The SAGE Handbook of Public

Administration
Policy Design and Implementation

Contributors: Peter J. May

Edited by: B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre
Book Title: The SAGE Handbook of Public Administration
Chapter Title: "Policy Design and Implementation"
Pub. Date: 2012
Access Date: February 2, 2018
Publishing Company: SAGE Publications Ltd
City: London
Print ISBN: 9781446200506
Online ISBN: 9781446274996
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446200506.n18
Print pages: 279-291
©2012 SAGE Publications Ltd. All Rights Reserved.
This PDF has been generated from SAGE Knowledge. Please note that the pagination of
the online version will vary from the pagination of the print book.
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Introduction and editorial arrangement © B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, 2012

Policy Design and Implementation

PeterJ.May

Introduction

Public policies set forth courses of action for addressing problems or for providing goods and
services to segments of society. Policies come in a variety of forms that include legislation,
executive orders, rules, or other official acts. These authorities do more than simply announce
a course of action. Policies typically contain a set of intentions or goals, a mix of instruments
or means for accomplishing the intentions, a designation of governmental and non-
governmental entities charged with carrying out the intentions, and an allocation of resources
for the requisite tasks. In short, these specify a policy design for accomplishing a public
purpose.

Choices that are made about the relevant policy instruments, the entities that carry out the
policy, the available resources, and the actions to be taken establish a blueprint for policy
implementation. That path is further signaled by the labeling of the policy, the language used
to communicate policy goals, and monitoring by politicians after policy enactment. Because of
these actions, the nexus between politics and policy making carries forward into policy
implementation (see Bardach, 1977; Brodkin, 1990; Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980).

A primary issue of relevance to public administration is understanding how the implementation

of a policy is shaped both by the design of the policy and the forces that influence the way
the policy is carried out. The main argument of this chapter is that policy designs provide both
the blueprint for carrying out policies and the foci for efforts to shore up or undermine policy
implementation.

Relatively little is known beyond broad generalities about what constitutes well-designed
policies. This presents challenges for those who seek a better understanding of the
relationships between policy design and implementation. Various strands of literature in public
administration and political science address aspects of these challenges. One strand
considers the assumptions and values that enter into policy design (see Bobrow and Dryzek,
1987; Ingraham, 1987; Linder and Peters, 1984). A second strand catalogs policy instruments
that make up the elements of policies (see Hood, 1983; McDonnell and Elmore, 1987;
Salamon, 1989, 2002; Schneider and Ingram, 1990). A third strand considers the way in which
policies structure implementation and send signals about desired courses of action (see
Elmore, 1987; Goggin et al., 1990; Smith and Ingram, 2002). A fourth strand considers how
choices about policy targets and instruments shape the reactions to the policies and their
eventual durability (see Patashnik, 2008; Schneider and Ingram, 1997).

This chapter draws from these strands of literature in discussing the interplay of policy design
and implementation. The first part of the chapter addresses the ways that policy designs
shape the course of policy implementation. The second part of the chapter considers how this
relates to different political environments. The third part of the chapter addresses choices for
policy design along with unresolved issues.

Influence of Policy Design on Implementation

The crafting of policies typically entails a long process of analysis of problems and options,
give-and-take over politically acceptable courses of action, and an authoritative decision to

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enact a policy. In one of the earlier writings on this topic, John Dryzek defines policy design as
‘the process of inventing, developing and fine-tuning a course of action with the amelioration
of some problem [in mind]’ (1983: 346). The design perspective in particular calls attention to
matching content of a given policy to the political context in which the policy is formulated and
implemented (see Linder and Peters, 1984, 1989; May, 1991; Schneider and Ingram, 1997).

Different Design Contentions

It is undisputed that policies signal desired courses of action and structure implementation.
Less settled, however, are the ways in which different policy designs either hinder or facilitate
implementation. An extensive set of case studies of implementation shortfalls suggest that
problems arise from inadequate specification of desired actions and from failure to include
features that overcome basic conflicts among those carrying out policies. Building upon these
case studies, an influential body of theorizing and research (see Mazmanian and Sabatier,
1983; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975) points to the ways that implementation is limited by key
attributes of policies (i.e., lack of goal clarity and inconsistency in goals), complex chains of
implementing actions and indirect control (i.e., multiple actors, decision points, and levels of
action), and by other non-statutory factors (i.e., problem intractability, unsupportive political
environments).

