Republic of The Philippines

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly
immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances. 1
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11,
1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months
suspension without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which
were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from the service of
respondent. 4
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic
Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their
eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (now
Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession
until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave
birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for
a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of
the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation,
this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with
Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella
Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along
Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena
in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was
done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the
dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement
from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept
her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts, including
deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case
which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under
the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and
cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty.
Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding
sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued
the illicit liaison with Elena. 7
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against
him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as
when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in
1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now my wife.
Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If
now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute triple jeopardy. If
that's the law so be it. 8
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on
May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted
by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing
Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that respondent's
actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission
to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity.9 There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. 10 The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency,
as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject
to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct — both public and private — fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and,
after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact
that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the
Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety. 11 For
a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary
citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. 12 Indeed, a
judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a
demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of
Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-law
is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice.
Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public
that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is expected
of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency
in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 16 Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in
the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility
that have been compendiously described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer
needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve
not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. 17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case
of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties
thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the
general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent,
honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full
confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member
of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and
that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to
overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In
another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by this
Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife.
The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found
respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in
the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he
still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter
against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not
be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still
subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross
misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his
moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms.
All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x--------------------------------x
G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
This Court defers to the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the factual issues. Not having heard any
cogent reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-graft court’s findings.
In any event, after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no ground to reverse the
Sandiganbayan.
The Case
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review1 assailing the March 8, 2002 Decision,2 and the
January 33 and 14, 20034 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20194.
Francisco SB. Acejas III and Vladimir S. Hernandez were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III
and Jose P. Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an Information that reads thus:
"That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S.
HERNANDEZ and VICTOR CONANAN, being then employed both as Immigration officers of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring
and confederating with Senior Police Officer 3 EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police
District Command, Manila, together with co-accused Atty. FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of
the LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW OFFICES, and co-
accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the
spouses BETHEL GRACE PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO
PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the return of the passport of said Japanese Takao Aoyagi
confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and out of said demand, the
complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave
and delivered the sum of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos in marked money to the
above-named accused at a designated place at the Coffee Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond Hotel,
Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said complainants in the aforesaid amount of P25,000.00,
and to the prejudice of government service."5
After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan,

Expedito S. Perlas and Francisco SB. Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven
(7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three million
pesos (P3,000,000.00). Accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and Victor D. Conanan shall also suffer
the penalty of special temporary disqualification. Costs against the accused.
"On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. The surety bond he posted for his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold
Departure Order against him embodied in this Court’s Order dated July 24, 2000 is recalled."6
The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other accused. The
second Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas’ Motion for New Trial.
Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7
The Facts
The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to the
house of Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand Villa, Sto.
Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila. His purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12 dated
December 13, 1993, issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a
Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were
complaints against him in Japan and that he was suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug
dependent and an overstaying alien.
"To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez
who issued an undertaking (Exh. ‘B’) which Aoyagi signed. The undertaking stated that Takao
Aoyagi promised to appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a
guarantee for his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez
acknowledged receipt of the passport.
"On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito ‘Dick’ Perlas9 and
informed him about the taking of her husband’s passport by Hernandez. Perlas told her he would
refer their problem to his brother-in-law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate,
Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas introduced the
Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario. They discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario told the Aoyagis
not to appear before the BID on December 20, 1993.
"As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the BID. Instead, Atty.
Rufino M. Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with the BID an Entry of Appearance (Exh.
‘6’ – Acejas). Atty. Margate requested for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao
Aoyagi and asked what the ground was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagi’s passport.
"Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. ‘5’ – Hernandez) which was submitted to
Ponciano M. Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division of the BID. Ortiz
recommended that Takao Aoyagi, who was reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed
under custodial investigation.
"In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis met accused Atty.
Francisco Acejas III who was then accompanied by Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it
would be he who would handle their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. ‘D’) dated
December 22, 1993 was entered into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented the
Lucenario Law Firm.
"In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied the Aoyagis to the
Domestic Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty.
Acejas P40,000.00, P25,000 of which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for
filing/docket fee (Exh. ‘O’). The Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the morning
flight was postponed.
"On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi
informed her brother, Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr., about her husband’s passport.
"On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio in Davao and
told the latter of Takao Aoyagi’s problem with the BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card
and told Pelingon to call him up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs.
Aoyagi flew back to Manila.
"On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir Hernandez, Vic
Conanan and Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard.
"Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel in Makati on January 8, 1994 with
Jun Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Hernandez attending.
"On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for the return of Takao
Aoyagi’s passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to
Atty. Angelica Somera, an NBI Agent detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the
NBI, and Atty. Somera who arranged the entrapment operation.
"On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the Coffee
Shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested
Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope
containing marked money representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas,
Acejas and Victoriano were brought to the NBI Headquarters."10
Version of the Prosecution
Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno "Jun" Basaca
Pelingon, Jr., and Carlos Romero Saunar.11
The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5, 1994, when P1
million as consideration for the passport was demanded. Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a
drug trafficker and Yakuza member. The money was to be used to settle the alleged "problem"
and to facilitate the processing of a permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to lower the
amount demanded, Conanan stated that there were many of them in the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID).12
During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the press and
government enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial payment of P300,000,
but Pelingon said that the whole amount would be given at just one time to avoid another
meeting.13
After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,14 Pelingon called up Dick Perlas
to schedule the exchange.
Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adds
the following facts:
"1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the Aristocrat Restaurant. [Acejas]
informed Pelingon that he would file a P1 million lawsuit against the BID agents who
confiscated the passport of Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed Pelingon several papers, which
allegedly were in connection with the intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez and Conanan
arrived at the Aristocrat Restaurant, [Acejas] never mentioned to the BID agents the P1 million
lawsuit. [Acejas] just hid the papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside his [Acejas’] bag.
"1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao Aoyagi pay the amount of P1
million in exchange for the help he would extend to him (Takao) in securing a permanent visa in
the Philippines. [Acejas], who was Aoyagi’s lawyer, did nothing.
"1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez met at the Hotel Nikko.
Thereat, Hernandez informed the group that certain government officials and even the press were
after Takao Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment of
P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi would pay in full the
amount of P1 million so as not to set another meeting date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout the
negotiations.
xxx xxx xxx

