, declaring CMS subject to
compulsory coverage as of September 1, 1957 and "directing the Social Security System to effect
such coverage of the petitioner's employees in its logging and real estate business conformably to the
provision of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended was certified to Us by the defunct Court of
Appeals 1 for further disposition considering that purely questions of law are involved.

3
Petitioner is a domestic corporation organized primarily for the purpose of engaging in the real estate
business. On December 1, 1952, it started doing business with only six (6) employees. It's Articles of
Incorporation was amended on June 4, 1956 in order to engage in the logging business. The
Securities and Exchange Commission issued the certificate of filing of said amended articles on June
18, 1956. Petitioner likewise obtained an ordinary license from the Bureau of Forestry to operate a
forest concession of 13,000 hectares situated in the municipality of Baganga, Province of Davao.

On January 28, 1957, petitioner entered into a contract of management with one Eufracio D. Rojas for
the operation and exploitation of the forest concession The logging operation actually started on April
1, 1957 with four monthly salaried employees. As of September 1, 1957, petitioner had 89 employees
and laborers in the logging operation. On December 26, 1957, petitioner revoked its contract of
management with Mr. Rojas.

On August 1, 1958, petitioner became a member of the Social Security System with respect to its real
estate business. On September 6, 1958, petitioner remitted to the System the sum of P203.13
representing the initial premium on the monthly salaries of the employees in its logging business.
However, on October 9, 1958, petitioner demanded the refund of the said amount, claiming that it is
not yet subject to compulsory coverage with respect to its logging business. The request was denied
by respondent System on the ground that the logging business was a mere expansion of petitioner's
activities and for purposes of the Social Security Act, petitioner should be considered a member of
the System since December 1, 1952 when it commenced its real estate business.

On November 10, 1958, petitioner filed a petition with the Social Security Commission praying for the
determination of the effectivity date of the compulsory coverage of petitioner's logging business.

After both parties have submitted their respective memoranda, the Commission issued on January
14, 1960, Resolution No. 91, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Premises considered, the instant petition is hereby denied and petitioner is hereby
adjudged to be subject to compulsory coverage as of Sept. 1, 1957 and the Social
Security System is hereby directed to effect such coverage of petitioner's employees in
its logging and real estate business conformably to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1161,
as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 609 of the Commission.

These two (2) resolutions are now the subject of petitioner's appeal. Petitioner submits that
respondent Commission erred in holding —

(1) that the contributions required of employers and employees under our Social
Security Act of 1954 are not in the nature of excise taxes because the said Act was
allegedly enacted by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State, not of its
taxing power;

(2) that no contractee — independent contractor relationship existed between petitioner

and Eufracio D. Rojas during the time that he was operating its forest concession at
Baganga, Davao;

4
 (3) that a corporation which has been in operation for more than two years in one
business is immediately covered with respect to any new and independent business it
may subsequently engage in;

(4) that a corporation should be treated as a single employing unit for purposes of
coverage under the Social Security Act, irrespective of its separate, unrelated and
independent business established and operated at different places and on different
dates; and

(5) that Section 9 of the Social Security Act on the question of compulsory membership
and employers should be given a liberal interpretation.

Respondent, on the other hand, advances the following propositions, inter alia:

(1) that the Social Security Act speaks of compulsory coverage of employers and not of
business;

(2) that once an employer is initially covered under the Social Security Act, any other
business undertaken or established by the same employer is likewise subject in spite of
the fact that the latter has not been in operation for at least two years;

(3) that petitioner's logging business while actually of a different, distinct, separate and
independent nature from its real estate business should be considered as an operation
under the same management;

(4) that the amendment of petitioner's articles of incorporation, so as to enable it to

engage in the logging business did not alter the juridical personality of petitioner; and

(5) the petitioner's logging operation is a mere expansion of its business activities.

The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government "to develop, establish
gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people
throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old
age and death" (Sec. 2, RA 1161, as amended). It is thus clear that said enactment implements the
general welfare mandate of the Constitution and constitutes a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the State. As held in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., et al. vs. SSS 3 —

Membership in the SSS is not a result of bilateral, concensual agreement where the
rights and obligations of the parties are defined by and subject to their will, RA 1161
requires compulsory coverage of employees and employers under the System. It is
actually a legal imposition on said employers and employees, designed to provide social
security to the workingmen. Membership in the SSS is therefore, in compliance with the
lawful exercise of the police power of the State, to which the principle of non-impairment
of the obligation of contract is not a proper defense.

xxx xxx xxx

The taxing power of the State is exercised for the purpose of raising revenues. However, under our
Social Security Law, the emphasis is more on the promotion of the general welfare. The Act is not
part of out Internal Revenue Code nor are the contributions and premiums therein dealt with and
5
provided for, collectible by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The funds contributed to the System
belong to the members who will receive benefits, as a matter of right, whenever the hazards provided
by the law occur.

All that is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for
covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary to appellant's
contention, are not 'in the nature of taxes on employment.' Together with the
contributions imposed upon employees and the Government, they are intended for the
protection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and
death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people.4

Because of the broad social purpose of the Social Security Act, all doubts in construing the Act
should favor coverage rather than exemption.

Prior to its amendment, Sec. 9 of the Act provides that before an employer could be compelled to
become a member of the System, he must have been in operation for at least two years and has at
the time of admission at least six employees. It should be pointed out that it is the employer, either
natural, or judicial person, who is subject to compulsory coverage and not the business. If the
intention of the legislature was to consider every venture of the employer as the basis of a separate
coverage, an express provision to that effect could have been made. Unfortunately, however, none of
that sort appeared provided for in the said law.

Should each business venture of the employer be considered as the basis of the coverage, an
employer with more than one line of business but with less than six employees in each, would never
be covered although he has in his employ a total of more than six employees which is sufficient to
bring him within the ambit of compulsory coverage. This would frustrate rather than foster the policy
of the Act. The legislative intent must be respected. In the absence of an express provision for a
separate coverage for each kind of business, the reasonable interpretation is that once an employer
is covered in a particular kind of business, he should be automatically covered with respect to any
new name. Any interpretation which would defeat rather than promote the ends for which the Social
Security Act was enacted should be eschewed. 5

Petitioner contends that the Commission cannot indiscriminately combine for purposes of coverage
two distinct and separate businesses when one has not yet been in operation for more than two years
thus rendering nugatory the period for more than two years thus rendering nugatory the period of
stabilization fixed by the Act. This contention lacks merit since the amendatory law, RA 2658, which
was approved on June 18, 1960, eliminated the two-year stabilization period as employers now
become automatically covered immediately upon the start of the business.

Section 10 (formerly Sec. 9) of RA 1161, as amended by RA 2658 now provides:

Sec. 10. Effective date of coverage. — Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take
effect on the first day of his operation, and that of the employee on the date of his
employment. (Emphasis supplied)

As We have previously mentioned, it is the intention of the law to cover as many persons as possible
so as to promote the constitutional objective of social justice. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails
over a prior statute and moreover the legislative in tent must be given effect. 6

6
Petitioner further submits that Eufrancio Rojas is an independent contractor who engages in an
independent business of his own consisting of the operation of the timber concession of the former.
Rojas was appointed as operations manager of the logging consession; 7 he has no power to appoint
or hire employees; as the term implies, he only manages the employees and it is petitioner who
furnishes him the necessary equipment for use in the logging business; and he is not free from the
control and direction of his employer in matter connected with the performance of his work. These
factors clearly indicate that Rojas is not an independent contractor but merely an employee of
petitioner; and should be entitled to the compulsory coverage of the Act.

