BATCH 2 OF 3

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. Computing just compensation - (City of Manila v. Estrada)

 EMINENT DOMAIN; EVIDENCE; OFFERS FOR THE CONDEMNED LAND INADMISSIBLE.—

Testimony as to mere offers for the land condemned is inadmissible.
 ID.; ID. ; PRICES PAID FOR OTHER LANDS IN VICINITY ADMISSIBLE.—Evidence of sales of
other land is competent if the character of such parcels as sites for business purposes,
dwellings, or for whatever use which enhances the pecuniary value of the condemned
land is sufficiently similar to the latter that it may be reasonably assumed that the price
of the condemned land would be approximately near the price paid for the parcels
sold. But to be admissible, the property thus sold must be in the immediate
neighborhood, that is, in the zone of commercial activity with which the condemned
property is identified. The sales must also be sufficiently coeval with the date of the
condemnation proceedings as to exclude general increases or decreases in property
values due to changed commercial conditions in the vicinity, and must be made by
one who is desirous but not obliged to sell and to one who is desirous but not obliged
to buy.
 ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CONDEMNED LAND AND OTHER PROPERTY
SHOULD BE SHOWN.—No two estates are ever exactly alike, and as the differences
between the parcels sold and the land condemned must necessarily be taken. into
consideration in comparing values, such differences should be shown as part of the
evidence of such sales. Where these differences are so great that the sales in question
can form no reliable standard for comparison, however, such evidence should not be
admitted.
 ID.; ID.; In.; EXCEPTION.—As an exception to the general rule that prices paid for
neighboring land are competent evidence tending to show the value of the
condemned land, evidence of prices at which neighboring parcels were sold under
eminent domain proceedings is inadmissible.

 ID.; VIEW BY THE COMMISSIONERS; ITS PURPOSE AND EFFECT.—The view of the premises
made by the commissioners is for the purpose of better enabling them to understand
the evidence submitted by the parties; that is, to determine upon the weight of
conflicting evidence. Being disinterested landowners, selected for their ability to arrive
at a judicious decision in the assessment of damages, and being allowed to view the
property, their report is entitled to greater weight than that of an ordinary trier of facts.
 ID.; ID,; ESTIMATE OF VALUE CONFINED TO EVIDENCE OF RECORD.—Notwithstanding
the respect due the report of the commissioners, their valuation of the property must
be supported by competent evidence of record, and in those cases where the
evidence as to value and damages is conflicting, they should always set forth in full
their reasons for accepting certain evidence and rejecting other evidence, especially
in those cases where a view of the premises has been made.
 ID.; JUST COMPENSATION.—"Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the
land taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than
compensation. The word "just" is used merely to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation."
 ID.; REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS; POWER OF COURT TO SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN ESTIMATE
OF VALUE.—A Court of First Instance, and, on appeal, under sections 496 and 497 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court may substitute its own estimate of
value as gathered f rom the record submitted to it, in cases where the only error of the
commissioners is that they have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to
them; or that they have disregarded a clear preponderance of the evidence; or that
 they have used an improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the award:
provided always, that the evidence be clear and convincing.

2. Custodial Investigation; When it begins; Rights

a. People v. Domantay
 Custodial Investigations; R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been
“invited” for questioning.—This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation,
that is, “when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.” R.A. No. 7438 has extended the
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally
arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning.
 Same; Requirements for Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions.—Decisions of this
Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing
 Same; Exclusionary Rule; “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine; Words and
Phrases; Once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also
inadmissible.—But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither
put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid
and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza’s testimony on the alleged confession
of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet
inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” As
explained in People v. Alicando: . . . According to this rule, once the primary
source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise,
illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
“fruit of the poisonous tree” is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The “fruit of the
poisonous tree” is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is
equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained
by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
 Same; Same; A suspect’s confession to a radio reporter is admissible.—We agree with
the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant’s confession to the radio
reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v. Andan, the accused in a rape with
homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the media. In holding the
confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the
assistance of counsel, this Court said: [A]ppellant’s [oral] confessions to the newsmen
are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of
Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents
 Same; A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said
reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under
circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of
fear.—Accused-appellant contends that “it is . . . not altogether improbable for the
police investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some
incriminating information from the accused.” This is pure conjecture. Although he
testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence to show that
Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown
 that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating
information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an
opposite stance against the government by exposing official wrongdoings. Indeed,
there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the
interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-
appellant confessed to the killing out of fear. As already stated, the interview was
conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-appellant had already
confessed to the killing to the police.

