Contents

Introduction

Rawls' Method

Rawls' Two Principles of Justice

Beyond Rawls

Introduction

Selecting Principles of Justice. Different principles of distributive justice are proposed by different
philosophers. Does that mean that we may choose any one of them with equal justification? A "yes"
answer to this question would make disputes about fairness impossible to settle. To avoid this, we must
find some non-arbitary method of selecting among proposed principles of justice.

The Uses of Tradition.One method for resolving this issue might be to follow the traditions of various
practices that have grown up over time. For example, the practice of grading students for their
performance in academic courses now includes a merit principle for determining most grades: the grade
a student receives should reflect the quantity and quality of her work. It might be said in defense of such
traditions that they have survived because they have proven more satisfactory to the parties affected,
considered collectively, than other conceivable alternatives, such as giving everyone the same grade or
handing out grades in accordance with the student's ability to pay. To argue this way would be to
reinforce the argument from tradition ("we've done it that way for a long time") by a kind of Utilitarian
argument ("let's optimize society's satisfaction").

The Problem of Radically Unjust Traditions. But traditions can be oppressive and unjust. Activities that
take place within unjust social systems can themselves be unjust, in spite of their traditional nature. Thus
a practice of giving a person that which is "his" can be unjust. Suppose this rule is included within a
system of slave property, the "property" in question is a slave, and the practice would require someone
meeting an escaped slave to return the slave to his or her master. The fact that the slave system is unjust
raises doubts about the justice of activities that occur within that system, such as returning escaped
"property" to its "owners." What is needed is a way to determine when social systems, or the rules of
justice that govern society a s a whole, are just:
Such an approach to the selection of rules of distributive justice is provided by John Rawls. Rawls'
approach is not Utilitarian and it does not rely heavily on arguments from tradition.

Summary

JOHN RAWLS – THEORY OF JUSTICE (SUMMARY)

Cons the classical utilitarianism of Bentham, Rawls offers a new solution to combine social justice and
liberalism in the Theory of Justice. Theorist of the contract, this work is considered today in the United
States as a classic of political philosophy and often as the greatest book of the contemporary philosophy.

John Rawls founded his thought on his readings : mostly Aristotle and the classics of English political
philosophy (Locke, Hume, Hobbes). His contractualism is partly inspired by Rousseau but without a
theory of the state of nature. His conception of morality is rooted in Kant’s ethics. Rawls criticizes
utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.Rawls and utilitarianism – the veil of ignorance

Bentham’s utilitarianism believes that humanity’s aim is the happiness, which everyone seek to obtain
what is good and avoid what is painful. Similarly, the purpose of the government is to seek the ommon
welfare, considered as the sum of the utility of individuals. This is to get maximum satisfaction for
everyone.Yet this argument is problematic. Consider to understand the following situation: you have to
organize a collective struggle against a fatal disease highly contagious. But to make the serum necessary
to protect general must sacrifice two victims at random. According to the utilitarian criterion we face the
following choice: either all die or die and only two others survive. It is therefore prefer the second
solution. Utilitarianism goes even further: those who will sacrifice the two less useful to society. But here
is the moral conscience is shocked and, in particular, the Kantian principles. Kant, indeed, at least two
reasons we should forbid such a choice:

Everyone is an individual and, as such, there is no individual who more or less valuable than another.
Discrimination is unethical. We must all have the same rights.

One of the formulations of the categorical imperative tells us never to humanity (in my person as in that
of others) only as a means but always at the same time as an end. Now it is clear that the two people
killed are taken only as a means and not at the same time as ends.

Should we then sacrifice the entire population, however, because morality forbids the sacrifice of two of
us? This is where the theory of Rawls who is considering a purely hypothetical original situation in which
individuals react under a veil of ignorance. This hypothetical situation is not without thinking of the
Social Contract Rousseau or Locke. This is, indeed, to derive the principles of political authority of a
convention by which first isolated the partners together to form a community of law. But Rawls believes
that policy so we are always tempted to try the theories based on the personal benefits that their
application would give us. Therefore a position where partners are located behind a veil of ignorance so
that they know nothing of what will be their place in society (boss or worker, active or inactive), their
natural abilities (strong or weak , invalid or handicapped etc..) and without pre-conception of the good
(and therefore not under the influence of any religion). The contractor does not even know what the
“circumstances of his own company” that is to say what its economic power, its political system, its
cultural level. It is in this context that people agree on what should be the principles of justiceIn our
previous example, is more important then the result (save thousand people at the expense of sacrificing
two or all) because the ends do not justify the means. Each person will decide according to his own
conception of Good. Imagine another example or fifty people living in a swamp with malaria. To save the
people, we must drain the swamp. The hard work will probably victims (say two) and three not benefit
individuals who are already immune. Is it necessary or not to drain the swamp? Under the veil of
ignorance it is not known, nor whether it is one of those immunized, or if you are part of those who die
in the works. All we know is that it does not dry out if you have three chances to survive in fifty (because
you will be part of the immune), while if it dries out the probability rises to forty-eight out of fifty. No
doubt, under the veil of ignorance, we will vote unanimously drying.

Rawls : The Justice as Fairness

Assuming, therefore, subjects placed behind the veil of ignorance, all selfish reasons (they are concerned
about their future) and endowed with reason, on what general principles of division of property can they
agree?According to Rawls all citizens in this situation will agree on two principles:

– The first principle (the principle of equal liberty), “each person must have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberty for all, consistent with a single system for all.” This means
that everyone has the same basic rights and duties. Everyone wants the same basic rights: freedom of
movement, expression, assembly, property etc.. “The basic liberties may be restricted in the name of
freedom.” Freedom is inalienable, and here is revealed Rawls liberal and close to the Enlightenment.

– The second principle (the principle of inequality) states that the inequalities (economic and social) are
justified only if: attached to positions, jobs available to all under conditions of equal opportunity
impartial (principle of equal opportunities). This assumes that the company must reduce the maximum
possible natural differences.

These principles are hierarchical: the principle of equal liberty has priority over the other two and the
principle of equal opportunity has priority over the difference principle.A just society is not egalitarian
but it is an equitable society where the position giving the greatest benefits are available to all and the
benefits obtained by some also benefit left behind. For example, if some are rich enough to acquire
works of art, however, they place them in museums where the poorest can admire them. Inequality does
not advantage all are unfair.

John Rawls' Method

We are to imagine ourselves in what Rawls calls the Original Position. We are all self-interested rational
persons and we stand behind "the Veil of Ignorance." To say that we are self-interested rational persons
is to say that we are motivated to select, in an informed and enlightened way, whatever seems
advantageous for ourselves.

To say that we are behind a Veil of Ignorance is to say we do not know the following sorts of things: our
sex, race, physical handicaps, generation, social class of our parents, etc. But self-interested rational
persons are not ignorant of (1) the general types of possible situations in which humans can find
themselves; (2) general facts about human psychology and "human nature".

Self-interested rational persons behind the Veil of Ignorance are given the task of choosing the principles
that shall govern actual world. Rawls believes that he has set up an inherently fair procedure here.
Because of the fairness of the procedure Rawls has described, he says, the principles that would be
chosen by means of this procedure would be fair principles.

A self-interested rational person behind the Veil of Ignorance would not want to belong to a race or
gender or sexual orientation that turns out to be discriminated-against. Such a person would not wish to
be a handicapped person in a society where handicapped are treated without respect. So principles
would be adopted that oppose discrimination.

Likewise, a self-interested rational person would not want to belong to a generation which has been
allocated a lower than average quantity of resources. So (s)he would endorse the principle: "Each
generation should have roughly equal resources" or "Each generation should leave to the next at least as
many resources as they possessed at the start."

The corollary of this, in rights terms, is that all generations have the same rights to resources, future as
well as present.John Rawls' principles of justice.
Rawls argues that self-interested rational persons behind the veil of ignorance would choose two general
principles of justice to structure society in the real world:

1) Principle of Equal Liberty: Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible
with similar liberties for all. (Egalitarian.)

2) Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are both (a) to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of equality of opportunity.

(1) is egalitarian, since it distributes extensive liberties equally to all persons.

(2b) is also quite egalitarian, since it distributes opportunities to be considered for offices and positions
in an equal manner.

(2a) is not egalitarian but makes benefit for some (those with greater talents, training, etc.)
proportionate to their contribution toward benefiting the least advantaged persons.

(1) obviously echoes, without exactly duplicating, libertarianism in its commitment to extensive liberties.

