PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs

PETRUS YAU a.k.a. “John” and “Ricky” and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. “Susan”, Accused-
Appellants.

G.R. No. 208170 August 20, 2014

PONENTE: Mendoza

TOPIC: Kidnapping for ransom

FACTS:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who
is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was
billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra
Mall. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant
received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone
conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and
gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to.
Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that
when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and
chained.

When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red
mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened
his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make
phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone
and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his
girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not
to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell
them that he was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were
demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate
with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day
either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down
biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.

Complainant was rescued when members of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task Force
(PACER) intercepted the same taxi with plate number PVD 115 and subsequently appellant led the team to
his house where complainant was held captive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petrus and Susana Yau were guilty of kidnapping for ransom

HELD:
 YES.

The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
are as follows:

1. Intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty;

2. Actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and

3. Motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the
prosecution in the case at bench.

1. Petrus is a private individual.

2. Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while
inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant.

3. Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite,
where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty.

4. Alastair was taken against his will.

5. Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of
the victim.

Petrus is a principal and Susana is an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom

It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana participated in the decision to
commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the
effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever
he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.

Requisites for a person to be an accomplice

1. That there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;

2. That he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and

3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and
never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave
food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only
countenanced Petrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held
that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person
responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of
giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support
to her husband.

People v. De Vera: where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be
considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. "Susan", Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No.
03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong
City (RTC). in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923. The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, as
defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
(R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana)as an accomplice to the
commission of the same crime.

The Facts

Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the Information,3 dated February
13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City,
the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping
substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM inthe following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM was on board a
white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a.
"John" and "Ricky" and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell
unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located
at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty
two (22) days, which house is owned by accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was maltreated;
that ransom in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchangefor his safe release
until he was finally rescued on February 11,2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Version of the Prosecution

In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of the
kidnapping:

On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a
practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was
billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra
Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the
vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong.
He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to
have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if
he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew
what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and
he was handcuffed and chained.

When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red mask and
introduced himself as "John" approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his
handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone
calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a
special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his
girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to
inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell
them thathe was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers
were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.

The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message purportedly from the
former informing them that he was kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.

On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the situation
and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.

Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired
US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private
complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank,
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety and eventual
release.

During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate with his
family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by
John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a
piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.

On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along
Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-
Crimeand Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for
Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115. On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the
morning, the PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the
overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a
different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they
followed it, then flagged it down and approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and
was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any
comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau,
a British national, they asked him for his driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to
produce any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring
him to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he
knew him, he answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being
placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his
constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were confiscated.
Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible
rescue operations of the victim.

Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, hewas led back to the police car.
The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and
handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.

During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi driver.
Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask
used by private complainant’s captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau.5

Version of the Defense

Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief6 to substantiate their claim of
innocence:

Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim coordinated
with the police to set up the subject case against him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the
Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country in July 2001 for a vacation and
had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto, he was in Singapore
running some businesses. On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and time the
victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.

On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the morning,
he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car
outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them
held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes with the
same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became unconscious.

When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. His hands were handcuffed and he felt
very cold because his body was wet. His head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People
came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was
made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus, someone removed the
cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to
them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.

When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his British passport,
alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of
Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash given to him by his wife . He lost
those personal properties.

After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following day, he was
brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.

Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He
bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use
and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for long
journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot drive a taxi as
an occupation since his driver’s license is non-professional.

Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing. Hence, she
decided to live separately from him (though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5,
Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.

Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s testimony that he was placed in
the basement. He was not in his house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left
his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had
markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.

During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informedof his
constitutional rights.

Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the latter
served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named
Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor,
Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes, Bacoor, Cavite, with
his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.

On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari store) and
to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as she does
not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning. At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of
the same day, four(4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to the hospital
where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.

Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They, however, were not
brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with
a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together with her children and helpers, were detained for
three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released and they went
home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.

Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He is
engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her
name. At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had withher Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied
Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring, necklace
and cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7

The Ruling of the RTC

In its judgment, dated December 14,2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of kidnapping
for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau,as an accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC
found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their versions of the incident
dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to rebut his positive identification
by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several
times over the phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately
reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the heinous act.

With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman who
fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should
be held liable as an accomplice.

The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because the same
were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds
the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree of the
imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby therefore sentenced to
suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS MINIMUM to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM.Accused
are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.

Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos
(273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until full payment, moral damages of One Million
Pesos (1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (200,000.00).

SO ORDERED.8

Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.9 The appellate court likewise lent credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to establish with certitude the commission of the crime
and the identities of the culprits thereof.

Hence, this appeal.

ASSIGNED ERRORS:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY
ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.10
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living separately with
her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by
Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if there was another person assisting Petrus
in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the Department of Justice, dated February
13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the registered owner of the house where Alastair
was held captive and not because she served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11

On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties that they could file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file
any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03446.13 Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his arguments raised in
his brief filed before the CA.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of
the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits
thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accusedappellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v.
Maxion15 that:

The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial
court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.Through its
observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.16

It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the
factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and
conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA17

In the case at bench, the RTC gavemore weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
compared to those of the accusedappellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record, the Court finds
no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment
and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the
person or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no
conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was
able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.

Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115
which he boarded before he lost consciousness on the afternoon ofJanuary 20, 2004. He claimed that while he
was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his
face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair claimed that he had a
good look and an ample opportunity toremember the facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and
identify him in court. It is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their
accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are committed.19

Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was
established that from the first to the twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity,his kidnapper would meet him five times a
day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s voice which had a unique tone
and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron
John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the
phone for three weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was
Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There was no showing that Alastair and
Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any
reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no suchimproper motive
exists, and their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20

Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led tothe
inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferencesare derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.21 The corollary
rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.22

The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by the RTC and
the CA:

1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, located at Block
23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor, Cavite;

2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled boarding in
going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost
consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;

3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered inside
the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;

4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain with
padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat;
two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and family footages, and
the other one labeled "sex scandal"; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM
cards; Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite,
under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the OfficialReceipts and Certificate of Registration
of a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to
Susana Yau; marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba;
birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM
deposit slips; and PLDT bills;

5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of Petrus.
Incidentally, it was reported that the owner ofthe QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran,
also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet; and

6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the house
and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched.23

The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial evidence,
when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the
kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are
asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the
victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.24

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the
prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using
sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-
appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was
taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of
US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.

Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as
correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that
Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her
was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who
accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a
person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there bea community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid
in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never
reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to
the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only
countenancedPetrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being
present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice
in the crime committed.26 As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not
essential and indispensable for the perpetration ofthe crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of
sympathy orfeeling of support to her husband.27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De
Vera,28 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of
an accomplice rather thanthat of a principal.

Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her name in his
sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility of witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the
allegationscontained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigator’s
questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a testimony in court do not outrightly justify the
acquittal ofan accused, as testimonial evidence carries moreweight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during
the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn statements are often executed when an affiant’s mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which
transpired.31

Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defenses of alibi and
frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and
difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.32 The defense of
frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is
difficult to prove.1âwphi1 In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their bare allegations, no competent and independent evidence was
adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain
selfserving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any
dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim
Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-
appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the
kidnapper be brought to justice and sentencedwith the appropriate penalty.

As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants questioned the
legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must fail.

Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before theyentered their respective pleas to the
kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in the
trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The
accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might
have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over their persons.35 Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.

Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests,
jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally
arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon
a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.37
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetuawithout eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of
R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.

The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of 273,132.00 plus interest
committed from the filing of the information until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the accused-
appellants, the Court findsthe award of ₱1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to
₱200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and his family
endured because of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and chains, and
mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from
mental, physical and psychologicalordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade. The
Court also finds the award of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence for the public good. The Court,
however, reduces the amount from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.38

The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of damages. This
is an erroneous apportionment of the damages awarded because it does not take into account the difference in
the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of
this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the
accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities
and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of damages than
Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.

In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages in the
amount of ₱273, 132.00; moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount
of ₱100,000.00, or a total amount of ₱573, 132.00. Taking into consideration the degree of their participation, the
principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages (₱573, 132.00 x 213) or
₱382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or
₱191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of P 182,088.00; moral
damages in the amount of ₱133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount or ₱66,666.6 7; and Susana for
the amount of ₱91,044.00 as actual damages; ₱66,666.67 as moral damages; and ₱33,333.33 as exemplary
damages.

WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decisi0n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered
to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of Pl 00,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount or ₱273, 132.00 is
maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:

1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱182,088.00; moral damages in the
amount of P 133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67; and

2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of ₱91,044.00, moral
damages in the amount of ₱66,666.67 and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱33,333.33.

SO ORDERED.
People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179)

Facts:

On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma,
were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca,Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called
them. When asked what it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house located
just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill
Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother -
appellant's aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to
the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter,
they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan.

Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he
was carrying. Jonathan together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room. Later,
Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the
kitchen. When about an arms length away from Hernan, Wilfredo, immediately walloped Hernan on the
right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo
immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan
out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They
then carried Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped, then Wilfredo
successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death. After
throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan,
Sheila and Merwin and warned them that if they will tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they
just followed whatever Tolentino told them.

On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario. Accused Jonathan
Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the
one who killed Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also fingered
the former as the killer of Sagario. However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had
become final and executory on his part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently conscience-stricken, executed an
affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and retracted his testimony
implicating accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros.

The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the person
who had hit the victim with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing
was qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant (Jonathan Fabros) manifested his
approval of the killing and the concurrence of his acts with those of the other accused. Thus, the RTC
concluded that Fabros was a co-conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder. Hence,
this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros) should be convicted as an accessory?

Decision:

Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory
as one who had knowledge of the commissionof the crime and did not participate in its commission as
principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting
oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2)concealing or destroying the body
of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to
take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an
accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the
crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes.

Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or
of the effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the
crime. That, precisely, is wanting in the present case.

In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he refused,
he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter
likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the
stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime,
especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril.

The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WILFREDO TOLENTINO Y ESPERAT and JONATHAN FABROS Y CASTRO, accused,
JONATHAN FABROS Y CASTRO, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire records to review. The appellate court may pass upon every
circumstance favorable to the accused. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. Neither was it able to show that appellant was an accomplice or accessory.
Hence, he must be acquitted on reasonable ground.

The Case

Jonathan Fabros y Castro appeals the May 27, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga
City (Branch 17) in Criminal Case No. 13698, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Wilfredo Tolentino and Jonathan Fabros guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
(morada) without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences the
above-named accused separately to suffer the penalty of [r]eclusion [p]erpetua, to pay separately the
heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to indemnify the said heirs [in] the sum of P15,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the
costs."2

The Information, dated March 2, 1996, charged appellant as follows:

"That on or about February 28, 1996, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a piece of wood and knife, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there without any warning, assault, attack and
stab with the use of said weapons that they were armed with, at the person of HERNAN SAGARIO y
CUESTA, thereby inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of the latter's body which directly
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

"That the commission of the above-stated offense has been attended by the following aggravating
circumstances, to wit:

1. Abuse of superior strength; and

2. Dwelling."3

With the assistance of counsel,4 appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on June 7, 1996.5 After due trial, the
RTC rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution's version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General as follows:6

"On February 28, 1996 around 7:30 in the evening, appellant and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and
Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their neighbor
Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what was it all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to
come to his house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately
revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way
to free Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then
instructed Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and
gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan.1âwphi1.nêt
 "Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he
was carrying. Meanwhile, appellant, together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living
room. Moments later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then
followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, without
saying a word, immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter
unconscious and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin
to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the
neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek
about seven meters away from the house.

"Upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped and moved closer to the water. At this juncture,
Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death.
After throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left.

"The post-mortem examination on the victim's cadaver disclosed that the cause of his death was cardio-
respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to [a] stab wound penetrating the chest."
(Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant, on the other hand, presented the following version of the facts:7

"Accused Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to
each other as the one who killed Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the
latter also fingered the former as the killer of Sagario.

"Relying on his lone testimony and corroborating the testimony of prosecution witness Sheila Guilayan,
accused Fabros narrated that he is a resident of Luyuhan, Pasonanca, particularly in the house of his
auntie Amparo Guilayan (the common-law wife of Hernan Sagario), together with his cousins Merwin
Ledesma and Sheila Guilayan.

"On 28 February 1996, at around 7:00 p.m., he returned home to Luyahan after his work at Astoria Hotel
as a waiter. Sheila was at home when he arrived. Shortly thereafter, their neighbor, accused Tolentino,
came over and called for Sheila. Sh[ei]la stood up and went to the house of Tolentino, leaving behind
Fabros and Merwin Ledesma. After a while, he and Ledesma heard Sheila crying and the two went to
the house of Tolentino. At the house of Tolentino, Fabros and Ledesma asked Sheila why she cried.
[She] disclosed Tolentino's plan to kill her stepfather Hernan Sagario. When asked for his motive to kill
Hernan Sagario, Tolentino merely reasoned that he just wanted to help their auntie Amparo get rid of her
problems. When they expressed apprehension [about] being implicated and tried to prevent Tolentino
from pursuing his plan, the latter told them not to worry; for he will take care.

"When Tolentino saw their uncle Hernan coming towards the house, he ordered them to go home and
they obeyed. As he arrived, Hernan ordered Fabros to boil water. Afterwards, Hernan went out of the
house to buy Ovaltine. When Hernan returned, Tolentino approached him and they talked for about two
minutes. Afterwards, Tolentino went to his house while their uncle Hernan told him (Fabros) to check if
the water was already boiling. Jonathan went to the kitchen while their uncle placed the rice he brought
in a container. At that instance, Jonathan heard the sound 'pok', and saw Tolentino holding a piece of
wood (2" x 2"). Then, he saw his uncle f[a]ll down slowly, his chest hitting the corner edge of a table.
Tolentino approached his uncle and kicked him. Then he ordered Fabros to come near him and carry
Hernan by his feet. Afraid that Tolentino will hit him with the piece of wood, Fabros held his uncle by the
feet while Tolentino pulled Hernan by the shirt and he just followed Tolentino. Tolentino brought Hernan
near the river. When Jonathan noticed that his uncle regained consciousness, he ran away towards a
banana plantation and from there he saw Tolentino [stab] Sagario on the chest. After stabbing the victim,
Tolentino pushed and waded him into the water. Scared, Jonathan ran home. About twenty minutes
later, Tolentino arrived and with thumbs up sign, he said, 'Okey na!'. Jonathan also observed that there
was blood on the shoulder of Tolentino. The latter then called the three (3) and warned them that if they
will tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed whatever Tolentino told them.

