RAMOS VS.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.
FACTS: Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija.
He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and
was registered as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to
Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract
of land under color of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument
giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
HELD: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the
claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that
the land was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that
the premises consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law.
When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property
collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director
of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of
Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for
registration.
 Director v. CA, 130 SCRA 9

Director of lands vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoins the Kailogan River
and private respondent Valeriano have converted it into a fishpond. In their application
in 1976, private respondents claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land
partly through inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it is not within any forest or
military reservation. The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of
Forest Development, opposed the application on the principal ground that the land
applied for is WITHIN THEUNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such area
are denominated as FORESTLANDS-do not form part of the disposable and alienable
portion of the public domain.

The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Valerianos. This was
affirmed by the CA which said in part that ´since the subject property is entirely devoted
to fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands.

Issue: WON the courts can reclassify the subject public land.

Held: Courts cannot reclassify... it’s beyond their competence and jurisdiction.

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department

of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of the Courts. In the absence
of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released there from
and rendered open to disposition. Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession Applicants (Valeriano) may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. The conversion of the subject property into a fishpond by Applicants
does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. The
recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from unclassified
region is not the ultimate word on the matter.

 Pleasantville Dev’t Corp v. CA, 253 SCRA 10

G.R. NO. 79688 253 SCRA 10 FEBRUARY 1, 1996PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that he land he is building
on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. The burden of proving bad
faith belongs to the one asserting it.

Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation, herein

petitioner a parcel of land at Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. The property
was designated as Lot 9, Phase II. In 1975, herein respondent Eldred Jardinico bought
the said subject lot from the former purchaser. Eldred later discovered that the
property he purchased had improvements introduced therein by respondent Wilson
Kee. Kee on the other hand bought on instalments Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI) which is the exclusive real estate agent of the
petitioner. Under the contract Kee was allowed to take possession of the property
even before full payment of the price. CTTEI through an employee, Zenaida Octaviano
accompanied Kee’s wife Donabelle to inspect Lot No. 8. Octaviano however mistakenly
pointed towards Lot 9. Hence spouses Kee had their residence, an auto repair shop, a
store and other improvements constructed on the wrong lot. Upon discovery of the
blunder both Kee and Jardinico tried to reach an amicable settlement but they failed.
Jardinico demanded that the improvements be removed but as Kee refused, Jardinico
filed a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee at the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City. Kee filed a third-party complaint against herein
petitioner and CTTEI.

The MTCC found that the error was attributable to CTTEI also since at present the
contract with Kee has rescinded for Kee’s failure to pay installments. Kee no longer
had any right over the subject property and must pay rentals for its use.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were
not at fault or were not negligent. It argued that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Even if
assuming that he was in good faith, he was no longer so and must pay rentals from
the time that he was given notice to vacate the lot.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith a she was unaware of
the mix-up when he constructed the improvements. It was in fact due to the
negligence and wrongful delivery of CTTEI which included its principal the herein
petitioner. It further ruled that the award of rental was without basis. Pending the
resolution of the case at the Court of Appeals Jardinico and Kee entered into a deed of
sale, wherein Lot 9 was sold to Kee. In the said deed a provision stating that regardless
of the outcome of the decision, such shall not be pursued by the parties and shall be
considered dismissed and without effect. The appellate court was not informed of this
deal.

Issue: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong
property erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent, a builder in good faith?

Held: Yes, Article 527 of the Civil Code provides the presumption that petitioner has
the burden of proving that Kee was a builder in bad faith. Kee may be made liable for
the violation of the contract with CTTEI but this may not be used as a basis of bad
faith and as a sufficient ground to negate the presumption of good faith. Jardinico is
presently only allowed to file a complaint for unlawful detainer. Good faith is based
on the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any flaw or defect in is title. Since at the time when Kee constructed his improvements
on Lot 8, he was not aware that it was actually Lot 9 that was delivered to him.
Petitioner further contends that Kee was negligent as a provision in the Contract of
Sale on Installment stated that the vendee must have personally examined the
property and shall bear on his own the consequential expenses in the changes that
may happen thereon.
The court held that such provision cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the
Vendee’s right to recover damages resulting from petitioner’s negligence. Such
interpretation of the waiver is contrary to law and public policy and cannot be
allowed. Petitioner cannot claim and excuse itself from liability by claiming that it was
not directly involved in the delivery of the property. The principal must be
responsible for the acts of the agent done within the scope of his authority. CTTEI was
the sole real estate representative of the petitioner when the delivery was made.
Wilson Kee is therefore declared a builder in good faith. Petitioner and respondent
CTTEI are declared solidarily liable for damages due to negligence. The award of
rentals to Jardinico is dispensed with.

 Kasilag v. Roque, GR No. 46623, December 7, 1939

69 Phil 217
PROCEDURAL FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from
the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First
Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void and
without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the
disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother
Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the
defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the
improvements thereon and free from any lien
SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an
accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract
involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having been acquired by means
of homestead. P for his part accepted the contract of mortgage.
Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P,
acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that
the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of
Antichresis.

ISSUE: Whether or not P is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based
upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states “Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith,” the P’s lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis.
HELD: The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is valid.
The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void.
REASONING: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every person who
is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is
invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith.” And in this case, the petitioner
acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the
petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was
done through his apparent acquisition thereof.