Political Violence Spanish General Elect PDF

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The Impact of Political Violence During the Spanish General Election of 1936
Manuel Álvarez Tardío
Journal of Contemporary History 2013 48: 463
DOI: 10.1177/0022009413481823
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DOI: 10.1177/0022009413481823
Spanish General jch.sagepub.com
Election of 1936
Manuel Álvarez Tardı́o
Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain
Abstract
Political violence was a significant force in Europe between the two world wars, and the
Spanish Second Republic (1931–6) was no exception to this general trend. The purpose
of this article is to analyse its role in the campaign leading up to the February 1936
general election – the last to be held prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. Without
doubt, this election constituted a crucial moment in Spain’s new experiment with
democratic competition, and for this reason, the presence and characteristics of vio-
lence during the campaign are useful tools for analysing the process of democratic
consolidation and its peculiar features. Until the present, historians have possessed a
certain amount of information on electoral violence in the Spain of February 1936, but
this has remained incomplete and is poorly documented. Therefore, this study presents
the results of a more thoroughgoing and systematic analysis of the subject, based on a
rigorous examination of the available primary sources. In addition, it also introduces a
reflection on the comparative prior context of interwar European politics.
Keywords
democracy, elections, political violence, Second Republic, Spain, twentieth Century
Political violence was a conspicuous feature of interwar Europe. It constituted a

key factor in the rise of Italian fascism, while more than 4000 people died in
Germany in various demonstrations, attempted uprisings and strikes between
1918 and 1923. Moreover, violence would prove decisive from early 1933 onwards
in the establishment of the National Socialist dictatorship. In both cases, violence
contributed significantly to the destruction of democracy. It also played a role in
Austria, where it helped bring about parliamentary paralysis, and aided the
Corresponding author:
Manuel Álvarez Tardı́o, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Paseo de Artilleros s/n, Madrid 28032, Spain.
Email: manuel.tardio@urjc.es
464 Journal of Contemporary History 48(3)
development of Dollfuss’s politics. Portugal provides a further example: here, in

the space of a just a few years, there occurred a striking succession of military
coups, insurrections and other violent outbreaks.1
Without doubt political violence was a prominent factor in the breakdown of
democracy, the establishment of dictatorships and during civil wars. Yet it also
manifested itself in less extreme circumstances.2 Even France experienced some
delicate moments after the election of 1932. In the two years that followed, organ-
izations of the anti-liberal and pro-Fascist right gained momentum, such as the
Croix de Feu – which even acquired a paramilitary wing which included ‘shock
troops’. A particularly serious incident took place on 6 February 1934, when rad-
ical right-wing protestors engaged in confrontations with the police, resulting in
almost 20 dead and 60 seriously injured. Yet despite the background of institu-
tional crisis, such incidents remained quite out of the ordinary in French politics.3
Nevertheless, political violence certainly made its presence felt in democratic par-
liamentary regimes, reaching higher or lower levels of intensity and involving a
range of different actors.4 One might therefore ask whether it was not merely the
product of extremist and anti-democratic political forces – as was the case in
France – but also a symptom of the absence of a broad-based consensus supporting
the state’s basic institutional structure. This might have been the case in Spain
between 1931 and 1936, that is, subsequent to the proclamation of the Second
Republic. As was pointed out in one landmark study, political violence was an
‘undeniably important’ contributing factor to the ‘breakdown of Spain’s first
attempt at twentieth-century democracy’.5
This article analyses the role played by violence in the 1936 Spanish general
election campaign, the last to take place before the outbreak of the Civil War. Until
now, historians have possessed some information relating to this subject, but it is
largely fragmentary and poorly documented. In contrast, the present study is based
upon a systematic and complete analysis of available primary material, and has
been carried out on the basis of two hypotheses. The first of these is that the specific
characteristics of this electoral violence must be disentangled. To avoid mere specu-
lation, the degree to which each political force was implicated, as well as the part
1 On Germany, see S.G. Payne, La Europa Revolucionaria: Las Guerras Civiles que Marcaron el Siglo
XX (Madrid 2011), 146; for comparisons between the role of violence in the cases of Nazism and
Fascism, R.O. Paxton, Anatomıá del Fascismo (Barcelona 2005), 82–3, and A. Lyttelton, ‘Fascism
and Violence in Post-War Italy: Political Strategy and Social Conflict’, in W.J. Mommsen and
G. Hirschfeld, Social Protest, Violence, and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe
(New York 1982), 257–75; on Austria, see G. Botz, ‘Political Violence, its Forms and Strategies in
the First Austrian Republic’, in Mommsen and Hirschfeld, Social Protest, Violence, and Terror, 300–29,
and on Portugal, R. Ramos, A Segunda Fundaçao (1890–1926) (Estampa 1994), 607–33.
2 J.J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration (Baltimore,
MD 1978), 14–5, 56–61; S. Kalyvas, La Lógica de la Violencia en la Guerra Civil (Madrid 2010).
3 J-P. Azéma and M. Winock, La Troisie`me Re´publique (Paris 1976), 264–5; M. Larkin, France since
the Popular Front: Government and People, 1936–1996 (Oxford 1997), 50; E. Weber, L’Action Française
(Paris 1964), V, 353–451.
4 C. Tilly, L. Tilly and R. Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930 (Cambridge, MA 1975).
5 S.G. Payne, ‘Political Violence during the Spanish Second Republic’, Journal of Contemporary
History, 25, 2/3 (May–June 1990), 269.
Tardı́o 465
played by the police and the state, must be evaluated using concrete data. In this
sense, it is a question of strengthening the foundations for a wider study of political
violence in this period, working on the principle that, as Stathis Kalyvas has asserted,
any ‘study of violence must deal with the thorny problem of data’. Indeed, the latter
aspect includes overcoming the common problem of this data appearing ‘out of
context’, that is, without ‘information about the exact circumstances that sur-
rounded the violence (who, where, when, how, for whom)’.6 Secondly, this electoral
violence should not be understood merely as a by-product of political modernization
and the tension generated by the struggle to win votes, but also as a symptom of an
underlying systemic fracture which was, in turn, related to the dominant political
cultures’ inability to accept defeat. Regarding the latter, this study also introduces a
reflection on the comparative prior context of interwar European politics.
For the purposes of this article, the term ‘electoral violence’ will be employed as a
sub-category within a broader conceptualization of political violence. It denotes
actions carried out by either individuals or groups which produce physical damage
to people or property, and which aim to limit or eradicate party competition within
the electoral process.7 The resulting intimidation and/or elimination of the oppon-
ent curtails political pluralism, in the process infringing on freedom of conscience,
association, assembly and expression.
Of course electoral violence was by no means the child of the interwar period.
Even prior to the widespread adoption of universal suffrage, the increasingly com-
petitive nature of elections had prompted violence of varying degrees and charac-
ter. In mid-nineteenth century Great Britain, violent incidents were not uncommon
in closely-fought electoral contests.8 Political violence also remained a virtual daily
reality in the United States, where the level of party competition remained rela-
tively high throughout the nineteenth century. For decades, a stable constitutional
and representative order proved no obstacle to its survival in both countries, and to
some extent a degree of violence was not only tolerated, but also viewed as justified
based on the opposition’s alleged use of illegitimate tactics.9 In any event, both
6 Kalyvas, La Lógica de la Violencia, 78–9.