The message of these studies is not particularly optimistic about implementation prospects
given that most policies lack goal clarity and have complex implementation structures. The
basic prescription for enhancing implementation from this line of research is a call for
‘statutory coherence’ that is brought about by clear goals and simple implementation
structures (see Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981, 1983). This prescription fails to recognize the
political realities that account for policies with multiple goals, vague language, and complex
implementation structures. The stated goals or intent of policies, as found in preambles to
statutes, are often so vague as to provide little basis for guiding actions. As noted by
Schneider and Ingram (1997: 82–84), policy goals can be framed broadly or narrowly, be
opaque, or may be largely symbolic or hortatory (see also Stone, 1997: 37). Eugene Bardach
suggests this leaves room for renegotiation of goals during implementation by diverse
partners in one of several directions: ‘trimming them back, distorting or preventing them, or
even adding to them in a manner that eventually leads to an unsupportable political burden’
(1977: 85).

A different perspective is offered by those who argue that the appropriate crafting of policies
can overcome implementation difficulties attributable to vague goals and complex
implementation structures (see Elmore, 1987; Goggin et al., 1990; May, 1993; Stoker, 1991).
According to this viewpoint, implementation prospects are enhanced through three sets of
policy provisions. One set are those provisions that build the capacity of intermediaries to
carry out requisite actions. Capacity-building instruments include funding, education and
training, and technical assistance. A second set are policy provisions that foster increased
commitment of intermediaries to the basic policy goals. Commitment-building instruments
include publicity about policy goals, authorization for citizen suits against inadequate
implementation, sanctions for failing to act, cost-sharing requirements, and incentives to carry
out programs. A third set are policy provisions that help to signal desired courses of action.
These include oversight mechanisms and publicity about successful implementation
practices. These mechanisms entail what Howlett (2000) labels procedural policy instruments
aimed at intermediaries, rather than substantive provisions aimed at the targets of policy.

The thorny problems of intergovernmental implementation were highlighted in firstgeneration

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case studies of implementation failures (see Derthick, 1972; Presssman and Wildavsky, 1973).
Those problems are all the more evident for policies that address diffuse problems – dealing
with immigration, providing health care, reforming education, strengthening emergency
management, and so on – that require actions at multiple levels of government as well as by
public and private sector entities. Because many policies establish overlapping authorities and
responsibilities for implementation, shared governance is the norm rather than the exception.
Added to this mix is the increased extensive involvement of non-governmental actors in policy
implementation, leading to what public management scholars have more recently labeled
‘dispersed collaborative authority’ (Moynihan et al., 2011). The challenges of successful
implementation for such policies are well illustrated by Kathryn McDermott's study of
education reform in Massachusetts in which she found that ‘poorly thought-out incentive
structures, lack of capacity, and lack of trust impeded implementation’ (2006: 45).

Some research suggests the implementation conflicts that arise from shared governance and
dispersed collaborative authority can be ameliorated as part of policy designs. Goggin et al.
(1990) find, in what they label as the ‘communication model’ of implementation, that
differences in state-level implementation of federal programs can be explained by variation in
the clarity and consistency in the communication of policy intent. Stoker (1991) describes
successful implementation by states and localities of reforms of the federal National School
Lunch Program that he attributes to the program's establishment of incentives for close
cooperation among different implementers.

Other research has highlighted the mobilization of stakeholders in support of common goals
as a way of addressing dispersed collaborative authority and diffuse goals (see Chisholm,
1989: 29–33; O'Toole, 2003). One set of notable examples of use of such mobilization in
addressing diffuse problems consists of a range of programs and policies that employ public
information campaigns. Janet Weiss (2002) discusses the use of this tool for information
provision about harms and ways to address them (e.g., Smokey Bear campaign and wildfires,
information about environmentally responsible recycling) or in establishing processes of
information collection and dissemination that in turn seek to lessen harms (e.g., food and
cigarette labeling).

Policy Instruments and Policy Design

The research findings that suggest key features of policy designs can be altered to enhance
implementation leads to consideration of the components of public policies. One of the
conceptual shifts in implementation research from the 1970s to the 1990s is a shift from the
study of policies and programs to a study of different policy instruments or tools that are part
of policies and programs. With this, scholarly attention shifted from addressing the content of
a policy as a whole to understanding the workings and politics of the components of the
policy. These components are variously labeled as policy instruments or as policy tools. The
basic notion is that any given policy incorporates a variety of means or tools for accomplishing
objectives that include mandates, incentives (e.g., grants, loans, tax expenditures), penalties
(e.g., sanctions, fines), and information provision.

