Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.

169838 April
25, 2006 DIGEST

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens
and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a

violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880
requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant
to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply
to mass actions in support of the government. The words “lawful
cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also,
the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being
tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to
be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution
of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising
factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P.
No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September
20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the

Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a)
and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it
causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the
right to peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides

that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and
of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of
constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of
a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct,

is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to
the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the
sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a

restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all
kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The
reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based
because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither
the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of
grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the
content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear

and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents,

 more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No.
880 through the establishment or designation of at least one
suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the
country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision,
subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition
in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has
not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore,
Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would
purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL
and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from
using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of
maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other
respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED

ADDITIONAL:::
ISSUE:

1. Whether BP 880 is constitutional;

2. Whether the CPR policy is constitutional.

RULING:

1. BP 880 is CONSTITUTIONAL.

o The provisions of BP 880 practically codify the ruling

in Reyes v. Bagatsing.

o BP 880 is a CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION.

§ It is a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmena v.
Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a content-neutral
regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies.
§ it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and
influencing in the definition of public assembly content based,
since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the
government for redress of grievances come from the wording of
the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
§ Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

o BP 880 is not vague.

§ the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. Public
does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-
known. Websters Dictionary defines it, thus:
§ public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of
people distinguished by common interests or characteristics x x x.
§ Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law
refers to rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place. So
it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.

o BP 880 is not overbroad

§ It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present
danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.

o No prior restraint
§ There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the
speech is not relevant to the regulation.

o Valid Delegation of power

§ As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a
precise and sufficient standard the clear and present danger test
stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same
thing and is not an inconsistent standard.

On Freedom Parks
· Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law
provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom
parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and
petition at any time:
o SEC. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the
country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act
establish or designate at least one suitable freedom park or mall
in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall
be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations
and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
o In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
· Compliance with Sec. 15
o Only Cebu City has declared a freedom park Fuente Osmea.
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted
into a golf course.
o The degree of observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that every
city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six months
from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and
regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for granted
amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution
of 1986.
· The Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the
exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or
municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with
Section 15 of the law.
o For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in
effect be to deny the right.
o Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to
ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO

Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano Holding of Religious Rituals at
the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
March 7, 2017

Facts:

This controversy originated from a series of letters written by

Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City
had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with
Catholic religious icons and other instrument for religious
activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional
provisions on the separation of Church and State and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public
money and property for the benefit of a sect, church,
denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred
that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice
showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the
rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the
employees; and that court functions are affected due to the
masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.

Issue:

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the

Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional principle of
separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional
prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for
the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution
or system of religion.
Ruling:

The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not

amount to the union of Church and State. The 1987 constitution
provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be
inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is
not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In
fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.
The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass
and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to
the free exercise of their religion.

It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of

Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation
wherein the government recognize the reality that some
measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the
population for the reason that these measures are contrary to
their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise
of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the
State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.

No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of

any Church. The constitution provides that “No public money or
property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation
is primarily intended for the furtherance of a particular church. The
aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the religious character
of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is
available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the
basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a
public property devoted for public use because the holding of
Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its
primary purpose.
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No.
95770, March 1, 1993
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Facts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints

about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness,
and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused
to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the
patriotic pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the

Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued Division
Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District
Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private
Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process,
teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and
pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not
participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute
rule.

Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum

to be contrary to their religious belief and choose not to obey.
Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu
officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow
their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by
the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated
July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school
register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade
1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against the
Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if
they change their mind.
Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of
Education but the latter did not answer to their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil
actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the
respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without
prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due
process, their right to free public education and their right to
freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for
the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’
issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the
respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order
their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the respondents to
immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes
until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to

the petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by the
respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the

compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external acts’
or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through observance of the flag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose
to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their
expulsion.
Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s

Witness from the schools violates right receive free education.

Held:

The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the

schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as
Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such
education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a
right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at
attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to
prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country

in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious
persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and
bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had
lived through that dark period of our history, they would not
quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.

The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and

expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.
 ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas

City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her
husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to

investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted

by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such

conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising
her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is
specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore,
a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres

the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the
OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

DIGEST: VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION

Constitutional Law | Bill of Rights | Right of Association
See full text

Plaintiff-Appellee: Benjamin Victoriano

Defendant-Appellant: Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
59 SCRA 54
G.R. No. L-25246
September 12, 1974
Ponente: J. Zaldivar

FACTS:
Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As
such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union which had a closed shop agreement with the Company that
membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all its permanent employees.
Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875
allows the employer to require as a condition of employment
membership in a labor organization, if such organization is the
representative of the employees. However, the provision was later
amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, which
reads: … “but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of

its members with any labor organization, Victoriano presented his
resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the Company to
dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano
to file an action to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA No.
3350, contending that it infringes on the fundamental right to form
lawful associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on
the fundamental freedom to form associations.

