American Academy of Political and Social Science

Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving

Author(s): P. Terrence Hopmann
Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 542, Flexibility
in International Negotiation and Mediation (Nov., 1995), pp. 24-47
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 ANNALS,AAPSS, 542, November 1995

Two Paradigms of Negotiation:

Bargaining and Problem Solving
By P.TERRENCE
HOPMANN

ABSTRACT: The development of negotiation theory over recent

decades has been organized aroundtwo majorparadigms:bargaining
and problem solving. For the bargaining paradigm, indicators of
flexibility include concession rates, initiation of new proposals, and
other soft behaviors. For the problem-solvingperspective, flexibility
is usually indicated by a search for better, mutually beneficial solu-
tions to problems that satisfy the needs, identities, and interests of
all parties. Empirical research generally reveals that bargaining
behaviors are used more frequently in international negotiations
than is problem solving. This may be explained by the dominance of
the realist paradigm of international relations, within which most
diplomats are socialized. Since diplomats generally construct their
image of negotiations in terms of bargaining, it is hardly surprising
that these behaviors should be prevalent in actual negotiations. In
addition, empirical research methods utilized to study negotiations
tend to emphasize bargaining variables, and more subtle problem-
solving behaviors are more difficult to detect. The empirical preva-
lence of bargaining, however,does not imply that it is the best method
to induce flexibility in international negotiations. On the contrary,
most research tends to reveal that problem solving produces greater
flexibility and more frequent, efficient, equitable, and durable agree-
ments than bargaining does.

P lTerrence Hopmann is directorof the Centerfor ForeignPolicy Developmentin the

WatsonInstitute for International Studies and professorof political science at Brown
University.He taught previously at the Universityof Minnesota. His researchfocuses
substantively on issues of East-Westand European securityand negotiations on arms
control and disarmament. He is the author of The Negotiation Process and the
Resolution of International Conflicts.
24
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION 25

THE topic
ofinternational negotia- Ikl6's How Nations Negotiate in
tions has been treated by scholars 1964.2 All of these early works had in
and practitioners of the diplomatic common their foundation in the the-
art for centuries, at least since ory of non-zero-sum,or mixed-motive,
Frangois de Calibresin 1716 and For- games, in which parties have both
tune Barth6l6my de Felice in 1778.1 competitive and cooperative options
It has been only since about 1960, available. Reliance on formal game
however, that the systematic study of theory was more explicit and exten-
negotiation has begun to push the sive in the work of both Schelling and
analysis of this fundamental process Rapoport,whereasIkl6integratedthis
in international relations beyond a theoretical orientation with more
set of ad hoc case studies or the pre- traditional international relations
sumption that diplomacy is no more theory and an extensive set of illus-
than an art form. The underlying as- trative cases from the real world of
sumption of the traditional case ap- international diplomacy. This ap-
proach is that each and every nego- proach to negotiations was most
tiation is unique, and no meaningful heavily influenced by the game the-
generalizations aboutthe process can ory literature developed by John von
be derived. Others treat negotiation Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,3
as an art to be mastered only by ex- John Nash,4 and Duncan Luce and
perienced diplomats who develop a Howard Raiffa.5 The approach is
subjective understanding of the pro- based on the assumption that all ne-
cess that cannot be conveyed in a gotiations involve situations where
meaningful way to those who are un- parties seek, in Ikl6's classic phrase,
initiated in the intricacies of the art "the realization of a common inter-
form. Neither approach treats nego- est where conflicting interests are
tiation as a topic that can be ana- present."6
Even though these early works
lyzed in a systematic and gener-
alizable fashion. treated negotiations as a mixed-mo-
tive game, almost fromthe beginning
BARGAININGAND PROBLEMSOLVING: 2. ThomasSchelling, The Strategyof Con-
THEORETICALFOUNDATIONS flict (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,
OF TWOPARADIGMS 1960); Anatol Rapoport,Fights, Games and
Debates (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan
The modern era of systematic Press, 1960); Fred Charles IklI, How Nations
Negotiate(NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1964).
theorizing about international nego- 3. John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
tiations began with Thomas genstern, Theoryof Games and EconomicBe-
Schelling'sStrategyof Conflictin 1960, havior (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Anatol Rapoport'sFights, Gamesand Press, 1947).
4. John F. Nash, "The Bargaining Prob-
Debates in 1960, and Fred Charles
lem," Econometrica, 18:155-62 (1950); idem,
1. See I. WilliamZartman,"Introduction," "Two-Person Cooperative Games," ibid.,
in The Fifty-PercentSolution, ed. I. William 21:128-40(1953).
Zartman(GardenCity,NY:DoubledayAnchor, 5. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa,
1976), p. 29; Fortune Barth6lmy de Felice, Games and Decisions (New York:John Wiley,
"Negotiations, or the Art of Negotiating," in 1957).
ibid., pp. 47-65. 6. Ikl, How Nations Negotiate, pp. 3-4.
26
they began to divide into those ap-
proaches that emphasized the com-
petitive nature of the negotiation pro-
cess-namely, the effort to advance
the interest of the nation relative to
its rivals-and those that high-
lighted the more cooperativeeffort to
enlarge the joint interests of both
parties simultaneously. Even though
the theory of non-zero-sumgames al-
lowed for mutual benefits, both
Schelling and Ikl noted that parties
had to protect themselves from being
exploited by others in a prisoner's
dilemma situation.'
The key aspects of the negotiation
process were characterized by bar-
gaining, in which (1) initial offers are
made by each party to the other, (2)
commitments are made to certain po-
sitions in an effort to hold firm, (3)
promises of rewards and threats of
sanctions are issued to induce other
parties to make concessions, (4) con-
cessions are made as one party moves
closer to another, (5) retractions of
previous offers and concessions are
issued as parties draw apart, and (6)
finally, when the dynamics of conces-
sion making overcome the pressures
to diverge, the parties tend to con-
verge upon agreement somewhere
between their opening offers.s In-
7. In such a situation, both parties have a
mutually beneficial,joint solution to the game.
However,both parties can also maximize their
individual interest at the expense of the other
by playing competitively. The fear by each
party that the otherwill behavein this way and
leave them worse off causes both players to
play competitively, producing an outcome in
which both players typically lose, at least in
comparison with the outcome in the mutual
cooperation solution. See Rapoport, Fights,
Games and Debates, pp. 173-79.
8. These various bargaining behaviors
have been operationalizedin a coding system
THEANNALSOF THEAMERICANACADEMY
equality of resources, of the ability to
exercise influence, and of bargaining
skill may lead to asymmetrical out-
comes, but in virtually all cases the
outcomewill fall somewhere between
the opening positions of the parties.
This process of bargaining has often
been summarized as one that pro-
duces agreement through conces-
sions and convergence.This bargain-
ing paradigm became the dominant
approachto the topic of international
negotiations in the decades of the
1960s and 1970s.
Rapoport, however, did not stop
with this simple model of bargaining
derived from game theory in his 1960
bookon conflict.Rather,he concluded
his discussion of game theory with
the following important observation:
At presentgametheoryhas, in my opin-
ion, two importantuses, neitherof them
relatedto gamesnorto conflictdirectly.
First,gametheorystimulatesus to think
about conflictin a novel way. Second,
game theoryleads to some genuineim-
passes, that is, to situationswhere its
axiomaticbase is shown to be insufficient
for dealing even theoretically with cer-
tain types of conflict situations. These
impasses set up tensions in the minds of
people who care. They must therefore
look aroundfor other frameworksinto
which conflict situations can be cast.9
This conclusion encouraged
Rapoportto go beyond formal games
and to introduce the concept that he
called bargaining process analysis by Charles
E. Walcottand P.TerrenceHopmann,"Interac-
tion Analysis and BargainingBehavior,"in The
Small Group in Political Science: The Last t7vo
Decades of Development, ed. Robert T. Golem-
biewski (Athens:University of Georgia Press,
1978).
9. Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates,
p. 242.
