VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 99 2005, Lambert 0s. Heirs of Ray Cant = 30 ORDERED. . Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, reia, JJ, concur. Carpio. - rpioMorales ang Petition denied, appealed decision affirmed, Note—Before a party is allowed to seek the j the courts, it is a pre-condition that he a ae ot a administrative processes afforded him. (Provinee at Of all boanga del Norte vs. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA sag faooot —000— G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005," NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, us. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, represented by MARILOU T, CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG, respondents. Remedial Law; Certiorari; As a rule, factual findings of the trial court especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the Court when supported by the evidence on record.— In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the Court of Appeals is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence Was based. As a rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court Supported by the evidence on record. Steeda FIRST DIVISION.286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon “s4 fined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence’ de oy any eset, interening case, produces the gti tithout which the reult would not have occured. Cleary, hd fbrupt and mudden let turn by Reynaldo, without frat estab”! hin right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap ahi claimed the lite of Rey and injured Sergio. Proximate caune ih Fined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequences yay keen by any efficent, intervening’ cause, produces the injury sr, without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of, collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, ns th tang court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no proces tion, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. Same; Same; Contributory Negligence; The underlying precep on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsitie for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full ‘but must bear the consequences of his own negligence—The underly. ing precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negli gence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the mitiga. tion of the defendant's liability varies depending on the circum- stances of each case, The Court had sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P; 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediale Appellate Court and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals; and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals and Phil- ippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals. Same; Same; Damages; Loss of Earning Capacity; Factors to be Considered in Determining the Compensable Amount of Lost Earn ings.—In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an elt ‘ment of damages, the following factors are considered in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years 0 ea tha hare would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate ae sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence 3 the first factor, ie., life expectancy, is cadboted by applying formula (2/3 x [80 -'age at death]) ‘adopted in the American Bx? fancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed iGVOL. 452, FEBRUARY 23, 2095 Lambert us. Heirs of Ray Caatilion Ne and other incidental on "outed at fity perenne of ewig cacy is: Nr Burning Capa SOND Mime of death) arose anna ae a neces reasonable and nece iiving expenses) sary Sane Sa: Same Raton ote Grant of Mor Pomag Paragraph 3 of the same provision alse oe bon eer ae he award rm ites ime tt renin, within eh na ra spat aan and thereon, a een tearing inci: The iene erat rnin af the victim is proportions ‘im and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or mesg the offender, PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court, Evergisto S. Escalon for petitioner. Moises G. Dalisay, Jr. for respondents, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Curt seeking the reversal of the decision’ of the Court of ‘epeals dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43734, ich affirmed the June 29, 1998 decision of the Regional ne Court of Tligan City, Branch 06, in Civil Case No. 06- > : i ando Fenned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fern te were in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jt. ©. Maambong,288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED mbert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon Lai in the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visit the house-of his brother Jos! Castillon’at Tambo, liga ci tnd borrowed his motoreycle. He then invited his friend, ge gio Labang, to roam around Hligan City. Ray drove the moter cycle with Sergio as the backrider- At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona’ Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Bray. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with = Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert ang driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.’ Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an ace tion for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No, 06-2086 uf te RTC of Higan City, Branch 06.' The complaint was subsequently amended io include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle.” On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown. trial, the court @ quo rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents but, reduced petitioner's liability by 20% in view of the contribu- tory negligence of Ray. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, directing the latter, jointly and severally, to pay the former the following: 1. ‘The sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND AND NINETY-ONE (P633,091) PESOS, representing loss of Suppo" —_ UTSN, July 6, 1992, pp, 20.21. id at pp. 21-26, | Records, pp. 1-5. Hd., at pp. 6-10,VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 9. 