7 For an overview of various theories of violence, see E. Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence.
An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts (London 2003), 1–29; and for a historical
perspective, Mommsen and Hirschfeld, Social Protest, Violence, and Terror; and H. Davis Graham and
T.R. Gurr (eds), The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives
(New York 1969). From a sociological-historical perspective, see C. Tilly, The Politics of Collective
Violence (Cambridge 2007); D. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A
Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge 2006); for electoral violence, see F.R. Von
Der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence (New York 1973), and N. Gash, Politics in the Age of
Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary Representation, 1830–1850 (London 1969).
8 F. O’Gorman, Voters, Patrons, and Parties: The Unreformed Electoral System of Hanoverian
England, 1734–1832 (Oxford 1987), 255–6; Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, 137–53; C. O’Leary, The
Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections (Oxford 1962).
9 T. Campbell, Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, an American Political Tradition,
1742–2004 (New York 2005), xviii; R.J. Jensen, Grass Roots Politics: Parties, Issues and Voters,
1854–1983 (Westport, CT 1983); J.F. Reynolds, Testing Democracy: Electoral Behaviour and
Progressive Reform in New Jersey, 1880–1920 (Chapel Hill, NC 1988).
countries did see a significant decline in violence during the closing decades of the
nineteenth century, although it would subsequently resurface periodically.
Prior to 1923 – the year in which Primo de Rivera’s coup brought an end to the
constitutional regime in place since 1876 – Spain experienced violence which ebbed
and flowed with the opening and closing of elections.10 As was the case in other
countries, this violence was largely incidental, born of the pressures originating
from a diverse range of factors; in this respect the Spanish experience was distinct
to that of Latin American nations such as Bolivia or Peru.11 Yet from 1931 to 1936,
the situation changed. During this period, political conflict reached particularly
high levels not only at election time, but also both prior to and after the voting
had taken place. Furthermore, violence did not remain circumscribed to the cam-
paign itself, suggesting that it was a symptom of underlying institutional problems:
the fact that the defeated found it difficult to accept election results; the fear that
the victors would use electoral success as a pretext to abuse their power once in
office; conflicts over the legitimacy of the system itself; and the consequent disloy-
alty or semi-disloyalty to the same on the part of certain political actors.12 In this
sense, the electoral violence that would be witnessed in Spain during the 1930s was
distinct to that experienced in Britain or the United States prior to 1914. At the
same time it exhibited parallels with that endured by countries such as Germany,
Italy, Poland and Portugal during the interwar period.13
An episode related by Angelo Tasca regarding the municipal elections in
Bologna, held on 21 November 1920, is particularly pertinent. In the aftermath
of a resounding defeat, the ‘local Fascists, furious . . . declared at every opportunity
that they would block the operation of the Socialist municipality. On the eve of the
handover of the council to the Socialists . . . they issued the battle-call for the fol-
lowing day. . .’ In turn, the Socialists – victors at the ballot box – decided to fortify
themselves with guns and bombs in the town hall. When the new mayor appeared
on the balcony and was proclaimed by the multitudes, the Fascists began to shoot;
nine deaths resulted from the violence which ensued. Symptomatic of a serious
problem at the heart of the Italian liberal state, these events were the opening salvo
for a violent offensive directed at the ‘whole of Italy’.14 During the critical juncture
of 1919–24, Italy saw the number of victims at election times soar. The day after the
10 In the hotly-contested general election of 1919, there were four deaths, M. Fernández Almagro,
Historia del Reinado de Don Alfonso XIII (vol. 2) (Madrid 1986), 58; see also J. Varela Ortega, Geografıá
del Caciquismo en España (1875–1923) (Madrid 2001), 603–15.
11 On Peru, see V. Peralta Ruiz, ‘Reforma electoral, violencia y revolución en el Perú, 1896-1909’, in
C. Malamud and C. Dardé (eds), Violencia y Legitimidad. Polı´tica y Revoluciones en España y Ame´rica
Latina, 1840–1910 (Santander 2004), 186–95; on Bolivia, see M. Irurozqui, ‘El bautismo de la violencia:
Indı́genas patriotas en la revolución de 1870 en Bolivia’, in Malamud y Dardé, Violencia y Legitimidad,
156–73.
12 It has been asserted that in 1930s Spain, ‘there was scarcely any political grouping which did not see
force as an acceptable alternative to the ballot box’, see E. Ucelay-Da Cal, ‘Buscando el levantamiento
plebiscitario: insurrecciona-lismo y elecciones’, Ayer, 20 (1995), 78.
13 For a new contextualization of political violence in the history of the Spanish Second Republic, see
M. Álvarez Tardı́o and R. Villa Garcı́a, El precio de la exclusión. La polı´tica durante la Segunda
República (Madrid 2010).
14 A. Tasca, El Nacimiento del Fascismo (Barcelona 1969), 114.
Tardı́o 467
November 1919 elections – which had not produced results favourable to his
party – Mussolini commissioned ‘a group of arditi who subsequently hurled a
bomb at the procession’ of the victors. There were nine injured as a consequence.
After many months of preparation and a growing number of victims, the election
campaign of 1921 brought more than 100 deaths. Unheard of in previous contests,
this figure reflected even greater levels of violence: in fact in some regions, the
elections took place ‘in an atmosphere of terror’.15
In the case of Germany, political violence had been present since the immediate
aftermath of the First World War. Although it declined between 1924 and 1929,
neither greater institutional stability nor an improved economic situation proved
sufficient to effect its total eradication from the political scene. During this period
there were ‘constant confrontations between rival paramilitary groupings’, and by
the late 1920s ‘gang fighting between Nazis and Communists’ had become even
more frequent, although ‘the Nazis sometimes attacked Socialists as well’.16
Yet from 1930 onwards, the toll taken by violence ‘increased dramatically’, a
fact which made itself felt above all at election time. In 1932, political clashes
produced 155 deaths in Prussia, at least 105 of which occurred during the two
months prior to the 31 July Reichstag elections. Furthermore, ‘the police recorded
461 political disturbances resulting in 400 injured and 82 deaths during the first
seven weeks of the campaign’. Nevertheless, all this would be overshadowed by the
campaign of terror and violence unleashed by the Nazis in spring 1933.17
Despite its evident importance, electoral violence was not the exclusive preserve
of Fascism’s rise to power. Even prior to the First World War, in Republican
Portugal the so-called Radical Democrats had employed their private militias to
attack the premises of other parties and newspaper offices, specializing in ‘a
scorched earth policy’ aimed at safeguarding ‘the monopoly of political action
and the control of power achieved between October 1910 and 1913’. In Poland,
political violence appeared at various moments, and assumed a particular prom-
inence in the March 1928 elections. Even prior to the tragic episode of February
1934, it also played a significant role in Austria – a country in which both the
Socialists and the nationalist right possessed well-organized paramilitary wings.
Finally, after the return of King George II to Greece and the calling of elections
for 26 January 1936, there were numerous ‘violent incidents’ in a campaign domi-
nated by the polarisation between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists.18
15 The quotation is from Tasca, El Nacimiento del Fascismo, 48, 147; for the deaths during the 1921
elections, see P.L. Ballini, Le Elezioni Nella Storia dÍtalia dallÚnità al Fascismo (Bologna 1998), 1996–7;
R. de Felice, Mussolini il Fascista. La Conquista del Potere, 1921–1925 (Turin 1966), 36–9.
16 S.G. Payne, Historia del Fascismo (Barcelona 1995), 220; on the Stahlhelmers’ violence and elec-
tions, see P. Fritzsche, De Alemanes a Nazis 1914–1933 (Madrid 2006), 166.
17 R.J. Evans, La Llegada del Tercer Reich (Barcelona 2005), 309–10, 376. For a categorization and
analysis of violence during the last five years of the Weimar Republic, see P.H. Merkl, ‘Approaches to
Political Violence: the Storm-troopers, 1925–33’, in Mommsen and Hirschfeld, Social Protest, Violence,
and Terror, 369.
18 For Portugal, see F. Rosas, ‘Pensamiento y acción polı́tica en el Portugal del siglo XX (1890–1976).
Ensayo interpretativo’, in B. Gómez and D. Palacios, Una Historia Polı´tica de Portugal: La Difıćil
Conquista de la Democracia (Madrid 2006), 58; for Austria, G. Brook-Shepherd, The Austrians:
In the most authoritative published account on the February 1936 Spanish elec-
tions – a work which is also a model study of electoral sociology – its author, Javier
Tusell, concluded that ‘with some exceptions, the incidents which occurred during
the campaign were not particularly grave’.19 It is surprising that the analysis of
violence warranted only a couple of paragraphs of the study’s two extensive vol-
umes. It seems that Tusell collected some samples of this violence, but since these
did not appear to indicate high levels of tension, they were granted little import-
ance. However, this material served to support his overall argument, which was
that despite ideological polarization and conflict between the political blocs, ‘a
more moderate spirit’ had prevailed during the campaign.20
Quite naturally, Tusell’s analysis and conclusions have been restated by many
subsequent works, thereby strengthening the notion that the 1936 election was not
especially violent. Moreover, this accords with the widely-held view that the pre-
vious elections of the Republican period had also not been overly characterized by
violence.21
However, certain aspects of this period’s political history may lead us to
question this interpretation: the February 1936 election took place in the after-
math of a turbulent period, and against a background of powerful ideological
conflict between the proponents of revolution and the forces of counter-
revolution.22
Besides, there is also evidence that the 1933 election had in fact been character-
ized by a significant degree of violence. According to the most recent and exhaust-
ive study of this subject, there were more than 300 acts of violence during the
campaign. From 10 October to 3 December 1933, that is from the opening of
the canvas until election day of the second round, 34 people died.23 Taking into
account this evidence, as well as the aforementioned immediate political context,
one might wonder what really occurred during the February 1936 election. Was the
latter really an exception to the rule which, according to a recent study,
A Thousand-Year Odyssey (New York 2002), 279–90; for Greece, G.T.H. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn
Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936 (Los Angeles, CA 1983), 52; on
Poland, see A. Misiuk, ‘Police and Policing Under the Second Polish Republic, 1918–1930’, in G. Blaney
Jr (ed.) Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 1918–1940 (Basingstoke 2007), 166–9.
19 J. Tusell, Las Elecciones del Frente Popular (Madrid 1971), I, 317.
20 Ibid., 318.
21 W.J. Irwin, The 1933 Cortes Elections (New York 1991) added nothing to our understanding of
electoral violence.
22 Stanley G. Payne signals the ‘plebiscitary, decisive, and even eschatological character’ of the elec-
tion, El Colapso de la República (Madrid 2005), 273; Gabriele Ranzato has emphasized the ‘impassioned
tones’ and the ‘demonisation of the opponent’ during the campaign, see G. Ranzato, El Eclipse de la
Democracia: La Guerra Civil Española y sus Orı´genes, 1931–1939 (Madrid 2006), 239; Jesús Pabón
spoke of ‘an alarming vehemence’, an expression which Javier Tusell, Las Elecciones del Frente
Popular, I, 316, considered to be quite accurate.
23 I am grateful to Roberto Villa Garcı́a for providing me with these statistics. He is the author of La
República en las Urnas. El despertar de la democracia en España (Madrid 2011), an impressive work on
1933 election.
Tardı́o 469
characterized the entire Republican period: ‘permanent mid-level violence’ which