"By reason of fear of Tolentino's threat, Jonathan told the police that he did not know what happened.
On 01 March 1996, however, he was arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario on account of an
information received by the police identifying him as the assailant. He was brought to the Sta. Maria
Police Station and thereat he was told by the police that if he will not admit, they will show him the
witness, which the police later did by showing to him his co-accused Tolentino. On seeing Tolentino, he
declared that he (Tolentino) was the one who killed the victim.
 "However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had become final and executory on his
part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently conscience-stricken, executed an affidavit admitting sole
responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and retracted his testimony implicating accused-appellant
Jonathan Fabros. His affidavit is herein reproduced as follows:

'I, WILFREDO TOLENTINO y ESPERAT, 65 years old, widower, Filipino, a convicted prisoner with
the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law hereby depose and state:

'That I was convicted for the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 13698 entitled 'The People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Wilfredo Tolentino y Esperat and Jonathan Fabros y Castro, accused,'
which Decision was promulgated on May 30, 1999 and ha[s] become final;

'That of the four years I have been in prison, I have contemplated on the consequences of my acts
and have been conscience stricken causing me sleepless nights and deep pity [for] my co-accused
Jonathan Fabros whom I have wrongfully imputed to be the killer of the victim Hernan Sagario y
Cuesta. As he appealed the Decision, [maybe] I still have the chance to rectify the wrong I have
done to him and tell the Honorable Court what actually happened [o]n the night of February 28,
1996, as hereunder narrated;

'That I had known Hernan Sagario earlier in 1994 when he was still a security guard and he
attempted to shoot me with his service firearm and although we had amicably settled the matter
between us, when he came to be my neighbor, I would remember that incident and my old grudge
against him would be rekindled;

'That earlier that night of February 28, 1996, I came home quite drunk [after] my drinking spree with
my relatives across the river and one of the topics we discussed was about the incident when
Hernan Sagario attempted to shoot me. As I recalled that incident, my old grudge against him
resurfaced and I resolved right then and there to take my revenge on Hernan. So when he came
home and he was in the kitchen, I took hold of a piece of wood and hit him with it and when he fell
down unconscious, I dragged his body outside of the house, ordering Jonathan Fabros who was
then in the kitchen to help me carry the body of Hernan outside or else he would also become my
victim. Jonathan unwillingly assisted me carry the body of Hernan outside and upon my direction,
we dragged the body of Hernan towards the river where to finish him off, I stabbed [him] in the
chest and pushed him down into the water to hide his body. For his part, Jonathan left me when the
body reached the river;

'That after [the] killing, I threatened Jonathan Fabros, Neneng (the daughter of Hernan's live-in-
partner) and Weng-weng, a cousin of Neneng and Jonathan[,] never to report the incident to any
one or else they could become my next victim;

'That during the investigation of the killing, I pointed to Jonathan as the killer of Hernan, thinking
that I would not be implicated. Even when I was also charged for the killing, I was confident that I
would be acquitted if I would point to Jonathan as the killer. During the trial of the case, I bribed
Jonathan and even gave P20,000.00 to a middle man to effect the pay off but Jonathan returned
the money to me saying he could not admit what he did not commit;

'That my conscience ha[d] been greatly troubled by denying Jonathan his future by [my] own evil
acts and by this affidavit hopes to correct the wrongs I had done to Jonathan Fabros;

'That I am executing this affidavit [to] attest to the truth of the foregoing narration of facts and to
appeal to the Court authorities to rectify the wrongs I had done to Jonathan Fabros and I am willing
to testify in court o[n] these statements narrated.'"

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had
hit the victim with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by
treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant manifested his approval of the killing and the
concurrence of his acts with those of the other accused.8 Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-
conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder.
Hence, this appeal.9

The Issue

In his Brief, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:

"The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting herein Accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros of the crime
charged notwithstanding the categorical statement of Prosecution Witness Sheila Guilayan that it was
Accused Wilfredo Tolentino who actually killed the victim, Hernan Sagario.

II

"The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding Wilfredo Tolentino's
categorical admission of guilt [of] the crime charged."10

The errors boil down to the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

This Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious; appellant should be acquitted.

Main Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

The RTC held that the assistance of appellant in bringing the body of the victim from the house to the river bank
where the latter was allegedly stabbed to death positively showed that the former had conspired in the
commission of the crime.11 In its abbreviated nine-page Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that
conspiracy has been duly proven. On the other hand, appellant argues that his "fleeting participation" in helping
carry the victim's body to the river bank did not indicate unity of purpose or design. We agree with him.

An appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case to review. This implies that the Court may pass upon every
circumstance favorable to the accused. In People v. Manambit,12 the Court explained thus:

"Indeed, the Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. It is a
matter of justice that the two other appellants be exonerated of the charges. This we do because an
appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty
and indemnity. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered."13

No Conspiracy

Even the Office of the Solicitor General admits that appellant did not directly kill the victim. It, however, urges us
to convict him on the basis of conspiracy.

In theory, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.14 To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a
crime, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon.15 Once conspiracy is established, the act of one
becomes the act of all.16

Well-settled is the rule that the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed.17 Quite the contrary, the evidence for
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.18 As this Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be
founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures.19 Prior agreement or assent is usually inferred from the
acts of the accused showing concerted action, common design and objective, actual cooperation, and
concurrence of sentiments or community of interests.20 Mere presence at the scene of the crime or even
knowledge of the plan or acquiescence thereto are not sufficient grounds to hold a person liable as a
conspirator.21 Therefore, the task in every case is to determine whether the particular acts established by the
requisite quantum of proof reasonably yield that inference.22
In the case before us, we agree that the culpability of Tolentino was clearly established, but we are also
convinced that the evidence fails to show the culpability of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.23 Because,
unquestionably, the latter did not personally inflict any of the fatal flows, he can be held liable as a principal, only
if conspiracy is proven.24 To recall, Sheila Guilayan, the prosecution eyewitness, narrated the circumstances
surrounding the killing of Hernan Sagario as follows:

"Q On February 28, this year, 1996, at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening, can you still remember
where were you?

A Yes, I could still remember, I was in our house.

Q You were in your house, are you referring to your house in Pasonanca, Luyahan?

A Yes.

Q Can you also remember who were with you in that evening of February 28, 1996 in your house at
Pasonanca, Luyahan?

A Yes, I can still remember, my companions were Jonathan Fabros and Melwin Ledesma.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And you said while you were in the sala sitting down, writing, there was an incident that
transpired, will you please tell us what transpired?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

That will ask for narration, what transpired?

COURT:

Be more specific on that.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

Q What happened?

A I was called by Tolentino and he requested me to go to their house.

Q You are referring to Wilfredo Tolentino?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Leading, Your Honor.

COURT:

Sustained.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

Q What did you do after you were called by this Tolentino?

A So I went with him to their house.

Q Where is his house?

A Just beside our house or near our house.

COURT:

Q Where was Tolentino when he called you to go with him?

A He was by the door of our house although he was still outside but he was at the door of our house
when he called me.

COURT:

Continue.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

Q And you said you went with him to his house, now what happened there in his house?

A There in their house he told me just to keep quiet because he [was] going to kill my step-father.

Q And what did you do next after he told you about that?

A After he told me that I cried and I told him not to do that because we will be implicated.

Q What else did you do aside from crying and telling him not to do it because we will be implicated,
what else did you do?

A Well, I just cried until my two cousins heard me and they, the two, also went to the house of
Tolentino.

Q While your two cousins were already in the house of Tolentino, what happened next?

A My cousins asked me why I was crying.

Q And then?

A They asked Tolentino why I was crying.

Q What did you do next?

A I just cried and kept on telling him not to do it because we will be implicated and also my mother
[was] not [t]here.

Q And how about Tolentino, what did he do?

A Well, he again told me just not to tell it to anybody because if I [was] going to tell it to anybody, he
will also kill us.

Q How about your two cousins, what did they do?

A My cousins also told him not to do it because they said they [were] the only persons [t]here and for
sure we will be implicated.

Q And thereafter, what happened next?

A Tolentino said he will just take care.

Q So what happened next after that?

A And then Tolentino asked Melwin Ledesma to get the bolo of my stepfather in our house.
Q And what did your cousin Melwin Ledesma do after he was ordered by Tolentino to get the bolo?

A Then Melwin Ledesma went to the house and got the bolo and brought the same to the house of
Tolentino.

Q And after bringing the bolo to the house of Tolentino, what happened next?

A Then when my step-father was on his way to our house, Tolentino told us to go home."25

"Q What happened next after you said your step-father went out to buy ovaltine?

A Then several minutes thereafter my stepfather again arrived in our house then he got inside the
house and he went directly to the kitchen.

Q And what did your step-father do?

A After that he transferred the rice he brought which was placed on a plastic cellophane to another
plastic container.

Q And what else happened?

A And then after that Tolentino entered our house and went directly to the kitchen and there he hit
my step-father.

