JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

G.R. Nos. 178831-32 July 30, 2009

PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Consolidated petitions were filed for the disqualification of Limkaichong
to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of
Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. They contend that she
is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement. She
was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest
votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed
her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
COMELEC declared Limkaichong as DISQUALIFIED from her candidacy for
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, however, Comelec issued
a proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner. Hence, she had taken her
oath of office.
Issue:
Does HRET have jurisdiction over the disqualification case?
Ruling:
Yes, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) should
assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases, and no longer the
COMELEC.
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his
case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated
tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals'
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning
candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason
for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash
of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's
mandate.
MALACORA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-51042 SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
An appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
which modified the judgment of the trial court, the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Branch I, Butuan City was filed. Petitioners questioning whether the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring the writ of execution, the sheriff's certificate of sale
and the sheriff's final deed of sale, and the orders of June 27 and August 1,
1978 in CAR Case No. 6 Agrarian '68. On the basis of the judgment to be
executed, the amount to be paid by the private respondents to petitioners
should be only P1,100.00, the value of 1/2 of the 275 coconut trees planted, at
the rate of P8.00 a tree already fruit bearing or not. The writ of execution fixed
the value at P2,184.00, not being in accordance with the judgment.
This case having been submitted for decision on October 8, 1980, had already
expired.
Issue:
Should the decision of the CA be affirmed on the ground that the period
of eighteen months for deciding it, as fixed in section 11, Article X of the
Constitution, had already expired?
Ruling:
The appealed decision was affirmed. The provision of Article X, Section 11
of the Constitution, is mandatory and should have been complied with
immediately after the effectivity of the New Constitution.
On the legal principle that all provisions of the Constitution which direct
specific acts to be done, or prohibit certain acts to be done, should be construed
as mandatory. To construe them as merely directory would be to thwart the
intention of the Constitution which, its command being of the highest order
should, under no circumstance, be permitted if they are the 'great ordinances'
as Justice Holmes had caned the provisions of the Constitution. The manifest
purpose of the provision is to avoid delay in the disposition of cases, which
always is a cause of injustice, under the familiar aphorism that "justice delayed
is justice denied."
The express mention by Section 11 itself of exceptions to the automatic
affirmance of appealed decisions, orders or resolutions when not reversed or
modified within the prescribed period, namely, (1) cases where a qualified
majority is required and (2) appeals from judgment of conviction in c cases,
which even after the lapse of the fixed period may still be decided on the merits,
clearly, means under the maxim "expressio inius est exclusio alterius," that aside
from the exceptions expressly mentioned, all other cases may no longer be
decided on the merits after the lapse of the applicable maximum period. The
appealed decision, order and resolution would be deemed affirmed, and shall
then be so certified by the chief magistrate of the court, as provided in the last
part of paragraph 2 of Section 11. Said provision would be rendered also useless
by holding Section 11 merely directory because the occasion for the certification
will never arise. It will thus be seen that the exceptions expressly mentioned in
the provision and the certification required thereby as just pointed out, argue
most eloquently and convincingly in favor of the mandatory character of Section
11 of Article X of the New Constitution.
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC November 28, 2001
PARDO, J.:

Facts:
On July 31, 2000, the IBP transmitted to the Court a Resolution
addressing the problem of delays in cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
the Sandiganbayan has a total of four hundred fifteen (415) cases for decision
remaining undecided long beyond the reglementary period to decide, with one
case submitted as early as May 24, 1990, and motion for reconsideration which
has remained unresolved over thirty days from submission.

Issue:
What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must
decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction?