resulted in an ‘unstoppable trickle of deaths’?24
Certainly the information which is already available suggests that these years of
intense political competition were one of the periods of ‘greatest violent conflict in
our history’.25 Of course, the data presented by some studies produced under the
Franco dictatorship appears all too clearly to have been exaggerated, and has not
been systematically confirmed. Yet in the first serious assessment of political vio-
lence published in 1990, figures were provided which now seem more like min-
imums: 1849 deaths between April 1931 and December 1935.26 One recent work
has determined that there were 48 deaths in the 6 weeks prior to the February 1936
elections, also adding 244 injured for the same period (although without indicating
whether these injuries were minor, serious or very serious). If these figures are
accurate, they cast considerable doubt over previous claims. However, this same
study also presents considerable problems: an imprecise methodology, the errors in
the calculations and the lack of precision in the correspondence between data and
sources impel us to treat its conclusions with caution.27
Nevertheless, another recent study also points towards the inadequacies of the
currently-accepted statistics on violence during the 1936 elections. Using
press sources, Rafael Cruz has calculated a total of 25 deaths. Yet the same
author presents this tally as an ‘approximate figure’, and does not include the
numbers injured or present any detailed statistics on the violence which caused
these deaths.28
Taking into account the foregoing, this study is based on a detailed examination
of the press between 1 January and 17 February 1936. This material was also
compared with the information on violence gathered by local and regional studies,
as well as with corresponding Ministry of the Interior documents held in
various archives.29
24 F. del Rey, ‘Reflexiones sobre la violencia polı́tica en la Segunda República española’, in M.

Gutiérrez Sánchez and D. Palacios Cerezales (eds) Conflicto Polı´tico, Democracia y Dictadura:
Portugal y España en la Dećada de 1930 (Madrid 2007), 26.
25 J. Aróstegui et al., ‘La violencia polı́tica en la España del siglo XX’, Cuadernos de Historia
Contemporánea, 22 (2000), 72.
26 Payne, ‘Political Violence’, 284; for ‘exaggerated’ data, see R.A.H. Robinson, Los Orı´genes de la
España de Franco: Derecha, República, Revolución, 1931–1936 (Barcelona 1973), 127; for regional
studies of political violence, F. del Rey, Paisanos en la Lucha: Exclusión Polı´tica y Violencia en la
Segunda República Española (Madrid 2008); J.M. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, República y Revolución
en Andalucıá (1931–1936) (Sevilla 2000).
27 J. Blázquez Miguel, España Turbulenta: Alteraciones, Violencia y Sangre durante la II República
(Madrid 2009), 559–65.
28 R. Cruz, En el Nombre del Pueblo: República, Rebelión y Guerra en la España de 1936 (Madrid
2006), 97.
29 In order to limit the impact of ideological bias, in every instance information was contrasted across
sources of different party affiliation. In this manner, editions of ABC, El Sol, El Heraldo de Madrid,
El Socialista, Ahora y La Vanguardia were subjected to exhaustive examination, while other titles, such
as El Debate, Época y Luz, were consulted sporadically. The regional press was employed only in cases
where it was necessary to confirm dubious information, and indeed for this purpose the material
available in regional and local studies proved to be of greater use.
Table 1. Political Violence: the first round of the 1936 election and the 1933 election
Political Violence: the first round of the 1936 election
Deaths Deaths (uncertain) Seriously and very seriously injured
1 to 31 January 21 5 15
1 to 15 February 7 2 30
16 February 9 1 10
Total 37 8 55
Political Violence: the first round of the 1933 election
Deaths Seriously and very seriously injured
10 Oct to 19 Nov 27 58
In order to evaluate the information provided by the press, it is important to