Q And what instrument did Tolentino use in hitting your step-father?

A A piece of wood.

Q Will you please describe this piece of wood?

A A round piece of wood.

Q How about the length of this piece of wood?

A (Witness extended her both hands to demonstrate the length which when measured gave us
twenty inches in length).

Q You said it was a round piece of wood, can you more or less tell us the diameter of this piece of
wood?

A (Witness again made a circle to demonstrate the diameter which [was] three and a half inches x x
x).

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

Q And where was your step-father hit by that piece of wood used by Tolentino?

A He was hit on the right side of his neck x x x extending to his right jaw.

Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court your particular position when you saw Tolentino hit with
the piece of wood your step-father?

A I was in a sitting position in the sala but you know in our house even if you are seated in the sala
you can see the kitchen from there.

Q Before you saw that, where did Tolentino come from?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
 Witness is incompetent, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

If she knows, Your Honor.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

She was seated in the sala, how can [she] know?

COURT:

According to her she went home and she was in the sala. If she went to the sala, probably she
will know. If she knows she may answer.

A I did not know where he came from but I just saw him getting inside our house and [going] directly to
the kitchen.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

Q When you saw Tolentino hit your step-father, where was your step-father facing?

A He was facing forward while Tolentino came from behind him.

Q And what happened next after your step-father was hit by that piece of wood used by Tolentino?

A After he was hit he fell [face] down x x x, he fell down first on the table and after that to the ground.
From the table he continued to fall to the ground.

Q And while your step-father was already on the ground, what if any did Tolentino do?

A Then when my step-father was already at the cemented pavement Tolentino stepped on his head
several times.

Q And then what happened next?

A After that I cried but he told me to keep quiet because if I [was] not going to keep quiet he will also
kill us.

Q After that, what happened?

A And then he asked my cousins to help him to bring the body of my step-father outside of the
house.

Q And then?

A Then they brought my step-father outside of the house and Tolentino held him on the collar of his
shirt and my cousins held him on his feet.

Q And while already outside the house, towards what direction did they bring your step-father?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Witness is incompetent, we object, Your Honor.

COURT:

Sustained.
PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

Q What else happened after you saw your cousins Jonathan Fabros and Tolentino carrying your
step-father?

ATTY. FABIAN:

Objection, Your Honor, there was no mention of any Jonathan Fabros in her testimony.

COURT:

Cousin only.

ATTY. FABIAN:

Yes, Your Honor, cousin only, no mention of Jonathan Fabros.

COURT:

I do not know if it was cousin or cousins.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

I heard cousins, Your Honor.

COURT:

Cousins, with 'S'. She may answer. Yes, according to her it was only her cousins who were with
her.

ATTY. FABIAN:

I heard the name Jonathan Fabros being mentioned by the prosecution, Your Honor.

COURT:

That is why I told the prosecutor to change it to cousins.

ATTY. FABIAN:

Yes, Your Honor.

A It was only Jonathan and Tolentino who carried him.

Q So what happened next after you saw them carrying your step-father?

A They brought my step-father to the creek.

Q How far is this 'sapa' or creek from your house?

A Maybe from here (witness again by the use of the witness stand as reference point, pointed to the
fourth bench from the front,) about 6.5 meters, because from the witness stand to the main door is
measured 7.5 meters, so if it is from here, it is only 6.5 meters.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

That is about 7 to 8 meters.

COURT:

That is about 7 meters already from the witness stand to the fourth bench, more or less 7
meters.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

Q This 'sapa' or creek that you are referring to, please describe to this Honorable Court this creek
which according to you is only 7 meters more or less away from your house?

A This is a wide creek.

Q And what else did you see?

A Well, since it was clear from our house although I stayed inside our house and since the walling of
our house, the portion of this is made of screen, I saw Tolentino when they were carrying my step-father
in the act of stabbing my step-father (witness demonstrated as if she was holding something and
thrust[ing it] forward).

Q What else did you see?

A And then after that, I only saw Tolentino [place] the body of my step-father on the water and there I
did not see my cousin anymore.

Q And then what transpired next?

A Then a few minutes thereafter my cousin returned to the house.

Q And what did you do when your cousin returned to the house?

A And then when he arrived home I just cried and I told him, because his nickname is Nonong, so I
said: 'Nonong, we will be really implicated and he said nothing and instead he just went to his previous
position and sat down.

Q How about the other cousin of yours Melwin Ledesma, where was he?

A He was also beside me and he was embracing me from behind.

Q What happened next?

A Then another few minutes after, Tolentino arrived in our house.

Q And when he arrived at your house, what did he do?

A And then there inside our house he flashed a thumb's up and he said it is already okey.

Q What else did he do?

A Then he approached me and told me not to report [t]his incident because if I [was] going to report
[it] he [was] going to kill me.

Q And that particular time when he arrived at your house, what if any did you notice from his person,
this Tolentino?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Leading, Your Honor.

 COURT:

Sustained.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

What if any have you noticed from Tolentino?

COURT:

Will you please be more specific with your question.

PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

At the time when Tolentino arrived at your house and told you 'okey na', with thumb's up, that
particular time, what if any have you noticed on his person?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

It is [a] very general question, Your Honor.

COURT:

Anything she noticed, she may answer.

A I noticed that his shortpants was wet and there [were] bloodstains on his shirt."26

The above testimony shows that Tolentino attacked Hernan Sagario. The assault was carried out without the
participation of appellant,27 who did not personally hit or stab the victim, but only subsequently helped carry the
latter from the house to the nearby creek.28 Nothing in the testimony conveyed a coordinated action, concerted
purpose or community of design to commit the criminal act.29 It must be emphasized that Tolentino's plan to kill
the victim was concocted in the absence of appellant.30 The latter's participation, as shown by the foregoing
testimony, was made when the decision to kill was already a fait accompli.31

Further, conspiracy cannot be inferred from the overt acts of appellant.32 He did nothing to assist Tolentino in the
actual commission of the murder.33 Neither did the former bear any weapon, much less use one to inflict injury on
the victim.34 In fact, appellant, showing clearly his lack of support for the criminal intent of Tolentino, even tried to
prevent the latter from hacking the victim, according to the eyewitness.35

Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, not on solid facts indubitably
indicating a common design to commit murder.36 Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt.37

Because of the lack of a united purpose, appellant cannot be considered a principal by indispensable
cooperation.38 Absent a conspiracy, his responsibility, as well as that of his co-accused, is individual -- not
collective -- and each is to be punished only for his own separate acts.39

Not an Accomplice

Neither can appellant be convicted as an accomplice. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code
defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17,40 cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts." To be convicted as an accomplice, it is necessary that the accused be
aware of the criminal intent of the principal and then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or
moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime.41

To consider a person an accomplice in the commission of the offense, the following must concur: (1) community
of design -- knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, one concurs therein; (b)
cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying
material and moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.42
To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act.43 In
other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the
same end.44 Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design.45

In the case before us, appellant did not concur in or lend support to the nefarious intent of Tolentino.46 The mere
fact that the former had prior knowledge of the latter's criminal design did not automatically make him an
accomplice.47 This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the principal's criminal intent.48

That appellant helped Tolentino carry the victim from the house to the creek did not necessarily demonstrate
concurrence of wills or unity of purpose or action.49 Quite the contrary, the former's attempt to dissuade the latter
from killing Sagario was attested to by the prosecution witness.50 With the nominal role appellant played in the
drama that had been thrust upon him, we cannot declare that he was an accomplice in the crime charged.51

Not an Accessory Either

Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory either. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory
as one who had knowledge of the commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal
or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or
the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in
the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when
the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements
must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the
three above-cited modes.52

Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or of the
effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime.53 That,
precisely, is wanting in the present case.54

In his testimony,55 appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he refused, he
agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise
indicated his innocence of the charge.56 Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident
as one born of fear for his own life.57 It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to
desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril.58

Thus, in People v. Verzola,59 we explained as follows:

