Republic vs CA
to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused [respondent]
Willaware Product Corp. vs Jesichris Manufacturing Corp.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2010
and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed
this present complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for
permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation
([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal
office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its
registration in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan
plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive
parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture
and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office
near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view
of the fact that some of the [respondent’s] employees had transferred to
[petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s]
products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner]
had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with
exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these
products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts
and to the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of
rubber in the manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as spring
eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing
cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive
parts with plastic material was taken from [respondent’s] idea of using plastic
for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s]
products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary
damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of TWO
MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to
institute this action and thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorney’s
fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent]
except for the following facts: that it is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that there’s
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that
some of [respondent’s] employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that
over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s]
products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair
competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions of
original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the
specifications of the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace.
Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for
these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
[respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it
still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these as it has no
patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only
exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts as there are
other establishments which were already openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that
petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately
copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC
further opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s
property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar
plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling
of the same products to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the
years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to
plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby permanently
[enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts
as those manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that if there is no intellectual property
protecting a good belonging to another, the copying thereof for production
and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted
by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure
away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the
plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the
copying of these can be done by simply buying a sample for a mold to be
made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are
immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the
Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are
present in the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts
are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and
employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the
ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said decision read:
Despite the evidence showing that Willaware took dishonest steps in
advancing its business interest against Jesichris, however, the Court finds no
basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual
damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was
engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there
was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No
amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative
income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales
in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this
pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris
like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the
part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal
damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s
award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also maintained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is
hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual
damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal
damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was
denied for lack of merit by the CA in a Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the
following issues for our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when
the parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage on the part
of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral
damages and attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no
rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refers to its copyright on automotive parts,
should it be considered in the light of the said copyrights were considered to
be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris
has established "goodwill?"6In essence, the issue for our resolution is:
whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28
of the Civil Code on human relations, and not unfair competition under
Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products
are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent
registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 is very much broader
than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article,
which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American
jurisdictions, the term cover seven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious
interference with the latter’s business.
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not
competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a
living. Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not
competition where the means used are fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two
characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and
(2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in
the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears
to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the
manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the
petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted
having employed respondent’s former employees, deliberately copied
respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these products
to respondent’s customers.
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of
the former employees of respondent and petitioner’s act of copying the
subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition,
viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in
competing with the business of [respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner’s] acts can
be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To
illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that
[petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to
its manufacturing of plastic automotive spare parts, it engaged the services
of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De
Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman was hired by
[petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive
spare parts were not being made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot
rely on its own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem.
[Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his
experience gained from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and
delivery man of [respondent], was fired because he was blamed of spying in
favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on,
he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he occupied
with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his employment by
[petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman
Thus, it is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown
by his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware
to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent
to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the
respondent.
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the
sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of
driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage
of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As
aptly observed by the court a quo, the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses
indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of
respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas,
Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the business of plastic-made
automotive parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is
kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor of
kitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you
have known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known it
to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes,
sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with
these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of
color, size, shape and composition as those sold by Jesichris was due largely
to the sudden transfer of Jesichris’ employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris
Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years.
I don’t know the exact date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co.
have transferred to your company, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the
other one, just one month ago.
That [petitioner] was clearly out to take [respondent] out of business was
buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s] witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware
Product Corporation (sic)?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you
kindly inform this court what unusual even (sic) transpired between you and
Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market
and then I passed by the place where they were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Q: And who else was there?
A: William Salinas, sir.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them
drinking?
A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: At that time, he offered me a glass of wine and before I was able to drink
the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something, sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na
lang pababagsakin ko na siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you
gather to be referred to as your "amo"?
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual
damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should
concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Marcos vs Manglapus
EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to
seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former
President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino
said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state
and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed
to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under
this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners,
raising the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to
their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the
rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she
has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order
respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc,
Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and
enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the
return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the
Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued
that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased
Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by
the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of
Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country,
a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at
destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for
Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the
burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are
compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for
reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have
been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's
decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event,
has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was
rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the
Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown
to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the
destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos
reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called
President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino,
who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter
"should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine
Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her
to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on
the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the
Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution
from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers
among three (3) separate branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely
accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the
specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton
stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section
1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ."
Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31
ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal
articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow
from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other
parts of the Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's
proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could
exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the
constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms,
strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate,
and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The
language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional
concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather,
the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are
themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere
properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless
there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 158-159 (1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's
implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of
the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to
Amendment No. 6 which provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary
decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of
the land,
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the
1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6
refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No.
