LIABILITY (Reading Assignment 5)

MENDOZA VS DE LEON
FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Villasis Pangasinan revoked the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff under the
provisions of Act No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. The plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution
adopted by the defendants in this case, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person. Mendoza filed an action for
damages against the individual members of the council.
ISSUE:
WON the council members can be held personally liable for the damages suffered by the lessee.
HELD:
Yes. Under the evidence of record, that there is no manner of doubt that this pretext was absolutely without foundation and as there
was therefore no occasion whatever for rescinding the contract, the defendant councilors are liable personally for the damages suffered
by Mendoza.
RATIO:
The Municipal Code confers both governmental and corporate powers upon municipal corporations. For the exercise of the former, it is
not liable to private persons. Its liability to them for the wrongful exercise of the latter is the same as that of a private corporation or
individual. Officers and agents of MCs charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative,
judicial, or quasi-judicial, are not liable for consequences of their official acts unless it can be shown that they acted will fully and
maliciously, with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. The officers of municipalities charged with the administration
of patrimonial property are liable for mismanagement of its affairs as are directors or managing officers of private corporations, not for
mere mistakes of judgment, but only when their acts are so far opposed to the true interest of the municipality as to lead to the clear
inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests. The defendant councilors
regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege to the plaintiff for two years. After continuous user of a little more than one year, they
forcible evicted him on the pretext that he was not operating the ferry leased to him.

TORIO VS FONTANILLA
Since the holding of a town fiesta is an exercise of a proprietary function, the Municipality of Malasiqui is liable for any injury sustained
on the occasion thereof.
FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed a resolution celebrating a town fiesta for 3 days on January, 1959. The
resolution created on Executive Committee which would oversee the operations of the town fiesta. The Executive Committee in turn
had a sub-committee in charge of building 2 stages, one of which was fora zarzuela program. Vicente Fontanilla was one of the actors
of the zarzuela. While the zarzuela was going on the stage where the play was set collapsed. Fontanilla, who has at the rear of the
stage, was pinned underneath and died the following day. The family and heirs of Fontanilla filed a complaint against the Municipality of
Malasiqui, the Municipal Council and the individual members of the Municipal Council. Can they be held liable?
HELD:
The Municipality of Malasiqui is liable and the individual members of the Municipal Council are not liable.
REASONS:
1) The basic rule to be first followed is that a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for an injury caused in the course
of performance of a governmental function. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be
held liable upon contracts and in torts.

2) The next question to be answered is that whether the fiesta above-quota was performed by the municipality in the exercise of its
governmental or proprietary function. According to 2282 of the revised Administrative Code, municipalities are authorized to hold fiesta,
but it is not their duty to conduct such. Thus, the fiesta is proprietary in nature. The same analogy can be applied to the maintenance of
parks, which is a private undertaking, as opposed to the maintenance of public schools and jails, which are for the public service. (The
key word then is duty.)
3) Under the doctrine of respondent superior (see first paragraph of Art. 2180), the municipality can be held liable for the death
of Fontanilla if a) the municipality was performing a proprietary function at that time and b) negligence can be attributed to the
municipality’s officers, employees or agents performing the proprietary function. The evidence proved that the committee overseeing
the construction of the stage failed to build a strong enough to insure the safety of zarzuela participants. Fontanilla was entitled to
ensure that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.

4) Finally, the municipal council is not responsible. The Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with
the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and
distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for
tort or negligence culpa aquillana committed by the corporation’s employees of agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross
or wanton negligence on their part. To make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have
been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in
the wrongful act.

PROVINCE OF CEBU VS IAC

FACTS:
Again, this case concerns the implied liability of a municipal corporation in paying the fees of an attorney hired – but the attorney ended
up with only a pittance. There was a time when Cebu City almost became the owner of practically the whole of the Province of Cebu.
This happened in Feb.4. 1964 when the Vice –Governor and the Provincial Board of Cebu, taking advantage of Governor Rene
Espina’s absence (he was away on an official business trip [ows?]} donated 210 lots or 380 hectares of provincial patrimonial land to
Cebu City. When Governor Espina finally heard of the donation, he filed a case to declare the donation void for being illegal and
immoral. The defendants in the case were Cebu City, City mayor Sergio Osmena and the dumb provincial officials responsible for the
donation. Governor Espina hired Atty. Pablo Garcia, a private lawyer, as his counsel. Atty. Garcia toiled for 8 years on the case, but for
some reason, he was no longer counsel when the parties settled for a compromise agreement. Nevertheless, Atty. Garcia claims he is
entitled to fees worth 30% of the worth of the properties or 36million pesos (a staggering amount, considering that the amount was
based on the peso - dollar rates of 1979).The province of Cebu City however refused to give him even one centavo. They said Sec.
1683 of the RAC and Sec. 3 of the Local Autonomy Law is clear that only the provincial fiscal and municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in its lawsuits. More importantly, if the province of Cebu were to hire a private lawyers (such as when the
provincial fiscal is disqualified) the Provincial Board must pass a resolution to allow such a move. The Trial court awarded attorney’s
fees based on quantum merit. On appeal, the IAC awarded 5% worth of properties. The questions now are 1. Should the province pay
Atty. Garcia and 2? If so how much isAtty. Garcia entitled to?
HELD:
The province must pay Atty. Garcia but he is entitled only to quantum merit.
Reasons:
1. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haee exception, si nonaliquid sit contra jus fasque. (Where anything is granted generally, this
exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right). This simply means that every rule, no matter how strict or harsh,
must have an exception. Here, equity comes into play. To deny Atty. Garcia compensation for his professional services would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

