I. Sources and Foundations of
The Philippines, consistent with the national
Environmental Law
A. 1987 Constitution
a. Substantive - Right to a Healthy
Environment [Articles II
(Sections 15 and 16)];
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the
protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of
the national territory.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military or civil
service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent
foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.
Section 8.
interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from
nuclear weapons in its territory.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education,
science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to
foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
1
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role
of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive
rural development and agrarian reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-
governmental, community-based, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
2
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of
communication and information in nation-building.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
 Jurisprudence
 Oposa v. Factoran, et al., 224 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
 MMDA, et al v. Residents of Manila Bay, GR Nos 171947-48, 18 Dec 2008
 Resident Dolphins and Mammals of Tanon Strait v. Reyes, GR 180771, April 21, 2015
b. Procedural Rights - access to information [Art III (Section 7)], public participation [XIII
(Section 16)]

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of
social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

CASES

Oposa v. Factoran

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff
is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
3
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such
as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of
rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures,
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process
carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in
the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
— nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

4
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph
6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of
the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);

5
 d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two
(2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse
of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order,
not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a
political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have
also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country
is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.

6
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25)
years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due
notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777
as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless,
We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare
that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised
and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent
Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence
to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
7
 and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by
the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution
— air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with
it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

8
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and
natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations
as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of
the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of
the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared
a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
9
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave
flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point
for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action]
lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the
law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands
in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry
or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

10
 As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch,
of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand
or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by
the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In
the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into
every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area

11
 and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co.
vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it
in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

12
MMDA, et al v. Residents of Manila Bay

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the
international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests
and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude
of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But
amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct
statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and
seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does
not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude
towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency
and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so
many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse
mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a
difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil
Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:

x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants]
resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine
life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming,
skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.3

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution
of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

13
 (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila
Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples
collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a
safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml.4

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners,
testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage
Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars
on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean)
project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its
waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To
attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months
from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and
concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in
strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage
facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste
facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other
solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use
or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila
Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

14
 Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and
rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters
to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the
construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing
debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require
them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of
preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all
forms of illegal fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual
Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other
executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a
Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of
MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD
1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from
raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning
of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,
stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.7

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and
supporting arguments:

THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE
HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION
20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS
SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

15
 [SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION
INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

II

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF

PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that
"requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist
and imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal
systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned.
They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill
should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with
and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to
respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water
they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that
petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other
words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how
they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v.
Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No.
8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant
case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as
well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s
duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines
and delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:

16
 Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and
operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs
intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which
prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum
operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing
Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the
effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five
years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code
(PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a
person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option
whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this
conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are
precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. Consider:

(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality
management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of
water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent
information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such
pollution."

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water
Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in
scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the
following functions, powers and responsibilities:

a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises,
said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the
completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the
completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed
by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the
preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to

17
submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to
accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.

Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and
in partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December
2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation
Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod
the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and
sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces
of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:

(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation
and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the
minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water
standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as
attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.19 In relation to
the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.

(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the
agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of
agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in
coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring,
control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously
utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the
PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention
and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic
resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 29223 to
provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource
development systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and
specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to
"flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was
made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall
remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control
and drainage services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD
979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and

18
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules
and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission
upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of
the law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft,
or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland
navigable waters of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either
from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable
water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and

c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any
tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either
by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or
obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on
December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial
waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the
latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the
capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of
1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws,
rules, and regulations.25

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a
rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states
that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and
functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of
Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:

xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as
movement within the port of watercraft.27

Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure
the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking
in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and
dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is
the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste
and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions,
within its area of jurisdiction.29

19
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste
matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and
landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment
or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed
"when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead
agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall
direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned
agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules
and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for
domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other
concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage
and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly
urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of
its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of
wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental
sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their
environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to
integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the
DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall
launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and
proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is
directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on
waste management principles.33

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code
of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the
country’s development objectives.34

One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This
law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of
the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of
appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a
holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot
be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of
life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line
with the country’s development objectives.