"x x x. It must be noted that Josefina testified that she helped her co-appellant bring the body of the
deceased down the stairs because of fear. Even if she assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply
assisting Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for
anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to conceal or destroy the body of the crime, the
effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime."60

The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.61 Thus, he must be acquitted.62

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. He is ordered RELEASED from custody immediately, unless legally held for another cause. In
this regard, the director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court his compliance with this
Decision within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RONALD a.k.a "ROLAND" GARCIA y FLORES,* RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES, ROTCHEL LARIBA y
DEMICILLO, and GERRY B. VALLER, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 accused-appellants Ronald a.k.a Roland Garcia y Flores, Rodante Rogel y
Rosales, Rotchel Lariba y Demicillo and Gerry B. Valler, along with a certain Jimmy Muit, were charged with and
convicted of kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced each to death, except aforementioned Jimmy Muit who
has remained at large, for obvious reasons, and to indemnify their victim Romualdo Tioleco P200,000.00 and to
pay the costs.1

In a related case, Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050, which was decided jointly with Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049,
accused-appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel were also found guilty of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition and each sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 plus the costs.2 No notice of appeal3 was filed in
this criminal case; nonetheless, for reasons herein below stated, we take cognizance of the case.

Atty. Romualdo Tioleco was jogging alone at Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, at about 5:30 o'clock in
the morning of 5 October 1996.4 He was heading towards 4th Avenue when he noticed a blue car parked at the
corner of this street.5 As he was about to cross 4th Avenue, the car lurched towards him and stopped.6 Two (2)
men quickly alighted from the car.7 One of them pointed a gun at Atty. Tioleco while the other hit his back and
pushed him into the back seat of the car.8 Once inside, he saw two (2) other men, one on the driver's seat and the
other on the back seat directly behind the driver.9 He found out later the identities of the driver whom he
undoubtedly recognized during the abduction to be accused-appellant Gerry Valler, and of the other person on
the passenger seat behind Valler as accused-appellant Roland "Ronald" Garcia.10 He described the man who
disembarked from the car and who pushed him inside to be 5'5" or 5'6" in height, medium built, and the other,
who threatened him with a gun, at 5'4" or 5'5" in height, dark complexioned and medium built although heftier
than the other.11 These two (2) persons have since the commission of the crime have remained at large.

While inside the car Atty. Tioleco was made to crouch on the leg room.12 As it sped towards a destination then
unknown to the victim, the men on board feigned to be military men and pestered him with the accusation of
being a drug pusher and the threat of detention at Camp Crame.13 As they were psyching him down, "they started
putting blindfold on [him] and packaging tape on [his]face and handcuffed [him] on the back of [his] body."14 His
eyeglasses were taken off "when they were putting blindfold on [him] x x x."15 Then they divested him of his other
personal belongings, e.g., his keys, wristwatch, etc.16

The car cruised for thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes.17 When it finally stopped, Atty. Tioleco was told to alight,
led to a house and then into a room.18 He remained blindfolded and handcuffed throughout his ordeal and made
to lie down on a wooden bed.19 During his captivity, one of the kidnappers approached him and told him that he
would be released for a ransom of P2 million20 although the victim bargained for an amount between P50,000.00
and P100,000.00 which according to him was all he could afford. While still under detention, one of his abductors
told him that they had mistaken him for a Chinese national and promised his release without ransom.21 But he
was just being taken for a ride since the kidnappers had already begun contacting his sister Floriana Tioleco.

Floriana was at her office when her mother called up about her brother's kidnapping.22 Floriana hurried home to
receive a phone call from a person who introduced himself as "Larry Villanueva" demanding P3 million for Atty.
Tioleco's ransom.23 Several other calls to Floriana were made during the day and in one of those calls the ransom
was reduced to P2 million.24 Around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, 5 October 1996, P/Sr. Insp.
Ronaldo Mendoza of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) arrived at Floriana's house to monitor her
brother's kidnapping upon the request of her friends.25 Floriana received the following day about eight (8) phone
calls from the kidnappers still demanding P2 million for her brother's safe release.26

By the end of the day on 7 October 1996 Floriana was able to raise only P71,000.00,27 which she relayed to the
kidnappers when they called her up.28 They finally agreed to set her brother free upon payment of this amount,
which was short of the original demand.29 The pay-off was scheduled that same day at around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening at Timog Avenue corner Scout Tuazon in Quezon City near the "Lighthaus" and "Burger
Machine."30 Upon instruction of P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, Floriana together with only two (2) female friends proceeded
to this meeting place.31 They reached there at 8:40 o'clock in the evening and waited for the kidnappers until
about 10:30 or 11:00 o' clock that evening.32
Meanwhile, P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza relayed the information about the pay-off and other relevant facts to P/Chief
Insp. Gilberto Cruz at the PACC headquarters.33 With the information from P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, P/Chief Insp.
Cruz, together with P/Chief Insps. Winnie Quidato and Paul Tucay with P/Sr. Insp. Nilo Pagtalunan, immediately
went to Timog Avenue corner scout Tuazon near the "Lighthaus" and "Burger Machine" in Quezon City.34 They
surveyed this site and saw a blue Toyota Corona with three (3) persons on board suspiciously stopping about five
(5) meters from Floriana and her friends and remaining there for almost two (2) hours.35

Floriana and her friends left the "pay-off site" after waiting for two (2) hours more or less;36 so did the blue Toyota
Corona almost simultaneously.37 No payment of ransom took place.38 P/Chief Insp. Cruz then ordered P/Chief
Insps. Quidato and Tucay and their subordinates to tail this car which they did all the way to the De Vega
Compound at Dahlia Street in Fairview, Quezon City.39 This compound consisted of one bungalow house and was
enclosed by a concrete wall and a steel gate for ingress and egress.40 They posted themselves thirty (30) to forty
(40) meters from the compound to reconnoiter the place.41 Meanwhile, the kidnappers explained in a phone call to
Floriana that they had aborted the pay-off on account of their belief that her two (2) companions at the meeting
place were police officers.42 But she assured them that her escorts were just her friends.43

At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 8 October 1996 Floriana received a call from the kidnappers at her
house44 who wanted to set another schedule for the payment of the ransom money an hour later or at 2:00
o'clock.45 This time the rendezvous would be in front of McDonald's fastfood at Magsaysay Boulevard in Sta.
Mesa, Manila.46 She was told by the kidnappers that a man would go near her and whisper "Romy" to whom she
would then hand over the ransom money. Floriana agreed to the proposal. With her two (2) friends, she rushed to
the place and brought with her the P71,000.00.47 About this time, the same blue Toyota Corona seen at the first
pay-off point left the De Vega Compound in Fairview.48 A team of PACC operatives under P/Chief Insp. Cruz
again stationed themselves in the vicinity of McDonald's.49

Floriana arrived at the McDonald's restaurant and waited for a few minutes.50 Not long after, the blue Toyota
Corona was spotted patrolling the area.51 The blue car stopped and, after dropping off a man, immediately left the
place. The man approached Floriana and whispered "Romy" to her.52 She handed the money to him who took
it.53 Floriana identified this man during the trial as accused-appellant Roland (Ronald) Garcia.54

The PACC operatives tried to follow the blue car but were prevented by traffic.55 They were however able to catch
up and arrest Garcia who was in possession of the ransom money in the amount of P71,000.00.56 They brought
him inside their police car and there apprised him of his custodial rights.57 Garcia informed the PACC operatives
that Atty. Tioleco was being detained inside the De Vega compound in Fairview.58 With this information, P/Chief
Insp. Cruz ordered P/Chief Insps. Tucay and Quidato who had been posted near the compound to rescue the
victim.59

The two (2) PACC officers, together with their respective teams, entered the compound and surged into the
bungalow house where they saw two (2) men inside the living room.60 As one of the PACC teams was about to
arrest the two (2) men, the latter ran towards a room in the house where they were about to grab a .38 cal.
revolver without serial number loaded with six (6) rounds of ammunitions and a .357 cal. revolver with six (6) live
ammunitions.61 The other PACC team searched the house for Atty. Tioleco and found him in the other room.62 The
two (2) men were arrested and informed of their custodial rights. They were identified in due time as accused-
appellants Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba.63