What does the Difference Principle mean? It means that society may undertake projects that require
giving some persons more power, income, status, etc. than others, e.g., paying accountants and upper-
level managers more than assembly-line operatives, provided that the following conditions are met:

(a) the project will make life better off for the people who are now worst off, for example, by raising the
living standards of everyone in the community and empowering the least advantaged persons to the
extent consistent with their well-being,

and (b) access to the privileged positions is not blocked by discrimination according to irrelevant criteria.
The Difference Principle has elements of other familiar ethical theories. The "socialist" idea (see
Distributive Justice) that responsibilities or burdens should be distibuted according to ability and benefits
according to need is partly contained within the Difference Principle. We may reasonably assume that
the "least advantaged" have the greatest needs and that those who receive special powers (hinted at
under "social inequalities") also have special responsibilities or burdens. However, the merit principle
that the use of special skills should be rewarded is also included in the Difference Principle.

What (2a) does not permit is a change in social and economic institutions that makes life better for those
who are already well off but does nothing for those who are already disadvantaged, or makes their life
worse.

Example: policies that permit nuclear power plants which degrade the environment for nearby family
farmers but provide jobs for already well-paid professionals who come in from the big cities.

Beyond Rawls

Rawls' theory of justice was set forth in his book A Theory of Justice ( Harvard University Press, 1971).
Since then it has been much discussed, and attempts have been made to improve and clarify it, not least
by Rawls himself. One of those attempts at improvement is that of Martha C. Nussbaum (Women and
Human Development), who has reinterpreted Rawls' argument from the perspective of Substantial
Freedom, an idea she gets from Amartya Sen.

For Nussbaum the liberties mentioned in the Principle of Equal Liberty, if they are to be meaningful at all,
are capabilities or substantial freedoms, real opportunities based on natural and developed potentialities
as well as the presence of governmentally supported institutions, to engage in political deliberation and
planning over one's own life.

Likewise, for Nussbaum, the concern of the Difference Principle to raise up those who are least
advantaged must be clarified in light of substantial freedoms. What is needed, in her view, is a
commitment by citizens and governments to a threshold of real opportunities below which no human
being should fall if she is able to rise above it.

THE MAIN IDEA OF THE THEORY OF JUSTICE

My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a

higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say,

in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant." In order to do this we are not to think of the

original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form

of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the

basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the

principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests

would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms

of their association. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they

specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of

government that can be established. This way of regarding the principles of justice

I shall call justice as fairness.

Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose

together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties

and to determine the division of social benefits. Men are to decide in advance

how they are to regulate their claims against one another and what is to be the

foundation charter of their society. Just as each person must decide by rational

reflection what constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational

for him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is to

count among them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men would make

in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty, assuming for the present that this

choice problem has a solution, determines the principles of justice.

ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN PERSPECTIVE

In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state

of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is
not, of course, thought, of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a

primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation

charact~rized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.b Among the essential

features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position

or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural

assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that

the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological

propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This

ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by

the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since

all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the
principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.

For given the circumstances of the original position, the symmetry of everyone's

relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individuals as moral
persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and capable, I shall assume,

of a sense of justice. The original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial

status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This

explains the propriety of the name "justice as fairness": it conveys the idea that

the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair. The name

does not mean that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same, any more

than the phrase "poetry as metaphor" means that the concepts of poetry and

metaphor are the same.

Justice as fairness begins, as I have said, with one of the most general of all

choices which persons might make together, namely, with the choice of the first

principles of a conception of justice which is to regulate all subsequent criticism

and reform of institutions. Then, having chosen a conception of justice, we can

suppose that they are to choose a constitution and a legislature to enact laws, and

so on, all in accordance with the principles of justice initially agreed upon. Our

social situation is just if it is such that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements

we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it. Moreover, assuming that the
original position does determine a set of principles (thatis, that a particular conception of justice would
be chosen), it will then be true

that whenever social institutions satisfy these principles those engaged in them

can say to one another that they are cooperating on terms to which they would

agree if they were free and equal persons whose relations with respect to one

another were fair. They could all view their arrangements as meeting the stipulations which they would
acknowledge in an initial situation that embodies widely

accepted and reasonable constraints on the choice of principles. The general recognition of this fact
would provide the basis for a public acceptance of the corresponding principles of justice. No society
can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person
finds himself

placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and the

nature of this position materially affects his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying
the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a

voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would

assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous and the
obligations they recognize self-imposed.

One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the parties in the initial situation

as rational and mutually disinterested. This does not mean that the parties are

egoists, that is, individuals with only certain kinds of interests, say in wealth,

prestige, and domination. But they are conceived as not taking an interest in one

another's interests. They are to presume that even their spiritual aims may be

opposed, in the way that the aims of those of different religions may be opposed.

Moreover, the concept of rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the

narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to

given ends. I shall modify this concept to some extent, as explained later, but one

must try to avoid introducing into it any controversial ethical elements. The initial
situation must be characterized by stipulations that are widely accepted.

In working out the conception of justice as fairness one main task clearly is to

determine which principles of justice would be chosen in the original position.

To do this we must describe this situation in some detail and formulate with care

the problem of choice which it presents. These matters I shall take up in the

immediately succeeding chapters. It may be observed, however, that once the

principles of justice are thought of as arising from an original agreement in a

situation of equality, it is an open question whether the principle of utility would

be acknowledged. Offhand it hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves

as equals, entitled to press their claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which may require
lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a

greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. Since each desires to protect his

interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no one has a reason
to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater net

balance of satisfaction. In the absence of strong and lasting benevolent impulses,

a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximizedhe algebraic sum of
advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own

basic rights and interests. Thus it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible

with the conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage. It

appears to be inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity implicit in the notion of a

well-ordered society. Or, at any rate, so I shall argue.

I shall maintain instead that the persons in the initial situation would choose

two rather different principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic

rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities,

for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in

compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged

members of society. These principles rule out justifying institutions on the

grounds that the hardships of some are offset by a greater good in the aggregate.

It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in order that

others may prosper. But there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a

few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved.

The intuitive idea is that since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of

cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of

advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone

taking part in it, including those less well situated. Yet this can be expected only

if reasonable terms are proposed. The two principles mentioned seem to be a fair

agreement on the basis of which those better endowed, or more fortunate in their

social position, neither of which we can be said to deserve, could expect the willing

cooperation of others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the

welfare of all.e Once we decide to look for a conception of justice that nullifies

the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance

as counters in quest for political and economic advantage, we are led to these

principles. They express the result of leaving aside those aspects of the social

world that seem arbitrary from a moral point of view.

The problem of the choice of principles, however, is extremely difficult. I do

not expect the answer I shall suggest to be convincing to everyone. It is, therefore,

worth noting from the outset that justice as fairness, like other contract views,

consists of two parts: (1) an interpretation of the initial situation and of the problem of choice posed
there, and (2) a set of principles which, it is argued, would

be agreed to. One may accept the first part of the theory (or some variant thereof),

but not the other, and conversely. The concept of the initial contractual situation

may seem reasonable although the particular principles proposed are rejected. To

be sure, I want to maintain that the most appropriate conception of this situation
does lead to principles of justice contrary to utilitarianism and perfectionism, and

therefore that the contract doctrine provides an alternative to these views. Still,

one may dispute this contention even though one grants that the contractarian

'For the formulation of this intuitive idea I am indebted to Allan Gibbard.method is a useful way of
studying ethical theories and of setting forth their

underlying assumptions.

Justice as fairness is an example of what I have called a contract theory. Now

there may be an objection to the term "contract" and related expressions, but I

think it will serve reasonably well. Many words have misleading connotations

which at first are likely to confuse. The terms "utility" and "utilitarianism" are

surely no exception. They too have unfortunate suggestions which hostile critics

have been willing to exploit; yet they are clear enough for those prepared to study

utilitarian doctrine. The same should be true of the term "contract" applied to
moral theories. As I have mentioned, to understand it one has to keep in mind

that it implies a certain level of abstraction. In particular, the content of the

relevant agreement is not to enter a given society or to adopt a given form of

government, but to accept certain moral principles. Moreover, the undertakings

referred to are purely hypothetical: a contract view holds that certain principles

would be accepted in a well-defined initial situation.

The merit of the contract terminology is that it conveys the idea that principles

of justice may be conceived as principles that would be chosen by rational persons,

and that in this way conceptions of justice may be explained and justified. The

theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of

rational choice. Furthermore, principles of justice deal with conflicting claims

upon the advantages won by social cooperation; they apply to the relations among

several persons or groups. The word "contract" suggests this plurality as well as
the condition that the appropriate division of advantages must be in accordance

with principles acceptable to all parties. The condition of publicity for principles

of justice is also connoted by the contract phraseology. Thus, if these principles

are the outcome of an agreement, citizens have a knowledge of the principles that

others follow. It is characteristic of contract theories to stress the public nature

of political principles. Finally there is the long tradition of the contract doctrine.

Expressing the tie with this line of thought helps to define ideas and accords with

natural piety. There are then several advantages in the use of the term "contract."

