Calang v.

People
Facts:
The RTC found Calang guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries
and damage to property.
The Court of Appeals (CA), in affirming the RTC decision, ruled that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due
care and precaution in driving the Philtranco bus.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, for
failing to prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the accident.
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA. Petitioner filed an MR claiming that there was no basis to hold
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang because the former was not a party in the criminal case before the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the employer (Philtranco) should be held jointly and severally liable with the petitioner,
based on quasi-delict.

Held:
No. The RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang. The SC
emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in this
case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that
an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict. If at all,
Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishments.
Philippine Rabbit vs. People
Facts:
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay
damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal
case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal
case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal
the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held:
No. Well-established is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an
appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail, on the rationale that the appellant loses his standing in court
when he absconds. An accused who has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal rendering the judgment against him final and executory.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, the
employers are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees; While employers may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify
or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court; The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to
its amount.
There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee, and a finding of guilt has both criminal and
civil aspects—it is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as
to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former; Where the civil liability of the accused-
employee has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then his employer’s subsidiary civil liability has
also become immediately enforceable.
People v. Combate

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate stands convicted of the crime of Murder and Homicide, as
defined and penalized under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively. He was sentenced
to suffer the penalties of reclusion temporal and reclusion perpetua.
The CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court and modified the award of damages. The award of
compensatory damages in both cases is deleted, and in lieu thereof, exemplary damages to the aggrieved parties.

ISSUE:
WON the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be
used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.

HELD:
Yes. With the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,
the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
RPC.
As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion
perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome and People v. Quiachon, is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable
penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding
damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
People v. Lipata

FACTS:
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando
Cueno. The CA affirmed the Decision.
Prior to Final Judgment the appellant died. SC declared that because of appellant’s death prior to the
promulgation of the CA’s decision, there is no further need to determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s
death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability.

ISSUE:
WON the death of the appellant prior to his conviction extinguished the criminal action and ipso facto
extinguished the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto.

HELD:
Yes. Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.”
The Court also ruled that “if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires
to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the
then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not
on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.”
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, The Court found that there was no separate civil case
instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of
action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order
to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict leads the Court to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a
centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima

FACTS:
On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29,
94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents SOJ Leila M. De Lima and SILG
Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became effective on April 18, 2014. Petitioners and intervenors assail the
validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance
(GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL)
mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

WON Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592
contravenes Article 22 of the RPC.

HELD:

Yes. Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is
favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are
the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.
In criminal law, the principle penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect is
well entrenched.
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules.
Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in nature.
In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law.
They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al.
further argue that if an amendment to the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused
cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter should be
considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.
While R.A. No. 10592 does provide/prescribe/establish a penalty component of our correctional system, not
define a crime/offense or as it addresses the rehabilitation its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing
the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article
22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the disadvantage
of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their
respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they
committed. Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending
their sentence and increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the
RPC.