The records indubitably show that petitioner started its real estate business on December 1, 1952
while its logging operation was actually commenced on April 1, 1957. Applying the provision of Sec.
10 of the Act, petitioner is subject to compulsory coverage as of December 1, 1952 with respect to the
real estate business and as of April 1, 1957 with respect to its logging operation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21642 July 30, 1966

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
CANDELARIA D. DAVAC, ET AL., respondents;
LOURDES Tuplano, respondent-appellant.

J. Ma. Francisco and N. G. Bravo for respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and E. T. Duran for
petitioner-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal from the resolution of the Social Security Commission declaring respondent
Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits payable for the death of
Petronilo Davac.

The facts of the case as found by the Social Security Commission, briefly are: The late Petronilo
Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. became a member of the Social Security
System (SSS for short) on September 1, 1957. As such member, he was assigned SS I.D. No. 08-
007137. In SSS form E-1 (Member's Record) which he accomplished and filed with the SSS on
November 21, 1957, he designated respondent Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his
relationship to her as that of "wife". He died on April 5, 1959 and, thereupon, each of the respondents

7
(Candelaria Davac and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS. It appears
from their respective claims and the documents submitted in support thereof, that the deceased
contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant Lourdes Tuplano on August 29, 1946, who bore him
a child, Romeo Davac, and the second, with Candelaria Davac on January 18, 1949, with whom he
had a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac. Due to their conflicting claims, the processing thereof was
held in abeyance, whereupon the SSS filed this petition praying that respondents be required to
interpose and litigate between themselves their conflicting claims over the death benefits in
question.1äwphï1.ñët

On February 25, 1963, the Social Security Commission issued the resolution referred to above, Not
satisfied with the said resolution, respondent Lourdes Tuplano brought to us the present appeal.

The only question to be determined herein is whether or not the Social Security Commission acted
correctly in declaring respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death
benefits in question.

Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, in force at the time
Petronilo Davac's death on April 5, 1959, provides:

1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or total and permanent disability under such
conditions as the Commission may define, before becoming eligible for retirement and if either
such death or disability is not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he or, in
case of his death, his beneficiaries, as recorded by his employer shall be entitled to the
following benefit: ... . (emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer is the one entitled to
the death benefits. In the case of Tecson vs. Social Security System, (L-15798, December 28, 1961),
this Court, construing said Section 13, said:

It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under the Social Security System is protection
of the employee as well as of his family, but this purpose or intention of the law cannot be
enforced to the extent of contradicting the very provisions of said law as contained in Section
13, thereof, ... . When the provision of a law are clear and explicit, the courts can do nothing
but apply its clear and explicit provisions (Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil, 270; Caminetti vs. U.S.,
242 U.S. 470, 61 L. ed. 442).

But appellant contends that the designation herein made in the person of the second and, therefore,
bigamous wife is null and void, because (1) it contravenes the provisions of the Civil Code, and (2) it
deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her own and her child's
legitime in the inheritance.

As to the first point, appellant argues that a beneficiary under the Social Security System partakes of
the nature of a beneficiary in life insurance policy and, therefore, the same qualifications and
disqualifications should be applied.

Article 2012 of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot
be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make any donation
to him according to said article.
8
And Article 739 of the same Code prescribes:

ART. 739. The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;

xxx xxx xxx

Without deciding whether the naming of a beneficiary of the benefits accruing from membership in the
Social Security System is a donation, or that it creates a situation analogous to the relation of an
insured and the beneficiary under a life insurance policy, it is enough, for the purpose of the instant
case, to state that the disqualification mentioned in Article 739 is not applicable to herein appellee
Candelaria Davac because she was not guilty of concubinage, there being no proof that she had
knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo. 1

Regarding the second point raised by appellant, the benefits accruing from membership in the Social
Security System do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered member.
They are disbursed from a public special fund created by Congress in pursuance to the declared
policy of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which ...
shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." 2

The sources of this special fund are the covered employee's contribution (equal to 2-½ per cent of the
employee's monthly compensation);3 the employer's contribution (equivalent to 3-½ per cent of the
monthly compensation of the covered employee); 4 and the Government contribution which consists in
yearly appropriation of public funds to assure the maintenance of an adequate working balance of the
funds of the System. 5 Additionally, Section 21 of the Social Security Act, as amended by Republic Act
1792, provides:

SEC. 21. Government Guarantee. — The benefits prescribed in this Act shall not be
diminished and to guarantee said benefits the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
accepts general responsibility for the solvency of the System.

From the foregoing provisions, it appears that the benefit receivable under the Act is in the nature of a
special privilege or an arrangement secured by the law, pursuant to the policy of the State to provide
social security to the workingmen. The amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered as
property earned by the member during his lifetime. His contribution to the fund, it may be noted,
constitutes only an insignificant portion thereof. Then, the benefits are specifically declared not
transferable,6 and exempted from tax legal processes, and lien. 7Furthermore, in the settlement of
claims thereunder the procedure to be observed is governed not by the general provisions of law, but
by rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission. Thus, if the money is payable to the estate
of a deceased member, it is the Commission, not the probate or regular court that determines the
person or persons to whom it is payable. 8 that the benefits under the Social Security Act are not
intended by the lawmaking body to form part of the estate of the covered members may be gathered
from the subsequent amendment made to Section 15 thereof, as follows:

SEC. 15. Non-transferability of benefit. — The system shall pay the benefits provided for in this
Act to such persons as may be entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Such benefits are not transferable, and no power of attorney or other document executed by
those entitled thereto in favor of any agent, attorney, or any other individual for the collection
9
 thereof in their behalf shall be recognized except when they are physically and legally unable
to collect personally such benefits: Provided, however, That in the case of death benefits, if no
beneficiary has been designated or the designation there of is void, said benefits shall be paid
to the legal heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. (Rep. Act 2658, amending Rep.
Act 1161.)

In short, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is not so in this case),
it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they are the
designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only when there is no designated beneficiaries or when the
designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable. And we have already held that the
Social Security Act is not a law of succession.9

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the resolution of the Social Security Commission
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 119891 August 21, 1995

BEN STA. RITA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review an Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals ("CA") in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 34384 which ordered the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 92, Quezon City, to reinstate
Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 filed against petitioner Ben Sta. Rita.

Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with violating Section 2(a) in relation to Sections 22(d)
and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. The
Information alleged that petitioner, "as President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc. a
compulsorily (sic) covered employer under the Social Security Law, as amended, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse and still fails, neglects and refuses to remit to the

10
Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for its
covered employees."1

Petitioner Sta. Rita moved to dismiss said criminal case on the following grounds:

1. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and;

2
2. That the RTC has no jurisdiction over this case.

The RTC sustained petitioner's motion and dismissed the criminal case filed against him. It ruled that
the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the Department of Labor and Employment
("DOLE") and the Social Security System ("SSS") extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical
Care and Employment Compensation laws to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and
void as it was entered into by the Administrator of the SSS without the sanction of the Commission
and approval of the President of the Philippines, in contravention of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as
amended.3

The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus assailing the order of dismissal issued by the trial court. Respondent
appellate court granted the petition and ordered the Presiding Judge of the trial court to reinstate the
criminal case against petitioner. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 17 April 1995.