Although this change in focus from the study of policy content as a whole to the study of
policy instruments provides a stronger analytic basis for unpacking policies, there is little
agreement about the relevant components of policies. Over a dozen different typologies of
policy instruments have been devised that vary in terms of their level of specification and their
scope (for overviews see Salamon, 1989, 2002; Vedung, 1998). While there is conceptual
agreement that policy instruments are the building blocks of policies, there is little agreement

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about the basic instruments. The more specific and comprehensive categorizations identify 10
to 15 instruments. For example, one commonly cited compilation (Salamon, 2002) addresses
the following 14 tools: direct government provision, governmental corporations and sponsored
enterprises, economic regulation, social regulation, government insurance, public information,
charges and special taxes, contracting, purchase-of-service contracting, grants, loans and
loan guarantees, tax expenditures, vouchers, and tort liability.

Other taxonomies of policy instruments are more parsimonious in their classification of

instruments. Elmore (1987) draws a distinction among mandates as rules that are intended to
produce compliance, inducements as conditional transfers of money for provision of specified
services, capacity-building tools that invest in development of future services, and system-
changing tools that transfer authority in order to alter service delivery. Schneider and Ingram
(1990) provide a related analytic distinction among authority tools that prescribe desired
behaviors, inducements and sanctions that alter calculated behaviors, capacity-building tools
that enhance abilities, and hortatory tools that are used to cajole action.

The strength of the literature about policy tools is development of an understanding of how
each tool works, the key features and variants of each tool, and the strengths and weakness
of each tool. In developing this understanding, the literature has taken a somewhat
technocratic perspective that is fairly devoid of consideration of the linkages among problems,
tools, and outcomes. Guy Peters argues ‘the contingent relationship argued to exist between
problems and instruments is crucial to the enterprise of policy design’ (2005: 351). In other
words, the problem context needs to be considered in the selection of tools. Anne Schneider
and Helen Ingram argue that the political context is paramount in situating ‘the concept of
policy design within a causal model that emphasizes the political processes through which
designs are created as well as the translating processes through which the effects of
democracy are realized’ (1997: 72–73). From this perspective the selection of tools for a policy
design is in part a reaction to the power and social construction of the relevant target groups
(1997: 102–140). The choice of tools, in turn, sends signals to target groups about their worth
and reinforces the stereotypes that led to the tool selection in the first place (1997: 140–145).

Following from these lines of reasoning, the more recent literature about policy tools has
considered how different tools can be combined to form distinct policy strategies. Richard
Elmore (1987) was one of the first to characterize the policy rationales for different
combinations of instruments. Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) suggested different
instrument mixes for achieving ‘smart regulation’ that reflects the contingent nature of different
policy instruments. Michael Howlett (2009) has developed this kind of reasoning further in
suggesting how different governance modes and policy logics lead to the identification of
different mixes of policy tools.

In short, the literature about policy instruments has moved from cataloging and considering
different instruments to addressing the interplay of different combinations of instruments.
Despite these developments, the literature still falls short in suggesting insights about
tradeoffs when choosing different mixes of instruments. This is because the value of a
particular combination of instruments is shaped as much by the political context in which they
are employed as by the inherent features of the instruments.

Political Environments Affecting Design and Implementation

Viewing implementation as policy politics alters how one thinks about policy design and
implementation. Rather than treating design as a technocratic activity of finding the best

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design subject to certain political constraints, the political perspective views policy design as
an art aimed at channeling energies of disparate implementers to foster agreement in working
toward similar goals and at mobilizing constituencies in support of the policy. The latter is one
key factor in affecting the durability of policies. Let us consider different aspects of the policy
politics of implementation.

Implementation Environments and Policy Design

It is useful to depict differing political environments that affect policy design and
implementation. Drawing from the discussion of May (1991), a continuum of political
environments can be depicted, with one extreme labeled ‘policies with publics’ and the other
extreme labeled ‘policies without publics’. The notion of a continuum is useful in making the
point that the differences are more matters of the degree of development of the relevant
publics and related policy subsystems than of their existence or total absence. For ‘policies
with publics’ there are well-developed coalitions of interest groups surrounding particular
issues. For ‘policies without publics’ there is limited development of interest groups, usually
restricted to technical and scientific communities.

