An overview of Cognitive Linguistics

(from Peña, M.S. and Samaniego, E. 2007. “An overview of Cognitive Linguistics”.
2007. In Mairal, R., Escobar, M.A., Peña, M.S., and Samaniego, E. Current Trends in
Linguistic Theory. Madrid: UNED).

OUTLINE
0. Introduction
1. Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar
2. Objectivism vs. experientialism
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Objectivism vs. experientialism: the classical theory of categorization vs.
prototype theory
2.3. The hierarchical organization of categories
3. Idealized Cognitive Models
3.1. Definition of Idealized Cognitive Model
3.2. Propositional ICMs
3.2.1. Lakoff’s conception of prepositional ICMs
3.2.2. Langacker’s theory: the notions of domain, profile, base, domain
matrix, basic domains, and primary and secondary domains
3.3. Metaphor and metonymy
3.3.1. The objectivist conception vs. the cognitive account of metaphor and
metonymy
3.3.2. Some basic notions in Cognitive Linguistics: source and target
domains and mappings
3.3.3. Demarcation problems between metaphor and metonymy
3.3.4. Classification of metaphor
3.3.5. Classification of metonymy
3.3.6. Blending theory
3.4. Image-schemas
3.4.1. Definition of image-schema
3.4.2. The structure of image-schemas and some examples
3.4.3. Image-schemas in linguistics
3.4.4. Taxonomies of image-schemas and Peña’s proposal for a distinction
between basic and subsidiary or dependent schemas
4. Final remarks
5. Suggested activities
6. References
7. Useful web pages
0. Introduction

This chapter provides a summary of the main tenets within the framework of Cognitive
Linguistics. Following the distinction between formal and functional approaches to
linguistics, Cognitive Linguistics would pertain to the functional branch of linguistics
since it pays more attention to the use to which language is put than to the formal
aspects of language. Formal and functional approaches to grammar are usually linked to
certain views of language and cognition. For instance, generative grammar is generally
associated with the idea that knowledge of linguistic structures and rules forms an
autonomous module or faculty independent of other mental processes of attention,
memory, and reasoning. This external view of an independent linguistic module is often
combined with a view of internal modularity so that different levels of linguistic
analysis such as phonology, syntax, and semantics form independent modules. This
view also holds that, for example, syntactic principles can be studied without reference
to semantic content. Functionalist approaches like cognitive linguistics, on the other
hand, imply a different view. Under this approach the difference between language and
other mental processes is one of degree but not one of kind. As a result, it makes sense
to look for principles shared across a range of cognitive domains. Similarly, it is argued
that no adequate account of grammatical rules is possible without taking the meaning of
elements into account. One interesting characteristic of cognitive linguistics is that it
does not differentiate between linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic real world
knowledge. In an extreme position the explanation of grammatical patterns cannot be
given in terms of abstract syntactic principles but only in terms of the speaker’s
intended meaning in particular contexts of language use.

First, we distinguish between Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar on

the grounds that the former embraces the latter. In this chapter, we focus on Cognitive
Linguistics. We set out to cover some of the most relevant topics within the framework
of Cognitive Linguistics: how the human mind organizes knowledge with the aid of
Idealized Cognitive Models; the fact that the so-called figurative language (e.g.
metaphor and metonymy) takes a prominent position in the conceptualization of
language and has both an explanatory and constitutive function; and the importance of
the embodiment of meaning as shown by the existence of image-schemas and their
different levels of dependency.
1. Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar (this point has been
provided for the study of unit 1 of this subject and is not reproduced here)

2. Objectivism vs. experientialism

2.1. Introduction

In the preface of his 1987 work, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories
Reveal about the Mind, Lakoff (1987: xi-xvii) challenges what he calls the objectivist
paradigm. As a matter of fact, Cognitive Linguistics appeared in the mid 1970s as a
reaction to a pervading philosophical tradition, objectivism, which influenced every
field of human investigation. The main principles of this view are the following:

• Thought consists in the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols.

• The mind manipulates symbols in the same way a computer does, since the mind
is conceived of as an abstract machine.

• Symbols are meaningful inasmuch as they correspond to things in the external

world.

• Symbols corresponding to external reality are the internal representation of this

external reality.

• Abstract symbols are likely to correspond to things in the world no matter what
the peculiar properties of any organisms are like.

• The mind is a mirror of nature.

• No matter how human bodies act and function in their environment. Concepts
and reason exist independent of their own presence.

• Thought is abstract in nature and disembodied, in the sense that it is not

constrained by the human body, the human perceptual system, and the human
nervous system.
 • Thought is atomistic. By atomistic Lakoff understands that thought can be
decomposed and broken down into simple building blocks which are liable to be
combined into complexes and manipulated by means of a set of rules.

• Thought is logical, since it can be controlled by systems similar to those used in

mathematical thought.

• Any machine that mechanically manipulates symbols that correspond to external

reality is able to think and reason in a meaningful way.

The consideration of language was also influenced by this conception of reality.

The following assumptions were held by objectivists:

• Reality is objective. This means that things are considered to be objectively,

absolutely, and unconditionally true or false. Linguistic expressions get their
meanings via their correspondence with objects or relations existing in the so-
called real world. In this regard, objectivism gives rise to truth-conditional
semantics, according to which the meanings of words and sentences are their
truth-conditions. In this view, truth-conditional semantics is given such a
prominent role in the study of language that pragmatics is considered a marginal
part which has no connections with objective reality, but merely with human
communication and subjective judgements of individual people should be
avoided because of their lack of objectivity. Only science allows people to be
objective and to build an unbiased point of view valid for people everywhere.

• In the objectivist view, words are endowed with fixed meanings. Words must fit
reality. Otherwise, they are misleading. Our language is the expression of the
concepts and categories in terms of which we make up our thoughts. This is but
a consequence of objectivist metaphysics, as expounded by Lakoff (1987: 60).
All of reality consists of entities, which have fixed properties and relations
holding among them at any instant.

• People are able to speak objectively by means of a language that fits reality. This
language must be straightforward. It must not be an obscurer of meaning and
should be able to convey truth.
 • Figurative language should be not be used. It only embellishes discourse and
constitutes a barrier to the pursuit of objective truth. Therefore, a clear-cut
distinction between literal and figurative language is posited, the former being
amenable to praise, the latter to condemnation. This idea derives from the belief
that being objective is the only way to get real knowledge. Moreover, objectivity
and rationality are seen as synonymous with each other1.

2.2. Objectivism vs. experientialism: the classical theory of

categorization vs. prototype theory

In their attempt to criticize the foundations of objectivism as a linguistic theory, Lakoff

and Johnson (1980) claim that the hallmark of this view is that we have access to
absolute and unconditional truths about the world. This myth has been held by both the
rationalist and empiricist traditions, even though they offer different explanations of
how we arrive at such absolute truths. Kant’s attempt to combine these two traditions
falls within the objectivist trap as well. Other research orientations which are
theoretically embedded within the objectivist paradigm nowadays are the work carried
out by the descendants of the logical positivists, the Fregean and Husserlian traditions,
and within the realm of linguistics work by neorationalists following Chomsky’s lead.
These long-standing assumptions which have pervaded the Western philosophical and
linguistic tradition and which are still prevalent in recent Anglo-American analytic
philosophy and much of modern linguistics and other disciplines have been questioned
within cognitive science by Johnson (1987), Lakoff (1987, 1989, 1993, 1996), Kövecses
(1990), Indurkhya (1992), Ross (1993), Ungerer and Schmid (1996), and many others.
These assumptions about language, meaning, truth, and understanding, which had gone
unquestioned up to now, will be seriously reviewed by cognitivism in the light of new
evidence. We will make a survey of the main objectivist ideas which are revised by
cognitive scientists (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 198-209). A new proposal which
falls midway between objectivism and subjectivism2 has been made by Lakoff (1987)

1
For more details about the main claims of objectivism, see Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 186-188, 195-
222, 1999: 79-94), Johnson (1987: xxi-xxxvi), Lakoff (1987: 157-195), and Lakoff and Turner (1989:
110-136).
2
For a long time, it has been held that the only alternative to objectivism is subjectivism. As applied to
language, it is claimed that meaning is private, neither meanings nor context have structure, and meaning
cannot be naturally or adequately represented. Throughout history and even nowadays, it is objectivism
that has triumphed over subjectivism, which has been reserved for the realms of religion and art. See
Lakoff and Johnson (1980:188-189) for detailed treatment of subjectivism.
and his associates (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999, Lakoff and Turner 1989). This
new alternative is termed experientialism. In this section, we will comment on the main
ideas held by the objectivists and the other side of the coin represented by the
experientialists. The general assumptions which we have discussed in section 2.1 carry
over to the domain of semantics.

- Meaning is objective. Truth-conditional semantics is the natural consequence of this

assumption. The meaning of an utterance is measured and understood in terms of its
truth-conditions3. These truth-conditions are not arbitrary. They are determined by
indexicals: who the speaker and the hearer are, the time and place in which the utterance
takes place, etc. The objective meaning of an utterance is independent of human
understanding. The objectivist would accept as an example of saying an utterance by a
parrot, for instance. In this view, understanding is limited to understanding the truth or
falsity of a given sentence.

As far as truth and understanding are concerned, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 157-
184) devote a whole chapter of their work Metaphors We Live By to questioning the
traditional view and to lending support to the experientialist account. These authors hold
that truth can be only predicated of something as relative to the reality which is imposed
by human understanding in general. For them, meaning is embodied. Language and the
world have meaning only because human beings make them meaningful by interacting
with objects. According to them, “truth is always relative to a conceptual system that is
defined in large part by metaphor” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 159). Lakoff and Johnson
(1980: 165) postulate that truth depends on categorization4 in four ways:

• the truth or falsity of a statement depends on its understanding;

3
Lakoff states that within the objectivist paradigm meaning-relations are defined in the following way:

ENTAILMENT: A entails B if and only if B is true in every situation in which A is true.

SAMENESS OF MEANING: A and B have the same meaning if and only if A and B are true in
exactly the same situations and false in exactly the same situations. (Lakoff 1987: 168)
4
Categorization will receive some attention later in this section. For the time being, let us advance that in
contrast to the traditional view of categorization, experientialism singles out the importance of notions
like prototype and family resemblance. In the experientialist view, categories are not a matter of black or
white anymore. Boundaries are fuzzy and clear-cut divisions among categories are disregarded. For a
detailed account of the classical view of categorization, see Taylor (1989: 21-37).
 • understanding and human categorization go hand in hand (the latter is a question
of interactional properties);

• additionally, the truth of a statement hinges upon the properties which are
foregrounded by the categories used;

• finally, categories are a matter of prototypes.

This experientialist account of truth draws many of its ideas from several theories,
namely correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, phenomenological, and Wittgenstein's
accounts.

- The objectivist approach to understanding is based on the distinction between

objective or literal meaning and speaker’s or utterer’s meaning. The objectivist realizes
that on some occasions utterances elicit a meaning which differs from the literal one.
For instance, this account of meaning is sustained by the speech act theorists. By way of
illustration, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 207) posit the following example: He is a real
genius (uttered in a context where sarcasm is indicated). According to objectivists, this
sentence would have the objective meaning M (‘He has great intellectual powers’) but
the speaker wants to express this other objective meaning M’ (‘He is a real idiot’). This
is the way Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 207) put it:

“In uttering a sentence S (S = “He’s a real genius”), which has the objective meaning M (M = he
has great intellectual powers), the speaker intends to convey to the hearer objective meaning M’
(M’ = he’s a real idiot).” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 207)

Or let us consider the utterance Mary is a cow in the context of a woman who is
unpleasant; in it, there exist two objective meanings: M and M’. In uttering the sentence
above, which has the objective meaning M (‘Mary belongs to the cow species’), the
speaker intends to convey to the hearer the objective meaning M’ (‘Mary is
unpleasant’). This can be applied not only to metaphor, but also to such uses of
language as metonymy, exaggeration, understatement, hints, irony, and all figurative
language in general. As far as metaphor is concerned, objectivists claim that the
meaning M is false. Therefore metaphor is found to be a case of indirect meaning where
M differs from M’. However, cognitive linguists have argued for the centrality of
figurative uses of language in general (and metaphorical in particular), which do not
seem to be indirect triggers of meaning.
 In experientialism the distinction between objective or literal meaning and
speaker’s or utterer’s meaning is blurred. Cognitivists, for example, argue for the
existence of fuzzy boundaries between categories and of cognitive continua, as we will
see when studying categorization. They observe that there exists a cognitive continuum
with two extremes: objective or literal meaning and speaker’s or utterer’s meaning. In
other words, the traditional distinction between literal and metaphorical language is
rejected. Moreover, everyday language is full of metaphorical language, which is not
regarded as deviant any more but as a conceptual mechanism which on many occasions
helps us understand some abstract concepts like love. For instance, how would we
conceptualize love if we did not use metaphorical language? Could we say that we are
in love with someone else by using so-called literal language?

- Meaning is disembodied. As has been observed, objectivists take for granted that
meaning is independent of human beings and the way they conceptualize experience
(see Lakoff 1987: 173). More precisely, it is postulated that the body does not play any
essential role in endowing concepts with meaning. For instance, Frege (1966), an
objectivist, posits a clear-cut distinction between sense, the objective meaning for a
sign, and the idea.

“… from memories and sense impressions that I have had and acts, both internal and external,
which I have performed… the idea is subjective… in the light of this, one need have no scruples in
speaking simply of the sense, whereas in case of an idea one must, strictly speaking, add to whom
it belongs and at what time.” (Frege 1966: 59-60, quoted from Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 199).

Each linguistic expression is endowed with a disembodied meaning associated

with it. This is connected with the CONDUIT metaphor, according to which “the
meaning is right there in the words” and there exists no connection between words and
the way speakers interact with them in the environment. This tradition is still alive
nowadays, as attested by the disciples of Richard Montague and others. As Montague
(1974: 188) argues, “like Donald Davidson, I regard the construction of a theory of truth
–or rather, of the more general notion of truth under an arbitrary interpretation– as the
basic goal of a serious syntax and semantics”.

On the other hand, the experientialist account insists on the embodied nature of
meaning. In fact, meaning cannot exist independent of human concerns. The existence
of image-schemas and the way they are interwoven in language and cognition attest to
this fact, as we will see in section 3.4. As we have previously observed following
Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 159), meaning is embodied. This means that language and
the world are meaningful only because human beings make it possible by interacting
with objects in the world.

- In the objectivist account, semantics is the study of how linguistic expressions

correspond to the world directly, without the mediation of human understanding. Lewis
(1972) has been one of the leading figures contributing to this conception of semantics.

“My proposals will also not conform to the expectations of those who, in analyzing meaning, turn
immediately to the psychology and sociology of language users: to intentions, sense-experience,
and mental ideas, or to social rules, conventions, and regularities. I distinguish two topics: first, the
description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are
associated with aspects of the world; and second, the description of the psychological and
sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a
person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics.” (Lewis 1972: 170)

In contrast to the objectivist claims, the experientialist argues for a semantic

account which is deeply influenced by the way people understand language and the
world.

- Meaning is independent of use. In the objectivist view, if meaning is objective and is

independent of human understanding and concerns, meaning must be independent of
use. In Davidson's (1978: 33) own words, “literal meaning and truth conditions can be
assigned to words and sentences apart from particular contexts of use”. This idea makes
meaning be kept within the realm of semantics alone. In contrast, experientialists argue
against this idea and hold that pragmatic factors (e.g. the context of use) are
fundamental to a theory of language. Meaning should be meaning to someone.

- According to objectivists, a theory of meaning is based on a theory of truth. Two main

assumptions are important in this respect:

• if a sentence fits the world, it is true;

• if a sentence does not fit the world, it is false.

This is the way Lewis (1972: 173) puts it: “A meaning for a sentence is something
that determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false”. That is to say,
the meaning of a sentence is equated with conditions of truth or falsity and truth is
defined in terms of ‘fitting the world’.
 Furthermore, within the objectivist paradigm, meaning is compositional. This
assertion gives way to the building-block theory within objectivism. The objects which
make up the world are endowed with well-defined inherent properties. These properties
do not result from the interaction of humans with objects. Moreover, there exist fixed
relations holding among such objects. If we apply this theory to the consideration of
language, the following ideas should be taken into consideration:

• We can give the objects which make up the world names in a language.