Ruling:
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provides that
all cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission to the
Supreme Court, and, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts; and that,
case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court
or by the court itself.
The periods to decide cases as provided in the Constitution refers to
regular courts.
The Sandiganbayan, however, is a special court. It is of the same level as
the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of
justice, with functions of a trial court.
The Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to promulgate its own
rules of procedure. However, on March 30, 1995, Congress repealed the
Sandiganbayan’s power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and instead
prescribed that the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall
apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the SC
held that to decide cases, the 3-month period (and not the 12-month period),
applies to the Sandiganbayan.
The ratio decidendi in the aforecited cases applies mutatis mutandis (with
the necessary changes) to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ought to be
the first to observe its own rules. It cannot suspend its rules, or except a case
from its operation.
SPOUSES MARCELO vs. JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838 March 12, 2014

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
Complainants Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2004-286
for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City,
Branch 78 (MeTC). In the case, Sps. Marcelo filed a motion submitting all
incidents for resolution. Instead of resolving the case, Judge Pichay directed
Spouses Marcelo to file their comment regarding the motion within 5 days and
after which the court will resolve the pending incidents. Spouses Marcelo failed
to file their comment, nonetheless, Judge Pichay set the motion for hearing.
Sps. Marcelo filed an administrative complaint charging Judge Pichay and
Sheriff Epres with inordinate delay in the disposition of the pending incidents
in Civil Case No. 2004-286 relating to the implementation of the writ of
execution of the subject decision.
Issue:
Should Judge Pichay be held administratively liable for undue delay in
the resolution of the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286?
Ruling:
Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay is found GUILTY of violating Section 9,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court for undue delay in resolving the pending
incidents relative to Civil Case No. 2004-286.
The Constitution requires our courts to observe the time periods in deciding
cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, in case of lower
courts, 3 months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or
resolution. In consonance with that, Sec 5, Canon 6 of New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that Judges shall perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently fairly and
with reasonable promptness. Noncompliance with the periods prescribed
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions against the defaulting judge. While trial court judges are often
burdened with heavy case loads, they are given the option to, for good reasons,
ask for an extension of the period within which to resolve a particular case or
any pending incident therein.
As observed in the case at bar, Judge Pichay failed to resolve the subject
motions within the 3 month period prescribed therefor. The matter had already
been submitted for Resolution but Judge Pichay continued with the
proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably
delaying the execution of the subject decision. Judge Pichay did not sufficiently
explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the matter on time, as well as
why he still had to set the same for hearing and grant postponements despite
the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the ministerial nature of the
subsequent issuance of a writ of execution.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC
GR 93867, 192 SCRA 358 [Dec 18, 1990]

CRUZ, J.:
Facts.
President Aquino designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting
Chairman of COMELEC, in place of Chairman Davide. The petitioner
contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates
their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior
Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief
Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

Issue:

Does the President of the Philippines have the power to make the
challenged designation in view of the status of the Commission on Elections as
an independent constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C,
Section 1(2) of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular

chairman comes under that discretion which cannot be exercised, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines. The Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their
respective functions. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar
is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by
extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation
could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections
themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on
Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they
themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis
thereof were for them and not the President to make.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts:
Pres. Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7
years starting from February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February
7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third member of the COA for a term of 7
years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following the
retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar
as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar
was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the
expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011. Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in
fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Issue:
Whether the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman
which is made vacant by the expiration of term of the predecessor is valid

Ruling:
No. Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that if the vacancy
results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor, the appointment of a
COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term. Here, the vacancy in the position
of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from
the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there can be
no unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light
of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villar’s appointment to a full term is not valid as
he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years under the constitutional
ban. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate
rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively
breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of
7 years.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
G.R. No. 191672 November 25, 2014

BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
On January 11, 2010, then President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed
Duque’s appointment.
On February 22, 2010, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864:
INCLUSION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IN THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES/DIRECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE HOME DEVELOPMENT
MUTUAL FUND.
Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees
of the following GOCCs: (a) GSIS (b) PHILHEALTH (c) ECC and (d) HDMF
pursuant to EO 864,
Funa filed a petition asserting that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was
constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political
pressures due to the significance of its government functions.
Funa claims that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional
commissions from holding any other office or employment. A conflict of interest
may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC
considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are
governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations.

Issue:
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impair the independence
of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual
or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?