2. The argument that the hiring of private lawyers by a province must first gain the approval of the Provincial Board is absurd. First
of all, the service of the Provincial Fiscal has already been engaged by the Provincial Board. More importantly, it’s so stupid for the
Provincial Board to pass a resolution grant the hiring of a private lawyer who would litigate against them. The Provincial Board may just
not pass such a resolution. The legal maxim which we can use as a basis for this situation is “Nemo tenetur ad impossibile” (The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility)

3. Until the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent.
His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on
appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. Even where an attorney is employed by an
unauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of the fact that it is being represented by an
attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed authority. Such acquiescence in the
employment of an attorney as occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification. The act of the successor provincial board and
provincial officials in allowing Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit led the counsel to believe his
services were still necessary.4. Atty. Garcia is entitled only to quantum merit. He simply was not counsel when the compromise
agreement was made. He gets only30,000 pesos.

JIMENEZ V CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:
Bernardino Jimenez was the unlucky lad who fell in an uncovered opening on the ground located within the premises of the Sta. Ana
public market. At that time, the market was flooded with ankle-deep rainwater which prevented the opening form being seen. Jimenez,
for his part, went to that market to buy bagoong despite the rains. He sustained an injury due to a rusty 4-inch nail which pierced his left
leg. Jimenez sued the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) and the City of Manila for his misfortune. The Sta. Ana Market argued that
at that time, such market was under the administration of the AIC by virtue of a management and Operating Contract it had with the
City of Manila. The trial court held the AIC responsible but absolved the City of Manila. Is the City of Manila indeed not liable?
HELD:
It is liable for the following reasons: 1) Again, Art. 2189 comes into play, since the injury took place in a public building.2) Also, Art.
2189 requires that the LGU must retain supervision and control over the public work in question for it to be held liable. The evidence
showed that the Management and Operating Contract explicitly stated that the City of Manila retained supervision and control over the
Sta. Ana Market.
Also, in a letter to Finance Secretary Cesar Virata, Mayor Raymond Bagatsing admitted this fact of supervision and control. Moreover,
Sec. 30(g) of the Local Tax Code says that public markets shall be under the immediate supervision, administration and control of the
City Treasurer.3) Jimenez could not be held liable for negligence. A customer in a store has every right to presume that the owner will
comply with his duty to keep his premises safe for customers. The owner of the market, on the other hand, was proven to have been
negligent in not providing a cover for the said opening. The negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury
suffered.
NOTE: It is not necessary for the LGU to have ownership over the public work in question; mere control and supervision is sufficient.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS FIRME

FACTS:
Laurence Banino, Sr., along with several other passengers in a jeepney they were riding in, died after collision involving said jeepney, a
privately owned gravel and sand trucks and a dump truck owned by the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, driven by Alfredo
Bislig, a regular employee of said municipality. The heirs included in its complaint the municipality and the dump trucks driver. The
municipality invokes non-suability of the State. Is it correct?
HELD:
YES,
1. The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express
of implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued
in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No.3083. A special law may be passed to enable a
person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts,
thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint thus opening itself to a
counterclaim. Municipal corporations for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

2. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability.

“Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance
that a State is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held allowing itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.”

3. About the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the
municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental of propriety functions.
As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability
of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. It has already been remarked that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not
liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in a propriety capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant is not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.4. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
that “he was on his way to Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.”

FACTS:
In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via
Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and
ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City
Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-
wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the
City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27,
1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was
given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from
execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October
5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as
back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can’t do so
because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of
the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City
Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may
be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.
HELD:
Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the
defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has
always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment
or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is
relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained,
the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and
admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already
approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back-wages plus
interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such
funds.

SPOUSES JAYME V APOSTOL

FACTS:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the
possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General
Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in South Cotabato. The
intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very
high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days
after the accident.
ISSUE:
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.
RULING:
1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel
during the time of the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding
Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to
Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the
driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and
Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from
suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that
municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a
vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries
or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of
record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.

OSMENA v COA
Facts:
The controversy had its origin in the stabbing of Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna Spouses. He was rushed to the
Cebu City Medical Center, but died due to severe loss
of blood. The de la Cerna Spouses claimed that their son died because of the ineptitude, grossnegligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and
incompetence of the medical staff. They filed acomplaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against the city of Cebu,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians. The City of Cebu was impleaded as defendant on the theory that as employer of the
doctors, it was vicariously responsible for the latter’s negligence. An amicable settlement was entered into between the parties whereby
the City of Cebu agreed to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30,000.00 as financial assistance. This agreement was ratified by
theSangguniang Panlungsod and the City Budget Officer was authorized to include in theSupplemental Budget for the year 1989 the
amount of P30,000.00. The agreement was approved by the Regional Trial
Court.About eleven (11) months later, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the financialassistance declaring that it is not within
the powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to provide monetary assistance that would promote the economic condition and private
interests of certain individuals only. The Motion for Reconsideration of the City was denied by COA, hence, this petition ascribing
ggrave abuse of discretion to the COA and its Members.

Issue:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the city’s appropriation of P30,000.00 made conformably with
the compromise agreement in the civil suit against the City of Cebu.

Held:
COA’s disallowance of the appropriation is tainted by grave abuse of discretion and should be rectified. The participation by the City in
negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto, are
indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is
a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law. That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant
formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure. Neither may it be disputed that
since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as
well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it. The COA failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the
consideration, not merely for the settlement of a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy. By making reciprocal
concessions, the parties put an end to the action in a manner acceptable to all of them, thus eliminated the contingency of being made
to assume heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection with activities being undertaken by it in its
proprietary functions and in accordance with which it may be held liable ex contractu or ex delito, for the negligent performance of its
corporate, proprietary or business functions.