• If these objects are endowed with well-defined inherent properties, we can have
a language consisting of one-place predicates which correspond to each of these
properties.

• If these objects hold fixed relationships among them, we can have a language
consisting also of many-place predicates which correspond to each of these
relationships.

• By means of the syntax of a language, we can generate sentences which

correspond directly to any situation in the world.

• The meaning of each whole sentence will be identified with its truth conditions.

• The meaning of each whole sentence will be the result of the sum of the
meanings of their individual parts and how they fit together (this is called the
compositional theory of meaning).

As we have seen, the truth-conditions of a sentence (that is to say, its meaning)

are determined by all the necessary building-blocks of such a sentence and the syntax.
Nothing more is required in order to work out the meaning of a sentence.

In objectivism, words and sentences are objects with well-defined inherent

properties which hold fixed relationships among them without the intervention of
human interaction or understanding. These words and sentences consist of parts and
these parts make it possible the relationships among them. Grammar is but the study of
the building-block structure of expressions, of the well-defined inherent properties of
the parts, and the relationships holding among them. Context and human understanding
are disregarded. Chomskyan approaches to linguistics can be well embedded within this
objectivist trend, in the sense that form (grammar) prevails over any other aspect outside
language itself.

As a result of all these assumptions, the objectivist theory of communication is

very well defined by the CONDUIT metaphor according to which:

• Meanings are objects.

• Linguistic expressions are objects.

• Linguistic expressions have meanings (in them).

• In communication, a speaker sends a fixed meaning to a hearer via the linguistic

expression associated with that meaning.

Proponents of experientialism have rejected the objectivist view that concepts are
undecomposable building-blocks described in terms of sufficient and necessary
conditions in favour of the idea that concepts should be described in terms of
prototypes. This discussion will take place under the general heading categorization.
Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 2) define categorization as a complex mental process of
classification. By sake of simplicity, we can draw a distinction between two accounts
which have prevailed over other approaches to the study of categorization:

• The classical theory of categorization.

• Prototype theory.

The problem of categorization should be studied in connection with the objectivist

and experientialist approaches. While proponents of the objectivist account are
associated with the classical view of categorization, experientialism is bound up with
the prototype theory of categorization. Categorization represents for both classical and
prototypical approaches what Lakoff defined as the main way we make sense of
experience (Lakoff 1987). This mental operation consists of grouping different things
and is essential in all mental activities. Most concepts belong to categories rather than to
individualities. But, what are the criteria we use to decide that something pertains to a
certain category and not to another? As has just been mentioned there are two traditions
to be considered. The objectivist tradition, on the one hand, for which categorization is
achieved starting from a group of common features or the list of features or minimal
condition theory. For this trend we group together elements following the shared
properties principle. On the other hand, for the experientialist tradition, which does not
follow the classical-aristotelian tradition of the necessary and sufficient features, the
existence of common shared properties is not a unique essential condition for
categorization. Let us explain this in more detail.

The origins of the classical theory of categorization should be searched in

Aristotle’s work. The main implications of this theory are the following ones:

• Features are binary (that is, an object is endowed with or devoid of some
property).

• Categories have clear boundaries.

• All the members pertaining to a given category hold the same status. There is no
room for degrees of membership in a category.

• Categories are defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. For

instance, take the case of the definition of the word ‘man’.

x is a man if and only if L (L being a list of attributes like these:)

x is human
x is adult
x is male

The pioneers of the use of binary features were the phonologists of the Prague
School of structuralism. Phonemes were defined in terms of such features. Consider the
following example:

/p, b, t, d, f, v, s, z/

/p/ – VOICED, – CONTINUANT /t/ – VOICED, – CONTINUANT

/b/ + VOICED, – CONTINUANT /d/ + VOICED, – CONTINUANT

/f/ – VOICED, + CONTINUANT /s/ – VOICED, + CONTINUANT

/v/ + VOICED, + CONTINUANT /z/ + VOICED, + CONTINUANT

 This way of analyzing linguistic items was called Componential Analysis (CA
henceforth) and worked particularly well in phonology because it was economic, it
offered an account of the sequences of sounds that could or could not occur in a word,
and was supposed to be limited to a small set of universal features valid for all existing
languages. However, the use of binary features in semantics proved problematic. As
argued by Löbner (2002: 138), the limitations of this approach as applied to semantic
analysis are severe. Some of the most important limitations of this theory are the
following ones:

• This kind of semantic analysis can be only applied to a limited range of lexemes.
There exist some lexical categories whose meaning cannot be reduced to a set of
binary features. This is the case with verbs, which do not seem to reasonably
lend themselves to the binary approach. Take the verb buy. The meaning that
this verb means an exchange of goods for money can be expressed by the binary
feature [± MONEY] but the fact that it constitutes a predication involving two or
more arguments cannot be captured by means of this approach since binary
features can only represent one-place predicates.

• Componential analysis cannot account for many meaning relations. For

example, it captures the hyponymous relationship between stallion and horse
because stallion is readily definable in terms of horse (a stallion is a male
horse). However, it cannot account for other pairs of hyponyms like horse and
animal. The definition of horse as [ANIMAL][EQUINE] is not very clarifying.
The feature [EQUINE] can only be understood if related to horse and means
something similar to ‘pertaining to horses’. Thus saying that horse =
[ANIMAL][EQUINE] amounts to saying that ‘a horse is a horsey animal’.
Furthermore, all types of more specific relations within lexical fields are
difficult to capture: mereological relations, cyclic orders (cf. Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, etc.), or meaning relations among number terms.

• Componential analysis has been criticized on the grounds that it ignores nuances
of meaning. For instance, the parallelism between man-boy, and woman-girl
(implicit in the componential analysis of boy [+ HUMAN][+ MALE][+
YOUNG] and girl [+ HUMAN][+ FEMALE][+ YOUNG]) is only approximate
since it does not capture the idea that the transition from boyhood to manhood
 nowadays occurs at an earlier age than the transition from girlhood to
womanhood. Another famous example is the analysis of the verb kill as
[CAUSE][DIE]. The problem with this analysis is that kill is not synonymous
with cause to die. There are some events which qualify as instantiations of cause
to die but not of kill. Cruse (2004: 250) illustrates this as follows:

John caused Bill to die on Saturday by poisoning his cornflakes on Friday.

? John killed Bill on Saturday by poisoning his cornflakes on Friday.

The lightning caused John to die when it struck the power cable supplying
his life-support machine.

? The lightning killed John when it struck the power cable supplying his
life-support machine.

In sum, the classical view of categorization takes as its basis those features which
are shared by the members pertaining to the category in question. Lakoff (1987: 5)
claims that this view is not entirely wrong. However, according to him, it is only part of
the story. Taylor (1989) notes three main points of divergence between the classical and
the experientialist accounts of categorization:

a) In the classical model, attributes5 were considered binary. They were either present or
absent. There was no middle ground. Nonetheless, the main expounders of prototype
theory contend that the fact that an entity is a member of a given category is not a black
or white affair. It is the degree of approximation to an ideal which determines whether
an entity pertains to a category or not. In this connection, the prototype is defined as the
best example of a category. Taylor (1989: 59) defines a prototype as “a schematic
representation of the conceptual core of a category”. The more similar an entity to the
prototype, the more central its status within the category. Attributes are weighted in
terms of perceptual and cognitive salience. In this connection, Langacker (1987) claims
that cognitive structures must be defined as holistic configurations and not as attribute
bundles. The more an entity resembles the prototype, the higher its degree of
representativeness within the category in question. Accordingly, we will find some poor

5
Taylor (1989: 40) restricts the term feature for properties of the classical approach. In non-classical
approaches, properties are dealt with under the rubric of attributes. For more details, see Taylor (1989:
59-65).
examples of a category inasmuch as they differ from the prototype. By way of
illustration, take the classical example of bird. While a robin will be a representative or
good member of the category bird, an ostrich will be a poor example, since it does not
display a very high degree of resemblance to the prototypical bird. Yet it belongs to the
category. In this same line, Labov’s (1973) studies on the categorization of household
receptacles shed new light on prototype theory. In spite of these recent assumptions, we
must emphasize that there exist some categories (for instance, odd and even numbers)
which are subject to both expert and folk definitions, the former hinging upon necessary
and sufficient conditions for category membership, the latter on our conception of
prototypes. Finally, the existence of linguistic hedges6 (e.g. loosely speaking or strictly
speaking) confirms the idea that there are different linguistic resources for expressing
degree of category membership. The presence of hedges renders the classical theory of
categorization invalid.

b) As opposed to classical features, attributes in the prototype view are not abstract in
nature. A sound theory of categorization cannot be limited to the consideration of
tangible properties. Instead, attributes can also be functional, regarding the use to which
objects are put, or interactional, since they are handled by people. In taking up Labov’s
(1973) studies on household receptacles, cups were not only categorized in terms of size
or shape but also in terms of their function and of their relationship with other real
world entities. In other words, objects are not categorized as if they were isolated
entities but as if they pertained to a whole network of associations by virtue of their
function and relationship with other objects in the world. Moreover, notice should be
taken of the culture within which an object is put to use (see Wierzbicka 1985 for
further discussion). Attributes do not correspond to semantic primitives, that is, to
undecomposable building blocks.

c) Finally, Labov’s experiments lend credence to the idea that no single attribute is
essential for distinguishing one category from another. In other words, no attribute can
be regarded as necessary or sufficient, as was the case in the classical approach to
categorization.

6
For a detailed account of the highly heterogeneous group of hedges, see Lakoff (1972). In his 1972
paper, Lakoff lists over sixty English hedges: sentence adjuncts (e.g. loosely speaking, strictly speaking),
conjunctions (e.g. in that), modifiers (e.g. so-called), graphological devices (e.g. inverted commas), or
certain intonation patterns (e.g. a 'liberal' politician). Taylor (1989: 76-80) discusses the relationship
between hedges and prototypes.
 Both Bloomfield (1933) and Gleason (1955) assert that categorization is arbitrary.
This is reminiscent of Saussure’s theory. Saussure claimed that the linguistic sign is
arbitrary and that language is an autonomous system. Structuralists uphold the view that
all terms and referents pertaining to a system have equal status and that it is the
language system and not individual terms that are the object of linguistic study. As has
been remarked, Aristotle and his followers defined categories in terms of necessary and
sufficient features. These features are binary. Furthermore, all members of the same
category have equal status. The foregoing account has been initially challenged by
Cruse’s (1986) incorporation of encyclopaedic knowledge into word definitions.
Moreover, Wittgenstein (1953) was one of the first scholars who began to question
some of the Aristotelian long-standing assumptions when talking about family
resemblances. This means that categories are structured by a criss-crossing network of
similarities. Austin (1961) applied Wittgenstein’s findings to the study of words. In this
connection, he talks about central and non-central senses of words. What he calls the
primary nuclear sense corresponds to contemporary central or prototypical senses.
Zadeh (1965) set the precedent for fuzzy set theory on the grounds that categories do
not possess clear-cut boundaries, but fuzzy limits. Furthermore, Lounsbury’s (1964)
studies on American Indian kinship systems shed new light on categorization based on
prototypes. According to Lounsbury, a given category can be generated by a generator
together with rules. Against the structuralist view, Berlin and Kay (1969) talked about
basic colour terms and focal colours. In investing their research with empirical rigour,
they established the notions of centrality and gradience. Kay and McDaniel (1978)
briefly hinted at the embodied nature of concepts and at the essential role that
embodiment plays when determining centrality. Brown (1958, 1965) set the precedent
for the study of basic level categories. Ekman (1971), and Ekman and his associates
(Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 1972) proved that some universal basic human
emotions have physical correlates in facial expressions and the autonomic nervous
system. In addition, they claimed that emotional concepts are embodied. Finally, Rosch
(1973, 1977, 1978) developed prototype theory. Rosch believes that focal colours are
more salient than non-focal colours both perceptually and cognitively. Moreover, colour
categories (and any other kind of category) are postulated to have a centre and a
periphery and they do not form a system in the sense proposed by Saussure.
 The prototype theory of categorization has also received criticism. According to
Coseriu (1990), prototype theory has been applied to those cases which best suit the
theory and not to abstract categories. Wierzbicka (1990) argues that we should avoid
abusing the concept of prototype as an excuse for not defining some word meanings.
She has also offered a critical reappraisal of some of the most popular examples of
prototype categories in the literature, like the concept of bachelor and the meanings of
bird and lie (see also Wierzbicka 1996: 148-157). Some recent criticism to prototype
theory has been summarized by Löbner (2002: 186-191). This author, after offering a
description of prototypes in chapter 2 of the semantics overview, states that cognitive
semanticists are to blame for misunderstanding some of the points of the classical
theory of categorization. For instance, Gutiérrez (2002: 372) argues, when the followers
of the Aristotelian tradition stated that all the members of a category have the same
status, they meant that all of them shared a series of attributes that made them belong to
that category in question. Löbner (2002) offers a summary of some challenges to
prototype theory in connection with graded membership and fuzzy boundaries. This
author claims that in order to solve these problems, some authors like Lakoff (1987)
have resorted to talk about prototype effects instead of prototypes in relation to graded
category structure (see Löbner 2002: 191).

2.3. The hierarchical organization of categories

The way we categorize entities exhibits different levels of generality. Take the
following examples:

musical instrument

trumpet saxophone piano

Jazz Bach soprano alto grand upright

trumpet trumpet sax. sax. piano piano

Figure 1: Categories of musical instruments (Löbner 2002: 184)

 animals

birds mammals reptiles

cats dogs ...

terriers

Scotch terriers bull terriers

Figure 2: Categories of animals

The principle underlying this and similar hierarchical structures is the notion of
class inclusion. Ungerer and Schmid (1996) hold that the whole range of concrete
entities in the world seems to be subject to be hierarchically ordered according to this
principle.

Different levels of genericity can be distinguished regarding our categorization of

entities. Three different levels of categorization have been distinguished:

• superordinate level
• basic or generic level
• subordinate level

By virtue of the principle of class inclusion, the superordinate class includes all
items on the basic and subordinate levels. Likewise, the generic level comprises all
items found in the subordinate level.

The classical model of categorization was conscious of the hierarchical structure

of categories. Nevertheless, the awareness that the basic or generic level somehow
displayed cognitive salience did not come until Rosch and her associates carried out a
series of experiments (see Rosch et al. 1976)7. Rosch’s findings belie the classical
assumption that no special status should be assigned to any particular level of
categorization. On the contrary, there exists evidence which shows that the basic level is
cognitively and linguistically more salient than the others. Ungerer and Schmid (1996)
even state that both the superordinate and the subordinate levels are cases of parasitic
categorization. This entails that these two levels borrow gestalt properties from the basic
or generic level of categorization. Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 66) point to three reasons
for the primacy of the generic level:

• The focus in folk taxonomies is on the generic level, mainly because it is usually
salient in cultural terms and on some occasions rooted in basic biological needs.

• This level is the first to which we resort when naming situations. Additionally,
the morphological structure of generic categories is simple.

• Finally, non-generic levels seem to be considered secondary, since they are not
fully developed where no additional categorization is needed.

Moreover, the generic level has proved to meet the principle of cognitive
economy, since this is the level at which the largest amount of information may be
retrieved with the least cognitive effort. In other words, it conforms to the Principle of
Relevance as proposed by Sperber and Wilson.

In brief, these are the most relevant characteristics of the basic level according to
Lakoff:

“... categories "in the middle" of a hierarchy are the most basic, relative to a variety of
psychological criteria: gestalt perception, the ability to form a mental image, motor interactions,
and ease of learning, remembering, and use. Most knowledge is organized at this level.” (Lakoff
1987: 56)

The main reason for the creation of superordinate lexical categories is, as
postulated by Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 78-79), the “highlighting of salient general,
and mostly functional, attributes”. Additionally, they are endowed with the so-called

7
Berlin and his co-workers (1974) had already noticed the centrality of basic level categories by studying
the taxonomy of Tzeltal people. In this same line, the contributions made by Brown (1958, 1965), among
others, were of the utmost importance. For a thorough analysis of their insights, see Lakoff (1987: 31-38)
and Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 63-66).
collecting function, according to which by means of a single label they are able to
assemble a large number of categories.

Finally, the subordinate level of categorization is used whenever it allows us to be

more specific in our organization of knowledge8.

SUMMARY:

So far, you should be able to have a command over the following

points:

- Objectivism and experientialism are two philosophical traditions

which provide the main foundations for linguistics, mathematics,
physics, and so on.

- Objectivism is related to formal theories of linguistics like

Generative Grammar in which the main focus is on the grammatical
issues of language to the exclusion of semantics and pragmatics,
which are relegated to a second position. The main interest is in the
search for generalizations and peripheral issues are considered
unimportant. In contrast, experientialism is the framework in which
Cognitive Linguistics can develop because of its emphasis on the
semantic and pragmatic aspects of language and on the peripheral
aspects of language.

- The classical theory of categorization follows the underpinnings of

objectivism. In it, categories are described in terms of binary features.
On the other hand, prototype theory, which draws on the main tenets
of experientialism and is central to Cognitive Linguistics, deals with
categorization in terms of prototypes and categories are defined in
terms of the degree of approximation to an ideal.

8
For the sake of brevity, we have characterized these three levels of categorization in rather a superficial
way. For more information on this subject, see Rosch et al. (1976), Lakoff (1987: 46-55), Taylor (1989:
46-51), and the detailed account provided by Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 60-113).
 - Finally, the hierarchical organization of categories within Cognitive
Linguistics takes place at three levels: the superordinate, basic or
generic, and subordinate levels.

NOW YOU ARE READY TO DO EXERCISES 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, AND

9

3. Idealized Cognitive Models

3.1. Definition of Idealized Cognitive Model

The notion of idealized cognitive model is crucial to the cognitive framework.

According to Lakoff (1987: 68), ICMs are the way in which we organize our
knowledge. ICMs may be defined as cognitive structures whose purpose is to represent
reality from a certain perspective, in such a way that they result in a process of
idealization of reality (see Lakoff 1987, 1989). Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 48-49)
focus their attention on some additional characteristics of cognitive models: first, they
are basically open-ended. Second, they tend to build networks since they are interrelated
entities. Finally, they are omnipresent. Each ICM uses four kinds of structuring
principles (see Lakoff 1987: 68):

• Propositional structure as in Fillmore’s Frame Semantics.

• Image-schematic structure as in Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar.

• Metaphoric and metonymic mappings as described by Lakoff and Johnson.

According to Ruiz de Mendoza (1996a: 343) a distinction can be made between

operational and non-operational cognitive models. The former (metaphor and
metonymy) make use of the latter (propositions and image-schemas). Another
difference must be noted between these models proposed by Lakoff: while image-
schemas are abstract cognitive constructs, the other models are more concrete. This has
led Ruiz de Mendoza to draw another distinction between abstract and non-abstract
cognitive models. One of the initial ideas for Peña’s (2003) work has been the way
metaphor, as an operational model, is based on the conceptual layout provided by
image-schemas. Furthermore, the generic structure of these experiential patterns has
enabled Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 289) to suggest that they prototypically serve both as
one of the input spaces cued by image-schematic metaphorical expressions and as the
basic blueprint for the projection and combination of information recruited from other
non-generic ICMs. It is due to the belief in the fuzzy boundaries between categories,
which argues in favour of the existence of cognitive continua, that the different kinds of
model proposed by Lakoff mesh. For instance, the domains involved in the construction
of metaphor and metonymy are either propositional models or image-schemas which
can be enriched by means of propositional structure as well. In fact, the relationship
between propositional knowledge and image-schematic structure is a difficult issue to
handle in which the notions of fuzzy boundaries and cognitive continua should be taken
into consideration. As will be studied in section 3.4.2, the built-in basic logic of image-
schemas takes propositional form. This causes some degree of fuzziness between these
two categories which is solved by postulating a cognitive continuum where occurrences
vary along a scale whose extremes are represented by the more abstract structure of
propositions to the more concrete nature of image-schemas. We might even dare to say
that the frequent use of image-schematic structure may make these cognitive constructs
crystallize into propositions. The non-discrete boundary between metaphor and
metonymy, which will be covered in section 3.3.3, is another phenomenon which
testifies to the cognitive belief in the fuzziness of categories and in cognitive continua.

3.2. Propositional ICMs

3.2.1. Lakoff’s conception of propositional ICMs

When dealing with propositional structure, Lakoff draws many of his ideas from
Minsky’s (1975) frames, Rumelhart’s (1975) schemas, Schank and Abelson’s (1977)
scripts, and Fillmore’s (1982) frames. The study of Frame Semantics is usually traced to
those scholars working on psychology and Artificial Intelligence. Some psychologists
did not like formal proposals which were almost componentialist in their formulations.
In the mid 1970s, authors like Schank, Abelson, Minsky, and Rumelhart developed
theories of knowledge organization which tried to look beyond the minimalist approach
of linguistics and psychology. They developed the notions of frames and scripts. The
former can be defined as knowledge networks which link a series of domains relative to
a given linguistic form. The latter are regarded as temporal sequencing and causal
relations linking events and states within given action frames. One of the crucial
differences between frames and scripts is that while frames seem to be rather static in
nature, scripts are more dynamic. According to Rumelhart (1975), a schema is a
network of nodes and links. In sum, all these entities (frames, scripts, schemas) refer to
theoretical constructs produced on an ad hoc basis, that is, just for the purpose of the
moment. Fillmore (1985) introduced the notion of frames into linguistics as knowledge
frameworks. By way of illustration, consider the analysis Lakoff (1987: 74-76) makes
of the concept mother. Lakoff (1987: 70) claims that interaction among schemas is a
source of prototype effects. One case of prototype effects is provided by the concept
mother. According to Lakoff (1987: 74), it is a cluster model consisting of a grouping of
cognitive models. The birth, genetic, nurturance, marital, and genealogical models make
up the cluster.

• The birth model: the person who gives birth is the mother.

The birth model is usually accompanied by a genetic model, although since the development
of egg and embryo implants, they do not always coincide.

• The genetic model: the female who contributes the genetic material is the mother.

• The nurturance model: the female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the mother of
that child.

• The marital model: the wife of the father is the mother.

• The genealogical model: the closest female ancestor is the mother. (Lakoff 1987: 75)

Compare this analysis of mother to the classical analysis in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. The classical definition would say something similar to this: a
mother is a woman who has given birth to a child. By examining the models listed by
Lakoff above, we necessarily conclude that the classical definition leaves aside many
aspects of the concept of mother which are crucial to its analysis. Consider for instance
the following example:

Example: My real mother died when I was an embryo, and I was frozen and later implanted
in the womb of the woman who gave birth to me.

The classical definition would not apply to this example because the person who
really contributed the genetic material is not the same as the person who has given birth
to the child. However, the definition of mother as a cluster would combine two models
in order to yield a complete analysis of this example: the genetic and the birth models.
In fact, the classical definition only pays attention to the birth model to the exclusion of
the other models which form the cluster.

From the preceding discussion, we might conclude that two fundamental features
of clusters are the convergence of models they involve, as well as the set of
interrelationships established among such models. It usually happens that one model is
more relevant than the others9. On some occasions there exist strong parameters that
make one of the models more outstanding than the rest (see Pérez 1996 for further
discussion). For example, we tend to see the birth and nurturance models as having the
most weight and they usually come together.

The propositional ICMs proposed by Lakoff are more comprehensive and general
than scripts, frames, scenarios, radial categories, etc. Lakoff’s propositional structure
constitutes some kind of structuring principle together with image-schematic,
metaphorical, and metonymic structure. This is the way Lakoff defines propositional
ICMs:

“By a propositional ICM, I mean one that does not use imaginative devices, i.e., metaphor,
metonymy, or mental imagery. Each ICM has an ontology and a structure. The ontology is the set
of elements used in the ICM. The structure consists of the properties of the elements and the
relations obtaining among the elements.” (Lakoff 1987: 285)

Lakoff (1987: 284) distinguishes five types of propositional ICM:

• Proposition.
• Scenario or script.
• Feature bundle.
• Taxonomy.
• Radial category.

Let us briefly describe them. First, the structure of the simple proposition consists
of an ontology of elements (called the arguments) plus a basic predicate holding of the
arguments. Thus a PART-WHOLE schema10 underlies the structure of propositions. In

9
We differ in this respect from Lakoff’s (1987: 74-76) opinion, since he seems to give the same weight to
all the models.
10
For a thorough description of image-schemas see section 3.4.
them, a proposition is the whole and the predicate and arguments represent the parts
which make up the whole. Moreover, there can exist semantic relations among the
arguments: there may be an agent, a patient, an instrument, a location, etc. Up to now
we have been talking about simple propositions but there are also complex propositions,
which may be formed from simple ones by means of such devices as modification,
quantification, complementation, etc.

The scenario displays the following ontology: an initial state, a sequence of

events, and a final state. Making a similar parallelism to the one provided in the case of
propositions, a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema in the time domain underlies the
structure of scenarios in general. In it:

• The initial state is mapped onto the source.

• The final state is mapped onto the destination.

• The events are mapped onto the locations on the path.

Other elements in the scenario are people, things, properties, relations, and
propositions. We have again relations holding among such elements of the ontology:
causal relations, identity relations, etc. Scenarios also have a purpose structure in the
sense that the purposes of people are specified in the scenario.

A collection of properties constitutes a feature bundle. From a structural point of

view, the bundle can be metaphorically seen as a container containing such properties.
As can be observed, classical categories can be represented by feature bundles.

Both classical categories and classical taxonomies are inventions of humans. In

this sense, we can say that each classical taxonomy constitutes an idealized cognitive
model or a hierarchical structure of classical categories. In any taxonomy, the elements
of the ontology are categories. Each of these categories is represented structurally by a
CONTAINER schema and the PART-WHOLE and UP-DOWN schemas underlie the
structure of the hierarchy. That is to say, each higher-order category is regarded as a
whole and the immediately lower categories are the parts. If each of these categories is
classical, then they are defined by feature bundles and the feature bundles which
characterize lower-level categories include all the features of the bundles characterizing
higher-level categories. A classical taxonomy attempts to encompass all the entities
belonging to a given domain11.

Finally, a radial category can be represented as a container and its subcategories

can be regarded as being located inside it. Moreover, its structure is guided by the
CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema since one category is the centre and the subcategories
are peripheral elements linked to the centre by several types of links. By way of
illustration, let us consider the category mother again.

“The category mother… is structured radially with respect to a number of its subcategories: there
is a central subcategory, defined by a cluster of cognitive models (the birth model, the nurturance
model, etc.); in addition, there are noncentral extensions which are not specialized instances of the
central subcategory, but rather are variants of it (adoptive mother, birth mother, foster mother,
surrogate mother, etc.). These variants are not generated from the central model by general rules;
instead, they are extended by convention and must be learned one by one. But the extensions are
by no means random. The central model determines the possibilities for extensions, together with
the possible relations between the central model and the extension models. We will describe the
extensions of a central model as being motivated by the central model plus certain general
principles of extension.” (Lakoff 1987: 91)

According to Lakoff, the concept of mother is a radial category in which we have

a central sense and different peripheral senses. These peripheral senses are variants of
the central sense and are extended by means of such devices as metaphor or metonymy
among others. For instance, when we say that necessity is the mother of invention we
are using the term mother metaphorically.

3.2.2. Langacker’s theory: the notions of domain, profile, base, domain matrix,
basic domains, and primary and secondary domains

Langacker has observed that what he calls domain overlaps to a large extent with such
concepts as frames, scripts, schemata, scenarios, or idealized cognitive models. That is
the reason why we study in this section the concepts of domain, profile, base, domain
matrix, basic domains, and primary and secondary domains.

Taylor (1989: 83) asserts that meanings do not exist in themselves. In other
words, he thinks that meaning is context-dependent, that context plays a very important
role in the determination of meaning. Cognitivists and structuralists agree that this is
true. However, while structuralists think that context dependency is determined by the
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations between signs within the linguistic system,

11
In section 2.3, it is contended that the subordinate term encompasses the entire domain. And each
category in the hierarchy has its own characteristics and inherits the ones of higher-order categories.
cognitivists believe that the context from which meaning arises is external to the
language system as such and that meanings are cognitive structures which partake in
patterns of knowledge and belief. For instance, Bickerton (1981: 230ff) exemplifies the
structuralist belief in the language internal nature of context. This author claimed that
the meaning of toothbrush is delimited by the meanings of other elements in the
linguistic system such as nailbrush and hairbrush. A cognitivist would say that a person
who does not have the words nailbrush and hairbrush in his/her vocabulary can
understand the meaning of toothbrush since its meaning stems from the role of
toothbrushes in dental hygiene and not from paradigmatic contrasts with other items
belonging to the language system.

Taylor (1989: 84) points out that the meaning of a linguistic form can be only
understood in the context of other cognitive structures. For instance, Saturday can only
be understood in the context of the concept week. In turn, week is explicated in the
context of the recurring day-night cycle and the concepts day, week, and Saturday are
understood in the context of the concept of time. In Langacker’s terms, we would say
that the seven-day week constitutes a semantic domain in terms of which we understand
Saturday and that the day-night cycle is the domain against which we understand week.

In this connection, the notion of profiling or highlighting proves fundamental

since Langacker observes that the meaning of a linguistic form derives from profiling or
highlighting a particular region or configuration in the relevant domain. For example,
the concepts week, day, and Saturday arise when a bounding schema profiles or
highlights bounded regions in the domain of time. The distinction between profile and
base has also been put forward by Langacker. In this case, Saturday would profile the
24-hour period (day) against the base of the seven-day week. In addition, Langacker
(1987: 147) has defined matrix as the group of domains which provide the context for
the understanding of a given semantic unit. For instance, Taylor (2002: 200) observes
that the concept of Saturday involves a rich network of domain-based knowledge
including:
• “the practice of designating the day-night cycle as a ‘day’, which is conventionally taken
to begin at a point (‘midnight’) which is mid-way between successive high points of the
sun;
• the convention of grouping days, as characterized above, into a seven-unit cycle, the idea
of the seven-day cycle going back, ultimately, to the Biblical creation story;
• the convention of naming the component units of the cycle;
• the idea that different units of the cycle may be suitable for different kinds of activities,
such as work, recreation, or devotion.
 Ultimately, the domain matrix against which Saturday profiles a 24-hour period reaches into many
aspects of our culture: astronomy, history, religion, work, time-measuring devices, recreational
practices. The word nicely illustrates the encyclopaedic nature of linguistic meaning.” (Taylor
2002: 200)

It is important to distinguish between profile and base. The profile of an

expression is the conceptual content that the expression invokes inherently, intrinsically,
and obligatorily. The domain constitutes a more generalized background knowledge
configuration against which conceptualization is achieved. As usually happens in
language, distinctions are not always clear-cut but fuzzy and on some occasions we find
it difficult to distinguish between profile and base. By way of illustration, take the case
of father. This word profiles an adult male human. As a base, the notion of a relation
between a profiled individual and one or several individuals (the father’s offspring) is
invoked by this word. If there are no offspring, a person cannot be regarded as a father;
a father has to be the father of someone. Nevertheless, the notion of the father-child
relation itself (which is the conceptual content of the base) is based on more general
notions of kinship, genealogy, gender, and procreation. Concepts like father, son, aunt,
etc. are characterized in terms of the idea of a kinship network which constitutes a
domain. Below we reproduce a figure which graphically illustrates the notions of
profile, base, and domain.

d’’

d’ P
B

d’’’

Figure 3: Profile, base, and domain (Taylor 2002: 197)

 Note: A linguistic unit profiles an entity P (represented by the bold circle); profiling takes
place against a base B (represented by the box); the profile-base relation is conceptualized
against overlapping configurations of knowledge, called domains (represented by the
overlapping circles).

In this figure, the profile-base matrix is conceptualized against the domain matrix
constituted by the three domains called d’, d’’, and d’’’. As has been remarked, the
concept father profiles an adult male human and is represented by P in the figure. The
base B might be identified with the relation between the profiled element and a child or
more children. Finally, ‘kinship’, ‘family unit’, and ‘living thing’ constitute three
possible domains which overlap partially and against which the profile can be
characterized.

Langacker’s (1987: 148) term basic domains can be illustrated by time and three-
dimensional space. Basic domains can be defined as concepts which cannot be reduced
to other more primitive cognitive structures. Other examples of basic domains are
spatial terms like boundedness, part-whole, containment, up-down, sensory experiences
like temperature, colour, taste, and pitch, and some psychological states such as pleasure
and enthusiasm.

In figure 3, we have seen that the concept of father is characterized against more
than a single domain. This happens on many occasions. Domains overlap and interact in
several ways. For instance, Taylor (2002: 197) analyzes the concept of father in the
following way:

“Consider again the concept [FATHER]. I stated that the concept is understood against the domain
of a kinship network. While this aspect certainly captures an important facet of the concept, other
domains are involved as well. For example, a father is a physical being, with weight and
dimensions; he is a living being, who was born, grew up, ages, and will die; he has a characteristic
role within a family unit, and is expected to display a certain behaviour towards other members of
the unit; and so on. Physical object, living thing, and family unit each constitutes a domain against
which [FATHER] is conceptualized. If we examine any one of these domains, we typically find
that it relates with other domains. The notion of kinship, for example, rests on notions of gender,
procreation, and family units; gender, in turn, is the domain against which a father is characterized
as male.” (Taylor 2002: 197)

Another example is golfball. This concept is characterized against several

domains simultaneously; these are shape (golfballs are bounded items in three-
dimensional space), colour, size, material, rules of the game of golf, etc. In the same
way, Saturday is not only the sixth day of the week, it must be also understood against
the domain which makes reference to the division of the week into periods of leisure
and periods of work, etc. On some occasions, one of the domains against which a given
lexical item is characterized is more salient than others which also help understand such
a lexical item. As a consequence, Langacker (1987: 165) distinguishes between primary
and secondary domains. Consider the concept salt. In its everyday sense, it is primarily
related to the domain of food (salt is an ingredient we add to some food in order to
enhance its flavour) and only secondarily to its chemical composition. However, the
term sodium chloride, in spite of having the same reference as salt, is primarily
associated with the chemical composition of this substance and only secondarily with
the domain of food additive.

We have already studied the concept of mother in section 3.2.1. This has been
proved to be a lexical item which is understood in terms of several domains
simultaneously. These domains are the genetic domain, the birth domain, the nurturance
domain, the genealogical domain, and the marital domain. The concept of father is
similar to the concept of mother in the sense that it is also characterized against several
domains at the same time. Taylor (1989: 86) lists five domains:

• The genetic domain. A father is a male who contributes genetic material to a child.

• The responsibility domain. The father is financially responsible for the well-being of the
mother and the child.

• The authority domain. The father is a figure of authority, responsible for the discipline of
the child.

• The genealogical domain. The father is the closest male ancestor.

• The marital domain. The father is the husband of the mother.

Once more, we can state that the classical account of categorization fails when it
comes to define concepts in terms of binary features. The concepts mother and father
would have to differ from one another only in terms of the feature [± MALE] according
to the classical approach to categorization but from the analysis above we can say that
this is not the case. The two concepts can only be compared with respect to the genetic,
genealogical, and marital domains.

3.3. Metaphor and metonymy

3.3.1. The objectivist conception vs. the cognitive account of metaphor and metonymy

The theories of metaphor and metonymy before the advent of Cognitive Linguistics
seem to be flawed in some respects. Their drawbacks mainly derive from their
commitment to the objectivist paradigm, which has been covered in section 2. In
general, all these approaches seem to make a clear-cut distinction between literal and
metaphorical language. They also tend to conceive of the metaphorical phenomenon as
a deviant use of language which should be kept apart from ordinary discourse, and
specially from such purported objective realms as science or politics. Moreover, it is
mainly those metaphors taking the form A is B (for instance, John is a bull) that are
analyzed, while those displaying a non-equative formula receive scant attention (for
instance, We are going nowhere in our relationship). All these problems are solved by
making an alternative proposal to objectivism which has been labelled experientialism.
The cognitive account of metaphor (and metonymy) will be shown to be based on it.
This approach will surmount all these difficulties by introducing such notions as fuzzy
boundaries and cognitive continua, which allow cognitive linguists to reject the
traditional distinction literal vs. metaphorical owing to the non-discrete nature attributed
to categories.

Cognitivists do not agree with the idea that both metaphor and metonymy are a
matter of words (i.e. linguistic devices). They assert that metaphor and metonymy are a
matter of thought, conceptual mechanisms we use everyday in order to communicate
our ideas. The linguistic level is only one of the aspects of metaphor and metonymy.
There exist two levels involved in both of them:

• The conceptual level, which in Cognitive Linguistics is represented by the use of

capital letters and takes the form A IS B in the case of metaphor and A FOR B in
the case of metonymy. This level encompasses a range of linguistic expressions.

• The linguistic level is constituted by all the linguistic expressions which belong
to a given conceptual metaphor or metonymy.

Let us exemplify these two levels.

Example of a metaphor:

• Conceptual level: LOVE IS A JOURNEY

• Linguistic level: we are going nowhere in our relationship, we are spinning our
wheels, we are at a crossroads
Example of a metonymy:

• Conceptual level: PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT

• Linguistic level: Downing Street has made no comment, I bought a Ford last
month

According to cognitivists, both metaphor and metonymy are ubiquitous in

language and cognition in general. They are different ways of conceptualizing our
experience. A metaphor is understood as a mapping or set of correspondences across
conceptual domains (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999, Lakoff and Turner 1989,
Lakoff 1993, 1996). There is a source domain and a target domain. The conceptual
structure of the source is used to understand and talk about the target. On the other
hand, in metonymy it is a mapping within domains that is involved. The role of
metonymy in cognition has received less extensive treatment than that of metaphor.
However, fairly recent studies have assigned metonymy a special status (see, for
instance, Ruiz de Mendoza 2000). The first attempts to deal with this phenomenon have
focused on its definition by setting it in contrast to metaphor (see Dirven 1993) or to
different polysemy phenomena (see Croft 1993). The main concern nowadays is with
the interaction between metaphor and metonymy (see Goossens 1990, Turner and
Fauconnier 2000), with the metonymic motivation of metaphor (see Barcelona 2000,
Radden 2000), and with its role in inferential activity and understanding (see Gibbs
1994, Thornburg and Panther 1997, Panther and Thornburg 1998, Ruiz de Mendoza
2000).

Basic conceptual metaphors and metonymies pertain to the common conceptual

apparatus shared by members of a culture. These metaphors and metonymies are
systematic, experientially bound, unconscious, cognitively automatic, and widely
conventionalized in language. In turning back to the traditional idea that metaphor and
metonymy are a matter of words, it could be objected that if this were true, each
different linguistic expression should give rise to a different metaphor or metonymy,
which is not the case. In contrast to the traditional theory, cognitivists have found
metaphor and metonymy to be mainly a matter of thought, and only secondarily a
matter of language. In this connection, our conceptual system is claimed to be
metaphorical in nature. For example, in order to express our emotions it is necessary to
resort to metaphor and to metonymy, as is attested by Kövecses’ (1990, 2000, 2002)
works. In this connection, Lakoff and Johnson state that:

“... metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than
thought or action... We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life...
Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally
metaphorical in nature.” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3)

For cognitive linguists, metaphor and metonymy are not rhetorical figures which
should be relegated to the confines of poetry. No doubt, poets make use of metaphor in
a different way, but their means are the same as the ones we have at our disposal to
build metaphorical expressions. Lakoff and Turner (1989) claim that poets and the rest
of people make use of the same resources. However, they usually take one of these three
stances towards metaphor (this can also be applied to metonymy):

“The first is simply to versify them in automatic ways... The second is to deploy them masterfully,
combining them, extending them, and crystallizing them in strong images... The third stance is to
attempt to step outside the ordinary ways we think metaphorically and either to offer new modes
of metaphorical thought or to make the use of our conventional basic metaphors less automatic by
employing them in unusual ways, or otherwise to destabilize them and thus reveal their
inadequacies for making sense of reality.” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 50-51)

The traditional objectivist idea that metaphorical and metonymic language is

deviant has received criticism (see Lakoff 1987). This amounts to stating that much
language is deviant since language is full of metaphorical (and metonymic) occurrences.
For example, conceiving of love as a journey is one of the normal and everyday ways
we have of conceptualizing this emotion. If metaphor and metonymy are a way of
thinking, then these devices must be present even in two realms which were regarded as
objective in the traditional view: politics and science12. Ungerer and Schmid wonder
whether metaphors in science are explanatory or constitutive. First, they state that
metaphors are ubiquitous in science and that many of them have an explanatory
function above all. For instance, this is the case with most metaphors used in computer
science. According to Ungerer and Schmid:

“… many user-friendly programs provide a surface screen which establishes a metaphorical link
with the category OFFICE. The screen is a desktop that can be tidied up, there are folders for filing
items, a clipboard where items can be temporarily stored, windows that can be opened and closed,
and a trash can into which superfluous items are dropped.” (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 147)

12
For a good compendium of papers dealing with metaphors and politics, see Mio and Katz (1996: 127-
201). Lakoff (1992) himself has written a paper about the metaphors used in talking about the war in the
Gulf. Another collection of articles edited by Ortony (1993) in relation to metaphor and science includes
contributions by Gentner and Jeziorski, Boyd, Kuhn, and Pylyshyn.
 This metaphor can be called COMPUTER WORK IS OFFICE WORK and has an
evident pedagogic value, especially if compared to the non-metaphorical complex
commands used in specialist programs (e.g. CLS for ‘clear screen’, MD for ‘make
directory’, etc.).

Programs also make use of animal and illness metaphors. Consider for example
the category COMPUTER MOUSE. By metaphorically naming this way the trackball
tool used in computers, we can understand all the necessary instructions of such a
device without needing explanations about the abstract principle behind it.

Another area where metaphor proves useful to understand certain complex and/or
abstract concepts is the malfunctioning of computer programs. For instance, the BUG
metaphor is used when something goes wrong in a program and the VIRUS metaphor is
used when something goes wrong with a computer and this is compared with the
mysterious and invisible spread of viruses which cause infection in humans or animals.
By means of these metaphors the average user of computers can understand certain
unknown or abstract concepts of this area. Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 148) argue that
for computer users these metaphors are not only explanatory but also constitutive for the
conceptualization of computer malfunctioning.

On the other hand, computer scientists are interested in (and look for) more
precise explanations of these metaphors than the average user, who only wants to
understand these concepts in a superficial way and does not intend to go beyond a lay
explanation of the concepts. For computer scientists the VIRUS and other metaphors are
explanatory rather than constitutive and are very useful when computer scientists are
confronted with lay audiences. However this is not always the case since on some
occasions there are some metaphors in the field of natural science which are constitutive
not just for popular but also for scientific models.

The physicist Bohr developed the orbit model of the atom. As can be seen in
figure 4 below, it consists of nucleus and electrons. This model can be explained by
making use of a parallelism with the interaction between the sun and the planets. In
other words, by resorting to the metaphor THE ATOM IS A (MINIATURE) SOLAR
SYSTEM. As was the case with the VIRUS metaphor, the SOLAR SYSTEM metaphor
has both an explanatory function and a constitutive function (take into account that this
metaphor can contribute to the popular theory about the model of the atom in important
ways) for the non-specialist.

NUCLEUS
ELECTRON = SUN
= PLANET

Figure 4: The structure of the atom as explained by the metaphor THE ATOM IS A (MINIATURE)
SOLAR SYSTEM (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 148)

By way of conclusion, Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 149) observe that while for the
layman conceptual metaphors have both an explanatory and constitutive function, they
usually have a constitutive function for the specialist.

We have seen that science is full of metaphorical language. Now we consider

politics in order to prove that this is also an area where metaphorical language plays a
very important role. We have to take into account that the purpose of political rhetoric is
persuasion. As a consequence, the explanatory function of metaphors is relegated to a
less important position in favour of their emotional impact. One of the metaphors which
politicians use very frequently is THE COUNTRY IS A PERSON THAT IS ILL. The
combination of this metaphor with the PART WHOLE metonymy yields the following
examples:

Ailments in a country gradually stain the whole country.

If limbs are severely damaged the whole body is disabled. If regions are left to rot the whole
country is weakened.

Unemployment is a contagious disease. It doesn’t stop at the borders of economic regions. It

infects the whole economic body.

There is no… vaccine to inoculate the country against the spread of shut down. (Ungerer and
Schmid 1996: 150)

As happened with the computer user, the average voter understands the message
the politician wants to convey by means of a rich but rather vague metaphor. Metaphor
plays a constitutive role in these cases.
 Ungerer and Schmid say that it is difficult to know whether politicians distinguish
between explanatory metaphors and theories based on non-metaphorical factual
analysis. But they state that there exist a set of conceptual metaphors, called ‘expert
metaphors’, which influence both the layman’s thinking and the specialist’s
argumentation. For instance, the metaphor POLITICS IS BUSINESS helps understand
politics in terms of a normal activity, business.

Summing up, conceptual metaphors can have two main functions: explanatory
and constitutive. Explanatory metaphors help the layman understand complex scientific,
political, and social issues. Constitutive metaphors constitute an integral part of
theorizing about these issues.

3.3.2. Some basic notions in Cognitive Linguistics: source and target domains and
mappings

Even though we have been mentioning different metaphors (and also some metonymies)
we have not given names to the parts of which both metaphors and metonymies are
composed. As we will see later on, metaphor is a mapping across domains. These
domains are called source and target and the source, which is usually more concrete
than the target, helps us understand the target, which is usually more abstract in nature.
Metonymy is a mapping within domains. In it, a domain-subdomain relationship is
established. According to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 63-64), each metaphoric mapping
consists of the following parts:

• Slots in the source domain schema which are mapped onto slots in the target
domain.

• Relations in the source domain which are mapped onto relations in the target
domain.

• Properties in the source domain which are mapped onto properties in the target
domain.

• Knowledge in the source domain which is mapped onto knowledge in the target
domain.
 Let us explain this is more detail. In the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, ‘love’
is the target and ‘journey’ is the source. As is evident, love is a much more abstract and
complex concept than journey. Thus the source domain lends its structure to the source
in such a way that it allows us to understand an abstract concept in terms of another one
which we know better or which is more concrete.

In the metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, there is only one domain

(‘producer’) and a relationship is established between the whole domain and one of its
possible subdomains (‘product’) in such a way that a whole domain provides us with
conceptual access to one of its subdomains13.

Another important concept we have mentioned is mapping. A mapping is a set of

correspondences. In metaphor, there are usually several correspondences, whereas in the
case of metonymy, it is only one correspondence that is at work. The figures below
illustrate these points.

JOURNEY (source) LOVE (target)

Travellers Lovers

Path Love
relationship
Destination Marriage,
living
together...

Figure 5: LOVE IS A JOURNEY

PRODUCER
(source)

PRODUCT
(target)

13
When dealing with the kinds of metonymy we will observe that the contrary also holds. In other words,
a subdomain can provide conceptual access to a whole domain of experience.
 Figure 6: PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT

In these two figures, we have dealt with conceptual metaphors and metonymies
and not with their linguistic realizations. We now illustrate one linguistic example of
each of these devices.

JOURNEY (source) LOVE (target)

We Lovers

Path Love
relationship
Nowhere Unspecified
(No-
marriage,
no-living
together)

Figure 7: We are going nowhere in our relationship

Ford
(source)

car
(target)

Figure 8: I have bought a Ford

In figure 7, the expression We are going nowhere in this relationship, which

belongs to the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, is analyzed. ‘We’ is
mapped into the lovers, the metaphorical path implicit in the expression is the love
relationship and the destination does not exist (it is ‘nowhere’). The implications of this
destination is that the love relationship goes wrong. Destinations are usually mapped
onto purposes from a metaphorical point of view (take into account that in real life
when we go to some place we have some purpose. Maybe we want to buy something or
we want to visit someone, etc.). If there is no destination in a love relationship, it is
implied that the lovers will never marry or live together. Thus this expression is charged
with negative axiological values.

In figure 8, we have a linguistic instantiation of the metonymy PRODUCER FOR

PRODUCT. We mention the producer (‘Ford’) in order to make reference to one of its
products, in fact the most prominent one (‘a car’). In this case there is only one
correspondence involved, which was not the case in the metaphor We are going
nowhere in this relationship.

3.3.3. Demarcation problems between metaphor and metonymy

The demarcation problems between metaphor and metonymy are a major issue in
Cognitive Linguistics. As pointed out when discussing the topic of the definition of
Idealized Cognitive Models in section 3.1, it is not always possible to make clear-cut
distinctions. This is the case with metaphor and metonymy. The limits between these
two kinds of cognitive model is fuzzy. First, we must take into account Lakoff and
Turner’s (1989: 103) consideration of the main differences between metaphor and
metonymy:

• In metaphor there are two domains involved and one of them is understood in
terms of the other whereas in the case of metonymy there is only one domain
involved and the mapping occurs within a single domain, not across domains.

• Metaphor is used predicatively whereas metonymy is mainly apt for referential

use.

• Metonymy, but not metaphor, describes a stand-for relationship.

In contrast, Ruiz de Mendoza (1999a) has rejected the traditional distinction

between metaphor and metonymy, outlined by Lakoff and his followers (see Lakoff and
Johnson 1980: 36, Lakoff and Turner 1989: 103). Ruiz de Mendoza (1999a), in
following the tradition of other cognitive linguists, has also proposed that while
metaphor develops on the basis of mappings carried out across domains, in metonymy
source and target input spaces stand in an inclusion relationship. However, Ruiz de
Mendoza (1999a) has postulated that the kind of contextual effects obtained by the
convergence of different mental spaces and the amount and kind of material to be
included in them seems to be a function of the nature of the mappings. For him, this is
the criterial feature which helps us draw clearer dividing lines between these two
phenomena. His definition of metonymy reads as follows:

Thus, a metonymy may be defined as a one-correspondence conceptual mapping within a domain

where, if the target is part of the source, the target is not a primary or central subdomain of the
source. (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997b: 171)

Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002: 26-28) have criticized Lakoff and Turner’s
(1989) distinction between metaphor and metonymy on the basis of the following
points:

• There is no use in defining metonymy as primarily referential since metaphor

can also be used referentially. Take the example The pig is waiting for his check
as uttered by a waitress who is very annoyed because a male customer is too
keen on her. ‘The pig’ in this case makes reference to the male customer and
suggests that he behaves in an immoral or abusive way; this is a metaphor used
referentially; the expression That customer is a pig, which is used predicatively
instead of referentially, would convey the same meaning.

• It is possible to use a metonymy non-referentially (i.e. predicatively). Consider

the examples She is a real brain or She’s just a pretty face. In these two
examples, different parts of a person tell us something about her characteristics
(that she is very clever and that she is very beautiful). Moreover, in these two
metonymies neither the brain nor the face provide conceptual access to the
whole body. Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002: 27) conclude that “there is a
connection between the referential use of metonymy (and of metaphor) and the
‘stands for’ relationship”. In the example That customer is a pig ‘the pig’ stands
for the customer (in fact it refers to him). On the other hand, in She is a real
brain and She’s just a pretty face, which are non-referential occurrences of
metonymy, the body parts do not stand for the person who has them.
Nevertheless, it must be taken into consideration that the predicative use of
metonymy and the referential use of metaphor are very productive. We could
 say that there exists a cognitive continuum where the two extremes are
represented by the predicative use of metaphor and the referential use of
metonymy and between these two extremes there are other occurrences which
are less frequent (for instance, the predicative use of metonymy and the
referential use of metaphor). This could be graphically drawn as follows in
figure 9:

Predicative use of metaphor Referential use of metonymy

Predicative use metonymy Referential use of metaphor

Figure 9: The continuum between metaphor and metonymy

On the basis of these observations, Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal reach the following
conclusion regarding the difference between metaphor and metonymy:

“Since there are one-correspondence metaphors, and both metaphor and metonymy may be used
referentially and predicatively, the sole (and crucial) distinguishing feature between metaphor and
metonymy is to be found in the domain-internal nature of metonymic mappings which contrasts
with the domain-external nature of metaphoric mappings.” (Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal 2002: 53)

By domain-internal nature of metonymic mappings Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal

mean that the mapping takes place within a single domain, whereas in the case of
metaphor the nature of the mapping is external because there are two domains involved
and the mapping takes place across these domains (and not within a single domain).

3.3.4. Classification of metaphor

Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a) has set forth two criteria for a classification of metaphor
types: first, the formal features pertaining to the mapping process itself, and second, the
nature of the domains involved. A twofold division arises in considering the number of
mappings giving rise to a metaphor: one-correspondence and many-correspondence
metaphors. This distinction constitutes the basis against which he establishes a
continuum from metaphor to metonymy. In it, many-correspondence metaphoric
mappings would be at one extreme and referential uses of metonymy at the other, one-
correspondence metaphors and predicative uses of metonymy occupying the middle
position (see Ruiz de Mendoza 1999a). Note that prototypically metaphors are many-
correspondence mappings which are predicatively used and metonymies are identified
with one-correspondence mappings used for reference. Let us illustrate this by means of
two examples.

• We are going nowhere in this relationship.

• I have bought a Ford.

In figures 7 and 8, these examples have been analyzed. In the case of metaphor, a
set of correspondences is established (the travellers are the lovers, the path is the love
relationship, etc.) whereas in the case of metonymy only one correspondence is
established (the producer, Ford, is mapped onto one of its products, a car).

The other criterion for a classification of metaphor makes reference to the nature
of the domains (see Ruiz de Mendoza 1997a). In this sense, a threefold distinction is
posited by Lakoff and Johnson (1980): structural, orientational, and ontological
projections. Let us examine them in detail:

• Structural metaphors are those in which one concept is metaphorically structured

in terms of another. For instance, in the case of ARGUMENT IS WAR and its
linguistic realizations (your claims are indefensible, he attacked every weak
point in my argument, his criticisms were right on target, I demolished his
argument, etc.) the concept of war lends its conceptual structure to the concept
of argument, which is rather abstract in nature.

• Orientational metaphors are based on spatial orientation (up-down, front-back,

central-peripheral, etc.). For example, the metaphors HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS
DOWN and their linguistic instantiations (I’m feeling up, my spirits rose, you’re
in high spirits; I’m feeling down, my spirits sank, I fell into a depression, etc.)
are based on the up-down orientation and their physical basis is the fact that
drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression whereas erect
posture goes along with a positive emotional state (see Lakoff and Johnson
1980: 15).

• Ontological metaphors are metaphors based on the Great Chain of Being.

According to Lakoff and Turner (1989), the Great Chain of Being, both in its
basic and extended version, makes reference to the relation which holds between
 human beings and lower forms of existence. This cultural model pervades our
way of conceptualizing experience in such a way that we barely notice it. As
formulated by Lakoff and Turner (1989: 167), the Great Chain of Being
concerns a scale of beings along with a scale of properties. In this way, humans
are conceived of as higher-order beings if compared to animals, which are in
turn higher than plants, the last or lower level being constituted by inanimate
substances. Each level is characterized by the properties of the immediately
inferior one and an additional distinctive feature. For instance, humans have all
the properties assigned to lower forms of being (substance, a complex functional
structure, life, and interior states like desires, emotions, limited cognitive
abilities, and so on) plus a set of features which make them human (capacities
for abstract reasoning, aesthetics, morality, communication, highly developed
consciousness, etc.) (see Lakoff and Turner 1989: 167-168). By virtue of this
metaphorical system, people can be understood in terms of lower-order forms of
beings, animals, or plants. On other occasions, it is those lower-order forms of
being that are seen in terms of people. By way of illustration, consider the
example John is a bull. This expression belongs to the PEOPLE ARE
ANIMALS metaphorical system. Its construal calls for the singling out of a
behavioural feature of bulls, i.e. their clumsiness. Note that in Spanish the
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor is interpreted by profiling a physical rather
than a behavioural feature (e.g. Juan está hecho un toro, María es una vaca,
etc.). Different cultures have different ways of conceptualizing reality. In
English, this expression means that a person is big, clumsy, and often
aggressive. It refers to a human being who has little consideration for other
people’s feelings. People are not usually thought of as clumsy and aggressive
entities that do not care for other people’s feelings. This is a feature we assign to
animals. However, the Great Chain of Being makes it possible to attribute a
stereotypical characteristic of bulls to a person.

In our opinion, the studies carried out by Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002) and
Santibáñez (1999) constitute improvements on Lakoff and Johnson’s classification.
They postulate that in general metaphors can be classified according to the following
distinction: situational metaphors, image-schematic metaphors, and metaphors based on
the Great Chain of Being.
 • According to Ruiz de Mendoza (personal communication), structural
metaphorical expressions roughly correspond to situational metaphors.
However, the concept situational is more comprehensive than the notion
structural because the former incorporates situations which are conceptualized
in terms of other situations and not only propositional structures proper14. In this
connection, Ruiz de Mendoza analyzes the metaphorical expression He got up
on his hind legs to defend his views. In it, the aggressive behaviour of an animal,
a horse, in a certain situation maps onto someone’s behaviour also in connection
with a certain situation. Ruiz de Mendoza (1999a) claims that “the elements of
the situation are only relevant in the sense that they provide a background of
similarities to make the mapping from animal to human behaviour possible”.

• Concerning image-schematic metaphors, which Lakoff and Johnson call

orientational, we believe that while these two authors confine themselves to the
analysis of such orientations as UP-DOWN or FRONT-BACK, Ruiz de
Mendoza’s term has the advantage of embracing other similar schemas like
CONTAINER and PATH.

• Finally, as we have just explained, our experience with physical objects

underlies the conceptualization of ontological metaphors, which are the same as
metaphors based on the Great Chain of Being.

Only those metaphors based on the Great Chain of Being would fit the model of
one-correspondence metaphors. The other kinds establish full-fledged systems of
correspondences between the source and the target domains (i.e. they are many-
correspondence metaphors). Ontological metaphors are the least prototypical metaphors
and they resemble metonymies in this respect. We have already remarked that the
notion of cognitive continuum is central to Cognitive Linguistics. While the most
prototypical metaphors are many-correspondence mappings used predicatively, the most
prototypical metonymies are one-correspondence mappings used referentially but there
are a number of expressions which gravitate towards one of these extremes (they are

14
Santibáñez (1999) offers a more thorough explanation of the way situational and structural metaphors
differ in order to give expressions their full import.
less prototypical cases like one-correspondence metaphorical mappings, metonymies
used referentially, etc.)15.

3.3.5. Classification of metonymy

Traditionally, metonymy has been classified into three different types: whole for part,
part for part, and part for whole.

• Whole for part metonymies are those in which we mention a whole domain of
experience in order to make reference to one of its subdomains. This is the case
with the example we have already analyzed, I have bought a Ford, in which the
company stands for the type of car produced by the company (see figure 8
above).

• Part for whole metonymies are those in which a subdomain provides conceptual
access to a whole domain of experience. By way of illustration, take the example
We are always in need of some new hands in the farm, where ‘hands’ stands for
people doing hard physical work. The hands are one of the most prominent parts
of a person when working. This is the reason why we can mention only the
hands in order to make reference to the whole person (as a worker in this
example).

People doing hard physical

work
(target)

Hands
(source)

15
Many more metaphorical classifications have been offered. For instance, Peña (2003) makes a twofold
distinction between ontological and situational metaphors. The latter are further subdivided into scenic
and experiential metaphors according to the metonymic component they incorporate.
 Figure 10: We are always in need of some new hands in the farm

• Part for part metonymies are those in which part of a domain is used to represent
another part. For instance, in Nixon bombed Hanoi, the ruler, Nixon, makes
reference to the army under his command. Both the ruler and the army under his
command constitute parts of a whole domain of experience (the domain of war).

Nixon
(source)

WAR

army
under
Nixon’s
command
(target)

Figure 11: Nixon bombed Hanoi

Ruiz de Mendoza (1999a, 1999b) has simplified the traditional threefold

distinction of kinds of domain relationship (whole for part, part for whole, and part for
part) to a twofold taxonomy between what he calls source-in-target and target-in-
source metonymies. The evidence gathered from the domain of anaphoric reference
lends further support to the hypothesis that metonymies may be reduced to cases of
source-in-target and target-in-source inclusion (see Ruiz de Mendoza 1999a, 1999b for
a thorough examination of this topic). The former kind develops the target domain. In it,
a subdomain provides conceptual access to a whole domain (called matrix domain) and
the source domain is a subdomain of the target domain. The latter highlights a part of
the source which is relevant for the understanding of the expression in question. A
whole domain is used to make reference to and to profile a subdomain. In it, the target
domain is a subdomain of the source domain. Ruiz de Mendoza (1999a, 2000)
represents these two kinds of metonymy as follows:
 TARGET

SOURCE

Figure 12: Source-in-target metonymy

SOURCE

TARGET

Figure 13: Target-in-source metonymy

The example We are always in need of new hands in the farm would illustrate the
case of source-in-target metonymies whereas I have bought a Ford would be an
example of target-in-source metonymy. Ruiz de Mendoza (2000) observes that source-
in-target metonymies are cases of domain expansion (in fact, a subdomain expands into
a whole domain) whereas target-in-source metonymies are cases of domain reduction
(we mention a whole domain in order to make reference to a subdomain, usually the
most prominent one).

3.3.6. Blending theory

So far we have been describing what has been termed the two-domain model of
metaphor. As has been observed, Lakoff and Turner (1989) have pointed out that
metaphor is a way of conceptualizing experience. Thus, they have focused their research
on the discovery of the mechanisms which motivate metaphor. In this version, metaphor
is understood in terms of two conceptual domains, the source and the target. Knowledge
about the former allows us to reason about the latter. The analysis of a metaphorical
expression will suffice as illustration. Take again the example We are going nowhere in
this relationship, which has been uttered by two lovers facing a difficult moment in
their relationship and is a linguistic realization of LOVE IS A JOURNEY. World
knowledge, context, and background assumptions are central to the building of a sound
theory of metaphor. In this metaphorical expression, the travellers are the lovers, the
vehicle is the love relationship, the destination is unspecified, there exist some
impediments to travel, which get mapped onto the problems which exist in this love
relationship. By means of a concrete entity, journey, we have been able to reason and
talk about love, an elusive entity.

The two-domain model put forward by Lakoff and his associates has been refined
by the many space version (see Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 1996).16 This model,
which hinges upon the notion of mental space, may be considered a major breakthrough
in research into cognition. Fauconnier and Turner (1994: 113) describe a mental space
as “a small conceptual packet constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local
understanding and action”. In a few words, a mental space constitutes a portion of
Lakoff’s Idealized Cognitive Models. A common conceptual operation in language
results from blending. In it, structure from two or more input mental spaces is projected
to a third space, called the blended space, which inherits partial structure from the
inputs and develops its own emergent structure by means of a set of default and
pragmatic procedures (see Fauconnier 1994, 1997, Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 1996,
Turner 1996). A fourth space is the generic space, which draws generic structure from
the inputs and licenses correlations. This can be shown in the figure below:

16
This section constitutes an adaptation of Peña (2003: 31-33) and Peña and Santibáñez (2005).
 Generic Space

Input 1 Input 2

Blend
Figure 14: Mental spaces

Consider the example When your whole being was overflowing with loathing and
hate there was no room for fear. According to the many-space model, in the
interpretation of this linguistic expression there exist two input spaces:

• One is the source domain, which consists of a specific instantiation of the

CONTAINER image-schema (the interior of an entity is so full that the
boundary of the container cannot hold the entity any longer and the container
overflows).

• The other, which is the target, is the situation to which this linguistic expression
refers (the person who expresses his/her feelings of loathing and hate).

• The generic space is provided by the structure and logic of the CONTAINER-
schema which we will describe in detail in section 3.4.2. In the conceptual
mapping, which is carried out as licensed by the generic space, the container is a
person, the inside of the bounded region corresponds to the specific emotions of
loathing and hate and the emotional intensity within the person is so high that
the subject cannot hold the emotions in his/her interior anymore.

• The blend. This conceptual schema elicits a set of inferences which are present
in the blend.
 Fauconnier (1997: 185-186) and Fauconnier and Turner (1998a: 162-163) have
proposed a series of optimality principles in connection with blended structures, namely
integration, web, unpacking, topology, backward projection, and metonymy projection.
These principles allow speakers of a language to create a series of routine processes
which lead him/her to a felicitous construal of all kinds of expression, either
metaphorical or not.

• Integration. The blend must be a unit subject to manipulation as such.

• Web. In the process of manipulation of the blend as a unit, the web of

appropriate connections to the input spaces must be kept easily and without
additional computation.

• Unpacking. The blend must be subject to decomposition. That is, the speaker or
hearer must be able to reconstruct the inputs, the mappings across or within
spaces, the generic space, and all the operations which are carried out between
the spaces.

• Topology. For any input space and any element in that space recruited by the
blend, the fact that the relations of the element in the blend match the relations
of its counterpart is optimal.

• Backward projection. Once the blend has been built, backward projection to an
input which disrupts the integration of the input should be avoided.

• Metonymy projection. The metonymic distance between an element of an input

space and another element of the same input which is projected to the blend due
to its metonymic connection with the first should be shortened.

In order to understand the full import of a given expression, say a metaphor or a

metonymy, the interpreter, in decoding the expression, will have to reconstruct the
inputs so as to understand the blend. Thus, we find unpacking specially relevant to the
process of construing a certain occurrence.

On the basis of the following account, researchers working within this paradigm
postulate that the blend develops idiosyncratic structure of its own (see Fauconnier
1994, 1997, Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, Turner and Fauconnier
1995, 1999, 2000, Turner 1996, 1998). This happens in three ways (see Fauconnier
1997: 150-151):

• Composition. The projections from the inputs mesh to yield new relations which
were not present in the separate inputs.

• Completion. Knowledge of background frames, cognitive and cultural models

enrich the information of the blend which, in principle, would only contain
structure selectively drawn from the input spaces.

• Elaboration. The structure in the blend can be elaborated. This is what is known
as running the blend. It is the own emergent logic of the blend that allows this
cognitive work to take place within the blend itself.

Ruiz de Mendoza (1996b, 1998) has refined Fauconnier and Turner’s model into a
more elaborate proposal which incorporates such pragmatic principles as Sperber and
Wilson’s (1995) Principle of Relevance. In obeying the Principle of Relevance, the first
acceptable interpretation will focus on the most central explicatures. Ruiz de Mendoza’s
(1997a) main criticism on Turner and Fauconnier’s account of blending is that when
two or more spaces are blended together into a third integrated conceptual space, no
emergent structure is evolved by the blend itself. Ruiz de Mendoza (1997a: 286-287)
points to two main failures of Turner and Fauconnier’s theory of blending:

• first, this view is inconsistent with the principle of cognitive economy;

• second, these scholars fail to discuss the principles which regulate conceptual
projection. It is precisely the introduction of Sperber and Wilson’s Principle of
Relevance that solves the problematic claims made by Turner and Fauconnier.

Peña and Santibáñez (2005) believe that, in fact, Fauconnier and Turner (1994,
1996) and Ruiz de Mendoza’s (1996b) models are not fully incompatible. Both of them
argue for some kind of additional structure in the blended space. The only difference
between these two proposals is that while Fauconnier and Turner hold that it is the
blended space that creates its own emergent structure, Ruiz de Mendoza thinks that this
additional structure is provided by increasing the number of inputs which lend their
structure to the blend. These mental spaces are invoked by a well-defined context or
sheer convention (see Ruiz de Mendoza 1997a: 288)17.

3.4. Image-schemas18

3.4.1. Definition of image-schema

The increasing interest in the study of generic level in metaphor coincides with the
discovery of other generic-level conceptual constructs, like image-schemas (e.g.
CONTAINER, PART-WHOLE, PATH). Each of these schemas consists of a number of
structural elements and a basic logic (i.e. a set of relations between elements and the
inferences based on them) which can be applied for abstract reasoning. Image-schemas
have been found to structure various semantic domains, (e.g. the field of visual
perception; see Faber and Pérez 1993); they have also been shown to lie at the base of a
large number of metaphorical constructions (for instance, in the case of HAPPY IS UP,
the VERTICALITY image-schema provides the source domain of the metaphor). The
definition of this structuring principle has been controversial. Most cognitive
semanticists postulate that conceptualizations are grounded in and structured by
preconceptual bodily experience. Johnson (1987) offers one of the most detailed
discussions on the nature of this grounding. In fact this researcher introduced the notion
of image-schema in semantics and defined it as follows:

“A recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives
coherence and structure to our experience... These patterns are embodied and give coherent,
meaningful structure to our physical experience at a preconceptual level.” (Johnson 1987: XIV,
13)

Johnson (1987: 44) identifies image-schemas with gestalt structures to mean “an
organized, unified whole within our experience and understanding that manifests
repeatable pattern or structure”. Johnson’s definition has remained largely unquestioned
(see, for instance, Krzeszowski 1993: 310, Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen 1993:
332, Cienki 1997: 3-4, 1998: 108, Mettinger 1999: 100). In Peña’s (2003: 41) view, this

17
For a complete version of Ruiz de Mendoza’s (1998) criticism of conceptual blending theory as
developed by Turner, Fauconnier, and their followers and an attempt to reconcile Ruiz de Mendoza’s
proposal and Turner and Fauconnier’s account, see Peña and Santibáñez (2005).
18
This section constitutes a summary of Peña’s (2003) work on the conceptualization of emotions. In it,
she provides a taxonomy of image-schemas. Notice should be taken that her results are based on a corpus
of emotion metaphors. Nonetheless, work is being carried out on other domains of experience which yield
the same results.
definition is too loose and Lakoff’s consideration of this notion proves useful in order to
restrict it. Lakoff claims that these cognitive constructs should be topological or spatial:

“PATHS, BOUNDED REGIONS, and CONTACT are cognitive topological concepts, commonly
referred to as ‘image-schemas’...
... topological in the sense that they generalize over geometry by virtue of preserving
neighbourhood relations.” (Lakoff 1989: 114)

Lakoff (1987: 68) asserts that they are one of the four structuring principles which
articulate ICMs. Manjali (1998: 156) also focuses on the spatial character of image-
schemas.

Peña’s (2003: 42) definition results from a combination of Johnson’s and Lakoff’s
proposals. In her opinion,

“… an image-schema is a recurring pattern of experience which is abstract and topological in

nature. Moreover, it can also be an eventive pattern in the sense that it takes place in space but is
not necessarily identified with space itself. This can be illustrated by means of the PROCESS
image-schema, which might be regarded as a case in point if we follow a strictly topological
definition of schemas. While processes are not spatial per se, they take place in space and can be
understood as following a sequential pattern which can be interpreted in terms of the PATH
schema.” (Peña 2003: 42)

These are the features which characterize image-schemas:

• Preconceptual, in the sense that they are non-linguistic. Johnson (1987: 13-15)
illustrates this by pointing out the difference between the FORCE image-schema
and the notion of force we learn at school.

• Non-propositional. Image-schemas are not expressed in any underlying language

of thought (see Johnson 1987: 23).

• Embodied. These cognitive constructs emerge from physical experience.

• Structured. Image-schemas constitute organized patterns or systems with a series

of structural elements which serve as a basis for their internal logic.

• Non-representational. There exists no duality between the subject and the

activity he/she is carrying out.

• Abstract in the sense of schematic. As argued by Clausner and Croft (1999: 14),
“they represent schematic patterns arising from imagistic domains, such as
containers, paths, links, forces, and balance...”.
 Turner (1991: 176-178) adds some properties of image-schemas to this list:

• First, he contends that absolute size is not relevant in connection with schemas.
For instance, an image-schema of a small CIRCLE is the same as an image-
schema of a larger CIRCLE. However, relative size seems to be important. He
claims that an image-schema including a small CIRCLE and a large CIRCLE
differs from a schema which includes two equal CIRCLES.

• Second, movement proves fundamental to some image-schematic

configurations. Turner (1991: 177) states that image-schemas can be either static
or dynamic.

• Third, number of entities is relevant. In Turner’s (1991: 177) own words, “an
image-schema of two entities is different from an image-schema of three”.

• Fourth, connectedness and continuity are central to the consideration of image-

schemas. This is specially the case with the WHOLE-PART and subsidiary
schemas (the PART-WHOLE image-schema is studied in section as studied in
section 3.4.2).

• Moreover, several image-schematic relations count. For example, an

equivalence relation is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.

• Finally, some order relations are essential. A different order activates a different
image-schema. For example, while a linear order may instantiate the PATH
schema, a vertical order underlies the VERTICALITY image-schema.

Very recently, Evans and Green (2006: 179-189) have further developed the
notion of image-schema by dealing with some other properties of such constructs. To
the ones we have already mentioned, they add some other characteristics like the
possibility image-schemas have of occurring in clusters (they pose the example of the
FORCE schema, which consists of a set of related schemas like REMOVAL OF
RESTRAINT, BLOCKAGE, ENABLEMENT, ATTRACTION/REPULSION,
COMPULSION, etc.) and the fact that they are subject to transformations (for instance,
Lakoff (1987: 428) says: “Imagine a herd of cows up close – close enough to pick out
the individual cows. Now imagine yourself moving back until you can no longer pick
out individual cows. What you perceive is a mass. There is a point at which you cease
making out individuals and start perceiving a mass”. This makes reference to a
transformation from the COUNT image-schema – a series of individual entities that can
be individualized and counted – to a MASS schema – an entity that is perceived as
internally homogeneous. In other words, the herd of cows, which consists of several
individual entities, ceases to be seen as a group of individualized entities and when
observed from some distance, this herd becomes a group of undifferentiated entities
which is perceived as a mass).

3.4.2. The structure of image-schemas and some examples

Regarding the structure of image-schemas, they consist of a series of structural elements

and a basic or internal logic (i.e. a set of relations between elements and the inferences
based on them). As has been previously pointed out, they have been found to lie at the
base of many metaphorical mappings. For instance, take the metaphor LOVE IS A
JOURNEY and its specific instantiations (we are going nowhere in our relationship, we
are spinning our wheels, we are at a crossroads, etc.). In it, the PATH image-schema
provides the source domain of the metaphor. We understand love relationships in terms
of paths with origins, intermediate points along the path, impediments to travel,
destinations, etc. Or as analyzed before, consider the metaphor HAPPY IS UP and some
of its linguistic realizations (I’m feeling up, cheer up, I was over the moon, etc). The
VERTICALITY image-schema allows us to understand such an abstract concept as
happiness in terms of vertical orientation. This way, high positions are associated with
positive axiological values (for instance, happiness).

Now we describe the structural elements and basic logic of the CONTAINER,
PATH, PART-WHOLE, and VERTICALITY image-schemas and provide some
examples of each of them.19

• The CONTAINER image-schema

- Structural elements:

- An interior.

19
For a thorough description of the CONTAINER, PATH, and PART-WHOLE image-schemas, see Peña
(2003: chapters 4, 5, and 6). The VERTICALITY image-schema is studied in chapter 5 as dependent on
PATH.
 - An exterior.

- A boundary.

- Internal logic:

- The boundaries prevent what is outside from affecting the entity or entities
found within the container or bounded region.

- Everything is either outside or inside the container.

- If container A is in container B and B in C, then A is inside C.

- If any entity enters the container, such an entity will be affected either positively
or negatively by the entity or entities within the bounded region, etc.

- Examples:

She is full of love.

He is in trouble.

I was filled with rage.

I cannot keep my anger bottled up any more.

• The PATH image-schema

- Structural elements:

- A source or starting point.

- A destination or end point.

- A series of contiguous locations which connect the source with the goal.

- A directionality or inherent orientation.

- Internal logic (Lakoff 1989: 119):

- If you go from a source to a destination along a path, then you must pass
through each intermediate point on the path.
 - The further along the path you are, the more time has gone by since starting.

- Examples:

We are on the right track.

Her accident was a enormous setback to her career.

We are going nowhere with this.

We are at a crossroads.

• The PART-WHOLE image-schema:

- Structural elements:

- A whole.

- Parts.

- A configuration.

- Basic logic:

- If A is a part of B, then B is not a part of A.

- The whole cannot exist if no part of it exists.

- Several parts can exist but without making up a whole.

- If the whole is located at a place, then the parts are located at the same place.

- The parts are usually contiguous to one another.

- If the parts are destroyed, the whole is destroyed.

- Examples:

We are one.

He took the problem apart piece by piece.

 She is my other/better half.

• The VERTICALITY image-schema:

- Structural elements:

- A vertical path which comprises the following elements:

- A source or starting point.

- A directionality.

- A destination or end point.

- Basic logic:

- If you go from a source to a destination along a path, then you must pass through
each intermediate point on the path.

- The further along the path you are, the more time has gone by since starting.

- Examples:

HAVING CONTROL or FORCE IS UP and BEING SUBJECT TO

CONTROL or FORCE IS DOWN

I'm on top of the situation.

He is a low man on the totem pole.

GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN

Things are looking up.

Things are at an all-time low.

3.4.3. Image-schemas in linguistics

Image-schemas have been explored from different points of view. Turner (1996: 22-25)
makes a good summary of three areas of study of these cognitive constructs:

• Image-schemas in the brain.

 • Image-schemas as basic-level categories.

• Image-schemas in developmental psychology.

Peña (2003: 46-56) adds a fourth area of study, the consideration of image-
schemas in linguistics and philosophy, which will be here the main focus of interest.
The study of image-schemas has been the main concern of many linguists and
philosophers. They examine the way these cognitive constructs are conceptualized into
the language and how they guide the interpretation of the expressions in which they are
involved.

As has been advanced, Johnson was a pioneer in the study of image-schemas in

linguistics. Figure 15 below reproduces Johnson’s (1987: 126) original list of image-
schemas:

CONTAINER BALANCE COMPULSION

BLOCKAGE COUNTERFORCE RESTRAINT REMOVAL

ENABLEMENT ATTRACTION MASS-COUNT

PATH LINK CENTER-PERIPHERY

CYCLE NEAR-FAR SCALE

PART-WHOLE MERGING SPLITTING

FULL-EMPTY MATCHING SUPERIMPOSITION

ITERATION CONTACT PROCESS

SURFACE OBJECT COLLECTION

Figure 15: Johnson’s list of image-schemas (Johnson 1987: 126)

In Peña’s (2003: 46) opinion, this figure comprises what she terms basic and
subsidiary or dependent image-schemas. Johnson (1987) endeavours to discuss the
nature of these experiential patterns in general, as well as to offer a comprehensive view
of the way they function in language and cognition.
 Lakoff (1987, 1989) studies image-schemas in greater depth. This scholar has
described the structural elements and internal logic of some of the most prominent
image-schemas, that is, CONTAINER, PATH, WHOLE-PART, and LINK. He has also
sought to prove that the Invariance Principle or Hypothesis (IP or IH) constrains image-
schematic expressions (see Lakoff 1990). In connection with the question of the
relationship between abstract reasoning and metaphoric mappings based on image-
schemas, Lakoff (1990, 1993) has formulated the Invariance Principle, according to
which the image-schematic structure of the source domain of a mapping is preserved in
such a way that it is consistent with the structure of its corresponding target domain20.

Krzeszowski (1993) and Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen (1993) have delved

deeper into the study of image-schemas. Nevertheless, they do little justice to the
cognitive grounding of Johnson’s theory since they limit themselves to introducing a
PLUS-MINUS parameter in order to compute the axiological value of image-schematic
expressions. Krzeszowski concludes that image-schemas are bi-polar, that is to say, they
have both plus and minus poles. Thus, he claims that GOOD IS UP, whereas BAD IS
DOWN.

Krzeszowski (1993) fits his investigation into axiological semantics, which is the
study of values with respect to the meaning of linguistic expressions (see Krzeszowski
1993: 307). The main idea this researcher puts forward is that all preconceptual image-
schemas must be considered in the light of a PLUS-MINUS parameter which all of
them involve. On the basis of his assumption, Krzeszowski studies several image-
schemas: PART-WHOLE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, LINK, CONTAINER, SOURCE-
PATH-GOAL, BALANCE, and orientational schemas (UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK,
and RIGHT-LEFT). Peña (2003: 48) disagrees with some points of Krzeszowski’s
theory. For example, in the analysis Krzeszowski (1993: 317-318) makes of the PATH
image-schema, he gives prominence to the concept of oriented motion. He goes on to

20
Lakoff’s formulation of the IP has been criticized by Brugman (1990), who observes that Lakoff does
not posit any distinction between image-schematic and topological and that he does not make it clear
what counts as the preservation of image-schematic structure. Lakoff also argues for the preservation of
the topological properties of the source domain. However, there seems to be evidence that target domain
properties must be maintained at least on some occasions. Lakoff does not clarify either whether the
properties which are preserved by virtue of the IP are transitively mapped or not. Finally, some image-
schematic properties might not be preserved in a mapping. Ruiz de Mendoza (1998) has noted that the IP
should be reformulated in order to comprise all kinds of generic-level structure and contextual effects.
This observation has resulted in Ruiz de Mendoza’ Extended Invariance Principle.
put PATH expressions in relation to their axiological value by stating that goal and
good are nearly synonymous. However, Peña (2003: 48) notes that there exist many
exceptions to this rule. Think of the metaphorical expression He went into trouble after
his father died. In it, the goal is conceptualized as a container which is endowed with a
negative axiological value and which will impinge negatively on the subject who enters
it. This and similar examples invalidate Krzeszowski’s hypothesis that goals are always
positively value-laden. Krzeszowski (1990: 150) and Cienki (1997: 5) contend that this
axiological parameter is not universal and that it is a tendency rather than a rule.
Axiological values can be reversed due to several reasons (for example, due to their
interaction with the Control ICM).

An innovative idea in his theory which is worth mentioning is that he realizes that
there is some connection between image-schemas. For instance, he claims that the
CONTAINER and LINK schemas are related to each other. Nonetheless, he only speaks
about combination or interaction between these constructs and does not establish
degrees of dependency between them.

Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen analyze the domain of body parts and bodily
functions. Their 1993 paper is divided into the following sections:

• An image-schematic approach to metaphors. These authors set themselves the

task of analyzing some image-schemas like CONTAINER, FORCE, PATH,
BALANCE or CONTROL, and CONTACT in order to prove that often in
linguistic conceptualization schemas do not come in isolation. It is a
combination of image-schemas that underlies a single linguistic expression and
that licenses its construal. For example, when analyzing the CONTAINER
image-schema, Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen (1993: 342-344) postulate
that it interacts with the FORCE and PATH schemas on many occasions.
However, as was the case with Krzeszowski’s account, these authors do not
establish different degrees of subsidiarity between several image-schemas even
though they are aware that they combine or interact with one another in
language.

• Value judgements. Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen (1993) do not argue for

the existence of a PLUS-MINUS parameter into which the different image-
 schemas should be fit in order to compute their axiological value. Value
judgements in this case are restricted to the linguistic action (LA) scene. These
authors relate this axiological component to the speaker’s intentions and
behaviour, to the linguistic form, to the manner of presentation, and to the
hearer’s attitude. Even though these researchers are not very explicit as to these
value judgements in the sense that they do not exemplify their hypotheses in
great detail, there exist several aspects which come in for evaluation.
Krzeszowski’s PLUS-MINUS parameter is further elaborated into a more
refined one which licenses the interpretation of the axiological value of
expressions in the LA scene. For instance, scales like intensity, quantity,
frequency, speed, and duration are taken into account when evaluating linguistic
expressions.

3.4.4. Taxonomies of image-schemas and Peña’s proposal for a distinction between

basic and subsidiary or dependent schemas

Peña (2003: 49) points out that Johnson’s (1987) and Lakoff’s (1987, 1989) studies on
image-schemas seem to consider all of them as on a same level of categorization.
Nevertheless, other studies have at least indirectly challenged this view (see Pauwels
and Simon-Vandenbergen 1993, Turner 1993). Recent research into image-schemas has
attempted to group them into different slots which share a series of common features.
This reduction simplifies our understanding of the functioning of these cognitive
constructs. We briefly examine these proposals.

As remarked above, Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen (1993: 365) briefly hint at

a proposal for a hierarchy of image-schemas on the grounds that some of them seem to
be more basic than others, even though they do not go into details.

“Presence or absence of control and the type of control indeed appear to be important variables
determining the value judgement. Its exact status in terms of links with the other schemata still
needs to be examined, but so does, in our view, the status of Johnson’s schemata. It seems
possible, for instance, that some schemata are more basic than others, or, in other words, that there
may be a hierarchy of schemata.” (Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen 1993: 365)

There exist two main advantages in Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen’s (1993)

paper over previous approaches:
 • First, they suggest that image-schemas should be organized in a hierarchy,
because it is obvious that not all of them are at the same level of categorization.

• Second, they relate value judgements to the notion of control.

Turner is also interested in establishing some taxonomy of image-schemas, as

well as in an explanation of their role in structuring concepts and in a fair
characterization of them.

“I have nothing approaching a definition or taxonomy of image-schemas, a theory of how they

arise and work, or an explanation of their role in structuring concepts. Finding a fair
characterization of these phenomena would require a theory of image-schemas, of their relation to
images, of their origin, of their relation across modalities..., of their use in structuring concepts,
and, beyond all this, a larger theory that could account for why they seem to have privilege in
metaphor.” (Turner 1993: 298)

Turner, together with Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen, observes that not all
image-schemas can be ranked on a par. He suggests that a hierarchy of such cognitive
constructs should be constructed. Nonetheless, he does not materialize his ideas into a
concrete model.

Cienki’s (1997) proposal is a more elaborated proposal than Pauwels and Simon-
Vandenbergen’s and Turner’s. Cienki investigates groupings of image-schemas. First of
all, Cienki (1997: 8) argues for the co-occurrence of some image-schemas in our
everyday experience. Some of the gestalts he mentions are listed below:

• MASS-COUNT, COLLECTION, MERGING, and OBJECT, which, in his view,

are related to a NEAR-FAR perspective.

• CENTRE-PERIPHERY, NEAR-FAR, SCALE, and FORCE. It is commonly

accepted that we are centres of force, as well as sources of movement and action.
The individual is both the target of movement by external forces and a source of
movement him/herself.

• CYCLE, PATH, PROCESS, ITERATION, and FORCE (ENABLEMENT).

Cienki (1997: 8) argues that a CYCLE can be understood as a PATH which
returns to its starting point, and which represents a PROCESS which may recur
in experience (ITERATION) and is able to continue by means of the FORCE of
momentum.
 • BALANCE, CONTACT, SURFACE, and COUNTERFORCE. Cienki (1997: 8-
9) claims that metaphors dealing with rational argumentation reflect a
presumption of CONTACT with a metaphorical SURFACE. The notion of
COUNTERFORCE is activated by some expressions (e.g. tip the scale) in
favour of one argument or the other.

• CONTAINER, FULL-EMPTY, and CENTRE-PERIPHERY. Johnson (1987:

125) observes that “we almost always superimpose a CONTAINER schema on
our CENTRE-PERIPHERY orientation”. Cienki further argues that the
CONTAINER image-schema is related to force-dynamic relations since
containers protect inside entities from exterior forces.

Cienki (1997: 9) becomes aware that the distinction between the CONTAINER
and FULL-EMPTY image-schemas differs from the one between the FULL-EMPTY
and PATH schemas. However, this hypothesis is not further developed. Then he
proceeds to observe that Johnson has already noted the subsidiary status which some
image-schemas like COMPULSION, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, RESTRAINT
REMOVAL (or REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT), ENABLEMENT, and ATTRACTION
hold with respect to the basic FORCE schema. In addition, Cienki (1997) comments on
the proposal for different degrees of dependency made by Quinn (1991). This author
derives her conclusions from the image-schematic metaphors found in some narratives
of American marriage. She points out that all image-schemas can be grouped under four
basic schemas: {ENTITY}, {TRAJECTORY}, {RELATION}, and {CONTAINER}.
She uses the notion schema to mean a conceptual abstraction from some range of
experiences. The schema captures a pattern of regularity in these experiences. Thus, her
schemas are very similar to Peña’s (2003) basic image-schemas in that they encompass
other such cognitive constructs, which Peña terms subsidiary. Nevertheless, these
schemas seem to be more abstract than Peña’s basic image-schemas (see Quinn 1991:
69-70). More specifically, in Quinn’s (1991) view, these are the basic schemas and their
dependent image-schemas:

• {RELATION}: LINK, CONTACT, MERGING, SPLITTING, and NEAR-FAR.

• {ENTITY}: PART-WHOLE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY.

• {TRAJECTORY}: CYCLE, ITERATION, SCALE, PATH.

 • {CONTAINER}: FULL-EMPTY.

Cienki does not agree with Quinn’s taxonomy for several reasons:

• Quinn’s (1991) notion of image-schema differs from Johnson’s (1987). In

Quinn’s view, these constructs are allowed greater significance than in
Johnson’s account. She believes that without the schemas she proposes many
more image-schemas should be introduced so as to account for the metaphors
she attempts to analyze. Quinn adds that this would necessarily result in an
unnecessary proliferation of image-schemas. Cienki (1997: 12) contends that
there exist two ways out of this problem: first, neither Johnson nor Lakoff state
that all metaphorical expressions require an image-schematic source domain.
Second, Johnson’s definition of image-schema is restrictive enough and does not
allow a proliferation of schemas.

• Cienki (1997: 12) finds it difficult to see the difference between the schema
{CONTAINER} and the image-schema CONTAINER or between the schema
{ENTITY} and the image-schema OBJECT. Peña (2003: 51-52) believes that in
Quinn’s approach the schema {CONTAINER} is only a cover term which is
realized as mediated by the more specific image-schemas it comprises. The same
holds for the schema {ENTITY}, which is made concrete by specific
instantiations of the OBJECT image-schema.

On the basis of the observations made above, Cienki argues for a different
taxonomy of image-schemas:

more general more specific

PROCESS MATCHING, MERGING, CONTACT, LINK, SPLITTING

PATH STRAIGHT, SCALE, ITERATION, CYCLE

OBJECT PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, SURFACE, MASS-

COUNT, COLLECTION

CONTAINER FULL-EMPTY, SURFACE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY

 [force] ATTRACTION, ENABLEMENT, COMPULSION,
COUNTERFORCE, BLOCKAGE, RESTRAINT REMOVAL

Figure 16: Cienki’s taxonomy of image-schemas (Cienki 1997: 12)

Cienki does not dwell on the discussion of his taxonomy. According to Peña
(2003: 52), the main problems with Cienki’s proposal are that Cienki does not set up the
specific criteria which guide the grouping of Johnson’s image-schemas into five
different slots nor does he specify the way in which they depend on one another.

In Peña’s (2003: 52) view, Quinn’s (1991) taxonomy makes more sense, even
though it does not take into account so many image-schemas as Cienki’s. The groupings
of image-schemas she puts forward after analyzing her corpus of marriage metaphors
partially coincide with those derived from a consideration of Peña’s emotion metaphors.
In fact, Peña (2003: 53) claims that no objection can be raised against her taxonomy.
For instance, a close examination of Peña’s data reveal that FULL-EMPTY depends on
CONTAINER and that CYCLE, SCALE (VERTICALITY), and PATH relate in
crucially interesting ways, even though in Peña’s opinion PATH includes such other
notions as CYCLE and SCALE.

Clausner and Croft (1999) provide another alternative hierarchy of image-schemas

which is based on Langacker’s (1987) theory of domains. In figure 17 below, the terms
in italics correspond to Clausner and Croft’s additions to Johnson’s initial inventory of
image-schemas. Peña (2003: 54) agrees with the introduction of the LEFT-RIGHT
image-schema, since it is an embodied pattern which is spatial and abstract. However,
Peña (2003: 54) lists a series of problematic points inherent in Clausner and Croft’s
(1999) proposal.

• The CONTENT schema is only a structural element of CONTAINER.

• There are other traces of redundancy in this classification: the IN-OUT schema,
which is the orientation set up by the CONTAINER construct, the SCALE and
UP-DOWN schemas, which in the literature are reduced to the VERTICALITY
pattern, and the coexistence of CONTAINER and BOUNDED REGION, which
are essentially the same.
 • REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT should be grouped together with other kinds of
force.
• As was the case with Cienki, Clausner and Croft do not devote much of their
research to commenting on the taxonomy they have built. They only observe
that PATHS should be reduced to SCALES (see Clausner and Croft 1999: 17)
and briefly outline the way CONTAINER and the image-schemas which belong
in its same set are related (see Clausner and Croft 1999: 20).

SPACE UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, LEFT-RIGHT, NEAR-

FAR, CENTER-PERIPHERY, CONTACT

SCALE PATH

CONTAINER CONTAINMENT, IN-OUT, SURFACE, FULL-EMPTY,

CONTENT

FORCE BALANCE, COUNTERFORCE, COMPULSION,

RESTRAINT, ENABLEMENT, BLOCKAGE,
DIVERSION, ATTRACTION

UNITY/MULTIPLICITY MERGING, COLLECTION, SPLITTING, ITERATION,

PART-WHOLE, MASS-COUNT, LINK

IDENTITY MATCHING, SUPERIMPOSITION

EXISTENCE REMOVAL, BOUNDED SPACE, CYCLE, OBJECT,

PROCESS

Figure 17: Clausner and Croft’s taxonomy of image-schemas (Clausner and Croft 1999: 15)

After sketching out the main flaws of the different approaches to image-schemas,
Peña (2003: 54-55) summarizes them. We reproduce here her ideas:

• Apart from mixing different levels of subsidiarity, Johnson ignores such image-
schemas as FRONT-BACK, as propounded by Lakoff and Turner (1989: 97),
and EXCESS, which has been briefly analyzed by Lakoff (1987: 433-434) and
Kreitzer (1997: 321). Peña (2003: 187-190) also proposes a more comprehensive
image-schema than CYCLE, which is subsumed together with SPIRAL, under
the notion of CIRCLE.
 • Even though Krzeszowski and Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen deal with
combinations of image-schemas and with their interaction, they do not establish
different degrees of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, as has been noted, the latter begin
to ask for a taxonomy of image-schemas, on the grounds that not all of them
belong to a same level of analysis. Turner (1993) makes the same suggestion.
Nonetheless, neither Pauwels and Simon-Vandenbergen nor Turner make an
elaborate proposal in which different levels of dependency among image-
schemas are postulated. Therefore their merit rests exclusively on the fact that
they suggest that a hierarchy of schemas should be set up, even though they do
not develop it fully.

• As has been pointed out, the proposals by Quinn (1991), Cienki (1997), and
Clausner and Croft (1999) seem more elaborate than preceding ones.
Nevertheless, Peña (2003: 55) points to some inadequacies inherent in them
which also apply to previous approaches:

- They do not illustrate their points in detail nor do they make any research
into the structural elements and the internal logic of each image-schema.

- They fail to provide an explanation of how each subsidiary schema is

subservient to the basic one on which it depends for its understanding and
development.

- None of these scholars discuss the criteria which they have followed in
order to establish the groupings of image-schemas.

On the basis of these observations, Peña’s (2003: 55-56) proposal attempts to

make up for these drawbacks.

She suggests that the CONTAINER, PATH, and PART-WHOLE image-schemas

are basic and thereby provide the blueprint for the orderly activation and projection onto
them of other mental spaces, including what she believes to be less basic image-
schemas. First, the FULL-EMPTY and EXCESS schemas are postulated to hinge upon
the CONTAINER schema for their development and understanding. For instance, the
FULL-EMPTY image-schema provides the source domain of the metaphorical
expression John is full of love. This occurrence pertains to the conceptual metaphor
PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS FOR EMOTIONS. The FULL-EMPTY image-schema
is subsidiary to CONTAINER in the sense that the former is but a specification of the
more general CONTAINER schema (containers may be full or empty). Thus we might
conclude that FULL-EMPTY is a dependent schema with respect to the basic
CONTAINER image-schema.

In the same way, several degrees of dependency are proposed between some
image-schemas subsidiary to the PATH experiential gestalt. COMPULSION,
OBSTACLE, COUNTERFORCE, DIVERSION, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT,
ENABLEMENT, ATTRACTION and REPULSION do constitute but part of the
structure of the FORCE schema, which is in turn dependent on the PATH image-
schema. Likewise, the PROCESS, CIRCLE (comprising CYCLE and SPIRAL), NEAR-
FAR, and FRONT-BACK schemas are found to be subservient to the PATH image-
schema. Finally, the VERTICALITY pattern is regarded as a modified path which
involves an UP-DOWN orientation.

The basic logic of the CENTRE-PERIPHERY image-schema is provided by the

basic inferences derived from the skeletal structure of the PART-WHOLE schema.
Moreover, Peña regards the MERGING and MATCHING schemas as conceptual
dependencies of the PART-WHOLE image-schema. She further argues that the PART-
WHOLE and the MERGING and MATCHING schemas share similar structural
elements and basic logic. There also exist some differences among them, which trigger
differences in the linguistic form they take and in their meaning. The COLLECTION
image-schema will be found to be another way of constructing the PART-WHOLE
schema. Furthermore, the LINK image-schema has been found to license the activation
of such image-schemas as PART-WHOLE, ATTRACTION, or NEAR-FAR schemas.

This is a summary of Peña’s taxonomy of image-schemas:

CONTAINER

FULL-EMPTY

EXCESS

Figure 18: The CONTAINER image-schema and subsidiary schemas (Peña 2003: 122)
 PATH

FORCE VERTICALITY

PROCESS CIRCLE
(CYCLE,
SPIRAL)
FRONT-BACK NEAR-FAR

Figure 19: The PATH schema and subsidiary image-schemas (Peña 2003: 194)

The FORCE image-schema can be further specified, as shown in figure 20

below:

FORCE

COMPULSION REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT

ATTRACTION ENABLEMENT
(and REPULSION)

BLOCKAGE - COUNTERFORCE

DIVERSION

Figure 20: The FORCE image-schema (Peña 2003: 195)

 PART-WHOLE

CENTRE-PERIPHERY COLLECTION

MATCHING MERGING

(LINK)

Figure 21: The PART-WHOLE schema and subsidiary image-schemas (Peña 2003: 210)

SUMMARY:

After this section, you should have a clear picture of the following
issues:

- The notion of Idealized Cognitive Model is central to Cognitive

Linguistics. It is an invention of the mind which allows human beings
to organize knowledge.

- Following Lakoff and his collaborators, there are four kinds of

Idealized Cognitive Model: propositional models, metaphor,
metonymy, and image-schemas.

a) Propositional models do not make use of imaginative devices (i.e.

metaphor, metonymy, and image-schemas). Lakoff divides them into
propositions, scenarios or scripts, feature bundles, taxonomies, and
radial categories. Langacker’s notion of domain is also relevant to the
description of propositional models since domains are very similar to
such concepts as frames, scripts, schemata, scenarios, or idealized
cognitive models. In this connection, notions like domain, profile,
base, domain matrix, basic domains, and primary and secondary
domains play a fundamental role in Langacker’s theory.

b) Metaphor and metonymy are seen as conceptual mechanisms which

we use everyday. They are not regarded as deviant language any
more. For instance, in science and politics they may play an
 explanatory or a constitutive role. Some classifications of metaphor
and metonymy are provided and their demarcation problems are
shown in order to prove that in Cognitive Linguistics categorization is
not a black or white affair and that the notions of fuzziness and
cognitive continuum are crucial.

c) Image-schemas are defined as another kind of ICM which emerges

from our bodily interaction with the world and are characterized as
abstract, eventive, and topological. They underlie the construction of
metaphor and metonymy and have been found to be structured
according to different levels, some of which are more basic than
others. Different theories are offered in which several taxonomies of
image-schemas are put forward.

NOW YOU ARE READY TO DO EXERCISES 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
AND 15

4. Final remarks

At the end of this chapter, the student should have learned the main underpinnings of
the Cognitive Linguistics approach. These have been divided into three thematic blocks:

• First, regarding the distinction between Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive

Grammar, the student should have understood that Cognitive Linguistics
comprises Cognitive Grammar and that this chapter has aimed to describe the
main tenets of Cognitive Linguistics. An attempt has been made to contextualize
Cognitive Linguistics as a reaction to a pervading linguistic paradigm, specially
dominated by Generative Linguistics, in which much attention was paid to
grammar to the exclusion of semantics and pragmatics.

• Second, we have provided an account of the main ideas inherent in objectivism

and experientialism, two philosophical traditions. Objectivism has been related
to the classical theory of categorization, in which categories are defined in terms
 of binary features and categorization is regarded as a black or white affair. In
contrast, experientialism has been associated with the prototype theory of
categorization, in which categories are measured against a prototype in such a
way that there are good and poor examples of categories. Moreover, while
Generative Linguistics and other linguistic approaches which pay almost
exclusive attention to grammar have been found to be embedded within
objectivism, experientialism has been proved to offer the appropriate framework
for the development of Cognitive Linguistics (as a theory in which semantics
and pragmatics play a prominent role and grammar is found to be somehow
subservient to semantics and pragmatics).

• Third, a section divided into three subsections has been devoted to outline the
main characteristics and typology of Idealized Cognitive Models. To begin with,
Idealized Cognitive Models are dealt with as inventions of the human mind
which allow us to organize our knowledge of the world. Four kinds of ICM have
been distinguished following such leading figures as Lakoff: propositional
models, metaphor, metonymy, and image-schemas. Propositional models,
together with their various kinds, have been defined as ICMs which use no
imaginative devices (metaphor, metonymy, or image-schemas). Metaphor and
metonymy have been found to form an integral part of language in the sense that
we have to use them everyday in order to be able to speak about almost every
topic including politics and science, realms which in the past were thought to be
objective and therefore should not comprise metaphorical language. Finally,
image-schemas, defined as experiential, eventive, abstract, and topological
cognitive constructs, underlie many metaphorical and non-metaphorical
expressions. They lie at the base of our conceptualization of language on many
occasions. A whole theory is developed in which a distinction between basic and
subsidiary or dependent image-schemas is made on the basis that the image-
schemas listed by Johnson cannot be ranked on a par, belonging as they do to
different levels of categorization.

5. Suggested activities
Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar
1. What is the main difference between Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar?

2. Outline the main differences between Generative Linguistics and Cognitive

Linguistics.

Objectivism and experientialism

3. Discuss the following paragraphs dealing with the main postulates of Objectivism
taken from Lakoff and Johnson (1980):

Meaning is objective. The objectivist characterizes meaning purely in terms of conditions of

objective truth or falsity. On the objectivist view, the conventions of the language assign to each
sentence an objective meaning, which determines objective truth conditions… (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980: 198)

Meaning is disembodied. In the objectivist view, objective meaning is not meaning to anyone.
Expressions in a natural language can be said to have objective meaning only if that meaning is
independent of anything human beings do, either in speaking or in acting. That is, meaning must
be disembodied. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 199)

Fitting the words to the world without people or human understanding. The objectivist tradition
views semantics as the study of how linguistic expressions can fit the world directly, without the
intervention of human understanding. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 200)

A theory of meaning is based on a theory of truth. The possibility of an account of objective truth,
independent of any human understanding, makes a theory of objective meaning possible. Under
the objectivist account of truth, it is possible for a sentence by itself to fit the world or not. If it
does, it is true; if not, it is false. This gives rise directly to an objectivist account of meaning as
based on truth. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 201)

Meaning is independent of use. If meaning is to be objective, it must exclude all subjective

elements –that is, anything peculiar to a particular context, culture, or mode of understanding.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 201-202)

Meaning is compositional –the building-block theory. According to the myth of objectivism, the
world is made up of objects; they have well-defined inherent properties, independent of any being
who experiences them, and there are fixed relations holding among them at any given point in
time. These aspects of the myth of objectivism give rise to a building-block theory of meaning.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 202)

4. Now, try to provide the counterpart of the above ideas from the point of view of
Experientialism.

5. Wittgenstein was one of the pioneers of the prototype theory of categorization. In this
well-known text this philosopher deals with what he calls family resemblances. First,
discuss the following text paying special attention to the contrast which is established
between the so-called classical or Aristotelian view of categorization and the prototype
theory of categorization. And second, answer the following questions:
• Why do you think the author uses italics for the verbs must, look, and see?

• Can you identify the common features to the different kinds of game mentioned at
the beginning of the text?

• Do you think that an analysis in terms of features properly describes the lexical item
game? Why/Why not?

Consider for example the proceedings we call ‘games’. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-
games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? –Don’t say: ‘There must be
something common, or they would not be called “games”’-but look and see whether there is
anything common to all… And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities
of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than family
resemblances… (Wittgenstein 1978: 31-33)

6. Define the category members robin, sparrow, dove, parrot, and ostrich in terms of
the following attributes: lays eggs, beak, two wings and two legs, feathers, small and
lightweight, can fly, chirps/sings, thin/short legs, short tail, red breast. How many
features in common do you think category members should have in order to be able to
say that they belong to the same category? What would you say about the degree of
membership of ostrich with respect to the category bird from both the point of view of
the classical theory of categorization and of prototype theory?

7. Organize the following sets of categories into three different levels: superordinate,
basic, or subordinate levels.

• Bicycle, racing bike, bus, vehicle, truck, motorbike, car.

• Spaniel, horse, bear, mare, alsatian, animal, tiger, lion, stallion, collie, pig, rabbit.

8. Provide a taxonomy in which the superordinate term is garment.

9. One of the characteristics of prototypes is that they can vary from culture to culture.
For instance, the prototypical Spanish breakfast differs from the prototypical English
breakfast. Describe these two prototypes and give some more examples of the cultural
nature of prototypes.

Idealized Cognitive Models

10. Provide the propositional cognitive model involved in a party.

11. Group the following metaphorical expressions into three different conceptual
metaphors:

• You make my blood boil.

• I am on top of the situation.
• He is just blowing off steam.
• How did I get myself into this situation?
• I have control over him.
• We are in a mess.
• Let her stew.
• He is under my power.
• We are in a lot of trouble now.

12. Once you have grouped the expressions above into three different conceptual
metaphors, identify the source and target domains of each one and list the metaphorical
mappings which are activated in each of them.

13. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) distinguish three types of metaphor: structural,
ontological, and orientational. Identify the kind of metaphor involved in each of the
following cases:

• He hungers for her touch.

• I’m feeling down.
• My neighbour is a dragon.
• He was drooling over her.
• I’m feeling up.
• John is a pig.
• He is sex-starved.
• Mary is a cow.
• Thinking about her always gives me a lift.

In which ways do these three types of metaphor differ? Pay attention both to the nature
of the mappings and to the number of mappings which are activated.
14. On the basis of the definition of metaphor and metonymy within the Cognitive
Linguistics framework, decide whether the following cases are metaphors or
metonymies:

1. John is a brain.
2. Mary is just a pretty face.
3. Jim is the fastest gun.
4. John is the best sax we’ve had in our band.

Do you find anything in common between these cases and the ontological metaphors of
exercise 4 above? Think about it in terms of the relationship between the domains
involved in the metaphoric/metonymic mapping and their predicative or referential use.

15. Image-schemas have been found to underlie the construction of the source domain
of many metaphorical expressions. Analyze the following expressions and identify the
image-schema used in each case. Contrast it with their counterparts in Spanish and
discuss the results21.
• Blanche seems to wallow in her self pity. (Blanche parece sumirse en sus propias
penas)
• We are in a mess. (Estamos metidos en un lío)
• He was full of hate. (Estaba lleno de odio)
• This relationship is not going anywhere. (Esta relación no va a ninguna parte)
• It led him into the way of happiness. (Le condujo al camino de la felicidad)
• She is my other/better half. (Ella es mi media naranja)
• John is in a bad mood. (Juan tiene muy mal humor/un humor de perros, Juan está de
mal humor)
• Harry is in trouble. (Harry tiene problemas)
• I am in a rage. (Tengo ira)
• She is in a depression. (Tiene una depresión)
• The most special thing that can happen to anybody is to fall in love, and the worst is
to fall out of love. (Lo más especial que puede ocurrirle a uno es enamorarse y lo
peor desenamorarse)
• She is a bit crestfallen. (Está un poco alicaída)

21
The examples of this exercise have been taken from Peña (2004).
• John was on cloud nine. (Juan está en el séptimo cielo)
• Mary was in high feather. (María tenía un humor excelente)
• John was in low spirits. (Juan tenía mal humor)
• Cheer up! You will pass your exam next year. (¡Alégrate! Aprobarás el examen el
año que viene)
• He fell into a depression. (Cayó en una depresión)
• His depression drove him to commit suicide. (Su depresión le condujo al suicidio)

16. Take the following examples and answer the questions below:

• His eyes were full of hate.

• She was feeling up.

What is the image-schema involved in each of the examples above?

Would you say that these schemas are basic or subsidiary? Give reasons for your
answer and in case they are subsidiary say on which basic image-schema each of them
depend.

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7. Useful web pages

• Center for the Cognitive Science of Metaphor Online. Internet,

 <http://philosophy.uoregon.edu/metaphor/metaphor.htm>.

• Conceptual Metaphor Home Page: Internet,

<http://cogsci.berkeley.edu/lakoff/MetaphorHome.html>.

• The Metaphor and Metonymy Group. Intgernet,

<http://www.psyc.leeds.ac.uk/research/metaphor/>.

• Gilles Fauconnier’s home page. Internet, <http://cogsci.ucsd.edu/~faucon/>.

• Mark Turner’s home page. Internet, <http://markturner.org/>.

• The FrameNet Project. Internet, <http://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/>.

• The Neural Theory of Language. Internet,

<http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/NTL/>.

• Grupo de estudios cognoscitivos. This is the home page of a research group at

the University of Concepción. Internet, <http://www2.udec.cl/~cognicio>.

• Researh group “Lingüística Cognitiva aplicada al estudio del inglés”. This is

the web page of a research group at the University of Murcia. Internet,
<http://www.um.es/~lincoing/>.

• CogWeb. Cognitive Cultural Studies. Internet, <http://cogweb.ucla.edu/>.

• Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. Internet,

<http://www.mpi.nl/world/>.

• Metaphors: Language, Culture, Concept. Internet,

<http://www.bohemica.com/index.php?m=catalog&s=276>.

Web pages of bibliography on Cognitive Linguistics:

• Internet, <http://philosophy.uoregon.edu/metaphor/annbib.htm>.
• Internet, <http://www.uni-
leipzig.de/~debatin/english/Research/Metaphor.htm#Met_biblio>.

Cognitive Linguistics: Associations:

 • International Cognitive Linguistics Association (ICLA). Internet,
<http://www.cognitivelinguistics.org/>.

• Spanish Cognitive Linguistics Association (AELCO-SCOLA). Internet,

<http://www.um.es/lincoing/aelco/>.

Cognitive Linguistics: Journals:

• An Interdisciplinary Journal of Cognitive Science. Internet,

<http://www.degruyter.de/rs/384_386_ENU_h.htm>.

• The Web Journal of Formal, Computational and Cognitive Linguistics. Internet,

<http://fccl.ksu.ru/>.

• The Online Journal Metaphorik.de. Internet, <http://www.metaphorik.de/>.