Thereafter, petitioner filed in this Court a motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. The Court granted the
motion and gave petitioner until 9 June 1995 to file the petition with warning that no further extension
will be given. Despite the warning, the petition was filed only on 13 June 1995 or four (4) days after
the due date. Moreover, it failed to comply with requirement no. 2 of Circular No. 1-88, as amended
and Circular No. 19-91 of the Court as it did not contain an affidavit of service of copies thereof to
respondents. It was only on 14 July 1995, through an ex-parte manifestation, that the affidavit of
service was belatedly submitted to this Court.

In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta.
Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage
of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5) thereof:

Terms Defined

EMPLOYMENT — Any service performed by an employee for his employer, except —

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel by an employee if he is

employed when such vessel is outside the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

According to petitioner, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the DOLE and the SSS is null
and void as it has the effect of amending the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 1161 by expanding its
coverage. This allegedly cannot be done as only Congress may validly amend legislative enactments.
11
Petitioner prays that the Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 and that the Order of the RTC dismissing the same
be upheld.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to
avail of the right must comply with the rules.4 These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as
they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of
judicial business.5 Petitioner's failure to seasonably file the Petition and its failure to comply with the
aforequoted Circulars of the Court necessitate the denial of the Petition.

Besides, even if the Petition had been filed on time and had complied with the Circulars, it would still
have to be denied as petitioner has failed to show that respondent appellate court committed any
reversible error in rendering the assailed decision.

The Court agrees with the CA that the Information filed against petitioner was sufficient as it clearly
stated the designation of the offense by the statute, i.e. violation of the Social Security Law, and the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, i.e., petitioner's failure to remit his
contributions to the SSS. The CA found that there is prima facie evidence to support the allegations in
the Information and to warrant the prosecution of petitioner.

Respondent appellate court correctly upheld the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement entered
into between the DOLE and the SSS. Upon the one hand, contrary to the trial court's finding, the
Memorandum of Agreement was approved by the Social Security Commission per the Commission's
Resolution No. 437, dated 14 July 1988.6 Upon the other hand, the Memorandum of Agreement
is not a rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the latter's quasi-legislative
authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which reads as follows:

Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission. — For the attainment of its main objectives as
set forth in section two hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

(a) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.

xxx xxx xxx

What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the understanding between the SSS on the
one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the latter would include among the provisions of the
Standard Contract of Employment required in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing
for coverage of the Filipino seafarer by the SSS. The Memorandum of Agreement is not an
implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security Commission which, under Section 4 (a)
abovequoted, is subject to the approval of the President. Indeed, as a matter of strict law, the
participation of the SSS in the establishment by the DOLE of a uniform stipulation in the Standard
Contract of Employment for Filipino seafarers was not necessary; the Memorandum of Agreement
related simply to the administrative convenience of the two (2) agencies of government.

Moreover, the Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 8 (j) (5) of R.A. No. 1161, as
amended, absolutely exempts Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels from the coverage of the
SSS statute. Section 8 (j) (5) simply defines the term "employment" and does not in any way relate to
the scope of coverage of the Social Security System. That coverage is, upon the other hand, set out
12
in Section 9 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended, which defines the scope of SSS coverage in the following
terms:

Sec. 9 Compulsory Coverage. — (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all
employees not over sixty years of age and their employers; Provided, . . . .

(b) Fillpinos recruited in the Philippines by foreign employers for employment abroad may be
covered by the SSS on a voluntary basis. (As amended by Sec. 2, P.D. No. 177, S-1973 and
Sec. 6, P.D. No. 735-S-1975) (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that the Memorandum of Agreement is in line with paragraph 9 (b) of the Social
Security statute quoted above. The Memorandum of Agreement provides, inter alia, that:

xxx xxx xxx

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto
agree and stipulate that one of the conditions that will be imposed by the Department of Labor
and Employment is the contract for overseas employment is the registration for coverage of
seafarers with the Social Security System, through the manning agencies as the authorized
representatives of the foreign employers in conformity with Section 9, paragraph (b) of the
Social Security Law (R.A. No. 1161, as amended), subject to the following terms and
conditions:

xxx xxx xxx7

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Standard Contract of Employment to be entered into between foreign shipowners and
Filipino seafarers is the instrument by which the former express their assent to the inclusion of the
latter in the coverage of the Social Security Act. In other words, the extension of the coverage of the
Social Security System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the contract of
employment signed by employer and seafarer; that same contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta.
Rita Company, who is solidarily liable with the foreign shipowners/employers.

It may be noted that foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally expressed their
conformity to the inclusion of Filipino seafarers within the coverage of the Social Security Act even
prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of Agreement. Thus, the Whereas clauses of the
Memorandum of Agreement state that:

WHEREAS, in the 74th Maritime Session (ILO) held from September 24 to October 9, 1987 in
Geneva, it was agreed that as an internationally accepted principle, seafarers shall have the
right to social security protection;

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, after a series of consultations with seafaring unions and manning agencies, it was
the consensus that Philippine social security coverage be extended to seafarers under the
employ of vessels flying foreign flags;

xxx xxx xxx8

13
 (Emphasis supplied)

It is, finally, worthy of special note that by extending the benefits of the Social Security Act to Filipino
seafarers on board foreign vessels, the individual employment agreements entered into with the
stipulation for such coverage contemplated in the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of Agreement, merely
give effect to the constitutional mandate to the State to afford protection to labor whether "local
or overseas."9 Nullification of the SSS stipulation in those individual employment contracts, through
nullification of the Memorandum of Agreement, constituted serious reversible error on the part of the
trial court. That petitioner should seek to deprive his countrymen of social security protection after his
foreign principal had agreed to such protection, is cause for dismay and is to be deplored.

The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the criminal case against petitioner did
not violate his right against double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial court
had been effected at his own instance. 10 There are only two (2) instances where double jeopardy will
attach notwithstanding the fact that the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused.
The first is where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution; and the
second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial. 11 Neither situation exists in the case at bar. There is no legal
impediment to the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426 against petitioner Sta. Rita.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for having been filed late, for failure to
comply with applicable Court Circulars and for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioner.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her
Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are as follows:

Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8,
1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on
December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor
child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. 2 Her claim for monthly pension was settled on
February 13, 1997.3

14
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter 4 dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna
abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man
on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children
with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña. In support of
her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth certificate 5 of one Jefren H. dela
Peña, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo
C. dela Peña, and that the two were married on November 1, 1990.

As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September
1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations. In a Memorandum 6 dated
November 18, 1997, the Social Security Officer who conducted the investigation reported that, based
on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also
a neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna; Jenelyn 7 and Jefren
were Rosanna’s children with one Romeo C. dela Peña; and Rosanna left the deceased six years
before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn, who was born on
October 29, 1991. Mariquita also confirmed that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was
under treatment.

On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo
was infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was
advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of ₱10,350.00 representing the total death
benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at ₱1,150.00 per month. 8

Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the said
decision.9 However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim. 10

This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions
with the Social Security Commission (SSC) on February 20, 1998. 11 Janet H. Aguas, who also
claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. The case was
docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.

The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo and
Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2) Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth;
and (4) Pablo’s certificate of death.

In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and documentary evidence
showing the disqualification of the petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the claims were barren of
factual and legal basis; as such, it was justified in denying their claims. 12

In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced
by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father. They asserted that Rosanna
never left Pablo and that they lived together as husband and wife under one roof. In support thereof,
they attached a Joint Affidavit13 executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu,
where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until the latter’s
death. In Janet’s birth certificate, which was registered in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it
appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. As to the alleged infertility of Pablo,
the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely because he was not an
expert on such matters, and that he treated the deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise
claimed that the information the SSS gathered from the doctor was privileged communication. 14
15
In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured Confirmation Reports 15 signed by clerks from
the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on
December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of Jefren dela Peña’s birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of
Jeylnn’s birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablo’s death on December 8, 1996.