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION 27

called "debate,"ajoint search for "em- influence of this paradigm is the

patheticunderstanding"betweenindi- work on "principlednegotiations" of
viduals and for a "domainof validity" Roger Fisher and William Ury,"
where their interests and under- which emphasizes negotiations based
standings overlap. It is only through on interests rather than bargaining
a process of developing mutual un- positions; the "diagnosis-formula-
derstanding and seeking mutual detail"perspectiveofWilliamZartman
gains that, Rapoportbelieved, funda- and Maureen Berman,12 which
mental conflicts between different stresses the importance of first un-
belief systems could be resolved derstanding a problem and then ar-
peacefully. Through this effort to ex- riving at a general conceptual for-
pand bargaining theory and to intro- mula to guide bargaining about
duce debate, Rapoportlaid the foun- details;andthe "problem-solving work-
dations for a second perspective on shops" of John Burton and Herbert
international negotiations, which Kelman, which seek to facilitate the
has frequently been identified as the ability of actors to realize their basic
"problem-solving"paradigm. needs and self-identity through infor-
In a 1965bookonlabor-management mal interactions.13
negotiations, these two paradigms The purpose of this article is to
were described by Richard Walton explore the implications of these two
and Robert McKersie in terms of a different paradigms for the analysis
distinction between "distributive of flexibility in international negotia-
bargaining" and "integrative bar- tions. The very definitionof flexibility,
gaining."10 In a mixed-motive game,
the analytical tools used to evaluate
distributive bargaining refers to that flexibility, and the prescriptive ad-
aspect of bargaining in which the in- vice that one would give to negotia-
terests of the parties are in basic con- tors concerning how to behave flex-
flict and in which each party tries to ibly without being exploited all may
win for itself the largest possible differ depending in part on which
share of whatever value is being di- paradigm one is working within. Sub-
vided. By contrast, integrative bar- sequent sections of the article will
gaining refers to a situation in which
the parties may jointly enlarge the 11. Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce
Patton, to Yes:NegotiatingAgreement
benefits available to both, so that withoutGettingIn, 2d ed. (New York:Penguin
Giving
both may gain from creating a larger Books, 1991).
amount of value to be shared by 12. I. William Zartman and Maureen R.
them. However, this latter perspec- Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Ha-
tive has blossomed into a major and ven, CT~YaleUniversity Press, 1982).
13. John W.Burton,ResolvingDeep-Rooted
distinctive approachto the study and Conflict:A Handbook (Lanham, MD: Univer-
analysis of international negotia- sity Press of America, 1987); idem, Conflict:
tions only since about 1980. Of par- ResolutionandPrevention(NewYork:St. Martin's
ticular significance for the enhanced Press, 1990);Nadim N. Rouhanaand Herbert
C. Joint
Kelman, "Promoting in In-
Thinking
10. Richard E. Walton and Robert B. ternational Conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian
McKersie,A Behavioral TheoryofLaborNego- Continuing Workshop,"Journal of Social Is-
tiations (NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1965),pp.4-5. sues, 50(1):157-78(1994).
28
develop these two paradigms as they
are reflected in the literature ofinter-
national relations in general and in
the study of international negotia-
tion in particular. I shall then con-
sider the degree to which the differ-
ent perspectives may be reconciledin
order to study negotiations as an in-
tegral part of the process of interac-
tion among states and other actors in
international relations.
REALISMAND LIBERALISM:
TWOPARADIGMSIN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONSTHEORY
The two major competing para-
digmsthat have appearedin the analy-
sis of international negotiations since
1960 parallel in many important re-
spects the two most important para-
digms that have also divided the
larger bodies of theory about interna-
tional relations in general, namely,
realism in its various manifestations
and liberalism or liberal institution-
alism. Indeed, there is a strong corre-
spondence between the central con-
cepts of bargaining theory and most
realist approaches to larger interna-
tional relations theory, whereas the
problem-solving paradigm is closely
linked in basic assumptions and con- theories in the tradition begun by the
cepts with the liberal orientation to- eighteenth-century Dutchjurist Hugo Grotius,
ward international relations.'4 to idealism of the variety developed by Woo-
14. For my purposesin this article, it is not
essential to distinguish between all of the
many variants of these two broad schools.
Therefore,under realism I consider both clas-
sical realism originating with Thucydides in
the fifth century B.C. and Thomas Hobbes in
the seventeenth century and articulated in
recent times by Hans Morgenthauand many
others, as well as the more recent neorealist
school, most closely identified with Kenneth
Waltz and his followers. Under liberalism I
consider approachesranging fromcontractual
THEANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY
In a recent analysis, David Baldwin
has distinguished between the basic
tenets of realism and liberalism ac-
cording to their different stances on
a number of key issues:
1. Anarchy. Realists generally be-
lieve that the international system is
essentially anarchic in structure, so
that each actormust rely on self-help
for its security, whereas liberals be-
lieve that joint decision making may
overcome the anarchy within the
system.
2. International cooperation.Real-
ists are generally skeptical about the
potential for cooperationin an anar-
chic system, believing that it is usu-
ally restrictedto short-termcollabora-
tion to achieve immediate interests,
whereas liberals see greater poten-
tial for cooperation to achieve long-
term objectives even in the presence
of apparent short-term differences of
interest.
3. Role of the state. Realists gener-
ally emphasize the unitary state as
the most relevant actor in interna-
tional relations, whereas liberals see
the state as disaggregated and em-
phasize the role of nonstate actors,
drow Wilson and later E. H. Carr,integration
theory of David Mitrany, Ernst Haas, and
many others, as well as interdependencethe-
ory and neoliberal institutionalism most
clearly identified recently with scholars such
as RobertKeohaneand Joseph Nye. Although
there are many and important differences
within these two broadschoolsof international
relations theory,for the purpose of this article
the assumptionsthat they holdin commonand
that differentiate the two schools from one
another are more important than the many
subtle differenceswithin the two schools.
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
including transnational actors, non-
governmental organizations, and in-
ternational regimes and institutions.
4. Relative versus absolute gains.
Realists emphasize the centrality of
measuring gains solely in terms of
the state's benefits relative to its po-
tential competitors, whereas liberals
see value in obtaining greater abso-
lute gains, even if others benefit as
much as or more than oneself.
5. Goals. Realists perceive that the
goals of the state are defined primar-
ily in terms of national security,
whereas liberals emphasize the
equal importance of other goals such
as economic welfare, environmental
protection, improvement of health,
and so forth.
6. Intentions versus capabilities.
Realists emphasize that in calcula-
tions of state behavior the most rele-
vant considerations are the pure ca-
pabilities that states possess to do
harm to others, whereas liberals tend
to consider the intentions of states as
being at least as important in ex-
plaining and predictingtheir behavior.
7. Institutions and regimes. Real-
ists are pessimistic about the ability
of international institutions and re-
gimes to serve the interests of indi-
vidual states except in specific and
limited circumstances, whereas lib-
erals are more optimistic about the
potential role of international actors
in promoting the long-term interests
of states, nonstate actors, and indi-
viduals.15
15. David A. Baldwin, "Neorealism,Neolib- wards and
eralism, and World Politics," in Neorealism in turn made credible demonstrat-
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate,
ed. David A. Baldwin (New York:Columbia ing that the states have sufficient
University Press, 1993), pp. 4-11.
29
All of these distinctions relate in
one way or another to the two major
paradigms of international negotia-
tion. The most important of these is
the distinction between relative and
absolute gains, between the pursuit
of gains at the expense of others in a
largely zero-sumcompetition and the
cooperative search for joint gains or
positive-sum solutions. Of the seven
distinguishing features between
neorealism and neoliberalism identi-
fied by Baldwin, this one owes the
most to the direct contributionmade
by theories of negotiation and bar-
gaining to the larger body of interna-
tional relations theory.
The bargaining approach focuses
primarilyon states as represented by
a group of negotiators who have spe-
cificnational interests to be achieved.