3, 2005 289 Lambert os Heirs of Ray Comiion munity, funeral and related et ead Sed expenses, moral damages and sey cunts ofthe suit, for tack ower defendants counters is diamine, om he claim of del Castilon, the evidence ah al owner of the motoreyeie ty pat bs a he Fe vvele. He is not the i wi Hs complaint is dismissed," "8! Party in On the third-party complaint, the thin, urance Corporation is ordered to Intiy to the plaintifls, This sum, it de amount adjudged in par. Labove, $0 ORDERED,” Tre Court of Appeals allirmed the decision of the trial court! Hence the present petition, based on the following arguments: 1 ite Honorable Court of Appeale commitied serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion when it did not apply the ruling of re nenoratle Court in the case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Line's. “wpresumed to be the cause of the accident, 2. The erroneous conclusion of the Honorable Trial Court as imed by the Honorable Court of Appeals that the act of tailgat- igh speed, constitutes contributory negligence only, is con- 29 the rulings of this Honorable Court in the case of Sanitary aim laundry, ine. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals [300 SCRA fgg tnber 10, 1998] and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie ‘and Jimmy Orpilla (306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999]. dag ie Honorable Court of Appeals grossly erred in its eon- Petitioner's driver was negligent, without taking into > Saal fil, PP. 59.60, : Heh Mat p. a7,290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lambert vs, Heirs of Ray Cantillon Pete Amen onan Caan Ps BA a 4. As an alternative relief, petitioner most rerpectfully, signs as error the Honorable Trial Court's e¢ ‘ation a8 to the logy Rey Transit, Inc. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 511 (1970). 5. The Honorable Trial Court's award of moral damages in contrary to the py ation of this Honorable Court in the case of Ace Haulers Corporation vs. The Honorable Court of Appeats ant Abiva [338 SCRA 572, August 23, 2000], wherein the award of ‘moral damages was disallowed absent any evidence of bad faith or ill. motive.” Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages, In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put into issue, Questions of fact cannot be entertained. ‘The finding of negli Bence by the Court of Appeals is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based, As a rule, fac: tual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when sup: Ported by the evidence on record.’ Our examination of the records shows that both the tral the Court of Appeals carefully considered the fac tual backdrop of the case, No cogent reason exists for dis ree id. at pp. 15-16, e see Imperial v. Jaucian, G.R. No, 149004, 14 ApriVOL. 4 BRUARY 23, 2005, i 291 Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Caslillon ing the following findings of the Appeals affirmed: al co . which the Court of road. At this juncture both were moving the motoreycle sliced into the ay The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile show that he did not stop even for a second. or leas tenes making the left turn. On the contrary, he slightly veered to the right immediately followed by the abrupt and sudden turn to the left in order to enter the side road. It is apparent tha: Reynaldo Gamot did not keep a lookout for vehicles or persons following him before pro- ceeding to turn left. He failed to take into account the possibility that others may be following him. He did not employ the necessary pre- caution to see to it that the road was clear. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natu- ral and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, in- tervening cause, produces the injury, ané without which the result would not have occurred." The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial Court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no lev. BPI, GR. No. 149507, 28 al292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon precaution, the mishap in all pened." Petitioner misunderstood 1 probability would not have hay. our ruling in Raynera v. Hicetg » : thing into the 1 involved a motorcycle cras| u oft Tat cys ed ei amg i he eg drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are P 0 by other evidence.” In Rayni era, the death of the victim was e il le to his own negligence in bumping the rear or ing rae trek which was traveling ahesd of him at 20 tg 30 kilometers per hour. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a posi, tion to observe the vehicle in front of him. The trailer track therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case at bar Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the aceh dent is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn mately caused the collision. While we agree with the trial court that R made by Reynaldo which Proxi- lay was likewise Sul’ of contributory negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we fi ratio of apportionment of dai mages on account of the victim's ind it equitable to increase the4 FEBRUARY 2 rt us, Heirs of Ray ¢ jainttt who Is partly responsible for his own haere CME a fouled to recover damages in full bt mast bent the come ose pisown etligence. The defendant must thus be held lathe ie the damages actually caused by his negligence.” The dterminatice the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies dependia net vreumstances of each case. The Court had s pea ained a mitigation o Sif in Rakes v. AG & P;" 20% in Phoenix Construction, Ine. © Inv te Appellate Court” and LBC Air Cargo, Ine. » and 40% in Bank of the Phi Court of ippine Islands v. Court of and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeate In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motoreycle at a high speed. 2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet.” These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contrib- uted to the same result. The contribution of these circum- stances are all considered and determined in terms of per. centages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner. Anent the award of loss of earning capacity, we agree with the petitioner that the trial court erred in the computation of the net earnings Syki v. Begasa, G.R. 244 7 Phil. 359 (1907 G.R. No. L-65295, 10 March 1987, 148 SCRA 3! 