Prosecution Memorial PDF

BEFORE THE LD.
SESSIONS JUDGE
Case No. SC 24 & 31 of 2012
Original Criminal Jurisdiction

Under Section 26 r/w
Section 28 r/w Schedule I
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973
STATE Prosecution
v.
DUSHYANT TEJIPAL & MANNA WAZARE Defence

&
STATE Prosecution
v.
KAVITA BHEDI & MANNA WAZARE Defence
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION
Most Respectfully Submitted to the Ld. Sessions Judge
20 12
ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2012

-TABLE OF CONTENTS- Page i of xiii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. VI
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................. VII
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... VIII
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... XII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................. 1
1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO MURDER UNDER
SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE? ...................................................................................... 1
1.1 That the Accused had an intention of murdering Mr. Jaykant Shikre ....................................... 1
1.2 That the offence under section-307 was committed ................................................................... 5
2. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC? 6
2.1 That Accused is liable under section 326 of ipc ........................................................................ 6
2.2 That the accused cannot claim the right of private defence .................................................... 10
3. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION ................................................... 11
4. WHETHER CHAYAWATI COMMITTED SUICIDE ........................................................................... 13
4.1 That there is enough evidence on record to prove that the victim committed suicide. ............ 13
4.2 That the Deceased had become extremely distressed due to the protests................................ 14
5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE ....................................................................... 15
5.1 That the accused had a clear intention to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. ............. 15
5.2 That the accused instigated the deceased to commit suicide. .................................................. 17
5.3 That the accused are also liable under other provisions of the Indian Penal Code ................ 19
6. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION ................................................... 19
6.1 That the accused had common intention .................................................................................. 19
PRAYER ............................................................................................................................. XIII
-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES- Page ii of xiii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAWS
Abhiram Mukhi v. State of Orissa, 82 (1996) CLT 576............................................................. 6
Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 SC 512 ...................................................... 18
Asha Shukla v. State of U.P., 2002 CriLJ 2233 ....................................................................... 19
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1977 CriLJ 164 ................................................................... 12
Baishali Hom Chauduri v. U.O.I. & Ors., (2009) ILR 2 Cal 311 ............................................. 9
Bappa alias Bapu v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., AIR 2004 SC 4119 ......................... 6
Basu Harijan v. State of Orissa, 2003 CrLJ 2270 ................................................................... 14
Brij Lal v. Prem Chand, AIR 1989 SC 1661 ........................................................................... 19
Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 CriLJ 2246 ............................... 12
Chilankur Nagireddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 1998 .................................. 10
Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 ..................... 19
Dharshan Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 333............................................... 11
Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 527 ........................................................ 19
Dwarkanath Goswami, 1932 60 Cal 427 ................................................................................. 20
Emperor v. Amiruddin, (1922) 24 Bom LR 534 ...................................................................... 18
Emperor v. Lavji Mandan, AIR 1939 Bom 452 ...................................................................... 20
Emperor v. Vasudeo Balwant Gogte, I.L.R(1932) 56 Bom. 434 ............................................... 4
Gandaram Taria v. State, 1982 CrLJ 1229 (Orissa) .................................................................. 3
Gangadhar v. State of Maharashtrsa, 1981 CrLJ 1725(Bom.) ................................................. 3
Girija Shankar v. State of U.P., (2004) 3SCC 793 .................................................................... 6
Gopi Nath v. State of U.P., AIR 2001 SC 2493 ....................................................................... 13
Hammu v. State of MP, AIR 1979 Sc 1755 ............................................................................... 9
Hari Kishan Vs. Sukhbir Singh and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2127 .................................................. 3
Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand, (2004)12 SCC 220 .............................................. 1
Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2002 SCC (Cri) 1518 ............................................................ 22
Hingu v. State of U.P, 1998 CrLJ 4154 (All.)............................................................................ 3
In Re: Konda Satyavatamma, (1932) ILR 55 Mad 90. ............................................................ 20
James Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004)2 SCC 203 ................................................................ 11
Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC 1808 ........................... 18
Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., (2007) 10 SCC 797 ................................................................... 18
Krishnan v. State, AIR 2003 SC 2978 ..................................................................................... 13

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES- Page iii of xiii
Kulamani Sahu and Anr. Vs. State of Orissa, 1994 CriLJ 2245 ................................................ 6
Kumar Majhi v. State, 1981 CrLJ 1787 (Orissa) ....................................................................... 3
Kunduru Dharua v. State, 2002 CrLJ 1757 (Ori) .................................................................... 14
Mathai v. State of Kerala, 2005 (3) SCC 260 ............................................................................ 9
Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 1929 ................................................................ 20
Nandu Rastogi alias Nandji Rastogi v. State of Bihar, 2003 SCC (Cri) 177 .......................... 21
Om Parkash v. The State of Punjab, AIR1961SC1782 ............................................................. 1
Padamati Venkata Sundara Rao v. State of A.P., 2006 CriLJ 2168 .......................................... 3
Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2004 SC 132 ............................................ 20
Parimal Chatterji v. Emperor, 140 Ind. Cas.787 .................................................................... 19
Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 5068 ..................................... 1
Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 2944 ............................................. 15
Prabhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 745 ........................................................... 9
Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 134 ................................. 6
Pran Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1982 ALJ 519.................................................................. 3
Pratap Tigga v. State of Bihar, 2004 CrLJ NOC 86(Jhar) ...................................................... 14
Prema Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, AIR 2003 SC 11 ............................................................. 19
R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 9 SCC 27.................................................................. 1
Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188 ........................................................................ 21
Shivabhai v. Emperor, (1926) 50 Bom 683 ............................................................................. 15
Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker. 98 ..................................................................... 3
State of Kerala v. Unni & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 819 .................................................................... 9
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru and Anr, AIR 2005 SC 3996 ....................... 6
State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 305 ................................ 5
State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1532 ................................................................. 19
State of Tripura and Anr.v. Bhupen Dutta Bhowmik, 2002 (2) ACR 1935 (SC)..................... 20
State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha, 2000 Cri. L.J. 4663 ............................................... 10
State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418.................................................... 14
Tatigari Durgaiah S/o. Lakshmaiah v. The State of A.P., 2007 CriLJ 524 ............................... 6
Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Ker. 301 .............................................................. 9
Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of Maharashtra, (2004 )9 SCC 31 ............................................... 1

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES- Page iv of xiii
BOOKS
 Batuk Lal, “Commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860”, Ed. R. P. Kataria and S. K. A.
Naqvi, Vol-I, (Section 1 to 300), (Orient Publishing Company, 1st Edn. New Delhi) (2006-
07).
 Dr. Hari Singh Gour, “The Penal Law of India”, Vol-I, (Section 1 to 120), (Law Publishers
(India) Pvt. Ltd., 11th Edn.) (2006).
 Field’s “Commentary on Law of Evidence”, Ed Gopal S. Chaturvedi, Vol-I & II, (Delhi
Law House, 12th Edn.) (2006).
 Halsbury’s Laws of India, Vol-32, “Criminal Procedure – I & II”, (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, New Delhi) (2007).
 Halsbury’s Laws of India, Vol-5(I), “Criminal Law – I & II”, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths,
New Delhi) (2004, Reprint 2006).
 K. D. Gaur, “Commentary on Indian Penal Code”, (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt.
Ltd., New Delhi) (2006).
 Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure”, Vol-I & II,
(Wadhwa and Company, 18th Edn., Nagpur) (2006).
 Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “Law of Crimes”, Vol-I & II, Ed. Justice C. K. Thakkar, (Bharat
Law House, 25th Edn., New Delhi) (Reprint 2006).
 Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, “The Law of Evidence”, (Wadhwa and Company, 21st Edn.,
Nagpur) (2004, Reprint 2007).
 S. K. Sarkar and Ejaz Ahmad, “Law of Evidence” Vol-I, (Section 1 to 90A), (Ashoka Law
House, 6th Edn., New Delhi) (2006).
 S. P. Joga Rao, “Evidence: Cases & Materials”, Student Series, (Lexis Nexis Butterworths,
2003).