With due precautions taken, it should not be misleading.

A final remark. Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is

clear that the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an

entire ethical system, that is, to a system including principles for all the virtues
and not only for justice. Now for the most part I shall consider only principles of

justice and others closely related to them; I make no attempt to discuss the virtues

in a systematic way. Obviously if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably well, a

next step would be to study the more general view suggested by the name "rightness as fairness." But
even this wider theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our
relations with other persons and to

leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves toward animals and the rest

of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach

these questions which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to

put them aside. We must recognize the limited scope of justice as fairness and ofthe general type of view
that it exemplifies. How far its conclusions must be

revised once these other matters are understood cannot be decided in advance.

THE ORIGINAL POSITION AND JUSTIFICATION

I have said that the original position is the appropriate initial status quo which

insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields
the name "justice as fairness." It is clear, then, that I want to say that one conception of justice is more
reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect to it, if

rational persons in the initial situation would choose its principles over those of

the other for the role of justice. Conceptions of justice are to be ranked by their

acceptability to persons so circumstanced. Understood in this way the question

of justification is settled by working out a problem of deliberation: we have to

ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the contractual

situation. This connects the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice.

If this view of the problem of justification is to succeed, we must, of course,

describe in some detail the nature of this choice problem. A problem of rational

decision has a definite answer only if we know the beliefs and interests of the

parties, their relations with respect to one another, the alternatives between which

they are to choose, the procedure whereby they make up their minds, and so on.

As the circumstances are presented in different ways, correspondingly different

principles are accepted. The concept of the original position, as I shall refer to it,

is that of the most philosophically favored interpretation of this initial choice

situation for the purposes of a theory of justice.

But how are we to decide what is the most favored interpretation? I assume,

for one thing, that there is a broad measure of agreement that principles of justice

should be chosen under certain conditions. To justify a particular description

of the initial situation one shows that it incorporates these commonly shared

presumptions. One argues from widely accepted but weak premises to more specific conclusions. Each
of the presumptions should by itself be natural and plausible; some of them may seem innocuous or
even trivial. The aim of the contract

approach is to establish that taken together they impose significant bounds on

acceptable principles of justice. The ideal outcome would be that these conditions

determine a unique set of principles; but I shall be satisfied if they suffice to rank

the main traditional conceptions of social justice.

One should not be misled, then, by the somewhat unusual conditions which

characterize the original position. The idea here is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that
it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice, and therefore on these principles
themselves. Thus it seems

reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural
fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It

also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the

circumstances of one's own case. We should insure further that particular inclinations and aspirations,
and persons' conceptions of their good do not affect theprinciples adopted. The aim is to rule out those
principles that it would be rational

to propose for acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew

certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. For example, if a

man knew that he was wealthy, he might find it rational to advance the principle

that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was

poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle. To represent the desired

restrictions one imagines a situation in which everyone is deprived of this sort of

information. One excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which sets men

at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices. In this manner the veil

of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way. This concept should cause no difficulty

if we keep in mind the constraints on arguments that it is meant to express. At

any time we can enter the original position, so to speak, simply by following a

certain procedure, namely, by arguing for principles of justice in accordance with

these restrictions.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are

equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles;

each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of
these conditions is to represent equality between human

beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice.
The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these

two respects. Systems of ends are not ranked in value; and each man is presumed
to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon whatever principles

are adopted. Together with the veil of ignorance, these conditions define the

principles of justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance their

interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or

disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies ....

Concept of Justice :

Broadly speaking, justice, means the fulfilment of the

legitimate expectation of the individual under laws and to assure him the

benefit promised therein. Justice tries to reconcile the individual rights

with the social good. The concept of justice is related to dealings amongst

human beings. It emphases on the concept of equality. It requires that no

discrimination should be made among the various members of the society

To define justice it is very essential to refer to the root idea of

the word “Jus" meaning joining or fitting. Thus, justice carries the meaning

of cementing and joining up human beings together. The values of liberty

equality and fraternity are important in any system of law and justice

These values exist in different proportions and there are conflicts between

them too. Therefore, there is need for a constant process of adjustment

between the conflicting claims of these values in a society. In this way

justice assumes the key role of an adjuster and synthesiser. It reconciles

the claims of one person with another.

The concept of justice is not static. With the changes in the

society, the concept of justice has also changed from time to time. Justice

is an evolutionary concept. Hence, it is essential to examine the concept

from the time of ancient Greece to the present day. It should also include
a discussion on the ancient Indian concept of justice to find out how the

idea of justice as conceived by the ancient Hindus was evolved.

Ancient Greece :

The Greek concept of justice was closely related to ethics

Accordingly, Greek scholars have tried to define justice in their own way

To Cephalus, justice consists of telling the truth and repaying one's debtPolemarchus defines justice as
giving what is due to every person in

society. Trasymachus opines that justice is the importance of the weaker

The Sophist philosophy of justice is based on the right of might as a basic

postulates of natural law. Socrates criticised this philosophy. Plato also

rejected all these concepts of justice. Plato believed in the natural

inequality of men and accordingly, he advocated the class system through

which he divided people into four categories, namely, the ruling class the

military class, the producing class and other craftsmen. Plato said that
every man has specific functions and should confine his activity to the

proper discharge of his functions. Justice, according to Plato is the quality

of the soul. Plato conceived of an ideal state based on justice. Plato s

perfect justice is, to a great extent synonymous with morality and

therefore, exist only in an ideally constituted community. Plato mentioned

two other kinds of justice known as individual justice and legal justice But

Plato's justice is in no way concerned with the judicial system.

Aristotle, though influenced by Plato, differed from him in

many ways. According to him, "Justice is a social virtue which is

concerned with relationships between persons ................. Justice alone is

the good of others, because it does what is for the advantage of another',

Thus Aristotle introduced equity in the administration of justice. Moreover

he classified justice in two categories, namely, distributive and corrective

justice. According to the principles of proportionate equality, when justice

deals with the distribution of right, honours, goods etc. to the citizen it is

called the distributive justice. The scope of distributive justice is wide 1 he

womens' right to franchise or labour's right to better pay and amenities

and their right to vote irrespective of any other qualifications or their right

to form unions come within the scope of distributive justice. Rights like the

right torsafety and security of citizens falls under the distributive justice

1. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethiest, Transt H. Rackham, Edn. 195, BKV.11 7In a democracy distributive
justice is dispensed by a

legislative body. But in a non-democratic state, distributive justice is

dispensed by the autocratic ruler or body.

Another kind of justice, according to Aristotle, is corrective

justice which implies making good the loss of a person to whom some
wrong has been done. Corrective justice stands against injustice. The term

"unjust" according to Aristotle, applies both to man who breaks the law

and the man who takes more than his due, the unfair man. Hence, it is

clear that the law-making man and the fair man will both be just2.

Classical Rome :

The Roman lawyers were influenced by the Greek philosophy

to a great extent. The absolute power system was the dominant feature of

the Roman political organisation. The Roman law was produced from this

absolute power system. In the eye of Roman law justice is a fixed and

abiding disposition to give to every person his right. The precepts of the

law are to live honourably, to injure no one, to give to every man his own

respect.
Many Roman political thinkers developed different theories of

justice. Cicero was a lawyer and a statesman of 106-43 B.C. who was

profoundly influenced by Plato and Aristotle. He was the only Roman

political thinker who exercised tremendous influence throughout the

middle ages. Cicero advocated that justice is a natural law which does not

depend upon the consent of man. It is not brought into existence by

convention and is not devised by men for the advancement of their benefit

It is unchangeable and eternal. It is binding upon all men and all nations

All legislations should conform to it. It commands men to perform their

duties and also restrains them from doing wrong things which is ofuniversal application, God is the
author of this law, its interpreter and

enforcing judge. Disobedience to this law is disobedience to one's own

nature and should be punished. Cicero's law of nature is the law of God.

He says that the main function of the state is to give effect to the principle
of justice.

Middle Ages :

The Church dominated the medieval period. St. Augustine

(354-430), the famous Christian theologist of this period says that justice

is the foundation of the state. Where there is no justice there can be no

jus. Moreover, he added that justice does not exist in a state which does

not worship God. It exists only in Christian states. Justice is not created by

the civil authority but by the Church. St. Augustine believed in the

authority of the Church as the guardian of the eternal law of God

According to Augustine, justice consists in the right relationship between

men and God. The medieval concept of eternal law of God was advocated
by St. Thomas Acquinas. He also agreed with Aristotle on the concept of

justice based on equality. Accordingly to Acquinas human beings must

submit to natural laws. Justice is expressed only through law which is

proportionate equality. St. Acquinas also divided justice into two kinds

namely - distributive and communicative. Distributive justice implies

distribution of something to an individual in proportion to his personal

dignity and status. But communicative justice is not related to the dignity

and status, rather it supported the equal distribution of justice irrespective

of high or low in the community.