6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance
with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the
absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave
abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit."
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition.
The death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as
the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been met with only
passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the
discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant
memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he
was already moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the
government stresses, he has been reduced to a non-person (which makes me
wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a
symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only
a dead body waiting to be interred in this country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than
debating over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and
oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep and let us be done with
it forever.
PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:
I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have already
expressed.
Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is still entitled to certain
rights. It is not correct to say that a dead man, since he is no longer a human
being, has ceased to have rights. For instance, our Revised Penal Code
prohibits the commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if
we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human rights what
about the human rights of his widow and the other members of his family?
Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national security have remained
unproved and consequently, unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily
control any possible uprising or political and military destabilization. In fact,
the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we do not allow the
remains to come, more trouble may be expected.
Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster pace if the petition for
the return is granted. To refuse the request can mean a hardening of
resistance against the well-intentioned aim of the administration. Upon the
other hand, to grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the
oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry.
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our government's act of mercy.
As Shakespeare once wrote "the quality of mercy is not strained." Surely,
compassion is the better part of government. Remove mercy, and you
remove the best reason against civil strife, which if not abated can turn our
country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end, as one great man
has put it, the question will no longer be what is right, but what is left.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which supervened after
decision in this case had been rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my
original dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and decisive
proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled
to return to, die and be buried in this country." I have only to add a few
statements to that dissenting opinion.
Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the first two (2) rights,
i.e. to return to and die in this country, The remaining right of this Filipino
that cries out for vindication at this late hour is the right to be buried in this
country. Will the respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying
the constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which, as stated
in my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return to, die and be buried in
this country? The answer should be in the negative if the Constitution is to
still prevail; the answer should be in the negative if we are to avoid the
completely indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his
mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the treasured land of his
birth.
Those who would deny this Filipino the only constitutional and human right
that can be accorded him now say that the constitutional and human right to
be buried in this country would apply to any Filipino, except Mr. Marcos,
because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This is the most
irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time. For, our democracy is built
on the fundamental assumption (so we believe) that the Constitution and all
its guarantees apply to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or
ignorant, religious or agnostic as long as he is a Filipino.
It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be buried in this country would
pose a serious threat to national security and public safety. What threat? As
pointed out in my dissenting opinion, the second cogent and decisive
proposition in this case is that respondents have not presented any "hard
evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat. "All we have are
general conclusions of national security and public safety' in avoidance of a
specific, demandable and enforceable constitutional and basic human right
to return." Recent events have, to my mind, served to confirm the validity of
such dissenting statement.
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a serious threat to
national security, the situation cannot be any worse with a dead Marcos
returning. For, a dead Marcos will return to be buried into mother earth,
where there are no protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that
reigns, in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the "unanimity of
the graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered impotent to threaten
national security, his supporters would pose that threat to national security.
This argument is untenable as it is without merit. As I see it, Marcos'
supporters pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived
of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the remains of Mr.
Marcos are brought to the country and allowed the burial to which he is
constitutionally and humanly entitled, Marcos' supporters would be deprived
of an otherwise potent argument—so conducive to mass protests and even
violence—that their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be buried in his
homeland.
It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no constitutional or
human rights, to speak of. This contention entirely begs the issue. In the first
place, one cannot overlook that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino, to be
buried in this country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It was
vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more importantly, the right of
every Filipino to be buried in his country, is part of a continuing right that
starts from birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his
country.
This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the Philippine government
the right to lay down conditions for the burial of Mr. Marcos in this country,
but I submit that these conditions must, as a fundamental postulate,
recognize the right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country NOW.
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos' burial in this country now.
Without in any way affecting my respect and regard for my brethren and
sisters in the majority, I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed that, with
their decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country, they have
passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional crisis that, in my humble
assessment, threatens to ignite an already divided nation, Regrettably, they
have ignored the constitutional dimension of the problem rooted in the
ageless and finest tradition of our people for respect and deference to the
dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing strife, among our people,
of unending hatred, recriminations and retaliations. God save this country!
My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to allow the immediate
return and burial in the Republic of the Philippines of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to such conditions as the Philippine government
may impose in the interest of peace and order.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe being on the other foot,
yet, as I stated before, I can not allow personal emotions to soften my
"hardened impartiality" and deny, as a consequence, the rights of the ex-
President's bereaved to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to
return from exile. As I had, then, voted to grant the petition, so do I vote to
grant reconsideration.