Generally these interests are as-
sumed to be fixed and unitary, and
the diplomat'stask is to try to maxi-
mize those national interests through
negotiation. These interests are
mapped on the bargaining situation
as static preferences, and the out-
come of the negotiation may be evalu-
ated largely accordingto the amount
of utility producedfor the state. Bar-
gaining tactics are assumed to be
largely competitive: states make
commitments to reinforcetheir offers
and demands;they manipulate infor-
mation to disguise their true prefer-
ences and their actual alternatives to
agreement in order to gain settle-
ments that are unilaterally favorable
to their own interests; they issue
threats and promises concerning re-
punishments, which are
by
capabilities to carry out the punish-
30
ments and rewards and by estab-
lishing a track record that demon-
strates commitment to implement
threats and promises; they forgo
agreements that will produce bene-
fits greater than the status quo or
their next best alternative to an
agreement, if their potential competi-
tors are perceived to be gaining more
than they from the agreement; they
will rely largely on their own means
to verify and enforce the implemen-
tation of agreements, including a uni-
lateral right to renounce and violate
an agreement, rather than accepting
any majorroleforinternationalinstitu-
tions in verificationand enforcement.
By contrast, problem-solving ap-
proaches to international negotia-
tions are generally associated with a
more liberal or institutionalist stance
on international relations theory in
general. The general argument of
this perspective is that the goal of
negotiation is to solve commonprob-
lems that the parties face and to try
to find solutions to those problems
that will benefit everyone. A meta-
phor frequently employed by Roger
Fisher is that this perspective views
negotiations not as a situation in
which the two parties sit on opposite
sides of the table facing off against
one another but, rather, as a situ-
ation where they both sit on the same
side of the table facing a common
enemy-the problemthat needs to be
solved.16This problem-orientedfocus
views security not as an isolated is-
sue but as one factor often inter-
twined with other political, economic,
social, and cultural issues. Achieving
security depends upon more than
considerations of power. This ap-
16. Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, pp. 39-40.
THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY
proach emphasizes parties' inten-
tions; it does not dismiss the impor-
tance of interests, and it indeed as-
sumes that the intention of all parties
is to realize their interests-but in-
terests may also be conditioned by
norms and institutions. It also as-
sumes that a party can be expected to
accept and implement agreements
that serve its interests, even if they
also serve the interests of others at
the same time.
Problem solving sees obstacles to
agreement arising not only because
of abstract state interests but also
because of the perceptions and inter-
ests of important political and eco-
nomic actors within the state, so that
negotiations must be sensitive to the
needs of important domestic actors in
other states. Finally, the problem-
solving approach tends to believe
that international regimes and or-
ganizations create a set of norms
within which negotiations take place
that facilitate an atmosphere of coop-
eration. These institutions may be
called upon to mediate disputes or to
assist in the collective implementa-
tion, verification, and enforcement of
agreements. Thus the interests and
the negotiating behavior of states
may be constrained by the institu-
tional context within which negotia-
tions take place. For example, nego-
tiations between the United States
and Japan on trade issues within the
context of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)are condi-
tioned by the history, set of prior
agreements, and institutional struc-
tures already provided by the GATT
system. Contrary to the typical as-
sumptions of bargaining models,
states do not enter most negotiations
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
as unitary, independent, and autono-
mous actors. Rather, they are fre-
quently participants in international
institutions that limit their sover-
eignty and constrain many aspects of
their behavior, both in negotiations
themselves and in the implementa-
tion of negotiated agreements.
RELATIVEVERSUS ABSOLUTEGAINS
Of all the many issues in which the
dialogue between the bargaining and
problem-solving models of negotia-
tion and the larger debate between
realist and liberal theories of interna-
tional relations come together, none
is more important than the debate
about absolute versus relative gains.
The disagreement occurs over differ-
ent interpretations of how to respond
in international negotiations to a
classic dilemma arising in all mixed-
motive games. Such a situation is
illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts
two parties and a payoffpolygon that
delimits the possible results from
multiple plays of this game. Solu-
tions falling outside this polygon are
impossible given the constraints of
the situation, and the parties must
agree to a solution that falls within
this polygon. The security levels de-
picted for each player represent the
outcome that each party can guaran-
tee itself by playing the game as if it
were a zero-sum game in which it
plays its best possible strategy.
Therefore, the axiomatic basis of
game theory provides a range of pos-
sible agreements, but no specific so-
lution. The range of outcomes must
fall within the triangle abc, that is,
above the security level of both par-
ties without going beyond the north-
31
east frontier, the line of maximum
possible benefits. Economic theory
also suggests that the parties should
seek a solution that falls along that
northeast frontier, often referred to
as the Pareto-optimalfrontier.Along
this frontier, it is no longer possible
for both parties to benefit simulta-
neously. Any gain by one party must
be at the expense of another. By con-
trast, any place within the abc trian-
gle that is not on the negotiation set,
such as point d in Figure 1, is not an
optimal solution. Both players may
benefit by any move in a generally
northeasterly direction: indeed, any
move between 00 and 900 will benefit
both players simultaneously until
they reach the northeast frontier, so
they have a mutual interest in mov-
ing in that direction.
The essential dilemma appears at
this point: both parties are better off
by moving in a northeasterly direc-
tion, but party A may prefer to move
from point d at 200 and arrive at the
frontier at point e, whereas party B
may prefer to move from point d at
700 and arrive at point g. Obviously
the most equitable solution, if the two
parties could agree on it, would be to
move at a 450 angle and arrive at
point f. However,each party may pur-
sue bargaining tactics to try to bene-
fit itself in the distributive aspects of
this mixed-motive game, even while
cooperating with the other party to
reach the northeast frontier in the
integrative, or problem-solving, as-
pect of this game.
The main difference between bar-
gainers and problem solvers, or in-
deed between realists and liberals, is
indicated by how they resolve this
dilemma. In general, liberals argue
32
FIGURE1
ABSOLUTEVERSUSRELATIVE
GAINSINA MIXED-MOTIVE
(A's SecurityLevel)
(-3,
for a problem-solving approach that
optimizes mutual gains for both par-
ties along the northeast frontier. It
matters less to them that these bene-
fits may not be completely equal;
what matters more is that both par-
ties are better off whether they end
up at points e, f, or g than they would
be if they accepted a suboptimal
agreement at point d. In other words,
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
GAME
A
(+)
(0, 10)
a c
(0)
-3) (B's Security Level)
absolute gains are maximized by
moving to the northeast frontier,
even if movements to either points e
or g create asymmetrical relative
gains, and in either case one party
gains more than the other, even
though both are better off than at
point d.
By contrast, realists generally ar-
gue that it makes a difference where
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
one ends up on the northeast frontier
when talking about negotiations be-
tween states in an anarchic interna-
tional system. Even if both are abso-
lutely better off, if one gains more
relative to the other, then this may
put the relative loser at a strategic
disadvantage that could do it seri-
ous harm over the long run. Michael
Mastanduno illustrates this argu-
ment with reference to the opinion of
some U.S. officials regarding trade
negotiations with Japan as follows:
"certainpatterns of economicinterac-
tion with Japan, even though mutu-
ally beneficial in absolute terms,
would bring relatively greater eco-
nomic benefits to Japan and over
time work to the detriment of Amer-
ica's competitive position in the de-
velopment and application of ad-
vanced technology."17
In otherwords,many realists would
argue that it is better for party A to
reach a suboptimal agreement at
point d than to accept a "mutually
beneficial, optimal" agreement at
point g, where party B has far greater
relative gains than A. Party Amay be
absolutely better off at g than at d,
but B would be so much better offthat
A's structural position in interna-
tional relations might be harmed by
such a mutually beneficialagreement.
Thus neorealists such as Joseph
Grieco have argued that "anarchy
means that states fear not just being
cheated but also being dominated or
even destroyed by others."In such a
Hobbesian world, he argues for what
he calls a "defensive positionalist"
17. Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative
Gains Matter?America'sResponseto Japanese
Industrial Policy,"InternationalOrganization,
16:190 (Summer 1991).
