esa ge Poul RESERVE {ST SEM “A Ap 1G: AND GOVERNMENT EDA AS VISION AND LIBERATION By Belinda A. Ravine N HIS CLASSIC WORK on the origins of dictatorship and democracy, Barrington Moore analyzes three main historical routes from the pre-industrial to the modern world. (Moore 1966) The first of these was the ‘bourgeois re which paved the way for the English, French, and American dustrial eapital in the 20th century, was also eapitalist in nature but reaetionary in im. And the . The author seeks to understand in all three cases the role of classes, o-called " lutions, minated st democracies. The second route, which c' form, as exemplified by German and Japanese fase third was Communism, with Russia and China as exempla notably the landed upper classes and the peasants, in these revolu- tions. In an equally famous work, Theda Skoepol examines the role in un of the state, peasant ce munities, and international factor derstanding the proce ses and outcomes of revolutions. Skoepol’s najor formulation is. at social revolutions are very complex phe- nomena, but a trigger fer their oceurrenes tion” of administrative an‘ mi.cary bureaueracies by separately determined processes in the 1 evolutionary situation. (Skoepol 1979) A revo- lution do a, for example, the not bappen overnight. In Chi -clerated revolutionary process was a prolonged on ngs leadership, only when the Communist Party under Ma 23Lookime BACK, LOOKING FORWARD started the mass mobilization of the population. If Moore, Skoepol, and the other theorists of revolution were is picee, they would be rushing to develop @ new model f vnderstanding the Phi Santos Avenue in Metro Manila (hereafter to be referred to as EDSA). And they would be equally hard-pressed to a: it does not confor writing t nio de los ippine Revolution of 1986 at By comes of that “revolution” bei with the familiar pattern of the great revolution torical times. from the fact that no one dis- In one sense, the dilfieulty arisi crete class or group of revolutionaries was responsible for EDSA, unlike in the other upheavals or revolutionary movements clse- where. EDSA was the great conjuncture of people from all clas \d and outlook but united and walks of life, so different in back grou in their resolve to end the Marcos regime. The people who con- verged at EDSA, however, probably never thought that they were contributing a Philippine model to the theory of modern revolutions. A broad-based “people power,” not class formation nor a prior ideo- logical vision mobilized by revolutionary organizations, was the defining element of BDSA. It was everybody's, and therefore no- body's, revolution. In the other modern examples, it was distinet classes like Bolsheviks, Maoists, Castroites, Sandinistas, Is! lamie na- tionalists, and others who were responsible for their respective revolutions. EDSA was for all Filipinos, abstractly denoted as “peo ple power.” le EDSA in a comparaTive perspec [vill attempt to look into the changes that have occurred since EDSA in the field of polities and government in a somewhat specu- ¢ beeause | have not undertaken a seientilie survey for very broad, not to mention vule inee polities nerable to a range of controversial interpretations, I do not expect to cover its gamut. I will focus » central concepts associated with polities in general, such as power struggles, mobilization, consolida- tion of ideological positions, political leadership, accountability, and the notion of estrangement, whieh one political scientist calls the “fundamental condition for political thinking.” (Tinder 1986:23) We usually think of polities as a striving for unity or stability, whieh intPOLITICS AND GOVERNMENT large sens hi active conflict, political thinking would not occur.” (T Refle DSA’ political aftermath might b ingful if done in a comparative context. Having a comparative it is. But in another sense and in a very real way, if fines or in wer 1986:23) more mean- ranged, “whether in quiet lon man beings are not gon sis of social situations tha framework always offers a richer un a single case-study approach. The two contemporary examples that will be cited for instructive purposes in terms of assessing the polit cal dynamies of EDSA are the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, h occurred in 1979, In Iran, two basic processes, according to a recent scholarly both of w work by Farideh Farhi, arising from the fall of the Shah's dyns intersected to shape the immediate revolutionary outcome: the struggles among the intermediate classes to gain control of the state political apparatus, and the accompanying grassroots pre a more radical socioeconomic transformation. (Farhi 1990:114) The ional Revolutionary Government (PRG) formed by Ayatollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the revolution, was sures for Pro essentially a reformist organization identified with the traditional intermediate classes in Iranian society. The PRG’s mandate, how- of the state to control ever, was “counteracted by the inabi popular revolutionary organizations, wh ch began to germinate ” (Farhi 1990:114) ‘This struggle forced the resignation ister Mehdi Bazargan, and in the ensuing Republican Party (IRP), while not totally in control of the new “theocratic state,” beeame the most important with the unleashing of revolutionary fi unsettling postrevolutionary power of PRG’s Prime M events, the Isla use of its influence on the Prime Min- broker in Iranian polities be: and the Parliament. In 1989 the off ‘olished and the powers of the presideney were ex- of the prime minister wa: panded. F competition for state power after the overthrow of Anas hi also analyzed the Nicaraguan revolution. In Nies Somoza was not as inte in Iran. The National Directorate of the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) established eon- trol over the new governm int and kept the bourgeois opposition from sha Phe latter were cut off from the military as the Nation i power. 1 Guard was rey d by the Popular Sandinista Army. At 25Lookiwe tack, LooDKING FORWARD 1, the struggle was over the ideologie: this poi government as the presence of moderate and conservative forces, nce of a social-democratic tendency ‘as well as the perceived ex LN itself, caused observers to wonder if the Lefiist eh ments would lose control. (Farhi 1990:117) Daniel Ortex in the F: SLN he anti least doctrinaire of the Sandinista ideology forces, meanwhile, left the country and were States in their counterrevolutionary activities In both the Iranian and Nicaraguan cases, there was a and intensity to en- postrevolutionary struggle in varying degre: and Sandinista sure control of the new order by the Islamic for ‘Two ideological formations, one around Islam and the other around a version of Marxism with a Christian underpinning, su ments that radieally cf held by dietatorships which also had the support of the US. Th with EDSA, which also materialized in a metropolitan setting eut- ed revolutionary move- fully mobi \ged the political two urban-centered revolutions had much in common ting across a broad spectrum of Philippine society. But EDSA was also vastly different in that no one group or coalition of groups, comparable to the Islamic leaders or Sandinistas, was the dominant jaim and defend the revolution. Even influence that would later the disaffected military elements which precipitated the showdown with Mareos acknowledged that they were at EDSA to reiterate their support for Corazon Aquino, the undisputed leader in that whole turbulent period. It was only much later that this elite mili tary group decided to revise EDSA history by claiming they handed nd therefore deserved to be vielory overto Mrs. Aquino at EDS p they had planned earlier aga in a ruling coalition of sorts. The series of coup attempts nst Marcos was preempted by EDSA\s “people power” momentum. The military was sidelined. EDSA was unique in that a military force that was supposed to proteet the peo- ple ended up being protected by the people themselves! And unlike the Islamic and Sandinista leaders, Mrs. Aquino, an inexperienced housewife who, by her own admission, eschewed polities, was not as quick and astute to consolidate power, She was ho Mao, Castro, Khomeini, Ortega, or a seasoned revolutionary from the trenches, She was the embodiment of the elite-led burgisberries Amo GovERMMEN (bourgeois) opposition that evolved: from the political martyrdom of her husband, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. She was the right sym- bol for the right moment, and there was no doubt that she would be the one to replace Mareos. morning hindsight that Mrs. Aquino should have moved more swiftly to consolidate the she already had. There was a power vacuum waiting to be She did not need anybody to broker it for her. But not being a true revolutionary — she was instead a God-fearing, forgiving, and th space” and reconciliation she opted for a benign afterm kindhearted political nov based on the restoration of “demoerati y. In time and to her credit, all the demoeratie forms for nation and spaces would come to light: a constitutional convention, a draft chart tional a icd Constitution, press freedom, elections, organi , legislatures, local governments, and so on. They came back with a vengeance. In 1987, in the first senatorial elections after Marcos, nearly 150 ean- didates contested 24 seats. A host of party formations eame forward a ral mblies, referenda, pol eal parti to press their claims on the new political turf. The surge was unde standable, People had been kept in subjugation for 14 years, and a whole generation had grown up in an atmosphere of repression and control, Mrs. Aquino reminds us of Ignacio Comonfort, who was pri- marily responsible for the overthrow of Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna in Mexico in 1855 and generally regarded as the leader With his hon nspired confidence, and all the who would guide Mexico through the eri esty and slike of bloodshed, Comonfort * moderados [moderates] began to dem ideney [of Mexieo |.” (Parkes 1988:234) But Comonfort was also a “tragie figure who was dist that he should ume the pr ualified by his very virtues for the role he was required to play.” For in stanee, he very well knew that it was necessary to limit the powers of the clergy; a powerful foree in a country like Mexico (read: Phil- ippines). But he also believed that Mexicans (again read: Filipinos) nd hi is po- were devoted to the chureh and “wanted its ministrations.” mother had pleaded with him not to antagoni litical education stressed moderation, and he hated the hhad just raged in Mexico. “He dr the priests! H ivil war that med of a peaceful and harmoni- 2ooKiuG BACK, LODEING FORWARD Mexico, and set himself the impossible task of winning the con- (Parkes 1988:234; int of the reactionaries to a program of reform: supplied.) In the ensuing chaos, Gomonfort ceased to be presi- the United States and was replaced by Islamic revolution, another Ayatollah (Ali An ved the cur- ‘Ten years after Iran Khamer country’s “supreme lea n will be held in 1997 to determine who will su ni. The theoeratic ) became the Hosei elect rent president, Ali Akbar Hashe: nature of the republie has not been challenged. Farhi points out n the Iranian case: the reemergence of i Rafsan, thres nportant factors Islamie nationalism, the development of an ideological basis for con- trolling the state, and the organizational prowess of the clergy. After 18 years, the Iranian ease for revolution has survived the test of time. In the same decade in Niearagua, the Sandinistas lost ground as 55% of the vote in the February 1990 elections opted for a united opposition against the regime. Sandinista strongman Ortega was defeated by Violeta Chamorro, who was portrayed as a Nicara- guan Cory Aquino who also had the support of the Catholic Chureh. The Ni the Philippine revolution. Violeta’s husband, Pedro Joaquin had ma allels with y interesting pa Chamorro, direetor of the opposition newspaper La Prensa, was assassinated in 1978 in Managua, a year before the revolution. joy Aquino, the 1 the spark that ite the revolution, And it was obvious that ‘There could be no doubt that, as in the ease of N Chamorro sination was eatal provi would ultimately i Violeta Cha based on her martyred husbands like Cory Aquino, inherited a leadership mantle sarious legitimacy.” But what happened to the Sandinista revolution? It was upheld after the revolution’s first election in 1984 when the FSILN won an. impressive 67 % of the vote, In 1990, however, as Violeta Chamorro coasted to vietory, only 40 % was all that the FSLN could muster Over time a range of facto FSLN’s preeminence. After 11 years of “hardship, errors, and s had conspired to undermine the war,” the Nicaraguan economy spinning out of control, and the ng Support of the US for the contras, “the FSLN, by Fel ruary 1990, simply could not win the argument.” (Kapeia 1994,Politics AND GOVERMMENT 13:318) ‘This is not to imply that the revolution is dead. The Sandi ing again nistas are still very much alive, perhaps waiting or mobiliz for revitalization, in preparation for the 1996 presidential cle What is evident in the two eases discussed above is the single- to reinforce sful revolutionari \ded on the ideological minded det their victory and install political systems fou utionalism and orientation that launched them, ic. Islamic San m. Both brought sea-change by toppling long of dynastie oligarchies. Both moved vigor- fiermath of the revolutions to gain control of the state their societies ana ously in the and, as Farhi has demonstrated, to develop or strengthen links with revolutionary organizations they would ultimately control. In both . however, the usual contradictions in postrevolutionary re- cas gimes would plague their efforts to stabilize the ensuing political dispensation. In the long run, the Iranian case would prove to be ing contradictions and estrangements of postrevolutionary more successful than the Nicaraguan experience in reconeil thes polities. Post-EDSA Philippines has undergone a jes of power strug- gles at the top, mainly during the “season of coups” following the n. The alienated mili- frst six months of the Aquino administra tary forces and their political patrons, notably Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, were unhappy with the way Mrs. Aquino was e.g. her wholesale release of Left. ruling the country political prisoners. The Right destabilization offensives that would last through the end of 1989. ing elements set in motion a series of \ combination of steadfast support from the US, the ineptness and inexperience of the military plotters, and the loyalty of the “consti- Lutionalists” in the military saved the day for Mrs. Aquino until her term ran out in 1992. Predictably she chose her loyal supporter and defender, Fidel Ramos, to succeed her. he other formidable challenges on the post-EDSA political wunist and Mus: ise scene have been mounted by the e¢ ntinuing Ci lim insurgencies. Peace negotiation efforts and dialogues between the government and these insurgent groups continue because only the military rebel groups have come to terms so far with the govern- ment. No appreciable breakthrough has appeared in the negotiations with the Muslim and Left-wing formations. Neverthe- zaLooKinG BACK, LOOKING FORWARD st its midterm, seems in cor the Ramos government, now p trol, and its more challenging problems lie in turning the eeonomy around to join the ranks of the NICs (newly industrializing cot tries). Day-to-day peace and order is also far from ideal,and extremist groups like the Abu Sayyaf exacerbate an already prob- lematic situation. Has anjThing changed a€Ter ESAT Ares dist who returned to the Philippi unding “yes” would come from Mary Racelis, a sociolo- ly 1990s after 14 years ‘as a United Nations official in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. the changes wrought by EDSA from the standpoint of and human developm the She views soci nt, in particular the emergence of peo- ple-oriented nongovernment organizations (NGOs). “A vibrant new civil society is being formed with parallels in no other country 1 know.” (Racelis 1994, 8:7) She considers this explosion of thousands of people’s organizations (POs) and NGOs as indications of the growth of a progressive civil society, as well as a signal that the state itself has become more enlightened “because Filipinos of all classes have been vigilant— fighting for, guarding, and nurturing their right, 8) to have a say in their country’s development.” (Racelis 1994, Reflective of this emergent civil society openness and progr ism, according to Rucelis, is the high level of debate and activity on nationwide issues like Philippines 2000, women’s rights, the Inter- national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, President Ramos’s frequent travel to foreign countries, squatter rights, other local, national, and international developments. I share y of her observations and much of her opti about the positive role of people's organizations in social change at the grassroots, ‘There has always been a strong element of loe: n Philippine society a community spirit and an ability to org rhe EDSA experience accelerated this tendeney and the degree of openness and expan around specific concerns or problems. sion made possible by the restoration of “demoeratie space” has led to many productive and significant gains in local mobilization and development. The number of NGOs on livelihood, health, eoopera- tiv ‘ocial services, adult education, and women’s es, among.Politics &ND GOVERNMENT ‘The insights on civil society that Racelis 1m in Palawan in 1993 are before and after BDSA, but mor latter, whieh should have provided a major forum for reconstruet- sal leadership. inking prefer realistic alternatives nportant from, nthe tists articulated in a foi the standpoint of politi 1g the nation’s poli Advocates of newer social tl to revolutionary or radical politics, departing from the classie no- tions of revolutions as utopian, apocalyptic, and unidimensional, “They include the embrace of society, democracy, human rights, particularistic identity polities . intent on seizing state pow: new social movements, romantic pre- and post-modern rejections of the Enlightenment tradition.” (Hunter 1995:321-322) The author cautions that these are to be noted as not strictly parallel alterna- tives, as some are more grounded in intellectual theory and others in political practice. But what is the concept of civil society? Jun Atienza proposes a definition which he thinks would be a usefull framework for social change. “As a first approximation, civil society can be defined as the arena of popular organizations, social movements, citizen associations and forms of public communica- tions.” (Atienza 1994, 8:5) He adds that crucial to this formulation is the civil society's “self-consciousness of its continuing autonomy as a socictal space,” because otherwise it would be vulnerable to ex- ternal threats or undue influences. Fr. John J. Carroll, S.J., long-standing analyst of Philippine society, reinforces the notion of d for divergent political civil society as providing a meeting grou persuasions. He asserts that “for those wearied of the dogmatism + the Left and an unrelenting conflict perspective, the entrance of values, pluralism and development, and the downplaying of polities was a breath of fresh air.” (Carroll 1994, 8:3) Following this broader insight, there isa necd, according to Carroll, for social movements exemplified by people's organizations to interface with the Church, ‘he state, the economy, the political systems, and other institution: in the larger society. I don’t think we can disagree with these basie arguments for the need to redireet our energies toward a more inclusive and e: rated civil society and its institutions. What is difficult, as we have time and again, is how to bring about a national political culture a1 | | \ 2 LooKins Bate, LOOKING FORWARD that will have the vision, the will, and the practical ability to ret wocicty, away from its centraliz the nature of power in Philipy ing, hi