bear in mind that during almost the entirety of this six-week period – and specifically
from 7 January onwards – there was no a priori censorship: therefore journalists
enjoyed full freedom of expression.30 Yet it remains the case that the results analysed
here cannot be considered as definitive, even though a large proportion of the data
has been confirmed by other sources. Nevertheless, in terms of quality and quantity,
the information provided by the press for this period is clearly very substantial
indeed.
The overall figures which this study has yielded are presented in Table 1.31,32 This
data provides a total of 37 fatalities during the 1936 electoral campaign, while the
tally of 55 seriously or very seriously injured indicates that the total number of
deaths could well have been greater. Eight deaths have been classified as uncertain,
since we lack the information necessary to connect them categorically with acts of
political violence.33
As one specialist in the study of political violence has observed, ‘murder is by no
means the sum of violence’s scope, but it is an index lacking in ambiguity which can
be gauged in a more reliable manner than other options’. For this reason, it is
fundamental ‘as the primary indicator of violence in quantitative studies’.34
30 El Sol (8 January 1936).

31 Statistics drawn from: Archivo Histórico Nacional (Serie Gobernación), Leg. 31, Exps. 5 to 8;
Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica, PS-Madrid, Leg. 1536; Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes;
various newspapers and other sources. The figures for 1933 come from the research carried out by Villa
Garcı́a, La República en las Urnas.
32 ‘Seriously injured’ denotes those who, according to the available information, sustained life-threa-
tening gunshot or stab wounds.
33 For two examples of deaths in unclear circumstances, see ABC (4 February 1936); El Sol (5, 14
February 1936); El Heraldo de Madrid (14 February 1936).
34 Kalyvas, La Lógica de la Violencia, 38.
Tardı́o 471
In the present study, it is clear that the total number of fatalities and serious injuries
indicates violence of a greater magnitude than has been hitherto assumed.
Of course, the statistics alone do not tell us much about the nature of political
violence during the period at hand, and it is therefore necessary to analyse the
qualitative information surrounding the events which produced these deaths.
The classification of these incidents is a complex task, but broadly speaking the
deaths were usually the result of two distinct types of situations:
. Firstly, different kinds of confrontations between groups who were ideologically

opposed to one another: street fights; verbal clashes during the distribution of
campaign material which culminated in physical violence; fights which began in
various ways; confrontations outside party offices or in the aftermath of rallies.
These scenarios produced 11 deaths and 21 injuries.
. Secondly, also with a high number of deaths and injuries (11 and 4 respectively),
is the category of confrontations between extremist groups and the forces of law
and order. These clashes usually occurred when the police attempted to make
arrests, engaged in searches on the highways, or arrived to settle disputes or
fights already underway.
These two sets of circumstances generated around 60 per cent of the fatalities
and 50 per cent of the injured. In the other categories the figures decline notably,
ranging between one and three deaths, with the exception of one situation which
would increasingly reproduce itself from mid-January onwards, albeit less fre-
quently than the two aforementioned main categories: attacks by armed men on
workers who broke with union discipline in relation to strikes or labour conflicts
(six recorded deaths and three injured). In some instances, the victims were workers
who sympathized with conservative parties, or who had obtained their jobs with
the assistance of Falangists, as was the case with Laureano Montero, murdered in
Madrid on 17 January. There are also some examples of attacks by armed anarch-
ists on UGT (the Socialist union) members, such as the mid-January murder of
Agapito Martı́n Fernández, also in Madrid.35 Finally, in relation to the injured, the
category which includes attacks and politically-motivated assaults reached a total
of 20 cases, reflecting high levels of premeditated violence against opponents – in
particular during the most intense period of the campaign, that is to say the two
weeks prior to election day, and on election day itself.
The foregoing information points towards the purely ideological nature of
much of this conflict. Groups sympathizing with one party or another did not
hesitate to resort to violence and to the use of various weapons (usually knives or
guns), not only in order to settle disputes, but above all to control the streets.
As will be explained in more detail below, this type of incident occurred with
great frequency, even while only a small number of deaths and serious injuries
were the result.
35 ABC, El Sol, El Heraldo de Madrid and El Socialista (10, 11, 17, 18, 19 January 1936).
Table 2. Classification of actions which led to deaths and serious or very serious injuries
(1 January to 16 February 1936)
Deaths Injured
Assaults or attacks on rural property 4 1

Attacks or politically-motivated assaults 1 20
Ideological clashes or quarrels 11 21
Attacks on party premises 2 4
Union rivalry (with arms) or labour issues 6 3
Armed men against the police 3 1
Police in the process of arrests, searches or following prior aggression 8 3
Attacks on newspaper sellers 1 2
Other 1
Total 37 55
Of equal interest is the information relating to the ideological profile of partici-

pants and those responsible for initiating the violent incidents recorded. The infor-
mation on the affiliation of those killed or seriously injured is quite extensive, since
it has been possible to identify with considerable precision that of almost three out
of four victims. Of the 64 cases where political affiliation can be determined, at least
30 were associated with one of the left-wing parties – mainly with either the
Socialists or the Communists. A further 25 were right-wing, of which half were
affiliated with the CEDA or its youth wing. The death of a Falangist can be con-
firmed with certainty in only one case, although it is quite probable that one or two
of the unidentified victims were Falange sympathizers, while a further six
Falangists were seriously injured. Finally, among the 92 recorded cases, two police-
men were killed, and a further five sustained injuries.
The ideological affinity of those who perpetrated acts of violence is often no
less difficult to determine. However, in this category the figures are even more
complete, as it has been possible to establish allegiance in around three out of
four cases. A total of 32 serious acts of violence can be attributed to groups of
left-wingers, and 21 to groups of right-wingers, which translate into percentages
of 47 and 30 respectively. It has not been possible to ascertain which sub-
grouping of what the press habitually referred to as ‘left-wing’ was the most
active, although it is clear that the Left Republicans seldom instigated violence
– which seems to have been an activity mainly engaged in by Socialists,
Communists and Anarchists. As regards conservatives, Falangists and
‘Cedistas’ were the initiators in equal measure of the cases for which the protag-
onists’ identification can be determined. Up to eight deaths and three cases of
injury resulted from the actions of either Civil or Assault Guards (the two
national security forces), representing 16 per cent of the cases in which the
aggressors have been identified.
Tardı́o 473
Table 3. Political affiliation of those killed or seriously/very seriously injured (1 January to 16