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES- Page v of xiii
DICTIONARIES
 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, (WEST PUBLISHING GROUP 7TH EDN.) (1999)
 P. RAMANATHA AIYAR’S, “ADVANCED LAW LEXICON”, VOL-I TO IV, (WADHWA AND COMPANY,
3RD EDN., NAGPUR) (2005).
 STROUD’S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES, VOL-I TO III, EDITOR DANIEL
GREENBERG, (SWEET AND MAXWELL LTD., 7TH EDN., 2006, REPRINT 2008) LONDON.
 WHARTON’S LAW LEXICON, BY A. S. OPPE, (SWEET AND MAXWELL UNIVERSAL LAW
PUBLISHING CO. PVT. LTD.,14TH EDN., 1997).
STATUTORY COMPILATIONS
 THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (2 OF 1974)
 THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 (10 OF 1897)
 THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (1 OF 1872)
 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (45 OF 1860)
INTERNET SITES
 http://www.manupatra.com
 http://www.supremecourtcaselaw.com
 http://www.scconline.com
 http://www.judis.nic.in
 http://www.heinonline.com
 http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe
 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/myncbi/

-LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS- Page vi of xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.I.R. ALL INDIA REPORTER

AC APPEALS CASES
All ALLAHABAD
AP ANDHRA PRADESH
Art. ARTICLE
Bom BOMBAY
Cal DELHI
Co. COMPANY
Comm. COMMISSIONER
Del DELHI
e.g. EXEMPLUM GRATIA (FOR EXAMPLE)
Ed. EDITION
JT JUDGMENTS TODAY
KB KING’S BENCH
LR LAW REPORTER
Mad MADRAS
MANU MANUPATRA
p. PAGE
Para. PARAGRAPH
Pun PUNJAB AND HARYANA
QB QUEEN’S BENCH
SC SUPREME COURT
SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTER
SCW SUPREME COURT WEEKLY
Sec. SECTION
Supp SUPPLEMENTARY
U.O.I. UNION OF INDIA

-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION- Page vii of xiii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PROSECUTION HAS APPROACHED THE LD. SESSIONS JUDGE UNDER SECTION 26 R/W
SECTION 28 R/W SCHEDULE I OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, WHICH READS AS
HEREUNDER:
S. 26. Courts by which offences are triable:
Subject to the other provisions of this Code,-
(a) Any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by-
(i) …
(ii) The Court of Session
(iii)…
S. 28. Sentences which High Courts and Sessions Judges may pass:
(1) …
(2) A Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law;
but any sentence of death passed by any such Judge shall be subject to confirmation by
the High court
(3) …

-STATEMENT OF FACTS- Page viii of xiii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
 Manna Wazare has been heading a populist movement spreading across the country
which has created a political upheaval in India. His methods have been hailed across
the world as the second coming of Gandhi, credited with using peaceful agitation to
secure his goals, which nowadays, include efforts to pressurize the government at the
Centre to enact stronger laws to effectively deal with the matters of corruption, black
money, election reform etc.
 In early 2012, Manna announced at a rally that it was time that the people took
matters into their own hands and that he and members of his core Team had taken
steps which would soon expose the most corrupt politicians of the country and that all
would be revealed on the 26th of January 2012 at the Parade Ground, New Delhi.
 The media and the social networks were all abuzz with excitement about what could
possibly be revealed by Manna in his address.
 On the 26th morning more than two lakh people were present to listen to Manna.
Manna delivered the following address: “To wipe out the menace of corruption and
black money, and to get the country out of the vicious problems of poverty, inequality
and unemployment, it is me, your chosen leader who has had to take matters into my
hands….Ladies and Gentlemen, it is time this country breaks free of this corrupt
political system that has kept us from achieving our true place in the world.”
 Manna further continued that he had hired Plasma Inc., the best investigating agency
in the world to thoroughly probe 10 of the most corrupt politicians in his opinion.
Then he revealed that the Sports Minister, Kumar Maalmadi had mis-appropriated
funds amounting to about 150 Crores and Chakbir Singh had fraudulently
appropriated flats meant for soldiers died in war.
 He further said about the Chief Minister of Haryana that she had an illegitimate
daughter, now 25 years in age, who, along with her father had been abandoned by
Chayawati for the rich and powerful Virat Singhania of Singhania Steel. “…A woman
who abandons her own daughter has no right to even live, let alone contest elections
in our glorious nation.” Manna said that Singhania, through numerous shell
companies has been getting tender after tender in Chayawati’s state of Haryana, in
return of which he gave her presents. He continued “…Dear friends, I say this again, a
woman who sold out her would be family for money and fame, has no right to live. If
she even has a modicum of shame, she herself should commit suicide…Heavens
forbid, if you voted for her it is time for you to send her a message that she is not
welcome in our world anymore and only in death can she redeem her sins…”
 Next, Manna mentioned that his team could not find anything on Vijender Lodhi,
whom he had believed to be corrupt .

-STATEMENT OF FACTS- Page ix of xiii
 Manna next announced that Delhi’s Jayakant Shikre has been involved in human
trafficking and is also the kingpin behind the drug and prostitution racket in Delhi.
“…If we can remove this one man from the equation completely, I can assure you
Delhi will be a different city altogether…Today it is your beholden duty to act, to
once and for all put a stop to all the wrongdoing this man continues to indulge in. If
rogues like Jaykant Shikre can flourish for so long, the police and the judiciary have
clearly failed us, and you the people of India have to take matters in your own hands.
You must act purposefully, and decisively, without caring for the consequences of
your actions…Today, you must pledge your allegiance to this movement. Promise me
that you will act on what I have told you and that none of these people will go
unpunished. Today, the people of this country will send a clear message out…”
 Manna’s speech became the most watched live event of all time in India. A large
section of the crowd headed towards Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse on the outskirts of
Gurgaon. Manna spoke with his aide and core Team Manna member, Dushyant
Tejipal and directed him to go to Jaykant’s house. The crowd began chanting slogans,
climbed the walls and started pelting the windows with stones and shoes.
 At around 3:00 pm Jayveer Shikre, Jaykant’s son, tried to drive out of the farmhouse;
on being stopped by the crowd, he fired two shots from his 9mm pistol into the air to
disperse the crowd. Jaykant came running out of the farmhouse and immediately, on
assessing the situation, called the police. At seeing Jayakant, Dushyant who was
trying to calm the crowd till then, shouted, ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it.
It is now or never!’
 At 3:20 pm by the time the police reached, the entire house was being ransacked.
Jayveer Shikre was severely injured, and the police had to intervene to stop the
rampaging crowd from causing more harm. Jaykant Shikre was found in an
unconscious state with multiple internal injuries and was rushed to the hospital. The
mob immediately disintegrated, rendering any arrests impossible. Eyewitnesses
present at the scene could only reliably identify Dushyant Tejipal coming out of
Shikre’s farmhouse with blood on his shirt, which was later identified as that of
Jaykant Shikre.
 News about the attack on Jaykant’s farmhouse spread across the country. Protests,
vigils and marches started picking up pace, many of them being organized by
Members of Team Manna. One such venue for protest was setup outside Chayawati’s
mansion by core Team Manna member and top Wazare confidant Kavita Bhedi. At
the site angry protestors, carrying morphed photos of Chayawati and Virat Singhania
and her daughter along with other defamatory and offensive material, raised slogans
and goaded Chayawati to commit suicide. Manna’s speech was screened on large
screens right outside her house for days together and the pressure kept mounting on
her.