rarchical, and traditionally elitist ing, corrupting, sell-del hu tendencies, and toward a more equitable, ju ane, and pro- n consti . chart ution ductive society. We have the rhetoric es, and documents that are crafted codes, laws, and other mea! beautifully but never meant to be followed or imple nted by those in power or authority to do so. I think this is why the people as a whole, who made EDSA happen, are the very same ones who are disillusioned because nothing meaningful or substantial by way of structural change has come about. His has been a fundamental problem, especially during the Marcos re- ‘Take the peren sue of graft and corruption. Because this ime, it should be on the front burner of any political leadership. We are not wishing that it disappear completely, only that government change the way it accepts the issue as a given. A se by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) from 1987 to 1993 illustrates how poorly the post-EDSA governme issue. (Da yo 1994:1) Just alter EDSA, the Aquino administration obt of surveys have performed on this ined at very high margin of satisfaction (+65) on the corruption issue, which 1 the time. But nt de- cline in these margins of satisfaction, going down to only +12 in October 1987, and to a negative (-8) in September 1993. Some ruption-related sur- 1 Laylo 1994, 94.3:8): tributed fo the sense of publie euphoria could be 1993, there was a consist from Mareh 1987 to Septembe major generalizations derived from these & veys may be summarized as follows (Dayag a 1) In Cory Aquino’s time, most people thought that she could aot disei= pling herappointees who were linked to anomalies, and that itwas useless to pay taxes hecause they would only be wasted or scolen by comupt offi cial. 2) There was relatively no difference berween the Marcos and Aquino administrations in the perceived number of graft cases. Moreover, the was public skepticism thar corruption would be properly addressed in the ailministeation after Mrs, Aquine, 3) The public believes that reports in the masy media about graft and corruption ia: government ste accurate most of the time 4) Corruption is deemed by an overwhelming majority ta bean obstacle to Philippine develupment by the year 2000, Throughout the surveys, strong publie vigilance against corrup-POLITICS AND GOvERHRENT on was indicated, as well as the sentiment that those suspected of it should be the courts were perceived to be corrupt. IL is important to remen pended or not elected. In many survey findings even ber, however, that these are perceptions, not necessarily reality. Perhaps the issue of corruption is not the best example to id structural problem and it would be naive to sinee it is an age expect its disappearance alter EDSA. However, it would have been been a weak, if KI be addressed ‘one area in which accountability, which has alway nonexistent, concept in Philippine governance, co and developed as a basie political ‘To be fair, the Aquino government did try to institute changes to deal with the accountability problem by creating the Presidential jon on Good Government (PCGG) and the Presidential iG was a novel idea which no other government left high and dry by a fecing dictator in a Third World country has adopted. The PCGG's performance alter ad Comnr Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR). The PC ide deserves another study but on the whole its goal of recovering the “hidden wealth” of Mareos has been only minimally successful. Its mandate has been compromised and its efforts have been stymied by complex developments involving liti- gations, unproductive negotiations with relevant parties like Swiss ! sues, the lack of « coherent strategy in both the Aqi anks, the Marcos heirs and the Marcos cronies, human rights ino and Ramos governments, and a general lack of political will to deal with the probler In the ease of the PCGR, Ca 10 notes that some of its efforts ‘© “de-Marcosily” the eivil serv ce ended in purges whieh affected he vulnerable elements, “who were only doing their job and who. had not been personally associated with the ousted President.” deine (Carino 1995:130) Meanwhile, the “big fish” who were ha #love with the dietator’s corruption had the ability to maneuver thei tion. In this kof a deter. ption. way out and cut deals with the ineoming adn st sense, nothing has really eh ged in terms of the ‘mined political resolve to deal with systemie ¢ ter EDSA would reveal th hundreds of these have been filed with the Ombudsn A review of corruption cases many of them against the family or eronies of Marcos. But who mong the big perpetrators of corruption during the Mareos regime 3a LooKinG Gack, LOOKING FORWARD has gonc to jail? Probably only Luis Tabuena for mishandling air- port-related funds. Imelda Marcos and her son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, were convicted for tax evasion and fraud, ba but instead of being in prison, Imeld: in Congress, not as powerful, but nevertheless unpunished for all the plunder to which she was party during