SPEC PRO

2.) AGAPAY vs PALANG (Digest)

[G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997]
FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel
attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed
alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months
earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same
place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child
Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon
Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at
Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint
but CA reversed the decision

ISSUE/S
1. Whether the appellate court erred on not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palangs illegitimate son and
thus entitled to inherit from Miguels estate?
2. Whether respondent court erred, in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer A.
Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be considered as party-defendant in this civil case?
RULING:
1. The issue concerning Kristopher Palangs status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguels estate is here
resolved in favor of respondent courts correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements
regarding Kristophers heirship and filiation inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof
of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.
2. As regards the 2nd issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant in the
case at bar following the trial courts decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as
party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the courts jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad
litem. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case
at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar.
Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is the illegitimate son of
Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits Petitioners grave error has been discussed in the preceeding
paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguels estate and Kristophers
successional rights has been pointed out.
PETITION DENIED.

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3.) VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
- Troadio Manalo died intestate  survived by wife and 11 children  left several properties in Manila and Tarlac.
- 8 children (resps)  pet for the judicial settlement of the estate in RTC Manila & appointment of bro Romeo as admin
- TC  order “declaring the whole world in default, except the government.”
- order of general default set aside upon motion of pets (wife & remaining 3 children)
- TC order admitting the petition for judicial settlement of estate.
- Pets  pet for certiorari under Rule 65
- absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members of the same family; and no certification of non
forum shopping was attached to the petition.
- CA denied the petition & MFR
- Pets – petition claiming Pet for issuance of letters of admin, settlement & distribution of estate is an ordinary civil action
thus should be dismissed under Rule 16, Sec 1(j) of the ROC on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with as there was failure to comply with the requirement in Art 222 CC
ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an ordinary civil action,
thus Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the petition  NO
HELD:
 Rule: In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment and the character of the relief sought
in the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling.
o scrutiny of the Petition for ILASD of Estate belies herein petitioner’s claim that the same is in the nature of an
ordinary civil action.

 petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate
 fact of death
 residence at the time of his said death
 enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
 tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
 reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
o petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action & so petitioners, as
oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and
ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of the Civil
Code.
 civil action/suit - action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong.
o Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions

 Use of term “suit”

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  excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.
 Special proceedings – remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status, right or particular fact.
o Pet for ILASD of Estate = special pro

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5.) Munsayac De Villa v CA
G.R. No. 148597
October 24, 2003

Facts:
DE VILLA, SUNGA and ROY, three of the five children of the late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC
filed for a petition for letters of administration nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their
parents.
DE VILLA’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children namely MUNSAYAC, JR. and VISPERAS, who
nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac Couple’s intestate estate.
"MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to respondent Judge’s Order thus, replacing Atty.
Ceasar G. Oracion as special administrator of the said intestate estate.
Subsequently, DE VILLA and SUNGA filed for a Request to Inhibit Respondent Judge. Barely a week after such request
and before respondent Judge could act on it, DE VILLA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
questioning respondent Judge’s Order in directing/ordering him (DE VILLA) to produce certain bank time deposit
certificates/documents; and the order of arrest for failure to produce the said bank certificates/documents.
Pending the resolution, DE VILLA filed an administrative case before the Supreme Court, which prayed for respondent
Judge’s suspension and his permanent removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct and serious inefficiency.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion which was filed by the administrator of the intestate estate, respondent Judge issued the
Order to surrender, under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the late
VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planter’s Bank, Baguio City (‘UCPB’) worth
P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not disclosed by the petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the
surrender of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the ‘freeze
order’ with the China Banking Corporation.
For their failure to comply with the Order the petitioners DE VILLA, SUNGA and ROY were arrested and were likewise
ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis amount of P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest.
A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed before the CA. CA nullified the arrest order only. Hence
this petition, arguing that the inhibition is still needed as the issue on withdrawal/release of the money deposited
in custodia legis and the lifting of the freeze order on certain jewelry is pending.

Issue: Whether properties in custodia legis must be released. YES

Held:
The Court ordered the TC to lift the freeze order and cause the return of property or money still in custodia legis. The
inhibition of the respondent judge became moot and academic.
It should be clear that the CA Decision20 terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition executed by all the parties was the "final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims
as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac." As such, any and all incidents relating to the
special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated.
When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze
the safety deposit box of petitioners and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding judge in

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the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it
follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the
special proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited with the court should
be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited should be
released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling
reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the
determination of whether a property should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such
determination is only provisional -- not conclusive -- in character and subject to the final decision in a separate action that
may be instituted by the parties.
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly made by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court that has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and that the final order of the
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heirs.
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally, a probate court
may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is
one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are
not impaired.27 These principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation
must come to an end.
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered frozen by the
lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties
should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have
already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares as
heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property originally
deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze order still pending
and to order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for this
Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation.29 To achieve that end and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge
to lift the freeze order and release the property deposited with the court becomes indispensable.30

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13.) Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic
will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the
same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the
same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing
the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the
same was already destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as
she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always
issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said
deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the
signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which
appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had
lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the
will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of
Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in
a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s holographic
will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be
prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of
the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of
the deceased.

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The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased
sign a document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept
the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other
documents written by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why
if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

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CO vs ROSARIO
G.R. No. 160671 April 30, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Luis Co and Vicente Yu were appointed by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on March 4, 1998, as special co-
administrators of the estate of petitioner's father. However, upon motion of other heirs, petitioner's appointment was set
aside, whereby petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co, in his place, which was granted by the court.
Four years later, however, the RTC, upon motion of one the heirs, revoked the appointment of Alvin in view of the several
criminal cases filed against the latter. Petitioner files petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alvin’s removal as special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle?

RULING:
The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator.
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion.
The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to
work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement.