BARREDO V. GARCIA, 73 PHIL.
607 (1942) FACTS:
FACTS:
A head on collision between a Malate Taxicab driven by
Fontanilla (owned by Barredo) and a carretela occurred.
The driver was speeding on the wrong side of the road.
The passenger of the carratela, Faustino Garcia (16 y.o)
was injured and died 2 days later. The driver was convicted
while the right to file a separate civil action was reserved.
Thereafter, parents of Garcia filed an action under Art.
1903 (old CC, quasi delict) against Barredo as the
proprietor and employer of Fontanilla. It was contended
that he did not exercise the diligence of a good father
when he employed Fontanilla who had previously violated
traffic laws. As such, the same court awarded damages in
favor of plaintiffs. In Barredo‘s defense, he contended that
his liability should only be subsidiary pursuant to the RPC.
Also, he claims that 1903 only applies to obligations arising
from wrongful or negligent acts/omissions not punishable
by law. Hence, since RPC punishes said acts, 1903 no
longer applies.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action
against Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly
liable under 1903 as Fontanilla‘s employer.
HELD:
Yes. Counsel for defendant failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from crime (Penal
Code) and responsibility for quasi-delict (CC). A quasi
delict/culpa aquiliana is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising
from criminal liability. The same negligent act may produce
either a civil liability arising from a crime or a separate
responsibility for fault/negligence. Under 1903, an
employer is primarily and directly responsible for the
employee‘s negligent acts.
ELCANO V. HILL, G.R. NO. L-24803, MAY 26, 1977
owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that
Sps. Elcano filed a complaint for damages against Reginald
Hill for the death of their son Agapito. However, CFI of QC
acquitted Hill on the ground that the act was not criminal
because of ―lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.‖
Sps. Elcano wish to continue to hold Hill civilly liable for
culpa aquiliana.
ISSUE: Is the civil action for quasi delict barred by the
acquittal of Hill in the criminal case?
HELD: Civil action for quasi delict can proceed. The concept
of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character, whether voluntary or negligent. Acquittal from
an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from the crime, but
for damages due to quasi delict. Double recovery,
however, is prohibited.
VIRATA VS OCHOA GR NO. L- 46179, JANUARY 31, 1978
FACTS: Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a
passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and
registered in the name of Victoria Ochoa. An action for
homicide through reckless imprudence was hen instituted
against Borilla. The heirs of Arsenio also commenced a civil
action for damages based on quasi-delict against Borilla
and Ochoa, resondents herein. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is criminal
actionpending between the same parties for the same
cause. The trial court acquitted the accused Maximo
Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by name
accident; and it granted respondents motion. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: WON the heirs of the Arsenio Virata, can
prosecute an action for the damages based on quasi-delict
against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and
bumped Arsenio Virata.
HELD:Yes. In negligence cases the aggrieved parties may
choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code
or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the
same negligent act. The extinction of civil liability refereed
to in Par. (c) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused.
The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime
charged is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case for
damages based on quasi-delict The source of the
obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134
isquasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law.
Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are
two different sources of obligation.
BANAL V. TADEO, (1987)
FACTS: It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations
for violation of Bp. 22, were filed against respondent
Claudio before the RTC of QC. She pleaded not guilty and
pre trial was set. Maraming changes ng judges, una nag
inhibit then nagpalit lang for some reason.
Court refused appearance of private prosecutor because
BP 22 does not provide for any civil liability and indemnity
hence “not a crime against property but a crime against
public order”. MR and all that hence the petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in
rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor
RULING: Underlying this legal principle is the traditional
theory that when a person commits a crime he offends
two entities namely ( 1) the society in which he lives in or
the political entity called the State whose law he had
violated; and (2) the individual member of that society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission. Many legal scholars treat as a
misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion
that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime when,
in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it
gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime
but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to
the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty
of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused
to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will
give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so
provides, indemnification of the offended party may be
had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms
an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22
SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692).
Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the
punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for
the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo,
19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case
at bar who suffered the offenses committed against her.
Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to
relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to
protect. She was assured that the checks were good when
she parted with money, property or services. She suffered
with the State when the checks bounced.
OCCENA V. ICAMINA (G.R. NO. 82146)
FACTS:
Petitioner Eulogio Occena filed a criminal complaint for
Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina
Vegafria alleging that the latter had openly, publicly and
maliciously insulted him by uttering that he is a “foolish
Barangay Captain, traitor, tyrant and Judas” which caused
great and irreparable injury to his person and honor. After
trial, Cristina was found guilty of Slight Oral Defamation
and was sentenced to pay the fine. However, the trial
court did not award damages to petitioner stating that the
facts and circumstances did not warrant the awarding of
moral damages. Petitioner appealed the civil liability of
Cristina but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to moral damages.