Reading Assignment 6

QUALIFICATIONS & DISQUALIFICATIONS

TORAYNO VS COMELEC

Private respondent was actually and physically residing in CDO City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis
Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered
as a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the consti and the law, he is a resident of CDO City and eligible to run for mayor
thereof.

In requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the
Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter from an elective office to serve that community. Such provision is
aimed at excluding outsiders from taking advantage of favourable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to
elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. The purpose is best met
by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same
area either by origin or by choice.
 We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted
not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies, but more important, with the constituencies themselves – their
needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development and all matters vital to their common welfare. The
requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies and likewise for the
electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek. In other words, the actual, physical and
personal presence of herein private respondent in CDO City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties
of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioner's very legalistic, academic, and technical
approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy the simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence
requirement.

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which
provides for the qualifications of local elective officials.

The Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was
governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June
1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that
Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office
therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.

Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of
the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a
consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting
acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms
and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the
city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.

To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to
run for mayor thereof. There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de
Oro City. He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.

Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must
be given fullest effect.

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the candidates’ residency in the political unit they seek to
represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent stranger[s]
or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that community.

FACTS

COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a
resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor. When his COC for the position
of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This
district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. Hewas elected Representative as a
domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of
2010.Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of
Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for
candidates for elective provincial officials. With the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub,
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of
Aborlan. Respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to
cancel Mitra’s COC.10 They essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet established
residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Both Comelec in division and en banc affirmed to
cancel the COC of Mitra. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

1. Did Mitra complied with the qualifications for governmental position, esp. the 1 year residency requirements?
2. Whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented that his residence is in Aborlan to deceive and mislead the people of the Province
of Palawan?

HELD

1. NO.COC Denial/Cancellation Proceedings Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code(OEC) governs the
cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires that the candidate’s
stated facts in the COC be true, under pain of the COC’s denial or cancellation if any false representation of a material fact is made. To
quote these provisions: SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. “The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey
the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to
a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.” x x x x SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election. The false representation that these
provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact. The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s
qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate’s status as a registered voter in the political
unit where he or she is a candidate similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government
Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the
political unit where he or she ran as a candidate. The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where
the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a
material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws. Under the evidentiary situation of the case, there is clearly no basis for the conclusion that Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead
the Palawan electorate. From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to
comply with the residence requirement of a candidate for an elective provincial office.

Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of residence, as its
Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a resident of the local government unit where he intends to run for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. In other words, the law itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of
domicile or residence, but imposes only the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of course, as a
continuing requirement or qualification, the elected official must remain a resident there for the rest of his term.

Mitra’s domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor –in light of the relatively recent change of
status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial
officials –he had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire anew one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this
would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the
following: (1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. While Mitra might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and activities as a
Representative were in Manila, it is hardly credible that he would not be seen in Aborlan. In this regard, the sworn statement of the
Punong Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan should carry a lot more weight than the statements of punong barangay officials elsewhere since it
is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. The COMELEC apparently missed all these
because it was fixated on the perceived coldness and impersonality of Mitra’s dwelling.

The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did
indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feed mill as his residence (while his house, on the
lot he bought, was under construction) and whether he indeed resided there. The notary’s compliance with the notarial law likewise
assumes no materiality as it is a defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties’ affirmation before a notary public of the
contract’s genuineness and due execution.

A sworn statement that has no counterpart in the respondents’ evidence in so far as it provides details (particularly when read
with the statement of Ricardo Temple) 72 is Carme Caspe’s statement on how Mitra’s transfer of residence took place. Read together,
these statements attest that the transfer of residence was accomplished, not in one single move but, through an incremental process
that started in early 2008 and was in place by March 2009, although the house Mitra intended to be his permanent home was not yet
then completed.

The COMELEC’s reasoning is not only intensely subjective but also flimsy, to the point of grave abuse of discretion when
compared with the surrounding indicators showing the Mitra has indeed been physically present in Aborlan for the required period with
every intent to settle there. Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC majority (but not on the Dissent) that Mitra made definite,
although incremental transfer moves, as shown by the undisputed business interests he has established in Aborlan in 2008; by the
lease of a dwelling where he established his base; by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; by his transfer of registration as a
voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house all viewed against the backdrop of a bachelor Representative who spent most
of his working hours in Manila, who had a whole congressional district to take care of, and who was establishing at the same time his
significant presence in the whole Province of Palawan.

2. NO. The character of Mitra’s representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to
consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitra’s feed mill residence. For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error – one
that goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment. By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation
in Mitra’s COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate
falsity in a material representation. In this case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence
shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.

Mitra’s feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence,
specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial
position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his
permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the
completion of his house. These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELEC’s highly subjective non-
legal standards do.

This case, incidentally, is not the first that we have encountered where a former elective official had to transfer residence in
order to continue his public service in another political unit that he could not legally access, as a candidate, without a change of
residence.

In Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, former Governor Vicente Y. Emano re-occupied a house he owned and had leased out in
Cagayan de Oro City to qualify as a candidate for the post of Mayor of that city (like Puerto Princesa City, a highly urbanized city whose
residents cannot vote for and be voted upon as elective provincial officials). We said in that case that - In other words, the actual,
physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to
fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and
technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence
requirement.

In Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe -Aguirre, we also had occasion to rule on the residency and right to vote of former
Congressman Luis A. Asistio who had been a congressman for Caloocan in 1992, 1995,1998 and 2004, and, in the words of the
Decision, "is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. "We recognized Asistio’s position that a mistake had
been committed in his residency statement, and concluded that the mistake is not "proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in
Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City." By this recognition, we confirmed that Asistio has not
committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his COC.