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of the Constitution, by
direct grant or by implication, the President's supposed "residual" power to
forbid citizens from entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution of
the majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that:
3. Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her
to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on
the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to
the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the Constitution has
imposed limitations on specific powers of the President, it has, a fortiori,
prescribed a diminution of executive power. The Charter says that the right
may only be restricted by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the
fundamental law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so. It
would have also completed the symmetry: judicial, congressional, and
executive restraints on the right. No amount of presumed residual executive
power can amend the Charter.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily, a limitation not only
against legislative encroachments on individual liberties, but more so, against
presidential intrusions. And especially so, because the President is the
caretaker of the military establishment that has, several times over, been
unkind to part of the population it has also sworn to protect.
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses
has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have
ceased" (Res., 3) is the realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination. The
military has shown no hard evidence that "the return of the Marcoses" would
indeed interpose a threat to national security. And apparently, the majority
itself is not convinced ("has been viewed...").
That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon Aquino as an illegitimate
President, does not, so I submit, reinforce alleged fears of a massive
destabilization awaiting the nation. The military has said over and over that
Marcos followers are not capable of successful destabilization effort. And
only this morning (October 27, 1989), media reported the assurances given
to foreign investors by no less than the President, of the political and
economic stability of the nation, as well as the Government's capability to
quell forces that menace the gains of EDSA.
I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My personal
impressions, however, are beside the point. I reiterate that the President has
no power to deny requests of Marcos relatives to bury Marcos in his
homeland. As for the former, let them get their just deserts here too. And let
the matter rest.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Nothing important has happened to change my vote for granting the petition.
The death of Marcos has not plunged the nation into paroxysms of grief as
the so-called "loyalists" had hoped. By and large, it has been met with only
passing interest if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the
discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only an unpleasant
memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the national security when he
was already moribund that feeble threat has died with him. As the
government stresses, he has been reduced to a non-person (which makes me
wonder why it is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a
symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical followers. It is only
a dead body waiting to be interred in this country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important things to do than
debating over a corpse that deserves no kinder fate than dissolution and
oblivion. I say let it be brought home and buried deep and let us be done with
it forever.
People vs Bugalao
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 which affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001
and Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006.
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in
separate Informations both dated December 21, 2000. The Informations read
as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA],3 14 years old, against the
latter’s will and consent.4
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001
That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], 14 years old, against the
latter’s will and consent.5
Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty on both counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the prosecution.
AAA was born on April 13, 1986. According to her late-registered birth
certificate, her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC (father). AAA, however,
testified that BBB and CCC are not her biological parents, as she was only
adopted when she was very young.6 CCC died in December 1999.7
In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house of her
brother DDD (son of BBB and CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan.
With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and accused-appellant
Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger sister, then six-year-old FFF (who were also
the children of BBB and CCC).
On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room
which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody
enter the room. She recognized the accused-appellant as the intruder, and
saw that he was holding a knife. Accused-appellant poked the knife at AAA’s
neck, causing her to freeze in fear. Accused-appellant removed AAA’s clothes,
and then his own. Both AAA and accused-appellant were wearing t-shirt and
shorts before the undressing. Accused-appellant kissed her neck and inserted
his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but accused-appellant
did not stop and continued raping AAA for one hour.9
On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in
Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was
sleeping in the second floor of the house, where there are no rooms. AAA was
roused from her sleep when accused-appellant was already undressing her.
Accused-appellant removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA tried to resist, but accused-appellant held her hands. Accused-appellant
then touched her breasts and kissed her. Accused-appellant remained on top
of her for half an hour.10
AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape incidents.
Upon learning of the same, BBB did not believe AAA and whipped her.11
During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the character
and chastity of AAA, asked AAA about an alleged sexual intercourse between
her and the now deceased CCC. AAA affirmed her statement in her affidavit
that CCC took advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was still alive.
This allegedly happened five times, the first of which was when she was only
seven years old.12 Answering a query from the court, AAA testified that she
was currently in the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD).13
The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray as its second witness. However, the latter’s testimony was
dispensed with upon the stipulation of the parties on the fact of examination
of AAA by Dr. Viray on September 5, 2000, and the contents of the
examination report,14 which includes the finding that AAA was in a "non-
virgin state."