"1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at the Diamond Hotel.
Hernandez handed the passport to [Acejas], who handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to Takao
Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi went over his confiscated passport, Bethel Grace handed to
Hernandez the envelope15 containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused and motioned
that [Acejas] be the one to receive it. [Acejas] willingly got the envelope and placed it beside
him and Perlas.
x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagi’s passport, he reminded the group of their earlier
agreement of ‘kaliwaan’, i.e., that after the passport is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1
million."16
Version of the Defense
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan and
Ponciano M. Ortiz testified for the defense.17
To the Sandiganbayan’s narration, Hernandez adds:
"6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation

(BID), went to the house of Private Respondents Takao and Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce and
serve a Mission Order issued and assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio on
December 13, 1993, for the arrest of Takao Aoyagi.
"7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husband’s passport, [Hernandez] found out that
the latter’s [authority] to stay had already been duly extended. He invited private respondents to
go with him to the BID office. They declined, but made a written undertaking to appear at the
BID office for investigation on December 20, 1993. As security for said undertaking, Bethel
Grace Aoyagi entrusted to [Hernandez] her husband’s passport, receipt of which [Hernandez], in
return, acknowledge[d] in the same instrument.
"8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of Aoyagi has been cleared and
that he can pick up his passport at the BID office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez] was
invited by Perlas to make the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond Hotel
Coffee Shop. Upon arrival thereat, [Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas, Aoyagi’s
counsel, and within less than ten minutes, he left the coffee shop."18
In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:
"1. 18th December 1993 – The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco & Acejas was
engaged by the spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"3. 22nd December 1993 –
"a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas] about the facts
regarding the confiscation by agents of the BID of the passport belonging to a Japanese client. x
x x.
"b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to ‘meet his brother-in-law Mr. Expedito
Perlas, who happened to be a policeman and a friend of Mr. Takao Aoyagi.’ Thus, [Acejas] ‘met
Mr. Perlas for the first time in the afternoon’ of this date.
"c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the Diamond Hotel,
where they were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that the law firm decided that the clients
‘can file an action for Replevin plus Damages for the recovery of the Japanese passport.’
"d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client and the law firm,
thru [Acejas] as partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php.50,000.00) was
agreed to be paid by way of ‘Case Retainer’s/Acceptance Fees’, which was supposed to be
payable ‘upon (the) signing (t)hereof’, and the sum of Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance fee.
However, the client proposed to pay half only of the acceptance fee (Php.25,000.00), plus the
estimated judicial expenses for the filing or docket fees (Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further
agreed that the ‘balance of Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be given upon the successful recovery
of the Japanese passport’.
"e) The clients informed [Acejas] that ‘they are supposed to leave for Davao the following day
on the 23rd because they will spend their Christmas in Davao City; but they promised that they
will be back on the 26th, which is a Sunday, so that on the 27th, which is a Monday, the
complaint against the BID officers will have to be filed in Court’.
xxx xxx xxx
"6. 27th December 1993 – ‘(T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas that the Japanese did
not come back on the 26th (December), x x x so that the case cannot be filed on the 27th instead
(it has) to wait for client’s instruction.’
"7. 4th January 1994 – ‘In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone call from Mr.
Perlas informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and he was requesting for an
appointment with any of the lawyer of the law firm on January 5, 1994’.
"8. 5th January 1994 – [Acejas] ‘met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon Jr.’ including a
certain Nimoto Akira.
x x x.
"b) [Acejas] ‘told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but, of course, the
Japanese client and the wife should first read the complaint and sign if they want to pursue the
filing of the complaint against the BID agents’.
"c) For the first time, ‘Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the case’. x x x He
‘instead suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the BID agents.’
"d) Thereafter, ‘Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID agent who
confiscated the Japanese passport.’ ‘Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon were able to contact the BID
agent’.
"e) For the ‘first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez’, when the latter arrived and also accused
Victor Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a confrontation ensued between [Acejas] and
[Hernandez] concerning the legal basis for the confiscation of the passport. [Acejas] demanded
for the return of the Japanese passport x x x. Mr. Hernandez ‘said that if there are no further
derogatory report concerning the Japanese client, then in a matter of week (from January 5 to
12), he will return the passport’.
"f) [Acejas] ‘gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese passport will not be
returned in one (1) week’s time, then (the law firm) will pursue the filing of the replevin case
plus the damage suit against him including the other BID agents’.
"g) ‘x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing thereof saying that his
Japanese brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in his own words ‘magbibigay naman [i.e.
will give money anyway].’
"9. 8th January 1994 –
"a) Again, ‘Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the Japanese client is now in
Manila.’ Petitioner attended the meeting they arranged in ‘(Makati) and meet Dick Perlas,
Vladimir Hernandez and Pelingon Jr. x x x.
"b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with anybody because
anyway they are willing to pay or negotiate.