These cases are to be distinguished from the case of Velasco v COMELEC where the COMELEC cancelled the COC of
Velasco, a mayoralty candidate, on the basis of his undisputed knowledge, at the time he filed his COC, that his inclusion and
registration as a voter had been denied. His failure to register as a voter was a material fact that he had clearly withheld from the
COMELEC; he knew of the denial of his application to register and yet concealed his non-voter status when he filed his COC. Thus, we
affirmed the COMELEC’s action in cancelling his COC.

If there is any similarity at all in Velasco and the present case, that similarity is in the recognition in both cases of the rule of
law. In Velasco, we recognized – based on the law –that a basic defect existed prior to his candidacy, leading to his disqualification and
the vice-mayor-elect’s assumption to the office. In the present case, we recognize the validity of Mitra’s COC, again on the basis
of substantive and procedural law, and no occasion arises for the vice-governor-elect to assume the gubernatorial post.

Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate of the electorate to serve. We
distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters
of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before
elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby
violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as
expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the
electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will.

RULING

Petition granted and COMELEC Resolutions annuled. Respondents petition to cancel COC of Mitra denied.

ALTAREJOS v COMELEC

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof.

FACTS:

Private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza filed to the COMELEC a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.

Petitioner object that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8171.

On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their
Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period. Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum subsequently.
Atty. Zaragoza, Jr hearing officer of this case recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of mayor.

Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he
ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the
registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought
about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of
Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.

ISSUE: When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?

RULING:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year’s residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at
least twenty-three years of age on election day).

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the
date of the filing of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took
effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in
nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:

xxx

The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events
i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention
is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective
manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x
can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this
or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

ARATEA V COMELEC

FACTS:
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground
that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms. The COMELEC
Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
remained pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor, respectively. Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor. Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc
disqualified Lonzanida from running for Mayor based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor because Lonzanida
ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of
his name from the list of official candidates. Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. He
reasoned that since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared
stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected
Vice-Mayor was mandated to succeed as Mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the
OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should
succeed as Mayor in this case.

RULING:

The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the "second placer," should be
proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All
votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides,
among others: Sec. 40.

Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:(a) Those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence; x x x Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Sec. 12.

Disqualification.

— Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. x x x

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of
the contents of the certificate of candidacy. Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate of candidacy. This included
among others a statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office. The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the
penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification.

Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of
the principal penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualification means that "
the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually.

Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.

A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material
representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction
against him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the OEC because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public
office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in
Fermin v.Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from
perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a
certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then
he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.The dissenting opinions place the
violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or
condition which bars him from running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC." In
so holding the dissenting opinions write inthe law what is not found in the law.

Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial
notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Lonzanida’s
disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, he is known to have been
convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification
is notoriously known in fact and in law.Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position, the votes cast
for him should be considered stray Votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.

JAPSON VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino,
having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).

Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the
last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident
of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991

Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on
31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.

Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as
proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.

Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the
cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.

Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American
citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No.
9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA,
an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3)
Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine
passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of
General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5)
thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.

Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of
Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]

Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and
our country or a unit of territory thereof.

Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007
in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen

Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty
has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at
least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC,
Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
discretion for dismissing the petition.

Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC
First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy;
and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty
was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court
cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court.

Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement
set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at
bar.

Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had
already effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the
respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election
on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.

RULING:

Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his
Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.

There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the
Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other
countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12
months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of
residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4
May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an
elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he
had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number
of votes.

To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant
Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.

MAQUILING V COMELEC

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second
to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the
qualified candidates.

FACTS:

Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship upon his naturalization as a citizen of the United
States. Subsequently, he availed of the benefits of RA 9225, the Citizenship Retetention and Re-acquisition act of 2003 and ran as
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 local elections.

Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado, contending that Arnado is a foreigner. It
turned out that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines.

COMELEC annulled the proclamation of Arnado and consequently directed the order of succession under Section 44 of the
LGC be followed. It ruled that Arnado’s act of consistently using his US Passport after renouncing his US citizenship negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation.

Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in
the 2010 elections, intervened in the case. Maquiling argued that while the First division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the LGC is not applicable in this case. Maquiling claims that due to the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy, and the nullification of the latter’s proclamation, he should be proclaimed as the winner.

ISSUES:

Is the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office?

Is the rule on succession in the Local Government Code applicable to this case?

HELD:
 The act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office. By
renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country. However this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a
former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of a foreign country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

The court agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

Thus, by the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino
and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

The rule on succession under the LGC will not apply. The electorate’s awareness is not a pre-requisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify
the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This Leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.

BAUTISTA V COMELEC

FACTS:

On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay
elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareño ("Election Officer Jareño") refused to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy because
he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareño
with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14 ("trial court"). On 1July 2002, the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareño to
accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court
ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election Officer Jareño to include the name of Bautista in the
certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise. In compliance with the trial court's order, Election Officer Jareño
included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño referred the matter
of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department on 5 July 2002. On 11 July 2002, the
COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter
in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department's recommendation before the barangay
elections on 15 July 2002.

During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza ("Alcoreza") were candidates for the
position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with
522votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers ("Board of Canvassers") proclaimed Bautista as the
elected Punong Barangay.

ISSUE: Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the winning
candidate Bautista.

HELD:

Under the Local Government Code of 1991, 38 which took effect on 1 January 1992, an elective local official, including a
Punong Barangay, must not only be a "qualified elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also be a "registered voter." These qualifications
were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23 May 2002 which prescribed the guidelines on the 􀀻ling of
certificates of candidacy in connection with the 15 July 2002 elections. Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 likewise requires
the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates are registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a candidate. It is thus
clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends
to run for office.

