Republic ofthe Philippines

Wjk
^anhtgatcbapn
Quezon City
***

SEVENTH DIVISION

MINUTES ofthe proceedings held on 24 July 2019.

Present!
Justice MA. THERESA DOLORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA Chairperson
Justice ZALDY V. TRESPESES Member
Justice GEORGINA D. HIDALGO Member

Thefollowing resolution was adopted:

Crinu Case Nos. 27755 to 27756 - People vs. ALFREDOK MACAPUGAY,et al

TRESPESES,/.

Submitted for the Court's consideration is accused Dionisio C.

Arengino's ("accused")Petition for Relief(with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order dated 2
July 2019 and filed with the Court on 3 July 2019.'

Antecedents

On 8 February 2019, the Court issued a Notice^ to Libatique Martinez

& Associates Law Offices, Atty. Reynaldo Libatique III and Atty. Gregorio
L. Salazar as counsel for accused Arengino, as well as for accused Genato
spouses, Romualdez, Aranador and Germina. The notice informed accused
and counsel of the setting of the cases for promulgation ofjudgment on 29
March 2019. Further, a personal notice intended for accused Ariengino was
sent at his residential address appearing on record, though it was not
successfully served on him.^

On 29 March 2019, the .Court promulgated the Decision"^ finding

accused (and several others) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts

'Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 242-256.

2 Record, Vol. XII, p. 316.
2 Record, Vol. XII, p. 322.
^ Record, Vol. XII, pp. 347-494.

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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of violation of Section 3(e) R.A. No. 3019 in Criminal Case Nos. 27755 to
27756.

In an Order issued in open court on 29 March 2019,^ the Court noted

that despite notice, several ofthe accused, including accused Arengino, were
not present for the scheduled promulgation of judgment. Accordingly,
judgment against them were promulgated in absentia with a copy thereof
entered in the criminal dockets of the Court and to be furnished to them at
their last known address, in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon the prosecution's motion, the
cash bond posted by accused Arengino was ordered confiscated^ and a
warrant for his arrest^ was issued.

Notice of the Decision was served upon Libatique Martinez &

Associates Law Offices, Atty. Reynaldo Libatique III and Atty. Gregorio L.
Salazar as counsel for accused Arengino, and others,^ though it was not
personally served upon accused Arengino.^ The Notice of Decision clearly
reminded the parties:

Please Note: Per Rule XI(Review ofJudgments and Final Orders

Section 1 ofthe 2018 Revised Internal Rules ofthe Sandiganbayan (A.M.
No. 13-7-05-SB) "The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases
decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its originaljurisdiction
shall be by notice ofappealfiled with the Sandiganbayan and by serving a
copy thereofupon the adverse party."

On 24 June 2019, accused, through his counsel, Reynaldo C. Libatique

III, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated 21 June 2019,*® informing the
Court that he was unable to attend the promulgation of judgment last 29
March 2019 due to deteriorating health caused by hospitalization and
confinement. Accused attached thereto a copy of two(2) pictures of accused
at the hospital, a more recent picture taken with his family, photocopies of
X-ray and CT Scan Reports and Hospital Statement of Account." The
reports show that accused was treated as an admitted patient at the Premiere
Medical Center in Nueva Ecija from 20 to 22 December 2018, and as an
outpatient on 27 December 2018 and 1 January 2019. The Statement of
Account issued by the Chinese General Hospital in Manila showed that
accused was confined therein from 31 January 2019 to 4 February 2019.

Accused moved for the lifting ofthe Order of Arrest issued against him
and the reinstatement of the cash bond he previously posted, to be

^ Record, Vol. XII, pp. 536-537.

® Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 121-E.
' Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 58-59.
8 Record, Vol. XII, pp.498.
i'
' Record, Vol. XII, p. 501.
Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 184-187.
"Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 188-201.
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People vs. Alfredo N. Macapugay, et al.
Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756 <
Page 3 of21

considered as his continuing bond on appeal. He also moved that he be

allowed to adopt the motion for reconsideration dated 10 April 2019 and
Reply dated 21 June 2019 filed by his co-accused private individuals.

Meanwhile, the Court denied outright the said Manifestation and

Motion in an Order given in open court dated 1 July 2019,*^ after noting that
accused Arengino presented himself at the hearing "fully ambulant and
capable of standing up." It held that it no longer has jurisdiction even to
entertain or give affirmative relief to accused. This is because he did not file
a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal within the period
allowed by the rules. Moreover, Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules
of Court was not complied with. Accordingly, the Court issued a warrant^^
for accused's arrest in view of the finality of the judgment, following his
failure to surrender and to avail of post-conviction remedies within 15 days
ofthe judgment's promulgation.

Accused's Petition

Accused claims that his petition is based on Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and is filed to set aside the following:

1. Order given in open court on 29 March 2019 declaring the

promulgation of judgment in absentia for accused, issuing a
warrant for his arrest and forfeiting his bond; and

2. Order given in open court on 1 July 2019 denying accused's

Manifestation and Motion dated 21 June 2019.

Accused claims that his petition was timely filed. He alleges that the
Court promulgated its Judgment in these cases on 29 March 2019.
Meanwhile, accused learned of his conviction sometime in June 2019.
Hence, he filed a Manifestation and Motion on 21 June 2019. When the
Court denied his Manifestation and Motion on 1 July 2019, accused filed the
present petition on 3 July 2019, or well within the sixty-day period allowed
under Section 3, Rule 38 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Accused attaches to his Petition as Annex "1" thereof his Affidavit

dated 3 July 2019.'^ In his Affidavit, accused claims that on 20 December
2018, he was attending a senior citizen's gathering in Nueva Ecija when he
lost his balance, fell to the ground and struck his head on the floor. He was
'2 Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 239-240.
Record, Vol. XIll, pp. 234-235.
''' SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.- When a Judgment or final order
is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fi^ud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the
judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 254-256. '

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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rushed to the hospital, where he was confined until the last week of January
2019. As he vomited blood a few days after being discharged from the
hospital, he had to be readmitted for several days. He claims he never really
recovered and could no longer remember things or do activities on his own.

Accused also alleges in his affidavit that he only relies upon his
children to take care of his needs. His daughter, Joan Salido, coordinates
with his co-accused, Rebecca Genato, regarding his situation. He avers that
he was not able to file a timely motion for reconsideration to the 29 March
2019 judgment because he had no prior knowledge of its promulgation. He
asserts that he did not receive any notice or order from the Sandiganbayan to
attend the promulgation ofjudgment.

He further claims in his affidavit that he had no intention to evade the

promulgation of judgment. In fact, it was the first time that he failed to
appear during a scheduled proceeding. Finally, he adds that he is willing to
post a bond, if required by the Sandiganbayan.

In his petition, accused argues that his failure to appear at the

promulgation of judgment and to file the necessary motion for
reconsideration was due to accident and excusable negligence. His resulting
medical condition after his accident, as well as his relocation to Nueva Ecija,
were the reasons why he was not able to inform his counsel, his co-accused
and the Court of his whereabouts.

Accused claims that the execution ofjudgment, if not restrained, will

cause grave and irreparable damage to him by depriving him of life and
liberty without being given the opportunity to exhaust the remedies accorded
to him by law. He also argues that judgments should be based on the merits
ofthe case. He moreover argues against the immutability offinal judgments,
citing Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation,^^ where the Supreme Court
held:

XXX Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a

decision that heis acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions offact or law, and whether it will be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon
finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same.

Nonetheless, the immutability offinal judgments is not a hard and fast

rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and
to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it. After
all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a
stringent application ofthe rules would hinder rather than serve the demands

G.R. No. 197582,29 June 2015. ^

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter, as specifically

mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 ofthe Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Construction. — These rules shall be liberally

construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.

Consequently(,) final and executory judgments were reversed

when the interest of substantial justice is at stake and where special
and compelling reasons called for such actions. In Barnes v. Judge
Padilla, we declared as follows:

... a final and executory judgment can no longer be

attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or
indirectly, even by the highest court ofthe land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, hoiior or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances,(c)the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules
of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself had already declared to be final.