b. People v. Tan
 Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions; The Constitution abhors an
uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom
shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.—It is well-settled
that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against
the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution
provides: “x x x x x x x x x Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7438; Words and Phrases;Under R.A. No. 7438,
“custodial investigation” shall include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed.—Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), approved on May 15, 1992,
reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads: “As used in this Act, ‘custodial
investigation’ shall include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.”
 Same; Same; The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus
on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements.—
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate
as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.
 Same; Same; Requirements for Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions.—Under the
Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing.
 Same; Same; Right to Counsel; Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.—While
the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
“voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel.” To reiterate, in People v. Javar, it was ruled therein that any
 statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible
in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.
 Same; Same; Same; Right Against Self-Incrimination;The constitutional rights of the
suspect, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from
the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation.—The evidence for the
prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police
headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice
to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant,
particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the
moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. “This Court values liberty
and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine
qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government.”

3. Deliberative Process Privilege - (In Re Production of Court Records)

a. Department of Foreign Affairs vs. BCA International Corporation
 Deliberative Process Privilege; The deliberative process privilege applies if its purpose is
served, that is, “to protect the frank exchange of ideas and opinions critical to the
government’s decision[-]making process where disclosure would discourage such
discussion in the future.”—The privileged character of the information does not end when
an agency has adopted a definite proposition or when a contract has been perfected or
consummated; otherwise, the purpose of the privilege will be defeated. The deliberative
process privilege applies if its purpose is served, that is, “to protect the frank exchange of
ideas and opinions critical to the government’s decision-making process where disclosure
would discourage such discussion in the future.” In Judicial Watch of Florida v. Department
of Justice, 102 F. Supp. 2d 6 (2000), the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the deliberative process privilege’s “ultimate purpose x x x is to prevent injury to the
quality of agency decisions by allowing government officials freedom to debate
alternative approaches in private,” and this ultimate purpose would not be served equally
well by making the privilege temporary or held to have expired. In Gwich’in Steering
Comm. v. Office of the Governor, 10 P. 3d 572 (2002), the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that communications have not lost the privilege even when the decision that the
documents preceded is finally made. The Supreme Court of Alaska held that “the question
is not whether the decision has been implemented, or whether sufficient time has passed,
but whether disclosure of these preliminary proposals could harm the agency’s future
decision[-]making by chilling either the submission of such proposals or their forthright
consideration.”
 Same; Same; Same; Deliberative process privilege contains three (3) policy bases: first, the
privilege protects candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public
confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes
final policy; and third, it protects the integrity of an agency’s decision; the public should
not judge officials based on information they considered prior to issuing their final
decisions.—The deliberative process privilege can also be invoked in arbitration
proceedings under RA No. 9285. “Deliberative process privilege contains three (3) policy
bases: first, the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents
public confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the agency
establishes final policy; and third, it protects the integrity of an agency’s decision; the
public should not judge officials based on information they considered prior to issuing their
 final decisions.” Stated differently, the privilege serves “to assure that subordinates within
an agency will feel free to provide the decision[-]maker with their uninhibited opinions and
recommendations without fear of later being subject to public ridicule or criticism; to
protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they have been finally
formulated or adopted; and to protect against confusing the issues and misleading the
public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of
action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency’s action.”
 If an official is compelled to testify before an arbitral tribunal and the order of an arbitral
tribunal is appealed to the courts, such official can be inhibited by fear of later being
subject to public criticism, preventing such official from making candid discussions within
his or her agency.—Under RA 9285, orders of an arbitral tribunal are appealable to the
courts. If an official is compelled to testify before an arbitral tribunal and the order of an
arbitral tribunal is appealed to the courts, such official can be inhibited by fear of later
being subject to public criticism, preventing such official from making candid discussions
within his or her agency. The decision of the court is widely published, including details
involving the privileged information. This disclosure of privileged information can inhibit a
public official from expressing his or her candid opinion. Future quality of deliberative
process can be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-making process to public
scrutiny after the court decision is made.
 Same; Same; Same; A party can disclose privileged information in its possession, even
without the consent of the other party, if the disclosure is to a tribunal. However, a party
cannot be compelled by the other party to disclose privileged information to the tribunal,
where such privileged information is in its possession and not in the possession of the party
seeking the compulsory disclosure.—Section 20.03 merely allows a party, if it
chooses, without the consent of the other party, to disclose to the tribunal privileged
information in such disclosing party’s possession. In short, a party can disclose privileged
information in its possession, even without the consent of the other party, if the disclosure
is to a tribunal. However, a party cannot be compelled by the other party to disclose
privileged information to the tribunal, where such privileged information is in its possession
and not in the possession of the party seeking the compulsory disclosure. Nothing in
Section 20.03 mandates compulsory disclosure of privileged information. Section 20.03
merely states that “the restrictions imposed in Section 20.02,” referring to the “consent of
the other party,” shall not apply to a disclosure of privileged information by a party in
possession of a privileged information. This is completely different from compelling a party
to disclose privileged information in its possession against its own will.

