CRIMINAL LAW I

Case Digests

People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946


Topic: Mitigating Circumstance – Privileged

Facts: At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina, deceased victim, went to
the chapel of Seventh Day Adventists to attend religious services and sat at the front
bench facing the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her
father for the same purpose and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door.
Upon seeing Avelina, Amado went and sat by Avelina’s right side from his seat on the
other side of the chapel, and without saying a word, placed his hand on the upper part
of her right thigh. Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife
which she had in a pocket of her dress with the intention of punishing Amado’s offending
hand. Amado seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife on her left hand
and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck inflicting upon him a
wound about 4 ½ inches deep, which is mortal.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all criminal
responsibility because she is justified in having acted in the legitimate defense of her
honor.

Held/Ratio: According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned
trial court, when Amado Capiña (deceased) sat beside the defendant near the chapel door
placing his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said
chapel was lighted and there were already several people. Under these circumstances,
there was and there could be no possibility for her to be raped. And so when she struck
Capiña with a knife on his neck resulting death, the means she employed to defend her
honor was excessive.

People v. Narvaez, L-33466-67, 20 April 1983 


Topic: Mitigating Circumstance – Privileged

Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia
during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from
getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard
sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked
them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, goahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and
shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep
where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the
company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other
land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the
civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't
pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely
2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral
damages.

Issue: Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that
he acted in defense of his person.

Held/Ratio: The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house
of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property.
On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of
property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of
owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article
because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending,
therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor.

People v. Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, 20 September 2000
 


Topic: Mitigating Circumstance – Privileged

Facts: Wapili, having a high fever and insensibly talking to himself, was acting strangely
in his home (nasisiraanna ng ulo). His brother in law was trying to calm him down but
to know avail. Wapili locked himself in his room. Later on, he went out naked and chased
his brother in law (Leydan). Leydan and neighbours tried to tie him with rope but to no
avail so he got loose in the village. Leydan went to a policewoman to report the incident
and while this was happening, Wapili turned up in front of the policewoman’s house to
bang her vehicle so she called for assistance. Later on, SPO1 Ulep and 2 other police
officers went to the scene where they saw Wapili armed with a bolo and a rattan stool
(sabi naman ng relatives ni Wapili wala siyang dalang bolo). Ulep fired a warning shot
but Wapili charged towards them so Ulep shot him. Wapili fell to the ground. Ulep came
closer then pumped another bullet to his head, literally blowing his brains out. Ulep: self-
defense and fulfilment of a duty.

Issue: Whether or not Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili.

Held/Ratio: The second requisite of Art. 11 Par. 5 of the RPC is lacking in the instant case.
The Court however, appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 of RPC, “a penalty lower by one of two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable
by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt
from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that
the majority of such conditions be present.