Policies with Publics

The dominant characterization of political environments for countries with democratic systems
is that of policies with publics. According to this depiction, policy options are fashioned and
choices are made in policy worlds composed of multiple publics with competing interests and
differential resources. In forming loosely connected, sometimes highly fragmented advocacy
coalitions (see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) the publics engage in a series of strategic
interactions, often over a period of years, in attempting to dominate the processes of political
problem definition, policy formation, and implementation. Underlying these interactions are
differing causal beliefs and belief systems (see Stone, 1989). The ability to arrive at a stable
consensus over problems or appropriate actions is undermined by the existence of strongly
held, opposing core beliefs by relevant publics and those political actors they influence. In
such instances, policy making takes place at the margins of solutions, and problems persist
for many years.

The implementation challenges for policies with publics stem from the fact that relevant
intermediaries and target groups who were active publics in defining the problem and shaping
policy solutions also attempt to influence implementation. In some settings, as discussed by
Winter (1990) regarding policy implementation in Scandinavia, stable relationships among
publics are helpful for policy legitimization and implementation. In the American setting, as
discussed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993), existing ways of doing business and existing
policy monopolies become potentially powerful drags for policy change and implementation.

As long as the coalitions in support of business as usual are stable, fundamental changes are
difficult to achieve. Similarly, in a given arena, policy instruments for new policies will differ
little from those of the existing policy. Mandates get added to existing mandates. Regulations
get piled on existing regulations. Grant-in-aid programs proliferate in areas where they
already exist. As a consequence, it is not surprising that ‘system changing’ policy designs
entailing new allocations of authority (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987) or ‘roundabout methods’
(Majone, 1989) entailing institutional redesign are infrequently used instruments for policy
design.

The policy design prescriptions for policies with publics emphasize structuring of relationships

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and coordinating behavior among the relevant publics that comprise intermediaries and target
groups. The trick is finding a political and governance logic that makes it possible to change
policy thrusts (see Elmore, 1987; Howlett, 2009; Linder and Peters, 1984). This may consist of
developing a policy design that is supported by a new coalition among interests with the
coalition based around a new combination of policy instruments. The political logic may also
consist of a different political strategy than used in the past efforts to enact new policies. This
may include creating a crisis, or the appearance of one, so as to make the case for new
policies. Or, it may include finding a leader willing to take the blame for the negative impacts
of the policy.

Policies without Publics

A contrasting political world is that of policies without publics. This is the opposite end of the
continuum of policy publics for which policy options are fashioned and choices made in what
appears to be an apolitical environment. Publics surrounding the issue are neither extensive
nor a source of major conflict. Issue networks or policy communities are only weakly
developed. Belief systems concerning problems and solutions are tentative and dominated by
technocratic expert opinions. Relevant policy discussions take place in the backwaters of
political institutions. These include issues for which there is little incentive for organized
interests to evolve in pursuit of a policy. This typically arises for public goods (or, conversely
public bads), as illustrated by dilemmas of achieving deficit reduction, maintaining biological
diversity, addressing global environmental problems, addressing terrorism, or dealing with
potential catastrophic disasters like major earthquakes.

The situation for policies without publics might appear to be beneficial for implementation. The
lack of publics provides a greater degree of implementation autonomy than is the case for
policies with publics. Under such circumstances, policy implementation is not likely to be
actively thwarted by intermediaries or target groups. However, the relative absence of publics
creates unique implementation challenges. Target groups are likely to be poorly delineated.
Various intermediaries such as governmental organizations and street-level bureaucrats will
exist, but are likely to be relatively uninterested.

Two broad strategies are potentially relevant to the design of policies when publics are
lacking. One is direct governmental provision of programs without relying upon other
intermediaries. In some instances, such as the response to terrorism, a centrally-managed
and implemented program is necessary for achieving rapid response to diffuse problems. In
other instances, such as provision of terrorism insurance, direct government action is a
necessary substitute for the faults of private markets. A second strategy is to stimulate the
formation of publics.

Mobilization of publics is appropriate when such participation of relevant stakeholders is

necessary for successful policy implementation, as might be the case for protecting
endangered species, for increasing awareness of civil rights, or for engaging the private sector
in the upgrading of infrastructure. The provision of information can be an important tool for
mobilizing attention (see Weiss, 2002).

