G.R. No.

L-8936 2 October 1915

Consuelo Legarda, with husband Mauro Prieto vs. N.M. Saleeby

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Consuelo Legarda and her husband Mauro Prieto, and the defendant N.M.
Saleeby occupy, are owners of adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. There
exists a stone wall between the lots located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the
title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for
under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall. Later the
predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of the lot now occupied by him. The description of the lot given in the petition of the
defendant also included said wall. The plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the
defendant. They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of
each of said parties. The lower court denied said petition upon the theory that during the
pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot including the wall.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiffs are the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it.

HELD:

Yes. The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree
was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it Granting that theory to be correct
one, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. It would be seen to a just
and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that
the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should
be protected.
G.R. No. 80687 10 April 1989
Republic of the Philippines vs. Honorable Mariano M. Umali

FACTS:

Land in question originally purchased on installment from the government by Florentina

Bobadilla, who transferred her right thereto in favor of Martina Cenizal, et al. Tomasa and Julio
assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In 1971, these three assignees signed a
joint affidavit that they were entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title over the said land, and
that they had already paid in full. On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources executed a deed, and thereafter a TCT. Several transfers thereafter followed.
Petitioner Director of Lands representing the Republic of the Philippines seeks reversion of a
parcel of land on the ground that the original sale thereof from the government was tainted with
fraud based on a forgery and therefore void ab initio, claiming that Gregorio died in 1943, Maria
in 1959, and could not have signed the joint affidavit. Respondent claimed that they all acquired
the property in good faith and for value, invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata,
others invoked no cause of action as no rights were violated, government not a real party-in-
interest because the land is already covered by Torrens system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not deception or fraud in the registration of title makes all titles derived
therefrom ineffectual ab initio.

HELD:

No. The status of the defendants as innocent transferees for value was never questioned,
and such accorded them the protection of the Torrens system, thus rendering the titles obtained
indefeasible and conclusive. The private respondents acquired the land not by direct grant but
after several transfers following the original sales thereof. They are presumed to be innocent
transferees for value. A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab initio,
unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although
it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the
land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as the land involved in the
present case does not belong to such category, OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable or
reviewable. The land remained private as long as the title thereto had not been voided, but it is
too late to do that now.
G.R. No. 94114 19 June 1991
Felicisima Pino vs. Court Of Appeals

FACTS:

Lot 6 was acquired by the spouses Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato. Juan Gaffud died in
1936. Lot 6 was originally registered in the names of Rafaela Donato, and sons Raymundo
Gaffud and Cicero Gaffudas as co-owners thereof. Said lot was sold to Rafaela Donato through a
Deed of Transfer who then later sold a portion in favor of Fortunato Pascua. Upon registration of
said sale in favor of Fortunato Pascua, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
Rafaela Donato covering the land designated as Lot 6-B. Rafaela Donato sold to petitioner
Felicisima Pino said Lot 6-B. Cicero Gaffud died survived by his wife Demetria Gaffud and sons
Romualdo Gaffud and Adolfo Gaffud who are the private respondents herein. Private
respondents filed a complaint for nullity of sale and reconveyance against Felicisima Pino.
Incidentally, the sale of the Lot 6-A is not assailed by private respondents. During the pendency
of the case before the trial court, Rafaela Donato died.

The RTC ruled and this was sustained by respondent CA that petitioner Pino is not a purchaser in
good faith, so (a) the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Rafaela in favor of Pino null and void
insofar as the shares of Cicero and Raymundo are concerned, (b) cancellation of TCT No. 49380
in the name of Pino and (c) reconvey one-half of Lot-6-B to plaintiffs withing 10 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Felicisima Pino is a purchaser in good faith and the filing of an action for
reconveyance has already prescribed.