Additionally, accused contends that this Court has the residual powers
to entertain his Manifestation and Motion dated 21 June 2019. Accused
quotes Angeles v. Court ofAppeals where the Supreme Court ruled:

The 'residual jurisdiction' of trial courts is available at a stage in

which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or
the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records
on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal ofthe appeal.

In this regard, accused insists that because there is a pending motion for
reconsideration filed by accused Arengino's co-accused private individuals

17
G.R. No. 178733, 15 September 2014.
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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 6 of21

and the records of the case are still with this Court, the latter still has
residual powers to give due course to accused's Manifestation and Motion.

Finally, he avers that there is a commonality of interest between him

and that of his co-accused private individuals. Meanwhile, Section 11, Rule
122 ofthe Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -(a) An appeal

taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment ofthe appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

Hence, accused concludes that it would better serve the ends ofjustice
that accused Arengino be allowed to adopt the pleadings filed by his co-
accused private individuals. This will prevent a possible but unfair scenario
wherein accused Arengino is serving sentence because his conviction has
already attained finality, while his co-accused private individuals are
acquitted.

Accordingly, accused prays that:

1. A temporary restraining order be immediately ISSUED suspending the

execution ofjudgment against Accused Arengino;
2. After due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be
ISSUED enjoining the execution judgment against Accused Arengino;
3. The Order in open Court during the proceeding on 29 March 2019 that
judgment be promulgated in absentia against accused Arengino, a
warrant of arrest be issued against him, and his bond be forfeited, be
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
4. The Order during the proceeding on 01 July 2019 of the Honorable
Sandiganbayan denying the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 June
2019, be REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
5. Accused Arengino be allowed to ADOPT the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated 10 April 2019, as well as the REPLY
dated 21 July 2019 of his co-accused private individuals;
6. Accused Arengino's ORDER OF ARREST/ WARRANT OF ARREST
be LIFTED; and
7. Accused Arengino's CASH BOND previously posted be REINSTATED
and consider the same to be his continuing BOND on appeal.

Our Ruling

We DENY accused's petition for lack of merit.

1. A petition for relieffrom judgment/order is '

a remedy available only for civil cases. It j"

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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cannot be successfully invoked herein as the

present cases are criminal in nature.

Accused anchors his petition on Section 1, Rule 38 ofthe 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, which provides:

SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other

proceedings. - When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.

Accused invokes a rule of procedure which is evidently meant to apply

only to civil cases. However, it is beyond dispute that the present
proceedings are criminal in nature. Hence, at the outset, it is clear that
accused's petition is devoid of legal basis.

2. Even assuming that a petitionfor relieffrom

judgment/order applies to criminal cases, it
cannot be availed of where there is a
remedy at law existing, which was lost due
to accused's negligence or mistake in the
mode ofprocedure.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that Section 1, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure could apply to criminal cases such as the ones
before the Court, accused would still not be entitled to avail of the petition
for relieffrom judgment/order under the circumstances.

Apart from being applicable only to civil cases, as expressly stated

therein, a petition for relief from judgment/order is not available to a party
who seeks to be relieved to from the effect of a judgment/order when the
loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure, to wit:

The present case will have to be decided in accordance with existing

rules of procedure. We apply the settled principle that petition for relief
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed onlv
in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy.
Hence, a petition for relief may not be availed of where a party has another
adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new trial or
appeal from the adverse decision ofthe lower court, and he is not prevented
from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is that relief wiW not
be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the
iudgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence,
or a mistaken mode of procedure: otherwise, the petition for relief will be

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either
because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
procedure taken by counsel.'^(Underscoring supplied.)

Based on the prayer'^ in his pleading entitled "Petition for Relief,"

accused Arengino seeks relief, not from the actual judgment of conviction,
but rather from the promulgation of judgment in absentia, leading to the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and the forfeiture of his bond.

Either way, there was an adequate remedy in law available to iaccused

Arengino. In order to set aside the judgment of conviction, the law provides
the Filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and subsequent appeal.
In order to set aside the consequences of his failure to appear during the
promulgation of judgment, there is the procedure clearly mapped out in
Section 6 of Rule 120 ofthe Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The existence of the said remedies precludes the application of petition

for relief from judgment, assuming that the latter is available for criminal
cases.

Just because a petition for relief from judgment provides a longer

period, reckoned from the time a petitioner learns of the judgment, does not
necessarily mean that accused Arengino may avail of the same when the
period for filing the appropriate remedies had already lapsed.

Simply put, the petition for relief is not a substitute for a lost appeal. In
Redena v. Court ofAppeals the Supreme Court explained that Rule 38 is
allowed only in exceptional cases,thus:

The present case will have to be decided in accordance with existing

rules of procedure. We apply the settled principle that petition for relief under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate
remedy. Hence, a petition for relief may not be availed of where a party has
another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new
trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not
prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is that relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or
a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be

Redena v. Court ofAppeals, 543 Phil. 358-371 (2007).

In his petition, accused Arengino prayed that the Court set aside the follovying:
1. Order given in open court on 29 March 2019 declaring accused's promulgation ofjudgment in absentia,
issuing a warrant for his arrest and forfeiting his bond; and
2. Order given in open court on 1 July 2019 denying accused's Manifestation and Motion dated 21 June
2019.
543 Phil. 358-371 (2007).
Minute Resolution
People vs. Alfredo N. Macapugay, et al.
Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 9 of21

tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either
because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
procedure taken by counsel.
Under Section 2 of Rule 38,supra, of the Rules of Court, a party
prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final order of a court by
reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, may file in the
same court and in the same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be
given due course. This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken
precisely because of any ofthe aforestated reasons, which prevented him from
appealing his case. Hence, a petition for relief under Rule 38 cannot be
availed of in the OA,the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction. For sure,
under the present Rules, petitions for relief from a judgment, final order or
other proceeding rendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the
court in the same case from which the petition arose. Thus, petition for relief
from a judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a case tried by a
municipal trial court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in the
same case, just like the procedure followed in the present Regional Trial
Court.

3. Even assuming that a petitionfor relieffrom

judgment applies to criminal cases, the
petition could not prosper because accused
Arengino's supposed grounds for his
petition are unavailing and the petition was
filed beyond the prescribed period.

Assuming that a petition for relief from judgment/order applies to

criminal cases, the reasons adduced by accused Arengino are insufficient for
the judgment of conviction or the promulgation ofjudgment in absentia to
be set aside.

We note that in his petition, accused Arengino attributes his failure to

appear before the Court during promulgation ofjudgment on two things: (i)
he did not receive any notice from the Sandiganbayan to attend the
promulgation ofjudgment, and (ii) he was not able to inform his counsel and
the Court of his whereabouts because he had become forgetful and had
relocated to Nueva Ecija following his accident.

Accused Arengino's reasoning is unavailing.

It must be emphasized that notice to counsel is notice to his client and

therefore binding on the latter.^ ^ Hence, it is of no moment that accused
Arengino was not able to actually receive the notice from the Court to attend
the promulgation ofjudgment. He is deemed to have been notified of the
order to proceed with judgment in absentia through his counsel, Atty.
Libatique, who was present during the 29 March 2019 promulgation.

Seavan Carrier, Inc., v. GTISportswear Corp., 217 Phil. 294-302(1984).

►

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People vs. Alfredo N. Macapugay, et al.
Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 10 of21
X X

Additionally, it must be stressed that the failure of a party's counsel to

notify him of the adverse judgment, resulting in the loss of his right to
appeal, is not considered excusable negligence for the purpose of filing a
petition for relieffrom judgment:

In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the judgment of
the lower court through their counsel, Attorney Ralph Lou I. Willkom on
March 3, 1995. Thus, the YEES are considered to have received notice on
March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice and not on March 24,
1995 when they actually learned of the adverse decision. Consequently,
their petition for relief, which was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days
from notice of their counsel, was filed out of time. This Court has
consistentlv held that the failure of a partv's counsel to notify him on time of
the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence,
which is not excusable. However, notice sent to counsel to record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground
for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.^^ (Underscoring
supplied.)