February 1936)
Deaths Injured Total
Falange 1 6 7
Right-wing (general) 2 1 3
CEDA (including youth wing) 4 7 11
Traditionalists 1 1
Workers affiliation unknown (likely right-wing) 3 3
Total right-wing 10 15 25
Radical Republicans 1 1
Total centre 1 1
Left Republicans 1 2 3
Left-wing (general) 6 7 13
Socialists (including youth wing) 2 2 4
Anarchists 1 2 3
Communists 2 1 3
Unknown (likely left-wing) 2 2 4
Total left-wing 14 16 30
Civil Guard 2 2
Assault Guard 2 1 3
Total police 2 3 5
Night watchmen 1 1
Workers of unknown affiliation 3 3
Unknown 7 20 27
Total 37 55 92
However, in very few cases has it been possible to ascertain who cast the first
stone – that is, which side instigated the violence, regardless of whether they were
the ones whose actions produced deaths or injuries. Naturally this complicates the
task of drawing conclusions, and the fact that a greater percentage of fatalities
corresponds to one political grouping or another should not imply that they had
not provoked the violence in the first place. However, it has been possible to con-
firm one piece of information which speaks for itself: in nine out of 10 cases of
deaths at the hands of the police, there had been some prior act of aggression on
the part of either the victim or his associates. The latter were in most instances
individuals linked to left-wing parties (Communists and Socialists). One particu-
larly notorious case during the campaign was the deaths of two Anarchists in Arcos
de la Frontera. These men had participated in an attack which had resulted in the
death of a labourer, but subsequently managed to escape. When the police located
Table 4. Political affiliation of the perpetrators (1 January to 16 February 1936)

Deaths Injured Total
Right-wing (general) 2 2 4
Monarchists 1 1
Falange 2 4 6
CEDA (including youth wing) 2 4 6
Unknown (likely right-wing) 1 3 4
Total right-wing 7 14 21
Radical Republicans
Total centre 0 0 0
Left-wing (general) 5 8 13
Socialists (including youth wing) 1 2 3
Communists 1 1 2
Anarchists 2 4 6
Unknown (likely left-wing) 4 4 8
Total left-wing 13 19 32
Civil Guard arrest or search (prior aggression) 5 2 7
Civil Guard self-defence (prior aggression) 1 1
Assault Guard arrest or search (no further information) 1 1
Assault Guard act of violence initiated by others 1 1 2
Total police 8 3 11
Rural watchman 3 1 4
Unknown 6 18 24
Total 37 55 92
them and attempted to make an arrest, they responded to the customary ‘Hands
up!’ with a shower of bullets which hit one of the officers. During the shoot-out
which followed, two of the gunmen died, and one of their associates was injured.36
A further relevant aspect is the geographical distribution of violent incidents
which resulted in deaths. The conclusions which can be drawn on this issue are
significant only up to a certain point, since the results are distorted considerably by
the fact that some very serious injuries did not ultimately lead to death. For this
reason, the map presented below, which includes all acts of violence – with and
without death-toll – is more revealing. Nevertheless, to the extent that fatalities
indicate ‘absolute levels of violence’, their distribution also has a certain
36 The Civil Governor confirmed the press version of events, ABC (18, 19 January 1936); El Heraldo
de Madrid (18 January 1936); El Sol (19 January 1936). For another case which followed a similar
sequence of events and occurred on election day in Culleredo, La Coruña, see El Heraldo de Madrid (17
February 1936); ABC and El Socialista (18 February 1936).
Tardı́o 475
importance.37 According to the information collected, the deaths were distributed

throughout the country to such a degree that almost half of all provinces saw
at least one. No region stands out clearly, with the exception of the Galician
provinces – which amassed numerous fatalities during the final stretch of the cam-
paign and on election day itself (no less than 50 per cent of the total occurred
between 1 and 16 February). The province of Toledo produced a particularly high
number, with its total of four representing the greatest of any single province.
However, across the nation what is really significant is the distribution: rather
than constituting a high percentage concentrated in the three or four key urban
centres, fatalities were instead scattered in ones, twos or threes per province. On the
other hand, along with the Galician provinces of Pontevedra and Coruña, the areas
which produced higher figures were the provinces of Toledo, Madrid, Cadiz and
Tenerife. Most striking is the absence of deaths or very low numbers (only one) in
areas with a track-record of conflict, such as Zaragoza, Barcelona and Valencia.
Moreover, given the tension experienced by the region during the campaign, it is
surprising that only one fatality was recorded in Caceres and Badajoz.38
The information relating to the geographical distribution of the seriously injured
confirms the trends already noted, at least in part. Galicia, the region with the
highest death-toll, also generated four out of every 10 injured, while Andalucia
registered 20 per cent of the injured versus 18 per cent of the deaths. In
Extremadura, which saw almost no deaths, no serious injuries were recorded.
Nonetheless, if we focus specifically on the injured, certain nuances become evi-
dent. In Madrid, where the number of deaths scarcely reached eight per cent of the
total, almost double the number of injuries were recorded (up to 15 per cent of the
national total), while the provinces of the southern part of Castile saw the opposite
phenomenon: 13 per cent of the deaths, but less than three per cent of the injured.
However, the information which this research has uncovered regarding the role of
violence in the campaign – irrespective of whether or not it generated deaths or
serious injuries – is of even greater interest. Although to a certain extent fatalities
allow us to measure extreme levels of hostility, they do not necessarily reflect
electoral violence’s wider complexities. In order to decipher this complexity, both
the volume of incidents and their individual characteristics must be examined.
More than 400 acts of violence took place between the start of 1936 and 16
February, with 249 of these occurring in the 15 days prior to the election.
Nonetheless, these figures should be treated as minimums, not least because they
will undoubtedly rise as a result of the information being uncovered by new local
studies. Secondly, the tallies presented here do not include a number of incidents
37 Quotation taken from S. Straus, ‘Definitions and Subtypes: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide’,
unpublished article (Berkley 2000), 27, cited in Kalyvas, La Lógica de la Violencia, 38.
38 On this tension, El Heraldo de Madrid (28 January 1936); El Socialista (9 February 1936). The
Minister of the Interior despatched a circular to the Civil Governor of Cáceres ordering that the forces
of law and order carry out regular weapons searches in order to avoid bloodshed, Archivo Histórico
Provincial de Cáceres, Gobierno Civil, unclassified material, cited in F. Ayala Vicente, La Violencia
Polı´tica en la Provincia de Cáceres durante la Segunda República (1931–1936) (Brenes 2003), 128.
Figure 1. Map of deaths and injuries caused by political violence during the first round of the
1936 elections.
which were reported in the press as complaints made by candidates regarding

intimidation in their constituencies, but which have not been verified elsewhere.
These acts of violence varied widely in character, yet in all cases they were
underpinned by the idea of the opponent as the enemy – that is to say, there was
an ever-present element of ‘ideological hatred’ regardless of whether other factors
of a more personal nature also drove the aggression.
Barely a week before election day, candidates on both sides maintained a tight
schedule. Despite the fact that campaign events proceeded without incident all over
Spain, there were also a number of violent episodes. As campaign activity reached
its peak, in Montemayor del Rı́o, a small and charming town to the south-east of
Salamanca and close to Béjar, an incident took place which would be repeated in
other parts of the country during those days. Almost inaccessible in winter,
Montemayor’s geographical and cultural isolation proved no obstacle to the cam-
paign’s intense competition culminating in the worst possible outcome. On 7
February, as CEDA campaigners were putting up election posters on the walls
of the village, a group of left-wingers devoted themselves to tearing them down.
Not much time elapsed before the latter were rebuked by one of the Cedistas – the
dispute quickly became violent, and the first shots soon followed, culminating in
tragedy: Bernabé González, a 48 year-old leftist, shot and killed Clemente
Barragán, the 24 year-old brother of one of the Cedistas.39
As has already been noted, this was clearly not the norm: indeed, it was
more common for a meeting or rally to end peacefully. Yet one cannot paint a
39 El Sol (9 February 1936); ABC (8, 10 February 1936); El Heraldo de Madrid (8 February 1936).
Tardı́o 477
picture of complete normality when incidents similar to that which occurred in

Montemayor – with or without a death-toll – were repeated at a rate of more than a
dozen a day between 1 and 16 February. This is an aspect that previous works on
1936 elections have ignored. Among all of those incidents, one type in particular
prevails: direct clashes between groups of activists or adherents of opposing ideol-
ogies which culminated in physical violence, and in which these groups were con-
testing above all control of the street and their respective ability to engage in
campaign activities. Out of the 93 recorded instances of violence, one in four fits
into this category, resulting in no fewer than nine dead and several dozen injured,
some of these seriously.
The central figures in these encounters were usually Falangists and leftists of
various stripes – particularly young Socialists and Communists – and clashes
between the aforementioned groups represent at least one out of every two violent
incidents. Indeed it was the Falangists who were the most active in terms of phys-
ical conflict, while violence between left-wingers and members of the CEDA was
much less frequent, reaching only 20 per cent of the total. Only 10 per cent of cases
involved monarchists or traditionalists; moderate Republicans had virtually no
known involvement in this type of violence, while Left Republicans were implicated
in only a few cases. In terms of the left, although many participants are identified
only by this general label, it is the Socialists who predominate among those whom
it has been possible to identify – being involved in at least one out of two cases –
followed by the Communists.
The question of who initiated the violence is particularly pertinent, albeit once
again difficult to clarify. It has been possible to determine the identities of the
instigators in more than 50 per cent of the cases. Of the 45 episodes for which
there is sufficient information available, in a total of 31 it was left-wingers who took
the initiative, while the remaining 14 were provoked by Falangists and other right-
wingers (of these 11 were instigated by Falangists, and only one by Cedistas).
Therefore, it is not only the Falangists’ particular aggressiveness that is note-
worthy, but also the Socialists and Communists’ willingness to resort to violence
as a means of hindering conservative campaigning. Of every three incidents for
which it has been possible to identify who instigated the violence, the ratio is 2:1,
with the higher proportion representing sympathizers or members of workers’
parties.
As well as direct clashes, other types of violent events also occurred during the
campaign. There were six attacks on newspaper vendors over the same period –
with one killed in Malaga on the night of 28 January.40 Various candidates also fell
victim to attacks or assassination attempts, with such cases being divided almost
evenly between left and right. Moreover, arrests of candidates or political leaders
which took place during the campaign also have a quantitative and qualitative
significance: if we exclude those made on the grounds of ‘electoral crimes’, there
40 ABC (31 January 1936); El Sol (29, 30 January 1936); El Heraldo de Madrid (29 January 1936); El
Socialista (30 January 1936); Ahora (29 January 1936).
Table 5. Violence between campaigners or clashes between groups in the

course of various activities
Falangists versus Socialists 11
Falangists versus Communists 9
Falangists versus left-wingers (general) 25
Right-wing (general) versus Socialists 2
CEDA and associates versus left-wingers (general) 12
CEDA versus Socialists 3
CEDA versus Communists 4
Monarchists versus left-wing (general) 6
Traditionalists versus left-wing (general) 2
Radical Republicans versus other 2
Left-wing versus right-wing (undetermined) 17
Group initiating the incident (where known)
Falangists 11
Cedistas (including youth wing) 1
Right-wing (general) 2
Socialists (including youth wing) 4
Communists 3
Left-wing (general) 24
were a total of 24, of which eight out of every 10 detainees were left-wingers. Of
course, this statistic may well be a reflection of the authorities’ particular antipathy
towards Popular Front candidates – especially acute in some localities – although it
does also suggest that some Popular Front leaders played a prominent role in local
political violence and intimidation.
In terms of their quantity and political colouring, four types of conflict stand out
(see Table 6). As far as the final category is concerned, 70 per cent of these attacks
were directed against the offices of conservative parties. Without doubt the most
serious of these episodes occurred in Vigo on 7 February, when armed trade union-
ists attacked the offices of the Falange. At first the only confirmed death was that of
a young Anarchist, cut down by shots fired by a plain-clothed Assault Guard who
had happened to be nearby, and who would subsequently lose an arm. Several days
later a Falangist who had been seriously injured in the exchange also passed
away.41
41 There were also four seriously injured, see Ahora (8, 9, 11, 13 February 1936); El Heraldo de Madrid
(8 February 1936); El Socialista (8 February 1936); La Vanguardia (8 February 1936); ABC (8 February
1936); G. Seonae, Los Orı´genes de la Derecha Gallega: la CEDA en Galicia (1931–1936) (La Coruña
1998), 248, follows the version published by El Ideal de Galicia (8, 13 February 1936), and states that
there was only one death, accompanied by five seriously injured.
Tardı́o 479
Table 6. Types of conflict

Politically-motivated attacks 56
Rallies disrupted or wrecked by violence 40
Rallies postponed or prevented due to action taken by the authorities 30
Assaults or attacks on party premises 10
As expressions of violence in the context of an election, the first two categories

are particularly relevant. In terms of the first, the vast majority of attacks occurred
in the 15 days prior to election day, in the midst of intense campaign activity,
indicating an eagerness on the part of certain extremist groups to obstruct the
normal processes of democratic competition. Regarding the cases for which the
perpetrators have been identified, two out of every three involved violence carried
out by left-wingers.42 Cedistas emerged most frequently from these actions worse-
off, but the Falange also appears to have been a priority target. Moreover, one of
these incidents led to the only two deaths of Assault Guards during the entire
campaign. This occurred when a number of armed men, almost certainly
Anarchists, opened fire in Santa Cruz de Tenerife in what was intended to be an
attempt on the life of the Gobernador Civil (Civil Governor).43
With reference to the third and remaining category – political events disrupted –
this represents one of the major manifestations of violence during an election, and
is therefore a good indicator of both sides’ levels of intransigence. Research has
uncovered at least 40 instances of events which were either prevented from taking
place, or in which the proceedings were disrupted to a significant degree. Since it
has been possible to identify those responsible in every single one of these cases,
this evidence is particularly revealing. Here a specific group of perpetrators stand
out above the others in a far clearer manner than is the case for attacks and
aggression: more than eight out of 10 such rallies were organized by the right,
and disturbed by adherents of the left. Particularly striking is the fact that despite
the efforts made by its youth wing to protect the CEDA’s candidates and provide
security at the party’s events, 55 per cent of the disrupted right-wing meetings were
CEDA-organized. It does not then appear that the alleged paramilitarization of the
‘japistas’ (CEDA youth) – greatly emphasized by some historians– served much
purpose. In fact, this evidence tends rather to confirm the argument that the
Catholic right did not foster violence, expressly forbidding its members from
becoming involved in such activities. Of course, it must be borne in mind that as
the most powerful conservative party, the CEDA possessed the greatest capacity
42 Although it is by no means the only example, an important case which is fairly representative of the
manner in which these attacks or aggressions proceeded is the murder of the CEDA member and
‘municipal judge’ of Cuevas del Valle, Ávila, by a Communist, El Socialista (1 February 1936); ABC
(1, 4 February 1936); El Heraldo de Madrid (31 January 1936); Ahora (5 February 1936).
43 El Heraldo de Madrid (20 January 1936); ABC (21, 22 January 1936); El Sol (22 January 1936);
Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes (June 19, 1936), 1518–9.
Table 7. Political or labour-related attacks or aggression