HELD:

Yes. When petitioner purchased the subject property the title was in the name of vendor
Rafaela Donato alone. Where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is
sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the
absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. There was no allegation or evidence that the transfer of subject property to Rafaela
Donato was fraudulent. What private respondents allege as fraudulent was the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Juan Gaffud, but it has been shown that this settlement was not the
basis of the transfer of the subject property. That petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value is
within the scope of established jurisprudence and so private respondents will have no cause of
action against her. The remedy of the defrauded party is to bring an action for damages against
those who caused the fraud or were instrumental in depriving him of the property. And it is now
well-settled that such action prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over
the property. Clearly then, the action has already prescribed because it was filed fifteen (15)
years after the issuance of TCT.
G.R. No. 118862 4 September 1999
Traders Royal Bank vs. Court Of Appeals

FACTS:

Parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgaged to and subsequently
extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public
auction, Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void
because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice of lis pendens was filed before
the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale
proceeded with the TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a
new one was entered in TRB’s name without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The
Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision declaring the
mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRB’s title and issued a new
certificate of title for the Capays. Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to
Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land.
Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good
faith since they purchased the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the court.
Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book
constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim over the property.
TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for
litigation. The Capays were issued the certificate of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to
pay damages to Capays.

ISSUE:

Whether or not spouses Capay had the better right over the land in dispute.

HELD:

No. The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid
conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no
lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered
title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in
good faith and for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the
notice for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action
for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In
consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration, the
foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the
real owner of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value.
Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay
the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.
G.R. No. 175485 24 July 2011
Casimiro Development Corp. v. Mateo

FACTS:

Parcel of land was originally owned by Isaias Lara, respondent’s maternal grandfather.
Upon death of Isaias Lara, the property passed on to his children Miguela and Felicidad, and
grandson Rosauro. Co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad
who had five children: Laura, Lara-Mateo respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and Leonardo.
With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property was
executed in favor of Laura, who was granted OCT. The property was used as collateral to secure
a succession of loans. In the end, China Bank acquired and foreclosed a mortgage on the
property. CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of the
property. CDC then brought an action for unlawful detainer against the respondent’s siblings.
MeTC ruled in favor of CDC, RTC against, CA and SC in favor of CDC. Respondent brought
action for quieting of title, RTC favored CDC, the Court of Appeals declared that the respondent
and his three brothers were the rightful owners of the land in litis, and directed the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City to cancel the transfer certificate of title (TCT) registered
under the name of petitioner Casimiro Development Corporation (CDC) and to issue in its place
another TCT in favor of the respondent and his three brothers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Laura’s title was indefeasible and CDC was a buyer in good faith.

HELD:

Yes. The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title before CDC
became the registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all that time, neither the
respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing the various transfers. Respondent’s
suit is also exposed as being a collateral attack on the title in the name of Laura. Registration of
land under the Torrens System, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after
the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack. A
collateral attack occurs when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of
the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of
attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an
action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if
not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been
disposed of. Considering that China Bank title was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had
the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in
the name of China Bank. The vendee’s notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in
order for it to amount to bad faith, should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious person to make further inquiry into the vendor’s title, or facts and
circumstances that would induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of
the property in litigation.
G.R. No. 101387 11 March 1998
Spouses Mariano and Erlinda Laburada vs. Land Registration Authority

FACTS:

Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A,
Psd-1372. On January 8, 1991, the trial court acting as a land registration court, finding the
application meritorious, declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title. After the
finality of the decision, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the
corresponding decree of registration. The LRA refused, stating that to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners may result in the duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration
system, and destroy the integrity of the same. In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor
general prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature. Hence, petitioners filed an
action for mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue decree of registration.

HELD:

No. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is
not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. Though a court may be
compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it
cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties. The court has to decide a question
according to its own judgment and understanding of the law. It is not legally proper to require the
LRA to issue a decree of registration. The Court deemed it more appropriate to direct the LRA to
expedite its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60)
days from receipt of the Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed
according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
G.R. No. 112905 3 February 2000
Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro

Facts:

Two applications for registration of the same parcel of land were filed twelve years apart
in different branches of the same Court of First Instance, but a certificate of title was issued in
one case while the other is still pending appeal. In 1956, Predo Lopez, et al. filed an application
for registration of a parcel of land in Tagaytay City, to which the Municipality of Silang, Cavite
opposed; a portion of the land being leased by the municipality to private persons had been its
patrimonial property since 1930. Applicant claimed that part of the land was their inheritance,
but was excluded in the application for registration since it is located in Laguna; same with the
part of the land in Tagaytay which was excluded from the proceedings in the CFI of Laguna.
Lower court denied the motion to dismiss since the oppositor municipality had no personality to
intervene. Meanwhile, the Land Registration Commission discovered that part of the land had
been decreed in favor of private respondent de Castro, the land being initially owned by one
Hermogenes Orte who sold the land to the father of de Castro in 1932. However the deed of sale
was destroyed during the Japanese occupation. Heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for
execution of judgment and cancellation of land titles of the defendants, claiming that they had
been unduly deprived ownership and possession of the land due to wrongful registration by
means of fraud and misrepresentation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Pedro Lopez were deprived of ownership and possession of
the contested land.