Finally, a party must strictly comply with the sixty(60)day period from
knowledge of the judgment or order within which to file a petition for relief
from judgment. The rationale is this:

As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing

a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
reglementary periods:first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside;
and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such
judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is
required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of
liberalitv on the part of the State, which remedv cannot be allowed to erode
anv further the fimdamental principle that a judgment order or proceeding
must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to
litieation.^^ (Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that a petition for relief from
judgment is the proper remedy herein, accused Arengino should have filed
the petition by 28 May 2019, this date being the sixtieth (60^) day from 29
March 2019, or the date when the promulgation of judgment in absentia
occurred, with Atty. Libatique attending. Considering that the present
petition was filed only on 3 July 2019, the petition was evidently filed out of
time.

Mercury Drug Corp. v. Court ofAppeals, 390 Phil. 902-916(2000).

Thomasites Centerfor International Studies v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 203642,27 January 2016.
Minute Resolution
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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 11 of21
X X

4. When accused Arengino failed to attend the

promulgation ofjudgment despite notice, he
violated a vital condition for his bail and
lost his standing in court to invoke its
jurisdiction to seek relief

The fifth paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure clearly mandates that where accused fails to appear
despite notice at the promulgation ofjudgment, which turned out to be for
conviction, he shall be ordered arrested. Further, he will be deemed to have
lost the remedies against the judgment which are available to him under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

An accused's absence in court during promulgation of judgment

violates the condition of his bail.^"* Thus, his bail is cancelled and a warrant
is issued for his arrest.

Moreover, when accused fails to appear in court for promulgation of

judgment, he is considered to have lost the remedies of filing a motion for
new trial or reconsideration and an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Supreme Court explains the logic behind this in Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan
(First Division)

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of

the accused despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by
recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to
the accused at their last knovm address or through counsel. The court shall
also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for conviction and the
failure to appear was withoutjustifiable cause.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules
of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to
appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the
availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction.
When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the
■ judgment of conviction, thev lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new
trial or reconsideration (Rule 12n and an appeal from the judgment of
conviction(Rule 122).

The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present

themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, thev are
considered to have lost their standing in court. Without anv standing in
court the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Alva V. Court ofAppeals, 521 Phil. 286-310(2006).

^ Jaylo V. Sandiganbayan (First Division), G.R. Nos. 183152-54,21 January 2015.
Minute Resolution
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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 12 of21

5. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides remedies for
accused to regain his standing in Court,
which was lost when the judgment of
conviction was promulgated in absentia.

In order for accused's standing in court to be restored, Section 6 of

Rule 120 of the Rules provides that he must first surrender to the Court arid
file a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration or new trial within
fifteen (15)days from promulgation ofjudgment. In his motion for leave, he
should explain the reason for his absence during promulgation. If accused's
reason for being absent is justified, he shall be allowed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment or a motion for new trial within fifteen (15)
days from notice.

In explaining this procedure,the Court held:

Thus, by failing to appear during the scheduled promulgation of
judgment despite due notice, petitioner's remedy should have been to
surrender before the Sandiganbayan and file a motion for leave of court to
file an appeal stating justifiable grounds for her non-appearance. Petitioner
failed to avail of this remedy hence her right to appeal was deemed waived
or foreclosed. Otherwise stated, the filing of a petition for review was not
proper.

Moreover, raising her justifications for failing to attend said

promulgation in the course of the appeal does not cure the procedural
infirmity. Appeal is a statutory privilege that mav be exercised onlv in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The partv who seeks
to avail of the same must comnlv with the requirements of the Rules. Thus,
petitioner's failure to complv with this remedial mandate results in her loss
of standing to seek an appellate review of her conviction.^^

In the instant case, accused Arengino failed to follow the procedure

outlined in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The promulgation of judgment was held as scheduled on 29 March

2019. On this day, accused Arengino was absent. Nonetheless, his counsel
on record, Atty. Libatique, was present, and had earlier been notified thereof
in his capacity as counsel for accused Arengino, among other accused.

