F2.

10
ABAKADA PARTYLIST VS PURISIMA

Facts:

RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation

capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF,
DBM, and NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service
officials and employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target; and further, to
issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and
the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the purpose of approving the
formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated IRR by the agencies,
JCOO became functus officio and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing
and enforcing said law.

Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on

the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function
should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation
of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

Issue:

Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution

Ruling: YES.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became
functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
REPORT THIS AD

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront
the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily

constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation
of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative

sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may
not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional
measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency

to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by
itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form
of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret

the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality
by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of
powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with
the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this
principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing
rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision
that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the
members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and
VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.

F2.14
PADILLA VS CONGRESS
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law
and suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of
rebellion and necessity of public safety.
Within 48 hours after the proclamation and while the Congress was in session, President Duterte
transmitted his Report to the Senate and House of Representatives.
After a briefing before the Senate (May 29) and the House (May 31), the former adopted Senate
Resolution No. 49 and the latter House Resolution No. 1050, which expressed support for
President Duterte’s Proclamation No. 216 and both of the Houses of the Congress voted against
calling for a joint session.
A petition for Mandamus was filed by Padilla et al. (Padilla Petition) which seek to direct the
Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 and to vote thereon.
The petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of former Senator Tanada et al. (Tanada Petition) seeks
to (a) declare the refusal of the Congress to convene in joint session to be in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (b) to direct the Congress to convene in
joint session.
Subsequently, the petitioners in the Padilla Petition filed a Manifestation, due to the imminent
expiration of the 60-day period of the validity of Proclamation No. 216, to still resolve the instant
cases for the guidance of the Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.
Consequently, the Congress convened in joint session and approved by virtue of a majority vote
the extension of the proclamation and suspension in Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President’s proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:
NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session EXCEPT to vote
jointly to revoke or extend the President’s declaration or suspension.
(1) There is no constitutional provision governing concurrence by the Congress in the President’s
proclamation and/or suspension, and absent a specific mandate for the Congress to hold a joint
session in the event of concurrence, then WON to hold a joint session under such circumstances
is completely within the discretion of the Congress

Art. VII, Sec. 18: “The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its members
in a regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President”
According to the SC, applying the plain-meaning rule or verba legis, the use of the word “may” in
the provision is to be construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress
on WON to revoke. Moreover, the Court stated that the provision does not actually refer to a “joint
session.” The requirement that the Congress “voting jointly” explicitly applies only to the situation
when the Congress revokes the President’s proclamation and/or suspension.
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framer’s specific intentions to (a) remove the
requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the President’s proclamation
of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) to grant to
the Congress the discretionary power to revoke the President’s proclamation or suspension by a
vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly.
(2) The usual procedure for having a joint session is for both Houses to first adopt a Concurrent
Resolution to hold a joint session.

With neither Senate nor the House adopting a concurrent resolution, no joint session by the two
Houses of the Congress can be had in the present cases. The Court is bound to respect the rules of
the Congress as a co-equal and independent branch of government. Moreover, both Houses already
separately expressed support for P.RRD’s proclamation, so revocation was not even a possibility
and the provision on revocation under the Constitution requiring Congress to vote jointly in a joint
session never came into operation.
(3) Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be deemed a judicial precedent for the present cases

In the Fortun case, the Senate expressed through Resolution No. 217 its objection to P.GMA’s
Proclamation No. 1959 for being unconstitutional, and both the Senate and the House adopted
concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session for the purpose of revoking said proclamation;
while in the cases at bar, the Senate and the House adopted Senate Resolution No. 49 and House
Resolution No. 1050, respectively, which expressed support for P.RRD’s Proclamation No. 216,
and both Houses of the Congress voted against calling for a joint session. Moreover, the two
Houses in 2009 also initially took separate actions on P.GMA’s proclamation before the two
Houses adopted concurrent resolutions to convene in joint session to vote on the revocation of the
proclamation. In addition, the fundamental issue in the Fortun case was whether there was factual
basis for Proclamation No. 1959 and not whether it was mandatory for the Congress to convene in
joint session. Furthermore, the word “automatic” in the Fortun case referred to the duty or power
of the Congress to review the proclamation and/or suspension, rather than the joint session of
Congress.

Therefore, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House to convene in joint
session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in complete
disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216,
including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session, considering their respective
resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.

F3.2.
LIBAN VS GORDON (2009)
Facts:

Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed
with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter
while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.

During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,1 he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2 which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or
controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman
of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,3 which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective
posts upon their appointment to another government office.

In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which
appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an
act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners
do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or
unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition
is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of
the public officer's forfeiture of office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross
volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and
re-elected in 2005.

Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayer's suit, petitioners
cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that they suffered
some actual damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent.
Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds, or that public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of
public funds.

Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, this Court
would have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional
Trial Court.

Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation
and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the
present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo warranto nor an
action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayer's suit
questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing
his salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office.
Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or
constitutional issue which is of transcendental importance.

Issues:

W/N the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

1. No. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions. The PNRC is a non-profit,
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective,
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides six
major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and
Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.

The Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each country of a voluntary
organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish
supplies for that purpose; the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July
4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on February 14, 1947,
and by that action indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the
suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that
purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention;

The PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in
order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not
appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot
merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross
Society.12 It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in
relation to the State.

To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned
or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The
PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.13The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals
and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors.

We hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates
the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare
that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National
Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are
VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.