The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify the authenticity of
Pablo’s signature as appearing on Jeylnn’s birth certificate from his claim records, particularly his
SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit application. 16 The SSS complied with said directive and
manifested to the SSC that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablo’s signature in the birth
certificate was made by the same person who signed the member’s record and other similar
documents submitted by Pablo.17

The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac for
clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn affidavits. 18 Vivencia testified that she had
known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30 years already; the couple were married and lived in
Macabacle, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the spouses, but four
years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family moved to Sto. Niño Triangulo, San
Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the two, especially during Christmas or fiestas; the
spouses’ real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an adopted child; the spouse later transferred
residence, not far from their old house, and Janet, together with her husband and son, remained in
the old house.19

On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for 15
years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her
neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose
child Jefren is.20

According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was just taken in by the
spouses because for a long time they could not have children; 21 however, there were no legal papers
on Janet’s adoption.22Later on, Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latter’s baptism, there
was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was claiming that he was the father of the
child and he got mad because the child was named after Pablo; the latter also got mad and even
attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them away from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna
separated;23 she knew about this because at that time their mother was sick, and she would often
visit her at their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying; Rosanna was no
longer living in their ancestral home but Janet resided therein; she did not know where Rosanna was
staying now but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela Peña were still living together. 24

Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned for clarificatory
questions.25 During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two baptismal certificates:
that of Jeylnn Aguas,26 child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29, 1991, and
that of Jenelyn H. dela Peña,27 child of Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna Hernandez, born on January
29, 1992.

On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and ordering
Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount of ₱10,350.00 erroneously paid to her and
Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the death
benefit to qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their absence, to his legal heirs. 28

16
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had
contracted marriage with Romeo dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. The
SSC based its conclusion on the birth certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that his mother,
Rosanna, and father, Romeo dela Peña, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC declared that
Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Peña while she was still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the
baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Peña showing that she was the child of Rosanna Hernandez
and Romeo dela Peña and that she was born on January 29, 1992). The SSC concluded that
Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his death because of her act of
adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her
father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC
deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and concluded,
based on the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela
Peña. It also gave credence to the testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of
Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she was
only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.29

The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their motion was denied by
the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. 30 The claimants then elevated the case
to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The fallo of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
a new one is entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo Aguas. The case is hereby REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of
computing the benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the same was cut and
suspended in September 1997.

SO ORDERED.31

In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were the
children of the deceased. According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, these records were
binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These entries made in public documents may only be
challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by mere
testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to show that she
ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña
was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña during her
marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her
not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the surviving spouse, she
is entitled to support from her husband.32

The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA denied for lack of
merit.33 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending that it

17
 GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS ACTUALLY DEPENDENT
FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY
BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO SECTION
(k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.

II

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO THE
PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS. 34

Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735,
which defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
employee." According to petitioner, Rosanna forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she
engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and married the latter during her
marriage to Pablo. Such act constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right to receive
support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is evident from the birth certificate of
Jefren H. dela Peña showing that he was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna and Romeo dela
Peña. Petitioner submits that Rosanna cannot be considered as a dependent spouse of Pablo;
consequently, she is not a primary beneficiary. 35

As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the pension because, based
on the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are not the legitimate
children of Pablo. It argues that, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section 5(a) of the
Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents’ relationship with the
member to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits, even without correcting their birth
certificates.36

Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna committed acts of
adultery or that she married another man after the death of her husband. They contend that Janet
and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned only on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family
Code, none of which were proven in this case.37

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS
death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

The petition is partly meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the
Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 38 In an appeal via certiorari, the
Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. 39 It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to
review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. 40 However,
the Court may review findings of facts in some instances, such as, when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court or quasi-
judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record. 41 The Court finds these instances present in this case.

At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to death
benefits:

18
Sec.13. Death benefits. – Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employee’s death, (a) his primary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependent’s
pension: Provided, That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the semester of
death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not satisfied, or if he has no primary
beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty
times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however, That the death benefit shall not be less than the
total contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos:
Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in the month of coverage shall be entitled to
the minimum benefit.

Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member as
follows:

SECTION 8. Terms defined. – For the purposes of this Act the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:

xxxx

(e) Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and
incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular
support.

xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who shall be
the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be the
secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated by the
covered employee as secondary beneficiary.

Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 42

The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established
her right to a monthly pension.

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born
on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4,
1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident
that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa
Dizon,43 extensively discussed this presumption –

19
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes
the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, 44 and in
proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.46

Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional
cases, his heirs.47 In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn
during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.

The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s
signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate
signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity. 48

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date
of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of
the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception
or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.49 It should be noted that respondents
likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give
said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by
the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no
confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.

In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 50 Here, the
witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by
Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not undergo any legal
proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent children. Absent any proof
that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her a dependent child of Pablo,
hence, not a primary beneficiary.

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must
prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimant-
spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2)
that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show
that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was
verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established
that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a
husband and wife are obliged to support each other, 51 but whether one is actually dependent for
support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone.

In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent
as "one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to,
20
someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will,
power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent
spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for

support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who
abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was
not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence,
the Court denied her claim for death benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death,
it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown
that she is capable of providing for herself.

Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been complied with,
particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time of his death. Aside from her own
testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together as
husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where
they made such declaration.

Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the SSC will not prevail over
the categorical and straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who testified that Rosanna and
Pablo had already separated for almost six years before the latter died. Except for the bare assertion
of Carmelita that the couple never separated, there was no further statement regarding the witnesses’
assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived together until Pablo’s death. On the contrary, Leticia
narrated that the two separated after Jeylnn’s baptism as a result of an argument regarding Romeo
dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a commotion at their ancestral house because Romeo
dela Peña was grumbling why Jeylnn was named after Pablo when he was the father, and as a result,
Pablo drove them away. The SSC’s observation and conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of
Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces this Court to further believe Leticia’s testimony on why Pablo and
Rosanna separated. As noted by the SSC:

It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Peña are one and the same
person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29, 1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral of San
Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez.
Jenelyn H dela Peña, on the other hand, was born on January 29, 1992 to spouses Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and baptized on February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn
dela Peña was born approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically
impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in so short a time. x x x The
testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of
Jeylnn because of the commotion that was created by Romeo dela Peña who wanted Jeylnn to be
baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the Parish of Sto. Niño in San
Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Peña. They changed her date of birth also to make it appear
in the record of the parish that she is another child of Rosanna.53

On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no longer living at Pablo’s
house even before he died, and that she is still living with Romeo dela Peña up to the present.
Mariquita testified as follows:

21
Hearing Officer:

Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?

Mrs. Dizon:

Ngayon at kahit na noon.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan namatay si Pablo?

Mrs. Dizon:

1996.

Hearing Officer:

Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?

Mrs. Dizon:

Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.

Hearing Officer:

So, buhay pa si Pablo ……

Mrs. Dizon:

…. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.

Hearing Officer:

Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya
Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng nanay ko. Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung nanay ni
Kuya Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.

22
Hearing Officer:

Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Oo.

Hearing Officer:

Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.

Hearing Officer:

Saan naman?