The most important concept of the Middle Ages was the

principle of justice. St. Augustine asserted that where there is no justice,

there is no commonwealth. This was also said by Plato, Aristotle and

Cicero. The medieval thinkers thought justice as a form of law.Renaissance and Reformation :
Renaissance and Reformation were the two movements which

have put emphasis on the realisation of justice. The movement which grew

against the Catholic Church during the sixteenth century is known as the

Reformation. The break-up of the Holy Roman Empire and a revolt against

the authority of the- Roman Church paved the way for "Reformation' The

movement grew as a protest against the abuses of the Church under the

leadership of Martin Luther, which was also known as Protestant

Revolution. Luther was suspicious of man-made laws. He insisted that

good judges are very essential for getting justice. Modern political thinkers

opine that the essence of justice lies in the attainment of the common

good as distinguished from the good of the individual. By justice, they

mean a social order based on liberty and equality. According to Barker

justice is the source of the social and democratic principles like liberty

equality and fraternity. Justice lies in doing one's own duty without causing

any injustice to others. Lord Bryce says that if the lamp of justice goes m

darkness how great is that darkness.

Concept of Justice - Karl Marx :

According to Karl Marx, the concept of justice in a capitalist

society is based on the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist

relations of production. It carries the result that justice has meaning for

those only who own the means of production. According to Marx, the

positive law of the state is imposed on its members by the authority of the

class which controls the means of production. Therefore, the idea of

justice and its content varies with the economic interest of the ruling classAncient India : .

The discussion about the concept of justice will not he

complete without reference to the ideas of philosophers of ancient India

The Hindu legal system is embedded in Dharma as

propounded in the Vedas, Puranas, Smritis and other works on the topic

The word Dharma is used to mean justice (Nyaya), what is right in a given

circumstance, moral, religion, pious or righteous conduct, being helpful to

living beings, giving charity or alms, natural qualities or characteristics of

properties of living beings and things, duty, law and usage or custom

having the force of law, and also a valid Rajashasana (royal edict)3

Thus the Indian or Hindu concept of justice is to preserve or

conserve a just, social order. From the "Varna" system of the Indian

society the concept of justice can be drawn out easily. Justice or Dharma

stood for the Varna system. This concept of Varna system is similar to
Platonic concept of justice to some extent.

In Hindu thought the State or King is the protector of Varna

The four fold division of society existed at that time are - Brahmins

Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras. Brahmins are like "the lovers of

wisdom1', in Plato, Kshatriyas are like the warriors, in Plato, Vaishyas are

like the appetite element in Plato and Sudras are also the slave class m

Plato - unfit for any work except to serve others.

The discussion about the Indian concept of justice will not be

complete without the concept of justice explained by Manu and Kautilya

Both of them were in favour of protection of social order in accordance

with the system of Varna and Dharma.

3 . Justice M. Rama Jois : Legal and Constitutional History of India, p. 3, Universal Law

Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. (2001Justice as conceived by Manu :

The "Smriti" or the code of Manu forms an important landmark

in the legal history of India. The systematic and cogent collection of all

rules of Dharma Sastras, covering all the branches of law then in force

and the simple language and great clarity in its composition made the

Manusmriti the most authoritative source of ancient Hindu jurisprudence.)

The word "Dharma" is used to mean justice (Nyaya). Manu

says Dharma protects those who protect it. Those who destory Dharma

get destroyed. Therefore, Dharma should not be destroyed so that we may

not be destroyed as a consequence thereof. The entire concept of Rule of

Law is incorporated in the principle laid down in this concept of Justice

Justice regulates the mutual obligation of individual and the society Manu

warns, "Do not destroy Dharma, so that you may not be destroyed"
In this way, Manu establishes the importance of justice by

pointing out that justice being violated, destroys justice, being preserved

preserves. Therefore, justice must not be violated lest violated justice

destroy us. He believes that justice remains with a person not only in his

lifetime but after death also. Manu entrusts the King of a state the major

responsibility of administering justice on the basis of law. Manu tries to

make justice lawful, impartial and honest which is clear from the system of

lawsuit provided by Manu himself. He gives emphasis to evidence and the

honesty of witness in lawsuits. According to him trustworthy men of all the

four varnas may be made eye witness to lawsuits. He prohibits some

sections of the society from becoming witness in any case and they are

King, the actors, a strotriya, an ascetic, a wholly dependent man, a man of

bad frame, an aged man, an infant, man of lowest class, a thief etc.
Kautilya's concept of Justice :

The Arthasastra of Kautilya occupies the most important place

in the legal and constitutional history of India. The author of this work is

Chanakya or Vishnugupta, who was the Prime Minister of the Magadha

Empire during the reign of Chandragupta Mauryas, has made Arthasastra

an encyclopedia of statecraft and legal system for the guidance of all

concerned which covered the topics relating to law, constitutional law and

other affairs of the state.

Kautilya was the first ancient law giver who gave every man

and woman the right to move the court of law. He says law in the hands of

ignorant people gets tampered and becomes incomplete. He prescribes a

panel of three members acquainted with sacred law and three ministers of

the King to carry on the administration of justice. He prescribes for judicial

organisation and procedure with a high sense of honesty and impartiality

The present judicial system is based on this type of judicial organisation

which is conducive to a sound judicial system.

This great work remained untraced till it was unearthed by Dr

R. Shamasastry of the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore. He translated

this work and published it in 19156.

The above discussion clearly reveals that the ancient Indian

concept of justice as well as Plato's concept of justice is conservative and

aristocratic in nature whereas modern concept of justice is liberal and

democratic in nature.

5. R.C. Majumdar : Ancient India, p. 104

6. Kautilya's Arthasastra : Translated by Late Mahamahopadhyaya, Arthasastra

Visharada Vidyalankara, Panditaratna Dr. R. Shama Sastry, p. 49Rawls concept of Justice :

A significant study on the subject of justice appeared a few

years ago which puts its author John Rawls in the category of great

political thinkers like Plato, Kant, Mill.

A thorough going attempt to formulate a general theory of

justice is that of Professor John Rawls (b.1921) of Harvard University He

writes mainly from the angle of philosophy and political science rather

than of Law7. Since its publication in 1971 it has received wide attention

Professor Rawls assumes that society is a more or less self

sufficient association of persons, who in their mutual relations recognise

as binding certain rules of conduct specifying a system of co-operation

Principles of social justice are necessary for making a rational choice

between various available systems8. The way in which a concept of justice

specifies basic rights and duties will affect problems of efficiency, coordination and stability. This is why it
is necessary to have a rational

conception of justice. Practical rationality has three aspects, namely

value, right and moral worth.

In modern times, contractual nature of justice was explored by

Kant that influenced John Rawls. A social contract test of political policies

is, in Kant's view a way to secure that acknowledgement by hypothetically

involving each member of the society in the assessment of those policies

in a way that respect his interest and perspectives as an individual. Rawls

also believes that a contract test takes the individual seriously in a way

that utilitarian does not.

Rawls justice is concerned not merely with human welfare but

also with individual’s welfare. Rawls argues that adequate theory of justice

must morally respond to, and preserve the "distinction of persons"

7. Rawls, "A Theory of Justice" (1971)The idea of the "original position" and the "Veil of ignorance"

as given by Rawls may be understood in the light of this interpretation that

the people as negotiators have general wisdom but particular ignorance

They strive to protect and promote their material interest, but in doing so

they are unable to distinguish their interests with the interests of others

They can protect and promote their interest by depending upon the system

of law and justice of a country.

The basic principles of justice are generalised means of

securing certain generalised wants, "primary social goods", comprising

what styled the "thin theory of the good", i.e. maximisation of the minimum

{as opposed to a "full theory")9. These primary social goods include basic
liberties, opportunity, power and a minimum of wealth. The first principle of

justice is : "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive

total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of

liberty for aH"io. The basic liberties include equal liberty of thought and

conscience, equal participation in political decision-making and the rule of

law which safeguards the person and his self respectn. The second

principle is : 'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that

they are both : (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged

consistent with the just savings principle and (b) attached to offices and

positions open to all under conditions of their fair equality of opportunity,.

The just savings principle is designed to secure justice between

generations and is described as follows : 'Each generation must not only

preserve the gains of culture and civilisation, and maintain intact those

just institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside m

each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation^ With

the aid of these'principles Professor Rawls seeks to establish a just basic

structure of an equalitarian society. It can also be said that Rawls is not an

egalitarian desiring equal distribution of social and economic advantages

but he is an egalitarian as he is in favour of autonomy of each individual

Kinds of Justice :

Concept of justice is not static as it varies from person to

person. Keeping in view the various concept of justice, justice may be

classified into certain kinds, namely - natural justice, economic justice

social justice, political justice, legal justice, distributive justice and

corrective justice.
Natural Justice :

Man as a member of society has to mould his behaviour so

that he can act in a proper way without disturbing the feelings of others

Thus to mould the behaviour of an individual to his fellow beings in

accordance with the laws of nature implies natural justice.