By left-wingers against Falangists 10
By left-wingers against unaffiliated workers 2
By left-wingers against Cedistas 10
By left-wingers against right-wingers in general 7
By left-wingers against Anarchists 1
By left-wingers against Radical Republicans
By Anarchists against members of the UGT 1
By left-wingers against persons of undetermined affiliation
By Falangists against left-wingers 3
By right-wingers against Republicans 2
By right-wingers against left-wingers (undetermined) 1
Undetermined 8
Aggression towards public officers at rallies (instigators unknown) 2
Attacks on Civil or Assault Guard by right-wingers 2
Attacks on CG/AG by left-wingers/Republicans 4
Attacks on CG/AG by unknown subjects 1
Other 2
Total 56
for organizing mass displays of support and distributing campaign material. Thus
it is hardly surprising that the extremists groups among the Socialists and
Communists would target the party with particular zeal. Yet on the other hand,
evidence has been found of only one Falange rally being disrupted, which might
indicate not only that the Falangists were less active, but also that they incited
greater fear and were more inclined to greet violence with violence (see Table 8).44
Finally, there is the question of the geographical distribution of this violence.
This map, considerably more significant than that displaying the death-toll, reveals
that electoral violence was to a great degree concentrated in Madrid, particularly in
terms of clashes or aggressive acts between opposing groups. The province experi-
enced one of every seven incidents, a proportion which is unmatched – even in
relative terms – by other cities.
Three regions stand out as especially violent: Madrid, Galicia and some areas of
Andalucia. Indeed, if we add Castilla la Mancha to this list – or at least a part of
this broad and complex region – almost two-thirds of all violence is accounted for.
44 In Seville two out of every three new members joining the Falange during the first half of 1936
chose to register themselves in the Falange de la Sangre [Blood Falange], ‘which is how the Primera
Linea [Frontline] came to be known as a result of its leading role in violent activities’. In contrast to the
CEDA’s youth wing, the Falangists openly sought opportunities for action, see J.A. Parejo Fernández,
Las Piezas Perdidas de la Falange: El Sur de España (Sevilla, 2008), 39–56; on the Falange and the 1936
election, see S.G. Payne, Falange: Historia del Fascismo Español (Madrid 1985), 107–16.
Tardı́o 481
Table 8. Political events disrupted or wrecked by violence

Ideology of the organising group
Popular Front (general) 2

Socialist 1
Communist 1
Falangist 1
CEDA 19
Traditionalist 2
Agrarian 1
Monarchist 1
Radical Republican 1
Total 40
Who were the provocateurs?

Socialists (including youth wing) 4
Anarchists 3
Falangists 2
Traditionalists 1
Total 40
On the other hand, some northern areas, such as most of Castilla Leon, Navarre,
La Rioja, Aragon and the Basque Country, display relatively low rates of violence,
at times practically none whatsoever. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Barcelona
does not figure in a higher position, as one might expect given its history of conflict.
If Galicia, Asturias and Barcelona are excluded, the northern portion of the coun-
try experienced only 15 per cent of the violence, while between them Andalucia,
Extremadura and Castilla la Mancha saw around 40 per cent of recorded incidents.
This evidence confirms that many of the regions which had hitherto manifested
high levels of political and social offences continued to play a leading role. In fact,
between 1931 and 1933 the highest incidences of these types of crimes had occurred
in Madrid, most of the Andalucian provinces and La Coruña. Barcelona, and to a
lesser extent Valencia, are exceptions to this pattern, as they had experienced
heightened conflict during the early years of the Republic. Nonetheless, what all
of these regions had in common was their significant levels of mobilization and
electoral support for the parties of the left.45
45 For information on political and social offences, see Rey, ‘Reflexiones sobre la . . .’, 62–4.
Figure 2. Map showing acts of political violence (1 January – 16 February 1936).
As early as 12 January, Prime Minister and candidate Portela Valladares admitted

before a group of journalists that the number of politically-motivated acts of vio-
lence had already increased sharply. Indeed, by that point the CEDA had already
acquired its first fatality of the campaign: the young Mariano Martı́nez Fernández,
who died on 5 January in Auñón, Guadalajara as a result of shots fired by the
Socialist mayor. A few days later, the caretaker of the Falange’s offices in Orense
was also shot. On 10 January a UGT member died in Madrid at the hands of an
Anarchist gunman. The following day – and also in the capital – a vendor of the
Communist Mundo Obrero was seriously wounded, and on that very same day a
clash between Falangists and Socialists also culminated in further serious injuries.46
It is therefore not surprising that Portela assured his audience that measures would
be taken to ensure a campaign without further violence. Several days later, Vicente
Santiago, the Director General de Seguridad (General Director of Public Order) in
Madrid, announced that only official vendors would be permitted to sell news-
papers, in effect limiting the distribution of campaign material in an attempt to
halt the violence on the streets.47
On January 19, the Civil Governor of Madrid addressed a circular to the
mayors, in which he reminded them of such basic facts as their being ‘representa-
tives of the government’, who were therefore duty-bound to ‘contribute’ to the
maintenance of public order. A word to the wise is sufficient: the circular conceded,
albeit indirectly, that the mayors were not conducting themselves in a particularly
46 ABC (7, 10, 11, 22 January 1936); El Sol (7, 10, 11, 12 January 1936); Ahora (10, 11 January 1936);
for Orense, see also El Ideal Gallego (10 January 1936), cited in G. Seonae, Los Orı´genes de la Derecha
Gallega, 248.
47 El Heraldo de Madrid (13 January 1936); ABC (15 January 1936).
Tardı́o 483
impartial manner. It was symptomatic that it was deemed necessary to request that
they cease permitting ‘that the law be flouted’ as far as freedom of expression and
assembly were concerned.48
As well as the violence that went hand in hand with the distribution of campaign
material, in Madrid there was the addition of an almost intolerable increase in
political and trade union-related conflict. As a result, in the final week of January
the Dirección General de Seguridad (General Directorate of Public Order) found
itself obliged to establish a special procedure for carrying out weapons searches and
seizures in the streets.49 However, in terms of the conflicts which were taking place
across the country, Madrid was the mere tip of the iceberg. In fact, it was the
mayor of Ferrol who, on 6 February, deemed it necessary to issue an edict restating
the fact that there were no restrictions on the putting up of electoral material, and
that anyone who attempted to impede it would be fined. He would not be alone.
Day in day out, the Socialists accused various local and provincial authorities,
including the governor and numerous mayors in Badajoz, of selective compliance
with the law and impartiality in their use of force. Finally, hours before voting
began, in Madrid as well as in Barcelona, the authorities announced extraordinary
measures designed to prevent the distribution of campaign literature in public
places and bars. The decision was also taken to intensify the checkpoints already
in place to search individuals for weapons.50
In the light of these examples of official conduct, as well as the evidence analysed
above, it is clear that electoral violence exploded with greater force than has hith-
erto been supposed during the long election campaign of 1936. In some localities it
was neither sporadic nor entirely spontaneous. Clashes between activists,
attacks and the violent disruptions of rallies occurred to a degree which simply
cannot be ignored.
In terms of allocating responsibility, we need to establish which parties propa-
gated a discourse of exclusion and wore their intransigence with pride. In no sense
has it been demonstrated that the deaths which occurred during this period were
mainly caused by the Civil Guard or Assault Guard, as has sometimes been
claimed – supposedly because the aforementioned were particularly violent or
outdated compared with police forces in the rest of Europe.51 The evidence over-
whelmingly points to police responsibility for no more than one in five deaths, and
in 90 per cent of these cases the fatalities were the result of prior aggression or
armed resistance to the authorities. Moreover, these percentages suggest a need to
reconsider the role of the Spanish police, or at least cease to resort to unproven
commonplaces regarding their special hostility towards the left, or their complicity
with anti-republican conservatism. Even in a context as fraught as that of February
48 El Sol (19 January 1936).

