Krizabel B.

Martinez

Cariño vs Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991

FACTS
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what
they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to
the latter's attention. The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education (Hon. Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those
who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions
continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.
After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively
charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension of
the administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for
issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied. The respondent
staged a walkout. The case was eventually decided ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of
others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court
was also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they were
denied due process and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order to Cariño to
appear and enlighten the commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its investigation and
resolution of the matter.

Cariño filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the Commission has
the jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and whether or not
grievances justify their mass action or strike.

ISSUE
Does the Commission on have jurisdiction to adjudicate, try and hear the issue?

RULING
The Court held that the Commission on Human Rights has no such power.
The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function the Commission does not have.
The Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not
"try and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within
the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education had already taken cognizance of the
issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved
parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said
issues. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its
own judgment on the questions involved.

EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights ,G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

FACTS
EPZA purchased a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take
possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products
therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-
assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private
respondents. Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent
Commission on Human Rights (a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies".
Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of
their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing
such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private
respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order
and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their
subordinates.

EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive
writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the Commission.

Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of
its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued
ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction
orders.

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The
CHR contends that it’s principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not
limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection.

ISSUE
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of.

RULING
The court held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.

In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., the court held that the CHR is
not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.”

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction
for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial
and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the
proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the
CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be
issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of
the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district."
(Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest
of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the
respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this
Court issued is made PERMANENT.

VIVARES vs. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

FACTS
Julia and Julienne , both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students at
STC. Sometime in January 2012, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her
Facebook profile. Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her
students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up,
dressed only in brassieres. Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her
student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol , STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action.

STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s
Student Handbook. On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures
in question, reported, as required, to the office Sr. Purisima, STC’s high school principal and. They
claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and informed their parents the following day
that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on
March 30, 2012. A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M.
Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC and command the respondent
not to implement the said sanction which the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration. Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students
from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ of habeas data.
Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together
with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ. In time,
respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the
following grounds for the denial of the petition. the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition
for habeas data. Hence the petition. adrianantazo.wordpress.com

ISSUES

1.) Whether a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu?

2.) Whether the Respondents violated the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors
involved in this case.

RULING

1.) NO, The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The
provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data
is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data. To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in
the nature of a personal Endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and
such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. to agree with the argument of the
petitioners, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the
effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view
of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting. adrianantazo.wordpress.com

2.) No, the respondents failed to establish that the uploading or showing the photos to Tigol constitute
a violation of their privacy. The showing of the said photo to Tigol disproves their allegation that the
photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement
that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim
that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration. adrianantazo.wordpress.com
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who
are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This
only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were,
in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. Considering that
the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited
the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to
the right to informational privacy. That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily
bolster the petitioners’ contention. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the
latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can
view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”

Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. 181796, November 7, 2017

FACTS
On July 9, 2007, Pablo Cayanan, a used car dealer, and Ronaldo F. Perez, a fixer, were forcibly taken
by a group of armed men led by SPO2 Rolando Pascua. Perez was later released but Cayanan has not
been seen nor heard from since then.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed in behalf of Cayanan but later converted to amparo
proceedings. Perez executed a sworn affidavit describing the abduction but later recanted his
statement. SPO2 Pascua submitted a counter-affidavit in which he denied the allegations and claimed
that he was also abducted in the same incident by unknown men.
The RTC issued the writ of amparo, ordering the CIDG Director to conduct further investigations and
for SPO2 Pascua to appear before the proper forum. The CIDG however appeals the RTC’s judgment,
arguing that the applicant for the writ failed to prove by substantial evidence the involvement of
CIDG in the disappearance of Cayanan because Perez recanted his affidavit; that the CIDG is only
required to exercise ordinary diligence and that it has already discharged its duty under the Rules
when it submitted its return with certifications that CIDG was not detaining Cayanan. Lastly, the
CIDG contends that the issuance of the writ violated Pascua’s right to presumption of innocence.
Pascua contended that Regina failed to establish by the required burden of proof that he caused the
“forced disappearance” of Pablo Cayanan within the ambit protected by the rule on the writ of
amparo; that following Mexico’s Amparo, it is an essential requirement for the supposed victim to
establish where he is being held; that Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers “ public officisl or
employee, or of a private individual or entity,” which eventually precludes a government
institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP; and that enforced or forced disappearance means that
it must be established that agents of the state perpetrated its commission.

ISSUE
Whether there is substantial evidence to justify the issuance of the writ
RULING
Yes. In amparo petitions, the Court allows for flexibility in considering the evidence presented,
including hearsay evidence which may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require for
the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty, and security.
The recantation has no evidentiary value for being general and bereft of details of what really
happened if the abduction did not occur. Other witnesses also identified Pascua as the person leading
the abductors.
Once an enforced disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies
should be tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to
bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Here, Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in
support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay before the NBI, whereby an eyewitness detailed the events of the
abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon was consistent and credible in itself.
Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting himself as
another victim of the same abduction. Yet, he did not furnish details of the abduction that would have
given to the investigators firm leads to quickly corner the perpetrators as well as to determine and
locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His omission was fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie
his part in the abduction by issuing a blanket denial. It is significant that his denial was already
doubtful in light of Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the leader of the
perpetrators of the abduction.
Thirdly, Pascua’s version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no consideration. For one,
he could not even mention the type and the color of the vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly
ordered to board. Such inability was uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him.
Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses to corroborate the allegation on the occurrence of the
abduction. Such other witnesses also identified Pascua as the person leading the abductors of Pablo
and Perez.

Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. 576 US (2015)

FACTS
Petitioners were two men whose same-sex partners had died and fourteen same-sex couples who all
brought cases in their respective District Courts challenging either the denial of their right to marry or
the right to have their marriage performed elsewhere recognised in their own state. The cases were
heard in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee, each of which defines marriage as between a
woman and a man. In each case, the relevant District Court found in favour of the petitioner.
Each of the respondents, who were state officials responsible for enforcing the relevant laws,
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated the respondents’ appeals and
reversed the decisions, finding in favour of the respondents.
Petitioners then sought certiorari in the Supreme Court. The situation of three of the petitioners
illustrates the nature of the cases. James Obergefell and his partner of over twenty years, John Arthur
travelled from Ohio to Maryland in order to marry. John died three months later of amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis but Ohio law prevented James being listed on John’s death certificate as surviving
spouse. Same-sex partners April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse have three adopted children; however,
Michigan permits only opposite-sex married couples or single persons to adopt, with the result that
each child is treated as having only one parent, and if that partner passed away, the other would have
no legal right to the children. Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York, where same-sex
marriage was legal, before Ijpe was deployed to Afghanistan. Upon his return, they settled in
Tennessee where their marriage is not recognised, with the result that their legal status in relation to
each other changes as they travel between states.
The petitioners each argued that the actions of the relevant respondent violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by either denying them their right to marry, or by denying the recognition of their
marriage legally performed in another state. They argued that rather than intending to devalue
marriage, it was their respect for the institution of marriage which meant that they sought it for
themselves.
Respondents argued that the petitioners did not seek recognition of the right to marry, but sought
recognition of a new and non-existent “right to same-sex marriage”. They argued that marriage was
by nature between a man and a woman and recognition of same-sex marriage would demean the
institution of marriage. Further, the respondents warned that there had not been sufficient democratic
discourse to decide on an issue as important as the definition of marriage. In addition, they argued that
if same-sex couples are allowed to marry, fewer opposite sex couples would marry because the
connection between marriage and procreation would be severed. This would further harm the
institution of marriage.

ISSUE

whether states are required to register same-sex marriages

RULING
The institution of marriage has evolved over time both legally and socially and that the states were
now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage, before turning to consider the Due Process Clause
(“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). The
liberties protected by this Clause extend to choices that are central to a person’s dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices about personal beliefs and identity. Injustice is not always recognised in
our own times and when new insights reveal a conflict between Constitutional provisions and
legislation, the Court must consider a claim to liberty. Applying these considerations, the Court has
long recognised that the Constitution protected the right to marry, including in Loving v Virginia 388
US 1, 12 (1967), in which the Court invalidated bans on interracial marriage. Although these previous
cases concerned opposite-sex marriages, they established more far reaching constitutional principles,
including four essential principles relating to the right to marry: the right to personal choice in relation
to marriage as an inherent aspect of an individual’s autonomy; the importance of the union of
marriage to the two individuals which was “unlike any other”; that marriage provides a safeguard for
children and families; and that marriage was central to social order, with states offering married
couples rights, benefits and responsibilities. Each of these principles applies equally to same-sex
marriages and while limiting marriage may have previously been seen as just and natural, it is now
manifest that limiting marriage to opposite-sex partners is inconsistent with the “central meaning of
the right to marry”. Such 3 knowledge must lead to recognition that banning of same-sex marriage
imposes “stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”
The respondents’ argument that the petitioners did not seek to exercise their right to marry but rather
sought a new “right to same-sex marriage” was inconsistent with the Court’s previous approach to
fundamental rights, including marriage. Rights cannot be restricted only to those who have exercised
them in the past. Such a restriction would allow accepted practice to provide its own continuing
justification and prevent groups from invoking rights previously denied to them. Rights do not come
only from history, but from a better understanding of how liberty should be defined in our own time.
It would diminish the personhood of same-sex couples and disparage their choices if they were denied
the same rights to marry as opposite-sex couples under the Constitution. The right to same-sex
marriage is also guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. In interpreting this Clause, the Court has
“recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our
most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged”. The marriage laws
challenged by the petitioners are “in essence unequal”. They denied same-sex couples all the benefits
granted to opposite-sex couples and work as a “grave and continuing harm”, serving to disrespect and
subordinate gays and lesbians. The respondents warned that the recognition of the right to same-sex
marriage has been the subject of too little democratic discourse. While it is recognised in the
Constitution that democracy is the appropriate process for changes to be made, that process cannot
impair fundamental rights. The Constitution allows an individual to seek protection for a violation of
their rights, even if the public disagrees and the legislature does not wish to act. The issue is whether
the Constitution protects the right to same-sex marriage and not whether same-sex marriage currently
has or lacks popular support. The respondents showed no foundation to conclude that recognising
same-sex marriage would harm the institution of marriage.

MMDA V. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18,
2008
FACTS
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically PD.. 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
Respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay.
The DENR, DPWH, Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard ,
PNP Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court
a petition for review under Rule 45.
Petitioners were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And
apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners
also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial
courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.

RULING
Yes. Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial
duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is available to compel
action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.
Petitioner’s obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to
carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the
MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza in which the Court directed the City of
Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local
oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals
within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant
case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and
liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of RA 7924 creating
the MMDA.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.
A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to
perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioner’s respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.