The word "nature" literally means the innate tendency or

quality of things or object and the word "just" means upright, fair or proper

So the expression "natural justice" would mean the innate quality of being

fair. It is another name of common sense justice meaning thereby natural

of what is right and what is wrong14. Justice Sarkaria has stated. The

phrase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It can not be

imprisoned in the straight jacket of cast-iron formulae. Historically, natural

justice has been used in a way, which implies the existence of moral
principles, of self-evident and unarguable truths. In course of time, judges

nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence often invoked with a

reference to "equity and good conscience". Legal experts of earlier

generations did not draw any distinction between "natural justice" and

"natural law". Natural justice was considered as that part of natural law

which relates to the administration of justice. On making the above

observation Sarkaria, J. has observed "Rules of natural justice are

principles into the conscience of man. Justice being based substantially on

14. P S. Kurien Vs. P.S. Raghaban AIR 1970 Ker 142

15. Paul Jackson - Natural Justice, 2nd Edition, p. 1natural ideals and human values the administration of
justice is here freed

from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually

associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and

grammatical niceties. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules

Being a means to an end not an end in themselves, it is not possible to

make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules'SeEconomic Justice :

The concept of economic justice is very wide. Economic

justice is nothing but a corollary of social justice. It evolves equal

economic values, opportunity and right for all and prohibition of economic

discrimination between man and woman in economic matters. No other

form of justice is realisable without being associated with economic

justice. The very concept of economic justice involves the idea of a

socialistic pattern of society. The ideal of Indian constitution is to establish

a welfare state. Therefore, economic justice has been accepted as one of

the basic principles. Nehru said, "I trust this Constitution itself will lead us

to the real freedom that we have clamoured for and that real freedom in
turn, will bring food to our starving people, clothing for them, housing for

them and all manners of opportunity of progress"i7.

The Constitution makers' desire about the social welfare

activities to be undertaken by the government is reflected through the

principles of economic justice enshrined in the Preamble and the Directive

Principles.

Political Justice :

Political justice prevails in a society where everyone has a

share in the political process. The state should establish political justice

16. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 818 (1981), SCR 533

17. Constituent Assembly Debates. Vol. II, p. 302by creating conditions under which all including the
minorities find scope

for exercising their political rights in pursuance of a system of Universal

Adult Suffrage, rule of law, achievement values as opposed to ascriptive

values.

The essence of political justice as enshrined in the

Constitution of India, is the opportunity to all for taking part in the

government of the state. The makers of the Indian Constitution say that

political justice involves Universal Adult Franchise and no distinction on

the grounds of religions, sex, caste, colour and the like in matters of

recruitment of public services. It also ensures reasonable reservations and

safeguards for the betterment of the minorities and other weaker sections

of the society.

Social Justice :

Social justice may be regarded as an important factor of

social transformation. Social justice implies the absence of discrimination

on the basis of caste, colour, religion etc. It also prohibits forces creating

artificial social barriers like those of untouchability. Social justice demands

equality along with liberty. Besides these, protection and improvement of

the weaker and downtrodden sections of the people, equitable distribution

of the necessities of life etc. constitute social justice. Social justice in a

wider sense, demands harmony and co-operation between labour and

capital, a substantial minimum wage according to the capacity of each

industry and other incidental benefits that improve the standard of living of

the general people of the country.

Legal Justice :

Justice must be supported by law. Legal justice implies justice

given according to law which again implies equality before law. It means
no one can be above the law and everybody should be equally punished

for equal crimes. Barker says that law ought to have both validity and

value. Validity stands for sanction of law and law draws its value from

justice. The courts of law can give legal justice.

Thus the fundamentals of modern justice are the codes of civil

and criminal law, law of evidence, property and contract law, procedure of

trial, provisions for appeal to higher courts etc. All those were evolved

from the medieval concept of rude and crude justice based on the mood m

mercy of the ruler or similar self-styled despot.

Justice and Law :

Justice and law are closely inter-related. The end of law is

justice. Bentham says that justice is the immediate purpose of law and

without an element of justice it will become an instrument of oppression

The end of law is justice. In the legal sense, justice is nothing but an

application of law to particular cases. In this sense law would include

common law, enacted law, equity law or case law. If law is the instrument

to maintain order, justice is the end of the state.

Though law and justice are intimately connected with each

other, there is difference between the two. When there is no legislation on

any matter, the court has to evolve some principle of customary law or

equity and decide the case. When there was almost no legislation, custom

helped in shaping the judicial decision.Legal Justice :

Justice must be supported by law. Legal justice implies justice

given according to law which again implies equality before law. It means

no one can be above the law and everybody should be equally punished
for equal crimes. Barker says that law ought to have both validity and

value. Validity stands for sanction of law and law draws its value from

justice. The courts of law can give legal justice.

Thus the fundamentals of modern justice are the codes of civil

and criminal law, law of evidence, property and contract law, procedure of

trial, provisions for appeal to higher courts etc. All those were evolved

from the medieval concept of rude and crude justice based on the mood m

mercy of the ruler or similar self-styled despot.

Justice and Law :

Justice and law are closely inter-related. The end of law is

justice. Bentham says that justice is the immediate purpose of law and

without an element of justice it will become an instrument of oppression

The end of law is justice. In the legal sense, justice is nothing but an
application of law to particular cases. In this sense law would include

common law, enacted law, equity law or case law. If law is the instrument

to maintain order, justice is the end of the state.

Though law and justice are intimately connected with each

other, there is difference between the two. When there is no legislation on

any matter, the court has to evolve some principle of customary law or

equity and decide the case. When there was almost no legislation, custom

helped in shaping the judicial decision.Roman writer. According to Augusitne Justice does not exist
among men

who do not serve God. Just as Cicero says that the state is one in which

justice is meaningful, St. Augustine says justice is the foundation of state

He believed that just state is one in which belief in true religion is taught

and one in which it is maintained by law and authority.

Thomas Acquinas, says that law is some ordinance of reason

for the promotion of common good, promulgated by him who has the care

of the community. All true laws are the manifestation of eternal law 1 in

said that law is eternal and the entire universe is governed by eternal law

Acquinas said about natural law also which is according to him is

essentially universal.

The law of nature may be changed when there is a change m

human conditions. Natural law enables human beings to seek good and

avoid evil, to preserve themselves and to live as perfectly as possible

About divine law, Acquinas said that divine law is the

knowledge disclosed to man by divine agency. For example, the special

code of law which God gave to the Jews, the special rules of Christian

morality or legislation given through scripture or Church are examples of

divine law.

There is another type of law, namely - the human law or

positive law. The positive law supplies certain rules to man which are not

provided by natural law. The positive or human law must be just and in

harmony with common good. It must be legitimate and it must be duly

promulgated. It must derive its powers either from the people or from

someone who has been elected by the people. Discussing about the

allegiance of the subject to the law of his society Acquinas said. "Man '

bound to obey the secular ruler so far as the order of justice requiresThree Theories of Justice

I will discuss three theories of justice: Mill’s Utilitarianism, Rawls’s Justice as Fairness, and Nozick’s
libertarianism. Much of my understanding of theories of justice comes from Business Ethics (Third
Edition) by Willian H. Shaw. I will expand my discussion of justice by considering objections to each of
these theories, but I do not necessarily endorse any of the objections and there could be good
counterarguments against them.

What is justice? Justice can be used to mean any number of things, like the importance of having rights,
fairness, and equality (87-88). People will think it’s unjust to have their rights violated (like being thrown
in prison without being found guilty in a court of law); or being unfairly harmed by someone unwilling to
pay compensation for the harm done; or being unfairly treated as an inferior (unequal) who isn’t hired
for a job despite being the most qualified person for the job. Theories of justice are not necessarily
“moral” theories because “justice” is a bit more specific and could even be separate from morality
entirely.

Mill’s utilitarian theory of justice

Utilitarians tend to be among those who see no major divide between justice and morality. Utilitarians
see justice as part of morality and don’t see justice to have a higher priority than any other moral
concern. In particular, utilitarians think that we should promote goodness (things of value), and many
think that goodness can be found in a single good; such as happiness, flourishing, well-being, or desire
satisfaction. Utilitarian ideas of justice connect morality to the law, economic distribution, and politics.
What economic or political principles will utilitarians say we should accept? That is not an easy question
to answer and is still up in the air. We have to discover the best economic and political systems for
ourselves by seeing the effects they produce (90).