P/Chief Insp. Cruz arrived at the De Vega compound64 and coordinated with the proper barangay
authorities.65 While the PACC operatives were completing their rescue and arrest operations, the house phone
rang.66 Accused-appellant Rogel answered the call upon the instruction of P/Chief Insp. Cruz.67 Rogel identified
the caller to be accused-appellant Valler who was then driving towards the De Vega compound.68 In the same
phone call, Valler also talked with accused-appellant Garcia to inquire about the ransom money.69

Then a blue Toyota Corona arrived at the De Vega compound.70 Valler alighted from the car and shouted at the
occupants of the house to open the gate.71 Suspicious this time, however, he went back to his car to flee.72 But the
PACC operatives pursued his car, eventually subduing and arresting him.73 The operations at the De Vega
Compound ended at 8:30 in the evening and the PACC operatives, together with Atty. Tioleco and the accused-
appellants, left the De Vega compound and returned to their headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City.74 The
ransom money was returned intact to Atty. Tioleco.75

When arraigned, accused-appellants Ronald "Roland" Garcia, Rodante Rogel, Rotchel Lariba and Gerry Valler
pleaded not guilty to the charge of kidnapping for ransom in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, although during the trial
Garcia admitted complicity in the abduction of Atty. Tioleco and in the receipt of the ransom money from the
victim's sister Floriana.76 In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba also pleaded not guilty.77
During the trial, Gerry Valler denied being part of the kidnapping for ransom and asserted that he was at the De
Vega compound where he was arrested on 8 October 1996 solely to pay for the fighting cocks he had bought
from one Jimmy Muit, alleged owner of the compound.78 Accused Ronald Garcia, despite his admission to the
crime, nevertheless disowned any role in planning the crime or knowing the other accused-appellants since his
cohorts were allegedly Jimmy Muit and two (2) others known to him only as "Tisoy" and "Tony."79 He also alleged
that it was Jimmy Muit's red Toyota car that was used in the crime.80 Explaining their presence at the De Vega
compound at the time they were arrested, Rogel claimed that he was employed as a helper for breeding cocks in
this compound81 while Lariba's defense focused on an alleged prior agreement for him to repair Jimmy Muit's
car.82

Accused-appellants filed separate appellants' briefs. In the brief submitted by the Public Attorneys Office in behalf
of accused-appellants Garcia, Rogel and Lariba, they argue that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was not
committed since Atty. Tioleco was released from detention by means of the rescue operation conducted by the
PACC operatives and the ransom money subsequently recovered.83 They conclude that their criminal liability
should only be for slight illegal detention under Art. 268, of The Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants Rogel
and Lariba further assert that they could not be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition since
neither was in complete control of the firearms and ammunition that were recovered when they were arrested
and no evidence was offered to prove responsibility for the presence of firearms and ammunition inside the
room.84

The brief filed for accused-appellant Gerry B. Valler asserts the same defense he made at the trial that he was at
the De Vega compound only to pay his debts to Jimmy Muit,85 arguing that Atty. Tioleco did not have the
opportunity to really recognize him so that his identification as the driver of the car was tainted by police
suggestion, and that P/Chief Insp. Cruz' testimony is allegedly replete with inconsistencies that negate his
credibility.86

Encapsulated, the issues herein focun on (a) the "ransom" as element of the crime under Art. 267 of The Revised
Penal Code, as amended; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove kidnapping for ransom; (c) the
degree of responsibility of each accused-appellant for kidnapping for ransom; and, (d) the liability for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under RA 8294, amending PD 1866.

First. We do not find any quantum of merit in the contention that kidnapping for ransom is committed only when
the victim is released as a result of the payment of ransom. In People v. Salimbago87 we ruled -

No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it
was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim's freedom. In municipal criminal law,
ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual
payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. It is enough if the crime was committed
"for the purpose of extorting ransom." Considering therefore, that the kidnapping was committed for
such purpose, it is not necessary that one or any of the four circumstances be present.

So the gist of the crime, as aptly stated in American jurisprudence from which was derived the crime of
kidnapping for ransom,88 is "not the forcible or secret confinement, imprisonment, inveiglement, or kidnapping
without lawful authority, but x x x the felonious act of so doing with intent to hold for a ransom the person so
kidnapped, confined, imprisoned, inveigled, etc."89

It is obvious that once that intent is present, as in the case at bar, kidnapping for ransom is already committed.
Any other interpretation of the role of ransom, particularly the one advanced by accused-appellants, is certainly
absurd since it ironically penalizes rescue efforts of kidnap victims by law enforcers and in turn rewards
kidnappers for the success of police efforts in such rescue operations. Moreover, our jurisprudence is replete with
cases, e.g., People v. Chua Huy,90 People v. Ocampo91 and People v. Pingol,92 wherein botched ransom payments
and effective recovery of the victim did not deter us from finding culpability for kidnapping for ransom.1âwphi1.nêt

Second. Issues of sufficiency of evidence are resolved by reference to findings of the trial court that are entitled
to the highest respect on appeal in the absence of any clear and overwhelming showing that the trial court
neglected, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance affecting the result
of the case.93 Bearing this elementary principle in mind, we find enough evidence to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the cooperation of all accused-appellants in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco.

Truly incriminating is the judicial confession of accused-appellant Garcia of his participation in the commission of
the crime. He admitted that he took part in actually depriving Atty. Tioleco of his liberty94 and in securing the
ransom payment from Floriana Tioleco.95 He could not have been following mechanically the orders of an alleged
mastermind, as he claims, since by his own admission he was neither threatened, forced or intimidated to do
so96 nor mentally impaired to resist the orders.97 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is presumed to be
in full possession of his faculties and conscience to resist and not to do evil.

We cannot also give credence to Garcia's asseveration that the persons still at large were his co-conspirators.
This posture is a crude attempt to muddle the case as discerned by the trial court from his demeanor when he
testified -

Because he had been caught in flagrante delicto, Roland Garcia admitted his participation in the crime
charged. From his testimony, however, there appears a veiled attempt to shield Gerry Valler from
conviction. First, Garcia claimed that the car they used was reddish in color (TSN, October 20, 1997, pp.
9, 19 & 20). Then he added that the owner of the car was Jimmy Muit and not Gerry Valler (TSN,
October 20, 1997, p. 9). Next, he said that there was no conspiracy and he did not know then Gerry
Valler, Rodante Rogel and Rogel Lariba until they were placed together in Camp Crame (Ibid., p. 22).

The Court however cannot simply accept this part of his story. To begin with, his repeated reference to the color
of the car as reddish is quite suspicious. He conspicuously stressed the color of the car in three (3) instances
without being asked. The transcripts of the notes bear out the following:

ATTY. MALLABO: Did you use any vehicle while you were there at Gilmore Street?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of vehicle was that?

A: Jimmy's car, a Toyota, somewhat reddish in color x x x x

Q: By the way, what car did you use when you were roaming around Quezon City on October 6 in
the evening?

A: Jimmy's car, which was somewhat red in color. Reddish.

Q: And what car did you use the following day when you took the bag? The same car?

A: The same car, the Toyota car which was somewhat reddish in color.