Ruling:
Yes, it violates The Constitution. The Court upholds the constitutionality
of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares
unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity
as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF.
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC
Chairman’s membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition
that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board
member must affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on this,
the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of
government employees are among the primary functions of the CSC and are
consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairman’s
membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his
position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
The Court also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to
receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the
concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the
proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This
situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must,
therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over
all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not
under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.
The CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under
the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the
CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
THELMA P. GAMINDE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 140335 December 13, 2000

PARDO, J.:
Facts:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner
Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She
assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September
07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines
confirmed the appointment.
However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office
of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her
request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07,
19982 opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000,
not on February 02, 1999.
Issue:
Does the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993,
expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 02, 2000, as claimed by her?
Ruling:
Yes, the term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde expired on February 2,
1999. The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of
the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and
three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval
between the expiration of the terms.
The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees
to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on
February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case
of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the
term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the
latter.
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the
hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93396. September 30, 1991
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
On May 3, 1988, the Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) terminated the services of private respondent Joel Montoya as Table
Supervisor at Casino Filipino on the ground of loss of confidence. He was
formally notified of this action on May 5, 1988. Alleging that he had been
dismissed without due process of law, Montoya lodged with the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City on June 7, 1988, a complaint for damages and attorney’s
fees against PAGCOR. PAGCOR filed a motion to dismiss challenging the
jurisdiction of the court.
The movant contended that, being a money claim arising from the
plaintiff s alleged illegal dismissal, the complaint was cognizable only by the
labor arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission. Montoya insisted,
however, that PAGCOR was a government-controlled corporation created under
PD 1869 and therefore not covered by the Labor Code.
Issue:
Is PAGCOR a part of the Civil Service and not a private corporation
governed by the Labor Code? ;and Should one rule for workers under the Labor
Code be applied and another rule for the herein private respondent because he
belongs to the Civil Service?
Ruling:
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by
PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the
relations of the employees with the management of PAGCOR should come
under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil
Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987. Section
16 (2) of the said Code vest in the Merit System Protection Board the power
inter alia to: es virtual 1aw library
(a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and
employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving
dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the
Commission.
Applying this rule, we have upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
authorities, as against that of the labor authorities, in controversies involving
the terms of employment, and other related issues, of the Civil Service officials
and employees.
Even as the labor authorities have original jurisdiction to interpret and
apply the Labor Code, so too have the Civil Service authorities the original
jurisdiction to resolve questions coming under PD 1869. The civil courts are
excluded from either case because the general civil and criminal laws are not
involved. Obviously, the same rule applied to workers in the private sector
should also apply to civil servants, for what is sauce for the goose is sauce for
the gander.
CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al.,
G.R. NO. 141020 : June 12, 2008

PUNO, C.J.:
Facts:
The series of events started with the consolidated cases filed by the
petitioner labor union with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. In an
Order dated 20 July 1987, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated cases
for lack of jurisdiction over the respondents therein, Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine Casino Operators
Corporation (PCOC).

Issue:
Does the National Labor Relations Commission have jurisdiction over
employee-employer problems in the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), the Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC),
and the Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC)

Ruling:
No. In this case, the Civil Service Commission is the proper venue for petitioner
to ventilate its claims. The present Constitution specifically provides in Article
IX B, Section 2(1) that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
The petitioner states in its motion for reconsideration that the PAGCOR charter
expressly exempts it from the coverage of the Civil Service Laws and,
consequently, even if it has an original charter, its disputes with management
should be brought to the Department of Labor and Employment. This
argument has no merit.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO
G.R. No. 88167. May 3, 1993

CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of
the Philippines School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he
was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of
final examination questions
UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18,
1908, it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy.
Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.

Issues:
Does the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the University of the
Philippines?

Ruling:
Yes. The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission
appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of
the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the
power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly
with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section
37(a), provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office." The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters."cralaw virtua1aw
library
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part
of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so
because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a
component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and
administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 113212 December 29, 1995

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Facts:
Ceferino R Laur who was employed at the DJRMH as a patient-assistant,
was dismissed by the Chief of Hospital on the basis of the Public Assistance
Complaints Unit's (PACU) report/investigation finding private respondent and
his companions to have mauled Jake Bondoc.
Ceferino R Laur filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a
complaint for illegal dismissal with additional claims for payment of wage
differentials, holiday pay, overtime pay and 13th month pay, as well as
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation and with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
against Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital (DJRMH) and Dr. Cesar J.
Viardo.