Utilitarians often advocate for social welfare because everyone’s well-being is of moral interest and social
welfare seems like a good way to make sure everyone flourishes to a minimal extent. On the other hand
utilitarians often advocate free trade because (a) free trade can help reward people for hard work and
encourage people to be productive, (b) the free market allows for a great deal of freedom, (c) freedom
has a tendency to lead to more prosperity, and (d) taking away freedom has a tendency to cause
suffering.

One conception of utilitarian justice can be found in the work Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill (91). Mill
said that justice was a subset of morality—“injustice involves the violation of the rights of some
identifiable individual” (ibid.). Mill suggests, “Justice implies something which is not only right to do, and
wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right” (ibid.). Morality
is larger than justice because it’s plausible that we can be heroic or act beyond the call of duty to help
others and such acts would not be best described as examples of “justice.”

When do we (or should we) have a right? When we can legitimately make demands on society based on
utilitarian grounds. “To have a right, then, is… to have something which society ought to defend me in
the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than
general utility” (ibid.). Rights are rules society can make for everyone that could help people flourish and
prosper in general, and we should have rights given the assumption that they are likely to increase
goodness in the long run.

Mill’s conception of rights can include both positive rights (for public education, food, shelter, medical
assistance, etc.) and negative rights (to be allowed to say what we want, to be allowed to have any
religion, etc.) Both of these sorts of rights can potentially help people have greater well being.

Concrete utilitarian suggestions

Utilitarians have suggestions for improving economic systems. For example:

Mill argued that we should reduce the division between workers and owners (92-94). Workers and
owners often engage in class warfare or other hostile relations. There might be a way for workers and
owners to blend together rather than be sharply divided groups, which could reduce class warfare and
hostile relations. For example, profits could be shared with the workers.

We can promote greater equality of income (93). The more money you get, the less that additional
money can help your well being. People who have billions of dollars don’t get as much of a benefit from
each dollar they own than others would. The poor often die from medical neglect, but everyone else can
pretty much attain everything needed for survival. The luxuries enjoyed by the rich are much less
important to their well being than the necessities that could be enjoyed by others if that wealth is
shared. If we tax the rich to help the poor, than we could expect that greater goodness would result.

Applying Mill’s theory of justice

Mill thinks that we should have rights, laws, and government intervention when doing so will best
maximize the good, which he finds to be happiness, and minimize evil in the form of suffering. We often
say that utilitarianism asks us to “maximize happiness” for short, and it’s implied that suffering is
incompatible and destructive to happiness. He thinks something’s just if it doesn’t violate any rights, and
there are ideal rights that would maximize happiness. His utilitarian theory of justice doesn’t tell us what
the ideal rights are.

How can we apply Mill’s utilitarian theory of justice to our lives? First, we need to figure out what rights
will probably lead to greater happiness. Second, we have to figure out whether those rights are being
violated in a given situation.

What rights will likely lead to greater happiness? – One proposed list of rights that seem like they could
be justified through Mill’s utilitarianism are those listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Let’s consider three of those rights:

1. Right to property – “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property” (Article 17). People ought to
have a right to property for at least four reasons. One, because we have various needs and property is
very helpful to fulfill those needs. We need food and shelter, and we can become ill or die when people
take our food and shelter from us. Two, we make plans throughout the day concerning our future (e.g.
retirement) and property rights are needed to have the stability required for these plans. Three, it often
makes people upset when they are robbed, even when only luxuries are stolen. Four, the right to make a
profit from one’s labor can be an incentive to work hard and be productive, which can help create
greater prosperity for society at large.

2. Right to social welfare – “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” (Article 25). The right to the
necessities of life requires the redistribution of wealth, but it can help many people who need help the
most and thus increases happiness (the grater good) despite the fact that it can harm certain people.
The greater happiness given to the poor can justify sacrificing some welfare of everyone else. As I said
before, utilitarianism can justify greater income equality, and redistributing wealth can lead to greater
income equality.

One could object that the right to social welfare violates property rights, but it is quite possible for
people’s rights to conflict. Sometimes we think one right can override another. Utilitarians can justify
when one right overrides another if we know that greater happiness will result from the violation. For
example, I can attack someone in self-defense to protect myself, even though we have a right against
being harmed. My own well being might justify the act of harming another when that other person is a
danger to me.

It’s also possible for moral concerns that require us to violate people’s rights in utilitarianism. Perhaps we
don’t have a right to social welfare, but the need for redistribution of wealth could still be a moral
priority that overrides property rights in some contexts. The alternatives to coerced redistribution of
wealth could be greater crime rates—the poor might have no better rational option than to steal from
the rich—or even revolution when the poor think their current state is totally unacceptable.

Mill doesn’t make it entirely clear when we have an “obligation” to help other people, but redistribution
of wealth certainly seems to imply that we can have such obligations because people can be punished if
they refuse to pay their taxes and so forth.

3. Right to education – “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible
to all on the basis of merit” (Article 26). Widespread education can help society in many ways, but I will
just discuss a couple. First, it can help people know how to be better productive and attain higher
positions in society. Increased education not only improves opportunity, but it can help motivate people
to be productive knowing that they have an opportunity to improve their lives by attaining better
positions. Two, without a right to education many people could be stuck being poor without much of a
chance at attaining a better position in society, and that could destroy their motivation to be productive.
The poor could even be motivated to commit crimes if it’s the only way for them to attain a better
position in life. Better opportunities diminish the desire to commit crime because there are often more
efficient and less risky ways to try to improve one’s life than crime has to offer.

When are rights violated? – Consider the following six situations and whether or not any rights are being
violated:

A corporation sells TV sets that don’t work and scams people out of their money because people assume
that the TV sets work when they buy them. Is this a violation of anyone’s rights? Mill can argue, yes,
because a person’s property rights entail that property is transferred given an agreement and no one
agreed to buy a broken TV set. Buying a TV set implies that it works unless it’s explicitly made clear that
the TV set is broken.

Samantha was born in a poor family and she could never afford an education. She couldn’t afford food
and couldn’t find a job, so she starves to death. Meanwhile there is an abundance of food and wealth
that is almost exclusively owned by the wealthiest members of society. Was any right being violated?
Mill could argue, yes, because (a) she should have been given a free education and (b) she has a right to
social welfare and redistributing wealth could have helped her survive. People have duties to help one
another and they can’t just let others die of starvation.

The government taxes all profits 10% to help poor families buy the necessities of life. Anyone who
doesn’t pay their taxes can be punished. Was any right being violated? It seems obvious that the right to
property was violated in this case, but Mill could argue that such a violation is necessary for ethical
reasons—either because of conflicting rights or other moral considerations to the “greater good.” It is
possible that a utilitarian could argue that taxing profits by 10% isn’t enough, or there’s some better way
to redistribute wealth, but we will leave that concern aside for now.

The government subsidizes the big bank industry by using tax money to give the big banks billions of
dollars to help them avoid bankruptcy. Was any right being violated? Yes, property rights are being
violated in this case because people are coerced to pay taxes to fund a bailout. Is it just to violate
property rights in this case? It depends whether the big bank industry getting loads of free money will
lead to the greater good. This seems unlikely considering that businesses that go bankrupt are often
either not conducting business properly or aren’t providing a service people want, but some people
might argue that “saving the banks” will prevent a huge disaster to the economy—and absolutely no
other alternative course of action would be better.

A corporation hires hit men to kill the competition. Was any right being violated? Mill will argue, yes,
because we have a right not to be harmed and it will probably not serve the greater good. The happiness
of the “competition” (and their family and friends) matters just as much as everyone else’s happiness.

The people who personally made the decision to hire hit men to kill the competition are thrown in prison
after being found guilty in a court of law. Are any rights being violated? Yes, the rights not to be harmed
are being violated here. The criminals have rights not to be harmed, just like everyone else, and being in
prison is a violation of liberty—something that would ordinarily be considered to be unjust behavior
against “innocent people.” However, a utilitarian could argue that it’s for the “greater good” to throw the
criminals in prison because such use of coercion helps discourage and prevent further criminal acts and
rights violations.

Objections

1. It’s too simple – Many philosophers who reject utilitarianism are “deontologists” who generally agree
that utilitarianism has much to say about morality that’s relevant, but utilitarianism is too simple and
ignores some moral principles. It’s possible that consequences (promoting goodness) is not the only
thing of moral relevance.

2. Utilitarianism fails to account for the need to be respectful – It’s not clear that utilitarians can fully
account for why we need to respect people. There are some “counterexamples” philosophers often give
against utilitarianism, and they often argue that it might (sometimes) be wrong to hurt someone even if
it promotes the greater good. For example, we wouldn’t think it’s right to kill someone and donate their
organs to those who need them to survive, even if the person’s death lead to a “greater good.” Someone
could argue that utilitarian governments would take away people’s rights whenever they decide that it
will serve the “greater good” to do so; but such a dispensable view of rights could miss the point of
having rights in the first place.

