1. Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs.

IAC
FACTS: Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian
Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit,
private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon
the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00
thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the
respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of
Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer
and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the
counterbond of the petitioner.
HELD: YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against
petitioner.
RATIO: It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the
principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and
general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and
one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other
words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts
are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the
law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment
that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a
judgment pending appeal.

2. Pilar vs COMELEC
Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner
withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three
days after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered
the political contest, and should have either won or lost".
Issue: Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures
after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.
Held: The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy
shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not
improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all
too remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.
3. Cecilio de Villa vs. CA
FACTS: Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
(Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and (b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the
obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of
Philippine Coin and Currency). A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was
filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs
against the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but
the same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not:
(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and,
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered
by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
HELD: YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
RATIO: For the first issue: The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, cannot be
questioned, as Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The information
under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and
therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing
of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191
[1988]).
For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where
the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law
does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify
it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III,
unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be
the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.

4. Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez

FACTS: Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract,
sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use
as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these
materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the
foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner
filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The
auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of
the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt
under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central
Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors” mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law
refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the
petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream
stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law
(Republic Act No. 601).
HELD: YES. The decision under review was reversed.
RATIO: General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors”
as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food
and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that “general terms may
be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific
language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable only to cases
where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific
class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a
number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other
items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.
The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals
when used in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended
merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other
rules of construction.

5. People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr.

FACTS: Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with
squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent
Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled)
on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth and strategy”,
whereas under the decree the entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem
generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the
fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural
lands.
HELD: NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed.
RATIO: The lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves
pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this
case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities,
particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction
which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

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