During this hearing, the Court noted that accused Arengino was
represented by Atty. Libatique.^"^ When the Court noticed accused
Arengino's absence, only then did Atty. Libatique state:

Granada v. People, G.R. Nos. 204241-42, 14 November 2016.

2' TSN,29 March 2019, p. 10.

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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ATTY. LIBATIQUE III

Your Honor, I was about to mention a while ago that Mr. Dionisio
Arengino could no longer be located, your Honor, as far as, ah, either
his last known address, as well as ...

AJ TRESPESES

Cannot be located.

DIV. CLERK OF COURT III

The Notice also was returned unserved, your Honor.^^

Notably, Atty. Libatique did not register any objection when the
prosecution moved for the promulgation ofjudgment in absentia for accused
Arengino (and the rest of the accused who were similarly absent at the
promulgation hearing):

AJ TRESPESES

Okay.

So those who are absent ... (or) are not here are Mr. Romualdo C.
Santos, Mr. Dionisio C. Arengino and Gerardo Villasenor.

PROS.TAN

For those who are absent, your Honor, may we just request for a
promulgation in absentia?

AJ TRESPESES

Yes. Okay.

Counsel, please could we just read the dispositive portion?

ALL COUNSELS

We submit, your Honor.^^

After the dispositive portion of the Decision was read, the Court
prompted defense counsels to make their comments/manifestations. Atty.
Libatique initially adopted Atty. Moscardon's motion that they will be.filing
the necessary pleading within the reglementary period and moving for
provisional liberty of his clients, including accused Arengino. However,

28 TSN,29 March 2019, p. 13.

29 TSN,29 March 2019, pp. 14-15.

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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X X

when the prosecution objected to the inclusion of accused Arengino in the

motion in view of the latter's absence, Atty. Libatique conceded that his
manifestation applied only to his clients who were present at the
promulgation hearing:

(Reading ofthe dispositive portion ofthe Decision.)

AJ TRESPESES

Counsels?

ATTY. MOSCARDON

Your Honor, for and in behalf of Romeo Montallana, we would be

filing the necessary pleading or motion within the ... period and with
that, your Honor, may we move for the provisional liberty of the
accused under the same bond, your Honor.

AJ TRESPESES

Okay.

ATTY LIBATIQUE III

Your Honor, for the accused William and Rebecca Genato, Candelaria
Arafiador, Marion C. Fernandez and for Dionisio Arengino, your
Honor, we adopt the same manifestation, your Honor.

PROS.TAN

We are objecting, your Honors...

AJ TRESPESES

But for Arengino, he is not here.

ATTY. LIBATIQUE III

Yes, your Honor.

AJ TRESPESES

Just for those present.

ATTY.LIBATIQUE III

Yes, your Honor.

AJ TRESPESES

The same manifestation.

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People vs. Alfredo N. Macapugqy, et al.
Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 15 of21
X X

ATTY.LIBATIQUE III

Yes, your Honor.^®

It was clear from the proceedings that Atty. Libatique represented

accused Arengino during the promulgation of judgment. Although he
informed the Court of the fact that his client could not be located during that
time, Atty. Libatique agreed to have the judgment promulgated in absentia
for accused Arengino. Thus, the Court has no other option but to proceed
then with the promulgation of judgment in absentia under the belief that
accused Arengino was ably represented by his counsel, Atty. Libatique.
Such proceedings then triggered the application of Sec. 6 of Rule 120 ofthe
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Fifteen (15) days after the promulgation of judgment or on 6 April

2019, accused Arengino still has not surrendered or filed any motion for
leave to file a motion for reconsideration.

Considering the passage of this period without accused Arengino filing

the necessary motion in Court, the judgment of conviction lapsed into
finality.

While Atty. Libatique belatedly filed on 24 June 2019 a brief

Manifestation and Motion simply alleging that accused Arengino was unable
to appear during the promulgation of judgment "due to his deteriorating
health condition resulting in his hospitalization and confinement," this
Manifestation and Motion was obviously filed after the judgment had
become final and executory.