-STATEMENT OF FACTS- Page x of xiii
 By the end of the week, some members of Team Manna had started sending her books
on how to commit suicide and on some days objects like knives, rope, sleeping pills
and kerosene oil were also received in the mail from all over the country. It was
reliably reported that Chayawati had become extremely distressed and had started
seeing a psychiatrist.
 On February 22nd 2012 against the wishes of her security agents, a visibly tormented
Chayawati, left her house after telling her housekeeper that she wanted to go for a
drive alone. Around three hours later the car was found in a ditch by the banks of a
river. It had apparently crashed through the barricades on the sides of the bridge and
fallen down. Chayawati died before she could be treated. Her dead body was sent for
a post mortem examination and the police impounded the car for further investigation.
 A case under Section 307, 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was
registered against Dushyant Tejipal and Manna Wazare for the incident at jayakant
Shikre’s house.
 Also, the police, believing that Chayawati’s death was a case of suicide charged
Manna Wazare and Kavita Bhedi under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code.
 On Manna Wazare’s request, the court has ordered a joint hearing with regard to both
the offences which have been listed together for final arguments before the court of
the Sessions Judge, Gurgaon.

-QUESTIONS OF LAW- Page xi of xiii
QUESTIONS OF LAW
THE PROSECUTION RESPECTFULLY ASKS THE HON’BLE COURT:
1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO

MURDER UNDER SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?
2. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE LIABLE

UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?
3. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE HAD COMMON

INTENTION?
4. WHETHER CHAYAWATI COMMITTED SUICIDE?
5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE?
6. WHETHER MANNA WAZARE AND KAVITA BHEDI HAD COMMON

INTENTION?

-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS- Page xii of xiii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO

MURDER UNDER SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?
1.1. THAT THE ACCUSED HAD AN INTENTION OF MURDERING MR. JAYKANT
SHIKRE
1.2. THAT THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION-307 WAS COMMITTED
2. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE LIABLE
UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?
2.1. THAT ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC
2.2. THAT THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENSE
3. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE HAD COMMON
INTENTION?
4.1. THAT THERE IS ENOUGH EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT THE
VICTIM COMMITTED SUICIDE.
4.2. THAT THE DECEASED HAD BECOME EXTREMELY DISTRESSED DUE TO
THE PROTESTS
5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE?
5.1. THAT THE ACCUSED HAD A CLEAR INTENTION TO INSTIGATE THE
DECEASED TO COMMIT SUICIDE.
5.2. THAT THE ACCUSED INSTIGATED THE DECEASED TO COMMIT SUICIDE.
5.3. THAT THE ACCUSED ARE ALSO LIABLE UNDER OTHER PROVISIONS OF
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
6. WHETHER MANNA WAZARE AND KAVITA BHEDI HAD COMMON
INTENTION?
6.1. THAT THE ACCUSED HAD COMMON INTENTION

-ARGUMENTS ADVANCED- P a g e | 1 of 21
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL1 CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO MURDER UNDER
SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that after the investigation into the
incident at Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse, a case under Section 307, 326 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code2 was registered against Accused and Manna Wazare3.
Section-307 provides “Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under
such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender
shall be liable either to 1[imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore
mentioned.”
It is submitted that to constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence
must be present:-
(i) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and
(ii) the doing of an act towards it.4
1.1 THAT THE ACCUSED HAD AN INTENTION OF MURDERING MR. JAYKANT SHIKRE
1.1.1. It is most humbly submitted that Accused had an intention of killing Mr. Jaykant Shikre,
which is clearly reflected in the following statements made by Mr. Manna Wazare5 at the
Parade Ground on the 26th of January. The statements have been reproduced in the factual
matrix:
“Today it is your beholden duty to act, to once and for all put a stop to all the wrongdoing
this man continues to indulge in. As I speak, Jaykant Shikre is at 420, Plutonium Avenue,
Gurgaon, where he indulges in all sorts of morally corrupt acts in the confines of his secret
1 Hereinafter “Accused”.
2 Hereinafter “I.P.C”.
3 Factsheet ¶ 13.
4 Om Parkash v. The State of Punjab AIR1961SC1782; Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar
AIR2004 SC 5068; Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of Bihar (2007);R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2004) 9
SCC 27; Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand (2004)12 SCC 220; Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of
Maharashtra (2004 )9 SCC 31.
5 Hereinafter “Co-Accused”.

farmhouse. This evil must be killed. If rogues like Jaykant Shikre can flourish for so long, the
police and the judiciary have clearly failed us, and you the people of India have to take
matters in your own hands. You must act purposefully, and decisively, without caring for the
consequences of your actions. Who knows, if you go to his farmhouse right now, who all you
might be able to rescue. Today, you must pledge your allegiance to this movement. You
cannot just come here, listen to what I have told you and go back home. Promise me that you
will act on what I have told you and that none of these people will go unpunished. Today, the
people of this country will send a clear message out, we must declare in one voice that we
will not go quietly into the night, we will not give-in without a fight. Today is our Republic
day, and the politicians must be made to realise the true meaning of this word. Jai Hind!”6
1.1.2. It is further submitted that Co-Accused’s speech went down as the most watched live event of
all time in India, breaking all records. The people present at the venue were specially charged
and a large section of the crowd began to head towards Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse on the
outskirts of Gurgaon. Co-Accused called on his aide and core Team Manna member,
Accussed and after speaking with him briefly, directed him to go to Jaykant’s house. Very
soon over 500 people gathered outside Jaykant Shikre’s location and began chanting slogans,
climbed the walls and started pelting the windows with stones and shoes7.
1.1.3. The mere sight of Shikre sent Accused, who had till then tried to calm the aggressive crowd,
into a tizzy. Accused at the top of his lungs, shouted, ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is
it. It is now or never!’8
1.1.4. It is most respectfully submitted that it has been held that “The Code uses the word intention,
in the sense that something is intentionally done if it is done deliberately or purposely, in
other words is a willed though not necessarily a desired result or result which is the purpose
of the deed.9 It is a settled law that whether a person intended to kill another would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case.10
6 Factsheet ¶ 7.
7 Factsheet ¶ 8.
8 Ibid.
9 Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker. 98.
10 Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of Maharashtra (2004)9SCC31; Gandaram Taria v. State, 1982 CrLJ 1229
(Orissa).

1.1.5. It is submitted that intention cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be detected from
the facts and circumstances of case. There are various relevant considerations like the nature
of weapon used, the place where the injuries were reflected, the nature of the injuries caused,
the opportunity available which the accused gets etc.11
1.1.6. In the recent judgment of Padamati Venkata Sundara Rao v. State of A.P.12, it was observed
by the Court that: “The intention is to be gathered from various circumstances and not
merely form the consequence that ensures. The prosecution should place and prove all the
facts and circumstances as mentioned in Section 300, IPC. Unless it can be said that the
intention or knowledge of the accused was to cause such a bodily injury as would come
within the scope of Section 300, IPC, the accused cannot be found guilty under Section 307,
IPC when there is attempt to cause injury. It must be proved that if the act complained of
would have culminated in the death of the victim, the offence would have come within the
ingredients as envisaged in Section 300, IPC. Mere giving a blow does not raise an inference
of attempt to murder.”
1.1.7. Section 30013 requires that there should be an intention of committing an act that the persons
knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
1.1.8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Kishan Vs. Sukhbir Singh and Ors14 observed
that:
“Under Section 307 IPC what the Court has to see is, whether the act irrespective of its
result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in that
section. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary constitute
murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of "attempt to
murder". Under Section 307 the intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore,
the intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely from the consequences
11 Gangadhar v. State of Maharashtrsa, 1981 CrLJ 1725(Bom.); Hingu v. State of U.P, 1998 CrLJ 4154 (All.);
Pran Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1982 ALJ 519; Kumar Majhi v. State 1981 CrLJ 1787 (Orissa).
12 Padamati Venkata Sundara Rao v. State of A.P.2006 CriLJ 2168.
13Section 300 of IPC provides that” Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if
the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”
14 Hari Kishan Vs. Sukhbir Singh and Ors. AIR 1988 SC 2127.

that ensue. The nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime,
severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted are some of the factors
that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention.”
1.1.9. The Supreme Court upheld the opinion of Strait J., in the landmark judgment of Om Prakash
v. The State of Punjab15:"It seems to me that if a person who has an evil intent does an act
which is the last possible act that he could do towards the accomplishment of a particular
crime that he has in his mind, he is not entitled to pray in his aid an obstacle intervening not
known to himself. If he did all that he could do and completed the only remaining proximate
act in his power, I do not think he can escape criminal responsibility, and this because his
own set volition and purpose having been given effect to their full extent, a fact unknown to
him and at variance with his own belief, intervened to prevent the consequences of that act
which he expected to ensue, ensuing."
1.1.10. In the same judgment16 SC followed the law laid down in the case of Emperor v. Vasudeo
Balwant Gogte17 in which a person fired several shots at another. No injury was in fact
occasioned due to certain obstruction. The culprit was convicted of an offence under s. 307.
Beaumont, C.J., said:"I think that what section 307 really means is that the accused must do
an act with such a guilty intention and knowledge and in such circumstances that but for
some intervening fact the act would have amounted to murder in the normal course of
events".
1.1.11. Further, in the recent judgment of Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar18, It was
held that: “For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge
and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention.
Section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which
fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The
intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In
the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there
can be no offence 'of attempt to murder'. Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by
precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. Some
15 Om Parkash v. The State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1782.
16 Ibid.
17 Emperor v. Vasudeo Balwant Gogte I.L.R(1932) 56 Bom. 434.
18 Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar AIR 2004 SC 5068.

of the relevant considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries
were inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took
place.”
1.1.12. It is most respectfully submitted that when the Police arrived at the site of incident, the entire
house was being ransacked and Police tried to intervene and stop the rampaging crowd from
doing the further harm. Jaykant Shikre was found in unconscious state with multiple injuries.
Eyewitness present identified Accused coming out of the house with blood on his shirt.
Forensic examination conducted by the Police revealed that the blood belonged to Jaykant
Shikre19.
1.1.13. Thus, in light of the prevailing circumstances and the relevant considerations like the
intervening act by police and the opportunity given to the accused, it can be clearly concluded
that Accused had the required murderous intention.
1.2 THAT THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION-307 WAS COMMITTED
1.2.1. It is most humbly submitted that in the landmark judgment of State of Maharashtra v.
Balram Bama Patil and Ors.20, it was held by the SC:
“To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of
causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may
often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused,
such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases,
be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction
between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any
result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the
culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused
to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the
death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its
result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this
section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in
law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.”
1.2.2. The interpretation given in Balram Bama Patil has been followed in catena of judgments21.
Further, in the matter of Abhiram Mukhi v. State of Orissa22, it was observed by the Court
19 Factsheet ¶ 8.
20
State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil and Ors., AIR1983SC305.

that: “The question, however, remains as to whether it can be said beyond all reasonable
doubt that an offence under Section 307, I.P.C, has been made out. In order to bring home the
charge under Section 307, the prosecution has to establish the following :- (i) death of human
being was attempted to be caused by or in consequence of the act of the accused;
(ii) such act was done by the accused with intention of causing death or with intention of
causing such bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to cause death or was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that by doing such an act as the accused knew
to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death.… In a given case offence under Section 307, I.P.C. can be said to
have been committed even without the slightest injury. It is the nature of the act and not the
result thereof that is the determinative factor.”
1.2.3. It is most humbly submitted that there was an overt action by Accused towards commission
of murder when he uttered the words after seeing Jaykant Shikre coming out of the
farmhouse “My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!” And when the
Police arrived at the scene the farmhouse was being ransacked by the crowd. Accused was
seen coming out with Jaykant Shikre’s blood on his shirt.
1.2.4. Thus, it is submitted that above stated facts clearly prove beyond doubt that death of Mr.
Jaykant Shikre was attempted which couldn’t be accomplished because the Police arrived at
the scene and isolated the victim.
1.2.5. Hence, it is most respectfully submitted that Accused should be convicted for Attempt to
murder under Section-307 of the IPC.
2. WHETHER ACCUSED AND CO-ACCUSED ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC?
2.1 THAT ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 326 OF IPC
2.1.1. It is submitted that the incident took place after the speech delivered by Co-Accused. After
which people present at the venue were specially charged and a large section of the crowd
began to head towards Jaykant Shikre’s farmhouse. Accused after speaking with Co-Accused
came to the farmhouse. Over 500 people gathered outside Jaykant Shikre’s location and
21
Parsuram Pandey and Ors. v. The State of Bihar AIR 2004 SC 5068; Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of
Bihar and Ors. (2007)13SCC134; Vasant Vithu Jadhav v.State of Maharashtra (2004)9SCC31;R. Prakash v.
State of Karnataka (2004)9SCC27; Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand (2004)12SCC220; State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru and Anr AIR2005SC3996.; Girija Shankar v. State of U.P.
(2004)3SCC793; Bappa alias Bapu v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. AIR2004SC4119; Kulamani Sahu
and Anr. Vs.: State of Orissa 1994CriLJ2245 ;Tatigari Durgaiah S/o. Lakshmaiah v. The State of A.P. the rep.
by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.2007CriLJ524.
22
Abhiram Mukhi v. State of Orissa 82(1996)CLT576

