G.R. No.
89572 December 21, 1989 After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS)
and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-
CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a
person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3)
chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East
with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many
times.1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected
his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel
his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education.
By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed
to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave
of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner
had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be
reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of
the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school
on the one hand, and the securing of the
health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation
of the pratice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety
of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to
the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a
recognized medical school-for admission to
the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely
related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as
noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of
the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading
the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading
is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among
other things, of limiting admission to those
who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually
for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular,
in the current state of our social and
economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled
to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission
tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite
probably, in other countries with far more
developed educational resources than our
own, and taking into account the failure or
inability of the petitioners to even attempt
to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold
that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation
and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the
public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that
the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld
only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing
about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot
apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the
academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded
any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State.
Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires
the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is
not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does
not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any
other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State
has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see
to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all.
These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace
to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better
as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he
may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may
not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who
has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to
take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be
for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent
is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen
has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give
way to those better prepared. Where even those who have
qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded
medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who,
like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal
protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists
between medical students and other students who are not
subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike
other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant
regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an
equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly
treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have
passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified
are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection
requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to
quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must
show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five
times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is
certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in
the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or
occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not
for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding.
It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality
education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the
sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a
brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of
dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who
should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as
merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and
enrich our system of education by directing the student to the
course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests
and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with
mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are
lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs
against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-40779 November 28, 1975
EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF
THEOLOGY, herein represented by FR. ANTONIO B.
LAMBINO, respondent.
Epicharis T Garcia in her own behalf.
Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel
the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to allow
petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein is
whether she is deemed possessed of such a right that has to be
respected. That is denied not only on general principle, but also in
view of the character of the particular educational institution
involved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore that at most
she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent
school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to such an obvious
conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by the Constitution
in this explicit language: "All institutions of higher learning shall
enjoy academic freedom."1 The petition must therefore fail.
Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent
admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4.
That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the
same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her
about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's
decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; 5. That the
reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not
constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither
present any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are
they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25, 1975,
Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the
purpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly
inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy the
benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but
all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's
Director, that the compromises she was offering were
unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for
her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner
then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the
possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A.
in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the
UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their
requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her
degree later in Theology — which would entail about four to five
years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola School of Studies
to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would
entail only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering
that time was of the essence in her case, and not wanting to be
deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for
her life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited
with any academic units for the subject she would take; 9. That
Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her
school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First Couple's entourage
now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this
is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for
registration; ... "2 She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the
purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester. She
made it more specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition
so that she would be allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the
June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and that whatever units
may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties be
likewise recognized by respondent. Her petition included the
letter of respondent Father Lambino which started on a happy
note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in two theology
subjects, but ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her, as
shown by this portion thereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me
for going into a matter which is not too pleasant. The faculty had
a meeting after the summer session and several members are
strongly opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School of
Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their
reason: They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties
were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the
presentation a chance and exerted more effort to understand the
point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and
problems. The way things are, I would say that the advisability of
your completing a program (with all the course work and thesis
writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the requisite
intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in
your best interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible
with your orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I
am only thinking of your welfare."3
This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975, required comment on
the part of respondent Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology.4 As submitted on behalf of Father Lambino, it
set forth the following: "Respondent is the Chairman of the
Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology,
which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon
City; In collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the
Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its
classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but
the degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by
the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the Loyola School of
Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to
the Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit
therein have to be officially admitted by the Assistant Dean of the
Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order for
them to be considered as admitted to a degree program;
Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to
take some courses for credit but said admission was not an
admission to a degree program because only the Assistant Dean
of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such
admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the
Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was
given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was
merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the
summer of 1975; Furthermore, petitioner was not charged a
single centavo by the Loyola School of Theology and/or the
Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the courses she
took in the summer of 1975, as she was allowed to take it free of
charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the
Loyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee,
necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit and/or to
continue admitting in the said school any particular student,
considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also
other considerations such as personality traits and character
orientation in relation with other students as well as considering
the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The
Petition for Mandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty,
much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to admit the
petitioner therein in the current year to take up further courses in
the Loyola School of Theology."5 It was likewise alleged in the
aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter of May 19, 1975,
the decision not to allow petitioner to take up further courses in
said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on reasonable
grounds, ... ."6 Then reference was made to the availability of non-
judicial remedies which petitioner could have pursued.7 The
prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner sought permission to reply and it was granted.
Thereafter, she had a detailed recital of why under the
circumstances she is entitled to relief from the courts. In a
resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court considered the comment
of respondent as answer and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda. That they did, and the petition was
deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at the outset,
we do not see merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.
1. In respondent's memorandum, it was made clear why a petition
for mandamus is not the proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot
compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further
studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has
no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of
Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly
and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay
person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there
is still no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said
studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down
even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities,
professors and optimum classroom size and component
considerations."8 No authorities were cited, respondent
apparently being of the view that the law has not reached the
stage where the matter of admission to an institution of higher
learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled discretion of the
applicant. There are standards that must be met. There are
policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In
terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of
petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot
therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a
mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty
imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a rather
comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately
did not have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute the
contention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain
her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It is
understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a
practitioner that was evident. While she pressed her points with
vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear
legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in
the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying
academic freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty
and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in
the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or
objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political,
economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert
McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher
and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate
his conclusions without being subjected to any interference,
molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the
institution." 9 As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook,
this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is
the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire,
discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of
their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except
the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths
or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines." 10
3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not
comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized by
the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference is to the
"institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It
would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of
such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how
best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision
is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a gradging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.
Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the
Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view
that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
university as an institution as distinguished from the academic
freedom of a university professor." 11 He cited the following from
Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France,
President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of
European universities: " "It is a well-established fact, and yet one
which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the
problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization
is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual
members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even
necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic
freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy
of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the
individual university teacher." " 12 Also: "To clarify further the
distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the
individual scholar, he says: "The personal aspect of freedom
consists in the right of each university teacher — recognized and
effectively guaranteed by society — to seek and express the truth
as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his
capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual
university teacher is at least as important, in considering
academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they
belong and through which they disseminate their learning."' 13 He
likewise quoted from the President of the Queen's University in
Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby: "'The internal conditions for academic
freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de
facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission and
examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii)
the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv)
the allocation of income among the different categories of
expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if
universities had to rely on the literal interpretation of their
constitutions in order to acquire for their academic members
control of these four functions, for in one constitution or another
most of these functions are laid on the shoulders of the law
governing body .'" 14 Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive
background in legal education as a former Professor of the
Harvard Law School, referred to what he called the business of a
university and the four essential freedoms in the following
language: "It is the business of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment
and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
essential freedoms" of a university — to determine for itself on graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it the parameters of these rules, it is within the
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 15 Thus is competence of universities and colleges to determine
reinforced the conclusion reached by us that mandamus does not who are entitled to the grant of honors among the
lie in this case. graduating students. Its discretion on this academic
matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by
the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in
4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons
its exercise."1
knowledgeable in the field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of
awareness of the need to respect freedom of thought on the part
of students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount to The Case
minimizing the full respect that must be accorded the academic
freedom expressly granted by the Constitution "to institutions of
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision2 of
higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity to the
the Court of Appeals3 dated 28 November 2003, reversing the 05
approach taken that colleges and universities should be looked
September 2002 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to
Quezon City, Branch 87.
admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to
a different, and certainly higher, category.
The pivotal issue from which this case arose is the interpretation
and application of Article 410 of the University of the Philippines
5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the
(UP) Code which provides:
persistence of petitioner to continue her studies in the Loyola
School of Theology is the result solely of a legal appraisal of the
situation before us. The decision is not to be construed as in any ART. 410. Students who complete their courses with
way reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was the following absolute minimum weighted average
on the part of respondent due acknowledgment of her grade shall be graduated with honors:
intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter of
Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of Summa Cum Laude ………..… 1.20
the school as well as of the other students and her own welfare,
that she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was
nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed Magna Cum Laude …….………1.45
relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even
petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other Cum Laude ………………….….1.75
institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any
rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy
was touched upon in this decision. Provided, that all the grades in all subjects prescribed
in the curriculum, as well as subjects that qualify as
electives, shall be included in the computation of the
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit weighted average grade; provided further that in cases
where the electives taken are more than those
G.R. No. 161172 December 13, 2004 required in the program, the following procedure will
be used in selecting the electives to be included in the
computation of the weighted average grade:
NADINE ROSARIO M. MORALES, petitioner,
vs.
THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE (I) For students who did not shift programs,
PHILIPPINES, respondent. consider the required number of electives
in chronological order.
DECISION
(II) For students who shifted from one
program to another, the electives to be
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: considered shall be selected according to
the following order of priority:
"It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are
given ample discretion to formulate rules and
 (1) Electives taken in the
program where the student is
graduating will be selected in
chronological order.
(2) Electives taken in the
previous program and
acceptable as electives in the
second program will be selected
in chronological order.
(3) Prescribed courses taken in
the previous program, but
qualify as electives in the second
program will be selected in
chronological order.5
The Facts
In the school year 1997-1998, petitioner Nadine Rosario M.
Morales transferred from the UP Manila campus, where she was
taking up Speech Pathology, to UP Diliman and enrolled in the
European Languages undergraduate program under the College of
Arts and Letters. Said program has three curricula, namely, Plan A,
Plan B, and Plan C. Upon the petitioner’s transfer, she chose the
Plan A curriculum and elected French as her major and German as
her minor. Under the Plan A curriculum, the student is required to
complete 141 units worth of subjects in the University, 27 of
which should be electives in his or her minor field of study.
During the first semester of school year 1997-1998, the petitioner
enrolled in the subjects German 10 and German 11 where she
obtained the grades of 1.0 in both subjects. At the start of the
second semester, however, the petitioner changed her language
minor from German to Spanish, while maintaining French as her
major.
By the end of the first semester of school year 1999-2000, the
petitioner was included in the list of candidates for graduation
"with probable honors" issued by the College of Arts and Letters
of UP Diliman. The inclusion of the petitioner in the said list was
based on the computation made by the College of Arts and
Letters of the petitioner’s General Weighted Average (GWA)
inclusive of her grades of 1.0 in German 10 and 11. According to
the college’s computation, the petitioner had a GWA of 1.725,
clearly above the minimum weighted average grade6 for
conferment of cum laude honors.7 Petitioner obtained an average
of 1.708 for her remaining subjects in her final semester in the
University, bringing her GWA to 1.729, which is definitely higher
than the 1.75 average grade required for cum laude honors.
During the assessment for graduation though, the petitioner was consideration, with full disclosure of who is involved in the
not granted cum laude honors because her grades of 1.0 in the matter.
subjects German 10 and 11, which she took when her minor was
still German, were excluded in the computation of her GWA, thus
Petitioner’s case was then again considered by the University
bringing her GWA to 1.760, which is lower than the minimum
Council during its 69th meeting held on 21 June 2000. After much
weighted average grade required for the conferment of cum
deliberation, the University Council, by a vote of 99 for, 12
laude honors.
against, and 6 abstentions, resolved to reaffirm its earlier decision
of 10 April 2000 denying the award of cum laude honors to
Prof. Edwin Thaddeus L. Bautista, Chair of the Department of petitioner.
European Languages, explained that a student following the Plan
A curriculum is required to major in one European language other
Upon the denial of the appeal, petitioner’s parents, on
than Spanish, and minor in another or any of the disciplines
petitioner’s behalf and for themselves, submitted a Notice of
allowed under the curriculum. In petitioner’s case, her major is
Appeal dated 27 June 2000 to the Board of Regents through
French and her minor is Spanish, thus, German does not fit into
President Nemenzo and, subsequently, an Appeal Memorandum
her curriculum. Furthermore, the Plan A curriculum does not
and Supplemental Memorandum dated 24 and 30 August 2000,
allow for free electives. Electives under said curriculum must be
respectively. The appeal was taken up during the 1144th meeting
major language electives, which, in the case of petitioner, must
of the Board of Regents held on 31 August 2000. After a thorough
have been taken from French courses in either literature or
discussion on the proper interpretation and application of Article
translation. German 10 and 11, being basic language courses, do
410 of the UP Code, the Board of Regents, by a vote of 9 against 2,
not fall under electives as contemplated in the Plan A curriculum.
elected to deny the appeal. Petitioner’s parents thereafter filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was also denied.
Maintaining that the college’s manner of computing her grades
was erroneous, the petitioner wrote Dr. Ofelia Silapan, College
Assailing the decision of the UP Board of Regents as erroneous,
Secretary of the College of Arts and Letters, on 06 April 2000,
petitioner, on 21 March 2001, brought a petition
requesting that her German language subjects (i.e., German 10
for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC, which resolved the
and 11) be included in the computation of her GWA, it appearing
case in her favor under Order of 05 September 2002. According to
that such had been done in connection with the inclusion of her
the said Order, the UP Board of Regents gravely abused its
name in the list of those graduating "with probable honors." Said
discretion in the improper application of its academic discretion in
letter was followed-up by another letter signed by petitioner’s
interpreting Article 410 of the UP Code. The lower court, hence,
father, and addressed to Dr. Elena L. Samonte, University
required the respondent UP Board of Regents to re-compute
Registrar, on 08 April 2000, explaining why petitioner’s German
petitioner’s grades by including her grades in German 10 and 11
10 and 11 grades should be included in the computation of her
and to confer upon petitioner cum laude honors. The respondent
GWA.
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 07 October 2002, which was
subsequently denied by the lower court. Upon said denial, the
These letters were taken up on a no-name basis during the respondent appealed the RTC’s Order to the Court of Appeals by
68th meeting of the University Council on 10 April 2000 upon the filing a Notice of Appeal dated 14 February 2003.
University Registrar’s endorsement. After deliberating on the
matter, the University Council, by a vote of 207 in favor and 4
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal on 24 April
against, affirmed the recommendation of the European Languages
2003, advancing that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
Department and the College of Arts and Letters of not awarding
take cognizance of the appeal, inasmuch as it raised only
the cum laude honors to the petitioner.
questions of law. Said argument was reiterated in petitioner’s
Memorandum, together with the position that the lower court
In view of the adverse decision of the University Council, the was correct to find that respondent had gravely abused its
petitioner, together with her parents, wrote UP President discretion in arbitrarily excluding petitioner’s grades in German 10
Francisco A. Nemenzo, on 18 April 2000, asking that the merits of and 11 from the computation of her GWA.
petitioner’s case be reviewed and, if deemed appropriate, the
same be elevated to the UP Board of Regents in order to correct
The respondent, for its part, contended that the lower court failed
the error in the computation of the petitioner’s GWA.
to take into consideration the interpretation of the pertinent
provision of the UP Code arrived at by the University Council
At the 1142nd meeting of the Board of Regents held on 26 May during its deliberations. It instead, substituted its own
2000, petitioner’s appeal was thus discussed, and it was resolved interpretation in violation of the academic freedom of UP as an
that said appeal be returned to the University Council for further institution of higher learning.
Noting the identity of the arguments raised by petitioner in both
her Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum, the Court of Appeals, in
a resolution, deemed the case submitted for decision. In deciding
the appeal, the appellate court initially determined whether only
questions of law are involved in the case. Eventually, the
appellate court declared that an analysis of the facts of the case is
indispensable. According to the Court of Appeals:
To resolve these issues, an incursion or investigation of
the facts attending the case of the petitioner-appellee
is indispensable. The Court must sift through the
contrasting evidence submitted to determine the
specific situation of appellee’s academic standing, and
the chronology of appellee’s scholastic progress, her
grades and scholastic average, as well as what
particular rules were used or misused by the
Respondent Board, and by the lower court, in coming
up with its respective decisions. The Court is called
upon to make a calibration and resolution of all these
elements, and to determine the existence and
relevancy [sic] of specific surrounding circumstances,
its relation to each other and to the whole and the
probabilities of the situation.