20
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what
are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their
tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water
pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as
may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up
water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the counterpart provision
(Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who
causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be
responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the
same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event
emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the
[DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and
cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have
caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred
shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were
sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the
amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the
cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the
matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin
provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup
operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water
to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such
as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to
undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water
concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are
21
situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding
containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g)
requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have
been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned
in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec.
20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture,
respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without
its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents,
however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope
of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to
Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their
respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents
assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the
definition of the phrase "cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition.
As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the
chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as
long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to
stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary
to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a
specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such
instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’
assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident
and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As
earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the
agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends
on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over
Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a
comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20
of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they
seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh
impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to
pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution
incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and
in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to
"any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that
pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay.
In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they
can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be
almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the
22
apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been
required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the
Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152,
covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is
imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be
stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in
no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD
1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-
agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level.
Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of
the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.37

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have
septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las
Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways,
river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major
rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and
the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized
structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important
bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water
Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art.
51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length
and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40)
meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks
of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized
constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways.
The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to
prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers,
and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer
their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory
tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results
of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as
alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez
dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that

23
 flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for
drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites
and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To
say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens
seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.40

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by
the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by
some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:

Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall be established
and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the
use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no
controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21,
2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA
9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in
roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like.
Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila
sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins
the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized
transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes
the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste
and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water,
land or air transport or other human-made structure."

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all
concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and
completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and
mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-
emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants
and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be
accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to
these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or
imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that
different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic
functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable
claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of
the bay is a discretionary duty.

24
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It
implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not
even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.41 Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of
Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a
betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP
No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC
Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to

clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea
waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA
9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
the DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the
aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government
Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate
guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152),
shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of
jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and
regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set
up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human
wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of
fines and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary
adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to
provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the
earliest possible time.

25
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of
the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA
8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and
regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend
the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage
services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of
programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and
other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003,
within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection
with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause
the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA
9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this
Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal
of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-
complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its
environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate
lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula
of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the
importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and
the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and
succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of
the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with
the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group,
DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of
this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with
this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

26
Resident Dolphins and Mammals of Tanon Strait v. Reyes

In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging
that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in
a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's
Creations."1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and
domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.3 As the
representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build
awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the
government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust.4

Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the
opportunity to lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."5

The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to continue to define
environmental rights in the context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space for legal creativity usually
required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the
other values protected by current substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set
the balance between competing interests. We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity is not clearly and
convincingly presented.

The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for animals through
their allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that (a) they were
chosen by the Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the
species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear
consent from their animal principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests.
Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners,
assert are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal
strategies that they invoked are the strategies that they agree with.

In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship between
them and all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.

Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law cannot be founded on
feigned representation.

Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have legal standing to sue
with respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have already been liberalized to take into
consideration the difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be
the occasion for abuse.

II

Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:

SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action.

The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be authorized by statute to
be parties in a civil action.

Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:

27
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost.

Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:

ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the following article.

Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:

ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality
begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe, the provisions of the
Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6

A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party in interest.7 When a case
is brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that another party's act or omission has caused a direct
injury, making his or her interest both material and based on an enforceable legal right.8

Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real party in interest, as
defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to
be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.(3a)9

The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to directly or actually benefit or
suffer from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real party in interest.10 The representative is
an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is
not an exhaustive list, but the rule limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11

These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that for the Petition of the
human petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and
(b) that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.

28
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species
inhabiting Tañon Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have legal
standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and
environmental rights.

In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan explains as the
"guardianship model for nonhuman animals":13

Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review
to enforce their statutory rights and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy organizations
may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of
mentally-challenged humans who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.

In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Christopher D.
Stone asserts that the environment should possess the right to seek judicial redress even though it is incapable of
representing itself. While asserting the rights of

speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate challenges - such as
identifying the proper spokesman -the American legal system is already well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by
which nonhumans may obtain standing via a judicially established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless -
and nonhuman - entities such as corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit on their
own behalf. There is little reason to fear abuses under this regime as procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding
conflicts of interest, and termination of a guardianship are well established.

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that AL
VA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the
humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-
known advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's
standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-
established prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous
activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue
legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause
could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.

This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit organizations with an
established history of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official guardians ad !item on behalf of
nonhuman animals interests. The American legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and
interests of nonhumans; any challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals
are minimal compared to an interest in the proper administration of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals, the legal system must recognize those statutory rights independent of humans and provide a
viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has been
urged on behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more compelling as applied to nonhuman animals,
because they are sentient beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are
qualitatively different from other legally protected nonhumans and therefore have interests deserving direct legal
protection.

Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal
statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman
animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known example is
found in the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic
participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should reflect this intent and its implication that
humans are suitable representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman animals.14 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)

When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as
individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit
29
for themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g.,
corporations, states, and others).

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue
and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals.

Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel the
need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore,
speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of
animals and that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.

Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for the Central District
of California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger,15 the court held that an emotional response to what
humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16 Such
sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to
represent animals was further limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting
animal rights:

What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing doctrine further
required ALVA to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general disdain for
animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be
abstract and thus relegated ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "

....

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that
ALVA might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the
humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-
known advocacy organization might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's
standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-
established prior to commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous
activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue
legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause
could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)

What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over the
environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to
act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is
defined in Section 5: .

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may
file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall
issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all
interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.

There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on behalf
of animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we,
humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is
designed to ensure that humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves,
which of course includes compassion for all living things.

Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.