began chanting slogans, climbed the walls and started pelting the windows with stones and
shoes. Jayveer Shikre, Jaykant’s son, tried to drive out of the farmhouse but was stopped by
the hoard of people right outside the gate. Jaykant also came out of the farmhouse after
sometime. The mere sight of Shikre sent Accused into a tizzy. Accused at the top of his
lungs, shouted, ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!23
2.1.2. It is further submitted that Jayveer Shikre was severely injured and Jaykant Shikre was also
found in an unconscious state with multiple internal injuries and was rushed to the hospital.
Eyewitnesses present at the scene could only reliably identify Accused coming out of
Shikre’s farmhouse with blood on his shirt. Forensic examination conducted by the police
later revealed that the blood belonged to Jaykant Shikre.
2.1.3. It is submitted that Section 326 of IPC states
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means
Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by
means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a
weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by
means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or
by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body inhale, to swallow, or to
receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for
life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
2.1.4. It is submitted that Section 320 IPC defines “Grievous hurt”, which read as follows:
The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous"-
First - Emasculation.
Secondly - Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly - Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
Fourthly - Privation of any member or joint.
Fifthly - Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any members or joint.
Sixthly - Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
Seventhly - Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly - Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space
of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits."
23
Factsheet ¶ 8.

2.1.5. It is submitted that in the present case as it has been stated earlier that Jayveer Shikre was
severely injured and Jaykant Shikre was found in an unconscious state with multiple
injuries.24 Therefore it is contended that Accused is liable under Section 326 of IPC.
2.1.6. It is submitted that the heading of the Section provides some insight into the factors to be
considered. The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are: (1) voluntarily causing a hurt;
(2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and (3) the grievous hurt must have been caused by
dangerous weapons or means.
2.1.7. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the accused has voluntarily caused hurt
to the victims.
2.1.8. It is submitted that accused was present at the place where the incident took place and at the
time when the incident took place.25
2.1.9. The lines ‘My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!’ clearly show the
intention of the accused to cause harm to the victims.26
2.1.10. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’le court that the hurt caused by the accused to the
victims were grievous.
2.1.11. It is submitted that the injuries caused to both Jayveer and Jaykant are not known, what is
known is that Jayveer was severely injured and Jaykant was found in an unconscious state
with multiple injuries.
2.1.12. It is submitted that Section 320 provides the definition for ‘grievous hurt’ which has been
covered in eight points. The eighth point clearly states that ‘any hurt which endangers life or
which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or
unable to follow his ordinary pursuits’ would be considered as ‘grievous hurt’.
2.1.13. It is submitted that it can be construed from the above facts that both of them were grievously
hurt. In the case of State of Bihar v. Govind Singh & Ors.27, the victim was severely injured
by the accused and the accused was convicted under Section 326 of IPC by the court.
2.1.14. Therefore it is submitted that the injuries caused to both the victims would be covered under
Section 320 and hence under Section 326 of IPC.
24
Factsheet ¶ 9.
25
Factsheet ¶ 8.
26
Ibid.
27
State of Bihar v. Govind Singh & Ors., Crim. App. No. 388 of 1995 (Patna).

2.1.15. It is submitted that Supreme Court in the case of Hammu v. State of MP28, held that, in
absence of definite finding about fatal injury accused persons acting in union with common
intention and causing grievous hurt can be convicted under Section 326/34 of IPC. Therefore
the accused here can be convicted under Section 326 of IPC.
2.1.16. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the grievous hurt caused by the accused
was caused by dangerous weapon.
2.1.17. It is submitted that the injuries to both the victims were caused by stones. Stones if in large
quantity used for injuring a person can be dangerous. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Mathai v. State of Kerala29 , that the expression “any instrument which,
used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death”, has to be gauged taking note of
heading of section. What would constitute a “dangerous weapon” would depend upon the
facts of each case and no generalisation can be made.30
2.1.18. It is submitted that the Kerala High Court held in Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala31, that
granite stone with rough edge will come under “instruments which, used as a weapon of
offence, is likely to cause death.”32
2.1.19. It is submitted that tooth is an instrument for cutting and serves as weapon of offence and
defence. Where the petitioner bit off the tip of his wife’s nose by his teeth, he can be
convicted under Sec. 326 of IPC.33 This proves that any instrument can be dangerous and that
would be covered under Section 326 of IPC.
2.1.20. It is submitted that Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha34 held that
there is no such thing as a regular or earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that
matter a hurt. Whether a particular article can per se cause any serious wound or grievous
hurt or injury has to be determined factually.
28
Hammu v. State of MP, AIR 1979 Sc 1755.
29
Mathai v. State of Kerala, 2005 (3) SCC 260.
30
Prabhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 745; State of Kerala v. Unni & Anr., AIR 2007 SC 819;
Baishali Hom Chauduri v. U.O.I. & Ors., (2009) ILR 2 Cal 311.
31
Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Ker. 301.
32
Ibid.
33
Chilankur Nagireddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 1998.
34
State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha 2000 Cri. L.J. 4663.

2.1.21. The evidence used in this case clearly shows that the hurt or the injury that was caused was
covered under the expression ‘grievous hurt’ as defined under Section 320 IPC. The
inevitable conclusion is that a grievous hurt was caused. It is not that in every case a stone
would constitute a dangerous weapon. It would depend upon the facts of the case. At this
juncture, it would be relevant to note that in some provisions e.g.
Sections 324 and 326, expression "dangerous weapon" is used. In some other more serious
offences the expression used is "deadly weapon" (e.g. Sections 397 and 398). The facts
involved in a particular case, depending upon various factors like size, sharpness, would
throw light on the question whether the weapon was a dangerous or deadly weapon or not.
2.1.22. Therefore it is submitted that the injuries are caused by the use of stones to both the victims.
And it has been proved above that stones can be used as dangerous weapon as per Section
326 of IPC. Hence the accused has committed an offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt
to the victims and therefore is liable.
2.2 THAT THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE
2.2.1. It is submitted that the accused cannot claim the right of private defence in this matter.
2.2.2. It is submitted that Section 96 of IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the
exercise of the right of private defence. The Section does not define the expression ‘right of
private defence’. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise
of such right.
2.2.3. The Supreme Court in the case of James Martin v. State of Kerala35 held that, whether in a
particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the exercise of the right of
private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each
case. No test in the abstract for determining such a question can be laid down. In determining
this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances.
2.2.4. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need
to defend no longer survived.36
2.2.5. It is submitted that in the present matter the victim fired two shots from his 9mm pistol into
air in an effort to disperse the crowd.37 From the given facts it is very much clear that there
35
James Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004)2 SCC 203; Dharshan Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2010) 2
SCC333.
36
Ibid.
37
Factsheet ¶ 8.