4. Doctrine of Specialty (in extradition) The rule of speciality

 The rule of speciality (or specialty), which prohibits a Requesting State from trying an
extradited individual for an offense other than the one for which he was extradited, is a
standard provision included in U.S. bilateral extradition treaties, including the six under
consideration. The Malaysia Treaty (art. 13) contains exceptions to the rule of specialty that
are designed to allow a Requesting State some latitude in prosecuting offenders for crimes
other than those for which they had been specifically extradited. [EXTRADITION TREATY
WITH THE PHILIPPINES. July 30, 1996 Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations. R
E P O R T [To accompany Treaty Doc. 104-16]]

5. Due Process in Deportation Proceedings - (Lao Gi v. CA)

 Before any alien may be deported upon a warrant issued by the Commissioner, prior
determination of the existence of the ground charged against the alien is necessary.—
From the foregoing provision it is clear that before any alien may be deported upon a
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration, there should be a prior determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground as charged against the alien.
 Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, the constitutional right of a person to due process shall not be denied; The rules on
criminal procedure in the Rules of Court are applicable to deportation proceedings.—
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to
due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.
 Requirements to be specified in the charge against the alien.—Hence, the charge against
an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary
and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what
ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper
judgment.
 Before any charge is filed in the Commission, a preliminary investigation is necessary and
issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without warrant and service of warrants should also
be in accordance with the Rules of Court.—Before any charge should be filed in the CID
a preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is a sufficient cause
to charge the respondent for deportation. The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests
without warrant and service of warrants should be in accordance likewise with Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; search warrants issued by the CID shall be governed
by Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; and so the matter of bail, motion to
quash, and trial, among others. Fealty to the prescribed rules of procedure in deportation
cases shall insure a speedy, fair and just dispensation of justice.

6. Due Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings - (ADMU v. Capulong)

 No denial ofdue process where all requirements of administrative dueprocess were met
by the school and the student given the opportunity to be heard.—JuanRamon himself
appeared before the Board of Discipline. He adniitted the slapping incident, then begged
to be excused so he could catch the bor»t for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was
given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the
investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due
process were met.
 Same; Same; Same; Due process in administrative proceeding re~ quires consideration of
evidence presented and existence of evidence to support the decisiori. —Due process in
administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the
existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of IndustrialRelations, 136
SCRA 112).