Mrs. Dizon:

Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54

In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child. On the
other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal
papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the
legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to
present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support
even if they were already living separately.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is
declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

23
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010
Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10,
entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.},
declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626. 2

The Facts

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled
under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). 3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008,
an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely
death the following day.4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the
SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 5 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim,
stating:

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL
based on documents you submitted to us.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the
ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.6

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s
entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be
considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were
adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of
the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4,
1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. 8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned,
24
would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has
already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:

Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent
spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that
the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there
are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."

The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the
covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of
the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the
adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.

xxxx

In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now
be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as
amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased
and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the
ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of
the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.

III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying
petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration. 11

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally
adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to
receive the benefits under the ECP?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record

25
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that
eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent,
Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:

Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr.
Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits.
Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be
alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security
law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to
the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.

We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction. 12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13

Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26,
1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in
view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

xxxx

(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are
the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and
regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as
prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe
time of employee’s death.
26
 (b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death
until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only
when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural
children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the
deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the
adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the
status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.

a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear
language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended

Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as
amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation.
In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the
provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)

27
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation16 that:

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because
any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
(Emphasis supplied)

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is
patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states
that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the
word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used
in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at
bar. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167
(j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited
to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore,
include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the
law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the
phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary
beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents,
then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which

28
the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention
of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an
illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626.
To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.

As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. 18 In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.19

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate
parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to
the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not
germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that
requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the
rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the
policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in
the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor
Code is not so narrowly interpreted.

There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there
can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase
"illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation.

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended
illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating
dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its
assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death
benefits under the law.

29
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those
who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed
Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not
overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate
parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still
qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after
the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that
there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, 21 who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a
novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 22 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall
be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter
and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at
such a tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after
Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided
by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24 wherein the paramount consideration
is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best
interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her
adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill
in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no
one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s
biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue
of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

30
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following
rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur
withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or
intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an
SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We
rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second
chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel
grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all
if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of
John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be
established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records,
petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing
children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported
"Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in
John’s Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life
accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John. 26 Likewise, this is John’s known address
as per the ECC’s assailed Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her
claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually
execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application, 28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits
under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover
31
compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries
who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating
petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the
restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s
clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind,
entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of
John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from
John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since
the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased
covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

DDDDDD

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164790 August 29, 2008

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, Branch Manager, Cubao

Branch, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not
qualified to be his beneficiary.

The principle is applied in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), awarding benefits to respondent Gloria de los Santos.

32
The Facts

Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were married on April 29,
1964 in Manila. Less than one (1) year after, in February 1965, Gloria left Antonio and contracted
another marriage with a certain Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria went back
to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They had three children: Alain Vincent, Arlene, and Armine.

In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). On May 8, 1986, she filed for divorce
against Antonio with the Superior Court of Orange, Sta. Ana, California. On May 21, 1983, she
executed a document waiving all her rights to their conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce
was granted on November 5, 1986.

On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union produced one
child, May-Ann N. de los Santos, born on May 15, 1989. On her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas
Constant, an American citizen, on July 11, 1987, in the US.

On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System (SSS). He changed his
beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to
May-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos.

Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began receiving monthly
pension. He died of respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila applied for and began
receiving his SSS pension benefit, beginning December 1999.

On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch.
Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio. The SSS letter of
denial dated September 1, 2000 stated:

We regret to inform you that your claim is denied for the following reason/s:

We received documents showing that you have remarried in the United States to one Larry T.
Constant. You were also the one who filed for petition for dissolution of your marriage with the
deceased member, which was in fact granted by the Superior Court of California, County of
Orange.

These circumstances are sufficient ground for denial as the SSS law specifically defines
beneficiaries as "the dependent spouse, until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted and illegitimate children who shall be the primary beneficiary." x
x x2

SSC Disposition

Gloria elevated her claim to the Social Security Commission (SSC). On February 12, 2001, she filed a
petition to claim death benefits, with a prayer that she be declared the rightful beneficiary of the
deceased Antonio.3

The SSC motu proprio impleaded Cirila as respondent in the case, it appearing that she was another
claimant to the death benefits of Antonio. Upon receipt of the summons, Cirila moved to dismiss the
petition of Gloria. She argued that Gloria had no personality to sue because the latter is neither a
dependent nor a beneficiary of Antonio, as evidenced by the E-4 form accomplished and submitted
33
by him when he was still alive. Gloria had also remarried an American citizen in the US. And that she,
Cirila, was the true and legal wife of Antonio.

Cirila likewise reasoned out that the authority to determine the validity of the two marriages of Antonio
lay with the regular courts. Since Gloria had already filed for settlement of the intestate estate of
Antonio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the petition she filed with the SSC should be
considered as forum shopping.

Gloria opposed the motion to dismiss. She contended that her marriage to Larry Constant was not the
subsequent marriage contemplated under the Social Security Law (SS Law) 4 that would disqualify her
as a beneficiary; that the decree of divorce issued by a foreign state involving Filipino citizens has no
validity and effect under Philippine law. Lastly, Gloria remonstrated that there was no forum shopping
because the petition she filed before the RTC did not involve the issue of her entitlement to SSS
benefits.

The SSC denied the motion to dismiss. After submission of position papers from both sides, it issued
a Resolution, dated February 13, 2002, 5 dismissing Gloria’s petition with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that May-Ann de los Santos, daughter of
Antonio and private respondent Cirila de los Santos is the secondary beneficiary of the former
and as such, she is entitled to the balance of her father’s five-year guaranteed pension.

Accordingly, the SSS is hereby ordered to compute the balance of the five-year guaranteed
pension less the amount of P21,200 representing the total of the monthly pensions and
dependent’s pension previously received by private respondent Cirila Nimo and minor May-
Ann de los Santos, respectively, and to pay the latter, through her natural guardian Cirila Nimo,
the difference between the two amounts, if any. If there was overpayment of pension, the
private respondent is hereby ordered to forthwith refund the amount thereof to the SSS.

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6

The SSC deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce against him abroad
and subsequently married another man. She thus failed to satisfy the requirement of dependency
required of primary beneficiaries under the law. The Commission likewise rejected her efforts to use
the invalidity of the divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim benefits from the SSS for her
personal profit.

However, despite all the sophistry with which petitioner, through her counsel, sought to justify
her acts in the USA, the petition must fail. The petitioner, who was primarily responsible for
obtaining the decree of marital dissolution from an American court, now wishes to invoke the
very invalidity of her divorce and subsequent marriage in order to lay hands on the benefit she
seeks. It is sheer folly, if not downright reprehensible, for the petitioner to seek to profit from
committing an act considered as unlawful under Philippine law. This Commission will not allow
itself to be used as an instrument to subvert the policies laid down in the SS Law which it has
sworn to uphold at all times. x x x7 (Emphasis added)

The SSC added that since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was likewise not a
qualified beneficiary. The fruit of their union, May-Ann, was considered as an illegitimate child and
34
qualified as a secondary beneficiary. May-Ann was entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate
children of Antonio in accordance with Section 8(k) of the SS Law. 8 However, considering that the
legitimate children of Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the only remaining
qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of the benefit.

