CASE NO.

251

Doctrine:

 Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code: How criminal liability is totally extinguished –
Criminal liability is totally extinguished

 The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AGAPITO DIMAALA Y ARELA, Accused-

Appellant.

G.R. No. 225054, July 17, 2017

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:

In a Decision dated May 8, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon (RTC) in Criminal
Case No. 4994-C found accused-appellant Agapito Dimaala y Arela (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the treacherous killing of Rodrigo Marasigan.
Said accused was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole.

He is likewise ordered to pay the family of Rodrigo Marasigan the following: PhP 75,000.00
as civil indemnity; PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages; PhP 36,000.00 as actual damages; PhP
30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and PhP 25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged but
deleted the award of temperate damages.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from the CA's Decision, but later on decided
not to pursue his appeal. Thus, he filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal with Prayer for Immediate
Issuance of Entry of Judgment, which the Court granted in its Resolution dated September 21,
2016. Following the closure and termination of the case, the Court declared the finality of the
aforesaid Resolution and issued an Entry of Judgment.

However, the accused-appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital prior
to his final conviction by the Court.

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Issue:

Whether or not the criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto, is ipso facto extinguished.

Held:

YES.

In view of this development, the criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto, is ipso facto extinguished.

It is settled that the death of accused-appellant prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

However, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources other than the
subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-
appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules as held in In People v. Culas, citing
People v. Layag, the Court explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. x x x.

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CASE NO. 256

Doctrine:

 The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or
"greater weight of the credible evidence," is required.
 He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
 Presumption upon the burden of proof means creating the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will prevail.
 Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing
than the opposing evidence

DOLORES DIAZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LETICIA S.

ARCILLA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 208113, December 02, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:

On March 11, 1999, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5 (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds from
various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on consignment basis
from respondent. During arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of respondent who claimed to be a
businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of
whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the
unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. Respondent averred that on February
20, 1996, she entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas and bath towels worth P35,300.00
to petitioner as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996 duly signed
by the latter. However, on March 20, 1996, petitioner was only able to remit the amount of
P3,300.009 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored respondent's
demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods.

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In her defense, petitioner denied having entered into the subject transaction with respondent,
claiming that she: (a) had not transacted with respondent as to other goods, except GCs and
POCs; (b) was made to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in blank prior
to the issuance of the GCs and POCs,29 and (c) was not able to retrieve the same after paying
her obligation to respondent.

She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been
settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from
respondent on February 20, 1996.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated June 29, 2011, the RTC found that the prosecution failed to establish any
intent on the part of the petitioner to defraud respondent and, thus, could not be held criminally
liable. However, it adjudged petitioner civilly liable "having admitted that she received the [GCs]
in the amount of P32,000.00." In this relation, it further considered the relationship of
respondent and petitioner as in the nature of a principal-agent which renders the agent civilly
liable only for damages which the principal may suffer due to the non-performance of his duty
under the agency.

The petitioner elevated the civil aspect of the case before the CA on appeal.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision15 dated January 30, 2013, the CA upheld petitioner's civil liability. It ruled that
respondent was able to establish by preponderance of evidence her transaction with petitioner,
as well as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth
P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of
which having been substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996. To
this, the CA rejected petitioner's attempt to discredit the said receipt which she denied executing
on the ground that she was only made to sign blank documents, finding that even if petitioner
was indeed made to sign such blank documents, such was merely a safety precaution
employed by respondent in the event the former reneges on her obligation.

However, the CA modified the award of interests by reckoning the same from the time of
extrajudicial demand on July 28, 1998. Accordingly, it directed petitioner to pay respondent the
amount of P32,000.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from July 28, 1998 until finality of
the decision and thereafter, at the rate of 12% p.a. on the outstanding balance until full
satisfaction.

The motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.

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Issue

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in finding petitioner civilly liable to respondent.

Held:

NO.

The Decision dated January 30, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 10, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97571 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, directing
petitioner Dolores Diaz to pay respondent Leticia S. Arcilla the amount of P32,000.00 with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from July 28, 1998 until full payment.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater
weight of the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be
held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.

In upholding the civil liability of petitioner, the CA did not dwell into the purported admission of
petitioner anent her receipt of GCs in the amount of P32,000.00 as found by the RTC. Instead,
the CA hinged its ruling on the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, the
documentary evidence that respondent had duly identified and formally offered in the course of
these proceedings.

The Court agrees with the CA.

Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust
receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve
after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled
that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence."

On the contrary, the CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by preponderance of
evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the
sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such

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merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the
acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes,
shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their
corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not
sold.

All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

In fine, the CA's ruling on petitioner's civil liability is hereby sustained. In line, however, with the
amendment introduced by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB Circular
No. 799,42 series of 2013, there is a need to partially modify the same in that the interest
accruing from the time of the finality of this Decision should be imposed at the lower rate of six
percent (6%) p.a., and not twelve percent (12%) p.a. as imposed by the CA.

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CASE NO. 257

Doctrine:

 Probable cause - defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof
 Grave abuse of discretion

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. MA. MERCEDITAS

NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ (AS THEN OMBUDSMAN), DON M. FERRY, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR.,
ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, OFELIA I. CASTELL, AND RAFAEL A. SISON,
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, RODOLFO M. CUENCA, MANUEL I. TINIO, AND ANTONIO R.
ROQUE, PRIVATE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Facts

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated July 15, 2003 filed by the PCGG
against former officers/directors of DBP, as well as former officers of National Galleon Shipping
Corp., charging them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Then President Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans in order to identify various anomalous behest loans entered into by the
Philippine Government in the past. One of which is the loan account granted by the DBP to
Galleon.

The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon from
DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans. Resultantly, the PCGG filed the instant
criminal complaint against individual respondents.

The Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and dismissed the
criminal complaint against them. It found that the pieces of evidence attached to the case
records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual respondents,
considering that the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive
summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value.
In this relation, the Ombudsman noted that the PCGG failed to present the documents which
would directly establish the alleged illegal transactions.

Aggrieved, the PCGG moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order dated
April 13, 2009; hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to
indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.ch

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Held:

YES. There was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman for failing to find
probable cause to indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.c

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary
or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings -
whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or
not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he
committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in
finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit:

Probable cause, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. It does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is determined is whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.

It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. In the case of
Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.

In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual respondents of
violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint against
them.

Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to issue the proper resolution indicting
individual respondents Don M. Ferry, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Rolando ML Zosa, Cesar C. Zalamea,
Ofelia I. Castell, Rafael A. Sison, Rodolfo M. Cuenca, Manuel I. Tinio, and Antonio R. Roque of
violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, in accordance with this Decision.