Implementation and Policy Durability

Policies take form and are adapted to changing circumstances as different forces shape their
implementation. These include the interests that are mobilized in support of strong
implementation or that seek to undermine policy implementation. Much depends on the

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relative political power of these groups, their perceptions of benefits and burdens, and their
resources. A newer line of research considers how these forces and the broader political
environment affects the durability of policy reforms (see Patashnik, 2008) and of policy
regimes (see Jochim and May, 2010).

Such durability depends in part on the degree to which a constituency is mobilized in support
of the policy while limiting opposition. The pollution abatement regime for reducing pollution in
the United States was strong in the 1970s because of the strength of environmental groups
and the decision by the Environmental Protection Agency to only pursue notable polluters.
The powerful forces behind this regime and their ties to political power, provided a basis at
least initially for warding off opposition during implementation (see Andrews, 1999: 238–239).
As the forces weaken or are altered, the durability of a regime is undermined and potentially
destabilized.

The political dynamic that affects policy durability is also influenced by the way in which the
use of different tools affects various interests. Smith and Ingram (2002; see also Schneider
and Ingram, 1997) suggest that the selection of tools can have a profound effect upon target
groups by sending messages about their value to others and by shaping opportunities for
participation and involvement in collective decision making. They argue that these effects
reverberate over time in shaping the ability and willingness of different groups to endorse or
work to undermine the implementation of a given policy. Schneider and Ingram (1997)
underscore that because groups differ in their power and resources, such policy feedback is
biased toward more powerful groups that were previously advantaged in the original design of
a policy.

Also relevant is the power of the ideas that are the heart a given policy design – what Howlett
(2009: 79–80) refers to as the logic of a policy regime. Ideas about ‘pollution abatement’ for
environmental pollution, ‘zero tolerance’ for illegal drug use, ‘personal responsibility’ for
welfare reform, and ‘homeland security’ for addressing the threat of terrorism provide a shared
purpose and common logic for policy design and implementation. Greater agreement about
core ideas that and the logic for them ease implementation and enhance policy durability.
With a sense of common purpose comes commitment to carry out the policy and to resist
efforts to undermine it.

The durability of policies is as much dependent on the broader political context as it is on the
preceding forces (see Jochim and May, 2010). As new political alignments take shape, the
composition of interests who have privileged access to political institutions changes. As a
result, the coalitions that support specific policy regimes and strong implementation are
weakened. For example, the emergence of the business ‘pro-growth’ coalition in the United
States under the Reagan administration shifted the balance of power towards business and
ultimately chipped away at the environmental pollution abatement regime of the 1970s (see
Andrews, 1999: 256–261).

Shaping Implementation – Choices in Policy Design

The process of policy design and implementation is not simply one of assembling parts and
plugging in implementation machinery. The compromises that are necessary to gain support
for a given policy explain why policy designs and implementation structures are often messy.
Recognizing these facts, however, does not negate the value of considering how choices
made when designing policies potentially shape policy implementation.

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Policy Intentions and Philosophy

Perhaps the overriding considerations in shaping the contours of a policy are the intentions
for and philosophy of the policy. Is the policy intended to provide benefits for particular
segments of society, restrict behaviors in preventing harm, mobilize action on the part of
groups to address a problem, or something else? Policy intentions establish the goals and
type of policy that is to be put in place. They also establish the contours of political debate
that shape eventual politics of policy adoption and implementation.

A key lesson of efforts to classify different types of policies is the dual relationship between
politics and policy. As discussed in a seminal article by Lowi (1972), not only does politics
affect the design of policies but also the choice of policy affects the associated politics. Lowi
demonstrated this in showing the different politics associated with distributive, redistributive,
and regulatory policies. Wilson (1973) further elaborated upon this framework in showing how
the perceptions of the distributions of costs and benefits of a given policy affect politics by
creating different challenges for policy enactment and implementation. The important point for
implementation scholars of research about the duality of policy and politics is that the political
environment for policy implementation is a malleable landscape that can be affected by policy
content.

The underlying philosophical or ideological glue provides important policy rationale for linking
solutions to problems, recognizing that any given intent can be justified and carried out in a
variety of ways (Donovan, 2001; Stone, 1989). Linder and Peters (1984, 1989), among others,
have argued that different national policy styles, reflecting cross-national differences in policy
approaches, establish the foundations for such philosophies. Noteworthy studies of the
development of policy regimes concerning economic policy (Hall, 1993), social policy (Heclo,
1974), and other reforms (Jochim and May, 2010) highlight the role of ideas, interests, and
institutions in shaping the contours of policy regimes.

