Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
The Circuit Court may consider the record of the
DOCTRINE: Police Power
FACTS: This is a writ of error to review a judgment of
the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia
affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Amherst
County by which the defendant in error, the
superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and
Feeble Minded, was ordered to perform the operation of
salpingectomy upon Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in error, for
the purpose of making her sterile. 143 Va. 310. The case
comes here upon the contention that the statute
authorizing the judgment is void under the Fourteenth
Amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws.
Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was
committed to the State Colony above mentioned in due
form. She is the daughter of a feeble minded mother in
the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate
feeble minded child. She was eighteen years old at the
time of the trial of her case in the Circuit Court, in the
latter part of 1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March
20, 1924, recites that the health of the patient and the
welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by
the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful
safeguard, &c.; that the sterilization may be effected in
males by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy,
without serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the
Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many
defective persons who, if now discharged, would
become a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might
be discharged with safety and become self-supporting
with benefit to themselves and to society, and that
experience has shown that heredity plays an important
part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, &c. The
statute then enacts that, whenever the superintendent of
certain institutions, including the above-named State
Colony, shall be of opinion that it is for the best interests
of the patients and of society that an inmate under his
care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the
operation performed upon any patient afflicted with
hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, &c., on complying
with the very careful provisions by which the act protects
the patients from possible abuse.
The superintendent first presents a petition to the special
board of directors of his hospital or colony, stating the
facts and the grounds for his opinion, verified by
affidavit. Notice of the petition and of the time and place
of the hearing in the institution is to be served upon the
inmate, and also upon his guardian, and if there is no
guardian, the superintendent is to apply to the Circuit
Court of the County to appoint one. If the inmate is a
minor, notice also is to be given to his parents, if any,
with a copy of the petition. The board is to see to it that
the inmate may attend the hearings if desired by him or
his guardian. The evidence is all to be reduced to
writing, and, after the board has made its order for or
against the operation, the superintendent, or the inmate,
or his guardian, may appeal to the Circuit Court of the
County.
board and the evidence before it and such other
admissible evidence as may be offered, and may affirm,
revise, or reverse the order of the board and enter such
order as it deems just. Finally any party may apply to the
Supreme Court of Appeals, which, if it grants the appeal,
is to hear the case upon the record of the trial
in the Circuit Court, and may enter such order as it
thinks the Circuit Court should have entered. There can
be no doubt that, so far as procedure is concerned, the
rights of the patient are most carefully considered, and,
as every step in this case was taken in scrupulous
compliance with the statute and after months of
observation, there is no doubt that, in that respect, the
plaintiff in error has had due process of law.
The attack is not upon the procedure, but upon the
substantive law. It seems to be contended that in no
circumstances could such an order be justified. It
certainly is contended that the order cannot be justified
upon the existing grounds. The judgment finds the facts
that have been recited, and that Carrie Buck
"is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually
sterilized without detriment to her general health, and
that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by
her sterilization," and thereupon makes the order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Virginia statute providing for
the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions
supported by the State who shall be found to be afflicted
with an hereditary form of insanity or imbecility, is within
the power of the State under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
HELD: In view of the general declarations of the
legislature and the specific findings of the Court,
obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the
grounds do not exist, and, if they exist, they justify the
result. We have seen more than once that the public
welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It
would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned,
in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world if, instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
But, it is said, however it might be if this reasoning were
applied generally, it fails when it is confined to the small
number who are in the institutions named and is not
applied to the multitudes outside. It is the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments to point out
shortcomings of this sort. But the answer is that the law
does all that is needed when it does all that it can,
indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and
seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far
and so fast as its means allow. Of course, so far as the
operations enable those who otherwise must be kept
confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the
asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more
nearly reached.
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Asscn., March 27, 2000
Doctrine: Police Power
Facts:Neptune Street is a private road inside Bel-Air
Village and is owned by respondent BAVA. It runs