7. Expropriation validity regarding private use

8. Hold Departure Order - (Genuino v. De Lima)

 There are only three (3) considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel:
national security, public safety or public health.—There are only three considerations that
may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public
health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the
Rules of Court providing for the impairment. The requirement for a legislative enactment
was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the person’s right to travel by
administrative officials who may be tempted to wield authority under the guise of national
security, public safety or public health. This is in keeping with the principle that ours is a
government of laws and not of men and also with the canon that provisions of law limiting
 the enjoyment of liberty should be construed against the government and in favor of the
individual.
 There is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail
the exercise of the right travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health.—The Court is in quandary of identifying the authority from which the DOJ believed
its power to restrain the right to travel emanates. To begin with, there is no law particularly
providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to
travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. As it is, the only
ground of the former DOJ Secretary in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the
pendency of the preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary
Investigation Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage against them. To be
clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent
the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval.
It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an
enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No.
292, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987.” She opined that DOJ Circular
No. 41 was validly issued pursuant to the agency’s rulemaking powers provided in Sections
1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of
the mentioned Code.
 Hierarchy of Rights; The Department of Justice (DOJ) must constantly be reminded that in
the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to
prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the
former.—Indeed, the DOJ has the power to investigate the commission of crimes and
prosecute offenders. Its zealousness in pursuing its mandate is laudable but more
admirable when tempered by fairness and justice. It must constantly be reminded that in
the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to
prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the
former. Thus, in Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994), the Court declared, viz.: The
sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts
which endanger the proper administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to
prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self-preservation, nay, its
very existence. But this does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The
right of the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and
disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution.
 Right to Liberty; Right to Travel; The Department of Justice (DOJ) cannot justify the restraint
in the liberty of movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground that it is
necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the
complaints. There is also no authority of law granting it the power to compel the
attendance of the subjects of a preliminary investigation, pursuant to its investigatory
powers under Executive Order (EO) No. 292.—The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint
in the liberty of movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground that it is
necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the
complaints. There is also no authority of law granting it the power to compel the
attendance of the subjects of a preliminary investigation, pursuant to its investigatory
powers under E.O. No. 292. Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately,
not broad enough to embrace the imposition of restraint on the liberty of movement. That
there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to take the situation upon itself and draft
an administrative issuance to keep the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that
he may not be able to evade criminal prosecution and consequent liability. It is an
arrogation of power it does not have; it is a usurpation of function that properly belongs to
the legislature. Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 is an
unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself under the pretext of dire exigency or
 urgent necessity. This action runs afoul the separation of powers between the three
branches of the government and cannot be upheld. Even the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its power to promulgate rules is limited in that the same shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. This should have cautioned the DOJ, which is only
one of the many agencies of the executive branch, to be more scrutinizing in its actions
especially when they affect substantive rights, like the right to travel.
 Hold Departure Orders; Watch List Orders; Due Process; The apparent vagueness of the
circular as to the distinction between a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and Watch List Order
(WLO) is violative of the due process clause.—Apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular
No. 41 also suffers from other serious infirmities that render it invalid. The apparent
vagueness of the circular as to the distinction between an HDO and WLO is violative of the
due process clause. An act that is vague “violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.” Here, the distinction is significant as it will
inform the respondents of the grounds, effects and the measures they may take to contest
the issuance against them. Verily, there must be a standard by which an HDO or WLO may
be issued, particularly against those whose cases are still under preliminary investigation,
since at that stage there is yet no criminal information against them which could have
warranted the restraint.
 The issuance of Hold Departure Orders (HDOs) shall pertain only to criminal cases within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), to the exclusion of criminal cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and all other cases.—The
silence of the circular on the matters which are being addressed by DOJ Circular No. 41 is
not without good reasons. Circular No. 39-97 was specifically issued to avoid indiscriminate
issuance of HDOs resulting to the inconvenience of the parties affected as the same could
amount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel. Contrary to
the understanding of the DOJ, the Court intentionally held that the issuance of HDOs shall
pertain only to criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, to the exclusion
of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC and all other cases. The intention
was made clear with the use of the term “only.” The reason lies in seeking equilibrium
between the state’s interest over the prosecution of the case considering the gravity of
the offense involved and the individual’s exercise of his right to travel. Thus, the circular
permits the intrusion on the right to travel only when the criminal case filed against the
individual is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, or those that pertains to more serious
crimes or offenses that are punishable with imprisonment of more than six years. The
exclusion of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the MTC is justified by the fact that they
pertain to less serious offenses which is not commensurate with the curtailment of a
fundamental right. Much less is the reason to impose restraint on the right to travel of
respondents of criminal cases still pending investigation since at that stage no information
has yet been filed in court against them. It is for these reasons that Circular No. 39-97
mandated that HDO may only be ssued in criminal cases filed with the RTC and withheld
the same power from the MTC.
 The power to issue Hold Departure Order (HDO) is inherent to the courts.—It bears
reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts. The courts may issue an
HDO against an accused in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law. It does not require legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; it coexists
with the grant of judicial power. In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), the
Court declared, thus: Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on
them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
 court, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power
to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. The
inherent powers of the courts are essential in upholding its integrity and largely beneficial
in keeping the people’s faith in the institution by ensuring that it has the power and the
means to enforce its jurisdiction.
 Hold Departure Orders; Right to Travel; Department of Justice; Jurisdiction; Contrary to its
claim, the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have inherent power to issue Hold
Departure Order (HDO), unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in any way.—The
point is that the DOJ may not justify its imposition of restriction on the right to travel of the
subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 by resorting to an analogy. Contrary to its claim, it does not
have inherent power to issue HDO, unlike the courts, or to restrict the right to travel in any
way. It is limited to the powers expressly granted to it by law and may not extend the same
on its own accord or by any skewed interpretation of its authority.