How does policy intention affect implementation? Rather than setting forth explicit directions
for policy, it sets boundaries around choices of policy instruments and implementation
structures (see Howlett, 2009). Thus, for example, a conservative ideological approach may
favor use of tax incentives, while a less conservative government may prefer direct subsidies
to promote particular ends. One key lesson for policy design is to fashion instruments and
implementation approaches (means) that are consistent with the policy intent (goals).
Otherwise, the policy is working at cross-purposes. A second key lesson is that the political
environment, i.e., the target groups and field staff that implement the policy, must be
supportive of the policy intention. Otherwise, they may exercise principled disagreement with
the policy and work to subvert it. This is one reason why, as discussed below, it is important to
build features into policies for building commitment to policy goals.

Scope of a Policy

The scope of the policy addresses the scale of the undertaking. This can be characterized
with respect to geographic scale (whether a policy is national or more limited in scale), with
respect to the degree to which particular groups are targeted (a focused policy versus a more
general one), with respect to the heterogeneity of the affected groups (whether they are
similar or differ greatly), and whether the policy is new or an adaptation of an existing policy.

How does the scope of the policy affect policy implementation? There are tradeoffs that
present a basic dilemma for policy implementation. On the one hand, all else being equal, a

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more contained policy is easier to implement (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). On the other
hand, the likely impacts of a more contained policy are more limited in that fewer are affected
by the policy. This dilemma gets to the basic issue of the tractability of the policy, which has
been a key variable in thinking about prospective implementation success.

As the scope of a policy becomes more heterogeneous with respect to affected groups or
other components, there is likely to be greater need and political pressure for policy
adaptation in implementation. What constitutes appropriate adaptation has not been
considered in the implementation literature beyond the observation that such adaptation can
add value to policy. The topic of designing policies to promote learning about appropriate
adaptation has been considered more generally in the literature concerning policy learning
(May, 1992) and the evolution of policies over time (Majone and Wildavsky, 1979).

Policy Instruments Affecting Target Groups

The means for bringing about behavioral changes among affected groups or for delivering
governmental services to segments of society entail choices about the appropriate means of
intervention. As Majone and Wildavsky (1979) articulated, all policies contain hypotheses
about how to bring about change – a theory of change – that may or may not be adequate
(see also Linder and Peters, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1997). Part of the theory of change
are presumptions about the workings of different policy instruments or tools that, as
articulated by Salamon (2002), structure action in identifiable ways.

Strategy, ideology, and politics influence the ways in which different tools are combined into
policy mixes. The strategic issues revolve around policy analysis considerations concerning
the appropriate role of government and other actors, the potential means of intervention, and
the costs and feasibility of carrying out programs. The possible combinations of tools into
policies provides a bewildering array of potential choices, but it is often the ideological glue
that guides choices about different potential mixes. The political considerations for the choice
of policy instruments affecting target groups invoke the dynamics discussed earlier in this
chapter, as theorized about by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram (1997: 102–135). They
suggest that perceptions of the social constructions and perceived political power of target
populations profoundly influences the choice of policy instruments. In selecting policy tools,
policy makers treat groups as advantaged (deserving, powerful groups), deviants
(undeserving, weaker groups), dependants (deserving, weaker groups), or contenders
(undeserving, powerful groups).

Regardless of the forces that lead to the selection of different tools aimed at affecting the
behaviors of target groups, it is clear that policy tools differ with respect to the implementation
issues they raise. One basic issue is the receptivity of target groups to their treatment.
Schneider and Ingram (1997: 140–149, see also Smith and Ingram, 2002) suggest target
groups react to the negative messages that are embedded in tools that are burdensome,
thereby undermining the ease of implementation. As discussed by Lester Salamon and
various contributors to the edited book, The Tools of Government (2002), policy tools vary in
terms of their degree of automaticity, directness, and coerciveness. The prospects for
implementation problems grow as policy designs invoke tools that are less automatic in their
implementation by virtue of introducing new ways of doing business, by being more indirect in
working through actions by multiple entities, and by being more coercive with respect to
burdening targets. The important lesson for policy design and implementation is that that the
mix of instruments needs to adhere to an overall strategy for which the elements do not work
at cross-purposes.