her years in power. In time Bongbong himself ‘The same observation applies to violators of human rights in the military. For 14 years, thousands of Filipinos were murdered, tortured, detained in solitary confinement, raped, or simply disap- peared. Both the Aquino and Ramos governments were not about itiate charges against or exact retribution from these “seala- wags in uniform.” Even if they wanted to pu to ii sh the offenders, doing so would have been too threatening to the political survival of their administrations. Ironically the survival of the Agi ino gov- ernment was threatened anyway by the restive military, but for different reasons. Not only did President Aquino not move against the military, she even seemed to prefer forgivenes to justice in not of her husband's assassination. Now vigorously pursuing the eas we have the spectacle of an Imelda Mareos saying she did not know anything about the a: have tried to solve it when she was in power. sassination and that Cory Aquino should Meanwhile, the thousands of martial law victims are left with nothing but dashed hopes after EDSA, aggravated by the fact that human rights litigation judgments awarding them damages Asin other e pain and suffering have not been enforce a are just a few of the contradictions that political struggles generate after they are won. There is a new “vietimhoo. * phenomenon and revolutionary outcomes never really bring justice. The bottom line is that politics is perfidious. By its very nature, it is vulnerable to reversals and compromises, So are revolutions. ‘The same old problems are still there — poverty, corrupt crime, violene ‘ooked politicians, inequality, the Mareos eror all about? Where was the promise of the great transformation? Was who are back in power, and so on. Is this what EDSA we EDSA a “lost revolution"? In time the people were back in the streets protesting the rise in oil pri s, the lack of decent wages for teachers, the emergence ofPotitics suo Govenuwen ses, and tax increases. Most of all, people were getting killed again for such things ine land reform near the presidential pal- To lary destabilizers swung back as demonstrating for ge ace. Massacres were continuing as well in the countryside. compound problems, the into action, The “coup factor” had not died with the revolution. ‘Phe new threat from the Right became more worrisome than the Communist or the Muslim insurgeney Filipinos had | for decades. Then, too, the broad spate of kidnappings, bank rob- beries, holdups, and other crimes happening in broad daylight made the Philippines look like the Wild West. Part of the dynamic of post-EDSA breast-beating could be at- tributed to the exaggerated level of hope that the glorious event left in its wake. This, of eourse, was due to the repression during the Marcos dictatorship, unprecedented in Philippine political history. Social movements have a way of generating utopiari hopes and longings for redemption or even perfection. Hunter theorizes that “most utopian visions have proceeded from eriticisms of some basie of commu- form of oppression and alienation — be it destru nity; distance from the divine or the natural, exploitation of labor, or loss of authenticity — that revolution could overcome.” (Hunter 1995:321) Marcos embodied that “core of oppression” that needed to be destroyed. Now that he was gone, things could be righted, or at least they could only get beter. ‘Ten years later, things are not any better. Perhaps EDSA. was a flawed revolution, but in the interest of balanee we have to search deeper into some of its redeeming factors. We cite a couple of in- stances of a political nature that the post-EDSA scenario has ive years ‘special relationship” the Philip- pines had with the US for 90 years was formally terminated by an act of the Senate, which refused to extend the lile of the Mili Bases Agreement (MBA). ‘That in itself w: ipinos thought the day would never come when tho ary 1 of sorts. ighty bases would leave. The people confronted this long simmering dis content with US power and won asain, Fe———— LOOKING BACK. LOOKING FORWARD was a shining moment, particularly for the Senate that as its president then, Jovito Salonga, put it, finally said “No.” (Salonga 1995) And it was a sad day for Cory Aquino, who landed on the wrong side of the issue by keeping her opt In what seemed to be a confused state of affairs, she called for a people's vote after the Senate had already voted. If BDSA and Mt. Pinatubo had not happened, the US. bas would still be very much around; Marcos would have agreed that ‘ns too open, too long. they were essential to Philippine stability and the economy. But the fact that the economy is picking up considerably, only a few years after the bases were withdrawn, debunks the myth about the US ‘The closure of the bases spelled not only the end of an era but also the presence that was foisted on Philippine society all those end of an illusion. In a. stirring speech after the move to extend the treaty was defeated, Salonga said that September 16, 