Considering that the Court's 29 March 2019 Decision is already final, it

is now immutable and may no longer be modified:

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains

finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court ofthe land.

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental

considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at
some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts ofjustice which is

30
TSN,29 March 2019, pp. 15-16.

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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
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X X

to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace
and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.^'

In the same manner, upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.^^

6. Notice to accused Arengino's counsel and

the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket are sufficient compliance
with the rule requiring notice to accused of
the promulgation ofjudgment.

It bears to emphasize that the rules on promulgation of judgment in

criminal cases is found in Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is

promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the court in which it was rendered However,ifthe conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk ofcourt.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city,

the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention
upon request of ihe court which rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of
appeal and to approve the beiil bond pending appeal; provided, that if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed and resolved by the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused

nersonallv or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him
to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of

nromulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made
bv recording the iudgment in the criminal docket and serving him a conv
thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the iudgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to

appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available
in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.

Manotok Realty, Inc. v CLTRealty Development Corp., 512 Phil. 679-710(2005).

Republic v. Dagondon, G.R. No. 210540, 19 April 2016.

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Within fifteen (15^ days from promulgation of judgment, however, the

accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail ofthese
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause,
he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15)days from
notice.(Underscoring supplied)

As plainly stated in the third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120, the

notice to the accused requiring his presence at the promulgation ofjudgment
may be sent to "accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and
counsel." Meanwhile, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Section 6,
promulgation ofjudgment may proceed notwithstanding accused's failure to
appear at the scheduled promulgation ofjudgment despite notice. In such a
case, accused shall be served a copy of the judgment at his last known
address or through his counsel, and a recording the judgment is made in the
criminal docket.

As further expounded by the Court:

The Rules of Court provides measures to make promulgation in

absentia a formal and solemn act so that the absent accused, wherever he
may be, can be notified ofthe judgment rendered against him. The sentence
imposed by the trial court cannot be served in the absence of the accused.
Hence, all means of notification must be done to let the absent accused
know of the judgment of the court. And the means provided by the Rules
are: (1) the act of giving notice to all persons or the act of recording or
registering the judgment in the criminal docket; and (2) the act of serving a
copy thereof upon the accused (at his last known address) or his counsel. In
a scenario where the whereabouts of the accused are unknown (as when he
is at large), the recording satisfies the requirement of notifying the accused
ofthe decision wherever he may be.^^

Hence, even assuming that accused Arengino was unable to receive

notice of the date of the promulgation of judgment, the notice sent to his
counsel, Atty. Libatique,^"^ as well as the recording of the judgment in the
criminal docket,^^ sufficiently complies with the notice rule.

7. This Court may relax the application of

rules but it does not have the power to
suspend them. The power to suspend
procedural rules belong to the Supreme
Court alone, as part of its constitutionally
grantedpower to make its own rules.

"Granada v. People, G.R. Nos. 204241-42, 14 November 2016.

Record, Vol. XII, p. 316.
Record, Vol. XII, p. 500.

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Minute Resolution
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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 18 of21
X X

Accused Arengino insists that this Court should take its cue from the
Supreme Court's ruling in Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation^^ and
consider the present case as an exception to the rule on immutability offinal
judgments.

Accused's reasoning is not warranted by the circumstances.

It is true that the Supreme Court in Sumbilla held that "the immutability
of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule" and that (t)he Court has the
power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from
their operation if and when justice requires it."

However, when the Supreme Court held that that it has the power and
prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation when justice requires it, the High Court refers to a power that it
enjoys as a part of its rule-making power and to the exclusion of courts
below it. As further explained in Redena v. Court ofAppeals'?^

The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding. Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the
duty to construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of substantive
law and substantial justice. Furthermore, the Court, unlike courts below, has
the power not onlv to liberallv construe the rules, but also to suspend them,
in favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherentlv
belongs to the Court, which is expresslv vested with rule- making power bv
no less than the Constitution.(Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no power to suspend the rule of

immutability offinal judgments.