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Policy Instruments Affecting Intermediaries

Although much of the discussion of policy design focuses on the intended targets or
outcomes of policy, the intermediaries charged with carrying out policy are also relevant. The
key advice of the literature is that policies should contain features that encourage or compel
intermediaries to carry out requisite actions for implementing the policy. Weimer (1992)
provides an instructive set of examples of how creation of desirable incentives, favorable
structuring of decisions, and instilling appropriate habits and norms can promote desired
responses on the part of implementers.

Building the commitment to the basic policy goals and the capacity of intermediaries to
accomplish those goals are important elements of this aspect of policy design. Commitment-
and capacity-building provisions are best thought of as interactive features that reinforce each
other in facilitating policy implementation (May, 1993). These features also serve important
functions in signaling what is expected of intermediaries (see Goggin et al., 1990).

Implementation Structures and Third Parties

The intermediaries that are charged with policy implementation and how they share
responsibilities are important aspects that constitute the implementation structure for a given
policy. The choice of a structure is rarely a simple matter of naming a governmental
organization to carry out a policy. One of the key themes of this Handbook is the increased
role of networks of public and private actors in carrying out policies. Laurence O'Toole
(Chapter 19), in discussing interorganizational relations and policy implementation, makes a
convincing case that it is no longer sufficient to understand how governmental agencies
operate to fully understand policy implementation. It is now necessary to understand the
dynamics and operations of other types of institutions and their relationships. As O'Toole
elaborates, this in turn introduces a host of possibilities and potential pitfalls.

The guidance of the implementation literature about relevant structures has shifted from
advice to clarify and simplify them (see Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983) to advice to develop
implementation structures that ‘mesh’ with policy objectives (see O'Toole, 1993). What the
latter consists of is not well articulated in the literature. It can be thought of as a structure that
both reflects the philosophy of the policy and engages entities that are committed to and have
the capacity to carry out the policy. Stoker (1991) refers to this as the development of
constructive patterns of cooperation. This is illustrated by New Zealand's intergovernmental
approach to environmental management (see May et al., 1996). Regional and district councils
are given latitude to carry out the spirit of the policy in ways they best see fit. This structure
fits the policy intent of devolved policy making while the policy also incorporates mechanisms
to ensure coordination of policies among layers of government.

It is important to recognize when the existing implementation structure is deficient or too rigid
to adapt to new requirements of a given policy. Under such circumstances, Elmore (1987)
reminds us that ‘system changing’ can be a useful policy tool. Changing the service delivery
or regulatory responsibilities provides an opportunity to put in place a new, and hopefully
more constructive, set of relationships. It also strongly signals a desire to do things differently.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the interplay of policy design and implementation. Policy design

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is not simply a technocratic task undertaken in a backroom that entails the assembly of policy
instruments to achieve some end. Nor is implementation an administrative task of handing
over policy details to an organizational machinery. Policy design and implementation are tasks
of policy and political problem solving that are subject to a variety of pressures. This chapter
has considered how different political environments foster implementation and design
challenges as well as how politics shapes choices about different mixes of policy instruments
and the durability of policies.

The literature addressing the nexus of policy design and implementation provides important
insights. The prescriptions of the early implementation literature to clarify and simplify the
design of policies have been replaced with more realistic advice about the design of policies
that create incentives for implementers to take requisite actions. In particular, implementation
prospects are enhanced through policy designs that contain provisions that build the capacity
of intermediaries to carry out requisite actions, that foster increased commitment to policy
goals, and that help to signal desired courses of action.

The policy and political problem-solving perspective alters how one thinks about policy design
and implementation. Rather than treating design as a technocratic activity of finding the best
design subject to certain political constraints, the political perspective views policy design as
an art aimed at channeling energies of disparate implementers to foster agreement in working
toward similar goals and at mobilizing constituencies in support of the policy. The latter is
particularly challenging for issues for which there is little incentive for organized interests to
evolve in pursuit of a policy. The mobilization of constituencies is also important for sustaining
policies over time.

Policy design is, of course, not the only factor that shapes implementation processes and
outcomes. The observations in this chapter need to be considered along with the discussion
of interorganizational relations and policy implementation by Laurence O'Toole (Chapter 19)
and the discussion of street-level bureaucracy in implementation by Marcia Meyers and
Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen (Chapter 18). Although much of the implementation literature has
moved on to address the role of other factors in shaping implementation, it is worth
remembering the basic axiom that well-designed policies are necessary but not sufficient for
improving implementation prospects.

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policy instruments
policy implementation
policies
selection tools
instruments
political environments
public policy

http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446200506.n18

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