9. John Doe Warrants - (People v. Veloso)

 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; SEARCH WARRANTS; "JOHN DOE" WARRANTS.—By the eleventh
and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic
Act, and by various provisions of the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure, the security of
the dwelling and the person is guaranteed
 A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and
statutory provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void.
 The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of
requiring technical accuracy.
 DESCRIPTION OF PLACE.—A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.
 The affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant described the building to be
searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands." Held: That this was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.
 RIGHT OF OFFICER TO TAKE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY FOUND ON THE PERSON ARRESTED.—
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of
the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence
or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not
otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
 DESCRIPTION OF PERSON.—The warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void,
"except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the
officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served.
 The affidavit and the search warrant stated that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in
the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and
effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Held: That the police could identify John
Doe as V without difficulty, and that the search warrant is valid.

10. Meaning of being a witness against himself

a. US v. Tan Tent
b. US v. Ong Siu Hong
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF.—The main purpose of the constitutional
provision against compelling a person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling
confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime
 PIUM LAW; WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF.—Forcing an accused to discharge morphine from
his mouth is not compelling him to be a witness against himself.

c. Beltran v. Samson
 COMPULSORY APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES AT FlSCAL'S INVESTIGATIONS; REFUSAL OF
WlTNESS TO WRITE FROM DICTATION.—The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative
Code, and the competent judge, at the request of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be
present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in
refusing to write down what the fiscal had to dictate to him for the purpose of verifying his
handwriting and determining whether he had written certain documents alleged to have
been falsified, seeks protection—his constitutional privilege.
 RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT; TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.—This right was promulgated,
both in the Organic Law of the Philippines of July 1, 1902 and in paragraph 3, section 3 of
the Jones Law, which provides (in Spanish); "Ni se le obligará (defendant) a declarar en
contra suya, en ningún proceso criminal," and recognized in our Criminal Procedure
(General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56. The English text of the Jones
Law reads as follows: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself," thus, the prohibition is not restricted to not compelling him to testify, but
extends to not compelling him to be a witness.
 SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE.—"The rights intended to be protected by the
constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the
suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that it is the duty of courts liberally to
construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps
tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as
well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in
short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret." (28 R. C. L., par. 20, page
434, and notes.)
 CASES INAPPLICABLE.—There have been cases where it was lawful to compel the accused
to write in open court while he was under cross-examination (Bradford vs.People, 43 Pacific
Reporter, 1013), and to make him write his name with his consent during the trial of his case
(Sprouse vs. Com., 81 Va., 374, 378); but in the first case, the defendant, in testifying as
witness in his own behalf waived his constitutional privilege not to be compelled to act as
witness; and in the second, he also waived said privilege because he acted voluntarily.
 PREPARATION AND CREATION OF EVIDENCE BY TESTIMONIAL ACT.—This constitutional
prohibition embraces the compulsory preparation and creation by a witness of self-
incriminatory evidence by means of a testimonial act. "For though the disclosure thus
sought" (the production of documents and chattels) "be not oral in form, and though the
documents or chattels be already in existence and not desired to be first written and
created by a testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process, still no
line can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue of
it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of
the articles produced." (4 Wigmore on Evidence 864', 865, latest edition.) In the case
before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is
not a purely mechanical act; it requires the application of intelligence and attention;
writing means for the petitioner here to furnish, through a testimonial act, evidence against
himself.