When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a year
later, it also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for
the prosecution. This time, she testified that the sexual encounters between
her and the accused-appellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of
rape against the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with
him. She also claimed that she was instructed by the police officer who
investigated the incident to say that the accused-appellant used a knife. She
also testified that she was raped by her father CCC when she was seven years
old. She was recanting her previous testimony because she purportedly was
no longer angry with accused-appellant.15
On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of rape
because she was angry with the accused-appellant for making her do laundry
work for him. However, when asked if she "consented and voluntarily
submitted" herself to the accused-appellant when she had sexual intercourse
with him, she answered in the negative. She had been released from the
custody of the DSWD and was alone by herself for some time, but she now
lives with the family of accused-appellant. 16
On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force
himself upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in
his mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant was
not her sweetheart.17
Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist.
She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12,
2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental
retardation as he had an IQ of below 50.18
Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June 15, 2005,
claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they
ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He
denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was
asking for ₱300 from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified
that there was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA ("ampun-
ampunan lang").19
On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case No.
197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and hereby sentences him to
suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise
directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
(b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise
directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱50,000.00.20
The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she
testified for the prosecution, and was returned to the family of the accused-
appellant after her original testimony. It was during the time when she was
back in the custody of the accused-appellant’s family that she recanted her
testimony for the prosecution. According to the RTC, it is clear that she had
no other place to go to as she was completely orphaned and was dependent
on the family of the accused, and it was understandable that she may have
recanted in order to remain in the good graces of the accused-appellant’s
family.21
As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from
mental retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of
accused-appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates
of the complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of
the psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or
psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming that
accused-appellant was of such mental state at the time of the incidents, the
psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right
from wrong.
On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that
of the RTC, except with a modification on the penalty in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death
penalty. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13, dated 23 January 2006, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and damages
awarded. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, in each of the two (2) counts of rape.
He is further directed to pay private complainant the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, for each count of rape, in addition to the civil indemnity
awarded by the court a quo.
Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties
manifested that they are waiving their rights to file a supplemental brief, as
the same would only contain a reiteration of the arguments presented in their
appellant’s and appellee’s briefs.
In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that the
prosecution evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAA’s
withdrawal of her original testimony.
We have recently held that "[c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or
for monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule
to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply because the
witness who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or
another."25 We have, in the past, also declared that the recantation, even of
a lone eyewitness, does not necessarily render the prosecution’s evidence
inconclusive.26 In the often-cited Molina v. People,27 we specified how a
recanted testimony should be examined:
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the
original testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous
testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony
is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is
one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of
evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and
disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony
and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized,
and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. x x x.28
(Emphases supplied.)
These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant is
usually the lone eyewitness. Thus, in People v. Sumingwa,29 where the rape
victim later disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her father, this
Court held:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most
often depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's
testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and
usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim's testimony
is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling examination,
it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such
testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its
subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such
recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other
testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the
stand.30
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
AAA’s accusation and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her
recantation was made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in
cases where recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case
had the opportunity to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated
the sordid details of the alleged rape by her "adoptive" brother, but also
when she claimed that she made up her previous rape charges out of anger.
As such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted
accused-appellant even after examining the young witness as she made a
complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial
court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an
entirely new significance in this case where AAA was subjected to grueling
cross examinations, redirect examinations, and re-cross examinations both as
a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court found that the private
complainant’s testimony for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of
belief.
However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this
Court which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was concocted.
AAA’s testimony for the prosecution, which was taken when she was in the
custody of the DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material discrepancies.
All accused-appellant can harp on in his appellant’s brief was AAA’s failure to
recall the length of the knife used in the assaults, a minor and insignificant
detail not material to the elements of the crime of rape. She remained
steadfast on cross-examination even as defense counsel tried to discredit her
by bringing up her dark past of being sexually molested by the accused-
appellant’s father when she was seven years old. This is in stark contrast to
her testimony for the defense, where AAA, now living with accused-
appellant’s family, claimed that she fabricated a revolting tale of rape simply Q: Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be dismissed because you
because accused-appellant made her do laundry. AAA’s recantation even testify today [would] you admit for a fact that he [was] also staying in the
contradicts the testimony of accused-appellant himself. While AAA claims in house where you are staying now?
her retraction that she had consensual sex with her brother, accused- A: No, sir.
appellant testified that they merely kissed and that AAA’s purported motive Q: Where will he stay?
for the rape charges was monetary. A: In Mindanao, sir.
As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the Q: Because that was one of the promise or commitment of the family of the
cross-examination of AAA as a defense witness revealed that it was taken at accused, is it not?
a time when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay with the family A: No, sir.
of accused-appellant and upon a reliance on the family’s implied commitment Q: And how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
to send accused-appellant to Mindanao: A: Because my other Kuya will not allow him to stay in the house, sir.