1991 may well be the day when “we in this Senate found the soul, the true spirit of this nation, because we mustered the courage and the will to de- clare the end of foreign military presence and helped pave the way to lasting peace here and in the world.” (Salonga 1995:279) Changes in The power sTrucTure of Philippine society. This structure rests on an elite class which has 9 nationalist along history but became prominent during the struggle in the late 19th century. This class in turn is anchored on th ability to define and control the “rules of the gam erations. Their ect clans or families which ha thrived for g in Philippine polities rests, of course, on selfinterest. This class has enjoyed tradi- tional wealth in the country based on land ownership and has preserved its position, power, and privilege by resisting democratic +, like other elit agrarian societies. It has dominated the symbols of cultural and social change. sntially feudal in chara sin political engagement in Philippine society. Marcos selectively challenged the preeminence of this oligarchy and in the process installed his own s of greed and plunder, which lasted for as long as it did essentially beeause of US. military and economic support. He ended up being much worse than the class he was trying to replace.PoLrtics AND GOVERNMENT When Marcos was overthrown, this same elite was restored, with many coming back to reclaim their positions of power. How dominant ion of t much change has there been in the compos political class after BDSAP An empirical study conducted by the Ins tute for Popular De- mocracy and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. notes certain changes in the House of Representatives of the Ninth Congres landholdings, and corporate and bu: ns for future polities. The n as the subject of the study in terms of family, nterests, which may have imp House of Representatives was ch be Filipino politicians — from the old, wealthy, and conservative rural boss to the young, crusading middle-class progres 19943) Tis the country’s national and local political systems ean be found in use, as the author puts it, the House “is the biggest gathering of jive.” (Gutierrez therefore logical that a sampling of the “key actors” in this institution, A major finding of the study is that while much has remained the same— the majority of the legislators with landed and corpo- rate interests and from traditional political families are still in power— there are significant changes as well. For instance, the number of legislators with backgrounds in business and the profes- sions is bigger now than it was in the 1940s and before martial law was declared in the 1970s. “A significant number of members of the House are middle-class professionals who were first drawn into political involvement during the anti-Marcos protests and elected to public office after the 1986 uprising.” (Guticrrez 1994:3) In 1940 only 10% of the House members were entrepreneurs. This ine creased to 30% in 1970. In the study undertaken in the early 1990s, 36% were full-time business or corporate people before their elee- ti holding public office. The n. Another 15% were involved in various business concerns while statistics indicate that agricultural land- holding is no longer the najor source of wealth and power among I, bank- ing, logging, mining, construction, and other business interests have expanded the traditional bases Some of these findings should, of course, be interpreted with the elite. Real estate, trade, nee, travel, transport, ret of power in Philippine polities. is ion, because we are not sure we can completely separate the holders of old and new wealth. There could be many overlapping a1. nn 38 LooKime sack coring FORWARD may not all be necessarily pro- “conflicts of interest” as legislators with corporate interests sit in the trade and terests and the new, younger elites gressive in their political outlook. The study also indicat industry committee, for instance, and loggers in the natural re. sources or environment committees. In past Congresses, landlords would sit in the agearian reform committee. Despite laws regulat- ing or preventing confliets of interest, the lawmakers are probably the biggest lawbreakers in this regard. An interesting finding is that as a congressman, Juan Ponce Enrile became an advocate of the total log ban, indicating « pro- gressive stance which did not square with his operation of huge logging concessions in Samar and Agusan del Sur. That he could very well take such a position is not necessarily an indication of enlightened polities. Logging, according to the study, “comprises .” (Gutierres, 1994:5) for broadening only a small portion of Enrile’s business empi What is instructive in the study is its implicatio the elas yackgrounds of major constituencies and opportunities for people’s inputs into this broadened arena. The study classified 71 or 36 % of the legislators as the “new elite” whose route to the House was either through the bureaueraey or the support of influential patrons. The hope is that this pos bring about a “new polities” that is more committed to social change. 