parallel to Kalayaan Avenue. Neptune and Kalayaan are
divided by a concrete wall.
On December 30, 1995, Bel-air received from MMDA a
request to open the Neptune street to public vehicular
traffic and a notice that the wall separating Neptune and
Kalayaan would be demolished.
MMDA claims that it has an authority to open the said
street because it is an agent of the state with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: WON MMDA has a mandate to open the Neptune
Street pursuant to its police power.
Held: No, the MMDA is not vested with police power for
the opening the Neptune Street.
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty
which is defined as the power vested by the Constitution
in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish laws,
statutes, and ordinances. Our Congress delegated
police power to LGU in Local Government Code of 1991.
LGC of 1991 defines a LGU as a body politic and
corporate, one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government. LGUs are the
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays which are
territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
RA No. 7924 declared Metro Manila as a special
development and administrative region and its
administration of basic services is placed under MMDA
in which MMC is its governing board. There is no
provision in RA No 7924 that grants MMDA to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. The
MMDA is termed as a development authority. All its
functions are administrative in nature as stated in its
Charter.
MMDA is not a local government unit or public
corporation endowed with legislative power. The
Chairman of MMDA is not an official elected by the
people, but appointed by the President with the rank and
priveleges of a cabinet member. This clearly shows the
administrative character of the MMDA.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Makati did not pass
any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, therefore, the request of MMDA is
illegal.
Ynot vs. IAC
DOCTRINE: Police Power
FACTS: The Executive Order 626-A stated that “…no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by government…”
Petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo, on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO 626-A. Petitioner sued
for recovery and he was issued by the RTC a writ of
replevin. The petitioner appealed the decision to IAC,
because according to him, the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries.
ISSUE: WON there had been valid exercise of police
power
OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc. G.R. No. 177056
DOCTRINE: POLICE POWER
FACTS: The petitioner, Office of the Solicitor General
filed for a petition for certiorari seeking for the reversal
and setting aside of the decision of the Court of Appeals
that the respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons Land Corp,
Shangri-la Plaza Corp and SM Prime Holdings are not
obliged to give their mall patrons with free parking
spaces. The OSG contends that the respondents are not
complying with the provisions under the National
Building Code (NBC) specifically Section 803. The
respondents in turn stand that they are required by law
to provide free parking spaces. The joint investigation
conducted by the Senate found that the collection of
parking fees by the respondents is illegal as it is contrary
to the National Building Code and the Consumer Act of
the Philippines. However the respondent SM Prime filed
for a petition for discretionary relief against the DPWH
officials in view of the legality of collection of parking
fees. In turn the OSG filed a petition for declaratory relief
and injunction to the RTC with prohibition in the
collection of parking fees. The RTC ruled that the NBC
does not impose that parking spaces should be free of
charge and that providing free parking spaces would
mean unlawful taking of property without just
compensation. The OSG appealed the case to the CA
contending that the RTC erred in holding that the NBC
did not intend that parking spaces should be free of
charge. The CA ruled that the Sec 803 of the NBC and
its IRR is clear and does not explicitly impose on the
respondents that they should provide free parking
spaces to their customers.
ISSUE:
WoN the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC that
respondents are not obliged to provide free parking
spaces to their patrons or the general public
WoN the petition of the OSG for prohibiting the collection
of parking fees is a valid exercise of police power of the
state
HELD:
No, the CA did not err when it affirmed the decision of
the RTC and the respondents are not obliged by the
existing statutes specifically the National Building Code
to provide their patrons with free parking spaces. The
contention of the OSG that the Sec 803 of the NBC that
a neighborhood shopping center should provide one slot
of parking for every 100 sqm of shopping floor area does
not relate to free parking spaces. In addition, the OSG
cannot expand the coverage of the NBC and its IRR to
include the regulation of the DPWH in relation to the
collection of the parking fees. The code only limits the
regulatory powers of the DPWH that all buildings are
compliant with the minimum requirements of the NBC. In
addition, OSG cannot claim that the IRR specifically
Rule XIX mandates the respondents to provide free
parking spaces as this is not in harmony with the
enabling statute.
No, the court finds that the prohibition of collection of
parking fees from the respondents is a exercise beyond
the bounds of exercising police power. Police power is
the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to
regulate, however, does not include the power to
prohibit. Hence the prohibition of collecting parking fees
from the respondents from their own private properties is
to be considered as taking/confiscation of property by
the state. Not only are the respondents deprived of their
right to use their property as they wish, they are also
prohibited to profit or recover from the expenses made
by maintaining their properties for the public’s use.
TITLE: CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE CMMUNITY OF
MANILA, ET AL.
GR No. L-14355, OCTOBER 31, 1919
FACTS:
This is an expropriation case filed by the Manila
city against the Chinese Community of Manila CCM
regarding a parcel of land that they are proposing to
construct a road through it. The lot under petition is used