33
strategy in which states are "inter-
ested in achieving and maintaining
relative capabilities sufficient to re-
main secure and independent in the
self-help context of international an-
archy."18
Grieco's defensive positionalists
are thus likely to approach interna-
tional negotiations from a perspec-
tive of hard bargainers. The goal is to
win in the negotiation at the expense
of the other party,by remaining firm
while they are flexible and offer com-
promises. Once the opponent has be-
gun to slide down the slippery slope
of compromise, the hard bargainer
may sit fast and achieve an optimal
agreement that also represents high
relative gains. Even if the opponent
remains inflexible, the hard bar-
gainer would prefer to remain firmly
committedto self-interestedpositions
and risk suboptimal agreements or
even no agreement at all rather than
be led into an agreement in which the
opponent made greater gains. Of
course, if the opponentis not gullible,
or if the opponent is similarly moti-
vated, then both parties are likely to
be engaged in a contest of wills.
Either one party will eventually give
in, or, more likely, stalemate or very
suboptimal agreements will ensue.
This, the realist would argue, is the
risk inherent in avoiding exploitation
at the hands of others by the search
to expand benefits with a potential
competitor. By successfully playing
hard ball, one may be able to win in
both absolute and relative terms, but,
18. Joseph M. Grieco,"Understandingthe
Problem of International Cooperation: The
Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the
Future of Realist Theory,"in Neorealism and
Neoliberalism, ed. Baldwin, p. 303.
34
if unsuccessful, one also runs a high
risk of stalemate orweak agreements
in which both parties potentially lose.
This kind of positional bargaining
seemed to characterize the vast ma-
jority of interactions between the
United States and the Soviet Union
throughout the Cold War.
By contrast, liberals argue that
the mutual benefits derived from
reaching agreement based on posi-
tive-sum solutions may generate an
atmosphere in which future coopera-
tion is also enhanced. As Roger
Fisher has pointed out, it is not just
the outcome of the negotiation that is
important but also the improved na-
ture of the long-term relationship be-
tween the parties that results from
achieving mutually beneficial agree-
ments.19Others, such as Duncan Sni-
dal, have argued that the relative-
gains argument is limited to relations
between two states in a tight bipolar
world. "Its truth diminishes rapidly
if concerns for relative gains are less
than total, or if the initial absolute
gains game between states is not PD
[prisoner's dilemma], or (especially)
if the number of states increases to
three or more. Since one or more of
these conditions characterizes most
international political phenomena,
relative gains do not limit interna-
tional cooperationin general."20Thus
the superpower relationship during
the Cold War may have been an ex-
about how rational actors ought to
confront this logical paradox, and a
19. Roger Fisher, "Whatis a 'Good'U.S.-
Soviet Relationship-and How Do We Build mixed-motive, non-zero-sum game is
One?" Negotiation Journal, 3(4):326 (Oct.
1987).
20. DuncanSnidal, "RelativeGains and the
Pattern of International Cooperation," in
Neorealism and Neoliberalism, ed. Baldwin,
pp. 201-2.
THEANNALSOFTHEAMERICAN
ACADEMY
ception rather than the rule, and in a
multilateral system this kind of com-
petitiveness may not be advanta-
geous for anyone.
Furthermore, liberals such as
RobertKeohanehave arguedthat the
relative-gains argument as applied
to negotiations requires the assump-
tion that the opponents
could use advantagesgained from the
internationalagreementto hurt oneself
in a futureperiod,and a significantpro-
spectivemotivationforit to doso. Onlyif
the advocate of relative gains interpreta-
tions can show that these conditions are
met, is it plausible to entertain his hy-
pothesis.21
Finally, liberals tend to emphasize
the extent to which cooperation to
achieve mutual, absolute gains is en-
hanced by the presence of interna-
tional institutions within which
states and their negotiations are em-
bedded, while this cooperation in
turn reinforces and strengthens
those institutions. Again, to cite Keo-
hane: "Internationalinstitutions ex-
ist largely because they facilitate
self-interested cooperation by reduc-
ing uncertainty, thus stabilizing ex-
pectations. It follows that expecta-
tions of states will depend in part on
the nature and strength of interna-
tional institutions."22
Much of the debate about relative
versus absolute gains has thus been
based upon different assumptions
21. RobertO. Keohane,"InstitutionalThe-
ory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold
War,"in Neorealism and Neoliberalism, ed.
Baldwin, p. 281.
22. Ibid., p. 288.
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
likely to be played differently by a
realist and by a liberal. At the same
time, a good deal of the actual behav-
ior of negotiators cannot be ade-
quately explained by these axiomatic
foundations of game theory. Indeed,
the difference between advocates of
relative versus absolute gains seems
to fall largely into that situation de-
scribed in the earlier citation from
Anatol Rapoport where the "axi-
omatic base is shown to be insuffi-
cient," setting up "tensions in the
minds of people who care." Much of
the difference in how people respond
to the same situation cannot be ex-
plained in terms of rational analysis;
after all, if rationality could account
for this behavior, then all rational
actors should be expected to behave
the same way in identical situations.
For roughly a decade I have util-
ized a teaching exercise based on the
prisoner's dilemma in which pairs of
individuals play a multi-play exer-
cise of a game involving setting the
price of oil for export to a third coun-
try. The two countries may compete
to undersell one another, thus reduc-
ing profits if both compete or produc-
ing very high profits for one and very
low profits for the other if the second
party fails to compete, or they may in
effect form a cartel and cooperate to
set high prices to the third country,in
which case both receive moderately
high profits throughout the exercise.
Although I do not have precise data,
no matter where this game is played
or whether it is played with experi-
enced diplomats or naive students,
the division between groups consis-
tently falls roughly equally into the
three classes of possible outcomes:
35
1. Both parties compete in most
rounds of the game, producing low
profits for both (the lose-lose result).
2. One party competes while the
other cooperates, in which case the
former exploits the latter and makes
very high profits while the latter
makes very low profits (the win-lose
outcome).
3. Both parties cooperate in most
rounds of the game, producing high
profits for both (the win-win solu-
tion).23
These three outcomes appear with
more or less equal frequencyfor indi-
viduals faced with identical situ-
ations and thus with the same di-
lemma. This result suggests that
behavior along the relative versus
absolute gains continuum can be ex-
plained by at least two factors other
than purely rational calculation. The
first is the orientationof the individu-
23. Since I have conductedthis exercise for
pedagogical purposes rather than research, I
have not collected systematic data on the re-
sults. However,in more than fifty uses of this
exercise in training courses for diplomats or
with students at Brown University and other
institutions, each conductedover 12 rounds of
play, I have never failed to find at least one
virtually pure example of each of the three
classes of outcomes.The debriefingof the exer-
cise requireshighlightingthe presenceof these
three different possible outcomes in order to
discuss the differencesin the interactionsthat
might account for these divergent results.
While the distributionsacross these three out-
comesmay not be exactly equal, the main point
is that there is great diversity every time the
same exercise is played, despite the fact that
all pairs start with the same informationand
play the exerciseidentically.That there is such
diversity of outcomes suggests that, if there is
one best, rationalsolutionto this dilemma,it is
certainly not evident to the pairs of parties in
this hypotheticaland highlysimplifiedexercise.
36
als themselves. Some may be intoler-
ant of ambiguity,may view the world
as essentially competitive, and may
thus be motivated to win relative to
others under virtually all conditions.
Such individuals are likely to pursue
competitive strategies in the pris-
oner's dilemma exercise even if faced
with a competitive opponent, in
which case they both would lose.
These individuals show little concern
for their absolute profits so long as
they are equal to or greater than
those of their opponent. Other play-
ers may view the situation differ-
ently. They may be more tolerant of
ambiguity,more cognitively complex,
and more willing to cooperate with
others to achieve collective benefits
over the many plays of the game.
They may even be willing to forgo
opportunities to cheat and to exploit
a cooperative partner for fear of dis-
rupting a pattern of cooperation,
knowing that cheating will probably
be retaliated against and hence lead
to lower absolute gains over the long
run, even if it might yield higher rela-
tive gains in the short term.