11. Non-establishment of religion clause regarding government property is used

 12. Non-establishment Clause - (Tilton v. Richardson)
This appeal presents important constitutional questions as to federal aid for church-related
colleges and universities under Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 364, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. 711-721 (1964 ed. and Supp. V), which provides construction grants for
buildings and facilities used [403 U.S. 672, 675] exclusively for secular educational purposes. We
must determine first whether the Act authorizes aid to such church-related institutions, and, if so,
whether the Act violates either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
 Numerous cases considered by the Court have noted the internal tension in the First
Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), is the most recent decision seeking to define the boundaries
of the neutral area between these two provisions within which the legislature may
legitimately act. There, as in other decisions, the Court treated the three main concerns
against which the Establishment Clause sought to protect: "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
 Finally, this record fully supports the findings of the District Court that none of the four
church-related institutions in this case has violated the statutory restrictions. The institutions
presented evidence that there had been no religious services or worship in the federally
financed facilities, that there are no religious symbols or plaques in or on them, and that
they had been used solely for nonreligious purposes. On this record, therefore, these
buildings are indistinguishable from a typical state university facility. Appellants presented
no evidence to the contrary.

13. Over breadth vs void for vagueness

14. Requisites of a Valid Warrant; Reliance on Prosecutor's Certification

a. Uy v. BIR
 Requirements for Issuance of Search Warrants.—A search warrant must conform strictly to
the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These
requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2)
the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the pplicant or
any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.
 In the determination of probable cause, the Constitutionand the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath, which must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma.—In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution
and the Rules of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make
his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. Asking of leading questions
to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in
a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant.
 The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause.—The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts
of their own personal knowledge. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. Search
 warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or
belief.

b. Placer v. Villanueva
 Before issuance of warrant of arrest, judge required to satisfy himself of existence of
probable cause; Absent probable cause in information the judge may disregard fiscal's
certification and require submission of affidavits of witnesses to determine the existence of
probable cause.—Under this section (Sec. 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court) the judge must satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on
the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule
since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this evidently is the reason for the
issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13,
1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a
matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala,
respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause.
 Purpose of requiring submission of affidavits of complainant and witnesses.—The obvious
purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses is
to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require further
proceedings.
 Power of judge to order outright dismissal of charge if from information and affidavits they
are patently without basis or merit; Effect of issuance of warrant of arrest upon baseless
charges.—We hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in doing so. From the
informations and affidavits presented to him, he found the charges patently without basis
or merit. For the respondent to issue the warrants of arrest and try the accused would only
expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as already
pointed out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent
judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information
and the affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit.

15. Right to Privacy; Subjective and Objectivel Test - (Pollo v. Constantino)

 Right to Privacy; The right to privacy has been accorded recognition as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.—The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in
this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec.
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
 It is elementary that before this constitutional right may be invoked a reasonable or
objective expectation of privacy should exist, a concept that was introduced in the
concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in the 1967 case Katz v. United States. Realizing the
significance of this new standard in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Harlan, in
his own way, characterized the reasonable expectation of privacy test as “the rule that
has emerged from prior decisions.
 Justice Harlan expanded the test into its subjective and objective component, however,
by stressing that the protection of the Fourth Amendment has a two-fold requirement: “first,
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.”