RULING: YES. Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows
the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation This provision of law
establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral
defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for
injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is
likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary
damages.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And
malice may be inferred from the style and tone of
publication subject to certain exceptions which are not
present in the case at bar. Calling petitioner who was a
barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is
clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner’s character
sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social
humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame
and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident
complained of.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to
his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain,
petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of
P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
PACIS V. MORALES (2010)
DOCTRINE: A higher degree of care is required of
someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has
the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any
injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of
life or business which involve little or no risk, a business
dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
FACTS: Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case
for damages against Jerome Jovanne Morales. Spouses
Paceis are the parents of Alfred, 17 y.o. who died in a
shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and
Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Morales is
the owner.
Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he
sustained while he was at gunstore. The bullet which killed
Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of
the gun store for repair. The gun, was left by Morales in a
drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
Morales as in Manila at the time. His employee Armando
Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of the gun store
was also not around. Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and
Herbolario a bunch of keys which included the key to the
drawer where the gun was kept. It appears that Matibag
and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer
and palced it in top of the table. Attacted by it, Alfred got
hold of it. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. Alfred
followed but it went off the bullet hitting Alfred.
The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death of
Alftred under A2180 in relation to A2176, ruling that the
accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was
partyl due to the negligence of Morales’ emplyee –
Matibag. CA reversed, ruling that there was no employee-
employer relationship because Matibag was not under the
control of Morales with respect to the means and methods
in the performance of his worK, thus A2180 cannot apply.
And even if Matibag was an employee, Morales still cannot
be held civilly liable because there is no negligence can be
attributed to Morales because he kept the gun.
ISSUE: WON Morales is civilly liable?
RULING: YES. Respondent was clearly negligent when he
accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. For failing to
insure that the gun was not loaded, Morales himself was
negligent.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms
and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in
the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to
Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Morales has
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate
from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for
ready access defensive use.
In the first place, the defective gun should have been
stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for
repair, Morales should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, Morales
should never accept a firearm from another person, until
the cylinder or action is open and he has personally
checked that the weapon is completely unloaded
Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care and
diligence required of a good father of a family, much less
the The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun
brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
Choice of claim of petitioners
This case for damages arouse out of the accidental shoting
of Alfred. Under A1161 of the Civil Code petitioners may
enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability
arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they
may opt to file an independent civil action for damages
under the Civil Code.
In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in
the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted
to file an independent civil action for damages against
respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer.
Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE: Morales is civilly liable to petitioners because
he was negligent.
CASUPANAN V. LAROYA (2002)
FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and
the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by
petitioner Casupanan, figured in an accident. This
prompted the filing of two cases before the MCTC of Capas
Tarlac: 1st – a criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property filed by respondent
against Casapunan; 2nd – a civil case arising from a quasi-
delict filed by the petitioners against the respondent. The
civil case was filed pending preliminary investigation on
the criminal case. Respondent as defendant in the civil
case filed a motion to dismiss on ground of forum
shopping due pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion for dismissal on basis of forum
shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on the ground that a separate civil action may be
instituted separately and independently from the criminal
case. MCTC denied the motion. Thereafter, petitioners
filed a petition for Certiorari before Capas RTC to assail
MCTC’s Order, however the RTC dismissed the same for
lack of merit. Hence, a petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal
case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case.
HELD: YES. The right of the accused to file a separate civil
action for quasi-delict is akin to the right of the offended
party to file an independent civil action pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 111. Under the said rule, the
independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil
Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111
refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement
of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file
two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability
ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum
shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil
action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict
for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate
civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the
accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in
the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately
his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues
to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second,
the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to
invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that
the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal
case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately
by Petitioners is proper.
PEOPLE V. AMISTAD (1981)
FACTS: sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed
of sale in favor of Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of
42,326 square meters of that parcel of land to 3 different
people: Amistad, Mat-an and Palispis. Knowing full well
that he already had an agreement with Mercedes Javellana
to convey to her 10000sqm for the sum of 10k having
already received 5k of said amount. So estafa was filed. He
was found not guilty by the lower court, said the case was
civil in nature. Appeal to CA insofar as civil liability was
concerned but was dismissed because appeal from
judgment of acquittal should be disallowed. MR denied.
Hence, certiorari.
ISSUE: whether from a decision of acquittal, the
complainant in a criminal action for estafa, may appeal
with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
RULING: The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied
upon by the petitioner clearly requires the institution of a
separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To
such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein, may
file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an
answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal action,
notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or
waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy.
Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all
civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability
recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent
upon conviction, because said liability arises from the
offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to
obtain admission as to the commission thereof, except on
the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability
involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously
with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or
waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court and as held in People vs. Herrera, 74
Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the
commission of the offense, such as from law or contract or
quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil
action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29 of the
Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of
evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses available,
such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the
other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be availed of,
as may be proper under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, complete with pre-trial after
issues have been joined. Upon these considerations, it
becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking
the rule against multiplicity of action may not forcefully or
convincingly be put forth.
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that
what is impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal
action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from
the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall
together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the
ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the
complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and
not based on, the commission of an offense. Only
preponderance of evidence would then be required.
JARANTILLA V. CA(1989)
FACTS: Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-
swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar Jarantilla
in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo
City" towards the direction of the provicional capitol
resulting to serious physical injuries thru reckless
inprudence.
Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action. Jarantilla was eventually acquitted because of
reasonable doubt.
On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a complaint (civil case)
against the Jarantilla in the former Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action involved the same
subject matter and act complained of in the dismissed
criminal case. RTC wanted to “enrich our jurisprudence.”
So RTC denies motion to dismiss, grants damages to Sing,
proposed that the case be elevated to the SC by certiorari.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether Sing, who was the complainant in the
dismissed criminal action (grounded on reasonable dobut)
for physical injuries and who participated in the
prosecution without reserving the civil action can file a
separate action for civil liability arising from the same act
or omission.
HELD: YES, because the civil action here is not based on
DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT.
RATIO/DOCTRINES:
Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can
create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender,
that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi
delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a
delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these
two types of civil liability may be enforced against the
culprit, subject to Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types
of liability.
Where the offended party elected to claim damages
arising from the offense charged in the criminal case
through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final
judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the
subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not
criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist'
Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that
the failure of the court to make any pronouncement,
favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the
accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the
civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action.
The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to
determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable.
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to
be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no
longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense.
There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such
circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the
civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability
or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested
of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or
omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a
civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted
thereafter, which action can be proved by mere
preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such
considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already
stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by
an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act
or omission.
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of
the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil
case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar
him from filing such separate civil action for
damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano
vs. Hill 31 that —
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec.
3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused . . .
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
without costs.
HUN YUNG PARK V. EUNG WON CHOI (2007)
Eung Won Choi (Choi) was charged for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
for issuing a postdated check in the amount of P1,875,000.
The same was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Choi filed a demurer to evidence after
the prosecution rested its case. The Makati Metropolitan
Trial Court granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.
Hun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect of the case
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending
that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include
its civil aspect. RTC held that while the evidence presented
was insufficient to prove respondent‘s criminal liability, it
did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. Upon a
motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside
its decisionand ordered the remand of the case to the
MeTC for further proceedings, so that the defendant may
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
ISSUES: WON the accuses has waived his right to present
evidence on the civil aspect of the case
HELD: No. In case of acquittal, the accused may still be
adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action
where 1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; 2) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; 3) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was
committed.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of
court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At
that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case
including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or
reserved.
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court,
the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the
court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears
no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because
there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the
quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other
words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the
criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer
as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is
not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable
doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient
to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of
evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is
insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a
preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case
generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an
acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the
civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect
of the case must perforce continue.
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and
dismissed the case without any finding that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He
thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, Choi stands by his defense that he merely
borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the
interest, and that he already made a partial payment of
P1,590,000. Park counters, however, that the payments
made by Choi pertained to other transactions. Given these
conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case
would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to
ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.
SALAZAR V. PEOPLE (2003)
If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not
only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and
acquitting him but also on the civil liability, the judgment
on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity as it
violates the constitutional right to due process. In 1997,
petitioner Anmer Salazar and Nena Jaucian Timario were
charged with estafa before the Legazpi City Regional Trial
Court. The estafa case allegedly stemmed from the
payment of a check worth P214,000 to private respondent
J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation (JYBMC) through
Jerson Yao for the purchase of 300 bags of rice. The check
was dishonored by drawee Prudential Bank as it is drawn
against a closed account. Salazar replaced said check with
a new one, this time drawn against Solid Bank. It is again
dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit
(DAUD). The DAUD means that the account to which the
check was drawn had sufficient funds. However, the fund
cannot be used because it was collected against a
deposited check which is yet to be cleared. Trial ensued.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, Salazar filed
a demurrer to evidence with leave of court, which the trial
court granted. In 2002, the trial court rendered judgment
acquitting Salazar, but ordered her to remit to JYBMC
P214,000. The trial court ruled that the evidence of the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the
issuer of the check, Timario. As a mere endorser of the
check, Salazar's breach of warranty was a good one and
did not amount to estafa under Article 315 (2)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. Timario remained at large. As a result,
Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil
aspect of the decision with a plea to be allowed to present
evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Because of
the denial of the motion, she filed petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court alleging she was
denied due process as the trial court did not give her the
opportunity to adduce evidence to controvert her civil
liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salazar was denied due process.
HELD: Salazar should have been given by the trial court the
chance to present her evidence as regards the civil aspect
of the case. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court explained the demurrer to evidence
partakes of a motion to dismiss the case for the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, thereby waives his right
to present evidence and submits the case for decision on
the basis of the prosecution's evidence he has the right to
adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect, but also
on the civil aspect of the case of the demurrer is denied by
the court. In addition, the Court said if the demurrer is
granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders
judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of
the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil
liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would
be a nullity as it violates the constitutional right to due
process. The Supreme Court explained that the trial court
erred in rendering judgment on the civil aspect of the case
and ordering the petitioner to pay for her purchases from
the private complainant even before the petitioner could
adduce evidence thereon is patently a denial of her right
to due process. Citing Aante vs Savelana, Jr., the Court
stressed that Section 14 (1) and (2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution which are elementary and deeply imbedded
in our own criminal justice system are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and
are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a
"law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial".
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY INC. AND
ADMERPAJARILLO VS. LAUROTANGCO, ET.AL
FACTS: On 3 November 1997, at about 2:50p.m.,
Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch in Quezon City to renew her time deposit.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with
corresponding permit to carry the same outside of her
residence, approached Pajarillo, security guard of Ecology
Bank to deposit the firearm for safekeeping,
suddenly,Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Evangeline’s husband, Lauro, together with his six minor
children filed with the RTC of QC a criminal case against
Pajarillo, where they likewise reserved their right to file a
separate civil action on the said criminal case. Pajarillo
was subsequently convicted of homicide in 19 January
2000 by the RTC and the CA upheld the decision with
modification on the penalty on 31 July 2000.
On 14 January 1998, respondents filed with the RTC of
Marikina City a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for
negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard
Security Agency Inc. for failing to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage committed
by its security guard. The respondents prayed for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The RTC of Marikina rendered judgment in favor of
LauroTangcoet. al. ordering Pajarillo and Safeguard
Security agency Inc. ,jointly and severally, to pay:
The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense;
giving no weight to his claim that Evangeline was seen
roaming around the area prior to the incident given that
Pajarillo had not made any such reports to the head office
and the police authorities. Pajarillo should have exercised
proper prudence and necessary care in ascertaining the
matter instead of shooting her instantly. The RTC likewise
found Safeguard to be jointly and severally liable with
Pajarillo since there was no sufficient evidence to show
that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father by
simply showing that it required its guards to attend
trainings and seminars which is not the supervision as
contemplated under the law. It includes the duty to see to
it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully
complied with.
The CA modified that decision of the RTC saying that
Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is only subsidiarily liable. A
motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed and
denied by the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in
shooting Evangeline
Whether or not Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be
held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to
respondents in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
RATIO:
Yes, Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline
as upheld by both the RTC and CA in separate decisions.
The SC affirms these decisions since based on the evidence
presented, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claims that
Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the
bank and acting suspiciously which Pajarillo mistook as a
bank robbery which led him to draw his service firearm
and shot Evangeline.
Yes, Safeguard Security Agency Inc. should be held
solidarily liable for the damages awarded to the
respondents. The nature of the respondents’ cause of
action is determined in the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. In the complaint, the respondents
are invoking their right to recover damages against
Safeguard for their indirect responsibility for the injury
caused by Pajarillo’s act of shooting and killing Evangeline
under Article 2176. Thus, the civil action filed by
respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of
Pajarillo but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi delict
which is a separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from crime.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and
solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by Pajarillo
and is presumed to be negligent in the selection and
supervision of his employee by operation of law. The
Court agrees with the RTC’s finding that Safeguard had
exercised diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since
records show that he underwent psychological and
neuropsychiatric evaluation, pre-licensing training course
for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
However, Safeguard was not diligent in providing trainings,
classroom instructions and continuous evaluation of the
security guard’s performance. Thus, the SC affirms with
modification that the civil liability of Safeguard Security
Agency Inc. is solidary and primary under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.
PEOPLE V. NAVOA (1981)
FACTS: In this Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
of this Court promulgated on July 31, 1984, which affirmed
the judgment of conviction upon defendants-appellants
Mario Navoa, Rafael Navoa, and Ricardo Sitchon and
sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify, jointly and solidarity, the heirs of the victim,
Tomas Izon, in the amount of P30,000.00, the two
assigned errors are that "the basic finding of the
Intermediate Appellate Court that the appellants shot and
killed the late Tomas Izon is not supported by the evidence
on record," and "that defendant-appellant Mario Navoa's
death on June 14, 1984 properly manifested before the
Intermediate Appellate Court on June 20, 1984, had not
been accorded proper legal consideration in the Decision."
RULING: The first contention is untenable. The Appellate
Court's conclusion that the testimony of Macario Saguinza,
a co-accused turned State witness, is substantially correct
was based on a careful and judicious review of the entire
record, specifically based on Exhibits "F", "G", "H" and the
testimonies during the hearing of June 9, 1977. The same
is true with the Appellate Court's conclusion that the
minor inconsistencies in the testimony of witness Baltazar
de la Rosa strengthened rather than weakened his
credibility.1 Even assuming that the testimony of de la
Rosa is without probative value, still, the unrebutted
testimony of Saguinza is more than sufficient to sustain a
conviction as it established not only conspiracy, treachery,
and evident premeditation, but even the very motive of
defendants-appellants in perpetrating the crime.
In respect of the second contention, it appears that the
accused, Mario Navoa, died on June 14, 1984 due to a
cerebro-vascular attack as shown by the Death Certificate
attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. When counsel
for the accused manifested the fact before the Appellate
Court, on June 20, 1984. he was unaware that the latter
had already certified the case to this Court, which, in turn,
promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1984 unaware of
appellant Mario Navoa's death. The judgment of
conviction will thus have to be set aside as against him.
However, the plea for extinguishment of the deceased's
civil and criminal liability is without merit. Only his criminal
liability is extinguished by his death but the civil liability
remains.2
ACCORDINGLY, 1) the prayer for the acquittal of the two
remaining accused is hereby denied; 2) the dispositive
portion of the Decision of this Court promulgated on July
31, 1984, is hereby modified to read as follows:
PEOPLE V. BADEO (1991)
FACTS: Witness said she was walking around 6 pm and
cresenciano was walking ahead of her when four men
attacked the latter. She saw manuel badeo hack the victim
with a bolo. Rogelio badeo hacked him again with a longer
bolo. Probable motive was because Cresenciano was
instrumental to the division of land being tenanted by one
of the Badeos. Badeo did not like the arrangement
because according him he could still work the entire land.
Defense alleged self-defense. Stating cresenciano pointed
a gun at them. Manuel plead guilty to a lower offense but
the offended party did not conform. Manuel and
Espiridion were found guilty by the lower court. Appeal.
Espiridion died of heart attack in as much as no final
judgment has been rendered yet. Case against espiridion
was dismissed with costs de oficio and entry of judgment
was made. SG filed an MR stating that his civil liability
subsists notwithstanding the extinguishment of the
criminal liability.
ISSUE: WON civil liability is extinguished
RULING: We find merit in the motion for reconsideration.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished "by the death of the convict,
as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment." In People vs.
Alison, 23 the Court, upon the recommendation of the
then Solicitor General who was required to comment on
the information that appellant Alison had died at the
prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final
judgment as yet, "the criminal and civil liability (sic) of
Alison was extinguished by his death."
The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution
in People vs. Satorre 24 similarly dismissing the case
against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in
the resolution, then Associate Justice Ramon C. Aquino
stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. According to Justice
Aquino, the term " pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) in
Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished from
" pecuniary liability" (responsabilidades pecunarias) in
Article 38 which include reparation and indemnity.
As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for
the punishment of the guilty party, and also to a civil
action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage
and indemnification for the losses 25 whether the
particular act or omission is done intentionally or
negligently or whether or not punishable by
law, 26 subsequent decisions of the Court held that while
the criminal liability of an appellant is extinguished by his
death, his civil liability subsists. 27 In such case, the heirs
of the deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the
criminal case and his estate shall answer for his civil
liability. 28
In the light of the foregoing, we reconsider the resolution
August 21, 1991 insofar as it considers as extinguished
Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, in order to determine
whether or not such liability exist. 29
PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS (1994)
Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on
February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The
Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that
the death of the accused does not excuse him from his
civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in
People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of
the accused claimed that in the Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before the
final judgement is rendered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
RULING: Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
by death of the convict personal liabilities are
extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.
Thus the court made a ruling as follows:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon;
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Aricle 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission: Law,
Contracts, Quasi-contracts, Delicts…,Quasi-delicts;
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefore may be pursued but only by way of separate civil
action and may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator of the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation aside from delicts;
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private
offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his
criminal and civil liability based solely on the act of rape.
Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together with his
criminal liability upon his death.
CALANG & PHILTRANCO V PEOPLE (2010)
FACTS: Petitioner Calang was driving a bus owned by
Philtranco when its rear left side hit the front left portion
of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a
result of the collision, the jeep’s driver, lost control of the
vehicle, and bumped and killed a bystander who was
standing along the highway’s shoulder. The jeep turned
turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25
meters from the point of impact. Two of the jeep’s
passengers were instantly killed, while the other
passengers sustained serious physical injuries. The
prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide,
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence before the RTC. RTC found
Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting [in] multiple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of RTC.
ISSUES:
Civil Law
(1) Whether or not Philtranco may be held jointly and
severally liable with Calang.
Criminal Law
(1) Whether or not Philtranco may be held subsidiary
liable with Calang.
RULINGS: (1) No. The RTC and the CA both erred in
holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang.
He was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly,
Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the
cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both
the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and
severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an
employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has
committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil
liability arising from delict.
Criminal Law
(1) Yes. Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article
102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil
liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall
be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulations
shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of
goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper’s employees.
The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers,
according to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed
written into the judgments in cases to which they are
applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer. Nonetheless, before the
employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate
evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed
the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they are
engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was
committed by the employees in the discharge of their
duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not
been satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of
these conditions may be done in the same criminal action
in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has
been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD CO., 38 PHIL. 768 (1918)
FACTS: Canco, a clerk of the defendant, was on his way
home via train. As the train was about to stop in the
station where Cangco usually deboards, Cangco, alighted
from the train as he and other passengers always did.
Unfortunately, due to the fact that it was nighttime and
that the station was dimly lighted, Cangco was not able to
see that there was a sack of melons on the platform. Thus,
he landed on said melons and slipped. He was drawn
under the train and his arm was injured so severely that it
had to be amputated. Cangco sued defendant for damages
due to negligence of servants & employees in placing the
sack of melons which obstructed the passenger‘s egress.
HELD: Manila Railroad is liable under the old civil code. It is
implied from the contract of carriage of the defendant the
duty to carry him safely and provide him with a safe means
to come in and out o the train. Being contractual, that duty
was direct and immediate. Its nonperformance cannot be
excused due to the fault of defandant‘s employees. Also,
no contributory negligence can be attributed to Cangco
because, as a public carrier, he had the right to assume
that the platform was clear. Cangco was also very familiar
with the place. As such, there can be no uncertainty in his
mind that what he was about to do was indeed unsafe.
AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
FACTS: Respondent bought First Class tickets from
petitioner‘s agent (PAL) for a trip from Manila to Lourdes.
Upon confirmation of said tickets, he flew first class to the
first 2 legs of the trip (HK, BKK). However, in Bangkok, after
being seated, the manager of the petitioner asked him to
transfer to the Tourist Class in lieu of another passenger
(―white man‖). Reluctantly, he did. Respondent sued
petitioner for damages on the ground of wrongful
expulsion to which the Trial Court & the CA granted and
awarded him moral (25k), exemplary (10k), and attorney‘s
fees (10k). Petitioner appealed contending that its contract
with the passenger was subject for confirmation.
HELD: Air France is liable. The facts and circumstances of
the cases make it reasonable for respondent to be
awarded said damages. Neither the captain nor any
employee of the petitioner intervened. There was also no
evidence presented that the white man had a prior
right/reservation. Respondent is entitled to said First Class
seat. The manager‘s arbitrary act made respondent suffer
humiliation. Said manager acted in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, public policy (Art. 21 CC).
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier‘s employees
with respect and kindness. Petitioner‘s contract is
attended by a public duty and a violation of which is
considered a quasi delict wherein damages may be
awarded.
SINGSON V. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 23 SCRA
1117 (1968)
FACTS:
Singson was one of the defendants in a separate civil case
along with a certain Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. They
were made liable to pay the sum of P105k. Singson and
Lobregat appealed. However, Villa-Abrille & Co. did not
and, as such, the decision became final with regard to it.
Thereafter, a writ of garnishment was issued and was sent
to BPI to which said Co. had an account. Upon receipt,
without reading the body of the writ saying it was only
intended for the accounts of other defandants, the clerk
prepared a letter regarding the freezing of Singson‘s
account for signature of the BPI President. Upon his
signature, Singson‘s account was frozen. Meanwhile,
Singson issued checks to corporations to whom he had
business with but due to the freezing, the checks were
dishonored to the detriment of Singson. Singson wrote the
back explaining the contents of the writ. Upon realizing its
mistake, BPI through its President immediately corrected
it. Despite this, Singson sued for damages on the ground of
illegal freezing of the said account. Unfortunately, CFI
Manila denied the complaint saying that Singson cannot
maintain an action for quasi delict because of the
contractual nature of the relationship between the parties.
HELD: The existence of a contractual relationship between
parties is not a bar for a commission of a tort by one
against another. Even more so, it does not bar the
consequent recovery for damages of the party injured.
However, since BPI corrected their mistake immediately,
nominal damages of P1,000 (need not be proven) + P500
attorney‘s fees would suffice.
LIGHT RAILWAY TRANSIT AUTHORITY V. NAVIDAD, 397
SCRA 75 (2003)
FACTS: Nicanor Navidad, while drunk, purchased a token
to enter the EDSA LRT station. Whilst standing by the
platform, security guard (Escartin) approached Navidad
and a fist fight occurred wherein Navidad fell into the LRT
tracks. At this time, a train operated by Roman passed by
and struck Navidad. The latter‘s wife filed a complaint for
damages against Escartin, Roman, Prudent Security
Agency, and LRTA. Roman & LRTA presented evidence
while Prudent & Escartin filed a demurrer contending that
Navidad did not prove Escartin‘s negligence. Trial court
held Prudent & Escartin liable. On appeal, CA held LRTA
and Roman liable and exonerated Prudent and Escartin. CA
held that a contract of carriage existed upon Navidad‘s
purchase of the token and thus must be complied with. CA
also held that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted
fist blows upon the victim but merely presented fact of his
death as having hit by the LRT.
HELD: Only LRTA is liable. The duty of common carriers to
provide safety to its passengers obligates it not only during
the trip but for so long as they are in the premises. A
common carrier is liable for death/injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or willful acts of its employees; or
(b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier‘s
employees through the exercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In such
cases, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
negligent. By simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to establish the fault or negligence of
the carrier or its employees. The burden shifts upon the
carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or force majeure. LRTA was presumed negligent.
Also, Roman is not part of the contractual tie between
LRTA (carrier) and Navidad (passenger). Roman can only be
made liable for his own fault or negligence.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., V. CORDERO,
G.R. NO. 138550, OCTOBER 14, 2005
FACTS: AMEX is a foreign corporation that issues charge
cards to its customers which the latter uses to purchase
goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide.
Nila Cordero, wife of respondent was one such holder. An
extension card was also issued to her husband, Noel
Cordero. Sometime after, respondent together with his
wife and relatives went on a holiday trip to HK. During the
trip, they went to Watsons Chemist Shop. Noel bought
some goods and handed to the sales clerk his AMEX
extension card. The sales clerk verified the card by making
a telephone call to the AMEX Office in Hong Kong. Its
representative said he wants to talk to respondent in order
to verify the latter‘s identity, pursuant to the procedure
observed under the ―Inspect Airwarn Support System‖
(IASS). However, respondent refused.
Due to respondents‘ refusal, Susan Chong, the store
manager, emerged from behind the counter and informed
respondent that she had to confiscate the card.
Thereupon, she cut respondent‘s AMEX card in half with a
pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him
embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was
done in front of his family and the other customers lined
up at the check-out counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for
the purchases using her own AMEX card.
Nilda called up AMEX‘s office in Hong Kong where it was
learned through the Senior Authorized that a person in HK
attempted to use a charge card with the same number as
respondent‘s card. The HK AMEX Office called up
respondent and after determining that he was in Manila
and not in HK, placed his card under the IASS (a system
used by AMEX to protect both the company and its
cardholders from fraudulent use of their charge cards;
once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the
system, the person to whom the card is tendered must
verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the
card owner is established, the card is honored and the
charges are approved; otherwise the card is revoked or
confiscated.).
Respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
against AMEX. The RTC ruled in favor of Cordero.
Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not AMEX is liable to Cordero for the
humiliation suffered by the latter.
HELD: NO. Respondent anchors his cause of action on
Article 2176. In order that an obligation based on quasi-
delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties. But there are exceptions.
There may be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding
that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where
tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by
tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or
negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used
his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that
indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have
been accomplished had respondent talked to AMEX‘s
representative, enabling the latter to determine that
respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly,
no negligence which breaches the contract can be
attributed to AMEX. If at all, the cause of respondent‘s
humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to
AMEX‘s representative.
There was testimony to that effect which showed that
when Watson Company called AMEX for authorization,
AMEX representative requested that he talk to Mr.
Cordero but he refused to talk to any representative of
AMEX. AMEX could not prove then that he is really the real
card holder.
Additionally, according to the terms of the Cardmember
Agreement, AMEX can revoke respondent‘s card without
notice. Again the subject card would not have been
confiscated and cut had respondent talked to AMEX‘s
representative and identified himself as the genuine
cardholder. Clearly, there was no negligence on the part of
the AMEX.
SO PING BUN V CA (1999)
FACTS: Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreement
with the lessor Dee C. Chuan and Sons Inc. (DCCSI). When
Tek Hua Trading Co. was later dissolved and the original
members built Tek Hua Trading Corp. The grandson of the
partners named So Ping Bun, after the death of his
grandfather, continued occupying the warehouse for his
own textile business.
In a letter to petitioner, the owner of Tek Hua Trading
Corp. informed the petitioner to vacate the warehouse.
Petitioner refused and requested formal contracts of lease
with DCCSI to which it acceded and a new lease of contract
in favor of Trendsetter was executed.
Tek Hua Enterprises Corp. then petitioned the court for
injuction, nullification of the lease contract between DCCSI
and So Ping Bun and damages, to which the Regional Trial
Court of Manila Branch 35 granted and was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the injunction should be upheld and
HELD: AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of
attorney's fees is reduced from two hundred thousand
(P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00)
pesos
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in
an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
asset if
(a) the other has property rights and privileges with
respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the
invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a
legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and
actionable under general negligence rules
elements of tort interference are:
(1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part
of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal
justification or excuse
Son Ping Bun asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its
favor, and as a result deprived DCCSI's property right.
Situation pertains to a 3rd person who induces a party to
violate his undertaking in a contract.
damage is NOT an essential element of tort interference
lower courts did not award damages, but this was only
because the extent of damages was not quantifiable
Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts
and causing breach of existing ones.
The injunction saved the respondents from further
damage or injury caused by petitioner's interference.
CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CO V CA (2003)
FACT:
C Diaz [professional partnership engaged in accounting]
opened a savings account with Solidbank. LC Diaz's cashier,
Macaraya, filled up two savings deposit slips, and she gave
them + passbook to messenger Calapre and instructed him
to deposit the money with Solidbank. Calapre presented
the deposit slips and passbook to the teller. He left the
passbook with Solidbank first as he had to make another
deposit at Allied Bank, but when he returned, he was
informed that somebody got the passbook. Calapre
reported this to Macaraya. Macaraya + Calapre went back
to Solidbank with a deposit slip [P200k check]. When
Macaraya asked about the passbook, the teller said that
someone shorter than Calapre got it. Macaraya reported
this matter.
The following day, CEO Diaz called Solidbank to stop any
transaction using the passbook until the company could
open a new account. It was found out that learned that
P300k was withdrawn from the account the previous day.
The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of two authorized
signatories of LC Diaz but they denied signing it. Noel
Tamayo received this sum of money.
An information for Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Document was filed against one of
their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola (first
time they appeared in the case discussion), but the RTC
dismissed the criminal case. LC Diaz demanded the return
of their money from Solidbank, but the latter refused and
a complaint for recovery of a sum of money was filed
against them. However, Solidbank was absolved.
RTC applied rules on savings account written on
the passbook ["Possession of this book shall raise the
presumption of ownership and any payment or payments
made by the bank upon the production of the said book
and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same
effect as if made to the depositor personally."] RTC said
that the burden of proof shifted to LC Diaz to prove that
the signatures are not forged. Also, they applied the rule
that the holder of the passport is presumed to be the
owner. It was also held that Solidbank did not have
any participation in the custody and care of the
passbook and as such, their act of allowing the withdrawal
was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate
cause was LC Diaz’ negligence. As regards the contention
that LC Diaz and Solidbank had precautionary procedures
(like a secret handshake of sorts) whenever the former
withdrew a large sum, RTC pointed out that LC Diaz
disregarded this in the past withdrawal.
CA, on the other hand, said that the proximate cause of
the unauthorized withdrawal is Solidbank's negligence,
applying NCC 2176. CA said the 3 elements of QD are
present [damages; fault or negligence; connection of cause
and effect]. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since
the amount being drawn was significant. Proximate cause
is teller's failure to call LC Diaz. CA ruled that while LC Diaz
was negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger
and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller,
Solidbank could not escape liability because of the
doctrine of “last clear chance.” Solidbank could have
averted the injury had it called up LC Diaz to verify the
withdrawal.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.
RULING:
Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
negligence, or culpa contractual.
Solidbank’s Breach of its Contractual Obligation
Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that “responsibility
arising from negligence in the performance of every kind
of obligation is demandable.” For breach of the savings
deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual,
the bank is liable to its depositor.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of
contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at
fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove
that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa
aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has
established that Solidbank breached its contractual
obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption
that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in
not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on
Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part
or its employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its
burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller
No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and
who was supposed to return the passbook to him.
Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard
procedure in verifying the identity of the person retrieving
the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller
No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees
under the principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility. The defense of exercising the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is
not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in
culpa aquiliana. The bank must not only exercise “high
standards of integrity and performance,” it must also
insure that its employees do likewise because this is the
only way to insure that the bank will comply with its
fiduciary duty
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is
determined by the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
CRISOSTOMO V CA (2003)
FACTS:
Petitioner contracted the services of respondent Caravan
Travel and Tours International, Inc. to arrange and
facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a
tour dubbed Jewels of Europe. Pursuant to said contract,
the travel documents and plane tickets were delivered to
the petitioner who in turn gave the full payment for the
package tour on June 12, 1991. Without checking her
travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday,
June 15, 1991, to take the flight for the first leg of her
journey from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioner’s dismay,
she discovered that the flight she was supposed to take
had already departed the previous day. She learned that
her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14,
1991. She thus called up Menor to complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take
another tour- the British Pageant. Upon petitioner’s return
from Europe, she demanded from respondent the
reimbursement of the difference between the sum she
paid for Jewels of Europe and the amount she owed
respondent for the British Pageant tour.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for breach
of contract of carriage and damages alleging that her
failure to join Jewels of Europe was due to respondent’s
fault since it did not clearly indicate the departure date on
the plane, failing to observe the standard of care required
of a common carrier when it informed her wrongly of the
flight schedule. For its part, respondent company, denied
responsibility for petitioner’s failure to join the first tour,
insisting that petitioner was informed of the correct
departure date, which was clearly and legibly printed on
the plane ticket. The travel documents were given to
petitioner two days ahead of the scheduled trip.
Respondent further contend that petitioner had only
herself to blame for missing the flight, as she did not
bother to read or confirm her flight schedule as printed on
the ticket.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caravan Travel & Tours International Inc. is
negligent in the fulfilment of its obligation to petitioner
Crisostomo thus granting to the petitioner the
consequential damages due her as a result of breach of
contract of carriage.
RULING:
Contention of petitioner has no merit. A contract of
carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person
or association of persons obligate themselves to transport
persons, things, or news from one place to another for a
fixed price. Such person or association of persons are
regarded as carriers and are classified as private or special
carriers and common or public carriers. Respondent is not
an entity engaged in the business of transporting either
passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor
a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to
transport petitioner from one place to another since its
covenant with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services as a
travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating
travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for
tours.
The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with
respondent is the service of arranging and facilitating
petitioners booking, ticketing and accommodation in the
package tour. In contrast, the object of a contract of
carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is
in this sense that the contract between the parties in this
case was an ordinary one for services and not one of
carriage. Since the contract between the parties is an
ordinary one for services, the standard of care required of
respondent is that of a good father of a family under
Article 1173 of the Civil Code. The evidence on record
shows that respondent exercised due diligence in
performing its obligations under the contract and followed
standard procedure in rendering its services to petitioner.
As correctly observed by the lower court, the plane ticket
issued to petitioner clearly reflected the departure date
and time, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The travel
documents, consisting of the tour itinerary, vouchers and
instructions, were likewise delivered to petitioner two
days prior to the trip. Respondent also properly booked
petitioner for the tour, prepared the necessary documents
and procured the plane tickets. It arranged petitioner’s
hotel accommodation as well as food, land transfers and
sightseeing excursions, in accordance with its avowed
undertaking. The evidence on record shows that
respondent company performed its duty diligently and did
not commit any contractual breach. Hence, petitioner
cannot recover and must bear her own damage.