According to Bautista's affidavit, he was practically out of the country from 1995 until 2001. When the certified list of voters
ceased to be effective and operative after the barangay elections in 1997, qualified voters had to register again to vote in any election.

Apparently, Bautista failed to register during the general registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC in 1997 since he
was still out of the country during that time. Republic Act No. 8189 ("The Voter's Registration Act of 1996") provides for a system of
continuing registration of voters. Thus, Bautista should have registered anew in the office of the Election Officer when he came back to
the Philippines in 2001 and learned that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters.

It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right to vote and to be voted for public office. As early as
2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose not to register
anew that year despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of Punong Barangay.

Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the
qualifications — that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a
material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An
elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely
representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. 43 Under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for
elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3)
prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the people's choice expressed in the local elections deserves
respect. Bautista's invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws is unavailing. The electorate cannot amend or waive the
qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility. 46 The fact that Bautista, a non-registered voter, was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does not erase the fact that
he lacks one of the qualifications for Punong Barangay.

Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of ineligibility of the winning candidate.

When the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was qualified.
There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautista's disqualification.
The Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the votes cast in favor of Bautista are stray votes. 52 A subsequent
finding by the COMELEC en banc that Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for
him.

The Local Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the Office of the Punong Barangay, thus:
 SEC. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor, Vice- Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. — If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in the case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-
governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay member, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member,
or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately
preceding local election. (Emphasis supplied)

Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in
the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

INHIBITIONS AND PROHIBITIONS

CATU v RELLOSA

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in
Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the
5th District of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings
and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where
respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant
administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and
that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to
them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under
Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713.

ISSUE: Whether or not an elected Punong Barangay is prohibited to engage in his profession while holding public office.

HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies
only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an
incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of profession of elective local
government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes
an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession.
Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.

Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of
their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees. For elective local government officials,
Section 90 of RA 7160 governs. Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of
the sangguniang kabataan for barangays. Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This
is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of
their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice
their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week. Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization
from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because
they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

FLORES v DRILON

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its
operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that
such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also
contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.

HELD:

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It
is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee, should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts,
attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his office, ignores the clear-out difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the
second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation
of an elective official to other government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

"No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries." the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective
officials who are governed by the first paragraph. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to
other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On
the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot
be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution
where no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . during
his term without forfeiting his seat The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective
officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being
appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. "

The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another.
Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office, and to render his election
or appointment to the latter office void, or voidable. "Where the constitution or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be
ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate
the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void.

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot
be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will
hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under
color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the
electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being
unknown to the public, under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such.
SUBSTITUTIONS, VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION

DAMASEN v TUMAMAO

FACTS:

The Vice Mayor of San Isidro Isabela died so she was replaced by the highest ranking member of the Sangguiniang Bayan who was a
member of LDP. Because of the permanent vacancy in the Sangguinang Bayan, Mayor Lim recommended to Governor Padaca the
appointment of Tumamao as he was a member of LDP. Tumamao was appointed, took his oath and attended sessions around April
2005. On May 2005, Atty. Damasen, became a member of LDP and got hold of a letter of nomination to the Sanggunian Bayan from
provincial chairman of LDP Balauag addressed toGovernor Padaca. He was appointed to SB, took his oath. But when he attended
sessions he was not recognized because of the presence of Tumamao. So he filed a petition for quo warranto with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction with the RTC. It was granted, and eventually the RTC resolved that Damasen was entitled to the position.
Tumamao appealed to the CA and it ruled that Damasen was not entitled to the position but it was Tumamao.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Damasen is entitled to the position in the Sangguinang Bayan.

RULING:

The SC held that Damasen was not entitled and it should beTumamao. As can be gleaned from Sec. 45, the law provides for
conditions for the rule of succession to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian
member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of Membership from the highest
official of the political party concerned Letter from the LDP that Damasen is not a bona fide member – What is damning to the cause of
Damasen, is the letter of Demaree J.B.Raval, the Deputy Secretary Counsel of the LDP, addressed to Governor Padaca wherein it is
categorically stated that Damasen is not a bona fide member of the LDP, to wit: As regards the claim of Mr. Lucky Magala Damasen,
please be informed that pursuant to the LDP Constitution, Mr. Damasen does not appear in our records as a bona fide member of the
LDP. While it is true that Mr. Damasen may have been issued a Certificate of Membership dated May 5, 2005 by our Provincial
Chairman for Isabela, Mrs. Ana Benita G. Balauag, his membership has not been endorsed (even to date) to the LDP National Council
for approval. Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy of Mr. Damasen for the May 10, 2004 elections shows that he was nominated by the
“Lakas-CMD Party”

Like the CA, this Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the letter coming from the LDP leadership. Quite clearly, from the tenor
of the letter, it appears that the membership of Damasen still had to be approved by the LDP National Council. Thus, notwithstanding
Damasen’s procurement of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, to this Court’s mind, the same merely
started the process of his membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automatic membership thereto. While it may be argued that
Damasen was already a member upon receipt of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, this Court cannot
impose such view on the LDP. If the LDP leadership says that the membership of Damasen still had to be endorsed to the National
Council for approval, then this Court cannot question such requirement in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

It is well settled that the discretion of accepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal matter, which this
Court cannot meddle in. In resolving the petition at bar, this Court is guided by Navarro v. Court of Appeals (Navarro), where this Court
explained the reason behind the rule of succession under Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160, to wit: The reason behind the right given to a political
party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as
willed by the people in the election. With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-
Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone belonging to the political party of petitioner
Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. Xxx.