3. It ignores personal relationships – Some philosophers argue that personal relationships provide us
with unique obligations that utilitarianism can’t account for. For example, parents have a duty to protect
and feed their children; but they don’t have the same duty to all children that exist. They shouldn’t
spend just as much time protecting and feeding the children of strangers as they spend to feed and
protect their own children.

4. It’s too demanding – Some philosophers argue that utilitarianism implies that we have a duty to
promote goodness as much as possible, but that’s too hard. Mill’s utilitarianism in particular says it’s
wrong to do something that maximizes happiness less than an alternative course of action. It might be
that you could be doing something better to promote goodness every second of your life. Maybe you
could be curing cancer right now instead of reading this. There might be no limit to how much good we
can do, and we would then be forever condemned for failing to live up to the unlimited demands of
utilitarianism. This not only requires us to stop enjoying ourselves when we could be doing something
better, but it implies that no actions are “above the call of duty” despite the fact that it seems intuitive
that there are.

You can read more about Mill here. You can read Utilitarianism for free here or buy it for $2.50 here.

Nozick’s Libertarian Theory of Justice

Libertarians are people who favor negative rights (and the right to property in particular), small
government, and a free market. Many libertarians ascribe to an extreme view that denies the existence
of positive rights and favors a laissez-faire free market no matter how horrible the consequences are.
This seems to entail no government regulation or public education.

Some utilitarians are libertarians because they think libertarianism will promote goodness best, but
Robert Nozick developed his own theory of justice that finds utilitarianism completely irrelevant to
justice, which was described in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Nozick argues that we have “Lockean rights”
by our very nature prior to any political institutions, such as the right to property (95). For Nozick these
rights are absolute and can’t be violated for any reason—except perhaps if the only alternative action
would directly violate even more rights.

Nozick thinks that we have property rights to keep our possessions as long as they were attained fairly—
without violating other people’s rights, harming others, or defrauding them (95-96). The world’s natural
resources are all up for grabs. They are the property of anyone who takes them. This conception of
property rights are described by three principles of justice:

A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to
that holding.
A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone
else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.

No one is entitied to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 or 2. (97)

Nozick’s view seems to imply that taxation is a form of theft because it violates our property rights.
People are coerced by governments to give up their property when they are being taxed. No one can
take away our legitimately attained property without permission. Any public service funded by taxation
would then also be illegitimate, such as public education or food for the poor.

Nozick argues for his theory of justice through a thought experiment, called the “Wilt Chamberlain
example” (97-98). Imagine that your favorite form of economic justice is enacted and a basketball player,
Wilt Chamberlain, agrees to play for a team by getting paid twenty five cents for each ticket sold.
Everyone was entitled to their money (assuming your favorite form of economic justice is truly just), and
that they therefore have a right to spend their money as they wish. Wilt Chamberlain also seems entitled
to the money given to him (assuming that people have a right to spend their money as they wish after
justly attaining it).

Applying Nozick’s theory of justice

Nozick’s theory of justice affirms that we have negative rights (to be left alone) but denies that we have
positive rights (to social welfare or education). Nozick says taxation is a form of coerced redistribution of
wealth and it’s unjust because we have a right to property and we don’t have a right to social welfare.
We have no ethical obligations to help others—and even if we did, his theory of justice would override
any other moral considerations there might be. Nozick says public education is one more form of
redistributing wealth. I expect that Nozick’s government to be fully funded by donations and/or requires
volunteers. It would be wrong to tax people to have a police department because that’s just one more
unjust violation of our property rights. The police department, fire department, public schools, prisons,
and everything else must either be “for profit,” exist from volunteers, and/or be funded by donations.

How do we apply Nozick’s theory of justice? First, we need to know what rights we have. He thinks we
have “Lockean rights”—a right from being harmed, a right to property, freedom of speech, and so on.
Second, we need to know how those rights apply to various contexts.

Consider how Nozick’s theory of justice could apply to the contexts mentioned earlier:

A corporation sells TV sets that don’t work and scams people out of their money because people assume
that the TV sets work when they buy them. Is this unjust? I expect that Nozick will agree with Mill here.
As I stated before, a person’s property rights entail that property is transferred given an agreement and
no one agreed to buy a broken TV set.

Samantha was born in a poor family and she could never afford an education. She couldn’t afford food
and couldn’t find a job, so she starves to death. Meanwhile there is an abundance of food and wealth
that is almost exclusively owned by the wealthiest members of society. Was any right being violated?
Nozick would say, “No.” No one has a right to anything nor does anyone have an obligation to help
others. To redistribute wealth using coercion would be a violation of our property rights and there is no
conflicting right against our property rights in this situation.

The government taxes all profits 10% to help poor families buy the necessities of life. Anyone who
doesn’t pay their taxes can be punished. Was any right being violated? Nozick would say, “Yes,” because
taxation is a violation of our property rights, just like any other form of coerced redistribution.

The government subsidizes the big bank industry by using tax money to give the big banks billions of
dollars to help the big bank industry avoid bankruptcy. Was any right being violated? Yes, property rights
are being violated in this case—and there’s no rights that could possibly justify taxation or coerced
redistribution of wealth.

A corporation hires hit men to kill the competition. Was any right being violated? Nozick will answer,
“Yes,” because we have a right not to be harmed and people were killed. There are no conflicting rights
in this situation, so the corporation has done something unjust.

The people who personally made the decision to hire hit men to kill the competition are thrown in prison
after being found guilty in a court of law. Are any rights being violated? Nozick can argue, “Yes,” the
rights not to be harmed are being violated here. However, there can be conflicting rights in this case. The
criminals in question should be in prison assuming it’s necessary to protect the rights of others, and that
seems like a fair assumption.

Objections

1. We have duties to each other – Many people argue that we have duties to each other, and Nozick isn’t
justified to reject such a moral fact. We start the world as helpless infants; and almost everyone
becomes incapacitated from illness, injury, or old age at some point in their age. If we have no duties to
anyone; then we can let orphans die, we can let uninsured poor people die from illness and injury, and
we can let the elderly die out in the streets. That doesn’t seem like acceptable behavior and could hardly
be described as “moral behavior.”

One could argue that Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain thought experiment is a good example of justice, but
only accounts for one example of a just form of libertarianism rather than the unjust forms. In the
scenario given, there is nothing unjust happening precisely when we assume that there is a “just
distribution” of wealth that assures us that no one is suffering from extreme poverty. If a libertarian
society donates to public service of its own free will, there is no problem with it. However, we can find
fault with his libertarian ethics via a counterexample. Imagine a libertarian society where the poor all
starve to death because there is no way for them to buy food and no job opportunities. The poor are
seen as what Scrooge called the “excess population.” In that case Wilt Chamberlain’s wealth would be
much better used to help the poor, and he is refusing to help them. We have reason to think that Wilt
Chamberlain would have a duty to help the poor, and he is failing to fulfill his obligation. In that case we
seem to have little choice but to tax him and therefore take a portion of his wealth to help the poor. The
point is that Nozick’s libertarianism isn’t necessarily unjust, but that it might allow for unjust situations
that should not be allowed in a proper theory of justice.
2. Freedom is more than negative rights – Nozick loves freedom and he thinks that his libertarian form of
justice will be the best theory to support freedom. However, we can argue that Nozick isn’t justified to
equate freedom with negative rights—rights to be left alone, like freedom of speech and a right to
property. Freedom can also entail power. The slaves that were freed after the civil war could have
negative rights, but they lacked positive rights—rights to food, to resources, to education, to medical
attention, to opportunity, and so on. In some ways some freed slaves were worse off than when they
were slaves. Many became sharecroppers and made barely enough money to survive and had little to no
opportunity to improve their lives. The so-called choice to work under the same (and perhaps even
worse) conditions as a slave or die doesn’t seem like the kind of freedom an economic system
embodying justice could allow.

3. The free market can lead to exploitation and oppression – This is related to the last objection.
Absolute property rights leads to a free market, but an unregulated free market can lead to exploitation
—disrespectful and oppressive behavior towards others. Sharecropping is one example. One could also
argue that the fact that we needed a minimum wage is evidence that a company would pay their poor
workers even less if it was legal to do so. Nozick doesn’t think a worker deserves to make more money
than companies will pay them. If workers have no choice but to work in horrible conditions for barely
enough money to live, then that’s perfectly fine. It seems like the result of a completely free market is
that company owners will often make tons of money while many of their workers will be forced to live in
poverty without any hope for medical insurance or educational opportunities. Those who have attained
the world’s resources (food, oil, etc.) and means of production (factories and machines) are holding all
the cards and are “good enough chaps” to provide work for those in poverty while making a great deal of
profit. Nozick seems to imply that such workers should be resigned to die young from a disease or poor
working conditions rather than revolt against those who are wealthy.