"c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] ‘met him for the second time. x x x
[Acejas] said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to return the passport on or before January 12,
1994, then the law firm will have no choice but to file the case against him x x x. Again, for the
third time Mr. Pelingon warned against the filing of the case because he said that he would
directly negotiate with the BID agents.’
"d) The Makati meeting ended up ‘with the understanding that Mr. Hernandez will have to
undertake the return [of] the Japanese passport on or before January 12, 1994.’
"10. 12th January 1994 –
"a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was already in Manila
and was requesting for an appointment with the lawyers at lunchtime of January 12 at the
Diamond Hotel where he was billeted.
xxx xxx xxx
"c) x x x x x x x x x
"At this meeting, ‘the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and he was wondering
why the Japanese passport is not yet recovered when according to him he has already paid for the
attorney fees. And so, [Acejas] explained to him that the case has to be filed and they still have
to sign the complaint, the Special Power of Attorney and the affidavit relative to the filing of
replevin case. But the Japanese would not fully understand. So, Pelingon Jr. again advised
against the filing of the case saying that since there is no derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the
BID office, then the BID agents should return the Japanese passport.’
xxx xxx xxx
"e) Thereafter, ‘Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr. Hernandez.’ Since, they
were able to contact the latter, ‘we waited until around 2:00 p.m.’. ‘When Mr. Hernandez came,
he said that the Japanese client is cleared at the BID office and so, he can return the Japanese
passport and he gave it to [Acejas]. x x x ‘When [Acejas] received the Japanese passport, (he)
checked the authenticity of the documents and finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted
to give it to the Japanese client.’
"‘Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to the Japanese across
the table, the Japanese was motioning and wanted to get the passport under the table. x x x
[Acejas] found it strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to receive things like
that under the table. But nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the table and instead passed it
on to Mr. Dick Perlas who was seated at (his) right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the
passport from [Acejas] and finally handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi.’ x x x. ‘After that, there was a
little chat between Mr. Hernandez and the client, and Mr. Hernandez did not stay for so long and
left.’
"Still, thereafter, ‘(w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace Aoyagi and [Acejas]
were talking and she said since the Japanese passport had been recovered, they are now willing
to pay the Php.25,000.00 balance of the acceptance fee.’
"‘Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr. Hernandez to receive
it while Mr. Hernandez was still around standing. But Mr. Hernandez did not receive it.
"Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown envelope.
xxx xxx xxx
"Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano, who was ‘signaling
something’ as if there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas] immediately stood up and left hurriedly.
When [Acejas] approached Mr. Victoriano, he ‘said that the car which [Acejas] parked in front
of the Diamond Hotel gate, somebody took the car’. [Acejas] ‘went out and checked and realized
that it was valet parking so it was the parking attendant who took the car and transferred the car
to the parking area’. [Acejas] requested ‘Mr. Victoriano to get (the) envelope and the coat’, at the
table.
"g) ‘When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking attendant to get the car.
When the car arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the doors of the Diamond Hotel Mr. Jose
Victoriano and Mr. Dick Perlas coming out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI
agents." They then ‘were taken to the NBI’, except the accused Vladimir Hernandez."19
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery,20 as well as conspiracy in the
commission of the crime,21 had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;22
Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants;23 and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave it
to Perlas.24
Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.25 Although he had picked up the envelope
containing the payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired with the other
accused.26
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money was the
balance of the law firm’s legal fees.27 If he had indeed believed that the money was payable to
him, he should have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he had merely been
pretending to protect his client’s rights when he threatened to file a suit against Hernandez.28
The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for Reconsideration
of Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan, Conanan was not shown to
be present during the meetings on January 8 and 12, 1994.29 His presence during one of those
meetings, on January 5, 1994, did not conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator.
The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas’ Supplemental Motion, which prayed for a new
trial.
The Issues
Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:
"I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part of the conspiracy to
extort money from private respondents, despite lack of clear and convincing evidence.
"II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
overlooked the fact that the legal requisites of the crime are not completely present as to warrant
[Hernandez’] complicity in the crime charged.
"III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled erroneously when it relied
solely on the naked and uncorroborated testimonies of the late Filomeno ‘Jun’ Pelingon, Jr. in
order to declare the existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as the guilt of the
accused.
"IV. Whether or not [respondent] court’s acquittal of co-accused Victor Conanan and its
conviction of [Hernandez] for the offense as charged effectively belies the existence of a
conspiracy.
"V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it found [Hernandez] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery."30
On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points:
"1. The Conspiracy Theory
2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to client’s cause; lawful performance of duties
3. ‘Instigation’ not ‘entrapment’
4. Credibility of witness and testimony