As earlier pointed out, the reason behind Par. (b), Sec. 45 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance of party representation in
the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate. Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because of the
elevation of LDP member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows that the person to succeed her should also belong to the LDP so as to
preserve party representation.

Thus, this Court cannot countenance Damasen’s insistence in clinging to an appointment when he is in fact not a bona fide member of
the LDP. While the revocation of the nomination given to Damasen came after the fact of his appointment, this Court cannot rule in his
favor, because the very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is that the appointee must come from the political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy.

To stress, Damasen is not a bona fide member of the LDP. In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve the will of the electorate.
He himself admits that he was previously a member of the Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the position of Mayor under the said party
on the May 2004 Elections. Likewise, he did not resign from the said party when he joined the LDP, and even admitted that his joining
the LDP was not because of party ideals, but because he just wanted to. How can the will of the electorate be best served, given the
foregoing admissions of Damasen? If this Court were to grant herein petition, it would effectively diminish the party representation of
the LDP in the Sanggunian, as Damasen would still be considered a member of the Lakas-CMD, not having resigned therefrom, a
scenario that defeats the purpose of the law, and that ultimately runs contrary the ratio of Navarro.

Lastly, the records of the case reveal that Tumamao has the nomination of Senator Edgardo J. Angara, the Party Chairman and,
therefore, the highest official of the LDP. In addition, he is a member in good standing of the LDP. Thus, given the foregoing, it is this
Court’s view that Tumamao has complied with the requirements of law.

JALOSJOS V COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22,
2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon
his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009. He acquired residential property where he lived and
applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village,
Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It
was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition
to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local
government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos
failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at
least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a
domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can
have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial
governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile
from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for
26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so
with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that
country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his
being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his
legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City)
and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s
house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not
required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived.
Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from
exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence
Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of
the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

NAVARRO v COURT OF APPEALS

 What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45 (b) providing that "xxx only the nominee of the political party under which
the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy
in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner herein above provided.

The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy xxx. "The
reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to
maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred
in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise,
REFORMA-LM's representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy created was that formerly held by
Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that party's representation in the Sanggunian at the
expense of the REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule
in statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the law.

As earlier pointed out, the reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government Code is the maintenance party
representation in the Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the electorate. The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that
created by the elevation of the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the
causes already enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously
created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8 position which occurred with the election of Rolando Lalas to the
seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity. Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appeals erred in
giving due course to the petition because the verification is defective. It is argued that the affidavit merely stated that the allegations
therein are "true and correct to the best of my own knowledge and information" whereas Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
specifically requires that the allegations be "true and correct of his knowledge and belief."

The contention is without merit. Verification based on the affiant's own knowledge and information is sufficient under the
circumstances. Verification is merely a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite which does not affect the validity or efficacy of the
pleading, or the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, a defective verification, as in the present case, does not render the pleading or the
petition invalid and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

TALAGA v COMELEC

FACTS:

Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo respectively filed their certificates of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be
contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon declared that he was eligible for the office he was
seeking to be elected to. Four days later, Castillo filed with COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a
City Mayor of Lucena. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowledge that he had been elected and had served 3 consecutive
terms as mayor of Lucena City, still filed his COC for Mayor in the upcoming elections.

Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms; and that the
three term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary separation from
office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, On Dcember 23, 2009, the court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino Jr. v COMELEC, holding that preventive
suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect off the three-term limit rule. Thus,
Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to resolve, acknowledging that he is now disqualified to run for the position
of mayor of Lucena City; yet did not withdraw his CoC.
Initially, Ramon filed his MR, however, he later on filed for its withdrawal. On the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor
of Lucena in substitution of Ramon, her husband.

On election day on May 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor
Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s
39, 615 votes.

Catillo then filed Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, alleging that Barbara cannot effectively substitute Ramon for Ramon’s CoC
had been cancelled, so she can’t be considered a candidate, and votes for Ramon’s name should be considered stray. Thereafter,
Alcala, the duly-elected Vice Mayor, sought to intervene, positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Ruby’s substitution
had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

ISSUES:

1. WON Barbara Ruby’s substitution was valid.

2. Who among the contending parties should assume the position.

HELD:

1. Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.

The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a
candidate in a national or local election. There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One
is through a PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION and the other through a PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL A
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does nnot give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the
candidate under Section 77 of the OEC. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not
filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be
properly substituted. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a
person lacks a qualification but also he made a material representation that is false. Such must likewise be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Misrepresentations cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate
results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material
falsity: a candidate who falsifies a maerial fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

To be sure,

2. Elected Vice-Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office.

TERM OF OFFICE

ABUNDO v COMELEC

ALDOVINO v COMELEC

FACTS:

Asilo was elected councilor for 3 times during the terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004 and 2004-2007. In September 2005, Asilo was ordered
“preventively suspended” by the Sandiganbayan. In 2007, Asilo filed a COC and ran for councilor.

ISSUE:
Was X qualified to run for the 2007 elections?

RULING:

NO. “Interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary
loss of title to office. An officer who is preventively suspended is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office but title to
office is not lost. Hence, there is no interruption, consequently, Asilo is disqualified to run for the 2007 elections under the 3-year-term-
limit rule.

BORJA v COMELEC

1993: X, the VM succeeded Y, then M who died, by operation of law. X served as Mayor until 1995.

