Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Republic of The Philippines
Republic of The Philippines
Republic of The Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals its decision are as follows:
1
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very
much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically
and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is
still very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either
one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology
or science.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
SO ORDERED.
II
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-
3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in
her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove
the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other
basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should
retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by
the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have
been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved. 3
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want
their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing
the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court
is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Procedural History:
The Federal District Court issued declaratory relief and held that
the statute was both vague and overbroad. When Roe was not
granted Injunctive relief, she appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
Issue and Holding:
Judgment:
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion that the Texas law was
unconstitutional and a woman’s right to an abortion is protected
under the constitutional right to privacy.
Reasoning:
Concurring (Burger):
The abortion statute wrongfully restricts abortions for the purpose
of preserving the pregnant woman’s health.
Concurring (Stewart):
The liberty interest at stake is best supported by substantive due
process, not a “vague” right to privacy.
Concurring (Douglas):
Douglas agrees with the majority that a woman’s right to have an
abortion exists and is not outweighed by the state’s stated
interest, but says the right to an abortion is a basic right under
marriage and family decisions in the Bill of Rights.
Dissent (White):
The holding merely creates a new constitutional right for women
and is not supported by the Constitution.
Dissent (Rehnquist):
Significance:
GR No. 119190
16 January 1997
FACTS:
On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they slept
in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no sexual
intercourse took place. Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations. She was found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her
husband’s examination was kept confidential.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual, and
that the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance
of a normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his wife’s
fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he was found not to be impotent,
and any differences between the two of them can still be reconciled. He
admitted that they have not had intercourse since their marriage until their
separation because his wife avoided him. He added that his wife filed this
case against him because she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the defendant, will consummate
their marriage.
The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However, neither
the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the
other. But the fact remains that there has never been coitus between them.
At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by
either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.
Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel
Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex... alteration.
Issues:
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Ruling:
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.[20] In
this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's
first name was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an... improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was
in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts...
and judicial decrees
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by... any law,
expressly or impliedly.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the... correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Principles:
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification.[11] A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for
change of name are controlled by statutes.[13] In this connection, Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority
to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications...
for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1)
The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2)
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3)
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:[24]
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of... citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground... of
sex reassignment.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total
of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term...
status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity
to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.[28] (emphasis supplied)
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks
of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and
his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.