5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of the accused
6. Elements of ‘bad faith’
7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)
8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence"31
In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points they raised
are therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions have no merit.
Main Issue:
Finding of Guilt
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)
agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a
crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official duties.32
Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the
following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents
personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4)
that act related to the exercise of official duties.33
Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly, he
was merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate Takao
Aoyagi.34 The passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to
appear at the BID office, but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.35
The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he who
had taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi.36 On various dates,37 he met with Takao and Bethel
Grace Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez then asked for
a down payment on the payoff,38 during which he directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to
Acejas.39
Bethel Grace Aoyagi’s testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded as
follows:
"PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:
"Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?
"A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?
"A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.
"Q: After that, what happened?

"A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.
"Q: The passport?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or what did Mr. Aoyagi do?
"A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the passport?
"A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would give the money so when
Mr. Perlas handed to my husband the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to my
husband and he passed it to Mr. Hernandez who refused the same.
"ATTY. ACEJAS:
"Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness referred to the money
it pertains to the brown envelope which allegedly contains the money x x x .
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"Noted.
"Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?
"A: No, sir.
"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so
my husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.
"INTERPRETER:
"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?
"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
"Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?
"A: Yes, sir.
"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just
seconds[.] Mr. Vlademir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came
and picked up the envelope, sir."40
Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao Aoyagi or
his representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the meetings held
outside the BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence Division of the BID,
testified that it was not a standard operating procedure to officially return withheld passports in
such locations.41 It can readily be inferred that Hernandez had an ulterior motive for
withholding the passport for some time despite the absence of any legal purpose.
Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanan’s acquittal.42 While the testimony
of Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy,43 there was an abundance
of evidence showing Hernandez’s involvement.
Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the prosecution’s
version that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the passport.44 According to
him, he kept giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the passport, with threats to file a court
case.
Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented by
Spouses Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might have just
been a charade and was in fact belied by Pelingon’s testimony regarding the January 5, 1994
meeting:
"ATTY. VALMONTE:
"Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?
"A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of me, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty. Acejas was showing you
documents that he was going to file [a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you were talking with each
other, Atty. Acejas also threatened, reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a] P1
million damage suit should Hernandez [fails] to return the passport?
"A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit] was not [anymore]
mentioned, sir."45
Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his client’s behalf, he still
failed to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all testified that he
had received the purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony of Bethel Grace
Aoyagi:
"Prosecutor Montemayor:
xxxxxxxxx
"Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your husband do?
"A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he pointed to Atty. Acejas so
my husband handed it to Atty. Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr. Perlas.
"Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say anything?
"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.
"Interpreter:
"Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.
"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?
"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty. Acejas, sir.
"Q: And then, what happened?