RULING:
No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:

“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging
to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
with any labor organization. What the exception provides,
therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of
any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on
the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far
from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions.
It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate,
or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their
religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign
up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty
to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.”
G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

On January 10, 2012, respondent MarelynTanedoManalo

(Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of Entry of marriage in the
Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment
of divorce Japanese court. Said petition alleged that petitioner is
previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO, that recently, a case for divorce was
filed by herein petitioner in Japan and after due proceedings, a
divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court, that at present, by virtue of the said divorce
decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are
living separately from said Japanese former husband.

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of
merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan
should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of
the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos
the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if
they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of
another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues
related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages."

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that

Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is
applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
It would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married
to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her.
For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied;

hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of the petition for cancellation of entry
of marriageviolates the constitutional principle of separation of
church and state.

HELD:
No. To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman
Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on
absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals,
and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what

the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious
sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government
to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus establish a state religion. (Re: Letter of Tony Q.
Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC (Resolution), March 7, 2017)

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country. While marriage is
considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code. It is in this aspect, bereft
of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right
and interest to regulate.

MUN. OF TANGKAL vs. HON. BALINDONG

THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL
NORTE, Petitioner, vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Judicial
District, Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO
ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN DIMNANG B. ALOMPO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 193340
January 11, 2017

Facts

The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed

a Complaint with the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City (Shari'a
District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for
recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an
area of approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon,
Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the
owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement
with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the
land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and
a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed a
condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the
land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the
land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that
the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land
within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus,
they prayed that the land be returned to them as successors-in-
interest of Macalabo.

The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on

the ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued
that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural
or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for
recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.
In its Order dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a District Court denied
the Municipality of Tangkal's motion to dismiss. It held that since
the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the
case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original
jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." It added
that venue was properly laid because the Shari'a District Court
has territorial jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and
Lanao del Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi and Iligan.
Moreover, the filing of a motion to dismiss is a disallowed
pleading under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts.

The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was

denied by the Shari'a District Court. The Shari'a District Court also
ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within 10
days. The Municipality of Tangkal timely filed its answer and
raised as an affirmative defense the court's lack of jurisdiction.

Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality of

Tangkal elevated the case to us via petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO). It reiterated its arguments in its earlier motion to
dismiss and answer that the Shari'a District Court has no
jurisdiction since one party is a municipality which has no religious
affiliation.

Issue

Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has

jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by Muslim
individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.
Held

The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction

are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, specifically
in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide
for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim
personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting
Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real
actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
cralawred The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these
matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial
courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the
general jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily
cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be
invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim,
the action must be filed before the regular courts.
The complaint below, which is a real action involving title to and
possession of the land situated at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal,
was filed by private respondents before the Shari'a District Court
pursuant to the general jurisdiction conferred by Article 143(2)(b).
In determining whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction
over the case, the threshold question is whether both parties are
Muslims. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as
plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the
requirement is satisfied because the mayor of the defendant
municipality is also a Muslim.

When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to

actions "wherein the parties involved are Muslims," the word
"parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. Section 2
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real parties in interest as
those who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the
parties who will be directly benefited or injured are the private
respondents, as real party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of
Tangkal, as the real party defendant. In their complaint, private
respondents claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Macalabo,
entered into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal for the
use of the land. Their cause of action is based on the Municipality
of Tangkal's alleged failure and refusal to return the land or pay
for its reasonable value in accordance with the agreement.
Accordingly, they pray for the return of the land or the payment of
reasonable rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private
respondents, either allowing them to recover possession or
entitling them to rentals, would undoubtedly be beneficial to them;
correlatively, it would be prejudicial to the Municipality of Tangkal
which would either be deprived possession of the land on which
its municipal hall currently stands or be required to allocate funds
for payment of rent. Conversely, a judgment in favor of the
Municipality of Tangkal would effectively quiet its title over the
land and defeat the claims of private respondents.

It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that
Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a representative capacity,
as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an
action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-
and neither does he become-a real party in interest. The person
represented is deemed the real party in interest; the
representative remains to be a third party to the action. That
Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of
complying with the jurisdictional requirement under Article
143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the
requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of
Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is
a legal impossibility.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a

person who testifies to the oneness of God and the Prophethood
of Muhammad and professes Islam."31 Although the definition
does not explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical
persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, which is
a fundamental personal right. The ability to testify to the "oneness
of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad" and to profess Islam
is, by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical
persons are artificial beings with "no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires."33 They are considered
persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal
falls under this category. Under the Local Government Code, a
municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers
as a political subdivision of the national government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of

the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City in Civil Case No. 201-09
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No.
201-09 is DISMISSED.