PROS. JOSON: Q: Because your other Kuya does not like Aniceto Bulagao to do the things
Q: Where are you staying at present that you have complaint [sic] against him, is it not?
A: In our house, sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your house where you were staying is the house of the parents of the Q: And what you are "isinusumbong" is the case today against him, is it not?
accused? A: Yes, sir.31
A: Yes, sir. Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial
Q: And you don’t have any relatives where you can go and stay except from court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree
that house? with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental
A: None, sir. condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
Q: Where [are] your parents? Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone
A: I do not know, sir. who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
Q: Are they all dead or still alive? proving it with clear and convincing evidence.32 Besides, this Court observes
A: They are deceased, sir. that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor
Q: All? his answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or
A: Both are deceased, sir. free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of
Q: Do you mean to say that do you have full blood brother and sister? reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of
A: They all separated, sir. the crime.33 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the
Q: Do you know where they were living? time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of
A: No, sir. insanity be considered.34
Q: From the time you were released from the DSWD you are alone by As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of
yourself? death for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to
A: Yes, sir. reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. It
Q: And the person[s] who are now taking care of you are giving you shelter should be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the
and everyday foods [sic] from the family of the accused, is that correct? imposition of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which
A: Yes, sir. would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause
the award of moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each from
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
(₱75,000.00) under prevailing jurisprudence.35 ₱50,000.00, both for each count of rape; and
In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the 2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with interest at the
use of a deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until
crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when committed with the fully paid.
use of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This SO ORDERED.
crime was proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was
alleged to have occurred on June 17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or
aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information, the proper penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used
a knife on June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000,
the date of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001.36 As such, the crime that was proven
in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any
circumstance affecting criminal liability. However, simple rape is also
punishable by reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B.
In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even
without the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award
of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00, as well as moral damages in
the amount of ₱50,000.00, both for each count of rape. 37 In addition, we
have held that since exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but
also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender.38 This Court believes that the conduct
of accused-appellant herein, who raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls
under this category and is therefore liable for exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape, in line with existing
jurisprudence. 39
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-appellant
Aniceto Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, for each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay AAA the
amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape, in
addition to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals, namely: civil
Oropesa vs Oropesa
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure of the Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the
Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA." The Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed the Order3 dated
September 27, 2006 and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No.
04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesa’s petition for guardianship
over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo
Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to
Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been
afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years
already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his
judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his
hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed
to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to
manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms.
Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set
the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social
case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted
her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The
Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any
finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental
Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his
testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the
(respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May
29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer
of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the
petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the
presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2)
To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To
Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondent’s)
Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to
Evidence dated July 23, 2006.5 (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his
personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositor’s Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in
an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-
movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his
personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its
earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his
appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29,
2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November
14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by
the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16,
2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS
DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD
BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP9
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition
to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the
Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and
reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court
which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him
showing respondent’s incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of
guardianship in the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed
to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to
preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the
ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.11
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who,
though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other
similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be
placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word
"incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read
and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid,
take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should
be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence."12 We consider that
evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore,
should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum13 the
following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly
for over ten (10) years already;
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Luke’s Medical
Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former
colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for
payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had
substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical
expenses;
c. Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of
care and management;
d. The realty taxes for respondent’s various properties remain unpaid and
therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the
necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for
the reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when
the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and
refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his
name and his daughter’s without the latter’s knowledge or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife
to stab himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend during one of their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of
groceries and furniture, despite protests from his children.14
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioner’s
lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent,
petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence
that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is
incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document
presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said document,
entitled "Report of Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by
respondent in his Memorandum16 to illustrate that said report in fact
favored respondent’s claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and
participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his
responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his
articulation was generally comprehensible.
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains
that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and
keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-
constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles.
Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock
Drawing Test.
Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective
solutions to problem situations. x x x.17
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his
proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by
himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s real and
personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any
expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of
petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to
evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a
formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of
certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father’s and his
sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment
of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way
relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only
medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of
Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence.
In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best,
for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on
the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view
that respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the
proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."18
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable
September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that
petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and,
likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s
physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which
states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and
physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s
evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that
Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that
were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide
solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in
memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts."20
We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional
circumstances;21 however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It
is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such
findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are
deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence
on record."22 We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and
the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to
evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the

presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an

action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a
judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought."24 1âwphi1

There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition
for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence
precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than
dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from
presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated
September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.