This is not a simple matter of determining what the
[sic] law is applicable on a given or specific set of facts.
Indeed, the facts itself [sic] must be determined and
reviewed, before a legal adjudication could be made.
To be sure, questions of law are attendant in the
instant appeal, but to resolve the same, a review and
determination of [the] facts, based on evidence and
matters on record, is necessary before such issues
could be resolved. The Court, therefore, as a legal
reviewer of issues of fact and law, is competent, and
legally empowered, to take cognizance of and resolve
the instant appeal.8
Having resolved the issue of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
went on to determine whether the lower court erred in not
finding that academic freedom should apply in the instant case.
According to the appellate court, the RTC’s Order involved an
intrusion on the discretion and authority of the UP Board of
Regents in the matter of whether or not to confer academic
honors upon the petitioner. The Court of Appeals stated that the
lower court violated UP’s constitutionally protected right to
academic freedom when it substituted its own interpretation of
the internal rules and regulations of the University for that of the
UP Board of Regents, and applied the same to the petitioner’s
case. The appellate court further made a determination that
respondent is not guilty of grave abuse of discretion in deciding
not to confer academic honors upon the petitioner, inasmuch as
respondent proceeded fairly in reaching its decision, giving the
petitioner and her parents ample opportunity to present their
case. Accordingly, on 28 November 2003, the Court of Appeals
issued a decision granting the UP Board of Regents’ appeal:
The Order, dated September 5, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87 is hereby SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition for certiorari and mandamus
filed by petitioner-appellee Nadine Rosario M.
Morales.9
Claiming that the Court of Appeals committed grave and
reversible errors in issuing its 28 November 2003 decision,
petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, raising the following assignment of errors:10
I probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over
respondent’s appeal of the RTC’s Order (the CA
Appeal) because the essential facts here were never in
dispute, this case involves purely questions of law.
II
The RTC correctly required respondent to confer cum
laude honors on petitioner because respondent
gravely abused its discretion in refusing to comply with
Article 410 of the UP Code (which respondent itself
issued) and in arbitrarily excluding petitioner’s grades
in German 10 and 11 from the computation of her
GWA. The Court of Appeals therefore gravely erred in
reversing the RTC’s Order.
According to the petitioner, it was erroneous for the appellate
court to assume jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal of the RTC
Order as said appeal involved purely questions of law, and that
respondents should have challenged said Order directly with the
Supreme Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari and
not before the Court of Appeals through a Notice of Appeal. The
petitioner further argues that it was error for the Court of Appeals
to rule that respondent’s refusal to interpret and apply Article 410
of the UP Code in order to confer cum laude honors to petitioner
did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, petitioner
advances that the appellate court mischaracterized this case as
one involving academic freedom, thus condoning respondent’s
alleged injustice to petitioner.
Ruling of the Court
First, we shall endeavor to dispose of the issue of jurisdiction.
Petitioner submits that this case involves only the interpretation
of a rule (i.e., Article 410 of the UP Code) and the determination
of whether the subjects German 10 and 11 can be considered as
"qualified electives" under the assailed rule in relation to
petitioner’s situation. According to petitioner, the facts of the
case have never been in dispute. Both petitioner and respondent
have presented the same pieces of evidence, albeit of course,
their respective interpretations and positions on the legal effects
of their common evidence are different. Petitioner also points out
that the total absence of questions of fact is precisely the reason
why the RTC did not require, and the parties themselves did not
demand, an evidentiary hearing for the case before the lower
court.
We agree with petitioner that respondent’s appeal to the
appellate court raises only questions of law. There is a question of
law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.11 On the
other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law.12
Contrary to what the Court of Appeals postulates, the resolution
of the issues presented by respondent UP Board of Regents does
not necessitate an incursion of the facts attending the case.
Whether the lower court erred in finding that respondent gravely
abused its discretion in interpreting and applying the provisions of
the UP Code on the case of petitioner is a question of law, the
determination of which calls for the analysis of the proper
application of law and jurisprudence. While the Court of Appeals
is correct in saying that in order to resolve the issues raised by the
parties, the court must consider all the facts and evidence
presented in the case, it does not, however, rule on the truth or
falsity of such facts, based on the evidence and matters on record.
It must be stressed that the facts were admitted by both parties.
Therefore, any conclusion based on these facts would not involve
a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence, but
would be limited to an inquiry of whether the law was properly
applied given the state of facts of the case.
It is thus evident that the controversy centered on, and the doubt
arose with respect to, the correct interpretation and application
of Rule 410 of the UP Code in relation to petitioner’s situation and
not as to any fact or evidence advanced by the parties. And since
the appeal brought by respondent UP Board of Regents before
the Court of Appeals raises only questions of law, the proper
mode of appeal is by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule
45.13 Therefore, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and to resolve respondent’s appeal.
The above conclusion, however, will not deter this Court from
proceeding with the judicial determination of the basic legal
issues herein. We must bear in mind that procedural rules are
intended to ensure the proper administration of law and justice.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice.14 A deviation from its rigid enforcement may
thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.15 Noting that this case involves the exercise of a
fundamental right - academic freedom no less - of the State
University, and that the petitioner has, in any event, raised before
us the legal question of whether the RTC correctly required
respondent to confer cum laude honors on the petitioner because
of respondent’s alleged grave abuse of discretion, for pragmatic
reasons and consideration of justice and equity, the Court must
go on to resolve the second assignment of error.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos
v. Court of Appeals,16 the discretion of schools of learning to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And
such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the
courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the
courts may not disturb the University’s decision not to confer
honors to petitioner.
"Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law."17
A judicious review of the records will show that the respondent
proceeded fairly in evaluating petitioner’s situation, giving her and
her parents ample opportunity to present their side on different
occasions and before different fora, i.e., the Department of
European Languages, the College of Arts and Letters, the
University Council and finally, the Board of Regents. Contrary to
the trial court’s findings, there is no showing that respondent
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in interpreting Article 410 of the
UP Code and consequently not conferring academic honors on
petitioner.
For clarity, Article 410 of the UP Code is again quoted hereunder:
ART. 410. Students who complete their courses with
the following absolute minimum weighted average
grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa Cum Laude ……….. 1.20
Magna Cum Laude ………… 1.45
Cum Laude ……………….... 1.75
Provided, that all the grades in all subjects prescribed
in the curriculum, as well as subjects that qualify as
electives, shall be included in the computation of the
weighted average grade; provided further that in cases
where the electives taken are more than those
required in the program, the following procedure will
be used in selecting the electives to be included in the
computation of the weighted average grade:
(I) For students who did not shift programs, consider
the required number of electives in chronological
order.
(II) For students who shifted from one program to
another, the electives to be considered shall be
selected according to the following order of priority:
(1) Electives taken in the program where
the student is graduating will be selected in
chronological order.
(2) Electives taken in the previous program
and acceptable as electives in the second
program will be selected in chronological
order.
(3) Prescribed courses taken in the previous
program, but qualify as electives in the
second program will be selected in
chronological order.18
As can be seen from the minutes of the meetings of the University
Council and the Board of Regents, petitioner’s case was subjected
to an exhaustive and judicious deliberation. During the
68th Meeting of the University Council, where petitioner’s case
was first submitted to the body for discussion on a no-name basis,
a member raised the issue of whether German 10 and 11 could be
counted as electives in the program of petitioner, to which the
University Registrar replied that the student’s program is
European Languages, major in French, minor in Spanish under
which German 10 and 11 are not required in the checklist; neither
can these subjects be considered electives as said electives should
be non-language electives. Since the student chose Spanish as her
minor language, German 10 and 11 are excess
subjects.19 Another member argued that if the student had
satisfied all the requirements in the curriculum, then German 10
and 11 should be included in the computation of the GWA since
the student had good grades.20 To this, Dean Josefina Agravante
of the College of Arts and Letters replied that while they
empathize with the student and her parents, this same rule had
been applied in the past, and if the student would be allowed to
graduate with honors, she (Dean Agravante) will be forced to
recommend the same for the other students who were denied
the same request in the past.21 At the 1142nd Meeting of the
Board of Regents, both positions of the petitioner and the
University Council on the proper interpretation of Article 410 of
the UP Code were presented before the Board and an agreement
was reached among the members to return petitioner’s appeal to
the University Council for further consideration, with full
disclosure of who is involved in the matter.
Upon the appeal’s return to the University Council, the issue of
whether the University rule allows for excess electives more than
those required by the program was raised. Prof. Cao22 answered
this query by pointing to Section 2 of Article 41023 which provides
for the manner of selecting which electives shall be considered.
Since the rule provides for an order of priority, it is clear that not
all electives taken by a student may be included in the
computation of the GWA. Dean Yu,24 on the other hand, pointed
out that the more basic issue is whether German 10 and 11 can be
considered as electives under petitioner’s curriculum within the
contemplation of the assailed rule. Dean Yu further stated that
the determination of which subjects will qualify as electives is best
left to the Department of European Languages and the student’s
curriculum. To this issue, Prof. Bautista, Chair of the Department
of European Languages, replied that this matter had been taken
up again at the Department level and they stood by their decision
that in the Plan A of the BA European Languages program, there is
a major and a minor language. There are no free electives and for
the minor language, subjects that fall under the same language
were the ones counted. In the case of Ms. Morales, she initially
thought that she would minor in German so she took German 10
and 11 during her first semester in UP Diliman, but eventually, she
changed her minor to Spanish. He said that the Advising
Committee of the Department allows a student to change his
major or minor, but courses which had been previously taken
before the shifting of major or minor are not counted as part of
the courses with credit in the curriculum. As to the interpretation
of the rules, Dean Tabunda25 said that it is a matter of course
that the traditional interpretation of the Department be taken.
And the Department made it clear that a free elective is different
from a course taken as a minor. With respect to the question of
what interpretation should prevail, she (Dean Tabunda) believed
that the traditional interpretation must be taken into account.26
In trying to get into the heart of the issue, the Board of Regents,
at its 1144th Meeting, went into an examination of Rule
410.27 Regent Hernandez28 considers the rule as referring to the
computation of the GWA, not only with respect to the subjects
prescribed in the curriculum, but also takes into account all
subjects that qualify as electives. Thus, those electives may not
only be part of the Plan A curriculum but are part of the program.
On the contrary, Vice President Diokno29 said that the
understanding of the Department and the University Council is
that subjects that qualify as electives must be in the curriculum.
Otherwise, the student can take anything they want. Vice
President Diokno stated further that in cases where there are free
electives, the electives are applied chronologically. Moreover, the
Plan A curriculum, incidentally, does not allow free electives,
therefore, there was nothing to put in chronologically. This has
always been the practice of the Department which is being
supported by the College Assembly and the University Council.30
Further discussing the matter, Regent Hernandez requested for an
interpretation of Article 41031 on the issue of whether or not the
German subjects which are supposedly electives should be
included in the computation of the petitioner’s GWA. Atty.
Azura,32 University General Counsel, explained that the words
"subjects that qualify as electives" must be read in conjunction
with the immediately preceding qualifying phrase "in the
curriculum." Where the first conjunctive part contains the
descriptive phrase/modifier "in the curriculum," so too must the
second conjunctive part be subject to the same modifier. Thus,
"subjects that qualify as electives" is modified by the words "in
the curriculum." In other words, in the computation of the GWA,
the grades of subjects prescribed in the curriculum and the grades
of subjects that qualify as electives in the curriculum are included.
Seen in this light, the view that German 10 and 11 must be
considered in the computation of petitioner’s GWA, being
electives in the European Languages undergraduate program, is
incorrect. The word program in Article 41033 must be interpreted
in the context of a particular curriculum. A student fulfills the
requirements of a program by following a certain curriculum.
Atty. Azura said that the University Council, in excluding German
10 and 11 from the computation of petitioner’s GWA, effectively
ruled that these subjects do not qualify as electives in the course
curriculum for a degree in BA European Languages, major in
French, minor in Spanish.34
In deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration submitted by
petitioner, the Board of Regents, during its 1147th Meeting,
reviewed the interpretation of petitioner’s curriculum. University
General Counsel, Prof. Marvic Leonen, explained that the
interpretation of the required subjects or allowable electives in
the curriculum must be taken in the context of the entire courses.
A student in Plan A is required to take:
Minor Language 12/Elective.b
Minor Language 13/Elective.b
Minor Language 20/Elective.b
Minor Language 21/Elective.b
General Education Subjects (i.e. common subjects for BA programs and required subjects under
Minor Language 30/Elective.b
the BA European Languages program)
French (major)
Minor Language 40/Elective.b Spanish (minor)
German
Minor Language 31/Elective.b Total Units
The numbered sequencing of the courses therefore clearly implies
that if German 10 and 11 would be equivalent to Minor Language
10 and 11, then German 12, 13, 20, 21, 30, 40, 31 should have
been taken by the student. The pattern would be different if the
student took up Spanish. This is so because there are no Spanish
12, 13, and 21 offered. This also explains why footnote "b" that
uniformly qualifies the quoted entries states:
(b) Courses in English, Comparative Literature, Creative
Writing, Filipino, Panitikan ng Pilipinas, Speech,
Theater Arts, Art Studies, Social Science, Philosophy,
Music, Fine Arts, Education, Mass Communication or
Tourism. As minor discipline, these non-language
electives must be taken only in one department
provided that the prerequisites has/have been
satisfied. For those taking Spanish as minor, the
following are recommended: Spanish 3, 20, 30, 31, 40,
60, 80, 100 and 105.35
The first two sentences in the footnote could not refer to "minor
language." The last sentence, on the other hand, could not refer
to the entry "elective." There is nothing in the footnote that could
be read to imply that the "electives" could be language courses
other than those enumerated in the footnote’s first sentence.
Petitioner argues that German 10 and 11 should be appreciated
as the minor languages 10 and 11 required. And that the Spanish
subjects should be taken as the "elective" subjects in the
curriculum. The difficulty with this position is that the description
of "elective" is very clear and leaves no further room for
interpretation. For purposes of graduation and for honors,
petitioner has to abide by the requirements of the curriculum.
Petitioner’s decision to shift her minor language caused the
exclusion of her grades in German 10 and 11 in the computation
of her GWA.
It must be stressed that it is the policy of the University to
thoroughly evaluate all candidates for graduation with honors to
ensure that students do not earn extra credits in order to increase
their GWA. A perusal of petitioner’s official transcript of
records36 will show that the subjects German 10 and 11 are in
excess of the requirements of the program (i.e., 141 units, 27 of
which are electives in the minor field of study), to illustrate:
Subjects Number of Units Earned
69
45
27
6
147
The fact that the UP Board of Regents chose to accept the
interpretation of Article 410 of the UP Code as construed by the
University Council based on its time-honored interpretation and
application of said rule, after the latter has deliberated on the
matter twice, vis-à-vis petitioner’s interpretation, is not
tantamount to a whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the respondent. It is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the UP Board of Regents to uphold the decisions of the
Department of European Languages, the College of Arts and
Letters and the University Council, when said decisions were
reached after a thorough discussion of the merits of petitioner’s
case in relation to the established interpretation and analysis of
its very own internal rules.
In the case of University of the Philippines v. Ayson,37 UP has
been likened to an administrative agency whose findings must be
accorded respect within its areas of competence. Well-settled is
the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under
their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment
thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts.38 Accordingly, the conclusion arrived at by the UP Board
of Regents that petitioner’s grades in German 10 and 11 should
not be included in computing her GWA must be respected and
given finality, the interpretation and application of Article 410 of
the UP Code being within the competence and expertise of the
Department of European Languages, the College of Arts and
Letters and the University Council to make.
Therefore, it was error on the part of the lower court to rule that
respondent’s discretion has been gravely abused, thus justifying
the substitution of judicial discretion in the interpretation of
Article 410 of the UP Code. The decision of the lower court in
substituting its own interpretation of the University’s internal
rules for that of the respondent UP Board of Regents, is an
intrusion into the constitutionally protected right of the University
to academic freedom.
Sec. 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
Academic freedom accords an institution of higher learning the
right to decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to
attain them. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in
a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.39 Certainly, the wide
sphere of autonomy given to universities in the exercise of
academic freedom extends to the right to confer academic
honors. Thus, exercise of academic freedom grants the University
the exclusive discretion to determine to whom among its
graduates it shall confer academic recognition, based on its
established standards. And the courts may not interfere with such
exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that the
University has arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its judgment.
Unlike the UP Board of Regents that has the competence and
expertise in granting honors to graduating students of the
University, courts do not have the competence to constitute
themselves as an Honor’s Committee and substitute their
judgment for that of the University officials.
Therefore, for failure to establish that the respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in not conferring cum laude honors to
petitioner, the lower court erred in mandating that petitioner’s
grades be re-computed including her marks in German 10 and 11
and to confer upon petitioner academic honors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the UP
Board of Regents on 31 August 2000 denying the appeal of the
petitioner is AFFIRMED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
dated 05 September 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD
HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA
QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN
AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and
ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na
estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang
karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung,
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle
University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint
Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive
action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other
student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop
of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to
education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the following:
(1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996
dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against respondent Judge
and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996
denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated January
7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila
granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May
14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the
penalties for the other private respondents from expulsion to
exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board, two violent incidents on March 29, 1995
involving private respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining
witnesses, it appears that one week prior to March 29,
1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in
Manang's Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard
two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at
Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two.
When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned
the remarks to his two other brods while watching
television. These two brods had earlier finished eating
their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together
with four other persons went back to Manang's and
confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By
admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony,
one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence
then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between
the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma
Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. "Kailangan ng
apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no
apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity
went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in
the campus. Among them were respondents
Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were looking
for a person whose description matched James Yap.
According to them, this person supposedly "nambastos
ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of them
remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr.
James Yap went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As
he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy
footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running
towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to
do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the
head with something heavy in his hands –
"parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee
were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were
also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards
arrived; and the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the
group who attacked him. With respect to respondent
Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya,
hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was
a long haired guy also running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At
this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the Engineering
Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university
clinic; reported the incident to the Discipline Office;
and informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan.
According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux
Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride
with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in Miguel
Building. However, they did not proceed directly for
home. With a certain Michael Perez, they went
towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr.
Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend
from another friend who lives somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they
could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, Mr.
Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He
said not to mind them and just keep on walking.
 However, the group got out of the restaurant, among
them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr.
Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But,
respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation.
Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and
respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr.
Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were
chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent
Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-
upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group
was able to catch up with him. His shirt was torn and
he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe.
Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then
returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee,
as among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual did
not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified
respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of
the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr.
Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto
and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed
to run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon
Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina
niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the
last time. Apparently being satisfied with their
handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and
Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited for
almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening
before they returned to the campus to have their
wounds treated. Apparently, there were three cars
roaming the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The
victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson
Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux
Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin
Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto
Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival
fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a
complaint7 with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints8 were also
filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and
private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled
"De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar
(AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403),
Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and sans driver. But on this particular date, respondent
Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to
Case No. 9495-3-25121. use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver
Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family
driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to
Philippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung
private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and
is also employed.
Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them
to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.9
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of
respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved
at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02
in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was
p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's
formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board
house in BF Parañaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran);
Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing12 to private
and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent
respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as
Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking
follows:
the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South
Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is
Please be informed that a joint and expanded located at the South Harbor.14
Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and
deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED
xxxx
Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of
James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his
friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board
March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50
scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro.
p.m. together to get some medicine at the university
Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give
clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was at the
testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You
clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all
may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your
within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
testimony or those of your witnesses.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to
of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette Aquino,
provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a
attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15
list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of
their proposed testimony.
xxxx
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your
failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board
statement of their proposed testimony will be that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March 29,
considered a waiver on your part to present evidence 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be
and as an admission of the principal act complained of. the paymaster of the construction workers who were
doing some works in the apartment of his parents.
Although he had classes in the evening, the workers
For your strict compliance.13
according to him would wait for him sometimes up to
9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, workers get paid everyday.
1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of
alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit,
follows:
unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly
attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, date and time in question.16
1995 was one of the few instances when he was
picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most
xxxx
of the time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone
 Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he]
left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting
with some of the officers that we were preparing."17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They were meted
the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED
Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board
finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105),
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN
LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-
MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order
No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-
MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for
reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-President
for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a
Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC,
Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It
was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to
respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to
annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the
Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a
TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives
and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and
desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and
Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist
from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of
school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion
to amend his petition to correct an allegation in paragraph
3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the
TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the amended
petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies
of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view
of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and
Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention29 in
Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued
corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner
DLSU to admit said private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in
behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On June 20, 1995,
petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-
in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an
Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents there) motion to
dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents'
(petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents,
representatives or any and all other persons acting for
and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and the
petitioners-in-intervention from the De La
Salle University and the letter-resolution
dated June 1, 1995, affirming the Resolution
dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses
offered at respondent De La Salle University
and to immediately allow them to enroll
and complete their respective
courses/degrees until their graduation
thereat in accordance with the standards
set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is
granted. Respondent, its agents, representatives, or
any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby
restrained and enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-
Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses
offered at respondent (De La Salle
University) and to forthwith allow all said
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to
enroll and complete their respective
courses/degrees until their graduation
thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect
upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting
an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00
executed in favor of respondent to the effect that
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to
respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by
reason of the injunction if the Court will finally decide
that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not
entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is
denied for lack of merit. Respondents are directed to
file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused
enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on
September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus,
on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an
urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt
of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to
enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order
dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent
Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant
portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until further
orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as
your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees
and any other person assisting or acting for or on your
behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic
expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU,
and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming
the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately
desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and
intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow
 them to enroll and complete their degree courses until
their graduation from said school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for
preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No.
181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all
private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated,
while other private respondents were to be excluded.38 The
Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE
UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE
APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED
ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V.
REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT
THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE
LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR.
ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented
private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his
classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters40 to
petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll
private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26,
1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private
respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes
pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused
to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated
September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar
through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU)
to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion
Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to
reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as
meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy
remedy available, considering the set deadline for
enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to
prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of
the institution, DLSU, through the proper school
authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin
Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for
Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through
petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent
Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote
another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using
CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA,
arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case
moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution
granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar,
disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein
petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is
immediately executory in character, the pendency of a
Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit,
the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case
records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS,
not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus,
necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of
the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed
an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned
order granting private respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to
reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the
order reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent
motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss is
denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25,
1995 is declared to be in force and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served
personally by the Court's sheriff upon the respondents
at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to
conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued
effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September
25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent
motion for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of
petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing
the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995
issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until
further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his
manifestation51 stating that he has long completed his course at
petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects
for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his
transcript of records52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having
completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has
not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
 1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal
authority to review decisions of institutions of higher
learning that impose disciplinary action on their
students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in
expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due
process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to
academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents
proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on
private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that
while CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the expulsion of
other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their
exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the
dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the
spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and
the respondent Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private
respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the
Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and
complete their degree courses until their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits,
brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the substantial
issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of
the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and
importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of
Our jurisdiction.54 This is in consonance with our case law now
accorded near-religious reverence that rules of procedure are but
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their
operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng
pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng
mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student
expulsion cases, even those involving students in secondary and
tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of
their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) &
(3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232,
otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer
to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over
expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say
that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the
right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character
and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A.
No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the
formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of
academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher
learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under
Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student
disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage"
of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and
functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education,
which the CHED has replaced and whose functions and
responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over
student disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise
known as "An Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education,
Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of
the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher
Education. – In pursuance of the abovementioned
policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby
created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate
from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) and attached to the office of the President for
administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be
both public and private institutions of higher education
as well as degree-granting programs in all post
secondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section
8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The
Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise
such other powers and functions as may be necessary
to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of
this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary
for its effective operations and for the continued
enhancement of growth or development of higher
education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A.
No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of
higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no
reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as institutions of
higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and
supervision over all public and private institutions of higher
education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post-
secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to
the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide
disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level
would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both
public and private institutions of higher education as well as
degree granting programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private
educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs.
Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection,
fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable
quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps
to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law
is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic
freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the
continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of
learning and research, the development of responsible and
effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level
professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural
heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No.
7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases involving
students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the
future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of
institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that
the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had
authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the
responsibilities of other government entities having functions
similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student
discipline cases should therefore be read in conjunction with the
provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating
that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-
supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and
tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On
Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or
distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely
the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of
academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher
learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only
concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither
should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of
jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the
CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by
virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng
batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our
entire history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is
solemn and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found
violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards
which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings.68 The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.69 So long as the party is given the opportunity to
advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot
be said that there was denial of due process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a
fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be
heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges
against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the
charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective
answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented
against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board.
Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-
3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due
process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected
in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court held that "x x
x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student
discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x
x x an essential part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning,
possesses academic freedom which includes determination of
who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-
aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang
karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all
institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best
to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught,
(3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching
the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise
finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is
categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students
have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established academic
and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic
freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission
to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung,
Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang
substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the
common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi may
succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time
of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully
invoked where the identity of the assailant has been established
by witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where
categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi
and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that
denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the
positive testimonies of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the
crime who can positively identify the accused.82 Alibi is an
inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution
because one can easily fabricate an alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds
that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of
positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime
and were the victim's assailants. As between categorical
testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on
the other, the former must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all
defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it
is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of accused by the witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student
discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor
preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence.
According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means
"such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private
respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and Reverente.1awphi1 They
were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene
of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for
them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail
over their positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the
expulsion of several students found guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students who
have been investigated and found guilty by the
Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner
university's disciplinary rules and standards will
certainly undermine the authority of the
administration of the school. This we would be most
loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner
university's academic freedom which has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987
Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes,
Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable institution as their own,
for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the
students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after
them.88 It must be borne in mind that universities are established,
not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but
to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to
give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame in Quezon
City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995.
This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he
submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and
affirm by way of this Certification that
sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and
between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were
together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan
Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City,
meeting in connection with an affair of our
class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the
Philippine Constabulary discussing on the
proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI
from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M.
that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our
permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp
Crame, in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino
(Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar
(ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler
(TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto
(Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance
or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and
disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense
which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability.
But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of
credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes
commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the
presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when
accused has no other possible defense for what could really be
the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such
defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private
respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private
respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their
students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the
establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be
regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival."94 This power,
however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to
impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of
the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the
offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an
element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due
process question.95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances,
the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity
of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents
lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any
serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve
suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future
of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage
of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of
colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious
of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action
should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive
measure.96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not
expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to
Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop
the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being
undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15,
1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated
January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED
Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of
completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On
the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private
respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls,
and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine
Military Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA,
who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
(PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and
HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
(CRAB), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF
P. CUDIA, and on her own behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his
personal commitment to uphold what is morally and ethically
righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most
challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma
between what is true and right as against his security, well-being,
pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and
those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character
does not think twice and chooses the fore. This is the essence of
and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth and
righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of one's basic
rights and privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia,
acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin
Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta Causing filed
this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
application for extremely urgent temporary restraining order
(TRO).2
In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the
prayer for TRO and instead, required respondents to file their
comment on the petition.3
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in
behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to
intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per
Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court granted the motion
and resolved to await respondents' comment on the petition.5
A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014,
recommending the admission of the petition-in-intervention and
adopting it as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014,
petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with motion for leave
to admit the Final Investigation Report of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was
relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses
Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for themselves and in
behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC)
members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for
violation of Cadet lCL Cudia's rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014,
petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt the submission of the
CHR Report.10 The manifestation was granted and the motion was
noted by the Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents
filed their Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a motion,
petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by
petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex "A" of the Reply was a copy of
the CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case
No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same on August 11,
2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to
submit the case for early resolution,15 which the Court noted in a
Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 3, 2014.16
The Facts
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of
the PMA, the country's premiere military academy located at Fort
Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the "A" Company
and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As claimed by petitioners
and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called
"petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to
graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the
Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be
commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air
Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations
Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr.
Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the
Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was
from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in
ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th
period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL
Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412
class x x x. "17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas,
Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five
minutes.18
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of
Tactical Officers. They were logged and transmitted to the
Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned
cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL
Cudia reasoned out that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We
were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."19
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj.
Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out to him the
penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet
lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The
latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the result of
his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she never
dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-
15 minutes earlier than scheduled. When he expressed his
intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the punishment,
he was · advised to put the request in writing. Hence, that same
day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia addressed his Request for Reconsideration
of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical
Officer (STO), asserting:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances,
our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which
is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I
went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his
comments on the request of Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to indicate if
there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were
also late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj.
Leander pointing out that, based on his investigation, the 4th
period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander
sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia came to know of the denial of his request only on January
24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was
informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation
of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written
appeal, stating that his 4th period class ended at l 500H that made
him late in the succeeding class.22
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol
(Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report,
Cadet lCL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindang's
conversations with their instructors and classmates as well as his
statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He
then verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to
answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could
shed light on the matter, was on emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL
Cudia, conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told
me its a report dated november. When maj hindang ask me, no
time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last
december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil finish early bee its
grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr.
Costales, who reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in
the same time reference when the latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the
Honor Report. He averred:
Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class.
When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper
and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and
Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for some query with regards (sic) to the
deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our
question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our
section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office,
and then she came out of the room and gave me a copy of the
grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to
our 5ti period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:
1. How could this be lying?
2. What is wrong with the side of Maj.
Hindang (why did he come up to that honor
report)?
3. What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case
be reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not violate the honor
code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to
deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and for the
following reasons:
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was
already settled and finalized given the fact
that no face-to-face personal conversation
with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify
what and when exactly was the issue at
hand.
2. Statements of the respondents support
my explanation.
3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR
(Request for reconsideration of meted
punishment) further supports my
explanation in my delinquency report.
4. My understanding of the duration of the
"CLASS" covers not just a lecture in a typical
classroom instruction but includes every
transaction and communication a teacher
does with her students, especially that in
our case some cadets asked for queries, and
I am given instruction by which (sic) were
directly related to our CLASS. Her
transaction and communication with our
other classmates may have already ended
but ours extended for a little bit.
I agree and consider that
because Cadet CUDIA is under
my instruction to wait, and the
other cadets still have business
with me, it is reasonable enough
for him to say that "Our class
was dismissed a bit late" (dealing
with matter of seconds or a
minute particularly 45 seconds
to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
And with concern to (sic) OR432
class, I can say it ended on time
(1500H).
(signed)
M COSTALES
w/ attached certification
5. I was transparent and honest in
explaining the 2-minute delay and did not
attempt to conceal anything that happened
or I did.
6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the
Tactical Officer of Hawk Company[,] and I
had a conversation with regards (sic) to the
same matter for which he can give
important points of my case.
7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a
witness that I waited for Ms. Costales. 24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet
1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the
investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1 CL Hasigan as
Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL
Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as
members.25 Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary
Investigation Report recommending that the case be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued.
The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1 CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the
nine (9) voting members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL
Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn
P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura,
2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko
Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the
entire proceedings were 4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL
Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who observed the trial were
Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino,
Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and
Cadet 3CL Umaguing.28
The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014
and lasted until early morning the next day. Cadet lCL Cudia was
informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded "Not
Guilty." Among those who testified were Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj.
Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second
night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with
Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales also testified under oath
via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting
members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed.
The members cast their votes through secret balloting and
submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with their
written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict.
Cadet lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was the lone
dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Chairman Cadet 1 CL
Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a
chamber adjoining the court room for further deliberation. After
several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer
announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already
served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed of the
unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code.
He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center until the
resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal
addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text of which stated:
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in
Eng412 class", my explanation on this delinquency report when I
received it, is that "Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I
came directly from 4th period class ... etc". Knowing the fact that
in my delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412 classes started
1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough for I (sic)
to interpret it as "I came 1502H during that class". This is the
explanation that came into my mind that time. (I just cannot recall
the exact words I used in explaining that delinquency report, but
what I want to say is that I have no intention to be late). In my
statements, I convey my message as "since I was not the only one
left in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used the term
"CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED" because I was under
instruction (to wait for her to give the section grade) by the
instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL
ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her that made me
decide to use the word "CLASS", while the others who don't have
queries and business with her (ex: lCL NARCISO and 1 CL DIAZ)
were also around.
Note:
The four named cadets were also reported late.
Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal
Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)
It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the
place of instruction after the section has been dismissed. EXCEPT
when told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any
competent authority for official purposes. "
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two
bells rang (indicating the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited for
her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made
me to decide to write "a little bit late" in my explanation. Truly,
the class ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose (instruction by
Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic schedule (to
which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4th PD class
1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-1 600H), and since Ms.
Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word
"CLASS".
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11
Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not because I don't want to serve
punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed
instruction, and believing that my reason is justifiable and valid,
that is why I approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF,
to clarify and ask why it was awarded that day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my
instructor and he even added that they have a protocol to dismiss
the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances,
our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which
is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class,
I went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my
delinquency report, in here, I specified the conflict in the schedule
and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it
further with these statements, my tactical officer said that since I
was reported in a written form, I should make an appeal in a
written form. Thinking that he already understood what I want to
say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that
I used in having conversation with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January
24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales attested:
1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO
was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making query about their
latest grades in OR432 and/or results of UEl outside
the ACADS office. The following facts may explain their
queries on 14 November 2013:
a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room
instead of room 104.
b. That OR432 releases grades every
Wednesday and cadets are informed during
Thursday, either in class or posted grades in
the bulletin board (grades released was [sic
J based on the previous LEs: latest LE before
UE was Decision Trees).
c. That UE papers were already checked but
not yet recorded due to (sic) other cadets
have not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed
to verify scores but not to look at the
papers.
d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan
clarified if indeed Cadet NARCISO and
ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets
said that they verified something with me
after the OR432 class and they were with
Cadet CUD IA. That the statements of the
three (3) cadets are all the same and
consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.
2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really
account for the specific time that I dismissed the class.
To this date, I [cannot] really recall an account that is
more than two (2) months earlier. According to my
records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during
(sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the time of
my dismissal, maybe it can be verified with the other
members of class I was handling on that said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same
day, January · 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial based
on the arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners,
however, claim that the written appeal was not acted upon until
the filing of the petition-in-intervention.32
From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the
Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal review
to check the findings of the HC. During the course of the
investigation, Prof. Berong was said to have confirmed with the
Officer-in-Charge of the HC that classes started as scheduled (i.e.,
3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the acting class
marcher of ENG412, verified before the Commandant, Assistant
Commandant, and STO that the class started not earlier than
scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the
Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for
review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in
order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez),
the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and
recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA
Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia
for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant
to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special
Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet
1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence without pay and
allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his
separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future appointment
and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for
any entrance requirements to the PMA. 33
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the
recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the
Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting for reinstatement
by the PMA of his status as a cadet.34
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his plight in her Face book account. The
day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar
Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent, asking to
recognize the 8-1 voting of the HC.35 Copies of which were
furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other concerned military
officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review
Cadet lCL Cudia's case. The latter, in turn, referred the matter to
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal
letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff
ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of
Annavee demanding the intervention of the military leadership.
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1
was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia
by not talking to him and by separating him from all
activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that any violation shall
be a "Class 1" offense entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and
90 hours confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not given a copy of
the order and learned about it only from the media.36 According
to an alleged news report, PMA Spokesperson Major Agnes
Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize
Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of
confidentiality by putting documents in the social media, violation
of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and smearing
the name of the PMA.37
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for
additional time, until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on the
ground that his intended witnesses are in on-the-job training (
OJT).38 As additional evidence to support his appeal, he also
requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings,
relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video footages
and recordings of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the
services of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following:
(a) letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014;
(b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and ( c)
guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr.
(Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed Cadet lCL
Cudia that, pending approval of the latter's request for extension,
the CRAB would continue to review the case and submit its
recommendations based on whatever evidence and testimonies
received, and that it could not favorably consider his request for
copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages
and recordings of the HC hearings since it was neither the
appropriate nor the authorized body to take action
thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his request.40
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before
the CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the
HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human
rights of Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication.41
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for
additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and
submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff
General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for
immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act
on Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests.42
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab
Diwa Class, the following events transpired:
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief
Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the
CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal
of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez
stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests for extension of
time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time
already given, and to be furnished with a copy of relevant
documents because of confidentiality and presumption of
regularity of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO,
then filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal
Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was
issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation
Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers to
conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's
Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the inquiry was not just to
find out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but
also to investigate possible involvement of other cadets and
members of the command related to the incident and to establish
specific violation of policy or regulations that had been violated by
other cadets and members of the HC.49
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public
Attorney had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez. On March 14,
2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which
recommended the following:
a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect
and uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;
b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially
pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed
against him before the Honor Committee;
c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and
entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and
allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;
d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the
investigation of Cudia's Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting
with Pres. Aquino and Department of National Defense (DND)
Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that
they put in writing their appeal, requests, and other concerns.
According to respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia would not join the graduation but it was without prejudice
to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of
Staff. The President then tasked Gen. Bautista to handle the
reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez
supervising the group conducting the review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner 1. The Philippine Military Academy must set 3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K.
Renato S. Cudia received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty" verdict SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the
Office of the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being AFP
Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the CRAB' s null and void; to uphold and respect the "8-
denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It held: Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting result and make
3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in
favor of Cadet Cudia;
After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the
3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO,
action of the PMA CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation
JR.
is legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the 2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the
finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the punishment President in whose hands rest the ends of
imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to: 3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC.
appeal from the date he was informed of the final verdict on TARAYAO
January 21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee was
2.1 officially proclaim Cadet
read to him in person, until the time the PMA CRAB conducted its 3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P.
Cudia a graduate and alumnus of
review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
the Philippine Military Academy;
the Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the
Academy's policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no
violation of his right to due process considering that the 2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the 3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R.
procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB corresponding Diploma for the MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
was consistent with existing policy. Thus, the previous finding and degree of Bachelors of Science;
recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your son, and 3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN,
subject Cadet guilty of "Lying" and recommending his separation now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
from the Academy is sustained. 2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the
corresponding official transcript 3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your 'of his academic records for his ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
appeal for lack of merit.51 Thereafter, the Fact-Finding BS degree, without conditions
Board/Investigating Body issued its Final Investigation Report on therein as to his status as a PMA
March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cadet. 3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G.
appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
investigation board tasked to probe the case submitted its final 3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide
report to the President.53 Pursuant to the administrative appeals legal services to Cadet Cudia in pursuing 3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L.
process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, administrative, criminal and civil suits EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete against the officers and members of the
records of the case for purposes of DND review and Honor Committee named hereunder, for 3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A.
recommendation for disposition by the President.54 violation of the Honor Code and System and CUARTERON (recorder)
the Procedure in Formal Investigation,
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the
ballot, tampering the true result of the 3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A.
with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and
voting, perjury, intentional omission in the DE JESUS II (record)
recommending as follows:
Minutes of substantive part of the formal
trial proceedings which are prejudicial to 4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human
the interest of justice and Cadet Cudia's the PMA competent authorities should
Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
fundamental rights to dignity, non- investigate and file appropriate charges
VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA Honor
discrimination and due process, which led against Maj. VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for
Committee and .. certain PMA officials, specifically for violations
to the infringement of his right to education violation of the right to privacy of Cadet
of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due
and even transgressing his right to a good Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer,
process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good
life. to ensure the protection of the right to
life.
privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at
3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY the PMA Holding Center;
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to
MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
indorse to competent authorities for their immediate appropriate
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and
action on the following recommendations:
PMA competent authorities should
investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL
 HINDANG for his failure and ineptness to
exercise his responsibility as a competent
Tactical Officer and a good father of his
cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for
failure to respect exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to
immediately cause the comprehensive
review of all rules of procedures,
regulations, policies, including the so-called
practices in the implementation of the
Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new
policies, rules of procedures and relevant
regulations which are human-rights based
and consistent with the Constitution and
other applicable laws;
7. The Congress of the Philippines to
consider the enactment of a law defining
and penalizing ostracism and
discrimination, which is apparently being
practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense
in this jurisdiction;
8. His Excellency The President of the
Philippines to certify as priority, the passage
of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-
discrimination law; and
9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the
PMA authorities to ensure respect and
protection of the rights of those who
testified for the cause of justice and truth as
well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent
authorities on the foregoing CHR recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by
substituted service to the complainants (the spouses Renato and
Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents.
Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the
Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of the
Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the
findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which
was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014
and 26 March 2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the
decision of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor
Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the
decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet
Corps, this Office has found no substantial basis to disturb the
findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board
(CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support the claim that
the decision of the Honor Committee members was initially at 8
"Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone affidavit of an
officer, based on his purported conversation with one Honor
Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on the
deliberations of the said Committee and is hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on
Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudia's due
process rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly
preliminary in nature, such recommendations are anchored on a
finding that there was an 8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is
not supported by competent evidence.
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been
guided by the precept that military law is regarded to be in a class
of its own, "applicable only to military personnel because the
military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of
discipline separate from that of civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R.
No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d
184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this
Office regarded the findings of the AFP Chief, particularly his
conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the proceedings
that ensued, as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained
the findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR
COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET
FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER
DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents
regarding his case, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia
was deprived of his right to have access to evidence
which would have proven his defense, would have
totally belied the charge against him, and more
importantly, would have shown the irregularity in the
Honor Committee's hearing and rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely
informed of the decisions arrived at by the Honor
Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and
the Philippine Military Academy
C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia
nothing but a sham trial
D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy
violated their own rules and principles as embodied in
the Honor Code
E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy, in
deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia's case,
grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so
as to defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
unquestionable fact that the former should yield to the
latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR
COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY
VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION
INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND
RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the
petition, respondents presented the issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE
INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF
2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT
EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL
WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT
THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE
JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON
CADET CUDIA'S APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST
EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR
PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY
MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY
RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY
INTO THE PMA.
VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES
IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT
DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE
ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate
cadets despite the absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal
of a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by
providing untruthful statements in the explanation for his
tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the
findings of the Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were
properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor
Committee, by incorporating executive session/chambering, was
adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor
Committee. Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without
any pressure from the other voting members of the Honor
Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding
on the Honorable Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he
was dismissed from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition
praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be included in the list of graduating
cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises
was already rendered moot and academic when the graduation
ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16,
2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does not
lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could
not be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a
student to continue studying therein because it is merely a
privilege and not a right. In this case, there is a clear failure on
petitioners' part to establish that the PMA has the, ministerial
duty to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list, much less award him
with academic honors and commission him to the Philippine Navy.
Similar to the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its
discretionary power on who may be admitted to study pursuant
to its academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow
Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014 commencement
exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the
other reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia enunciated that a
respondent can be ordered to act in a particular manner when
there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that the certiorari
aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is within
the province of the Court to determine whether a branch of the
government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a
ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be
performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to
perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a
discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide
how or when to perform the duty.61
In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due
notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue a Writ of
Mandamus to:
1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of
graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA,
including inclusion in the yearbook;
 2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in
the commencement exercises if he completed all the
requirements for his baccalaureate degree;
3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the
academic honors he deserves, and the commission as a
new Philippine Navy ensign;
4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB
of the PMA all its records of the proceedings taken
against Cadet Cudia, including the video footage and
audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for
the purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct
intelligent review of the case of Cadet Cudia;
5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova
of all the records without requiring Cadet Cudia to
submit new evidence if it was physically impossible to
do so;
6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the
certification signed by Dr. Costales, the new evidence
consisting of the affidavit of a military officer declaring
under oath that the cadet who voted "not guilty"
revealed to this officer that this cadet was coerced into
changing his vote, and other new evidence if there is
any;
7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right
to a counsel who is allowed to participate actively in
the proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations
during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses
against him; and
8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of
the case by the CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a
representation of a counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:
A. xxx
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:
a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB
to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty -1 Not
Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB
to officially pronounce Cadet Cudia as Not
Guilty of the charge filed against him before
the Honor Committee;
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights
and entitlements as a full-fledged
graduating cadet, including his diploma and
awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in
the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him
to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was
rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies
pushed through on March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1 CL
Cudia in the roll of graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1
CL Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating
cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new
Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition
for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom, which We shall
discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that
these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the
right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the
Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant
awards, and commission officers in the military service are
discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP
Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of Garcia:
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be
pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of
Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of
petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this
case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot
be availed against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to
issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of
respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.67
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being
sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB
proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision
of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a
specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of
discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.68
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must
proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered
to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL
Cudia from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually
require the Court to make findings of fact because it sets forth
several factual disputes which include, among others: the
tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his ENG412 class and his
explanation thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the
investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings before
the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to
change his vote during the executive session/"chambering."
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy
presents legal issues. Rather than determining which between the
two conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly
centers on the application, appreciation, and interpretation of a
person's rights to due process, to education, and to property; the
interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and the
conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation constitutes
lying. Even if the instant case involves questions of fact,
petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed
questions of fact and law. Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.
On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law.69 The petition does not exclusively present factual matters
for the Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing
issue of more importance is the determination of whether a PMA
cadet has rights to due process, to education, and to property in
the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in
the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even
respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that We have
to resolve. In support of their contention that the Court must
exercise careful restraint and should refrain from unduly or
prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters, they argue
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished
certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into the PMA, and that
the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition
of disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and
consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside
from being purely legal being purely legal questions, are of first
impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a
categorical ruling.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over
the petition pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of
the full administrative process. While Cadet 1 CL Cudia underwent
the review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level -
the determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted according
to the established procedures of the Honor System, the
assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of the procedural and
legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA
Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the
guilty cadet, and the appellate review proceedings before the
CRAB - he still appealed to the President, who has the utmost
latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is contended
that the President's power over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.)
Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth
Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act''). As
such, the President could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In
respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the case is
pending resolution of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if
not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of
justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that
President Aquino effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts
to seek reconsideration of the HC recommendation from the APP
officials and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances
prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which
was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL
Cudia's family the night before, foreclose the possibility that the
challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case,
petitioners insist that the· rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and
Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is that "courts, for reasons of law,
comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and
the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter
complained of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to
act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United
States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held
that in a typical case involving a decision by military authorities,
the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before
appealing to the court, the doctrine being designed both to
preserve the balance between military and civilian authorities and
to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction,
a party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the
following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the
dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a
ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the
fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11,
2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which
sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the
occurrence of this supervening event bars any objection to the
petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Court's interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger
v. Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial
intervention would pose substantial threat to military discipline
and that there should be a deferential review of military statutes
and regulations since political branches have particular expertise
and competence in assessing military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v.
Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the
U.S. Supreme Court that the military constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the
military recognizes that constitutional rights may apply differently
in the military context than in civilian society as a whole. Such
military deference is exercised either by refusing to apply due
process and equal protection doctrines in military cases or
applying them but with leniency.
In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power
of judicial review in cases attended with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations
call for the widest latitude of deference to military affairs. Such
respect is exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved
entail a substantial consideration of legitimate governmental
interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to
prosper will set an institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a
Pandora's box of other challenges against the specialized system
of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's mandate
to train cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its
disciplinary rules and procedure necessarily must impose h
different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of
the State's check-and-balance machinery, specifically mandated
by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of
the government or any of its officials acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of, discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial non-interference in
military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They
cite Schlesinger and Parker, which were invoked by respondents,
as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals
on account of issues posed concerning due process and violations
of constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this
Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial
power to determine whether the APP and the members of the
court martial acted with grave abuse o.f discretion in their military
investigation.
Petitioners' contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the
government, not the courts, with superintendence and control
over the military because the courts generally lack the
competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military
decisions and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon
discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority
might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that
the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases cited by
respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v.
Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who were separated
from the United States Military Academy due to Honor Code
violations. Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v.
Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the power of the district courts
to review procedures used at the service academies in the
separation or dismissal of cadets and midshipmen. While it
recognized the "constitutional permissibility of the military to set
and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics,"
it said that the courts "have expanded at an accelerated pace the
scope of judicial access for review of military determinations."
Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it has been well
settled that federal courts have jurisdiction "where there is a
substantial claim that prescribed military procedures violates
one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually
made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) by expressly providing, among others; for a direct review
by the U.S. Supreme Court of decisions by the military's highest
appellate authority.89
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is
still formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only
"to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.91
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes
of the Due Process Clause, be considered a governmental activity.
As ruled in Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the
separation process at the Academy has been sufficiently
formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that
committee's activities within the definition of governmental
activity for the purposes of our review. While the Academy has
long had the informal practice of referring all alleged violations to
the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that
committee and the separation process has to a degree been
formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or
informal, the Honor Committee under its own procedures
provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the
matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts a cadet with the hard
choice of either resigning or electing to go before a Board of
Officers. An adverse finding there results not only in formal
separation from the Academy but also in a damaging record that
will follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude that
the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is
clearly part of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately be
adjudged to have violated the Cadet Honor Code and be
separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the
committee's procedures and determinations on the separation
process is sufficiently intertwined with the formal governmental
activity which may follow as to bring it properly under judicial
review92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the
present Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military.93 Consistent with the republican system of checks and
balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary
implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining,
in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or
executive action.94
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a
cadet is not the same as that of a civilian because the former' s
rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the military
purpose and necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col.
Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree,
individual rights of persons in the military service may be curtailed
by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its
effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be discharged
under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student
aspiring to a commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia voluntarily gave up certain civil and political rights which
the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The deliberate surrender
of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets' Honor
Code Handbook. It is noted that at the beginning of their
academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, along with the rest of
Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the Honor
Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human
rights, including the right to due process, is, for petitioners,
contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by
E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the
Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism, and,
in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB,
and the PMA, grossly and in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code
and the Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case
considering that these should not be implemented at the expense
of human rights, due process, and fair play. Further, under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can never overpower
or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the
latter. Petitioners stress that the statement that "a cadet can be
compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for
the Code and System to be implemented" simply pertains to what
cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or
women of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices
and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the
context of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a
surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to the
cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to
subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the
educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater
degree than a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA expresses
that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society
which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is
good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the
Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and
liberties for the good of the group."100
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian,
which were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal
from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally
protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence,
disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of
procedural due process is a must.101 For that reason, the PMA is
not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements
of the due process clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet
faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of
college instruction which he or she has pursued with a view to
becoming a career officer and of probably
being forever denied that career.103
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do
not specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a
military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court
denied the petition that sought to annul the directive from then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners
from testifying before the Congress without her consent. We
ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for
their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the
other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction
imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest"
(particularly, that he may not issue any press statements or give
any press conference during the period of his detention) are
justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two
cases, the constitutional rights to information, transparency in
matters of public concern, and to free speech - not to due process
clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military
purpose. Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding
by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the
dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code
violation is not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor Code
and Honor System are "gentleman's agreement" that cannot take
precedence over public interest - in the defense of the nation and
in view of the taxpayer's money spent for each cadet. Petitioners
contend that, based on the Civil Code, all written or verbal
agreements are null and void if they violate the law, good morals,
good customs, public policy, and public safety.
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose
disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and
consistent with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without
express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed
reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law
grants to the President the authority of terminating a cadet's
appointment, such power may be delegated to the PMA
Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control
over the cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution,
the PMA has the inherent right to promulgate reasonable norms,
rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the
maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically mandated
by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the
premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance
with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and
59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292
("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that
enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,108 it was held that concomitant with such
freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon
its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help
College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and,
conversely, to expel) given the high degree of discipline and honor
expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly
assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC' s decision to recommend
his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and
studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or should have been
fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets
and the corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these
standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr.
and Ateneo, academic freedom is not absolute and cannot be
exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the
1987 Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to
choose what to teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the same
does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to graduate
when there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since,
in such a case, the right to graduate becomes a vested right which
takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of the
educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of
respondents are more in line with the facts of this case. We have
ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in nature.
Once admitted, a student's enrolment is not only semestral in
duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to
complete it.111 An institution of learning has an obligation to
afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued with public interest
because of the high priority given by the Constitution to education
and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers
over a educational institutions.113
The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal.
"[It] has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights
and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with
education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or
a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by
the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules
and regulations."114
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of
universities and institutions of higher learning,115 has been
enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In
Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of
a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who
may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and
(4) who may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution
has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed
expedient for its government, this being incident to the very
object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful
management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside
coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public
welfare which would call for some restraint.120 Indeed, "academic
freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a
privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly.
An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every 'person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."'121
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is
subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the establishment
of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A
school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as
the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power
assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard,
the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose
disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or
expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam
College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this Court
elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once
apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A
school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an
educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary
for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the
creation of an educational environment conducive to learning.
Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student
discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of
learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis
in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only
has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The
Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral
character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative
thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and
promote vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for
the school to carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow
and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy
citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline
more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school
has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that
it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as
well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension
and the withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends
even after graduation for any act done by the student prior
thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals,127 We upheld the university's withdrawal of a doctorate
degree already conferred on a student who was found to have
committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more
precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in
Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly
extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction
was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke
or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation"
of a student, .as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the
"graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy
that the investigation of private respondent's case began before
her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies
on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations
conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should
not have been allowed to graduate.
Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of
higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom,
to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly
manner or in a grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest
governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the
power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the
University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is
founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also
empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to
withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights.
An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it
discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not
rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than
bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an
individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit.
The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It
should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures
to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to
pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is
also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process
has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not
jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely
to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to
inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development,
or flowering if you will, of the total man.129 Essentially, education
must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and
reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to education," students
have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the
school.131 Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements.132 The PMA is not different. As the
primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly
has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of
its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and
the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and
moral principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior
and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is
the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of
honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is
absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the
Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called "Long
Gray Line."
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the
cadets' character development. It defines the desirable values
they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the
atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and it
makes them professional military soldiers.133 As it is for character
building, it should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It
is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying
it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary
means of achieving the cadets' character development and as
ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are
deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards
of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that
graduates have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and
moral standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the
Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized as
"correctional and educational in nature rather than being
legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be
prepared to accept full responsibility for all that they do or fail to
do and to place loyalty to the service above self-interest or loyalty
to friends or associates. "137 Procedural safeguards in a student
disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more
appropriate in determining the minimum standards for the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions.
Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded due process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and
the PMA fell short in observing the important safeguards laid
down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which
set the minimum standards to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. For them,
Guzman did not entirely do away with the due process
requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely stated
that the minimum requirements in the Guzman case are more
apropos.
Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the
issue as it held that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman
essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter
case is more apropos since it specifically deals with the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the
procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed
by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan
De Letran.142
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right
to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; ( 4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may be
summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential part of the
investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in a
student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is
neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."147
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum
standards of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass
the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process,
the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to
advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot
be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process - it is enough that the parties are given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a
fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean
presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be
heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance should,
process.150 therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and
efficiency.154 Considering that the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one
of first impression in the sense that this Court has not previously
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative
dealt with the particular issue of a dismissed cadet's right to due
proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet's honor violation
process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for
need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It
some guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been patterned
articulates that – The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in
after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code produced a salutary
identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested
effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence,
in legal precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who
pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and
hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these
practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this
precedents for loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are
jurisdiction.
not to interpret the system to their own advantage.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize
"due process" is a flexible concept, requiring consideration in each
Honor in a substantive way. Technical and procedural misgivings
case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural
of the legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting the
protections as the particular situation demands.156 Hagopian
Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can be used to make
opined:
unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters especially when
a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and
liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By In approaching the question of what process is due before
virtue of being a cadet, a member of the CCAFP becomes a governmental action adversely affecting private interests may
subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are bound properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a
by the existing norms that are logically applied through the Code rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly
and System in order to realize the Academy's mission to produce to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept
leaders of character - men of integrity and honor.151 which depends upon the balancing of various factors, including
the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the
extent to which the proceeding is adversarial in character, the
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also
severity and consequences of any action that might be taken, the
states:
burden that would be imposed by requiring use of all or part of
the full panoply of trial-type procedures, and the existence of
2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the other overriding interests, such as the necessity for prompt action
state's Justice System but it does not demean its Spirit by in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must
reducing the Code to a systematic list of externally observed rules. therefore be considered in each case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise through legalism
and its technicalities, the objective of building the character of the
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the
cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law penalizes only
minimum standards of due process required in the dismissal of a
the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine both the action
cadet. Thus:
and the intention.152
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion
individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily but must observe due
towards undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the
process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent
military academy. It has been said that the mission of the military
in the concept of due process of law precludes the dogmatic
is unique in the sense that its primary business is to fight or be
application of specific rules developed in one context to entirely
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-
distinct forms of government action. "For, though 'due process of
proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers
law' generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular
less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some
and complex due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity,
settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not
practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several
universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case what
days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with
procedures due process requires, the court must carefully
legal and procedural' points, and legal motions and evidentiary
determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected
objections that are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt,
and of the government interest involved, taking account of history
delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make them
and the precise circumstances surrounding the case at hand.
unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be tolerated since it is
unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy,
While the government must always have a legitimate concern
with the subject matter before it may validly affect private
interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of government
concern such as national security and military affairs, the private
interest must yield to a greater degree to the governmental. x x x
Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the discretion of
the appropriate government officials than the selection, training,
discipline and dismissal of the future officers of the military and
Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale
in these young men who will be required to bear weighty
responsibility in the face of adversity -- at times extreme -- is a
matter of substantial national importance scarcely within the
competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that
because of these factors historically the military has been
permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary procedures
than the civilian authorities.
We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the
dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant Marine Academy that he
be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges
against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the
parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are
plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges against
him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to present his
defense both from the point of view of time and the use of
witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest, however, that
the Cadet must be given this opportunity both when demerits are
awarded and when dismissal is considered. The hearing may be
procedurally informal and need not be adversarial.158 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and
Hagopian are equally controlling in cases where cadets were
separated from the military academy for violation of the Honor
Code. Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in order
to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet
who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy
must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges
against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his
or her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of
witnesses and other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital
conditions are not too far from what We have already set in
Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine School
of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals.161
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code
violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices
in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj.
Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted
a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to
the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for
formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the
hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed
of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He
had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against
him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have
violated the ' Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the
OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to
the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ
to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to
conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the
opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had
issued unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and
expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling
under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of
administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not
finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by
evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the
procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet
1 CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule.
The grounds therefor are discussed below seriatim:
As to the right to be represented by a counsel –
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1
CL Cudia the right to be represented by a counsel who could
actively participate in the proceedings like in the cross-
examination of the witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC,
if remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to be
represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an
observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163 According to them, he was not
sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not
even asked if he would like to have one. He was only properly
represented when it was already nearing graduation day after his
family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners assert that
Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right
to answer the charges against him or her with the assistance of
counsel, if desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and
Nera v. The Auditor General165 in asserting that the right to a
counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations or non-
criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet lCL Cudia's academic
standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully
understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the
confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his right to
be represented by a counsel. In any event, respondents claim that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel's
advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed
the right to have his counsel not just in assisting him in the
preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and the
CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings. The Court
disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987
Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer,
while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil
Service Commission,166 the Court held that "a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel." Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with
counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a
function of all of the other aspects of the hearing. Where the
proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is
investigative and not adversarial and the government does not
proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is
mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x
should enable him to develop the facts adequately through
available sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing
taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require
representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right
to representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in
military academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is
principally motivated by the policy of "treading lightly on the
military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and
authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs
within the broad confines of constitutional due process" and the
courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in
nature and should be kept informal, and that literate and
educated cadets should be able to defend themselves.169 In
Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of informality in the
proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be
accorded the right to representation by counsel before the
Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks
the training and education needed to understand his rights and
express himself, the cadet should be capable of doing so.170 In the
subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was not
access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of
oneself, examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections,
and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the case, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by
the argument that an individual of a midshipman's presumed
intelligence, selected because he is expected to be able to care for
himself and others, often under difficult circumstances, and who
has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was
deprived of due process by being required to present his defense
in person at an investigatory hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was given the option or was able to seek
legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable
that he was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when
the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement
of due process is already satisfied since, at the very least, the
counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal
Memorandum and even acted as an observer who had no right to
actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the
cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts
that the offense committed by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in
nature; that the hearings before the HC and the CRAB were
investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet lCL Cudia's
excellent-academic standing puts him in the best position to look
after his own vested interest in the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March
11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL Cudia's request for documents, footages,
and recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence
negating the regularity of the HC trial and supporting his defense
have been surely overlooked by the CRAB in its case review.
Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be
unearthed from the video and other records of the HC
investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but they
refused to present them for the parties and the Court to peruse.
In particular, they note that the Minutes of the HC dated January
21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report dated January
20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to
petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no way to confirm the
truth of the alleged statements therein. In their view, failure to
furnish these documents could only mean that it would be
adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court.172
For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records,
petitioners contend that it is the ministerial duty of the HC to
submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the
case, all its records of the proceedings, including video footages of
the deliberations and voting. They likewise argue that PMA' s
refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1 CL Cudia under
the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the
Honor Code, which merely provides: "A cadet who becomes part
of any investigation is subject to the existing regulations
pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to
the creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without proper
guidance from those with authority" (IV. The Honor System,
Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision, they say, does
not deprive Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies and
examine relevant documents pertaining to his case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents,
footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings are
favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and, consequently, to rule
that respondents' refusal to produce and have them examined is
tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due process.
They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any
documents, witness testimony, or oral or written presentation of
facts submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL
Cudia's defense. The Court may require that an administrative
record be supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong
showing or bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of the
agency,"173 both of which are not present here. Petitioners have
not specifically indicated the nature of the concealed evidence, if
any, and the reason for withholding it. What they did was simply
supposing that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty verdict would be
overturned with the production and examination of such
documents, footages, and recordings. As will be further shown in
the discussions below, the requested matters, even if denied,
would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's predicament. If at all, such
denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously
prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA –
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and
evidence because Special Order No. 1 issued on February 21,
2014, which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him
without any opportunity, to secure statements of his own
witnesses. He could not have access to or approach the cadets
who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting
result. It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the Honor Code
unequivocally announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing
the cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will
not have to resort to other humiliating means and shall only have
the option to make known among its alumni the names of those
who have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor
Code."
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the
petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy of the alleged
Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is
improper and misplaced because of petitioners' admission that
ostracism has been absolutely dismissed as an Academy-
sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in International
Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum.
Assuming that said Order was issued, respondents contend that it
purely originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of
which was to give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring
that they did not tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's honor violation and
breach of confindentiality of the HC proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable
and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was ostracized by his fellow
cadets. They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was
already transferred to the Holding Center. The practice of billeting
an accused cadet at the Holding Center is provided for in the
Honor Code Handbook. Although within the PMA compound, the
Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any
business to conduct therein. The cadets could not also ostracize
him during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted to take his
meals at the Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when
Special Order No. 1 was issued clearly foreclose the possibility
that he was ostracized in common areas accessible to other
cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014
when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests
were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.
However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from
ostracism in the PMA. The practice was somehow recognized by
respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA
Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report. The CHR likewise
confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For
them, it does not matter where the ostracism order originated
from because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came
from the cadets themselves. There was a tacit approval of an
illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for ostracism would
have been charged by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not choose to take his meals at the Holding
Center as he was not allowed to leave the place. Petitioners opine
that placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is
inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence and certainly
gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-
inintervention attached a full text copy or even a pertinent
portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the
ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and
contents are of doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the
matter can never be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an
admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that, upon
consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet
Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order against
Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While not something new in a military
academy,175 ostracism's continued existence in the modem times
should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue
that the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the loss of private
interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may
render illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body
once found guilty by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind,
ostracism practically denies the accused cadet's protected rights
to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be
presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper
proceeding.
As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court
upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook
provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of
violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or she
may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event,
the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG
Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of "Boarders
Ward" is to quarter those cadets who are undergoing separation
actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered ,
therein until final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was
opined that the segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper
exercise of the discretionary authority of Academy officials. It
relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to decisions
made by Army authorities, 'orderly government requires us to
tread lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for
the power and authority of the military establishment to govern
its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due
process.'" Also, in Birdwell v. Schlesinger,178 the "administrative
segregation" was held to be a reasonable exercise of military
discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the rights to
freedom of speech and freedom of association.
Late and vague decisions –
It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the
charge against him and the decisions arrived at by the HC, the
CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him,
and if any, the information was unjustly belated and the
justifications for the decisions were vague. He had to constantly
seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what he was Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of
confronted with. C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has
the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause.
The law gives no authority to the HC as the sole body to
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict,
determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not
Cadet 1 CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor,
empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis
but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he
for recommending the cadet's dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1 CL
would still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez
Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC's finding
informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their
of guilt in terminating his military service.
recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters
sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he received no
decision/recommendation on his case, verbally or in writing. The Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review
PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written de nova of all records without requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia to
decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from submit new evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so.
the Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously In their minds, respondents cannot claim that the CRAB and the
delayed when the Cudia family received the same only on March PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation and heard
20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with specificity the Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from the
factual and legal bases used by the CRAB and even by the Office Office of the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated March
of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings and recommendations
and the PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1 CL of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed by
Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the the subject Cadet." However, the Final Investigation Report of the
CRAB, whether the same is substantial, and whether the new CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a
evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account. report was submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on March
10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12, 2014 that it was
designated as a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice
unusual that the CRAB would do the same things twice. This
of orally declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a written
raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never
document so as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and
undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came
guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings pursuant to the
out with its report, and the Final Investigation Report was drafted
Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of the report of the
merely as an afterthought when the lack of written decision was
CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL
pointed out by petitioners so as to remedy the apparent lack of
Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence,
due process during the CRAB investigation and review.
were the ones who were given a copy thereof.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a
Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a
proper assessment of the procedural and legal correctness of the
constitutional mandate stating that "[no] decision shall be
guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that the higher
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,"179 such
HC, noting that there was also a separate investigation conducted
provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case. Neither
by the HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise,
Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a
contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued
decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and
with the review of the case despite the absence of necessary
Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on the matter.
documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and
Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a
even conducted another investigation by constituting the Fact-
point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by
Finding Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners
the parties are necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished
failed to discharge the burden of proof in showing bad faith on
to him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed of how it was decided,
the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
and considering further that petitioners' allegations are merely
the conclusions of the reviewing body, assuring that it went
self-serving and baseless, good faith on the part of the PMA' s
through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not left in the
higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.
dark as to how it was reached and he knows exactly the reasons
why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.
We agree with respondents.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a
limited role of investigating and determining whether or not the
alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is
given the responsibility of administering the Honor Code and, in
case of breach, its task is entirely investigative, examining in the
first instance a suspected violation. As a means of encouraging
self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final
adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the function of
identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners'
assertion, the HC does not have the authority to order the
separation of a cadet from the Academy. The results of its
proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no binding
effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an indictment, an
allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-CRAB
investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined that due
process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor Committee
level because it is only a "charging body whose decisions had no
effect other than to initiate de nova proceedings before a Board
of Officers."184
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due
process clause and that irregularities in its proceedings were in
fact committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not
required that procedural due process be afforded at every stage
of developing disciplinary action. What is required is that an
adequate hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a
cadet from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets, and the
PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the
directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was
conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating
Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior
officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of
the case. The Board/Body actually held hearings on March 12, 13,
14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it
"unusual" that the CRAB would do the same things twice and
suspect that it never undertook an in-depth investigation/review
the first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere
conjecture that deserves scant consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a
sham. The people behind Cadet ICL Cudia's charge, investigation,
and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to
deceive and who took advantage of the situation. Cadet 1 CL
Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the second in
rank to Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of the
team which conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet I
CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia
with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving
with and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving
solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack
of merit. Even if he was a non-voting member, he was in a
position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic
exercise for Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the procedure for the standing, the separation militates against PMA' s mission to
removal of HC members.186 produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing The Court differs with petitioners.
was given to Cadet I CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO counsel.
During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent
intervenor was advised to convince his son to resign and
some showing of actual bias, petitioners' allegations do not hold
immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later
water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is
became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee:
speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the
"Your brother, he lied!" The CRAB conferences were merely used
challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome
to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never really intended to
hear his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
clear resolve to dismiss him no matter what.
adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal
of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring
For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual
Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice
discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he "paved
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
the road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor
implemented.187
Committee" is an unfounded accusation. They note that when
Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he revoked
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits
the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all
are to be awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but an
revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the review of the
educator who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom
STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the
he counsels from time to time as a future leader.188 When the
established procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang
occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned as to the accuracy
was prompted to investigate the circumstances surrounding
or completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or issue
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith
may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1 CL
cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to
Cudia concerning his being late in class is proper, since there is
the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1 CL
evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred
Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their next class.
and there is reasonable cause to believe that he was involved in
Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being
the breach of regulations.189
late and effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness
to Dr. Costales.
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in rely on the non-toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., "We do
bad faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for not tolerate those who violate the Code." Cadets are reminded
reasons of his own" because the former previously reported the that they are charged with a tremendous duty far more superior
latter for an honor violation in November 2013, respondents to their personal feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help
argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is others by guiding them to accept the truth and do what is right,
rather than tolerating actions against truth and
failure to note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting member of
the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically
honor violation since he is the HC Chairman and nothing less is honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the
expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or
of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did,
is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation.
representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia believed that there was Note that even the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook
bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the recognizes that interpretation of one's honor is generally
removal of HC members provided for in the Honor Code subjective.193
Handbook.
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL'
Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive
grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no
on the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia from
matter what, the latter's downfall, their nefarious conduct would
graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything
still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the preliminary
and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim
that the proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce
because the three personalities participated therein is
tantamount to implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting
the competence, independence, and integrity of the other
members who constituted the majority. Again, in the absence of
specifics and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give
credence to this baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative
hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia because two voting rounds
took place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL
Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a room without the
cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura,
was asked to explain his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to change his
vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia
guilty. The original ballot was discarded and replaced. There was
no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was
mentioned in the HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March
6, 2014 was submitted by petitioners since he purportedly
recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to
change his "not guilty" vote after the voting members were
"chambered." In the sworn statement, Commander Tabuada said:
1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor
violation, I [cannot] remember exactly the date but
sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of January
2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the renewal
of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had
business with my staff;
2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags,
halika muna dito," and he approached me and I let him
sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told and
asked him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang
nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied,
"Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir", and I
asked him, "Oh, bakit naging guilty di ha pag may isang
nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied "Chinamber
ako sir, bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote
ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya binago ko, sir." So, I
told him, "Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa naman"
and he replied "oo nga sir". After that conversation, I
let him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it
committed voting manipulation since, under the rules, it is
required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused
cadet guilty. There is nothing in the procedure that permits the
HC Chairman to order the "chambering" of a member who voted
contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to reconsider in
order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from
the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning the HC procedure
or approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31
of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own
rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear
deviation from the established procedures, the second
deliberation should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous
vote involves a substantive right which cannot be
unceremoniously changed without a corresponding
amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook. In their view, "chambering" totally defeats the
purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very
essence and philosophy behind the provisions of the Honor
System, which is to ensure that the voting member is free to vote
what is in his or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure
or persuade another to change his or her vote. They suggest that
if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is obviously
guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from
the HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in the
Honor Code.195 Anent the above arguments, respondents contend
that a distinction must be made between the concepts of the
Honor Code and the Honor System. According to them, the
former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum ethical and moral
behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of rules for
the conduct of the observance and implementation of the· Honor
Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as may be
warranted by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be
more responsive to the moral training and character development
of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines when the Honor
System can be used to supplement regulations. This being so, the
voting process is continuously subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty
verdict automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor
violation. The voting members only write either "guilty" or "not
guilty" in the voting sheets without stating their name or their
justification. However, this situation drew criticisms since there
were instances where a reported cadet already admitted his
honor violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a
sympathetic voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing
practice that should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would
automatically sanction a jury type of discussion called "executive
session" or "chambering," which is intended to elicit the
explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This prevents
the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over
the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been
adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa Class of
2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of
conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by the fact that
such practice was in place and applied to all cases of honor
violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote
rests solely on the personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without
any compulsion from the other voting members. There can also
be no pressuring to change one's vote to speak of since a vote
may only be considered as final when the Presiding Officer has
affixed his signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise
the argument that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral
testimony made under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an
affidavit explaining that:
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the
Department of Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is possible not
to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our
baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I
was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN,
our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention.
I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano
ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because
of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He
again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko
naman na bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not
guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna
kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga
nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila
Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung
boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied: "Sayang si Cudia
ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman
at matalino."196
Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit
executed on March 12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR
wherein he attested to the following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor
Committee for Honor Code violation committed by
Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member, we are
the one who assess or investigate the case whether
the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT
GUILTY" among the nine (9) voting members of the
Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that
after the proceedings and before the presiding Officer
told the members to vote, I was confused of the case
of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the
investigation to make my decision but for me it is not
yet enough to give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I
decided to vote "NOT GUILTY" with a reservation in my
mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if we
will arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote
if I may be enlightened with the other's justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer
told us that the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty.
By way of practice and as I predicted, we were told to
go inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to
discuss our respective justifications. I have been a
member for two (2) years and the voting committee
will always go for executive meeting whenever it will
meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I
saw things that enlightened my confusions that time. I
gave a thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet of
voting paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT
GUILTY" to "GUILTY" and the voting members of the
Honor Committee came up with the final vote of nine
(9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told
that the verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all
persons inside the courtroom went back to barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was
approached by Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and
said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I answered:
"Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo." They
also asked who were inside the Chamber and I
mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was
the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to
me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went
to the Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic)
permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty
for the reason that I will be attending our baseball
game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty
and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR
JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head Department Naval
Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him
and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga
ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer
because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee
proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin,
atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then
I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung}
Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa
Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung]
mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit
ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not
Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?"
And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa
naman at matalino. "197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that
Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made to explain in
the presence of other HC members, who were in disagreement
with him, gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or pressure.
For them, the records of the HC proceedings, which were not
presented assuming they actually exist, could have been the best
way to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject the
opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision. Also, it was
pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his
affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and
what made him change his mind. His use of general statements
like he "was confused of the case " and "saw things that
enlightened my confusions " could hardly suffice to establish why
he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of
·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was the
only one who was given another ballot sheet while in the
chamber and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he
only submitted the following day. However, as the CHR found, the
announcement of the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC
came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1 CL Lagura
submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code
tersely provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding
member of the Board will call for the members to vote whether
the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes)
of GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of violating the
Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC
practice of conducting "executive session" or "chambering" is not
at all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures
in' actual cases taking into account the exigency of the times.
What is important is that, in the end, there must be a unanimous
nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor
Code.
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written
procedure,199 We still rule that there is nothing inherently wrong
with the practice of "chambering" considering that the presence
of intimidation or force cannot automatically be inferred
therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the freedom to
vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the voting
member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final
voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL Mogol before
the CRAB:
13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and
insights regarding the case at hand. The other members, on the
other hand, would be given the chance to explain their votes as
well as their insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to
change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely on his
personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change
his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded
respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed.
Mere allegation is definitely not evidence.1âwphi1 It must be
substantiated and proved because a person is presumed to be
innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has been
regularly performed.201
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should
settle the issue. Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
and the CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by the
other voting members of the HC. His representation must be
accepted as it is regardless of whether he has satisfactorily
elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who was
"chambered," he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of
doubt, We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura
observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet
must be his or her own Final' Authority in honor; that he or she
should not let other cadets dictate on him or her their sense of
honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any person can have
confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair
and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words and ways are
sincere and true.203
As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not
putting on record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's
bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks,
the Court shall no longer dwell on the same for being harmless
procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of the
HC proceedings.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to
them, there is no clear time reference as to when was the actual
dismissal or what was the exact time of dismissal - whether it
should be the dismissal inside the room or the dismissal after the
section grade was given by Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1
CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting
members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of
dismissal was usually five minutes before the class was set to end
and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was
not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia perverted the truth by stating that OR432
class ended at 1500H, he did not state what was the true time of
dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was relying on
was 5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask
Dr. Costales a query such that his business was already finished as
soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business was
initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia must stay and
wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he was no longer
in control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr. Costales
never categorically stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She
recognized the confusion. Her text messages to him clarified his
alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its investigation that
she could not exactly recall what happened in her class on
November 14, 2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents
stated that ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet
1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his
Delinquency Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-
1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m.
Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m.
Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners
were of the view that what appears to have caused confusion in
the minds of respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the
entire incident was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is
malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely
used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam
Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue that "dismiss" means to
permit or cause to leave, while "class" refers to a body of students
meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them,
these two words do not have definite and precise meanings but
are generic terms. Other than the words "class" and "dismiss"
used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may actually be used in their
generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said.
Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is contrary, it was them who wanted to meet with the instructor.
not false or not true. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's explanation, his subsequent class,
ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In
the informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of
For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently
the HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started
truthful and with no intent to deceive or mislead. He did not
as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier.
manipulate any fact and was truthful of his explanation. His ..
Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412 also
statements were clear and unambiguous but were given a
testified that their class started as scheduled (3 :05 in the
narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code
afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204
acknowledges that "[e]xperience demonstrates that human
communication is imperfect at best, and some actions are often
misinterpreted." Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia had no intention to mislead or deceive but merely used
wrong and unfitting words in his explanations. For them,
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of
considering his academic standing, it is highly improbable that he
records reflects not only his outstanding academic performance
used incorrect language to justify his mistake. Respondents'
but proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the
arguments are tenable.
Academy. He has above-average grades in Conduct, with grades
ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is,
therefore, far from the truth. The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue
of fact. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier
of facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to
to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in
proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule
the military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling
that factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily
a simple truth. He lied by making untruthful statements in his
accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown
written explanation. Respondents want Us to consider the
in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings
following:
of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported
by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable
investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is dismissed as long errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion,
as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to the
lesson examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they core issue of whether lying is present in this case, all investigating
have answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL
his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, "We had Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first
bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some
to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx" Clearly, at the time Cadet
points.
Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered dismissed.
Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the
afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late." As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed
Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states: "We, the Cadets, do not
lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do. "
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading
to his tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to
leave and attend his next class. However, he initiated a The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets
conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He was not violate the Honor Code by lying if they make an oral or written
under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her statement which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful
class. information with the intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is expected
that every cadet's word is accepted without challenge on its
truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and that the
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding
cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even
Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her statements in
though the answer may result in punitive action under the CCPB
her written explanation. She explained that the "instruction to
and CCAFPR.206
wait" is a response to Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not
her initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr.
Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified that: "I came directly from OR432 Class.
We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir." Subsequently,
in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj.
Leander, he reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances,
our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which
is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I
went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the
Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling"
has been defined in one U.S. case as follows:
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his
listener by cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant facts,
or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the
intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is an
intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here,
instead of directly and completely telling the cause of his being
late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose
to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have
committed an honor violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code,
but intent to commit or omit the act itself.209
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer
unequivocally are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing
the honorable thing.210
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof,
but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore, can
only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and
circumstances generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent
to deceive is manifested from the very act of capitalizing on the
use of the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the matter is
that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an
educational institution, does not correspond to what Cadet 1 CL
Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not
generic and have definite and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda,
Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a "class." The Court
cannot agree that such term includes "every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students." Clearly, it does
not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
should have been accurate by pinpointing who were with him
when he was late in the next class. His deceptive explanation is
made more obvious when compared with what Cadets 1 CL
Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was:
"We approached our instructor after our class."212
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on
November 14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead of the
scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales,
who stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia, consistently
admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating
Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when he passed
his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also
declared that she merely responded to his request to see the
results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on the phrases
"under my instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used in his letter
of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested her
view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring
about his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE
paper is not part of the class time because the consultation, being
cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section grade,
still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a responsible
cadet who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say,
that is, to politely decline the invitation and immediately go to the
next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot
be said that he already lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose
words which led to confusion in the minds of respondents and
eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a
matter of semantics and a product of plain and simple inaccuracy.
There is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful
explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia ..
While his Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his
outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in
subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it
does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense
charged. It is enough to say that "evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did or did not do the same or similar thing at another
time."216 While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or
habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific
intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific
Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants
separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the
Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR),
a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1)
delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet's
dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise
clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1
CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that the Honor Code
does not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There
is no difference between a little lie and a huge falsehood.
Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been
considered as an absolute yardstick against which cadets have
measured themselves ever since the PMA began and that the
Honor Code and System seek to assure that only those who are
able to meet the high standards of integrity and honor are
produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally
permissible for the military "to set and enforce uncommonly high
standards of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor
Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the
PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet
breached the Honor Code, the offense warrants his or her
dismissal since such a policy may be the only means to maintain
and uphold the spirit of integrity in the military.217 They maintain
though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case there is no need to
distinguish between a "little lie" and a "huge falsehood" since he
did not lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue
advantage, the penalty imposed on him is considered as unjust
and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the
penalty of dismissal is not commensurate to the fact that he is a
graduating cadet with honors and what he allegedly committed
does not amount to an academic deficiency or an intentional and
flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and regulations.
Citing Non, petitioners argue that the penalty imposed must be
proportionate to the offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely
applicable to the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived
of his right to education, the only means by which he may have a
secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact
lied and his acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants
the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually
no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set
forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he
entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it
is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not
in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the district
court, thus:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a
finding that he has violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets
even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of a
Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the
part of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and
tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an
unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit
severe method of preventing men who have suffered ethical
lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of
admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be
more compassionate --or even more effective in achieving the
intended result --is quite immaterial to the question of whether
the harsher penalty violates due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's
recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional body
mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights, and to
conduct investigative monitoring of economic, social, and cultural
rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of society. Further, it was
contended that the results of CHR's investigation and
recommendations are so persuasive that this Court, on several
occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment &
Natural Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on
Elections,222 gave its findings serious consideration. It is not,
therefore, too late for the Court to hear what an independent and
unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission
on Human Rights223 ruled that the CHR is merely a
recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive at a
conclusive determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are
merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court.
The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only
to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.224 As held in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of subsequent
cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice
or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to adjudicate
claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The
power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is
not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x to subject to
an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose
of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn,
obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace
or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge
or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy x x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise
of judicial authority.1âwphi1 To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. xx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment. "226
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages in accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of
the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA
did not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliche though it may
sound, being a PMA graduate is not the "be-all and end-all" of his
existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to
pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the
stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by
respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the
enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides
under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among
others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets.227 If the positions open does
not appeal to his interest for being way below the rank he could
have achieved as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still
practice other equally noble profession or calling that is best
suited to his credentials, competence, and potential. Definitely,
nobody can deprive him of that choice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First
Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military Academy is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
APRIL 18, 2018
G.R. No. 211273
RAYMOND A. SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, and WILFREDO E.
POLLARCO, Petitioners
vs
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, DR.
CLARITA CARILLO, DR. CYTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO ALAURIN,
and the COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN FACULTY COUNCIL,
Respondents
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the
September 27, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 128666 setting aside the August 10, 2011
Decision3 and October 30, 2012 Decision4 and January 22, 2013
Resolution5 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC LAC Case No. 04-001131-11 and reinstating the March 26,
2012 Decision6 of the NLRC, as well as the CA's January 29, 2014
Resolution7 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.8
Factual Antecedents
Respondent University of Santo Tomas (UST) is an educational
institution operating under the authority of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). The rest of the herein respondents are
impleaded as officers and administrators of the school.
Petitioners Raymond A. Son (Son), Raymond S. Antiola (Antiola),
and Wilfredo E. Pollarco (Pollarco) are full time professors of the
UST Colleges of Fine Arts and Design and Philosophy, and are
members of the UST Faculty Union, with which UST at the time
had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Son and Antiola were hired in June, 2005, while Pollarco was
employed earlier, or in June, 2004. Under their respective
appointment papers, petitioners were designated as "faculty
member[s] on PROBATIONARY status," whose "accession to
tenure status is conditioned by [sic] your meeting all the
requirements provided under existing University rules and
regulations and other applicable laws including, among others,
possession of the (prerequisite] graduate degree before the
expiration of the probationary period and by your satisfactory
performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth in the job
description hereto attached."9
The UST-UST Faculty Union CBA provided that –
ARTICLE XV
TENURE
Section 1.Tenured Faculty Member. - He is:
a. Teaching Faculty member, given a tenure track appointment
upon hiring who has rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of
satisfactory service on a full-time basis, carrying fifteen-unit load
(15) or more. Although a master's degree is an entry requirement,
a faculty member admitted to serve the University without a
master's degree shall finish his master's degree in five (5)
semesters. If he does not finish his degree in five (5) semesters, he
shall be separated from service at the end of the fifth semester;
however, if he is made to serve the University further, in spite of
the lack of a master's degree, he shall be deemed to have attained
tenure.10
The CBA provision relative to the requirement of a Master's
degree in the faculty member's field of instruction is in line with
the requirement laid down in the 1992 Revised Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools issued by then Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS), and the CHED's
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 - or Manual of Regulations for
Private Higher Education of 2008 - stating that:
Section 35. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. - The minimum
qualifications of a faculty in a higher education institution shall be
as follows:
1. For undergraduate program
a. Holder of a master's degree; to teach mainly in his major field
and where applicable, a holder of appropriate professional license
requiring at least a bachelor's degree for the professional courses.
However, in specific fields where there is dearth of holders of
Master's degree, or a holder of a professional license requiring at
least a bachelor's degree may be qualified to teach. Any deviation
from this requirement will be subject to regulation by the
Commission.
Petitioners did not possess the required Master's degree, but
were nonetheless hired by UST on the condition that they fulfill
the requirement within the prescribed period. Petitioners
enrolled in the Master's program, but were unable to finish the
same. In spite of their failure to obtain the required Master's
degree, they continued to teach even beyond the period given for
completion thereof.
On March 3, 2010, then CHED Chairman Emmanuel Angeles
issued a Memorandum11 addressed to the Presidents of public
and private higher education institutions, directing the strict
implementation of the minimum qualification for faculty
members of undergraduate programs, particularly the Master's
degree and licensure requirements, as mandated by
Memorandum Order No. 40-08, "to ensure the highest
qualification of their faculty."
Acting on the March 3, 2010 Memorandum, UST wrote the
petitioners and other affected faculty members, informing them
of the university's decision to cease re-appointment of those who
failed to complete their Master's degrees, but allow a written
appeal from the concerned faculty members who are due for
thesis defense/completion of their Master's degrees.12
Petitioners did not make a written appeal, operating under the
belief that they have been vested tenure under the CBA for their
continued employment despite failure to obtain the required
Master's degree.13
On June 11, 2010, petitioners received termination/thank you
letters14 signed by respondent Dr. Cynthia Loza, Dean of the
College of Fine Arts and Design. The reason given for non-renewal
of their appointments is their failure to obtain the required
Master's degree.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Petitioners filed a labor case against the respondents for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, and recovery of money claims. In
their joint Position Paper and other pleadings,15 petitioners
claimed that since they have already acquired tenure by default
pursuant to the tenure provision in the CBA, they could not be
dismissed for failure to complete their respective Master's
degrees; that the UST-UST Faculty Union CBA is the law between
the parties, and its provisions should be observed; that in spite of
the CBA provision on tenure, respondents illegally terminated
their employment; that they were illegally terminated for their
refusal to send the prescribed appeal letter, which is tantamount
to an undue waiver and unlawful surrender of their tenurial
rights, and is against the law and public policy; that in terminating
their employment, respondents did not comply with the required
"twin-notice rule"; that respondents are guilty of bad faith and
unfair labor practice on account of their violation of the CBA; that
respondents are guilty of bad faith when they re-hired the other
professors even when they did not possess the required Master's
degree, while they (petitioners) were discriminated against and
terminated from work just because they did not file the
prescribed appeal letter; and that they should be paid backwages
and other money claims. Thus, petitioners prayed for
reinstatement with full backwages, allowances and other benefits;
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees and costs of
suit.
In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings16 respondents
countered that there is no unfair labor practice committed,
because the CBA provision adverted to is not an economic
provision; that the implementation of Memorandum Order No.
40-08 takes legal precedence over the parties' CBA; that the CBA
provision granting tenure by default may no longer be enforced
on account of the requirement under Memorandum Order No.
40-08, an administrative regulation that is equivalent to law and
has the effect of abrogating the tenure provision of the CBA; that
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is a police power measure for the
protection and promotion of quality education, and as such, the
CBA should yield to the same and to the broader interests of the
State; that
petitioners could not have acquired tenure since they did not
possess the minimum qualification - a Master's degree -
prescribed under Memorandum Order No. 4008; that the CBA
provision on tenure by default has become illegal as it is contrary
to law, and for this reason, it may not be enforced; that said CBA
provision, being contrary to law, car not be the object of
estopppel, and produces no effect whatsoever and need not be
set aside nor declared ineffective by judicial action; that in not
renewing petitioners' probationary appointments, respondents
observed due process and the provisions of the Labor Code,
particularly Article 281, which provides that a probationary
employee may be terminated from work "when he fails to qualify
as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement"; that petitioners are not entitled to monetary
awards as they were dismissed for cause, paid their correct
salaries, and are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees; and
that the case against the individual respondents should be
dismissed as well, as they were acting within their official
capacities. Thus, they prayed for the dismissal of
petitioners'complaint.
On March 17, 2011, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria rendered his
Decision17 in NLRC Case Nos. NCR-07-09179-10, 07-09180-10, and
07-09181-10, finding for petitioners and declaring respondents
guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, as well as
malice and bad faith in illegally dismissing the former. The Labor
Arbiter upheld the CBA provision granting tenure by default to
petitioners, and declared that petitioners were not accorded due
process prior to dismissal. Thus, petitioners were awarded money
claims, damages, and attorney's fees.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
Respondents appealed before the NLRC. On August 10, 2011, the
NLRC issued its Decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit
and affirming the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that the UST-
UST Faculty Union CBA took precedence over CHED Memorandum
Order No. 40-08; that by said CBA provision, petitioners acquired
tenure by default; that UST continued to hire faculty members
without the required Master's degree in their field of instruction
even after petitioners were dismissed from work; and that the
only cause for petitioners' dismissal was their refusal to submit a
written appeal, which is not a valid ground for dismissal or non-
renewal of their appointment.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. The case was re-opened
as the handling Commissioners inhibited themselves from the
case.
On March 26, 2012, the Special Division of the NLRC issued a new
Decision which set aside the earlier August 10, 2011 Decision and
dismissed petitioners’ labor case. It held that CHED Memorandum
Order No. 40-08 took precedence over the parties' CBA; that the
CBA should conform to the said Memorandum, which had the
force and effect of law; and that since the CBA provision on
tenure by default did not conform to the CHED Memorandum, it
is null and void.
Petitioners moved to reconsider.18 Meanwhile, the case was re-
assigned to the Second Division of the NLRC which, on October
30, 2012, promulgated a Decision granting petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. It set aside the March 26, 2012 Decision of the
Special Division and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held
that the CBA superseded the CHED Memorandum; that CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 requiring a Master's degree of
professors in the undergraduate programs is merely directory,
and did not provide that the lack of a Master's degree was a
ground to terminate the professor's services; that CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 was issued only in 2008, while the
CBA was concluded in 2006 - thus, it may not be retroactively
applied in the absence of a specific provision authorizing
retroactivity; and consequently, petitioners acquired tenure.
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a
January 22, 2013 Resolution,20 the NLRC denied the motion for
lack of merit.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Certiorari21 before the CA, respondents
questioned the adverse NLRC dispositions and prayed for
dismissal of the labor case or NLRC Case Nos. NCR-07-09179-10,
07-09180-10 and 07-09181-10.
On September 27, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed Decision
granting the Petition, decreeing thus:
Private respondents22 contend that they already attained
tenureship by reason of their continuous employment service on
a probationary status to petitioner University, invoking the
provision of the 2006-2011 Faculty Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), particularly Article XV, Section 1 thereof, which
was signed on July 18, 2008. According to them, when the
petitioner University and the UST Faculty Union of which private
respondents are members agreed to the terms and conditions set
forth in the UST Faculty CBA, the former explicitly and
unequivocally intended to vest tenure to those professors without
master's degrees who served for at least six (6) semesters.
Private respondents' reliance on the collective bargaining
agreement is not tenable. While every individual has autonomy to
enter into any contract, the contractual stipulations, however,
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy. In a case involving the observance of a collective
bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court, in Lakas ng
Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM) vs. Abiera, had the occasion
to pronounce:
'It is a fundamental postulate that however broad the freedom of
contracting parties may be, it does not go so far as to
countenance disrespect for or failure to observe a legal
prescription. The statute takes precedence; a stipulation in a
collective bargaining agreement must yield to it. That is to adhere
to the rule of law.'
The above principle was likewise reiterated in Escorpizo, et al. vs.
University of Baguio, et al., from which We quote:
"...Indeed, provisions of a CBA must be respected since its terms
and conditions constitute the law between the contracting
parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its
provisions. And in the event that an obligation therein imposed is
not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for
redress. XXX XXX XXX
...Nevertheless, the aforecited CBA provision must be read in
conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations
governing faculty qualifications. It is settled that an existing law
enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need for
the parties expressly making reference to it. Further, while
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may see fit, such right to contract is subject
to limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law or
public policy."
It should be borne in mind that the operation of educational
institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to
ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient
academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in
such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human
activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the
public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the
required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required
to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as
prerequisite to employment.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that private respondents
failed to meet the standards for regular employment provided
under Memorandum Order No. 040-08 issued by CHED. The
termination of their contract was based on their failure to obtain
(a) master's degree and cannot, therefore, be regarded as illegal.
In fact, the services of an employee hired on probationary basis
may be terminated when he fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. There is
nothing that would hinder the employer from extending a regular
or permanent appointment to an employee once the employer
finds that the employee is qualified for a regular employment
even before the expiration of the probationary period.
Conversely, if the purpose sought by the employer is neither
attained nor attainable within the said period, the law does not
preclude the employer from terminating the probationary
employment on justifiable ground. Here, no vested right to
tenureship had yet accrued in private respondents' favor since
they had not complied, during their probation, with the
prerequisites necessary for the acquisition of permanent status. It
must be stressed that herein private respondents were given
more than ample opportunities to obtain their respective master's
degree since their first appointment in 2004 or 2005 as a
prerequisite to tenure status. But they did not take advantage of
such opportunities. Justice, fairness, and due process demand
that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it
had little or no participation or control.
In addition, the petitioner University as an educational institution
enjoys academic freedom - a guarantee that enjoys protection
from the Constitution. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes
the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. Indeed, the Constitution allows
merely the State's regulation and supervision of educational
institutions, and not the deprivation of their rights.
The essential freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic freedom
encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic
grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it
shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study.
Undeniably, the school's prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have
been met is in accordance with academic freedom that gives the
educational institution the right to choose who should teach.
In Peña v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme
Court emphasized:
"It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of
efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of
the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable
and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside."
The authority to choose whom to hire is likewise covered and
protected by its management prerogative - the right of an
employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring,
the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods,
process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of
employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and
dismissal and recall of workers. This Court was more emphatic in
holding that in protecting the rights of the laborer, it cannot
authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.
All told, We are satisfied that private respondents' termination
from employment was valid and legal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions dated
August 10, 2011 and October 30, 2012 as well as the Resolution
dated January 22, 2013 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-LAC Case No. 04-001131-11 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision dated
March 26, 2012 that dismissed the complaints of herein private
respondents is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.23 (Citations omitted)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied
the same via its January 29, 2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant
Petition.
In a February 3, 2016 Resolution,24 the Court resolved to give due
course to the Petition.
Issue
Petitioners claim simply that the CA erred in ruling that they were
not illegally dismissed.
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply 25 seeking reversal of the assailed CA
dispositions and, in lieu thereof, the reinstatement of the August
10, 2011 and October 30, 2012 NLRC Decisions and the January
22, 2013 NLRC Resolution, petitioners insist that they were
illegally dismissed; that the CBA and its provision on tenure by
default prevail over CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08, as they
constitute the law between the parties; that since they acquired
tenure by application of the CBA provision, they may not be
removed except for cause; that contrary to the provisions of said
CHED Memorandum, respondents were never prohibited from
maintaining faculty members without a master's degree, as in fact
they continued to hire such faculty even after they were
separated from UST; that respondents' continued hiring of non-
Master's degree holders constitutes estoppel - respondents are
estopped from claiming that they (petitioners) are not qualified to
teach in UST, and so should not have been dismissed therefrom;
that instead of treating their respective cases with harshness,
respondents should have instead allowed them to finish their
Master's degrees, since the only requirement missing is their
thesis defense; that the true reason for their removal is their
obstinate refusal to make the required appeal letter in waiver of
their acquired tenure, which manifestly indicates respondents'
malice and bad faith in dealing with petitioners - especially
considering that they (petitioners) were the only professors
whose appointments were not renewed out of the 70 faculty
members without Master's degrees who were notified of the
strict implementation of CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08
and required to file a written appeal; that respondents violated
the twin-notice rule as petitioners were not given notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to their separation; that the right of
academic freedom does not give respondents the unbridled right
to undermine petitioners' right to security of tenure; and finally,
that the CHED itself did not direct the removal of faculty members
without Master's degrees, but only the strict implementation of
the schools' faculty development programs.
Respondents' Arguments
In their joint Comment26 to the Petition, respondents argue that a
Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's field of
instruction is a mandatory requirement that may not be the
subject of agreement between the school and the professor,
citing Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's College,27 where the
Court held that full-time faculty status may be extended only to
those who possess, among others, a master's degree in the field
of instruction, and this is neither subject to the prerogative of the
school nor the agreement of the parties, and this requirement is
deemed impliedly written in the employment contracts between
private educational institutions and prospective faculty members;
that the Herrera-Manaois doctrine was reiterated in University of
the East v. Pepanio,28 where it was held that government had a
right to ensure that only qualified individuals with sufficient
academic knowledge and teaching skills are allowed to teach in
educational institutions, whose operation involves public interest;
that the CBA provision on tenure by default has been superseded
by CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08, which for all intents and
purposes is deemed law to which the CBA must yield as it conflicts
with the former, that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes of government, as
into every contract is read the provisions of existing law; that the
operation of educational institutions involves public interest, and
to this end, these institutions have the obligation to the public to
ensure that only those individuals who possess the required
academic knowledge, training, and qualifications may teach; that
CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is a police power measure
which may impair the CBA provision on tenure by default for the
protection of the public; that the strict implementation of CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is not subject to compromise or
leniency, contrary to what petitioners believe - in claiming that
they should be allowed to finish their master's degrees even while
the Memorandum is already in effect, which places UST in a
precarious position of active violation of law; that petitioners
cannot claim tenure as they remained probationary teachers even
if their appointments/contracts were repeatedly renewed - so
long as they do not obtain their master's degrees, they continue
to remain probationary employees of the university; that
petitioners were given ample opportunity to finish their master's
degrees, but they did not do so; and that UST's decision not to
renew petitioner's appointments is a valid exercise of academic
freedom and management prerogative. Thus, respondents pray
for denial of the instant Petition.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the
undergraduate program professor's field of instruction has been
in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992)
or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Article
IX, Section 44, paragraph 1 (a) thereof provides that college
faculty members must have a master's degree in their field of
instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching in a private
educational institution and acquiring regular status therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in
the exercise of its rule-making power as provided for under
Section 70 of Batas PambansaBlg. 232, otherwise known as the
Education Act of 1982.29 As such, it has the force and effect of
law.30 In University of the East v. Pepanio,31 the requirement of a
masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was held to be
not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public interest.
Thus, when the CBA was executed between the parties in 2006,
they had no right to include therein the provision relative to the
acquisition of tenure by default, because it is contrary to, and thus
violative of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools that was in effect at the time. As such, said CBA provision
is null and void, and can have no effect as between the parties. "A
void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect;
and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical
relation."32 Under the Civil Code,
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from
the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
XXXX
When CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 came out, it merely
carried over the requirement of a masteral degree for faculty
members of undergraduate programs contained in the 1992
Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. It cannot
therefore be said that the requirement of a master's degree was
retroactively applied in petitioners' case, because it was already
the prevailing rule with the issuance of the 1992 Revised Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools.
Thus, going by the requirements of law, it is plain to see that
petitioners are not qualified to teach in the undergraduate
programs of UST. And while they were given ample time and
opportunity to satisfy the requirements by obtaining their
respective master's degrees, they failed in the endeavor.
Petitioners knew this - that they cannot continue to teach for
failure to secure their master's degrees - and needed no
reminding of this fact; "those who are seeking to be educators are
presumed to know these mandated qualifications."33
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of
the law: respondents, for maintaining professors without the
mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be
employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary
qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed
by UST since they still do not possess the required master's
degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain
professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground
for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the
law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED
regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified
teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of
petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein,
they are in pari delicto.
Latin for 'in equal fault,' in pari delicto connotes that two or more
people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law
nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an
illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari
delicto. Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a
controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no
action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it
finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo
malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis."
XXXX
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally
governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code, which state
that:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the
cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal
offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
xxxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules
shall be observed:
XXXX
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties,
neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract,
or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;
x x x x.34 (Citations omitted)
The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the
undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has been cemented in
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents
have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked
down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the
provision, does not erase the violations committed by erring
educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply
means that government will not punish these violations for the
meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant effects,
nonetheless. And if respondents knew the overwhelming
importance of the said provision and the public interest involved -
as they now fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have
complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
It cannot be said either that by agreeing to the tenure by default
provision in the CBA, respondents are deemed to be in estoppel
or have waived the application of the requirement under CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08. Such a waiver is precisely
contrary to law. Moreover, a waiver would prejudice the rights of
the students and the public, who have a right to expect that UST is
acting within the bounds of the law, and provides quality
education by hiring only qualified teaching personnel. Under
Article 6 of the Civil Code, "[r]ights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law." On the other hand, there could be no
acquiescence - amounting to estoppel - with respect to acts which
constitute a violation of law. "The doctrine of estoppel cannot
operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or
ultra vires."35 "[N]o estoppel can be predicated on an illegal act."36
It cannot be said either that in requiring petitioners to file a
written appeal, respondents are guilty of bad faith and malice for
practically forcing the former to renounce their tenure. There is
no tenure to speak of in the first place.
Just the same, as correctly argued by the respondents, the crucial
issues in this case have been settled. In the case of University of
the East v. Pepanio,37 the Court held that –
Three. Respondents argue that UE hired them in 1997 and 2000,
when what was in force was the 1994 CBA between UE and the
faculty union. Since that CBA did not yet require a master's degree
for acquiring a regular status and since respondents had already
complied with the three requirements of the CBA, namely, (a) that
they served full-time; (b) that they renderedthree consecutive
years of service; and (c) that their services were satisfactory, they
should be regarded as having attained permanent or regular
status.
But the policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers
was provided in the Manual of Regulations as early as 1992.
Indeed, recognizing this, the 1994 CBA provided even then that
UE was to extend only semester-to-semester appointments to
college faculty staffs, like respondents, who did not possess the
minimum qualifications for their positions.
Besides, as the Court held in Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, a
school CBA must be read in conjunction with statutory and
administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications. Such
regulations form part of a valid CBA without need for the parties
to make express reference to it. While the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions, as they
may see fit, the right to contract is still subject to the limitation
that the agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy.
The State through Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (The Education Act
of 1982) delegated the administration of the education system
and the supervision and regulation of educational institutions to
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of
Education). Accordingly, in promulgating the Manual of
Regulations, DECS was exercising its power of regulation over
educational institutions, which includes prescribing the minimum
academic qualifications for teaching personnel.
In 1994 the legislature transferred the power to prescribe such
qualifications to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
CHED's charter authorized it to set minimum standards for
programs and institutions of higher learning. The Manual of
Regulations continued to apply to colleges and universities and
suppletorily the Joint Order until 2010 when CHED issued a
Revised Manual of Regulations which specifically applies only to
institutions involved in tertiary education.
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education Section 89.Conditions of Employment. Every private school shall
teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educational promote the improvement of the economic, social and
institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to professional status of all its personnel.
ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient
academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in
In recognition of their special employment status and their special
such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human
role in the advancement of knowledge, the employment of
activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the
teaching and non-teaching academic personnel shall be governed
public as well from illprepared teachers, who are lacking in the
by such rules as may from time to time be promulgated, in
required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required
coordination with one another, by the Department of Education,
to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as
Culture and Sports and the Department of Labor and
prerequisite to employment.
Employment.
Respondents were each given only semester-to-semester
Conditions of employment of non-academic nonteaching school
appointments from the beginning of their employment with UE
personnel, including compensation, hours of work, security of
precisely because they lacked the required master's degree. It was
tenure and labor relations, shall be governed by the appropriate
only when UE and the faculty union signed their 2001 CBA that
labor laws and regulations.
the school extended petitioners a conditional probationary status
subject to their obtaining a master's degree within their
probationary period. It is clear, therefore, that the parties Section 92.Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to
intended to subject respondents permanent status appointments compliance with Department and school requirements, the
to the standards set by the law and the university. probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more
than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory servicefor those in
the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular
Here, UE gave respondents Bueno and Pepanio more than ample
semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level,
opportunities to acquire the postgraduate degree required of
and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for
them. But they did not take advantage of such opportunities.
those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on
Justice, fairness, and due process demand that an employer
the trimester basis.
should not be penalized for situations where it had little or no
participation or control. (Citations omitted)38
Section 93. Regular or Permanent Status. Those who have served
the probationary period shall be made regular or
In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaois v. St.
permanent.1âwphi1 Fulltime teachers who have satisfactorily
Scholastica's College39 that –
completed their probationary period shall be considered regular
or permanent.
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual,
Manaois still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of
Considering that petitioner ultimately sought for the position of a
employment. Private educational institutions must still
permanent full-time instructor, we must further look into the
supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications,
following provisions under the 1992 Manual, which set out the
and conditions set by the appropriate government agencies
minimum requirements for such status:
(presently the Department of Education, the Commission on
Higher Education, and the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private Section 44. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. The minimum
schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the qualifications for faculty for the different grades and levels of
employment status of their academic personnel has been instruction duly supported by appropriate credentials on filein the
imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of school shall be as follows:
educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and
competency of our schools and educators. xxxx
The applicable guidebook at the time petitioner was engaged as a c. Tertiary
probationary full-time instructor for the school year 2000 to 2003
is the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992
(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational:
Manual). It provides the following conditions of a probationary
employment:
(a) Holder of a master's degree, to teach largely in his major field;
or, for professional courses, holder of the appropriate
professional license required for at least a bachelor's degree. Any
deviation from this requirement will be subject to regulation by
the Department
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27, 2013
Decision and January 29, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 128666 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Section 45.Full-time and Part-time Faculty. As a general rule, all

private schools shall employ full-time academic personnel
consistent with the levels of instruction.

Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following

requirements:

a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications

prescribed by the Department under this Manual for all academic
personnel;

xxxx

All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing

qualifications are considered part-time.

XXXX

Thus, pursuant to the 1992 Manual, private educational

institutions in the tertiary level may extend -full-time faculty'
status only to those who possess, inter alia, a master's degree in
the field of study that will be taught. This minimum requirement
is neither subject to the prerogative of the school nor to the
agreement between the parties. For all intents and purposes, this
qualification must be deemed impliedly written in the
employment contracts between private educational institutions
and prospective faculty members. The issue of whether
probationers were informed of this academic requirement before
they were engaged as probationary employees is thus no longer
material, as those who are seeking to be educators are presumed
to know these mandated qualifications. Thus, all those who fail to
meet the criteria under the 1992 Manual cannot legally attain the
status of permanent full-time faculty members, even if they have
completed three years of satisfactory service.

In the light of the failure of Manaois to satisfy the academic

requirements for the position, she may only be considered as a
part-time instructor pursuant to Section 45 of the 1992 Manual. In
turn, as we have enunciated in a line of cases, a part-time
member of the academic personnel cannot acquire permanence
of employment and security of tenure under the Manual of
Regulations in relation to the Labor Code. (Citations omitted)