1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor

1998-2001: X was re-elected and again served as Mayor

2001 Elections: Was X barred to run as Mayor?

Answer: NO, for 2 reasons:

i. In 1993, he was elected because he succeeded by operation of law.

ii. In 1993, he was elected not in the same office because during the1St term, he was elected for the position of VM, and not for M
Private respondent was first elected as vice- mayor, but upon the death of the incumbent mayor, he occupied the latter ’s post for the
unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for two more terms. The Court held that when private respondent occupied the post of the
mayor upon the incumbent’s death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional provision.

The term served must be one for which the official concerned was elected.

COMELEC v CRUZ

FACTS:

When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections” was passed, questions of
the constitutionality were raised against Section 2which states that “No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall ot be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected. Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then incumbent
officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the
said provision as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were singled out
that their consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.

ISSUE:

1. WON the term limit should apply prospectively and not retroactively.

2. WON it violates the equal protection of the law

RULING:
SC affirmed the constitutionality of Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164:1. No retroactive application was made because
the three-term limit has been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679-changed the two-term limit by
providing for a three-consecutive term limit). After the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC and can still be
found in the current law.2. No. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which
provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is
equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one
another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in
facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies
inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay
officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between
these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that
while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the
application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial dis-tinctions, it recognizes
as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions. From
another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not
result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials

ONG v ALEGRE

1995-1998: X was elected and served as Mayor1998-2001: X was re-elected and served as mayor, but an election protest was filed
against X in 19982001-2004: X was re-elected and served as mayor, and the 1998election protest was decided against X2004
elections: Was X qualified to run as mayor?

Answer: NO. Petitioner Ong was duly elected mayor (San Vicente) in the May1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving
the July 1,1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full.

The controversy revolved around the 1998-2001 term. Ong ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and
actually served the 1998- 2001 term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of San Vicente. But after the
term1998-2001, it was declared that Ong was not the real winner in the elections. The question was whether or not Ong’s assumption
of office as Mayor of San Vicente from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service. The Supreme Court
held that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term”, and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.

His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule (even if he was later on, after the full
term, declared that he was not the winner in the election)

MONTEBON v COMELEC

FACTS:

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections.
However, in January 2004, or during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the
incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007 elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. In his answer, Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified
on the ground of the 3-term limit rule because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor due to the
retirement of elected vice mayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintained that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his
office as municipal councilor.

ISSUE:

Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary severance or interruption?

HELD:

Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local
Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law
speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent
inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to
occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post
vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public
duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of
dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than
voluntary.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Montebon,
being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, Montebon's assumption of office as vice--
mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of
his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.

Note: Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice mayor, his occupation
of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V. SENATE

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case assailed the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
10153.Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, this law postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and
recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms
of the elected officials.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?

2. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

3. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

4. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative
and executive offices?
5. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory powers over autonomous regions?

HELD:

The Supreme Court denied the motion for lack of merit and upheld the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections.

The Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct
Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the provisions of the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution stating that the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the
discussions of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I wouldonly state that in view of the action taken by the Commission
onSection 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: “THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDERTHIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON
OF JUNE 30, 1992.”

I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and
Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local
officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to
1992. We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.

So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local election or
an election for Members of the Lower House in1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also
stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12
Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So,
consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to
the local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three
years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another six
years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators
are concerned.

And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the
Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo): What does the committee say?

MR. DE CASTRO: During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in
order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved—the first national and local officials to be elected in
1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all serve until
1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have
national, local and presidential elections.

This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall
serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election every three
years.

MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992for all, from the President up to the municipal officials.

The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all
elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen
or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. We
came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, where we unequivocally stated that “the Constitution has
mandated synchronized national and local elections." Despite the length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to
convince us to deviate from this established ruling.

Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate
of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the
Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign,
a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the
unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time
of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive
and not static.

To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled “Local Government,” clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify
autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which provides:

That the Constitution mentions only the “national government” and the “local governments,” and does not make a distinction between
the “local government” and the “regional government,” is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more
powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous
regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections
are not covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local elections. In construing provisions of the Constitution,
the first rule is verba legis, “that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.”

Applying this principle to determine the scope of “local elections,” we refer to the meaning of the word “local,” as understood in its
ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, “local” refers to something “that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.”

Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this
definition.

To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat
the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the
law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.

RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054

A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for
the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the
ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No.10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054To recall, RA
No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act– RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix
the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in
another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all
enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA
No.6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for
ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on
the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA
No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was
not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No.
10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No.
9054.

Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the
amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision

The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May
2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their
duties in a holdover capacity.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a
limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM
officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity.

Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in
RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.

Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the
present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials
whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM
Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year
term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII
of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has
made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the
wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the
executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature
complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.

COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections

To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC toenforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.

Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power
to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law.
Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions:

Section 5. Postponement of election.

Section 6. Failure of election

As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections
have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen
circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism and other analogous circumstances.

In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and
local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP881. More
importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a
different election date.

Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so,
there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with
the May2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it
does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years.

President’s authority to appoint OICs

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend
to positions held by elective officials. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus: The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to
the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:

The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence
construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence,
the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two
sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a
distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential appointments.

The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution,
pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

The second group of officials the President can appoint are “all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.” The second sentence acts as the “catch - all provision”
for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. The wide
latitude given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose
appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not
provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment.

Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly
stated in order to be recognized. Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from
law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, which merely grants the President the power of supervision over autonomous regions. This is
an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of
supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of
RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as “the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law.” This is distinguished from the power of control or “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.”
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the
President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people. Section 3 of RA
No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the
OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that
the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent
than real.

RA No. 10153 as an interim measure

We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No.10153 not in a vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the
first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections
with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it
with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office –twenty-one (21) months away –of those who will win in the synchronized
elections on May 13, 2013.