R.A. No. 8282, which is the law in force at the time of retiree Antonio’s death on May 15, 1999,
provides as follows:

"Section 12-B. Retirement Benefits. x x x

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. Provided, That if he has no
primary beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly
pension, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent
to the total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed
period, excluding the dependents’ pension." (Emphasis supplied)

Since Antonio de los Santos retired on March 1, 1996, and began receiving monthly pension
since then, the determination of who his primary beneficiaries were at that times should be
based on the relevant provisions of the applicable prevailing law then, R.A. No. 1161, as
amended, which is quoted hereunder:

"Section 8. Terms Defined. x x x

xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children
who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents, and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants
and illegitimate children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any
of the foregoing, any other person designed by the covered employee as secondary
beneficiary." (Emphasis supplied)

Applying these provisions to the case at hand, May-Ann de los Santos as the illegitimate child
of Antonio and Cirila is considered her father’s secondary beneficiary who, in the absence of a
primary beneficiary x x x, becomes entitled to the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension
as Antonio died just three (3) years after he began receiving his retirement pension, pursuant
to Section 12-B par. (d) of the SS Law, as amended.9

CA Decision

Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA. She insisted that she, as the legal wife, was
the qualified beneficiary to Antonio’s death benefits.

The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria and Antonio subsisted
until his death and the subsequent marriages contracted by both of them were void for being
bigamous. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA found that being the legal wife, Gloria was
entitled by law to receive support from her husband. Thus, her status qualified Gloria to be a
dependent and a primary beneficiary under the law. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

35
 WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the
appealed Resolution dated February 13, 2003, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent SSS is DIRECTED to compute the amount of benefits to which petitioner is
entitled under the law.10

Issues

Petitioner SSS and the concerned Branch head present a lone issue for Our consideration: THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS
STILL QUALIFIED AS A PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF DECEASED SSS MEMBER ANTONIO,
UNDER SECTION 12-B IN RELATION TO SECTION 8(e) and (k) OF THE SS LAW. 11

The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who divorced Antonio in
the US, or Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary entitled to claim death benefits from the
SSS.

Our Ruling

At the outset, let it be recalled that in 2005, this Court ruled in Dycaico v. Social Security
System12 that the proviso "as of the date of retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act No.
8282,13 which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries," is unconstitutional for it violates the due
process and equal protection clauses. For ready reference, the concerned provision is reproduced
below:

SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. – (a) A member who has paid at least one hundred
twenty (120) monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement and who (1) has reached
the age of sixty (60) years and is already separated from employment or has ceased to be self-
employed or (2) has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, shall be entitled for as long as he
lives to the monthly pension; Provided, That he shall have the option to receive his first
eighteen (18) monthly pensions in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be
determined by the SSS.

xxxx

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension; Provided, That if he has no primary
beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the total monthly
pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the
dependents’ pension. (Emphasis added)

In deciding that death benefits should not be denied to the wife who was married to the deceased
retiree only after the latter’s retirement, this Court in Dycaico reasoned:

x x x In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those
contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated
death of the other spouse.

x x x However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor’s

pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the
36
 other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the
achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection to members
and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and
other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden." x x x 14

That said, the reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio should be
the time of his death. There is no need to look into the time of his retirement, as was the course
followed by the SSC in resolving the claim of respondent. We note, however, that considering the
circumstances of this case, the Dycaico ruling does not substantially affect the determination of
Antonio’s beneficiaries.

The SS Law clearly and expressly provides who are the qualified beneficiaries entitled to receive
benefits from the deceased:

"Section 8. Terms Defined. – For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:

xxxx

(e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or
if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been
permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and

(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.

xxxx

(k) Beneficiaries – The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries
of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty
percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided,
further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children
of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent
(100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person
designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.

As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased
Antonio was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. 15 The divorce was obtained by
respondent Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy against absolute
divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.

37
However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is
still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of
dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.

Social Security System v. Aguas16 is instructive in determining the extent of the required
"dependency" under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court ruled that although a husband and wife are
obliged to support each other, whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot
be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. 17

Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with other
men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire
period.

Said the Court:

In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined
a dependent as "one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or
subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform
anything without the will, power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law
likewise defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the
family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was not
dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence,
the Court denied her claim for death benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the
contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the
time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for
support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. 18

Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with
two different men. The first was in 1965, less than one year after their marriage, when she contracted
a second marriage to Domingo Talens. The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went
to the US, obtained a divorce, and later married an American citizen.

In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her
deceased husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Resolution of the Social Security Commission is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

38
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173582 January 28, 2008

YOLANDA SIGNEY, petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA SERVANO,
representative of GINALYN and RODELYN SIGNEY, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

We are called to determine who is entitled to the social security benefits of a Social Security System
(SSS) member who was survived not only by his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with
whom he had six children.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the
31 March 2004 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals affirming the resolution of the Social Security
Commission (SSC),3 as well as the 23 July 2004 Resolution 4 of the same court denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his member’s records, he had
designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as
secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July 2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public
respondent SSS.5 She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina
Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13
April 1996, and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000. 6

Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits on
13 July 2001 in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the
deceased and that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.

In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating
that she was the legal wife of the deceased. 7

The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001, 8 denied the death benefit claim of petitioner.
However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the
primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage
between petitioner and the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage
contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local Civil
Registry of Cebu City.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition 9 with the SSC in which she attached a waiver of rights 10 executed
by Editha whereby the latter waived "any/all claims from National Trucking Forwarding Corporation
(NTFC) under the supervision of National Development Corporation (NDC), Social Security System
(SSS) and other (i)nsurance (b)enefits due to the deceased Rodolfo Signey Sr., who died intestate on

39
May 21, 2001 at Manila Doctors," and further declared that "I am legally married to Mr. Aquilino
Castillo and not to Mr. Rodolfo P. Signey Sr." 11

In a Resolution12 dated 29 January 2003, the SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave
more weight to the SSS field investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage showing that the
deceased was married to Editha on 29 October 1967, than to the aforestated declarations of Editha in
her waiver of rights. It found that petitioner only relied on the waiver of Editha, as she failed to present
any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the confirmed marriage certificate. The SSC also
found, based on the SSS field investigation report dated 6 November 2001 that even if Editha was the
legal wife, she was not qualified to the death benefits since she herself admitted that she was not
dependent on her deceased husband for support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a certain
Aquilino Castillo.13

Considering that petitioner, Editha, and Gina were not entitled to the death benefits, the SSC applied
Section 8(e) and (k) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282, the SSS Law which was in force at the time of the
member’s death on 21 May 2001, and held that the dependent legitimate and illegitimate minor
children of the deceased member were also considered primary beneficiaries. The records disclosed
that the deceased had one legitimate child, Ma. Evelyn Signey, who predeceased him, and several
illegitimate children with petitioner and with Gina. Based on their respective certificates of live birth,
the deceased SSS member’s four illegitimate children with petitioner could no longer be considered
dependents at the time of his death because all of them were over 21 years old when he died on 21
May 2001, the youngest having been born on 31 March 1978. On the other hand, the deceased SSS
member’s illegitimate children with Gina were qualified to be his primary beneficiaries for they were
still minors at the time of his death, Ginalyn having been born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn on 20
April 2000.14

The SSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in an Order15 dated 9 April 2003.
This order further elaborated on the reasons for the denial of petitioner’s claims. It held that the mere
designation of petitioner and her children as beneficiaries by the deceased member was not the
controlling factor in the determination of beneficiaries. Sections 13, 8(e) and 8(k) of the SSS Law, as
amended, provide that dependent legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member
and dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children of the member shall
be the primary beneficiaries of the latter. 16 Based on the certification dated 25 July 2001 issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, the marriage of the deceased and Editha on 29
October 1967 at the Metropolitan Cathedral, Cebu City was duly registered under LCR Registry No.
2083 on 21 November 1967. The SSS field investigation reports verified the authenticity of the said
certification.17

The SSC did not give credence to the waiver executed by Editha, which manifested her lack of
interest in the outcome of the case, considering that she was not entitled to the benefit anyway
because of her admitted cohabitation with Aquilino Castillo. Moreover, the SSC held that considering
that one of the requisites of a valid waiver is the existence of an actual right which could be
renounced, petitioner in effect recognized that Editha had a right over the benefits of the deceased
thereby enabling her to renounce said right in favor of petitioner and her children. The declaration by
Editha that she was not married to the deceased is not only contrary to the records of the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City which state that they were married on 29 October 1967 but also renders
nugatory the waiver of right itself, for if she was not married to the deceased then she would have no
rights that may be waived.

40
Petitioner had argued that the illegitimate children of the deceased with Gina failed to show proof that
they were indeed dependent on the deceased for support during his lifetime. The SSC observed that
Section 8(e) of the SSS Law, as amended, provides among others that dependents include the
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and has not reached 21 years of age. The provision vested the right of the benefit to his
illegitimate minor children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, irrespective of any proof that they had been
dependent on the support of the deceased. 18

Petitioner appealed the judgment of the SSC to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for
Review19 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the SSC in its 31 March 2004 Decision. Resolving the determinative question of who
between petitioner and the illegitimate children of the deceased are the primary beneficiaries lawfully
entitled to the social security benefits accruing by virtue of the latter’s death, it held that based on
Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a surviving spouse claiming death benefits as a dependent must be
the legal spouse. Petitioner’s presentation of a marriage certificate attesting to her marriage to the
deceased was futile, according to the appellate court, as said marriage is null and void in view of the
previous marriage of the deceased to Editha as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City.

The appellate court also held that the law is clear that for a child to be qualified as dependent, he
must be unmarried, not gainfully employed and must not be 21 years of age, or if over 21 years of
age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of
self-support, physically or mentally. And in this case, only the illegitimate children of the deceased
with Gina namely, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, are the qualified beneficiaries as they were still minors at the
time of the death of their father. Considering petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and the
absence of any legitimate children of the deceased, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor
children of the deceased should be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries, the Court of
Appeals concluded.20

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in a Resolution21 dated 23
July 2004. It found that there was no new matter of substance which would warrant a modification
and/or reversal of the 31 March 2004 Decision.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner raises issues similar to the ones which have been adequately resolved by the SSC and the
appellate court. The first issue is whether petitioner’s marriage with the deceased is valid. The second
issue is whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate
minor children of the deceased.

There is no merit in the petition.

We deemed it best not to disturb the findings of fact of the SSS which are supported by substantial
evidence22 and affirmed by the SSC and the Court of Appeals. Moreover, petitioner ought to be
reminded of the basic rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.23

It is a well-known rule that in proceedings before administrative bodies, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not binding.24 The important consideration is that both parties were afforded an
opportunity to be heard and they availed themselves of it to present their respective positions on the
matter in dispute.25 It must likewise be noted that under Section 2, Rule 1 26 of the SSC Revised Rules
of Procedure, the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law shall not be controlling. In the case
41
at bar, the existence of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha is supported by
substantial evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her right to be heard, only relied on the
waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the
confirmed marriage certificate registered under LCR Registry No. 2083 on 21 November 1967. She
did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha.

As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A.
No. 828227 is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory
construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that
the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.28

Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined.—For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:

xxx

(e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried,
not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over
twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and

3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.

xxx

(k) Beneficiaries — The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary
beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be
entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled
to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who
shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing,
any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.

SEC. 13. Death Benefits. — Upon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36)
monthly contributions prior to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be
entitled to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36)
times the monthly pension. If he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions,
42
 his primary or secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the
monthly pension times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12)
times the monthly pension, whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).

Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by
substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased
has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall
be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child
to qualify as a "dependent,29" the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age,
not married nor gainfully employed.30

In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and 20
April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified
as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share
equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the
deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the
deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 2003 4 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.

By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:

43
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of
the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.

SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon. 10

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. 11

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits13 which was also granted
by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother
Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for
Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in
support of her claims are spurious.

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is "still very much alive." 16

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, 17 he
further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.

Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries
before the SSS.20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the
denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during
his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:

1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in
declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.

xxxx

44
 x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not
become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.

xxxx

3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith,
and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.

xxxx

In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz
[sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of. 21 (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised respondent that
as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.

In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of
her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested
respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she
had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.

Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 1999 25 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon
was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000, 26 maintained the denial of her
claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she
was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.

In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake." 28

After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch
attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by
Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have
easily located her, she having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she

45
found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.

Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as
well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.

The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising
from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)

In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.

After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.

xxxx

There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in
its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona,
Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.

As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by
exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased
member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void,
considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined
through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.

xxxx

It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of
the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the
latter’s death benefit. x x x

xxxx

46
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x

Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial
of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the
SSS as funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration 34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June
4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due
her. Held the CA:

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the
then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings
of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import,
can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the second
marriage null and void?

xxxx

x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as
the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the
second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and
upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere
does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the
RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x

x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the
decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair
play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given
ample opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.

xxxx

Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore
as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s

47
death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise
dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.

However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare
the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were both denied for
lack of merit.

Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari 38 anchored on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION.39

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant
to Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.

The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no
moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the
SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue
of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits." 41

The petition fails.

That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand
and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The
law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of
its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988
of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of their celebration.42

48
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime
of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under
any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage. 44

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45 when
Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first
marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the
first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring
supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, 48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
49
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. 49

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses
in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by

judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in
a direct action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.

In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

50
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 175952 April 30, 2008

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC. and SEMIRARA COAL
CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines represented by the Social Security System (SSS) assails the
Decision2

dated 31 August 2006 of the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution3 dated 19
December 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Following are the antecedents culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:

On 13 February 2004, Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. (AG & P) and Semirara Coal
Corporation (SEMIRARA) (collectively referred to as private respondents) filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against SSS before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City,
Branch 3, docketed as Civil Case No. 7441. The complaint alleged that:

xxx

3. Sometime in 2000, plaintiff informed the SSS in writing of its premiums and loan amortization
delinquencies covering the period from January 2000 to May 2000 amounting to P7.3 Million. AG&P
proposed to pay its said arrears by end of 2000, but requested for the condonation of all penalties;

4. In turn, the defendant suggested two (2) options to AG&P, either to pay by installment or through
"dacion en pago";

5. AG&P chose to settle its obligation with the SSS under the second option, that is through dacion en
pago of its 5,999 sq. m. property situated in Baguio City covered by TCT No. 3941 with an appraised

51
value of about P80.0 Million. SSS proposes to carve-out from the said property an area sufficient to
cover plaintiffs’ delinquencies. AG&P, however, is not amenable to subdivide its Baguio property;

6. AG&P then made another proposal to SSS. This time, offering as payment a portion of its 58,153
square meter-lot, situated in F.S. Sebastian, Sto. Niño, San Pascual, Batangas. In addition, SSS
informed AG&P of its decision to include other companies within the umbrella of DMCI group with
arrearages with the SSS. In the process of elimination of the companies belonging to the DMCI group
with possible outstanding obligation with the SSS, it was only SEMIRARA which was left with
outstanding delinquencies with the SSS. Thus, SEMIRARA’s inclusion in the proposed settlement
through dacion en pago;

7. AG&P was, thereafter, directed by the defendant to submit certain documents, such as Transfer
Certificate of Title, Tax Declaration covering the subject lot, and the proposed subdivision plan, which
requirements AG&P immediately complied;

8. On April 4, 2001, SSS, in its Resolution No. 270, finally approved AG&P’s proposal to settle its and
SEMIRARA’s delinquencies through dacion en pago, which as of March 31, 2001 amounted
to P29,261,902.45. Approval of AG&P’s proposal was communicated to it by Ms. Aurora E.L. Ortega,
Vice-President, NCR-Group of the SSS in a letter dated April 23, 2001. … ;

9. As a result of the approval of the dacion en pago, posting of contributions and loan amortization to
individual member accounts, both for AG&P and SEMIRARA employees, was effected immediately
thereafter. Thus, the benefits of the member-employees of both companies were restored;

10. From the time of the approval of AG&P’s proposal up to the present, AG&P is (sic) religiously
remitting the premium contributions and loan amortization of its member-employees to the defendant;

11. To effect the property transfer, a Deed of Assignment has to be executed between the plaintiffs
and the defendant. Because of SSS failure to come up with the required Deed of Assignment to effect
said transfer, AG&P prepared the draft and submitted it to the Office of the Vice-President – NCR thru
SSS Baclaran Branch in July 2001. Unfortunately, the defendant failed to take any action on said
Deed of Assignment causing AG&P to re-submit it to the same office of the Vice-President – NCR in
December 2001. From its original submission of the Deed of Assignment in July 2001 to its re-
submission in December 2001, and SSS returning of the revised draft in February 28, 2003 AG&P
was consistent in its regular follow ups with SSS as to the status of its submitted Deed of Assignment;

12. On February 28, 2003, or more than a year after the approval of AG&P’s proposal, defendant sent
the revised copy of the Deed of Assignment to AG&P. However, the amount of the plaintiffs’
obligation appearing in the approved Deed of Assignment has ballooned from P29,261,902.45
to P40,846,610.64 allegedly because of the additional interests and penalty charges assessed on
plaintiffs’ outstanding obligation from April 2001, the date of approval of the proposal, up to January
2003;

13. AG&P demanded for the waiver and deletion of the additional interests on the ground that delay in
the approval of the deed and the subsequent delay in conveyance of the property in defendant’s
name was solely attributable to the defendant; hence, to charge plaintiffs with additional interests and
penalties amounting to more than P10,000,000.00, would be unreasonable….;

52
14. AG&P and SEMIRARA maintain their willingness to settle their alleged obligation
of P29,261,902.45 to SSS. Defendant, however, refused to accept the payment through dacion en
pago, unless plaintiffs also pay the additional interests and penalties being charged;

xxx

Instead of filing an answer, SSS moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. In an order dated 28 July 2004, the trial court granted
SSS’s motion and dismissed private respondents’ complaint. The pertinent portions of the assailed
order are as follows:

Clearly, the motion is triggered on the issue of the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
nature of the instant complaint. The length and breadth of the complaint as perused, boils down to the
questions of premium and loan amortization delinquencies of the plaintiff, the option taken for the
payment of the same in favor of the defendant and the disagreement between the parties as to the
amount of the unpaid contributions and salary loan repayments. In other words, said questions are
directly related to the collection of contributions due the defendant. Republic Act No. 1161 as
amended by R.A. No. 8282, specifically provides that any dispute arising under the said Act shall be
cognizable by the Commission and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the
Commission. Hence, a procedural process mandated by a special law.

Observingly, the running dispute between plaintiffs and defendant originated from the disagreement
as to the amount of unpaid contributions and the amount of the penalties imposed appurtenant
thereto. The alleged dacion en pago is crystal clear manifestation of offering a special form of
payment which to the mind of the court will produce effect only upon acceptance by the offeree and
the observance and compliance of the required formalities by the parties. No matter in what form it
may be, still the court believes that the subject matter is the payment of contributions and the
corresponding penalties which are within the ambit of Sec. 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by
R.A. No. 8282.

WHEREFORE, the Court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant complaint, the
motion is granted and this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.4

Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order but the same was denied in an Order
dated 15 September 2004.

Consequently, private respondents filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial
court erred in its pronouncement that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint
and in granting the motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s challenged order, granted private
respondents’ appeal and ordered the trial court to proceed with the civil case with dispatch. From the
averments in their complaint, the appellate court observed that private respondents are seeking to
implement the Deed of Assignment which they had drafted and submitted to SSS sometime in July
2001, pursuant to SSS’s letter addressed to AG& P dated 23 April 2001 approving AG&P and
SEMIRARA’S delinquencies through dacion en pago, which as of 31 March 2001, amounted
to P29,261,902.45. The appellate court thus held that the subject of the complaint is no longer the
payment of the premium and loan amortization delinquencies, as well as the penalties appurtenant
53
thereto, but the enforcement of the dacion en pago pursuant to SSS Resolution No. 270. The action
then is one for specific performance which case law holds is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.5

SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 19 December 2006.

Now before the Court, SSS insists on the Social Security Commission’s (the Commission) jurisdiction
over the complaint pursuant to Section 5 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282. SSS maintains the
Commission’s jurisdiction over all disputes arising from the provisions of R.A. No. 1161, amended by
R.A. No. 8282 to the exclusion of trial courts.6

The main issue in this case pertains to which body has jurisdiction to entertain a controversy arising
from the non-implementation of a dacion en pago agreed upon by the parties as a means of
settlement of private respondents’ liabilities.

At the outset, it is well to restate the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the
tribunal or body which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.7

The pertinent provision of law detailing the jurisdiction of the Commission is Section 5(a) of R.A. No.
1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, to wit:

SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes.– (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage,
benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable
by the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any
of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided within the
mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination
and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission.

The law clearly vests upon the Commission jurisdiction over "disputes arising under this Act with
respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any matter related thereto..."
Dispute is defined as "a conflict or controversy."8

From the allegations of respondents’ complaint, it readily appears that there is no longer any dispute
with respect to respondents’ accountability to the SSS. Respondents had, in fact, admitted their
delinquency and offered to settle them by way of dacion en pago subsequently approved by the SSS
in Resolution No. 270-s. 2001. SSS stated in said resolution that "the dacion en pago proposal of
AG&P Co. of Manila and Semirara Coals Corporation to pay their liabilities in the total amount
of P30,652,710.71 as of 31 March 2001 by offering their 5.8 ha. property located in San Pascual,
Batangas, be, as it is hereby, approved.."9 This statement unequivocally evinces its consent to
the dacion en pago. In Vda. de Jayme v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court ruled significantly as follows:

Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor
as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. It is a special mode of payment where
the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an
outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is the
creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against
the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, consent, object
certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In its modern concept, what actually takes place
54
in dacion en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale,
while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case, common consent is an essential
prerequisite, be it sale or novation, to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.11

The controversy, instead, lies in the non-implementation of the approved and agreed dacion en
pago on the part of the SSS. As such, respondents filed a suit to obtain its enforcement which is,
doubtless, a suit for specific performance and one incapable of pecuniary estimation beyond the
competence of the Commission.12 Pertinently, the Court ruled in Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,13 as
follows:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts).14

In fine, the Court finds the decision of the Court of Appeals in accord with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals
Eleventh Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 83775 AFFIRMED.

Let the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

55