was no intention of harming anyone from the side of the victim, he just fired the shots in air
and not in the direction of the crowd or accused.
2.2.6. It is therefore submitted that the accused cannot claim the right of private defence.
3. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION
3.1.1. It is most humbly submitted that Co-Accused shared a common intention to murder Jaykant
Shikre. Before the incident at farmhouse took place, he made speech instigating the crowd
and also mentioned the address of Jaykant Shikre. His speech which has been reproduced in
the factual matrix which is cited above clearly exhibits the murderous intention.38
3.1.2. The Supreme Court while dealing with the question of conviction under Section 307
alongwith Section 34 in the matter of Girija Shankar v. State of U.P.39 held that:
“Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act.
The Section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The
distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one
person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by
several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a
common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common
intention is seldom available and, therefore such intention can only be inferred from the
circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In
order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the
accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34,
be it pre-arranged or on the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime. The true concept of Section is that if two or more persons
intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done
it individually by himself.”
3.1.3. Further in the matter of Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab40, it was observed that “the
existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element
for application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged
with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may
38
Factsheet ¶ 13.
39
Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004)3SCC793.
40
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab 1977 CriLJ 164.

be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention
in order to attract the provision.”
3.1.4. It was further observed by the Court in the matter of GirjaShankar41: “The Section does not
say "the common intention of all", nor does it say "and intention common to all". Under the
provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a
common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance
of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when
an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the
accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it
was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult
to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the
common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them.”
3.1.5. In the matter of Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh42, it was held that:
“Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself.
For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the
accused.”
3.1.6. It is submitted that the common intention or plan may be proved either from conduct,
circumstances or from incriminating facts.43
3.1.7. It is submitted it can be inferred from the instant facts that the co-accused had the common
intention as made speeches instigating people to kill Jayakant Shikre. Moreover, the factsheet
provides that Manna called on his aide and core Team Manna member, Accused and after
speaking with him briefly, directed him to go to Jaykant’s house.44
3.1.8. The fact that Co-accused spoke to main accused before the act exhibits that there was a plan
or meeting of mind between them. Further, when accused saw Jaykant Shikre coming out the
house, he uttered the words “My friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!”45
41
Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004) 3 SCC 793
42
Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 CriLJ 2246.
43
Krishnan v. State AIR 2003 SC 2978: (2003) 7 SCC 56; Gopi Nath v. State of U.P. AIR 2001 SC 2493:
(2001) 6 SCC 620.
44
Factsheet ¶ 8.
45
Ibid

he acted in furtherance of common intention of murdering and causing grievous hurt to

Jaykant Shikre.
3.1.9. In light of the above, it can be rightly construed that Co-accused had the common intention to
kill and cause grievous hurt to Jaykant Shikre as all the ingredients required under Section 34
are satisfied. It is humbly submitted that Accused and Co-Accused are liable to be convicted
under Section 34 read along with Section-307 and Section-326.
4.1 THAT THERE IS ENOUGH EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT THE VICTIM COMMITTED
SUICIDE
4.1.1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that evidence of the suicide has to be drawn
from the post-mortem report of the victim, forensic report of the car and the mental condition
of the victim. It is humbly submitted that as per Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act 46,
Evidence includes all documents produced for the inspection of the Court.47 Both the post-
mortem report of the victim and the Forensic Report of the car are documents within the
meaning of Section 3 of the I.E.A.48 These documents are admissible in court as expert
opinion under Section 45 of the I.E.A.
4.1.2. It is respectfully submitted that the post mortem report submitted by the doctor conducting
autopsy of the dead body is admissible in evidence even without examining the doctor in
court.49 The Apex Court has admitted as evidence and relied on post mortem reports in a
catena of cases.50
4.1.3. It is deferentially submitted that according to the post-mortem report, victim died due to
excessive bleeding from a deep incised wound on the left arm. She was found clutching a
small pocket knife in her right hand. It is pertinent to note that while the forensic examination
of the car, a large pool of blood was found around the hand brake area and under the driver’s
seat.
46
“Hereinafter I.E.A.”
47
" Evidence" means and includes-- (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it
by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all
documents produced for the inspection of the Court; such documents are called documentary evidence.
48
" Document" means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or
marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of
recording that matter.
49
Basu Harijan v. State of Orissa 2003 CrLJ 2270; Pratap Tigga v. State of Bihar 2004 CrLJ NOC 86(Jhar).
50
State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal AIR 1994 SC 1418, Kunduru Dharua v. State 2002 CrLJ 1757 (Ori).

4.1.4. It is most deferentially submitted that according to the Oxford Dictionary; incise means to cut
(skin or flesh) with a surgical instrument. An ‘incised wound’ is a cut or incision on a human
body - a wound made by a cutting instrument, such as a razor.51 Thus, it appears that the
wound which caused the victim’s death was made by a sharp instrument, which in this case,
would be the pocket knife found in the deceased’s hand.
4.1.5. It is humbly submitted that it can be rightly inferred from the above facts that the deceased
cut her wrist with a knife while driving, which led to bleeding ultimately causing her death.
4.2 THAT THE DECEASED HAD BECOME EXTREMELY DISTRESSED DUE TO THE PROTESTS
4.2.1. It is humbly submitted that a protest was setup right outside the deceased’s mansion by core
the accused. The speech of co-accused had been screened outside her house. Protestors,
carrying defamatory and offensive material about her, raised slogans and goaded her to
commit suicide. This scenario continued for days together, unabated. Moreover, by the end of
the week, some members of the team of the accused had started sending her books on how to
commit suicide also some objects like knives, rope, sleeping pills and kerosene oil.52
4.2.2. It is respectfully submitted that as result of this, the deceased had become extremely
distressed and had started seeing a psychiatrist.53 It is pertinent to note that on the fateful day,
a visibly tormented Chayawati told her housekeeper that she wanted to go for a drive alone.54
4.2.3. This statement is admissible in court under Section 32(1)55 of the I.E.A as it is spoken by the
deceased ‘as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death…’
With regard to this clause, it has been held that “the wide words used in the clause show that
it is intended to cover statements other than ‘dying declarations’ i.e statements made by a
dying person as to the cause of his death. The clause covers also other statements made by a
deceased person, such as a conversation between the deceased and another person…”56
51
Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing Group, 7th Edn. (1999).
52
Factsheet ¶ 11.
53
Ibid.
54
Factsheet ¶ 12.
55
32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant
- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead…are themselves relevant facts in
the following cases : (1) When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person' s death
comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the
time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in
which the cause of his death comes into question. or is made in course of business;
56
Shivabhai v. Emperor (1926) 50 Bom 683.