HELD:

No. Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land
registration. In the same way that publication of their application for registration was supposed to
have rendered private respondents on constructive notice of such application, the publication of
notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had the same effect of
notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed to have been notified of the land
registration proceedings filed by private respondents, thereby providing them with the
opportunity to file an opposition thereto. Petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, they could or should
have done earlier. They neglected or omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that they either had abandoned or declined to assert it. In short, they
were guilty of laches. An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of
the decree of registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the validity of
the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the one-year period has elapsed, the
title to the land becomes indefeasible. This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is
without a remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an
action for reconveyance is still available. If the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for damages.
G.R. No. 123346 29 November 2005
Manotok Realty, Inc vs. Clt Realty Development Corporation

FACTS:

Plaintiff CLT Realty filed a complaint alleging that they are the registered owner of Lot
26, having acquired the same from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito, by virtue of a
Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage; that she, in turn, purchased the same lot from Jose B.
Dimson; that Manotok Corporations illegally took possession of 20 parcels of land within said
Lot 26; that based on the technical descriptions of Manotok Corporations’ titles, their property
overlap or embrace Lot 26 of CLT Realty; and that the titles of Manotok Corporations constitute
a cloud of doubt over the title of CLT Realty. Manotok Corporations alleged that Jose B.
Dimson’s title was irregularly issued, hence void; and that consequently, the titles of Estelita
Hipolito and CLT Realty derived therefrom are likewise void. By way of affirmative defense,
Manotok Corporations asserts they acquired the same from the awardees or vendees of the
National Housing Authority. The trial court, upon agreement of the parties, approved the creation
of a commission tasked to resolve the conflict in their respective titles. Manotok Corporations
submitted their Memorandum praying that the trial court approve the Minority Report while CLT
Realty filed its Memorandum on praying that the Majority Report be approved in toto. Trial
court rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the Decision of
the trial court. Manotok Corporations’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the Appellate
Court hence this petition. They allege in essence that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
trial court’s Decision which decided the case on the basis of the Commissioners’ Report.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court’s decision which
was rendered having merely relied on the technical report of the commissioners appointed by the
court based on the parties’ nomination.

HELD:

No. The trial court acted properly when it adopted the Majority Report of the
commissioners as part and parcel of its decision. The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the
assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering. Given their background, expertise and
experience, these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the titles is valid.
That the parties agreed to such commission means petitioners, under the doctrine of estoppel,
cannot now be permitted to assail the Decision. The titles of the respondents in these cases were
derived from OCT No. 994, the validity of which has long become final and executory. Nothing
is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or
orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be
no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005
Republic of the Philippines vs. Jeremias and David Herbieto

FACTS:

Respondents Jeremias Herbierto and David Herbiertio, brothers, filed with the MTC a
single application for registration of two parcels of land. They claimed to be owners in fee
simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed an opposition to the respondents' application arguing that: (1) Respondents
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2) Respondents'
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) Subject Lots were part of the public domain not
subject to private appropriation. MTC granted the application. CA affirmed the decision of MTC
holding that the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report, may
now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. Republic appealed to the
SC contending that 1) MTC had no jurisdiction since there was a procedural defect in filing of a
single application for two parcels of land; 2) Respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject
Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a procedural defect which resulted to MTC’s lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes, but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner. The misjoinder of
causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the
publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree. A land registration case
is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive
seizure of the land through publication and service of notice. The late publication of the Notice
of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all.
Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof.

Respondents also failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject
Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. Not being
members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the
land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963. It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially
confirmed or legalized.
G.R. No. 173775 8 October 2008
Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap

FACTS:

Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. filed a petition for declaratory relief alleging that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles
over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. The Republic, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ right to judicial confirmation of title
was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. The RTC
upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that
neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. The CA held that respondents-claimants
could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial
were part of a forest reserve. During the pendency of the case, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into (400) hectares of reserved forest land and
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands
in Boracay Island.

HELD:

Yes. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA
No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Private claimants’ bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and
disposable land. Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter
how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. Neither may they apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which
were classified as agricultural lands, for failure to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.