The following real-world example,
taken from a recently declassified
transcript of a meeting in the White
House Situation Room early in the
Carter administration, illustrates
these different styles. The topic dis-
cussed at this meeting of President
Carter's top foreign policy advisers
was the U.S. response to Soviet in-
volvement in the Horn of Africa
(Ethiopia and Somalia). In particu-
lar, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
(CV) represents an almost classic il-
lustration of a liberal who empha-
sizes joint U.S.-Soviet interests; the
special assistant for international se-
THEANNALSOFTHEAMERICAN
ACADEMY
curity affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski
(ZB),represents a traditional realist,
hard bargainerwho emphasizes com-
petitive position taking; and Secre-
tary of Defense Harold Brown (HB)
seems to alternate between the two
approaches. "VP" refers to Vice Presi-
dent Walter Mondale.
CV:I want you to knowwhat I said in
hearings before Congressyesterday.I
was asked, "Is there a linkage between
what is going on in the Horn [of Africa]
and SALT[StrategicArms Limitation
Talks]?"I replied, "There is not." I did
have to recognizethat what is happening
could affect the political atmosphere. I
made a speech for about two minutes on
the importanceof SALT.
ZB: The President said in response to a
question this noon that there is no link-
age but Soviet actions may impose such
linkage.
HB & CV:That is wrong.
CV:I think it is wrong to say that this is
going to producelinkage, and it is of fun-
damental importance.
ZB:It is going to poison the atmosphere.
CV:Wewill endup losingSALTandthat
will be the worst thing that could happen.
If we do not get a SALT Treaty in the
President'sfirst four years, that will be a
blemish on his recordforever.
ZB:It will be a blemish on his recordalso
if a treaty gets rejected by the Senate.
CV: Zbig, you yesterday and the Presi-
dent today said it may create linkage, and
I think it is wrong to say that.
VP:Howwouldyou see it playing out, Cy?
CV:It willtoughenthe Russian'sposition.
Whatis more,we aregettingourselvesin
a problemhere at home.The problemis
that peoplewill say that if the Russians
are good,are we goingto givein to them
on something in SALT?
TWOPARADIGMS
OFNEGOTIATION 37

HB: There is going to be linkage-but we us, we are going to have major problems
should not encourage it. with them in the south [SouthAfrica and
ZB:What we are saying is that if there is Angola]. We should communicate to the
an aggravation of tensions because of Soviets that they do not have a free hand
what the Soviets are doingin the Horn [of and that what they do entails risks. Oth-
Africa],there is going to be linkage. That erwise, what will they think? ...
is a statement of fact. CV:I think the key still remains SALT.If
HB: Not all statements of fact should be we make progress on SALT,then a lot of
made. things will fall into place that do not fall
into place otherwise.
ZB:The Soviets should be made aware of
the fact that they are poisoning the at- HB: I do not think a SALTTreaty would
mosphere. make any difference-if we had it now,
HB: We should find something else to they would be reacting in the same way.
beat the Soviets with.... ZB:They must understand that there are
HB: I have an idea re China. The Chinese consequences in their behavior. If we do
are less concerned about the aggressor not react, we are destroying our own pos-
[Somaliain the Ogadenprovinceof Ethio- ture-regionally and internationally and
pia]. Why don't we get together with the we are creating the conditionsfor domes-
Chinese in Warsaw and issue a joint tic reaction.
statement of concern about the Horn [of CV: This is where
you and I part. The
Africa] and append it to a statement that consequences of doing something like
we will consult on other issues where we this are
very dangerous.24
have a joint interest? That would get the
Soviets' attention.
CV:That would get their attention, but This dialogue at the highest levels
we are at the point where we are on the in the U.S. government illustrates
brink of ending up with a real souring of clearly that the different orientations
relations between ourselves and the So- of realists and liberals lead to very
viet Union, and it may take a helluva long different recommendations for the
while to change and may not be changed conduct of international relations, in-
for years, and I think that is a very im- cluding international negotiations.
portant step to take-we should examine That discussion generated the idea of
it carefully before we go down that road.
"playing the China card" to punish
HB: It is an important step-it is not like Soviet actions in Africa, leading to
postponing or cancelling a meeting on Brzezinski's visit to Beijing during
space. I am struck by the approach the 21-23 May 1978. The U.S. decision to
Chinese ambassadormade the other day normalize relations with China in
to our ambassador in the Sudan. They
want to be in close touch with us. early 1979, when Deng Xiaoping
made a return visit to Washington,
ZB: On this business of souring relations created such a hostile reaction in the
with the Soviets, the real question is why
are they being soured? Do the Soviets 24. U.S., SpecialConsultativeCommittee
want to sour these relations? If they can Meetingon Hornof Africa, 2 Mar. 1978, 12:50-
do what they want in the Horn [ofAfrica] 2:15 p.m.,WhiteHouseSituationRoom,Secret/
without getting evidence of concernfrom Sensitive (declassified 12/19/90).
38
Soviet Union that negotiations on the
final stages of the SALTTreaty came
almost to a halt for many months,
long enough to jeopardize any chance
that the treaty might be ratified prior
to the almost complete collapse of
U.S.-Sovietrelationsin December1979.
In addition to the approaches
adopted by individuals, the interac-
tion process itself clearly creates the
kind of dynamic behavior that pro-
duces one of the three classes of out-
comes noted previously: lose-lose,
win-lose, and win-win. Most of the
research on negotiationshas indicated
that the dynamic that produces the
greatest long-run cooperation is tit-
for-tat reciprocity,in which coopera-
tive behaviors by one party are imme-
diately reciprocatedby the other and
in which conflictual behavior is also
immediately retaliated against by a
conflictual response.25 Under condi-
tions when mutual competition be-
comes "locked in," one party must
break this cycle of pure reciprocityby
undertaking some "unilateral initia-
tives." These initiatives are likely to
break the cycle of competition, how-
ever, only when they are also recipro-
cated more or less immediately.26
The factor most often suggested to
explain the value of reciprocityis its
predictability, that is, the assurance
that it provides to both parties that
their behaviors will be reciprocated
by the other. By contrast, when the
25. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation(New York:Basic Books, 1984).
26. For a summary of relevant research
findings, see Daniel Druckmanand P.Terrence
Hopmann, "Behavioral Aspects of Negotia-
tions on Mutual Security,"in Behavior, Soci-
ety, and Nuclear War, ed. Philip E. Tetlock
et al. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989), 1:107-15.
THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY
interaction pattern becomes charac-
terized by uncertainty and confusion,
cooperation is likely to break down.
One party may try against all odds to
return to a cooperative pattern and
be exploited by a competitive oppo-
nent, or both parties may fall back on
a strategy of minimizing maximum
losses through playing competitively.
In one case, one party may take ad-
vantage of the confusion to enhance
its relative gains at the expense of its
opponent, or both parties may as-
sume the stance of defensive posi-
tionalists and both may lose as a con-
sequence.
In short, whether the outcome of a
particular negotiation reflects the
predictions of relative-gains or abso-
lute-gains theorists depends on much
more than just calculations of the
most rational, utility-maximizing
strategy for responding to this di-
lemma. The initial orientation with
which individuals approach this di-
lemma will itself exert a great influ-
ence on how they behave in the actual
interaction, and their joint behavior
will interact to create a dynamic pro-
cess leading to mutual cooperation,
exploitation of one by the other, or
mutual competition. The axiomatic
foundation of game theory can take
us only so far in explaining this be-
havior. Beyond those axioms, we
must look to the realm of psychology,
to ideas and beliefs about how the
world works, and to the dynamics of
group interactions in an interna-
tional context. An expanded focus is
necessary to understand when and
why the expectations of realists or
liberals will be realized in any par-
ticular international conflict or any
specific negotiation trying to resolve
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
that conflict. These hypotheses need
to be tested with systematic empiri-
cal evidence before they can be ac-
ceptedwith confidence,but the empiri-
cal evidence availableto date suggests
that some factors beyond pure ra-
tional choice must account for differ-
ent responses to the dilemma posed
by the conflict between relative and
absolute gains.27
IMPLICATIONSOF
THE TWOPARADIGMSFOR
NEGOTIATINGFLEXIBILITY
Flexibility has long been consid-
ered an important part of the process
of international negotiations. In the
vast majority of situations, it is clear
that some degree of flexibility is re-
quired in order for negotiators to
reach agreement. Therefore,flexibil-
ity has often been considered to be a
highly valued characteristic of inter-
national negotiators. At the same
time, too much flexibility has gener-
ally been believed to encourage ex-
ploitation by other parties.