"WITNESS:
"A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I think, it happened in just
seconds[.] Mr. Vladimir Hernandez immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came
and picked up the envelope, sir.
"Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the envelope?
xxxxxxxxx
"A: Victoriano, sir."46
Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain his
contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firm’s legal fees. That it was given to
Hernandez immediately after the return of the passport leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the money was a consideration for the return. Moreover, Acejas should have kept the amount if
he believed it to be his. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement on this point:
"x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the acceptance fee, how
come he passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown envelope to Perlas only proves that the same
did not contain the balance of the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained it.
Moreover, the three prosecution witnesses testified that the brown envelope was being given to
Hernandez who refused to accept the same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not
for the balance of the acceptance fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez.
xxxxxxxxx
"Acejas’ defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to why he left
immediately after the brown envelope was given to him was uncorroborated. He should have
presented accused Victoriano to corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who allegedly
called him and caused him to leave their table. This, he did not do. The ineluctable conclusion is
that he was, indeed, in cahoots with his co-accused."47
Lawyer’s Duty
Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship with the
complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest48 and had the right to be
present when the passport was to be returned.49
True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other people. His
presence at Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was justified. This fact,
however, does not support his innocence
Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew of the payoff,
but did nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated that he was to get a
share. Thus, he received the money purporting to be the payoff,
even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was a
conspirator.
The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics50 when confronted by public officers who
extort money. Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities.51 If the extortion is
directed at the client, they must advise the client not to perform any illegal act. Moreover, they
must report it to the authorities, without having to violate the attorney-client privilege.52
Naturally, they must not participate in the illegal act.53
Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists.
Instigation
Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame them
into accepting the payoff.54 Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons
into the commission of an offense in order to prosecute them.55 As opposed to entrapment,
criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator.56
There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed an
extortion attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who had
arranged for the payoff.
During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate Justice Escareal
clarifying question as follows:
"AJ ESCAREAL:
"[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport to your husband?
"A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to abide with the agreement
that upon handing of the passport, the money would also be given immediately
(‘magkaliwaan’)."57
Alleged Discrepancies
According to Acejas, Pelingon’s testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit, Supplemental-

Affidavit, inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of Desistance were
contradictory.58 He cites these particular portions of Pelingon’s Affidavit:
"5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I might be prosecuting innocent
men, I have decided on my own disposition, not to further testify against any of the accused in
the Sandiganbayan or in any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of action.
"6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily executed, and that no
reward, promise, consideration, influence, force or threat was executed to secure this
affidavit."59
Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a threat to his
life.60 He did not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to him. Allegedly, his true
testimony was in the first Complaint-Affidavit that he had executed.61
By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit of Desistance.
An affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive evidence given on the
witness stand.62
Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly inconsistent. The Court
therefore adopts the Sandiganbayan’s finding that these were minor details that were not
indicative of the lack of credibility of the prosecution witnesses.63 People v. Eligino64 is in
point:
"x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily
follow from their disagreement that all of them should be disbelieved as liars and their testimony
completely discarded as worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the
slight clashing statements neither dilute the witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity of their
testimony. Thus, inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not, in any way,
destroy the credibility of witnesses, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but natural and even
enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and
unrehearsed."65
Suppression of Evidence
Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money was
supposedly demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a witness.66
The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People.67 The freedom
to devise a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the prosecution.68 Necessarily, its decision
on which evidence, including which witnesses, to present cannot be dictated by the accused or
even by the trial court.69 If petitioners believed that Takao Aoyagi’s testimony was important to
their case, they should have presented him as their witness.70
Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecution’s Formal Offer of
Evidence was not resolved by the Sandiganbayan.71 In that Comment/Objection, he had noted
the lateness in the filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence.
It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecution’s Formal Offer of
Evidence upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas’ Comment/Objection was
deemed immaterial. It could not overrule the finding of guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that
the Sandiganbayan needed to act upon.72
Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this
Court.73 We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence adduced in this case.
In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no
question that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted
money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in
procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received the
money as payoff, which Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money
was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime.
Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official
duties.
For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as
principals.74 The evidence shows that the
parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the
parties did not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated
unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design.75 The act of one is the act of all.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9881 June 4, 2014
(Formerly CBD 10-2607)
ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board
of Governors of the administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty.
Manuel Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a contract on the
complainant's client who had never been a party to the agreement.
The facts are as follows:
The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square"
at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M.
Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3)
Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.
The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu.
The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of
internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit
gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty.
Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning
the parking arrangements.
On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty1 with the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina2 for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to
the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to
the contract.
In his Answer,3 Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He
maintained that the Times Square Preamble4 was entered into for purposes of maintaining order
in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.5
Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases
against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by
the Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), which was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second
suit was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were dismissed.6
Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the
Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his
own hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the
latter’s egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon
City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-08-63579. According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an
Order dated 12 December 2008.7
Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer to the Complaint.
On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and

Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds:
1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina
gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of
malice or bad faith.8
On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210, adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9
Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors on 29 December 2012.10 Notices of the denial were received by the parties
on 21 March 2013.11
No petition for review has been filed with this Court.
It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a petition with
the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution. This rule is
derived from Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
(Underscoring supplied)
In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board’s resolution on 21 March 2013, as
evidenced by a registry return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for
review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with the Court within
15 days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c).
Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the findings
of the IBP Board of Governors.
When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum
of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the
complainant.12
In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia
charges Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the
Times Square Preamble is binding on complainant’s client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory
to the agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this
case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that
Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations
are not proof.13
Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice.
The rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an
attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law;
God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to
know all the law. x x x.14
The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never
presumed.1âwphi1 It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question
of fact and is evidentiary.15 There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice,
assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of
good faith, therefore, stands in this case.
The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of
evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the
Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent")

for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by
me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33
Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real
property in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a
Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of
title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing
Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations.
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier
in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment
case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7
because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier and
Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and
asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable
for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as
Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted,
with modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of
law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent
stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of
his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family
and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the
IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance
of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from
owning real property.11 Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of
the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the
Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the
property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier
in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by
preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when
he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership
of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act
amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for
three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In
re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year
for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of
separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of

Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective
upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP
BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA

DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION
UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR
FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a
disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath taking as
IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and
EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national
presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and
recommendation on subject case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension
and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative

Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his
client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee
Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case
No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender
his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to
lead the country's most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule"
provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur
Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-
Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer
was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant
prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-
mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the
same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively
discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in
Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera).
Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle
of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation
of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is

substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could
be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that
he used his client's money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence
that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was
accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar.
He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his
disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this Court
to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand,
is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP
President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing
Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the
IBP Board and the IBP in general.2
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular
meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6
voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed
before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs.
Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The
Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227,
authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.3
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the
above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor
Carlos L. Valdez.4
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP
Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP
Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.5
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as
National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the
disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.6
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera
allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the
IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No.
9227.7
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de
Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.8
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter
wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having
committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.9
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu
City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board
of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.10 Quoted hereunder is the dispositive
portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor

Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive
Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme
Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th
National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April
2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the
PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The
Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the
Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108",
was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board
of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which
mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others", by making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary
Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of
Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION,
thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented
him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation
and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.11
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of
the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing
Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition
to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately
Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from
Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation."12
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical
to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by
IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in
complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter
read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me
especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to
assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in
administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me
was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt of
the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov.
Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so
I could be questioned. My request was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion
to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another
round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.13
(Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.14 In their
Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was
based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the
grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from
IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the Petition,
all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the
decision to withdraw the Petition.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the
IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention
of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de
Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of
Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of
Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of
Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the
members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without
mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme
Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it appear that the IBP Board of
Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure"
from the Supreme Court.15
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the last
straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board
and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position
paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and
as IBP EVP.16
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of
the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of
the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his
stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP
EVP.17
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.18 On 20 June
2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the
IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a
new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice
Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National President Cadiz also
requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be allowed to
assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is
approved by this Court.21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty.
Salazar.22
In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was
absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the
same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise
executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of
due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed
against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably
impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once
undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He
posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's
Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board
of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or
the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Court's
Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No.
9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP
EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the
provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office
for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in
office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed
by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the
President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion
of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the
Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office
for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the
President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such
term as the Board may fix.24
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die,
resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an
Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such
election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement
should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule
embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel,
submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself
from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his
disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the various acts that he committed
which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to
Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental
principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the
Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor
Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said
Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of
the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was
duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region
because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had
already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected
IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable,
possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that –
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his
oath as IBP National President.25
The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)

COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS
PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE

PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND
NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL

T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE
NO. [6052]27
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De
Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against

him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative

Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case
against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their
respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11
December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard
de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was
practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to
practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or
lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory
findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the
final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California
administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's
money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still
practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is
a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case,
the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's
moral fitness to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really
from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member
of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver
that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer
will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the
discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he
does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where
he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a
lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of
IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein,
thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less
than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to
transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan
del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty.
Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de
Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This
letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted.
Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3
September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday
of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than
three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27
November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave
misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a
Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for
disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent,
interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same
misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly
administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded
against as an erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the
second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over membersof
the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in
administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague
(Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and
substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already
answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon,
Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14
December 2004), this Court held that:
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case
becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that
the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter
in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it
again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and
repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important,
res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law."
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already
been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant's contention that
the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was
one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or
disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant
administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed
neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin
the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11 December
2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the
present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these
cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res
judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must
concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be
between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of
causes of action.29 In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res
judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of
action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run
as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present
administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first
administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation or
circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action
is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is
being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on
the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty.
de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the
present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors.
Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held
that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws
prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP
President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de
Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum.
Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence,
Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing
officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We
held in that case that –
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he
can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so
long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment
of an offense which involves moral turpitude.30
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case
declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is
presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is
sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No.
6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or
disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon
G. Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the
Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was
suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of
the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However,
unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered
his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute
into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court's
action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise
held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical
acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign
judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of
due notice in the foreign forum."
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial
evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is
successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.33
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence.34 The statutory enunciation of the grounds for
disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be
restricted.35
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.

Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice."36 That meaning is in
consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.37
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.38
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera
was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control
the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds
in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then
deposited to his personal account;39
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years;40 and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California.41
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his
client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that
the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few
days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds,
Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum that he
(de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his
personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for
personal purposes.42
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies,
a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.43 It
means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.44
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical. Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires
utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary
nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon
of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession
of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are
guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
(Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for
personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than
substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting
the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the
funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full
amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the
State Bar of California.46
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of
this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In
Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that –
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had
indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As Atty. de Vera
had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now
estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de
Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might,
indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera
or the way such character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the latter's
acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de
Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty
of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to
himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect
of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession
betrays their trust and confidence.48 Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all
good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of
law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.49 Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his
practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the
latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo
IV,53 the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients
monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them
for their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely
suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of
P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the
amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2)
years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground
for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las
Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of
the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President.
Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold
office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is
not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under
Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than
three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that
he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal
act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to
an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP EVP who will
automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to
be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following
issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty.
de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing
Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry
that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his
duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his
position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the
region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which
the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by
resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and
substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process recognized
by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in
writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair
hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant,
IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion
which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when
his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be
mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own
motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and
personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was
no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was
given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized
that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board
Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda.
Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his
case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty
and property.55 It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the
constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in
fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side.56 At the
outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the Constitution has no
fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a
fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than
one general statement."57 The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it depends
on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.59
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different
principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its
requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right
to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of
due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or
tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter,
there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of
such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process
requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies
differ.60
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.61 Nor is an actual
hearing always essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of
the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP
governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera's
actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was
present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13
May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given
fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at
the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself
from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote,
he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's
expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted
by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the members
exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that
such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion
impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off
which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven
remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the
2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP
Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board
argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable
member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to
various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in
particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the
Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-
elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that
the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the
IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Vera's
removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are
inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to
disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are
brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which
speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an
authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with the
lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing
board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are
made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an
opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a
contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that
the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to
implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the
board.63
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's
actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP
Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the
public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court
enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member
of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution
approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board
as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board
member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should
resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his heart's
content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty.
de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as
IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since
it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over
the IBP,64 it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its
reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the
provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to
define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure,
and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in
place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day
affairs, without the Court's interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested
in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of
the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.65 The Board acts as a collegiate body
and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the
possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual
members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the
disputable presumption66 of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any
allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority
or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's
action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in
Article VI, Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board
abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP
Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal from the
IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority
and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's resolution to remove Atty. de
Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board
of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of
Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave
abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated
13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in
the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
Integration Rule,68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal of members),70 Section
47 (National officers),71 Section 48 (other officers),72 and Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of
the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on
how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in
the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007
Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the
Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the
Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP
shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the next
succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP
President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the
2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP
EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to
resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter,
Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov.
Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his
removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from
Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the
IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation
basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
"ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The
right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,
1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be
rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)"
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among
the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the
automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in
particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the
Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic
succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De
Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the
rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Vera's
removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency.
The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption
by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose
of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic
succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National
President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the
usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting
a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable
preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of
Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is
intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have
been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for
Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from
among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience
of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have served in a
national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP
for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of
the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May
2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national
capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly
indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling
and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national
presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he
comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee
would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in
service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in
electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had
the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the
Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached
to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-
5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having
been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term
2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the
Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with
the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and
expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called
them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City Tel: 362-7820
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1avvphi1
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation
of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,9
found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule
8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would
merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character
of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during
the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s
"referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent

violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees
for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that
he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of
his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the
case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer
lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an
interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or
to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the
exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on

lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services
by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This
crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is
not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year
effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4984 - April 1, 2003
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR.

ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA
CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,1 an official of
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of
respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that
respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds
for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-
Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of
Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00
and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie
B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation
as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a
student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to
Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be
P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig
to facilitate the application for correction of name.3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven
(11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.4
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of

Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire
Supply" and "Novas Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued,6
the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.7
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against
complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and
ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to
draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this
incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a
libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven
(11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and
with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.9
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the
charges.10 A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12,
Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the
notation "Unclaimed."11
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the
Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio
Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.12
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent
to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the
case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the
Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the
directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or
Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents
submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her
oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or
attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending applications/requests before her
office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly,
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment
of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar
action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full
text of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment
of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.13
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)

of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that
her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist,
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.14 However, if
said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then
he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.15
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as
OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela
Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable
action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains
unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents
misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a
member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and
illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath
imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty
is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.16 Respondents
demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests
before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the
Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to
govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars
lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private
interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents
conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of
the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of
dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent
deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the
practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her
name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and