1972 group of politicians will Conclusion ‘This concluding section is more in the nature of comment rather than an assessment of the changes that have occurred in two. tutions a decade after EDS. As disaffected as we are with power politics and power strug les, it is important to address two of the more prominent arenas in the post-EDSA scene in which these struggles are played out: the multiparty system and the presidency. This complements the previ- ous discussion on the House of Representatives, a major bastion of political power. ‘The multiparty structure, though ehaotic and preferable to the old two-party s ditio ‘agmentary, is ystem dominated by alternating tra- al and conservative elites. In the old system we got more of the same each time. It shut out broad-based participation, talent, new idcas, and democratic tendencie: ‘The expanded system com- —~ePoLiTi¢s AND GOVERNMENT it plements the growth of eivil society noted earlier, and make harder for warlords, political machines, and traditional power hold ers to monopolize the resources and dynamics of political life. Eventually many NGOs and people's organizations could and should be i but they should guard against degenerating into the kind of nes that the old parties became. Coalition-building and consensus decision-making built around stitutionalized into bigger and productive coalitions bureaueratized political mach people's issues could eventually become the basis for the “new poli- ties” that should supersede the traditional polities of power an: privilege. Itshould undermine the ingrained values of patronage and personality considerations, which have perpetuated the undemo- cratic and unequal nature of Philippine polities. Institutionalizing the political party infrastructure to make it more pluralistic ultimately means that power is shared or dispersed among representative sectors of the population. The political play- ing field is not skewed in the direction of entrenched interests. No one elite or class dominates the government and public decision- making accommodates inputs from a wide spectrum of competing interests. ‘The presideney in turn should be reshaped by this pluralistic notion of political forces that give it direction. The final question we should confront in this essay is to what extent people power has infused the presidencies of Gory Aquino and Fidel Ramos. It is interesting to note that the two, while products of an elite upbring- ing, were not drawn from the ranks of the “trapos” or traditional politicians who have had long experience in political office-holding and “wheeling and dealing” skills, In short, they were not from the ne mold that produced the Enriles, Mitras, Laurels, Osmeti and other clans with long-standing political clout and ex- s. Aquino and Mr, Ramos never held publie office before becoming president, And Mrs. Aquino, while coming from anda 2 political family and married into one, had such diffides distaste for power she probably never realized what she could have done with it, Ramos is testing the powers of the presideney with iatives his predecessors never attempted, such as trying to break up bu the C sund confronting, his own gentle manner, surch on family planning issues. He should proceed 38LooKING BACK. LOOKING oawano ively on these attempts at fundamental reform in a sys- more aga tem beset by inertia, corruption, and lack of accountability, or ply by the rigidities of time and tradition. EDSA has been called “the lost revolution,” “the Whatever it was, it was infinitely failed revolu- tion,” and “the flawed revolution, superior to the repression and corruption of the Mareos re which would have worsened were it not for the timely intervention of EDSA. The aftermath of EDSA could also have drifted into other some dark abyss of fundamentalism or sectarianism, as post-revolution scenarios. The escalation of violence and bloodbaths, which have characterized recent upheavals in other ies, were fortunately avoided during and after EDSA. ‘The downside is that peopie have cither forgotten EDSA or have the sinking feeling that it has not necessarily led to a better life. People ask, why is there still so much poverty, so much erime? Thave tried to get into some of these lingering concerns somewhat ambivalently because while there is general agreement on the need for fundamental reform, the realities of power often prevent change f- Quite aid, “those who have the interest in fundamental change have not the power, 1980: from happer ply, as Michael Parenti once and those who have the power have not the interest.” (Par 312) When one is talking about polities, it is tempting to end on a cynical note. That is in the nature of the beast. We always think of politics in its negative meanings or manifestations. But the dynamic that led to EDSA was also politics on a higher order of vision and liberation. We should revisit these win dimensions of EDSA as we celebrate its 10th anniversary. .