by CCM as a public cemetery.
The City Government of Manila argues that by
law, they are authorized to expropriate any land they
desire and that the function of the court is only to
determine the value of the land. They further argue that
there is a necessity to expropriate the land.
CCM on the other hand argues that the land
under petition cannot be expropriated under the present
circumstances. They further contend that there is no
existing necessity.
The CFI of Manila rules in favor of CCM.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Government of Manila
has the right to expropriate the land.
RULING:
No, the City of Manila has not proven to have
the right or the necessity to expropriate the land. The
court sets down two requirements for the City of Manila
to have the right to expropriate. First, is the necessity for
the public improvement. They were not able to prove
that the lot is needed for the road. In fact, the
respondents were willing to offer free of charge adjacent
lots. Second, the land to be expropriated should be
private in nature. The cemetery cannot be deemed to be
private in nature because it is used by different citizens
of manila and not just one family or group of people, the
reason which the court provides to determine the nature
of the land. Therefore, by not meeting the two
requirements placed by the courts, the decision of the
CFI of Manila is affirmed.
PEOPLE V. FAJARDO
DOCTRINE: Police power
FACTS: Mayor's permit. Fajardo contends that they
proceeded with the construction despite being denied of
the mayor's permit as they needed a place of residence
badly as their house was hit by a typhoon. The then
mayor contends that the permit was not issued as it
blocks the view of the public plaza.
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is valid.
HELD: No. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to
set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action.
No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is
expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are
enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient
standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance
thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits,
and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity, per se lawful, is invalid. It is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
taking of appellants property without just compensation.
 REPUBLIC VS. CASTELLVI
EMINENT DOMAIN
FACTS:
Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent
domain against Carmen de Castellvi an owner of a
parcel of land which is rented and occupied by the
government. Carmen de Castellvi refuses to extend the
contract of lease. The republic of the Philippines
commenced their expropriation proceedings, during the
assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract
of lease commenced and not when the proceedings
begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was
not taken when the government commenced to occupy
the said land as lessee because the essential elements
of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by
condemner upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the taking of property has taken place
when the condemner has entered and occupied the
property as lessee.
2. Whether or not the "taking” of Castellvi's property should
be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted
lease agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26,
2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of "Eminent
Domain,
HELD:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the
expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that
two essential elements in the "taking" of property under
the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the condemner must be for
a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting
the property to public use the owner was ousted from the
property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not
present when the Republic entered and occupied the
Castellvi property in 1947.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1)
Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more
than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal
authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such
a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present
when the government entered and occupied the property
under a contract of lease.
TAXATION
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works
FACTS:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law
appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig
feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, in his official
capacity as the Provincial Governor of Rizal, prayed for
that RA No. 920 be declared null and void, that the
alleged Deed of Donation made by Zulueta be declared
unconstitutional. Pascual claimed that the appropriation
was actually going to be used for private use for the
terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator
Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate
that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual
claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the
fact that he owns those terminals and that his property
would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then
prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications be restrained from releasing funds for
such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of
Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an
appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent
donation of the property to the government to make the
property public does not cure the constitutional defect.
The fact that the law was passed when the said property
was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In
accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and
not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch
as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to
be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is
that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and,
hence, was null and void.
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. L-19201, June 16, 1965
DOCTRINE: Taxation
FACTS: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc. of Bacolod
City donated 10,000 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz,
then parish priest of Victorias Negros Occidental for the
Construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. On
March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc. filed the
donor’s gift tax return. On April 29, 1960, the respondent
Commissioner on Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an
assessment for donee’s gift tax against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which Rev. Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc, petitioner, was the priest (successor of
Rev. Fr. Ruiz). Rev. Fr. Lladoc protested and requested
the withdrawal thereof on the ground that the tax
assessment violates Section 22 (3) of the Constitution
which exempts churches and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Catholic Parish of Victorias is
liable from the assessed gift donor’s tax by the CIR
HELD: Yes. The exemption provided by the Constitution
is only from the payment of taxes assessed as property
taxes. In this case, what the CIR assessed was a
donee’s gift tax as an excise upon the use made of the
properties. The assessment was not made on the
properties themselves thus is not covered by the tax
exemption provided by the Constitution. “Exempt from
taxation” as employed in the Constitution should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes.
The exemption raised herein is denied.
DOCTRINE: Hierarchy of Rights
TITLE: Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51
SCRA 189
FACT:The petitioner Philippine Blooming Employees
Organization(PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondentPhilippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang to protest against the alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police, to be participated in by the workers in the
first shift as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts and that they informed the respondent Company of
their proposed demonstration.
The complainant company learnedof the planned mass
demonstration. A meeting was called by Philippine
Blooming Mills Co. Inc., (complainant company) with all
the department and section heads. During the
meeting,the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc.,asked the
union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it
has already been agreed upon in the meeting.
The management informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
company. The company warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA
and would be amounting to an illegal strike.
Another meeting was convoked. Company reiterated
and appealed to PBMEO representatives that while all
workers may join the Malacanangdemonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift should be excused
from joining the demonstration and should report for
work in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly XXIV: ‘No Lockout- No Strike.’ All those who
will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismissed.
However, since it was too late to cancel the plan, the
rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were
eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and
No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the
officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations
for being filed two days late.
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
HELD: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights
is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate
and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If the
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs – political,
economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
Duncan Assoc vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. secrets and procedures to its competitors. The law also
recognizes that management has rightd which are also
PRINCIPLE: Bill of Rights- Hierarchy of Rights entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair
play.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprise to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect The record also shows that Glaxo gave several chances
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to to eliminae conflict of interest.
expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor
to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice
and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every
labor dispute will be decided infavor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights which
are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair policy.

FACTS:

Tecson the petitioner in this case, was hired by Glaxo

Wellcome Philippines, Inc as medical representative and
was assigned to Camarines Sur and Norte. He signed a
contract of employment where he agrees to study and
abide by existing company rules; to disclose to mgnt any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies and should mgnt fond that such relationship
poses a possile conflict of interest, to resign the
company. Subsequently, he had a relationship with
Bettsy, branch coordinator who supervises the district
managers and medicak representatives of Astra
Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo.

Tecson married Bettsy on September 1998. On Jan

1999, his superiors informed him that his marriage with
Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. After series of
requests on extension of time to comply with the
company policy, Tecson still failed to comply. Glaxo
transferred him to Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan
saales area. His request for reconsideration this time
was denied. The parties failed to resolve the matter.
Glaxo offered Tecson a separaion pay but he declined.
On Nov 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board declared Glaxo's policy as valid and affirming
Glaxo's right to transfer Tecson to another sales area.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
apellate court, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Glaxo's policy prohibiting its employees from

marrying an employee of a competitor company violates
his right.

HELD:

No. Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships

with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's
employees is reasonable under the circumstances
because relationships of this nature might compromise
the interests of the company. Glaxo only aims to protect
its interests against possible revelation of company's
.