Issue:
Did NLRC and the Labor Arbiter committed serious error in their
decisions and acted without jurisdiction when they took cognizance of the
complaint filed by private respondent Ceferino R Laur before the NLRC instead
of the Civil Service Commission?

Ruling:
Yes, the Civil Service Commission should have the jurisdiction.
Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital is within the scope of the Civil
Service Law and not of the Labor Code The petitioner-hospital, the DJRMH was
one of three leper colonies established under Commonwealth Act No. 161.
Maintained to this day as a public medical center and health facility attached
to the Department of Health, the DJRMH exercises strictly governmental
functions relating to the management and control of the dreaded
communicable Hansen's disease, commonly known as leprosy. As it is clearly
an agency of the Government, the DJRMH falls well within the scope and/or
coverage of the Civil Service Law in accordance with paragraph 1., Section 2,
Article IX B, 1987 Constitution and the provisions of the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines.
As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service
Commission administers the Civil Service Law. It is, therefore, the single
arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service.6 The discharge of this
particular function was formerly lodged in one of its offices, the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) which was vested with the power, among others, "to
hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and
employees of the civil service and its decision shall be final except those
involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to
the Commission.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE
G.R. No. 185766 November 23, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
On March 16, 2005, the Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to appoint
Josefina A. Sarsonas (Sarsonas) as Assistant Department Manager II of the
Internal Audit Department (IAD) of PCSO under temporary status. Thus, on the
same day, PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte issued a temporary
appointment to Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II.
On April 26, 2005, the Civil Service Commission Field Office – Office of
the President (CSCFO-OP) disapproved the temporary appointment of Sarsonas
as she failed to meet the eligibility requirement for the position.

Issue:
Does the position of Assistant Department Manager II falls under the
CES.

Ruling:
No. Although the Administrative Code gives the CESB jurisdiction over
entrance to the third level or the CES, the officers should be all "appointed by
the President."
Also worthy of note are CSC Resolution No. 100623 dated March 29,
2010 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 7, S. 2010, both of which provide for
clarificatory guidelines on the scope of the third level in the civil service:
1. The third level or Career Executive Service (CES) shall only cover the
positions of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified
by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President;
2. Executive and managerial positions in the career service other than the
foregoing shall belong to the second level; and
3. All policies and issuances of the Commission which are not in conformity
with these guidelines are superceded, repealed, amended or modified
accordingly
In order for a position to be covered by the CES, two elements must
concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book
V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of
1987 or (2) a position of equal rank as those enumerated, and
identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such position of equal
rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential appointee.
Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered as one
covered by the third-level or CES.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS MELITON C.
GERONIMO
vs. LT. FIDEL V. RAMOS IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE
CONSTABULARY AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-60504 May 14, 1985

GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:

Facts:
Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a
candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political
turncoatism. 2 years after winning the election, the Court ruled that Geronimo
was disqualified to run as a candidate for mayor for being a political turncoat.
Geronimo entered en masse the Municipal Hall of Baras, occupied its
premises causing a paralyzation of official business in the municipality. The
COMELEC after hearing, found Geronimo guilty of contempt.
COMELEC proclaimed Bayani A. Ferrera, who garnered the second
highest number of votes, as the duly elected Mayor of Baras, Rizal in the
January 30, 1980 elections

Issue:
Did the COMELEC exceed its power and jurisdiction when it proclaimed
Bayani A. Ferrera as mayor of Baras, Rizal, in spite of the fact that he did not
obtain the plurality of votes in the January 30, 1980 municipal elections?

Ruling:
Yes, the COMELEC exceeded its power and jurisdiction. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into
office or maintain him there.
The result is a failure of elections for that particular office. The winning
candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was
elected. A permanent vacancy is thus created.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT)
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
After the May 14, 2007 elections, Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before respondent COMELEC a
petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives provided by
the Constitution. Meanwhile, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 07-60
proclaiming all party-list candidates garnering at least 2% of the total party-list
votes (13 party-list candidates). COMELEC en banc thus declared the BANAT’s
petition moot and academic and declared further that the total number of seats
of each winning party-list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT
then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5(2), Art
VI of the Const. mandatory?
(2) Is the three-seat limit provided in Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Is the 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to congressional seats
prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(4) How shall the seats for party-list representatives be allocated?