30
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have given to the rule on
standing. While representatives are not required to establish direct injury on their part, they should only be allowed to
represent after complying with the following: [I]t is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on
whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal
rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20

I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño21 regarding this rule alongside the appreciation of legal
standing in Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases
brought by representatives, should be used with great caution:

Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.

That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of
emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be
used to obtain judgments that would preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their
actual concerns. The present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will
exist at a different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit
will inevitably result in preventing future generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests
and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we
again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.

It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a)
there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing
legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those
that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe
so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we
abandon the precedent all together.23 (Emphasis in the original)

Similarly, in Paje:

A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the
court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words, he or she must have a cause
of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the
real party in interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a
curiosity about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and substantial. It is not a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent interest.

A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as representative of a .real party
in interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, that representative is not and does not
become the real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative
remains to be a third party to the action instituted on behalf of another.

....

To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose
right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of
Court to represent the victim."

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows
any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet
unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions
on behalf of the real party in interest.

The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition
of this court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents)

31
to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to
ensure the future generation's access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.

To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous for three
reasons:

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question
its representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political
issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on
behalf of minors and generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue,
especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.

In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others. Uninterested persons will
argue for the persons they represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision
by the court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The
court's decision will be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.25

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the
value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine
Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on
mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their
concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right
and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the
responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of
those they represent.

Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be considered carefully so
that no unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of Madame Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing.
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.

However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center,.
Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in interest and as representatives of subsistence
fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future
generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-
46) directly affected their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest.27 The
actual, direct, and material damage they suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a
proper subject of a legal suit.

III

In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners, most especially
when the implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from
adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, human petitioners also impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for
"her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon Strait."28

No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction,
only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was unwilling to join would there be an
allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a
necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should
the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if
jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

32
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim
against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.29

A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a
defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he
may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.30

The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but who do not consent
should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other court processes. Petitioners. should not
take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling
co-petitioner at the risk of being denied due process.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal constitutional
department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The
procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the
contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case.

IV

I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.

SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234,31 which declared Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional
because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph
1 of the .1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It
further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed
under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall
under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under paragraph 4.34· Public respondents further
aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources.35

VI

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception. of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.

33
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)

I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural
resources, but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import of the words "either
financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also

the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:

1973 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the
Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or association at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such
citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any
of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)

1935 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant.

The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer interpretation from the
Constitutional Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in
a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other
hand, may result in dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further subjectivity from
those who spoke during the Constitutional Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will
34
be used. It is safer that we use the words already in the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words
were read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.

SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.

Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the standards set forth in La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant
thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure
that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in
the original, citation omitted)

Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against three important points: (a)
whether SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b)
whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by
the President to Congress within 30 days of execution.

VII

The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972. It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts,
1âwphi1

contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)

The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter into with
foreign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no longer
allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders
the law invalid and ineffective.

SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an important point,
which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the
parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected
seascape under Presidential Decree No. 123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from
that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas,
except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering
information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
35
Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys
shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation
and utilization of energy resources found within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)

No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil exploration,
extraction, and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken
under SC-46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of
energy resources in a protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.

VIII

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by
paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered
into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main
Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty
cannot be delegated to another public official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the President's involvement,
being one of the constitutional safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality:

At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:

• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in
referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance. • They spoke of service
contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.

• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.

• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would eliminate or m minimize
the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)

Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the signing or
execution of SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null and void.

IX

Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the execution and existence of
SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally important requisite to the validity of any service contract involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress
about SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.

In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII,
Section 2. It is, therefore, null and void.

I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being
violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of
the requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañon Strait is covered by the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of the natural
environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement and
recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the
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environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant
and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future
generations the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.

It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values that may be
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of these areas is
possible only through cooperation among national government, local and concerned private organizations; that the use
and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable
development.

To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall
encompass outstanding remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and
endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland
or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment:

SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management
plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are
adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.45 (Emphasis
supplied)

The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty project is implemented:

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) under the Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are
allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to
lack of caution or indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)

In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will
recommend the program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of
energy resources found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas,
except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering
information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys
shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation
and utilization of energy resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed by
Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)

Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining an Environmental
Compliance Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They
argue that the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the
Tañon Strait is not a nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering information; and ( c)
measures were in place to ensure that the exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for cases involving
Philippine energy resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize

37
the importance of protecting the environment in light of resource exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place
to secure for Filipinos local resources under the most favorable conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a
protected seascape, the institution of additional legal safeguards is even more significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46. Based on the records,
JAPEX commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its project, with the
Environmental Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007.51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any environmental assessment
contrary to Section 12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

XI

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in
the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not
incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign
representation of any other species or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to
claim any of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor and courage, we fully shoulder
the responsibility deserving of the grace and power endowed on our species.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote:

(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;

(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and

(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act
No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1234.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

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