4.2.4. In Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat57 it was held that “The words ‘statements as to
any of the circumstances’ are by themselves capable of expanding the width and contours of
the scope of admissibility. When the word ‘circumstances’ is linked to ‘transaction which
resulted in his death’, the subsection casts the net in a very wide dimension. Anything which
has a nexus with his death, proximate or distant, direct or indirect, can also fall within the
purview of the sub-section.”
4.2.5. Moreover, this fact is also relevant under Section 658 of the I.E.A, as it forms part of the same
transaction that resulted into the deceased committing suicide.
4.2.6. The fact that the deceased left her house against the wishes of her security agents, after
expressly telling her housekeeper that she wanted to be alone coupled with the fact of her
being extremely distressed point to the inference that she had made up her mind to commit
suicide.
4.2.7. It is humbly submitted that in the context of the facts of the case, it can be seen that the
accused persons instigated the deceased to commit suicide and in fact left her no other option.
5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE
It is most deferentially submitted before this Hon’ble Court that for a person to be convicted
of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code59, two essential
ingredients must be established:
1. The deceased committed suicide
2. The accused abetted her in committing suicide.
The first has already been established above.
Abetment contemplated in section 306 must conform to the definition given in section 107 of
the Indian Penal Code, according to which abetment can be brought about in three ways: by
instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid to the deceased.
5.1 THAT THE ACCUSED HAD A CLEAR INTENTION TO INSTIGATE THE DECEASED TO COMMIT
SUICIDE.
57
Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat AIR 2001 SC 2944.
58
6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction - Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected
with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time
and place or at different times and places.
59
306. Abetment of suicide - If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine.

5.1.1. It is most deferentially submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the intention of co-accused is
relevant here. As per Section 14 of the I.E.A60, facts showing the existence of a state of mind
such as intention are relevant when the existence of such a state of mind is in issue or
relevant. Therefore certain excerpts from the speech of co-accused, which clearly indicate his
intention to instigate the victim to commit suicide, are relevant in the present case. There are
four distinct instances61 in his speech whereby he clearly expresses his opinion that
Chayawati should die:
 A woman who abandons her own daughter has no right to even live, let alone contest
elections in our glorious nation.
 Dear friends, I say this again, a woman who sold out her would be family for money
and fame, has no right to live.
 If she even has a modicum of shame, she herself should commit suicide…..
 Heavens forbid, if you voted for her it is time for you to send her a message that she is
not welcome in our world anymore and only in death can she redeem her sins……
5.1.2. Further, his aggressive ideas can be ascertained not only from the final speech but also from
his previous speeches. At a rally in early 2012, he announced that it was time people took
matters into their own hands.62 In fact he expressly declares that to wipe out the menace of
corruption etc, he has taken matters into his hands.63 These would also be admissible in court
under Section 864 of the I.E.A.
5.1.3. It is deferentially submitted that the character and circumstances of the act of the accused
strongly suggest an intention to abet the suicide of the deceased; hence if at all there was
60
14. Facts showing existence of state of mind, or of body, of bodily feeling - Facts showing the existence of
any state of mind, such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill- will or good- will towards
any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant, when the
existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling, is in issue or relevant.
61
Factsheet ¶ 7.
62
Factsheet ¶ 5.
63
Factsheet ¶ 7.
64
8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct - Any fact is relevant which shows or
constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. The conduct of any party, or of any
agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact
in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any
proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and
whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.

some other intention with which he acted, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.
This is in keeping with Illustration (a) to Section 10665 of the I.E.A.
5.2 THAT THE ACCUSED INSTIGATED THE DECEASED TO COMMIT SUICIDE.
5.2.1. It is most deferentially submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused ‘abetted’ the
suicide of the deceased by instigating her to commit suicide. The accused brought about the
instigation in two ways, firstly by himself suggesting her to commit suicide in his speech and
secondly, by calling upon the public to instigate her to commit suicide. The speech delivered
by the co-accused 2 was being telecast live all over the country and was being heard by
millions of people. He expressly announced that “You must act purposefully, and decisively,
without caring for the consequences of your actions. Today, you must pledge your allegiance
to this movement. You cannot just come here, listen to what I have told you and go back
home. Promise me that you will act on what I have told you and that none of these people will
go unpunished.”66
5.2.2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the nature of the protest against the
deceased was not political. The accused and the public were protesting against the deceased
not in the capacity of the Chief Minister of a State but in her personal capacity. The accused
was not entitled to point his finger at the deceased’s personal life in the garb of political
protest. Statements made by him were calculated to instigate the deceased to commit suicide.
5.2.3. Moreover, it was not under a fit of emotion that the accused uttered words to the effect that
the deceased should go and die. On the contrary there was a persistent effort on the part of
both the accused persons to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. A venue for protest was
setup right outside the deceased’s mansion by the co-accused 1, where the angry protestors
raised slogans and goaded her to commit suicide. Protestors carried photos of her daughter,
morphed pictures of her and Virat Singhania and other defamatory and offensive material.67
Further, the speech delivered by the co-accused 2 on 26th January was screened on large
screens right outside her house for days together to not let her forget what was said in the
speech about her. This pressure was too great for the deceased to bear, as a result of which
she committed suicide.
65
106. Burden of proving fact specially within knowledge - When any fact is specially within the knowledge
of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
66
Factsheet ¶ 7.
67
Factsheet ¶ 10.

5.2.4. In Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat68 the Apex Court has held that the
word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to
do anything. A person is said to instigate another to act, when he actively suggests or
stimulates him to the act by any means of language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the
form of express solicitation, or of hints, insinuation or encouragement.69
5.2.5. It is humbly submitted that the law regarding offence of abetment to commit suicide is clear.
A person can be said to instigate another when he incites or otherwise encourages another,
directly or indirectly, to commit suicide70 The word instigate means to goad or urge forward
or provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act.71
5.2.6. It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court upheld conviction under section 306 of
Indian Penal Code when the accused by his acts produced an atmosphere which forced the
deceased to commit suicide.72
5.2.7. In Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P.73 mental harassment and pressure put on the
deceased were held to be amounting to instigation to commit suicide.
5.2.8. In Brij Lal v. Prem Chand74, where the deceased stated in despair that she had enough of
torment and that she preferred death to living, the accused added fuel to fire by saying that
she may put an end to her life the very same day and she need not wait till the next day to quit
this world; such an utterance by the accused was held to be an instigation to her to commit
suicide.
5.2.9. The Supreme Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State held that “Each person's suicidability
pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-
respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any strait-jacket formula in dealing with such
cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.”75
68
Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat AIR 2009 SC 1808; Kishori Lal v. State of M.P (2007)
10 SCC 797; Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal AIR 2010 SC 512.
69
Emperor v. Amiruddin, (1922) 24 Bom LR 534.
70
Asha Shukla v. State of U.P. 2002 CriLJ 2233.
71
Parimal Chatterji v. Emperor 140 Ind. Cas.787.
72
State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh AIR 1991 SC 1532.
73
Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of A.P. AIR 2008 SC 527; Prema Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao AIR 2003 SC 11.
74
Brij Lal v. Prem Chand AIR 1989 SC 1661.
75
Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605.