In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the problem created by
synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for
special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13,
2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the
ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms.
We have already established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.

In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given
the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In other words, “given the plain unconstitutionality
of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint –
for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and asallowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution– an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?” We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the
adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us.
Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure is comparable to the interim measures
traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local
government units.

The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is
neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No.10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any
cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook).

Conclusion

In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the
power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally
impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than three
years. Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there
is no legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials from continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency
require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to
stand on.
SARAMBANI v COMELEC

FACTS:

Sambarani et al are incumbent punong barangays of 5 barangays in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. They ran for new terms in the 2002
elections. However COMELEC delared failure of elections in the 5 barangays and set a date for special election, which were not held
because of the local election officer’s failure to use the proper voting lists and records. The COMELEC did no assail this fact.
Sambarani et al. thus filed a petition for declaration of failure of special election. They also asked COMELEC in their petition to set a
new date for another special election. COMELEC did declare a failure of election, but did not call a special election, citing logistical and
financial problems, as well as Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provided that special elections should be held “not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.” COMELEC also
ordered DILG to appoint replacement barangay officials. Sambarani et al assailed this resolution before the SC, Which reversed that of
the COMELEC. SC held that COMELEC erred in not calling a special election because it erroneously relied on OEC 6, because the
prohibition in that provision is only directory. The applicable provision is OEC 45, which provides that special elections should be held
within 30 days from the cessation of the causes of postponement. Following such provision, the election may be held anytime, as long
as it is within 30 days from the cessation of the cause of postponement. SC also cited Basher v COMELEC, wherein a special election
was ordered held in 2000, even if the original elections were for 1997.

On the issue of the propriety of ordering DILG to appoint replacement officials, SC held that the holdover provision in RA 9164 must
govern, it being the new law which prescribes the term of office of barangay and SK officials. Under the law, the clear mandate is for
the incumbent officials to remain in a holdover capacity until the successors are elected and qualified.

DOCTRINE:

RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK elections, prescribes the term of office of barangay and SK officials, and
provided for the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. LGC 43(c) limits the term of elective barangay officials to
three years. However, RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a holdover capacity until
their successors are elected and qualified. The application of the holdover principle preserves continuity in the transaction of official
business and prevents a hiatus in government, pending the assumption of a successor into office. Cases of extreme necessity justify
the application of the holdover principle.

The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the cause of the failure of elections is not
absolute. It is directory and not mandatory. COMELEC possesses residual power to conduct special elections even beyond the
deadline prescribed by law in OEC 6, which cannot prevail against the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The period under OEC was applied.

Reading Assignment #7 – Jurisdiction and Appeal

ALEJANDRO v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:

Alfredo Rap Alejandro owned MICO Car Wash. They have been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to wash cars. The
PNP-CIDG discovered this during an anti-water pilferage operation. Thus, the carwash boys were arrested and their water containers
were confiscated. Petitioner Alejandro, is the father of Alfredo Alejandro, the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 293, Binondo, Manila.
The petitioner interfered with the PNP-CIDG’s operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated containers. This
intervention caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the apprehended car wash boys to escape. For this, the
respondent office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, filed an administrative case against him.

The office of the deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The
deputy Ombudsman ruled that the petitioner cannot over-extend his authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to
disrespect proper authorities. An MR was filed but denied. Petitioner appealed to CA, and it dismissed the same due to prematurity and
held that it should have filed with the Ombudsman first.

Now, petitioner argues that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to order his dismissal from the service since under the LGC of 1991, an
elective local official may be removed from office only by the order of a proper court.

ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over elective Officials and has the power to order their dismissal from the
service. YES

HELD:

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts
or administrative agencies.

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act 19 and the Local
Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate
any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of apublic officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases[.]

The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. 22
Consequently, as we held in

Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed
first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. 26 Under RA
7160, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, as follows:

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
prepared as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.

Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially 􀀻led with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction
is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.

DON v LACSA

FACTS:
Ramon H. Lacsa, then Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon was charged with grave threats, oppression, grave misconduct,
and abuse of authority by Azucena B. Don, et al. A Special Investigating Committee (SIC) was created by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
to investigate. A resolution was passed by the SB for the preventive suspension of Lacsa. The mayor, acting on such resolution,
imposed a two-month preventive suspension. The SIC subsequently submitted its report finding the allegations to be true. On the basis
of such report, the SB issued another resolution providing therein the removal of Lacsa from office. The mayor thereafter appointed
Florencio H. Lacsa to replace Ramon H. Lacsa. Consequently, Lacsa filed before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon a Petition for
Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Don, et al, along with the
Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Ma. Theresa Guab-Frugata.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lacsa has the right to appeal despite the ―final and executory phrase provided for by the Local
Government Code.

HELD:

An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory. Lacsa shall be considered as having been placed under
preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event that he wins such appeal. In the event that the appeal results in
exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and other such emoluments during the pendency of the appeal. Obviously, the said Code does
not preclude the taking of an appeal. On the contrary, it specifically allows a party to appeal to the Office of the President. The [phrase]
―final and executory in Sections 67 and 68, respectively, of the Local Government Code, are not, as erroneously ruled by the trial
court, indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the decision of the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the
administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The decision is immediately executory but the respondent
may nevertheless appeal the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be.

HAGAD v GOZO-DADOLE

FACTS:

On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all
public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended, Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public
officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent
officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without
authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.

The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of
1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive
suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to
the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was
at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A.
No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary
(the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.

Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is
much too repugnant to the 60- day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain
its application.
The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case 􀀻led against him.

The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under
investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local
Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,
(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.