Ruling:
The Court maintains that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-
list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership
of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party
list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes."
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is not mandatory. It is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. Neither the Constitution nor RA
7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in Sec 5(1) of Art
VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress.
The three-seat limit is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation
to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, is a
valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
The 2% threshold is constitutional. As to the guaranteed seats; but no,
as to the additional seats. The 2% threshold vote for additional seats makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds. The continued
operation of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. It
presents an unwarranted obstacle the full implementation of Sec 5(2), Art VI of
the Const. and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.” (4) In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Sec 11 of RA 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
4.1 The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
4.2 The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
4.3 Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in 4.1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
until all the additional seats are allocated.
4.4 Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat
each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation
as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in RA allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In
declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered
by each party by the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There
are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats. The whole integer of the product
of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s
share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to
each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of
seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
The petitions stem from certain regulations promulgated by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) relative to the conduct of the 2013
national and local elections dealing with political advertisements. Petitions filed
before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the
exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.
Issue:
Does Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?
Ruling:
Yes, it violates the Constitution. There is no question that the COMELEC
is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws
but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It
could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is
the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion,
but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and
intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules
especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular
manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be
properly explained with sufficient basis.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the
Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license
to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby.
The IRRs the COMELEC issued for that purpose should always be in accord
with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify
the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based”
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute
a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction
on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so
in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive
measure.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock,
non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields,
including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On
the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes
the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features news-
worthy items of information including election surveys. 1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission
on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15)
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not
be published seven (7) days be- fore an election.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:
Does the restriction on the publication election survey constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint?

Ruling:
The Court holds that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of
a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. Even
though the COMELEC is given the power to stop any illegal activity, or
confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false
election propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in
§5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus survey
results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys
conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No principle of equality
is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate brings his ideas.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise
of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions."
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA vs.THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G. R. No. 180989 February 7, 2012
SERENO, J.:
Facts:
The COA issued Circular No. 89-299, which lifted the pre-audit of
government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and
government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs). The rationale for the
circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in
management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines;
and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and
improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and
ensuring facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve
and protect the integrity of these transactions.
Petitioner alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot
be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional
mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He
further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious
irregularities in government transactions have been committed.
Issue:
Is it the constitutional duty of COA to conduct pre-audit before the
consummation of government transaction?
Ruling:
No, there is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to
conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government
agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in
Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this
Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line
with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language
of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application.
A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their
consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following
conditions are present: (1) the proposed expenditure complies with an
appropriation law or other specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are
available for the purpose; (3) the proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or
extravagant, and the unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will be
charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and (4) the
transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly
supported by authentic underlying evidence.18 It could, among others, identify
government agency transactions that are suspicious on their face prior to their
implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds.
RAMON R. YAP vs. COMMISION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 158562 : April 23, 2010

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:
Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of
the National Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors,
Manila Gas Corporation (MGC). The additional employment entitled him to
honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and
various allowances attached to the office. In the course of the regular audit,
MGC issued notices of disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were
predicated on the ground that appellants appointment to MGC in addition to
his regular position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent
receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former
directly contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8,
Article IX-b of the Constitution. Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances
primarily contending that the questioned benefits were all approved by the
MGC Board of Directors.

Issue:
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it used as a basis the public purpose requirement in
affirming the questioned disallowances?

Ruling:
Yes, the respondent's act of subjecting the salaries, allowances and
benefits of MGC employees to the "public purpose test" is not only wrong, but
also an act of grave abuse of discretion since the said salaries, allowances and
benefits are intended to compensate MGC employees for services performed on
behalf of the corporation. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes
payment of salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must
(a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. Public purpose in
relation to disbursement of public funds means any purpose or use directly
available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been
defined as an activity as will serve as benefit to the community as a body and
which at the same time is directly related function of government. However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere,
the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public
has been discarded.
The disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of government
officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable
public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or
employees must be commensurate with services rendered. Public funds are
the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view
to prevent dissipation and waste.