4. Inheritance is unfair – Some people argue that Nozick’s libertarian justice allows for unlimited
inheritance, but that allows children of the wealthy to be given an unfair amount of freedom, power,
opportunity, and education while the children of the poor might almost be guaranteed to live a horrible
life of no better quality than a slave (101).

5. The free market can lead to horrible consequences. Absolute property rights seems to lead to a free
market, but that could hurt a lot of people. For example, lots of people can starve to death when they
can’t get access to food, even when there’s a free market.

Professor Amartya Sen of Oxford University shows how, in certain circumstances, changing market
entitlements—the economic dynamics of which he attempts to unravel—have led to mass starvation.
Although the average person thinks of famine as caused simply by a shortage of food, Sen and other
experts have pointed out that famines are frequently accompanied by no shortfall of food in absolute
terms. Indeed even more food may be available during a famine than in nonfamine years—if one has the
money to buy it. Famine occurs because large numbers of people lack the financial wherewithal to
obtain the necessary food. (101)
In some cases a country would rather export its food to other countries for greater profits than sell them
to their own people who are starving. In other cases a country would rather sell its fertile land to rich
foreigners than sell it to its own starving people for less. Is there any reason to think that this couldn’t
happen in a free market? Perhaps there is no reason for Nozick to criticize people for exporting all their
country’s food to other countries.

You can read more about Nozick’s theory of justice here. You can buy Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia
here.

Rawls’s theory of justice

Rawls described his theory of justice called “Justice as Fairness” in his book A Theory of Justice. Rawls
agrees with Nozick that justice is quite separate from morality and he too rejects utilitarian forms of
justice. He first suggests a new way to learn about principles of justice—the original position (103-105).
The original position asks us to imagine that a group of people will get to decide the principles of justice.
These people don’t know who they are (what he calls a ‘veil of ignorance’), they are self-interested, and
they know everything science has to offer. He argues that in a veil of ignorance they couldn’t be as
biased towards their profession, race, gender, age, or social status because they wouldn’t know which
categories they belong to (104-105). As far as self-interest is concerned, Rawls argues that they will want
principles of justice that will “fairly distribute” certain goods that everyone will value—what Rawls calls
“primary social goods” (105). Rawls argues that the people in the original position will discuss which
principles of justice are best before voting on them, and the best principles worth having will reach a
“reflective equilibrium”—the most intuitive principles will be favored and incompatible less intuitive
principles will have to be rejected in order to maintain coherence. He argues that two intuitive principles
of justice in particular will reach reflective equilibrium:

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions
and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the
greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged members of society (107).

Rawls says that the first principle has priority over the second, “at least for societies that have attained a
moderate level of affluence” (ibid.). The liberties Rawls has in mind are negative rights, like the freedom
of thought. The distribution of social goods can include education, food, and housing; which could be
considered to be positive rights.

The second principle’s second restriction—that social and economic inequalities must benefit the worst
off group—is known as the “difference principle” and seems to imply that total communism is
automatically just if such a system has no economic or social inequalities because it’s only inequalities
that require a rationale. Capitalism will only be justified if it benefits the least advantaged group—the
poor, orphans, and so on. The assumption is that inequality can allow hard work to be rewarded to the
point that people decide to be more productive and share their wealth with the poor. People won’t be
allowed to be wealthier unless the wealth is shared with the poor.

Applying Raws’s theory of justice

Rawls agrees with Nozick that we have negative rights and no positive rights, but he argues that social
and economic inequalities are unjust unless they meet certain requirements. In particular, there must be
equal opportunity (public education) and greater inequality must benefit those who have the least social
and economic goods (the worst off group). Rawls disagrees with utilitarians that economic inequality is
justified if it maximizes happiness—by providing rewards to being productive members of society—if
such inequality doesn’t help those who are the worst off. (A utilitarian could argue that some people
living in poverty are a necessary for the “greater good” but Rawls would rather no one live in poverty.)

Rawls thinks that redistribution of wealth and taxes are justified if it is the best way for the “worst off” to
benefit from social and economic inequalities. He thinks total economic equality is just (perhaps in a
socialist state), but he thinks that a capitalistic system might actually be better and help the “worst off”
by rewarding productive behavior to give an incentive to increase productivity and therefore prosperity.

How will Rawls’s theory of justice apply to the six above contexts?

A corporation sells TV sets that don’t work and scams people out of their money because people assume
that the TV sets work when they buy them. Is this unjust? I expect that Rawls will agree with Mill and
Nozick here. As I stated before, a person’s property rights entail that property is transferred given an
agreement and no one agreed to buy a broken TV set.

Samantha was born in a poor family and she could never afford an education. She couldn’t afford food
and couldn’t find a job, so she starves to death. Meanwhile there is an abundance of food and wealth
that is almost exclusively owned by the wealthiest members of society. Was any right being violated?
Rawls would likely say, “Yes” because the economic inequalities don’t seem to help the “worst off.”
(Perhaps Rawls assumes that people won’t starve to death if we have economic equality.)

The government taxes all profits 10% to help poor families buy the necessities of life. Anyone who
doesn’t pay their taxes can be punished. Was any right being violated? Rawls would say, “Yes,” because
taxation is a violation of our property rights—but he might still think this form of taxation is just if it’s the
best way to redistribute wealth and make sure the “worst off” benefit from economic inequalities.

The government subsidizes the big bank industry by using tax money to give the big banks billions of
dollars to help the big bank industry avoid bankruptcy. Was any right being violated? Yes, property rights
are being violated in this case, but is it also unjust? If this form of redistribution will help the “worst off,”
then it is just. However, it seems likely that Rawls would agree that saving an incredibly powerful
company from going bankrupt would somehow benefit those who are the “worst off.”

A corporation hires hit men to kill the competition. Was any right being violated? Rawls will agree with
utilitarians and Nozick here and will answer, “Yes,” because we have a right not to be harmed and people
were killed.
The people who personally made the decision to hire hit men to kill the competition are thrown in prison
after being found guilty in a court of law. Are any rights being violated? Rawls can argue, “Yes,” the rights
not to be harmed are being violated here. However, there can be conflicting ethical considerations in this
context. Rawls can agree with Nozick that the criminals in question should be in prison assuming it’s
necessary to protect the rights of others.

Objections

1. Basic liberties aren’t good enough – The first principle of justice equates freedom with some list of
negative rights, but we can argue that freedom is and ought to be more than that. The idea of having a
finite list of rights implies that we can restrict freedom and oppress people willy nilly as long as the
specific freedom in question isn’t on some official list. Why not make freedom innocent until proven
guilty? We shouldn’t be restricting any freedom until we have an overriding reason to do so.

2. Aren’t these people too risk averse? – It’s not entirely clear how Rawls knows what principles people
will agree to in the original position nor is it entirely clear that the original position is going to help us
discover the best principles of justice. In particular, some people argue that they wouldn’t agree the
difference principle because so few people will be part of the least advantaged group. Why not take a
risk by screwing over the poor to help everyone else as long as there’s a very low chance of being poor?

3. The difference principle unjustly restrains freedom and power – Someone could argue that many of us
want as much freedom and power as possible and the difference principle will deny the ability of the
wealthy and powerful to attain more wealth or power, even when it doesn’t hurt anyone. What if the
rich could attain a great deal more power and wealth without hurting anyone? It seems oppressive to
stop them from doing so.

4. The difference principle can lead to poverty – First, it’s possible that communism might lead to mass
poverty. Everyone can all be equally poor, but that doesn’t seem to imply that it’s a just economic
system. Second, it’s logically possible that every economic system that leads to prosperity requires that
the least off group to do very poorly. The difference principle would force us to reject prosperity and live
in poverty just because economic differences might inevitably require that the worst off group do poorly
compared to everyone else.

5. International responsibilities – Rawls’s Justice as Fairness doesn’t guarantee that a civilization will treat
other civilizations with respect nor does it require civilizations to help other civilizations living in poverty
and with many people who are starving to death. Utilitarians could argue that justice doesn’t stop within
our borders, but it expands to everyone in the world and Rawls’s Justice as Fairness ignores this fact.

Conclusion

It’s possible that none of these theories of justice are true, but they have been the result of decades of
philosophy. They could be the best philosophers have to offer at this time and they are certainly
important to understand the history of the historical debate of justice. It’s possible that no theory of
justice needs to be endorsed and we could reason about justice using intuitive assumptions rather than a
systematic attempt to capture justice in its entirety. That doesn’t imply that justice is just a matter of
opinion or meaningless. The fact that we are ignorant about justice neither implies that all beliefs
concerning justice are equal nor does it imply that we know absolutely nothing about it.