Because of the mixed-motive na-
ture of all negotiating situations, the
dilemma faced by most negotiators is
to identify the appropriate balance
between the degree of flexibility nec-
essary to reach agreement and the
degree of firmness required to avoid
being exploited and to assure oneself
of an adequate share of the value
being negotiated. Too much rigidity
on the part of negotiators risks creat-
ing stalemate, whereas too much
flexibility by one of the parties risks
exploitation by more rigid opponents.
From the point of view of reaching
agreement (integrative negotiation),
flexibility is thus a valued commod-
27. Ibid., esp. pp. 103-37.
39
ity, but from the point of view of each
party's own individual interest (dis-
tributive bargaining), flexibility may
detract from winning a sufficiently
large share of the benefits of the ne-
gotiation. The right balance is thus
difficult to strike, and a negotiator is
constantly faced with cross pressures
between acting flexibly in order to
reach agreement and behaving rig-
idly in order to avoid exploitation or
to gain the largest possible share of
the outcome.
Dean Pruitt and Steven Lewis
have tried to overcomethis dilemma
by introducing the notion of "flexible
rigidity,"also called "firmflexibility"
by Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin.28The
essence of this concept is to be firm
about fundamental interests and ba-
sic goals, to which one must be reso-
lutely committed, while exhibiting
flexibility about means ofnegotiating
a solution to the problem. While this
is a useful advance, it does not solve
altogether at least two problems. On
the one hand, where there are funda-
mental conflicts of interest, rigidity
about basic goals may block progress
altogether. On the other hand, flexi-
bility in the negotiating process may
be perceived by the other party as a
sign of weakness that can be ex-
ploited to the other's benefit. Thus
the basic dilemma, illustrated as fol-
lows by Sebenius, remains unsolved:
28. Dean G. Pruitt and Steven A. Lewis,
"ThePsychologyof IntegrativeBargaining,"in
Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspec-
tives, ed. Daniel Druckman(BeverlyHills, CA:
Sage, 1977), pp. 183-84; Dean G. Pruitt and
Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict:Escalation,
Stalemate and Settlement(New York:Random
House, 1986), pp. 153-54. See also Dean G.
Pruitt, "Flexibilityin Conflict Episodes,"this
issue of TheAnnals of the AmericanAcademy
of Political and Social Science.
40
If the otherpartyis openand forthcom-
ing, I can take advantageof it andclaim
a greatdealofvalue;thus,I shouldadopt
a value-claimingstance. On the other
hand, if the other party is tough and
adopts a value-claimingstance, I must
alsoadoptsucha stanceto protectmyself.
Eitherway,a strongtendencyoperating
on all partiesoftenresultsin competitive
movesto claimvalueindividually, driving
out cooperativemoves.The results are
pooragreements,deadlocks,andconflict
spirals.29
Not only is the right balance of
flexibility difficult to determine, but
even the very concept of flexibility
itself means quite different things to
different analysts of negotiations. In-
deed, the very definition of the con-
cept of flexibility depends intimately
on the research paradigm through
which one understands and inter-
prets the negotiation process. In ad-
dition, the advice one offers to resolve
this dilemma depends in large part
on which paradigm one prefers.
Flexibility in the different
negotiation paradigms
The treatment of negotiating flexi-
bility is thus often a function of which
paradigm one selects. Within the re-
alist, bargaining paradigm, flexibil-
ity is generally defined in terms of the
willingness to make new offers and
concessions and to avoid commit-
ments or retractions. Put differently,
flexibility may be viewed as the
prevalence of soft over hard negotia-
tion styles, that is, the dominance of
converging behaviors comparedwith
29. James K. Sebenius, "NegotiationAnaly-
sis," in International Negotiation: Analysis, cott, "The Impact of External Stresses and
Approaches,Issues, ed. Victor A. Kremenyuk Tensionson Negotiations,"in Negotiations, ed.
(San Francisco:Jossey-Bass, 1991),pp. 210-11. Druckman,pp. 311-12.
THEANNALS
OFTHEAMERICAN
ACADEMY
stalemate-creating or diverging be-
haviors. Soft behaviors may include
the initiation of new proposals, mak-
ing concessions toward the position
assumed by the other side, refraining
from the use of rigid commitments,
making promises rather than
threats. In simulated studies of bar-
gaining by this author and Charles
Walcott, these soft behaviors have
been found to be significantly associ-
ated with attainment of agreement in
mixed-motive negotiations. Rigidity
is characterized by the inverse be-
haviors, including retractions of pre-
vious offers and concessions, commit-
ments to fixed positions, and
utilization of frequent threats, all of
which have been found in the same
simulation study to be associated
with stalemate and nonagreement.30
In the previous dialogue in the
U.S. Special Consultative Commit-
tee, Brzezinski'sefforts to link Soviet
behavior in the Horn of Africa with
the SALTnegotiations and to utilize
the opening of diplomatic relations
with China to punish the Soviets il-
lustrate how bargaining tactics may
create rigidity for negotiators in fora
such as SALTand may prevent them
from finding solutions to the complex
issues they face. Not only did the
SALT negotiators have to overcome
the obstacles to agreement on the
issue in question-namely, strategic
weapons-but they also had to find
solutions to a wide range of Soviet-
American issues on a global basis,
which substantially constrained
their negotiating flexibility.
30. P.TerrenceHopmannand CharlesWal-
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
Within the liberal, problem-solving
paradigm, on the other hand, the pri-
mary objective is not so much to di-
vide up goods as to realize the major
needs and interests of all parties si-
multaneously. Negotiating behavior
is, therefore, not treated as a series of
moves toward or away from one an-
other but, rather, as a collective effort
to solve a common problem in a way
that all parties perceive as beneficial.
The tactics utilized to achieve flexi-
bility within this paradigm are typi-
cally quite different from those found
within the bargaining approach.Al-
though liberals generally prefer soft
to hard behaviors when engaged in
bargaining, Fisher and Ury argue
that, in "principlednegotiations,"it is
best to try to negotiate on the merits
of the issue rather than adopting
either hard or soft bargaining tactics.
If one accepts the premises of the
realist, bargaining game, then soft
behaviors may invite exploitation
rather than reciprocity and thereby
encourage the effort of the other
party to achieve greater relative
gains at one's own expense. Fisher
and Ury thus contend that it is pref-
erable to change the game altogether
rather than to pursue the lesser of
two unsatisfactory approaches
within the realist, bargaining para-
digm.31Zartmanand Bermanlikewise
note that a negotiation begins with a
joint diagnosis of the common prob-
lem, followed by an effort to identify
a formula to solve that problem. The
formula is "a shared perception or
definition of the conflict that estab-
lishes terms of trade, the cognitive
structure of the referents for a solu-
31. Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, pp. 10-14.
41
tion, or an applicable criterion ofjus-
tice."32
Flexibility from the liberal, prob-
lem-solving perspective is typically
defined in terms of a search and dis-
covery process rather than move-
ment back and forth along an issue
dimension-concessions and retrac-
tions-within the bargaining para-
digm. Flexibility entails a willing-
ness to search by trial and errorto try
to identify a formula. It may involve
the use of role reversal or other per-
spective-taking techniques to enable
the parties to share in one another's
perspectives, to establish empathy,
and to approach a shared image of
the problem. It may entail identify-
ing underlying needs, aspirations,
and interests of the parties and then
working together to invent mutually
beneficial solutions to joint problems
that satisfy those basic needs. It may
take the formof creative, brainstorm-
ing sessions in which various heuris-
tics are tried informally to invent so-
lutions that were not evident from
the original definition of the problem.
Rather than sticking to the prob-
lem as it was defined by the parties
in conflict, the liberal approach gen-
erally strives to find new ways to
reconceptualize the issues so that
they may be more amenable to solu-
tion. Thus cognitive change is more
important than a change of negotiat-
ing positions. This is illustrated in
the previous White House dialogue
by Secretary of State Vance's efforts
to create a positive overall relation-
ship between the United States and
the Soviet Union in order to keep
open a flexible range of options in the
32. Zartman and Berman, Practical Nego-
tiator, p. 95.
42
SALTnegotiations,which he believed
would in turn reinforce the positive
elements in the relationship between
the two nuclear superpowers.
Such change is usually best pro-
moted by the introduction of a third
party as facilitator or mediator, sel-
dom found in traditional bargaining.
The problem-solvingapproachto con-
flict resolution emphasizes the im-
portance of a third party, who can
encourage rethinking of the problem
and new perspectives that will en-
hance a flexible search for mutually
advantageous agreements. In short,
flexibilitywithin this frameworkis de-
fined in ways that are generallydiffer-
ent and at times incompatible with
those of the bargainingperspective.
Largely for this reason, the two
perspectives have been viewed by
most theorists as antagonistic, and
the proponents of each perspective
have frequently criticized those tak-
ing the opposing point of view. How-
ever, these two approachesmay both
capture certain key aspects of nego-
tiations, but each may be treating
only a part of the process.33In the
classic parable about three blind men
feeling an elephant, each perceived
something different-the tail as a
rope, the trunk as a hose, and the leg
as a tree-and none perceived the
entire elephant. So it may be that
there is no single paradigm that ex-
plains all aspects of negotiating be-
havior, and proponents of each of the
two perspectives may only be exam-
ining one aspect of the negotiation
33. See Otomar J. Bartos, "ModelingDis- perience. See Kenneth Kressel et al., "The
tributive and Integrative Negotiations," this Settlement-Orientationvs. the Problem-Solv-
issue of TheAnnals of the AmericanAcademy ing Style in Custody Mediation,"Journal of
of Political and Social Science.
THEANNALSOF THEAMERICANACADEMY
process or one particulartype or class
of negotiations.
In addition, part of the difference
between these two perspectives rep-
resents a difference in the analysts'
goals. Often proponents of problem
solving take a normative or prescrip-
tive approach:they recommendprob-
lem solving as a mechanism not only
for reaching agreement but also for
achieving efficient, mutually benefi-
cial results. In other words, the pri-
mary argument by advocates of prob-
lem solving has not been that it is the
best descriptive account of how nego-
tiations actually operate in contem-
porary international relations but
rather that it is prescriptively the
best way to achieve optimal, fair, and
stable agreements through negotia-
tions.34On the other hand, most ad-
vocates of the bargaining approach
tend to cite empirical evidence that
supports the view that bargaining
models provide a useful framework
for describinghow states actually ne-
gotiate or for explaining the out-
comes of specific international nego-
tiations. Although they may offer
prescriptive advice from time to time
about how best to manipulate the
34. By contrast with the subject matter of
international relations, there is empirical evi-
dence to support the superiority of problem
solving over bargaining in other contexts. For
example, in the case of divorce settlements,
Kressel et al. found that the "problem-solving
style"was superiorto the "settlement-oriented
style" in terms of producing a more vigorous
approachto conflict resolution, more frequent
and more durable settlements, and a more
favorable attitude toward the mediation ex-
Social Issues, 50(1):67-84 (1994).
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
bargaining process, prescription is
not their primary goal.35And many
would acknowledge that bargaining
in a normative sense is not the best
method for negotiation, although it is
the approach most frequently prac-
ticed and therefore best understood
within the contemporary interna-
tional diplomatic community.There-
fore, the two perspectives have to
some extent talked right past one
another, because their fundamental
purposes have usually been quite dif-
ferent-one focusing on description
and explanation and the other em-
phasizing prescription.
Reconciling the
competing paradigms
Without attempting to develop 'a
full reconciliation of these two per-
spectives here, I would nonetheless
like to suggest briefly some of the
characteristics of the negotiation pro-
cess or classes of negotiations that
may be best treated by one perspec-
tive versus the other. Furthermore,
the dichotomy between prescription,
on the one hand, and description and
explanation, on the other,may also be
35. Again, this predisposition toward em-
pirical rather than prescriptivework by tradi-
tional bargaining theorists applies primarily
to the research on international negotiations.
By contrast, there are a numberof prescriptive
works, supportedmostly by anecdotalillustra-
tions, primarily about business negotiations
that emphasize the bargaining, relative-gains
approach.See, forexample,CharlesL. Karrass,
The Negotiating Game (New York: Thomas
Crowell, 1974);GerardL. Nierenberg,TheArt
of Negotiating: Psychological Strategies for
Gaining Advantageous Bargains (New York:
Hawthorn Books, 1968).
43
overdrawn: both perspectives may
provide valid descriptions and expla-
nations of behaviorin differentkinds
of negotiations, and both may provide
useful prescriptive tools for dealing
with different kinds of problems. In-
deed, issues concerning the breadth
of applicability of each perspective
can best be examined through sys-
tematic, empirical research.
In this article, however, I attempt
to suggest in a preliminary way the
conditions for the applicability of
each perspective primarily on theo-
retical grounds. Many negotiable is-
sues resemble the classic bargaining
problem of a buyer and seller hag-
gling over the price of any good, such
as a used car. In such a situation,
each party has an opening bid and an
undisclosed point of minimal accept-
able agreement (often referred to by
Fisher and Ury's acronym of the
BATNA36--bestalternative to a nego-
tiated agreement-or resistance
point37).As long as the resistance
points of the parties are not mutually
exclusive, there exists between them
a range of acceptable agreements,
often referredto as bargaining space.
In these kinds of situations, the pri-
mary problems for the negotiators
are twofold: to identify the approxi-
mate range of bargainingspacewithin
which agreementmay be reached and
to engage in concession making until
the positions of the parties converge
somewhere in the middle.
In these kinds of situations, where
bargaining space is known to exist on
36. See Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes,
p. 104.
37. See Walton and McKersie,Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations, pp. 41-44.
44 THEANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY
a more or less linear issue, the pro-
cess of reaching agreement may be
fully explained by bargaining mod-
els. Prescriptive advice may be useful
in assisting the parties to reach
agreement when it helps negotiators
to remain flexible in making new of-
fers, accepting offers of the other
party, and making concessions to the
other, while avoiding impasses based
on rigid commitments and retrac-
tions of previous offers. The major
dilemma in these bargaining situ-
ations, as noted at the outset, derives
from the fact that bargaining tactics
designed to win a larger share of the
good for one party may create a stale-
mate and thus detract from the abil-
ity of the parties even to reach agree-
ment, whereas tactics designed to
facilitate rapid and efficient consum-
mation of agreements may cause the
party using such tactics to receive a
smaller share of the gains than might
have otherwise been possible. Thus
bargaining theory still has an impor-
tant explanatory and prescriptive
role to play: namely, to give advice
about how to juggle these competing
demands of the bargaining situation
in such a way as not only to reach
agreement but to achieve results that
the parties will consider to be fair or
equitable in terms of some common
standards of distributive justice.
On the other hand, a great many
negotiating problems are not readily
susceptible to solution by this kind of
bargaining. These kinds of problems
tend to have several features that
differentiate them from issues more
amenable to solution through a con-
cession-convergenceprocess:
1. There appears to be an absence
of bargaining space, which can reflect
either a real conflict of interest or
misperception by one or more parties
of the situation. This is particularly
the case in those deep-rooted con-
flicts that have endured for a long
period of time and are often thought
of as being intractable.
2. There are multiple and complex
issues that are linked in such a way
that they cannot readily be negoti-
ated one by one;that is, the negotiation
situation is characterizedby a condi-
tion referred to by Robert Keohane
and Joseph Nye as "complexinterde-
pendence."38In such situations, log-
rolling, trade-offs,and the creation of
"issue packages"may be necessary to
reach agreement.
3. There are multiple parties
whose preferences are quite different
and crosscutting rather than rein-
forcing, so that there is no clearly
defined and mutually agreed issue
dimension along which bargaining
may occur.
4. There is intense emotional in-
volvement by the parties; mutual
misperceptions are common; ten-
sions are high; the most fundamental
needs, identities, and interests are
threatened; and the parties'cognitive
framing of the problem prevents the
identification of a clear issue dimen-
sion or bargaining space.
If any of these conditions pertain,
then traditional bargaining behav-
38. RobertO. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977),
pp. 24-25.
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
iors are not likely to produce an effi-
cient or fair solution. There is no
room for flexibility if it is defined in
terms of soft rather than hard bar-
gaining tactics. What is needed in
these situations is flexibility defined
in terms of creative problem solving.
This orientation typically includes
such features as issue redefinition
(aggregating issues or packaging
trade-offs, disaggregating issues or
fractionating, and reframing issues
through role reversal, brainstorming,
or other perspective-taking tech-
niques);basing the outcomeon widely
recognized principles that suggest
mutually beneficial solutions rather
than on the result of power-oriented
tactics; utilizing third parties or me-
diators, who play roles ranging from
fairly passive good offices to quite
active exertion of influence on the
main parties in conflictto assist them
in reaching agreement; and task-
oriented group behaviors, including
the emergence of efficient leadership
and the effective management of
complexity by the group.These kinds
of behaviors not only may create a
cooperative negotiating process and
produce efficient and mutually bene-
ficial agreements but also may im-
prove the relationships between the
parties over the long term, well be-
yond the duration of the actual ne-
gotiations.
In summary,I have suggested that
a comprehensive model of the nego-
tiation process cannot rely on either
a simple bargaining or problem-solv-
ing paradigm alone. Instead, we
must evaluate each and every nego-
tiation to determine whether or not
one approach or the other, or some
combination of the two, is likely to be
45
most appropriateto facilitate agree-
ment. Thus the appropriate form of
flexibility must be determined situ-
ationally rather than abstractly, and
in one situation flexibility may be
defined better in terms of a willing-
ness to engage in soft rather than
hard bargaining tactics, whereas in
other situations flexibility may be
conceived better as a willingness to
explore alternative definitions of the
problem, to work with other coun-
tries in a task-oriented, problem-
solvingapproach,andto seek solutions
based on interests and principles
rather than on power or bargaining
skill.
Thus far, all attempts to resolve
the differences in emphasis and ap-
proach of these two perspectives by
empirical research have proven un-
successful.39 Most systematic re-
search aboutpast international nego-
tiations has revealed the presence of
bargaining processes, whereas evi-
dence of creative problem solving is
found far less frequently in interna-
tional negotiations. There may be
several reasons for this.
First, the methodologies for sys-
tematic research have generally been
biased in favor of finding evidence
consistent with the bargaining
model, since the variables incorpo-
rated in such analyses have generally
been derived from the bargaining
paradigm itself. Thus far, empirical
tools have not been sufficiently sensi-
tive to identify problem-solvingpro-
cesses at workin many negotiations.40
39. For an effort to try to bridge this gap
throughuse of a computersimulation, see Bar-
tos, "Modeling Distributive and Integrative
Negotiations."
40. In this connection,my bargaining pro-
cess analysis coding scheme, developedin the
46 THEANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY

Second, and probablymore impor- accordancewith the expectations of a

tant, is the fact that the bargaining single paradigm, it should hardly be
paradigm probablyhas been the one surprising that empiricalanalysis re-
most frequently employed by diplo- veals evidence to support this para-
mats actually engaged in the day-to- digm. But this is the result not be-
day process of negotiating. This is not cause this paradigm is inherently
necessarily testimony for the general superior to all others but because it
validity, much less the preferability, is the only one that has been internal-
of this paradigm, however. Rather, a ized within the belief systems of most
self-fulfilling prophesy may be at of the relevant actors. Finding evi-
work. Since most senior diplomats dence to support the validity of the
were trained during the period when paradigm in their own behavior and
the realist paradigm was dominant in the behavior of those with whom
in the field of international relations, they interact, they implicitly confirm
it is likely that whatever theoretical the validity of the paradigm within
analysis of negotiations they might their own minds and continue to act
have encountered would have been accordingto its precepts.
heavily laden with the content of the It will be interesting to observe
bargaining approach. Believing it, what will happen if the problem-
along with the realist perspective to solving paradigm begins to become
which it is closely related conceptu- more widely accepted by the commu-
ally, to be valid, they have tended to nity of professional diplomats. A few
negotiate as if bargaining constituted individuals such as Jimmy Carterap-
the only appropriate approachto in- pear to have behaved in accordance
ternational negotiations. When most with the problem-solving paradigm
negotiators subscribe to and act in in approaching conflicts such as the
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations at
early 1970s, included almost exclusively vari-
Camp David, to say nothing of his
ables found in models of negotiation based on
much more recent forays into diplo-
the bargaining paradigm. I have developed a
macy in his efforts to apply problem
new coding process, still untested with data
solving to difficult conflicts involv-
from international negotiations, called nego-
ing North Korea, Haiti, and Bosnia-
tiation process analysis to add key components
of the problem-solvingperspective. However,
the somewhat moresubjective,open-endedna-
Herzegovina. Yet he and others like
ture of the problem-solvingapproachmay in-
him are typically regarded with sus-
picion by the vast majority of the
crease the difficulty of finding reliable mea-
sures of some key components.See P.Terrenceprofessional diplomatic community,
Hopmann, "Flexibilityin Negotiating Behav- who were socialized into a different
ior: An Approachfor Measuring Flexibility in
International Negotiations"(Paper delivered
paradigm.
at the conference "Negotiation Flexibility," Nonetheless, the larger commu-
nity is likely to recognize sooner or
Processes of InternationalNegotiationproject,
International Institute for Applied Systemslater that there are many conflicts
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 16-17 Mar. where the liberal, problem-solving
1992). Interested readers may request a copy
perspective can generate solutions
of the codingsystem by contactingme by e-mail
at PhilipHopmann@Brown.eduor by fax at that could not be found through tra-
401-863-7440. ditional bargaining processes. Only
TWOPARADIGMSOF NEGOTIATION
then will we begin to build up suffi-
cient empirical data from actual in-
ternational negotiations in which
problem-solving approaches have
been attempted, rather than having
to rely exclusively on evidence from
experimental research or from other
contexts such as divorcemediation to
support the case for this paradigm.
Then we should be in a position to
evaluate systematically the utility of
problem solving in comparison with
bargaining and to understand the
much more subtle conditions under
which each perspective may be use-
ful in facilitating agreements to re-
solve different kinds of international
conflicts.
When greater confidence in the
problem-solving paradigm is estab-
lished within the diplomatic commu-
nity, this paradigm can be expected to
provide guidance to negotiators seek-
ing to develop a flexible approachto
the resolution of international con-
flicts. Flexibility within this approach
thus entails an effort to invent solu-
47
tions to problems that producejoint,
absolute gains. In this case, diplo-
mats should be sensitive to the need
to foster long-termrelationships with
other states in which the joint effort
to find mutually beneficial solutions
to common problems and to develop
stable long-term relationships takes
precedence over the attempt to gain
short-term tactical advantages rela-
tive to other states. Although realism
will no doubt remain a significant
part of international interactions, its
role will increasingly be relegated to
those specific situations where in-
tense, mostly zero-sum conflicts of
interest prevail. Since the vast ma-
jority of relationships between states
in a complex, multipolar world are
not of this type, however,the effort of
liberals to expand the potential for
resolving international conflicts and
enhancing cooperation through the
problem-solving orientation toward
negotiation may be most relevant in
the vast majorityofrelationshipsin the
post-ColdWarinternationalsystem.