8. The principle of "residual jurisdiction" is

inapplicable herein. Residualjurisdiction of
the Court is available only upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or
upon the approval ofthe records on appeal,
but prior to the transmittal of the original
records or the records on appeal- instances
that are notpresent herein.

Similarly, the Court is not impressed with accused's assertion that the
residual jurisdiction of the Court, as discussed in Angeles v. Court of
^^5«/7rflatnote 13.
Supra at note 20.

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Appeals, should enable it to rule on his motion to adopt his co-accused

private individuals' motion for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court explained the concept of"residual jurisdiction" in

this manner:

Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue

orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which
do not involve any matter litigated bv the appeal: to approve compromises:
to permit appeals bv indigent litigants: to order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2. Rule 39: and to allow the withdrawal of the
appeal, provided these are done prior to the trsinsmittal ofthe original record
or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been perfected or
despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for
review under Rule 42. before the CA gives due course to the petition.
The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in
which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or
the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records
on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal ofthe appeal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that before the trial court can be said to
have residual jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the merits must have been
conducted: the court rendered judgment: and the aggrieved partv appealed
therefrom.^^(Underscoring supplied.)

As discussed above, a trial court is deemed to have residual jurisdiction

over the case only at the stage when the parties' appeal has been perfected or
the records on appeal has been approved, but prior to the transmittal of the
original records or records on appeal.

Even where residual jurisdiction is available to the Court, its exercise is

limited only to the issuance of orders for the protection and preservation of
the rights ofthe parties not involving any matter litigated by the appeal.

Evidently, no residual jurisdiction exists for the Court to exercise in

order to act on accused's belatedly filed motion because the judgment
against accused Arengino has already lapsed into finality.

9. Accused Arengino cannot adopt the motion

for reconsideration and Reply filed by his

at note 17.
Development Bank ofthe Philippines v. Carpio, G.R. No. 195450, 1 February 2017.
Minute Resolution
People vs. Alfredo N. Macapugay, et al.
Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 20 of21
X X

co-accused private individuals because the

judgment has, already lapsed intofinality as
to him. Section 11 of Rule 122 may be
invoked only in the event that his co-
accused's motion/appeal yields favorable
result.

We are likewise not persuaded by accused Arengino's argument that it

would be best to allow him to adopt his co-accused private individuals'
motion for reconsideration for the sake of consistency, in order to prevent a
possible but unfair scenario wherein accused Arengino is serving sentence
because his conviction has already attained finality, while his co-accused
private individuals are acquitted.

As discussed in the preceding section, the judgment against accused

Arengino has already lapsed into finality. Hence, the Court no longer has
jurisdiction to entertain his motion or give him affirmative relief.

The mere fact that accused Arengino's co-accused private individuals

filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision is not sufficient ground to
allow accused Arengino to adopt their motion for reconsideration.

Section 11 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

explicitly lays down the general rule that the accused who did not file an
appeal is not affected when his co-accused file an appeal:

Sec. 11. Effect ofappeal by any ofseveral accused.-(a)An appeal

taken bv one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter.

(b)The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall
not affect the criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed
from.

(c) Upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the

judgment or final order appealed from shall be stayed as to the
appealing party.(Underscoring supplied.)

The exception to this general rule occurs when the appellate court has
rendered judgment on his co-accused's appeal and such judgment is
favorable to accused and applicable to him. Only in such instance will an
accused be affected by his co-accused's appeal.

The circumstance in the case at bar is different. Accused Arengino's

co-accused private individuals have not even lodged an appeal from the
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Crim. Case Nos. 27755 to 27756
Page 21 of21

decision yet, much less has an appellate court rendered judgment favoring
them. Clearly, the cited provision finds no application herein.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Dionisio C.

Arengino's Petition for Relief is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

)Y\.TjPfESPESES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA.THERESA DOLORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA

Associaie Justice, Chairperson

L/
GEORGINA DJ HIDALGO
Associate(lustice