JON DE YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have
been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their
differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal
concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable
acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to
resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before
it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing
(Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances
covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such
other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the
farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the
surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over
four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without
due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written
demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio
Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his
salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer
for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth
month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that
petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause,
but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his
failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in
Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth
Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner
filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner
was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back
wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment
of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion
of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent,
such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of
the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same
are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner
of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions
of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was
required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of
November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its
earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth
noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special
relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go
down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action
filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his
own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may justify
why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner
and private respondent had with each other, were personal matters affecting father and son
relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their
personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of
just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the
NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter
who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions
as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his
employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question
the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be
appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant
petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages
of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44
(should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every
and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be
availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a
judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact
that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the
validity of the judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care
and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the
bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who
conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no
procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of a public officer's functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of
technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the
long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat,
justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial
technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere
procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be
dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article
282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an
employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by
law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for
termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay.16 On the other
hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to
effect the former's dismissal from employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in
affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial
bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual
findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from
judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982,
cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was
suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical
attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr.
Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda
Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative
matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay
24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic
human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi
II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work
during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not
warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx

The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear
intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus
Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must
be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred
that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly
pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's
absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his
illness and strained family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail
health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private
respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once
instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these
are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the
hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied
that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly
shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod
City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments
were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is
beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were
amply substantiated by the attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion
of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from
work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not
mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of
employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be
classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want
to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority.
His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the
office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every
aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as
possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he
proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the
time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to
1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on
account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and
minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was
necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters
relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal
affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator,
petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual
stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay
therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the
termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against
him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se
be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of
returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported
him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes, and paid his salaries and
benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in
January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he
considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an
employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner
from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father
to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was
only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance
when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition
regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I
have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his
job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm
and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent
takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the
administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary
resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about
petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding
abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued performance of
various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his
persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his
pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered
and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated
September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly
pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without
deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made
there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of
returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may
have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. As to
what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private
respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a
conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after
January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would
no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his
position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as
picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying
for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod
through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for
crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent
through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal
activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command
his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature of these
transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that
private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be
handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is
familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If
indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private
respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to
concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be
his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can
have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill
District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for
all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-

FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place and
stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the
power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or
payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my proper
disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by
reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation
regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports,34
as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work,35 and,
specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has
abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to
abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the
presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably
advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the
proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,

pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto
inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The change
in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private
respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of
the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that
receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business
expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment
was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to
support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no abandonment
took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were
in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and
were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and
solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a
voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the
employee of his employment38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of
the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private
respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the
services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner
on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule
XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a
written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal.
In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in
the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer
shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance
of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a
decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him
during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their
dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by
them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and
statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was
denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending
dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent
controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in
this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact
is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for
Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of
petitioner was submitted thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that
notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of
Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's
last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the
employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the
requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary
exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental
guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General
rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:

While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation
and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required by BP
130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a
valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the
notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor
Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In
Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must
not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process.
The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render
a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be
penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon
his employment because he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00
on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his
part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the
failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as
required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every
worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the
Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence
of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events
may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder
provided, and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the
employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are concerned.47 Thus,
where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee
be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA
295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court
held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made between managers and the
ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers
cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the
difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who
had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of
antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator
of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so
strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a
deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant
which was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court
to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of
moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages
prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages
were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly
victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for
fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of
sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their
actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the
likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for
damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can
rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of
the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no
voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or
such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent,
therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not
exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be
paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of
six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs.
NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical
duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much
their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement
or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."
On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite
their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary,
their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they
may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less
than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert
all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever
did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this
controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make.
The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in
the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really
achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues
herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by
the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who
figured as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the
impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the
parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more
convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET
ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months
being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.

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A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.

Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 156891 June 27, 2006

VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan,

Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.7

The facts8 are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

xxx xxx xxx

Version of the Defense

To the Sandiganbayan’s narration, Hernandez adds:

"6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation

In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"3. 22nd December 1993 –

xxx xxx xxx

"9. 8th January 1994 –

"10. 12th January 1994 –

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:

"1. The Conspiracy Theory

3. ‘Instigation’ not ‘entrapment’

4. Credibility of witness and testimony

6. Elements of ‘bad faith’

7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)

8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of evidence"31

The Court’s Ruling

The Petitions have no merit.

The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1)

"Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?

"Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?

"A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.

"Q: After that, what happened?

"Q: The passport?

"A: Yes, sir.

"A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.

"Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?

"A: No, sir.

"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

"Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

"A: Yes, sir.

"A: Expedito Perlas, sir.

"Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?

"A: Yes, sir.

"Q: After that, what happened?

"Q: And then, what happened?

"Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?

"A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

"Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

"A: Yes, sir.