49 El Sol and ABC (23 January 1936).
50 ABC (6, 13, 14 February 1936); El Socialista (9 February 1936); El Sol (13, 14 February 1936).
51 ‘The perpetrators were mainly Civil Guards or military; to a lesser extent Anarchists, Falangists,
and members of Acción Popular; and lesser still, Socialists and Communists’, Cruz, En el Nombre del
Pueblo, 97.
1936, nothing indicates that the Civil Guard failed to comport themselves as they
had done for years previously: this entailed, as Fernando del Rey has asserted, that
‘in the majority of cases’ they limited themselves to ‘securing compliance with the
law in accordance with orders received either from the Ministry of the Interior or
its subordinates in the provinces’.52
As has been seen, during the election campaign the left suffered almost double
the number of fatalities experienced by the right. However, the evidence also
reveals that the former were responsible for initiating the violence in a high per-
centage of cases, while they caused twice as many deaths as the right: 42 per cent of
those for which the responsible party has been identified. The right, in turn, was
responsible for 22 per cent of deaths, while only two fatalities and four serious
injuries can be attributed to Cedistas. As noted above, the CEDA was the main
conservative party, and it also experienced the greatest number of disrupted rallies.
One can therefore conclude that the majority of its members complied with the
message of the party’s leadership: they did not make violence the leit motiv of their
mobilization strategy.53
Finally, we should pay attention to the four categories which are key to the
examination of electoral violence: clashes between activists; party events disrupted;
assaults on party offices; and attacks on individuals. These four types represent
almost 70 per cent of the violent episodes recorded during the campaign, and thus
cannot be dismissed as merely anecdotal. In some places and for some candidates,
this violence constituted clear intimidation, and represented a serious obstacle to
freedom of expression and assembly. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that it
was individuals and groups recognized by the media as ‘left-wing’ which were the
most active in the selective use of violence to impede their opponents’ ability to
proselytize and mobilize. Among the cases which have been identified, the initiative
originated with the Socialists and Communists in two out of every three clashes. On
the right, the Falangists also manifested a similar proclivity for proactive violence,
if less substantial given their comparative lack of importance and presence at this
moment in time. As regards the issue of disrupted political events, three out of four
cases for which we have sufficient information involved events staged by conser-
vative parties, almost invariably the CEDA.
Political violence in January and February 1936 was not so extensive as to
prevent effective political competition, but it was a clear symptom of heightened
tension and the apocalyptic mood with which many approached the election. It
claimed numerous victims, and also became an issue of growing concern for the
authorities, who on not a few occasions found themselves overwhelmed. At a time
when political violence had become so commonplace, it is possible that a total of
52 Rey, ‘Reflexiones sobre la . . .’, 40; for a contextualization of the role of the Civil Guard, see G.
Blaney Jr., ‘Keeping Order in Republican Spain, 1931–1936’, in G. Blaney Jr., Policing Interwar Europe,
31–68.
53 On violence and the CEDA’s discourse, see M. Álvarez Tardı́o, ‘La CEDA y la Democracia
Republicana’, in F. del Rey, Palabras como puños. La intransigencia polı´tica en la Segunda República
(Madrid 2011), 384–409.
Tardı́o 485
almost 100 dead or seriously injured did not, in itself, have a great impact on public
opinion. Nevertheless, it clearly demonstrated the dominant political cultures’ lack
of respect for either the adversary or the existence of competing political opinions.
It had become virtually impossible for some participants in Spanish politics to
admit that their opponents had any right to occupy public space, place their posters
on walls, or even hold a political meeting.
Biographical Note
Manuel Álvarez Tardı́o is Senior Lecturer in the History of Political Thought and
Social and Political Movements at Rey Juan Carlos University of Madrid. His
research has focused on the political history of Spain and Europe in the interwar
period, especially on the relations between politics and religion, the Second
Republic and the transition to democracy. He has been a visiting research fellow
at the universities of Tufts (Boston), Madison-Wisconsin (USA) and the Sorbonne
(Paris). Author or co-author of Anticlericalismo y libertad de conciencia. Polı´tica y
religión en la Segunda República Española (Madrid 2002); El camino a la democracia
en España. 1931 y 1978 (Madrid 2005); and El precio de la exclusión. La polı´tica
durante la Segunda República (Madrid 2010). Coeditor of The Spanish Second
Republic Revisited. From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931–1936) (Brighton
2011). He is currently working on political life and electoral violence in the Spanish
Second Republic.

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Journal of Contemporary

The online version of this article can be found at:

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>> Version of Record - Jul 22, 2013

Spanish General jch.sagepub.com

Political violence was a conspicuous feature of interwar Europe. It constituted a

development of Dollfuss’s politics. Portugal provides a further example: here, in

6 Kalyvas, La Lógica de la Violencia, 78–9.

characterized the entire Republican period: ‘permanent mid-level violence’ which

24 F. del Rey, ‘Reflexiones sobre la violencia polı́tica en la Segunda República española’, in M.

Deaths Deaths (uncertain) Seriously and very seriously injured

In order to evaluate the information provided by the press, it is important to

30 El Sol (8 January 1936).

. Firstly, diﬀerent kinds of confrontations between groups who were ideologically

Assaults or attacks on rural property 4 1

Of equal interest is the information relating to the ideological proﬁle of partici-

Table 3. Political affiliation of those killed or seriously/very seriously injured (1 January to 16

Table 4. Political affiliation of the perpetrators (1 January to 16 February 1936)

importance.37 According to the information collected, the deaths were distributed

which were reported in the press as complaints made by candidates regarding

picture of complete normality when incidents similar to that which occurred in

Table 5. Violence between campaigners or clashes between groups in the

Table 6. Types of conflict

As expressions of violence in the context of an election, the ﬁrst two categories

Table 7. Political or labour-related attacks or aggression

Table 8. Political events disrupted or wrecked by violence

Popular Front (general) 2

Who were the provocateurs?

Figure 2. Map showing acts of political violence (1 January – 16 February 1936).

As early as 12 January, Prime Minister and candidate Portela Valladares admitted

48 El Sol (19 January 1936).

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