311 Phil 1SCRA 619 (1995). », GR. No, 102383, 26 November 1992, 216 SCRA 51 336 Phil. 667; 269 SCRA 695 (1997). Rollo. p. 84 No, 149149, 23 October 2003, 414 SCRA20 | SUPREME COURT RBPORTS ANNOTATE) ~~ Lambert us. Heirs of Ray Castillon In considering the earning capacity of the vieu, element of damages, the following factors are consid, ®® determining the compensable amount of lost earninge: (ry number of years for which the victim would otherwicg shai lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, ie, if expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (af ¢ {eo Age a death)) adopted in the American Expectancy Table Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Tehie of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by multiply. ing the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, ie., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other ines” tal expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earn. ing Capacity = 12/3 x (80 - age at time of death) x (groan, ‘nual income ~ reasonable and necessary living expenses)]= It was established that Ray was 35 at the time of his death and was earning a gross annual income of P31,876.00 as a driver at the Mindanao State University. In arriving at the net earnings, the trial court deducted from the gross annual income the annual living expenses in the amount of P9,672.00, broken down as follows: P20.00 a day for travel o P520.00 per month; P60.00 a month for cigarettes; P26,00 for drinks; and other personal expenses like clothing, toiletries, ete. estimated at P200.00 per month.” The amount of P9,672.00, however, appears unrealistic, and constitutes only 30.34% of the gross earnings. It even includes expenses for cigarettes which by no means can be classified as a necessary expense. Using the cited formula with the net earnings com Puted at 50% of the gross earnings, a detailed computation is as follow: —___ gap, | Pevov. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 482 SCRE * Rollo, pp. 57-58,VOL. 452, FEBRUARY 25, o995 295, et a ce. Mthetimeot “GAD a Xsesaor'' S inatemen © Sse We sustain the awards of P33,215.00 as funeral and burial expenses being supported with receipts; P5O,000,00 ax tet indemnity and 50,000.00 as moral damages. Howeves att anard of P20,000.00 as attorney's foes must be deleted oe lack of basis. ty for death cai 100.00," hasod used by a quasi-delict used to be on Article 2206 of the Civil Code, pegged at P3, whieh reads: ART. 2206.) The amount of damages for death caused by a rime or quasi-delict shall be at least 1 ‘hree thousand pesos, even ‘hough there may have been mitigating circumstances, In dings {1 The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning sepuity ofthe deceased, and the indemnity shal be paid to the hen atthe later; such indemnity shall in every case be aseeased sect Atunded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent Uovil dsability not caused by the defendant, had no earning ‘“nicity atthe time of his death; (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to Tivisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to ‘cedent’s inheritance by the law of Lestate or intestate succes. pasty demand support from the person causing the death, for a tenant e8eeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by cane = Hords, pp. 121, 128, & 131. 298 SCRA 495, 506 (1998). Ma wang Mania Transit Corporation . Caurt of Appel, 359,ie 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lambert us. Heirs of Ray Castillon (2) ‘The spore, legitimate and iegitimate descendants ang nd moral damages for ny decensed. oa ascendants of the decsased may de anguish by reavon of the death of t the amount has been gradually increaseg went, prevailing jurisprudence fixes However, through the years. At pr the amount at P50,000.00. Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the basis for the award of moral damages in quasi-delict. The reason fog the grant of moral damages has been explained, thus: the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it ‘must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever wits, the wealth or means of the offender.” While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical eal- culation,” we hold that the trial court’s award of moral dam- ages of P50,000.00 for the death of Ray Castillon is in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.” With respect to attorney's fees, it is well settled that the same should not be awarded in the absence of stipulation except under the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The trial court did not indicate the basis for its "Pesta v. Sps. Si 2000, 46 Sclea sro ang mavens CLR. No, 189876, 4 Decembet «, Cesar Sangeo, Torts and Damages, 1994 edition, p. 986. * Sps. Hernande2 v, rages, ition, 435 SORA 668, ¥. Sps. Dolor, G.R. No, 160286, 30 July on : ‘ag Ceoon, "7M" & Hapa, 413 Phil, 679, 699-700; n6i SCRA 36h 3FEBRUARY 23, 2005 297 Lambert vs. Heire of Ray Castitton sr. As we have held in Rizal Sure, awit, Court of Appeals YY and Insurance Com Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attor waned by @ curt when its claimant is eonpelled to teens ee thin persons oo neu expenses to protec hit iteret tee mast itis sought, While judicial diseretion is here extant, an award therest dese ertheless, factual, legal or equitable justieation: The Chaot and should not be left to speculation and conjecture ns te De la Cruz, 84 SCRA 357; Stronghold Insurance Compan ae ® Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619), In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for sustaining the award for attorney’s fees and to adjudge its parece petitioner Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold Insurance Com: puny, Inc. vx. Court of Appeals that In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R, No. 67910, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57] the Court had occasion to state t Ihe reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the ofthe court's decision, otherwise, if itis stated only in the dispo. ive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on ap. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the net earnings 's computed at 50% of the gross annual income to conform wih the prevailing jurisprudence, and the FURTHER MODIFICATION that petitioner NELEN LAMBERT is or- tered to pay the heirs of Ray Castillon only 60% of the dam- p fees which is DE- Ii herein awarded, except attorney URTED for | lack of basis, “29 Phil. 786, 811; 261 SCRA 69, 88 (1996). =