Such a clear attempt to mislead and deceive the Court with such unsolicited replies cannot succeed. On
October 8, 1996, in the vicinity of McDonald's, he was seen alighting from the blue Toyota Corona (TSN,
March 17, 1997, pp. 28-32). As earlier pointed out, the blue Toyota Corona car is owned by Gerry Valler
who was the one driving it in the afternoon of the same day to the De Vega compound (TSN, April 28,
1997, pp. 64-67; and November 10, 1997, pp. 22-28). Gerry Valler was also identified by Atty. Tioleco as
the driver of the dark blue car used in his abduction (TSN, April 10, 1997, pp. 10-11; and TSN, April 14,
1997, pp. 21-27).98

Accused-appellant Valler's profession of innocence also deserves no consideration. Various circumstances

indubitably link him to the crime. For one, he was positively identified by Atty. Tioleco to be the driver of the dark
blue Toyota car used in the abduction on 5 October 1997, which car was seen again twice during the occasions
for ransom payment. This was followed by a telephone call made by Valler to the house where Atty. Tioleco was
being detained and in fact talked with accused-appellant Rogel to tell him that he was coming over99 and with
accused-appellant Garcia to ask from him about the ransom supposedly earlier collected.100 Given the
overwhelming picture of his complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defense that he was only trying
to pay his debts to Jimmy Muit when he was arrested.

We find nothing substantive in Valler's attempt to discredit the victim's positive identification of him on the trifling
observation that Atty. Tioleco was too confused at the time of his abduction to recognize accused-appellant's
physical features accurately. It is truly evident from the testimony of Atty. Tioleco that his vision and composure
were not impaired by fear or shock at the time of his abduction and that he had the opportunity to see vividly and
remember unerringly Valler's face -

Q: Where were these two unidentified men positioned inside the car?

A: One of them was at the driver's seat and the other one was immediately behind the driver's seat.
 Q: Now, could you please describe to this honorable court the person who was seated on the
driver's seat?

A: He has a dark complexion, medium built and short hair at that time.

Q: If you see that person again will you be able to identify him sir?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And if he's present in the courtroom will you be able to point to him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: At this juncture your honor we would like to request with the court's permission the witness be
allowed to step down from the witness stand and approach the person just described and tap him on his
shoulder.

COURT INTERPRETER: Witness stepping down from the witness stand and approached the person he
had just described and tapped him on his shoulder and who when asked to identify himself he gave his
name as Gerry Valler.101

Even on cross-examination, Atty. Tioleco was steadfast in his reference to Gerry Valler -

Q: What stage was that when your eyeglasses were grabbed by these persons inside the car?

A: That was after the other accused entered the vehicle and the car zoomed away, that was when
they were putting a blindfold on me, that was the time when they started removing my eyeglasses, sir x
x x x102

Q: So when you were inside the car, you had difficulty seeing things inside the car because you
were not wearing your eyeglasses?

A: No, sir, that is not correct, because they were close, so I can see them x x x x103

Q: And as a matter of fact, it was the PACC operatives who informed you that the person being
brought in was also one of the suspects, am I correct?

A: That is not correct, sir. They said that, but I know that is one of the suspects because he was the
person who was driving the vehicle at the time I got kidnapped. So I know him.

Q: So you saw him at the time you were kidnapped that is why you were able to identify him when
he was ushered in?

A: When he was brought into the kitchen I saw him. When I saw him, I knew he was one of the
suspects.

Q: When you saw him, he was in handcuffs?

A: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Q: You were informed that his name is Gerry Valler?

A: When he went inside the house and the kitchen, they started interviews, that is where I learned
his name, Gerry Valler x x x x104

Q: But I thought that when you were pushed inside the car, you were pushed head first, how can you
easily describe this person driving the vehicle and the person whom you now identified as Roland
Garcia?
 A: Even if they pushed my head, there was an opportunity for me to see the face of the accused.105

As we held in People v. Candelario,106 it is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the
faces of their assailants and the manner in which the craven acts are committed. There is no reason to disbelieve
Atty. Tioeleco's claim that he saw the faces of his abductors considering that they brazenly perpetrated the crime
in broad daylight without donning masks to hide their faces. Besides, there was ample opportunity for him to
discern their features from the time two (2) of his kidnappers approached and forced him into their car and once
inside saw the other two (2), including Gerry Valler, long enough to recall them until he was blindfolded.

The victim's identification of accused-appellant Valler is not any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention Valler's
name in his affidavit. It is well-settled that affidavits are incomplete and inaccurate involving as they do mere
passive mention of details anchored entirely on the investigator's questions.107 As the victim himself explained -

Q: Now, in Question No. 5 and I quote x x x Why did you not identify here the name of the driver as
one Gerry Valler?

A: Because they never asked me the name. They just asked me to narrate what happened. Had
they asked me the name, I could have mentioned the name.108

In light of the positive identification by the victim of accused-appellant Valler, the latter's denial must fall
absolutely. Clearly, positive identification of the accused where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over his defense.109 When
there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify
falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.110

Finally, we do not see any merit in Valler's enumeration of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of P/Chief
Insp. Gilbert Cruz concerning (a) the time and place of meeting between the PACC operatives and Floriana
Tioleco; (b) the schedule of the first and second ransom pay-offs; (c) the number of Floriana Tioleco's
companions during the aborted first pay-off; (d) the number of occupants in the blue Toyota car; and, (e) the
PACC operatives' recognition of Floriana Tioleco during the ransom payments. This is an argument that clutches
at straws. For one, the purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve estimations of time or number,
hence, the reference thereto by the witness would understandably vary. Furthermore, they are too minor to
warrant the reversal of the judgment of conviction. They do not affect the truth of the testimonies of witnesses nor
do they discredit their positive identification of accused-appellants. On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies
strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution's case as they erase suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and
negate any misgiving that the same was perjured.111

We also do not believe that accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba are innocent bystanders in this case. It taxes
the mind to believe Rogel's defense that as a caretaker of the place where Atty. Tioleco was detained, he
observed nothing unusual about this incident. An innocent man would have immediately reported such dastardly
act to the authorities and refused to sit idly by, but a guilty person in contrast would have behaved otherwise as
Rogel did.112

Accused-appellant Lariba's defense is similarly incredible. He joins Gerry Valler in proclaiming that he too was
allegedly at the wrong place at the wrong time for the wrong reason of just wanting to tune up the car of Jimmy
Muit. But for all these assertions, he failed to produce satisfactory evidence that he was indeed there to repair
such car. Of all the days he could have discharged his work, he chose to proceed on 8 October 1997 when the
kidnapping was in full swing. There was even no car to repair on the date that he showed up. Like the submission
of Rogel, Lariba's defense falls completely flat for he could have so easily observed the kidnapping of Atty.
Tioleco that was taking place in the house of Jimmy Muit.

In sum, accused-appellants cannot rely upon the familiar phrase "reasonable doubt" for their acquittal. As
demonstrated by the fastiduous references of Valler to alleged inconsistencies of P/Chief Insp. Cruz, not all
possible doubt is reasonable since in the nature of things everything relating to human affairs is open to some
imaginary dilemma. As we have said in People v. Ramos,113 "it is not such a doubt as any man may start by
questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony,
for it is possible always to question any conclusion derived from testimony. Reasonable doubt must arise from the
evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence, and it should pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime
charged." Accused-appellants have not shown the presence of such fatal defects in this case. Clearly, all the
elements and qualifying circumstances to warrant conviction for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third. We go into the criminal liability of each accused-appellant. There is no doubt that Gerry Valler and Ronald
Garcia are principals by direct participation and co-conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco.
Their respective participation in perpetrating the crime cannot be denied. As regards their liability as co-
conspirators, we find the same to have also been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it for which
liability is joint.114 Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant itself may be
inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the commission of the crime disclosing a
common understanding between them relative to its commission.115 The acts of Valler and Garcia in coordinating
the abduction, collection of ransom and detention of their victim indubitably prove such conspiracy.

Lariba and Rogel were caught inside the house where Atty. Tioleco was detained. P/Chief Insp. Paul Tucay
testified on their involvement -

Q: Okey, when you stormed the place, do you know where these two men were?

A: The two men were seated at the sala during that time, sir.

Q: They were seated at the sala when you entered the place?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened after entering the gate?

A: We announced that we were police officers of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.

Q: Do you know what happened with these two men during that time?

A: They were caught by surprise and they were about to run to the first room.

Q: What happened when these two men who were at the living room or at the sala, when they ran to
the first room?

A: We surprised them and cornered them in that room.

Q: What about the team of Major Quidato, where did they proceed?

A: Major Quidato's team proceeded to the second room where Atty. Tioleco was being kept.

Q: According to you, you gave chase to these two men who were earlier in the sala and they ran
upon your announcement that you were police officers?

A: When we cornered them in that room, they were about to grab the two revolvers loaded with six
(6) rounds of ammunitions.

Q: Where were these revolvers placed, Mr. Witness?

A: They were placed on top of a cabinet, which, when you enter in the room, is placed on the right
side of the room.

Q: How many revolvers were you able to recover?

A: There were two revolvers.

Q: And can you please describe these revolvers to this Honorable Court?

A: Yes, sir x x x x The revolvers confiscated on that raid are one (1) .38 caliber revolver without
serial number loaded with 6 rounds of ammunition, live ammo, one .357 also loaded with 6 rounds of
live ammunitions.116
Correlating the above testimony with the other evidence, it is clear that at the time Lariba and Rogel were caught,
Atty. Tioleco had already been rendered immobile with his eyes blindfolded and his hands handcuffed. No
evidence exists that he could have gone elsewhere or escaped. At the precise moment of their apprehension,
accused-appellants Lariba and Rogel were unarmed although guns inside one of the rooms of the house were
available for their use and possession.

Assessing these established circumstances in the manner most favorable to Lariba and Rogel, we conclude that
they were merely guarding the house for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating
the successful denouement to the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim, as shown by the availability
of arms and ammunition to them. They thus cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts by means of which they aided or facilitated the execution of the crime but without any
indispensable act for its accomplishment. Under Art. 18 of The Revised Penal Code, they are mere accomplices.

In People v. De Vera117 we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner -

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon
such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the
decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime
should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime
should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators
are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to
the perpetration of the offense.

In the instant case, we cannot deny knowledge on the part of Lariba and Rogel that Valler and Garcia had
kidnapped Atty. Tioleco for the purpose of extorting ransom and their cooperation to pursue such crime. But these
facts without more do not make them co-conspirators since knowledge of and participation in the criminal act are
also inherent elements of an accomplice.118 Further, there is no evidence indubitably proving that Lariba and
Rogel themselves participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. As the evidence stands, they were
caught just guarding the house for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the
success of the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim as shown by the availability of arms and
ammunition to them. These items contrast starkly with the tried and true facts against Valler and Garcia that point
to them as the agents ab initio of the design to kidnap Atty. Tioleco and extort ransom from his family.1âwphi1.nêt

Significantly, the crime could have been accomplished even without the participation of Lariba and Rogel. As
stated above, the victim had been rendered immobile by Valler and Garcia before the latter established contacts
with Floriana Tioleco and demanded ransom. The participation of Lariba and Rogel was thus hardly
indispensable. As we have held in Garcia v. CA, "in some exceptional situations, having community of design
with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the
perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character."119 At any rate, where the
quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking and doubt created as to whether the accused acted
as principal or accomplice, the balance tips for the milder form of criminal liability of an accomplice.120

We are not unaware of the ruling in People v. Licayan that conspiracy can be deduced from the acts of the
accused-appellants and their co-accused which show a concerted action and community of interest. By guarding
Co and Manaysay and preventing their escape, accused-appellants exhibited not only their knowledge of the
criminal design of their co-conspirators but also their participation in its execution.121 But the instant case is
different. Considering the roles played by Lariba and Rogel in the execution of the crime and the state the victim
was in during the detention, it cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt that these accused-appellants were in a
real sense detaining Atty. Tioleco and preventing his escape. The governing case law is People v. Chua
Huy122 where we ruled -

The defendants' statements to the police discarded, the participation of the other appellants in the crime
consisted in guarding the detained men to keep them from escaping. This participation was
simultaneous with the commission of the crime if not with its commencement nor previous thereto. As
detention is an essential element of the crime charged, as its name, definition and graduation of the
penalty therefor imply, the crime was still in being when Lorenzo Uy, Tan Si Kee, Ang Uh Ang, William
Hao and Young Kiat took a hand in it. However, we are not satisfied from the circumstances of the case
that the help given by these accused was indispensable to the end proposed. Our opinion is that these
defendants are responsible as accomplices only.

Fourth. In the beginning, we noted that neither Lariba nor Rogel who were both convicted of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 filed a notice of appeal in accordance with established
procedures, although the records show that accused-appellant Gerry Valler needlessly did so exclusively in his
behalf.123 But in light of the enactment of RA 8294 amending PD 1866 effective 6 July 1997,124 and our ruling
in People v. Ladjaalam125 followed in Evangelista v. Siztoza,126 we nonetheless review this conviction to give effect
to Art. 22 of The Revised Penal Code mandating in the interest of justice the retroactive application of penal
statutes that are favorable to the accused who is not a habitual criminal.127

In Ladjaalam we ruled that if another crime was committed by the accused he could not be convicted of simple
illegal possession of firearms under RA 8294 amending PD 1866 -

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court
convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended
by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor x x x x

The trial court's ruling and the OSG's submission exemplify the legal community's difficulty in grappling
with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to
interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:

Sec. 1. - Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed
as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.

x x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other
crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of
RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is
justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.
 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms
and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and
not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance x
x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates accused-appellants x x x of illegal possession
of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While
the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second, it is only prision correccional. Indeed, an
accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing
an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable
by arresto menor. This consequence necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294 the wisdom of
which is not subject to review by this Court.128

Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 and set aside the judgment of conviction
therein since accused-appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel cannot be held liable for illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions there being another crime - kidnapping for ransom - which they were perpetrating at
the same time.

In fine, we affirm the conviction of Gerry Valler and Ronald "Roland" Garcia as principals and Rotchel Lariba and
Rodante Rogel as accomplices for the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. This Court is
compelled to impose the supreme penalty of death on Valler and Garcia as mandated by Art. 267 of The Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.

The penalty imposable on Lariba and Rogel as accomplices is reclusion perpetua, the penalty one degree lower
than that prescribed for the crime committed pursuant to Art. 52 in relation to Art. 61, par. (1), of the Code. We
however set aside the judgment in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 convicting Lariba and Rogel of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition in light of the foregoing discussion.

As regards the moral damages against accused-appellants to be paid by them in solidum, we find the amount of
P200,000.00 to be reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings Atty. Tioleco and his family endured
due to accused-appellants' inhumane act of detaining him in blindfold and handcuffs and mentally torturing him
and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological ordeal which constitute the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code129 is too obvious to
require still the recital thereof at the trial through the superfluity of a testimonial charade.

Following our finding that only Gerry Valler and Ronald "Roland" Garcia are principals by direct participation and
conspirators while Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel are accomplices, we apportion their respective
responsibilities for the amount adjudged as moral damages to be paid by them solidarily within their respective
class and subsidiarily for the others.130 Thus, the principals, accused-appellants Ronald "Roland" Garcia and
Gerry Valler, shall pay their victim Atty. Romualdo Tioleco P150,000.00 for moral damages and the accomplices
P50,000.00 for moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 (G.R. No. 133489)
accused-appellants RONALD "ROLAND" GARCIA y FLORES and GERRY B. VALLER are declared guilty as
PRINCIPALS of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and are sentenced each to death, while
accused-appellants RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO are convicted as
ACCOMPLICES and are ordered to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law
for the same crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. Accused-appellants are further ordered
to pay moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, with the principals being solidarily liable for P150,000.00 of
this amount and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the accomplices, and the accomplices being solidarily liable for
P50,000.00 for moral damages and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the principals.1âwphi1.nêt

Finally, in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 (G.R. No. 143970) the Decision of the court a quo convicting RODANTE
ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE in light of the enactment of RA 8294 and our rulings in People v.
Ladjaalam131 and Evangelista v. Siztoza.132

Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality
of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible
exercise of Her Excellency's pardoning power. Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.