5.2.10. It is respectfully submitted in the context of the facts of this case, a clear case of instigation to
commit suicide has been made out.
5.3 THAT THE ACCUSED AND CO-ACCUSED ARE ALSO LIABLE UNDER OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE

5.3.1. It humbly submitted that the co-accused abused the charismatic authority he had over the
public to instigate them to abet the suicide of the deceased.
5.3.2. It is humbly submitted that Section 11776 of the IPC makes it an offence to abet the
commission of an offence by the public. Under this section it will be sufficient to show any
instigation or other mode of abetment, though neither the effect intended, nor any other effect
follows from it.
5.3.3. In Emperor v Lavji Mandan77, the instigation of the Hindu public to murder the complainant
was held to be within the ambit of Section 117.
5.3.4. In State of Tripura and Anr.v. Bhupen Dutta Bhowmik78, where editorials of a daily were
alleged of containing statements of abetting/instigating people of State to murder of
Government officers, the Apex court upheld the framing of charges under Section 117 of the
IPC.
5.3.5. The gravamen of a charge under Section 117 is the abetment itself, the instigation to general
lawlessness, not the particular offence of which the commission is instigated.79
5.3.6. Thus, it is submitted that the accused persons are liable to be convicted under section 306
read with section 117 of the IPC.
6. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION?
6.1 THAT THE ACCUSED AND CO-ACCUSED HAD COMMON INTENTION
6.1.1. It is deferentially submitted that the co-accused 1 accused was a team of the co-accused 2 and
also his top confidant.80 It was she who started the protest outside the house of the deceased.
6.1.2. Also, she got the speech of the deceased screened on large screens.
76
Section 117. Abetting commission of offence by the public or by more than ten persons - Whoever abets
the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.
77
Emperor v. Lavji Mandan AIR 1939 Bom 452; Dwarkanath Goswami, 1932 60 Cal 427.
78
State of Tripura and Anr.v. Bhupen Dutta Bhowmik 2002 (2) ACR 1935 (SC).
79
In Re: Konda Satyavatamma (1932) ILR 55 Mad 90.
80
Factsheet ¶ 10.

6.1.3. It is humbly submitted that section 3481 of the IPC establishes joint liability of persons acting
in concert. The main ingredients of the provision are:
(1) there must be a criminal act
(2) committed by more than one person,
(3) each act cumulatively resulting in the commission of the criminal offense must be
been in furtherance of the common intention.82
6.1.4. The common intention required under Section 34, IPC need not, however, be identical with
the guilty intention or ‘mens rea’ which is the ingredient of the substantive offence.
6.1.5. Under this section a pre concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan need not be proved.
The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required.83
6.1.6. Russel, in his book on Criminal Law says: “It indicates some kind of aid or assistance
preceding an effect in future and that any act may be regarded as done in furtherance of the
ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken for the purpose of effecting the felony."
6.1.7. In Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh84 it was held that the provision is
intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual
members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly
what part was taken by each of them.
6.1.8. In Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab85 it was held that it is not necessary that the acts of the
several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or
identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by
one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.
6.1.9. In Nandu Rastogi alias Nandji Rastogi v. State of Bihar , the Supreme Court held that the
common intention refers here to the ultimate crime intended thus each person need not
81
34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention - When a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if it were done by him alone.
82
Mithu Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 1929: (2001) 4 SCC 193;Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of
A.P. AIR 2004 SC 132; Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. AIR 2004 SC 1808.
83
Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188.
84
Ch. Pulla Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1993 SC 1899.
85
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 109.

commit each act, or even know of the others’ actions, so long as the intention to commit the
ultimate crime is commonly intended.86
6.1.10. It is respectfully submitted that because direct proof of such an agreement is often
unavailable intention can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 87 The common intention
or plan may be proved either from conduct, circumstances or from incriminating facts.88 The
Apex Court has held in Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab that common intention is a state of
mind and can be inferred objectively from one’s conduct as well as from prior or subsequent
attendant circumstances.89
6.1.11. In light of the above, it can rightly be inferred that the accused persons had a common
intention to abet the deceased to commit suicide as all the ingredients required under section
34 are satisfied.
6.1.12. It is humbly submitted that conviction under section 306 read with section 34 of the IPC
requires three ingredients:
1. That the deceased committed suicide.
2. The accused abetted the deceased to commit suicide.
3. The accused were acting according to their ‘common intention’.
6.1.13. It is humbly submitted that the evidence on record proves all these factors conclusively and
beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is submitted that the two accused are liable under
Section 306 read with section 34 of the IPC.
86
Nandu Rastogi alias Nandji Rastogi v. State of Bihar 2003 SCC (Cri) 177.
87
Justice M.R. Mallick, Criminal Manual (Criminal Major Acts) Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), p. 8 (2009).
88
Krishnan v. State AIR 2003 SC 2978: (2003) 7 SCC 56; Gopi Nath v. State of U.P. AIR 2001 SC 2493:
(2001) 6 SCC 620.
89
Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab 2002 SCC (Cri) 1518.

-PRAYER - P a g e | xiii
PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED, REASONS GIVEN
AND AUTHORITIES CITED, THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO:
I. HOLD MANNA WAZARE AND DUSHYANT TEJIPAL JOINTLY LIABLE FOR ATTEMPT
TO MURDER;
II. HOLD MANNA WAZARE AND DUSHYANT TEJIPAL JOINTLY LIABLE FOR CAUSING
GRIEVOUS HURT;
III. HOLD MANNA WAZARE AND KAVITA BHEDI JOINTLY LIABLE FOR ABETMENT OF
SUICIDE.
AND ANY OTHER RELIEF THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO GRANT IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
COUNSELS FOR THE PROSECUTION

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BEFORE THE LD.

Original Criminal Jurisdiction

DUSHYANT TEJIPAL & MANNA WAZARE Defence

KAVITA BHEDI & MANNA WAZARE Defence

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

Most Respectfully Submitted to the Ld. Sessions Judge

ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2012

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. II

1.2 That the offence under section-307 was committed ................................................................... 5

2.1 That Accused is liable under section 326 of ipc ........................................................................ 6

3. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION ................................................... 11

4. WHETHER CHAYAWATI COMMITTED SUICIDE ........................................................................... 13

5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE ....................................................................... 15

6. WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSONS HAD COMMON INTENTION ................................................... 19

6.1 That the accused had common intention .................................................................................. 19

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................. XIII

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

(India) Pvt. Ltd., 11th Edn.) (2006).

Law House, 12th Edn.) (2006).

Butterworths, New Delhi) (2007).

New Delhi) (2004, Reprint 2006).

Ltd., New Delhi) (2006).

(Wadhwa and Company, 18th Edn., Nagpur) (2006).

Law House, 25th Edn., New Delhi) (Reprint 2006).

Nagpur) (2004, Reprint 2007).

House, 6th Edn., New Delhi) (2006).

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, (WEST PUBLISHING GROUP 7TH EDN.) (1999)

3RD EDN., NAGPUR) (2005).

 WHARTON’S LAW LEXICON, BY A. S. OPPE, (SWEET AND MAXWELL UNIVERSAL LAW

PUBLISHING CO. PVT. LTD.,14TH EDN., 1997).

 THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (2 OF 1974)

 THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 (10 OF 1897)

 THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (1 OF 1872)

 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (45 OF 1860)

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

A.I.R. ALL INDIA REPORTER

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

S. 26. Courts by which offences are triable:

Subject to the other provisions of this Code,-

(ii) The Court of Session

the High court

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

THE PROSECUTION RESPECTFULLY ASKS THE HON’BLE COURT:

1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO

2. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE LIABLE

3. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE HAD COMMON

4. WHETHER CHAYAWATI COMMITTED SUICIDE?

5. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE?

6. WHETHER MANNA WAZARE AND KAVITA BHEDI HAD COMMON

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

1. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL1 CAN BE CONVICTED FOR ATTEMPT TO MURDER UNDER

SECTION-307 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-

9 Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker. 98.

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION-