Potencia Estimada

MIDWEST
RELIABILITY
ORGANIZATION
September 18, 2007

System Event Analysis Report
MRO’s Analysis of the

September 18 t h , 2007
System Event
December 11, 2008

Prepared by:
MRO Event Analysis Team
2774 Cleveland Avenue North, Roseville, MN 55113 Ph: 651.855.1760 Fx: 651.855.1712 www.midwestreliability.org
Table of Contents
T AB L E OF C ONT E NT S
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................3
Quick Facts...................................................................................................................................................................7
Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................................................8
State of the System..................................................................................................................................................... 17
Summary of the Event ............................................................................................................................................... 22
Sequence of Events .................................................................................................................................................... 31
Restoration ................................................................................................................................................................. 47
Restoration Observations and Recommendations .................................................................................................. 55
System Event Response ............................................................................................................................................. 56
Power Flow and Dynamic Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 58
Operational Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 66
Equipment Performance ........................................................................................................................................... 78
Technical Discussions ................................................................................................................................................ 90
Root Cause Analysis .................................................................................................................................................. 93
System Improvements ............................................................................................................................................... 94
Post-report Tasks ....................................................................................................................................................... 95
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................................. 96
Appendix A — Acronyms and Definitions .............................................................................................................. 97
Appendix B — Event Analysis Team ..................................................................................................................... 100
Page 2 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Introduction
Introduc tion
Maintaining the reliability of the North American Bulk Electric System depends on the
complicated and technically sophisticated activities of balancing electricity supply and
demand and managing the flow of electricity throughout North America’s interconnected
networks.
Every system disturbance is an opportunity to learn more about how the electric system
responds to abnormal or extreme conditions. By detailed analysis of disturbances, the
industry can learn key issues about the behavior of the system that can be used to improve the
bulk power system’s response to future disturbances.
This report addresses the system disturbance that occurred on September 18, 2007 in the
MRO region that resulted in the formation of two islands and the loss of some 2590 MW of
generation and 790 MW of load.
There were 12 Balancing Authorities involved:

• Alliant Energy West
• Dairyland Power Cooperative
• Great River Energy
• Manitoba Hydro
• Minnesota Power, Inc.
• Nebraska Public Power District
• Northern States Power Company
• Independent Electricity System Operator
• Otter Tail Power Company
• SaskPower
• Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency
• Western Area Power Administration - Upper Great Plains East
There were two Reliability Coordinators involved:

• Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO)
• SaskPower (acting as a Reliability Coordinator, but not then certified by NERC)
This event was classified by NERC as a Category 4 event (system separation or islanding of
more than 1,000 MW of load), which calls for a detailed event analysis. Since the event was
confined to the MRO region, an MRO Event Analysis Team was formed with support from
NERC Event Analysis staff and TransGrid Solutions, Inc. of Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Introduction
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to present the findings of the analysis of this system disturbance,
which include:
• Analyzing this bulk power system event

• Identifying the root causes that may be precursors of potentially more serious events
• Assessing the reliability performance for lessons learned
• Disseminating the findings and lessons learned to the electric industry to improve
reliability performance, subject to confidentiality requirements
The purpose falls in line with the Reliability Assessments and Performance Analysis
Program’s objectives that are part of the scope of the Electric Reliability Organization, and
which are detailed within NERC’s Rules of Procedure.
Methodology
The process used in this analysis follows NERC’s Blackout and Disturbance Response
Procedures and uses root cause analysis methods, which include:
• Reviewing the sequence of events

• Defining and analyzing causal factors
• Analyzing each factor’s root causes
• Developing and evaluating corrective actions
Terms and abbreviations used in this report are contained in Appendix A.
Acknowledgements
MRO would like to sincerely thank the members of the Event Analysis Team for their
participation and hard work. The roster of the September 18, 2007 Event Analysis Team is
contained in Appendix B.
The subject matter expertise of the team members represents the following areas:
• System Protection
• Frequency Response
• Power System Operations
• System Dynamics and Stability
MRO also recognizes the following companies for their cooperation, contributions, and
assistance in conducting this analysis:
• American Transmission Company, LLC

Introduction
• Dairyland Power Cooperative

• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
• Ferguson Consulting, LLC
• Great River Energy
• MidAmerican Energy Company
• Manitoba Hydro
• Midwest ISO (St. Paul and Carmel)
• Minnesota Power
• Minnkota Power Cooperative
• North American Electric Reliability Corporation
• Nebraska Public Power District
• Otter Tail Power
• Rochester Public Utility
• SaskPower
• TransGrid Solutions, Inc.
• Western Area Power Administration
• Wiedman Power System Consulting, Ltd
• Xcel Energy
Work Timeline
The initial phase of work involved the development and circulation of a data request to MRO
entities and the establishment of a protected FTP site for the archiving of all data submissions.
This data collection effort started on October 5, 2007. A second data request was sent out on
January 30, 2008. In June 2008, a follow-up data request was made to several companies for
additional relay data, identified in the earlier data requests. Finally, on August 22, 2008 a
third request was sent to generator owners in MRO.
The detailed analysis of the event of September 18, 2007 began at a meeting of the Event
Analysis Team at the MRO offices on October 31, 2007 and continued with meetings in
Minneapolis and conference calls. Various working group meetings continued to be held in
2008. The analysis was conducted by MRO with significant assistance from NERC and from
subject matter experts from the utilities within MRO. The structure of the Event Analysis
Team and a list of participants are provided in Appendix B.
The Analysis Process

Using a sequence of events template developed by R.W. Cummings of NERC, all relevant
data is captured for each switching event (trip or reclose) as individual records in a database.
The data includes topology, ownership, rating information for each element that switched,

Introduction
along with the protection and timing information (including time source and accuracy) for
each switching instance. The database is ordered by time and extracts were generated for
inclusion in the final report. Timing information is critical and manual work was required to
reconcile time stamps from a variety of sources. In some cases, time traces of system
quantities had to be aligned to resolve discrepancies.
The database was a significant input to the work on the modeling and simulation of the event,
with the detailed relay analysis, modeling and simulation work providing corrections to the
sequence of events. The database contains over 400 separate records.
In parallel to work on the sequence of events, a separate team looked at operational issues.
The scope of this work included consideration of all of the outage approvals before the event
(process, study approach, criteria); communications before, during and after the event; and
documentation on procedures followed before, during and after the event. The team looking
at operational issues also developed “what if” (sensitivities) questions for the simulation team.
A third team was established to undertake the collection of data and modeling, and then
simulation of the system and the sequence of events. There were confirmations of the system
limits in place at the time of the event and consideration of the impacts of different operator
actions, different protection schemes and sensitivities to various system quantities. While the
Midwest ISO uses a relatively large and complete model for system studies, this model had to
be updated, expanded and augmented and then adjusted for the prevailing system conditions.
A small team reviewed, in detail, all protection system operations to determine problems in
protection design and operation.
A NERC-led team reviewed the data to determine the root cause of all actions before, during,
and after the event.
Lastly, under NERC leadership, further work continues to determine the low frequency
response of the system to this event along with low frequency inter-area oscillations (0.5 Hz)
seen in other Eastern Interconnection events.

Quick Facts
Quic k F ac ts
Table 1 — Quick Facts –September 18, 2007 Event
Date & Time 05:14:54 CDT September 18, 2007
Lowest / Highest 60.87 Hz at approximately 5:21:26 CDT

Frequencies 58.43 Hz at approximately 5:21:38 CDT
Load Loss 18 MW – Island 1
770 MW – Island 2
Generation Loss 20 conventional generators in 12 plants – 2311 MW capacity
9 distributed generation locations – 860 MW capacity at risk
Transmission Involved 5 – 345 kV lines
1 – 345/115 kV transformer
2 – 345/161 kV transformers
9 – 230 kV lines
2 – 161 kV lines
12 – 115 kV lines
4 – 69 kV lines
System Recovery First Island resynchronized – 8 minutes, 11 seconds
Second Island resynchronized – 58 minutes, 14 seconds
All load was recovered by 12:30:40 CDT
Major Contributory Failure of splice and conductor on 345 kV line
Factors Failure of protection on second 345 kV line
Generation overfrequency trip setpoints
Recommendations 30 entity-specific and industry-wide recommendations are made for reliability
improvement.

Executive Summary
E xec utive S ummary

Synopsis of the Event
On September 18, 2007, an event occurred in the Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO) area
that resulted in islanding (significant loss of generation and significant loss of load). The Quick
Facts Table details some of the key information about the disturbance.
The purpose of this report is to inform the Boards of the Midwest Reliability Organization and of
NERC, and committees within these organizations about the analysis of the event.
The September 18, 2007 event is classified by NERC as a Category 4 event since the
interconnected system separated or islanding of more than 1,000 MW of load or generation
occurred. Category 4 events require a detailed analysis to be undertaken.
The September 18, 2007 event was a complex disturbance, involving equipment failure,
protection failures and mis-coordination, under voltage, over frequency, under-frequency, and
over-voltage conditions, and loss of system synchronism.
Analysis of the event indicates that the IROL facilities were being operated within published
limits prior to the event.
The event had the following major phases:
• Multiple 345 kV line contingencies occurred within the first 38 seconds of the event.
Specifically, both 345 kV lines that form the Minnesota-Wisconsin Stability Interface
(MWSI) tripped and locked out within the first 38 seconds of the initiation of the event.
There was insufficient time after the first 345 kV line trip to re-adjust the system for the
second trip. Preliminary analysis indicates that after both lines had tripped, the system
was operating beyond dynamic stability, voltage, and thermal limits.
• North Dakota, Minnesota, Manitoba, part of South Dakota, and Saskatchewan separated
from the Eastern Interconnection.
• Saskatchewan then separated from Manitoba and North Dakota.
• Saskatchewan lost a significant amount of load and generation.
• Rapid coordinated reductions to generation and the DC schedule in Manitoba allowed the
frequency in the first island to return to near 60 Hz. This action enabled quick restoration
and stabilization of the bulk power system in the North Dakota, South Dakota,
Minnesota, and Manitoba area.
• Various MRO entities in the first island were reconnected to the Eastern Interconnection
in less than 10 minutes through automatic reclosing (with synchro-check) of a number of
the open transmission lines between that island and the Eastern Interconnection.
• Both islands were reconnected to the Eastern Interconnection within 59 minutes.

Executive Summary
Line and Transformer Trips
• 5 – 345 kV Lines
• 1 – 345/115 kV Transformer
• 2 – 345/161 kV Transformers
• 9 – 230 kV Lines
• 2 – 161 kV Lines
• 12 – 115 kV Lines
• 4 – 69 kV Lines
At 05:21:25.201 CDT the last line (230 kV) tripped to form the first island covering Minnesota,
North Dakota, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. All time references in this report are Central
Daylight Time (CDT).
Saskatchewan remained in the first island until 5:21:36.261 when a 230 kV tie line to Manitoba
opened.
Generation Loss
The earliest generation losses were on third party generation, gas and wind. Later losses were
more substantial in terms of lost capacity, even though the generation levels at trip were small or
zero. Approximately 3141 MW of generating capacity tripped or was affected during the event
for reasons ranging from over-frequency generator protection, turbine/boiler controls, loss of
excitation (generator protection) during over-voltage conditions, and reverse power while
condensing.
It is difficult to know the exact loss of generation during the event as records from some third
party generation were not available. It should be noted that the simulation studies revealed the
possibility that significant additional generation losses occurred during the event. In general,
these were small, distributed generators (usually wind) where a high voltage or feeder/collector
breaker did not operate, but the available data indicates that a loss of generation within a plant
did occur.
Additional detail on known generation tripping can be found in the Summary of Switching,
Generation Loss and Load Loss section and the Equipment Performance section of this report
Load Losses
Load was lost during the event for four main reasons: under-voltage load shedding, over-voltage
shedding, under-frequency load shedding, and loss of load consequential to line switching. The
total load lost during the event was about 790 MW.
All load was restored in the first island by 6:16:30 CDT, and the final load restoration, in
Saskatchewan, occurred by 12:30:40 CDT.

Executive Summary
System Restoration
The 230 kV line that tripped to form the first island reclosed at 5:29:37.418 (an island time of
about 8 minutes and 11 seconds) reconnecting the first island (without Saskatchewan) to the
Eastern Interconnection.
At 6:19:51 Saskatchewan was reconnected to the system with the reclosing of a 230 kV tie line
to Manitoba (separated for 58 minutes and 14 seconds).
Initiating, Causal, Contributory Factors

The initiating event was the conductor/splice failure on a 345 kV line. At this time, the causal
factor of the overall event was the protection failure on a second 345 kV line, which also cross-
tripped a third 345 kV line. Had that failure not occurred, simulation analysis shows that the
system would have likely remained intact with appropriate operator action to adjust for the
outage. Subsequent to the loss of these three lines, in the absence of an automated mitigation
scheme or any predefined operator actions to reduce the export from Minnesota to Wisconsin,
overloading and loss of additional lines was unavoidable.
The causal factor for the separation of Saskatchewan from the first island was the sensitive,
uncoordinated settings of over-frequency protection on a range of thermal generators. Premature
tripping of these units resulted in the separation of Saskatchewan from the first island, and in
significant load shedding in Saskatchewan.
The protection failure of a 115 kV line in the east Twin Cities metro is deemed to have been a
contributing factor. A sensitivity study examined whether correct operation of that protection
system might have prevented the subsequent loss of lines. That analysis showed that although
correct operation may have prevented the next line in the sequence of events (115 kV line in the
south east Twin Cities metro) from tripping, it is unlikely that the system could have been
reliably operated for a long period of time in the resulting overload and under-voltage conditions
in the area.
Mitigating Impact of System Improvements since the Event

Construction of the Arrowhead – Stone Lake 345 kV line was completed in January 2008, about
four months after the September 18 event. That line was the last portion of the Gardner Park –
Stone Lake – Arrowhead 345 kV line construction project. The Gardner Park – Stone Lake
portion of that project was in service at the time of the event. Post-disturbance analysis indicates
that, had the Arrowhead – Stone Lake 345 kV line been in service during the event, the only line
that would have tripped after the outage or loss of the initial three 345 kV lines would be 69 kV
line south of the Twin Cities. The northern part of the MRO Region would have remained
synchronized with the Eastern Interconnection.

Executive Summary
Recommendations for Reliability Improvement

NERC Advisory and Recommendation Previously Issued
Early in the analysis process, on March 10, 2008, through the NERC Alert program, NERC
issued an Advisory to Transmission Operators, Planning Authorities, and Regional Entities, and
a Recommendation to Reliability Coordinators regarding system model accuracy.
The key text in the Advisory was:
Transmission Operators, Planning Authorities, and Regional Entities should be aware

that updating the power flow and dynamics models used in operational studies for
determining thermal and dynamic system limitations is necessary to ensure that
simulations yield accurate results.
The following aspects of system models are critical to accurate simulations and may
require verification with Transmission Owners within the Reliability Coordinator’s
footprint:
• Current system topology
• Circuit normal and emergency limits
• Transformer tap settings
• Ratings and operational properties of all shunt and series reactive devices
• Ratings, operational properties, and dynamic settings and properties of all DC
circuits
• Current planned and forced circuit and equipment outages
• Interchange schedules up-to-date and appropriate for the intended use of the models.
The following aspects of system models are critical to accurate dynamics simulations and
may require verification with Generation Owners for generators 20 MW and above within
the Reliability Coordinator’s or Transmission Operator’s footprint:
• Real and reactive ratings
• Operational voltage schedules
• Generator step-up transformer representation
• Dynamic properties of each machine
• Operational status and any current derates of each machine
• Current planned and forced generation outages
• Current generation derates

Executive Summary
The key text in the Recommendation was:

Reliability Coordinators should immediately review and, as necessary, update the power
flow and dynamics models used for operational studies for determining thermal and
dynamic system limitations. Should a material discrepancy be found, the system models
should be updated and the updated models should be used to verify that calculated system
limits are still correct and, in particular, that the limits established for the 2008 summer
are still appropriate.
This review should include verification of the following with Transmission Owners within
Reliability Coordinator’s footprint:
 Current system topology
 Circuit normal and emergency limits
 Transformer tap settings
 Ratings and operational properties of all shunt and series reactive devices
 Ratings, operational properties, and dynamic settings and properties of all DC
circuits
 Current planned and forced circuit and equipment outages
 Interchange schedules up-to-date and appropriate for the intended use of the
models.
This review should include verification of the following with Generation Owners for
generators 20 MW and above within Reliability Coordinator’s footprint:
 Real and reactive ratings
 Operational voltage schedules
 Generator step-up transformer representation
 Dynamic properties of each machine
 Operational status and any current derates of each machine
 Current planned and forced generation outages
 Any current generation derates
Recommendations
The following is a compilation of the 30 recommendations that appear in the body of the report.
Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators
Recommendation: That Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators include dynamic

models of the capacitor switching controls in the transient stability models where appropriate.
This information should be available to planning authorities and reliability coordinators
throughout the Eastern Interconnection for proper modeling in operational dynamic studies.

Executive Summary
Recommendation: That Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators in MRO and NPCC
modify the representation of the∆P l imit between Manitoba and Ontario, as a function of the
number of phase shifters in service and recognizing other pertinent system conditions. This
information should be available to planning authorities and reliability coordinators throughout
the Eastern Interconnection for proper modeling in operational dynamic studies.
To be completed prior to the summer 2009 operating season with a report to the MRO.
Recommendation: That the Transmission Operators conduct a study to determine if the Twin
Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV path can be automatically reclosed following a trip of either or both
of these lines.
Generator Owners
Recommendation: That the Generator Owner review the loss of field settings on the generators
at their northwest Wisconsin plant to assure loss of field relay coordinates with excitation system
controls and does not trip for stable power swings.
The results of the review are to be reported to MRO by the summer 2009 operating season.
Generator Owners and MRO
Recommendation: That Generation Owners within the MRO identify the overfrequency tripping
setpoints of all generators and that MRO then investigate the reasons for all generator
overfrequency relays that are set below the continuous rating of the generators. The affected
Balancing Authorities should be notified of all changes throughout this process.
Reliability Coordinators
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators in MRO review procedures and monitoring to

ensure that identification of an islanding condition is communicated to all system operators
without undue delay.
This review to be completed by June 1, 2009 with a report submitted to MRO.
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators in MRO develop a process to efficiently

translate power system telemetry data from state estimator and SCADA system historical data
into power flow and dynamics study models (system snapshots) for use in event analysis and
modeling benchmarks.
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators investigate alternatives for development of an

on-line dynamic security assessment tool.
This review is to be completed by January 1, 2010 and documented in a report to MRO

Executive Summary
Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO review

restoration procedures to assure that the coordinated plans minimize adverse conditions during
restoration (e.g., adverse flows, equipment damage, delays), particularly when reconnecting from
islanded conditions.

system restoration procedures to assure that they have flexibility and adaptability for multiple
scenarios, including non-worst case situations, i.e., other than a blackout condition.
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO

investigate and implement a process to capture and hold pre-contingency flows on PTDF
interfaces.
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO develop a

plan for enhanced Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data collection in the region, with the goal
of enhancing island separation identification, restoration and post-event analysis.
Recommendation: That the Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO

investigate and implement a method for retaining state estimator cases based on manual or
automatic triggers.
Transmission Owners
Recommendation: That the Transmission Operator review and mitigate the sync-check function
misoperation at their Sioux Falls station.
The results of the review and mitigation actions are to be reported to MRO by the summer 2009
operating season.
Recommendation: That the Transmission Operator review the directional comparison blocking
(DCB) scheme on the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV line to determine the ability of the
scheme to withstand the type of transient current reduction condition found on September 18,
2007.
The results of the review are to be reported to MRO by the summer 2009 operating season.
Recommendation: That Transmission Owners, in conjunction with the MRO Reliability

Assessment Committee include the additional identified locations in the MRO list of locations
for disturbance monitoring equipment (DME, digital relays or digital recorders) installation
and/or upgrades within the MRO four year plan.

Executive Summary
MRO
Recommendation: That MRO begin the implementation of PRC-023 Loadability Standard

requirements for transmission lines and transformers operating at 100 kV and above. PRC - 023
has been approved by the NERC BOT and is currently awaiting FERC approval.
Recommendation: That the MRO Standards Committee, along with the MRO Reliability
Coordinators and Planning Coordinators, review the regional criteria for contingencies to be
considered in the establishment of system limits on stability-limited interfaces, to ensure that N-2
events, breaker failure events, and protection misoperation events reflect the historical
performance of the system.
Recommendation: That the MRO Protective Relay Subcommittee (PRS) reclosing guide under
development address the reclosing technologies necessary to automatically restore lines from a
wide area perspective balanced with addressing individual line reclosings.
NERC and the Industry
Recommendation: That the NERC Resources Committee review the primary governor response
on the Eastern Interconnection.
Recommendation: That NERC, the Regional Entities, Planning Authorities, and Reliability
Coordinators develop a method to thoroughly review and check data for interconnection-wide
power system dynamic models for data errors – review and correct data errors with owners, and
disseminate corrections to planners, transmission operators, and reliability coordinators
throughout the interconnection.
Recommendation: That NERC work with the Planning Authorities and wind model developers
to include the initialization calculations in the models and make them suitable for case libraries.
Recommendation: That NERC initiate a dynamic model validation regime of the generators and
other dynamic responsive equipment to benchmark the models against observed behavior during
system disturbances.
Recommendation: That NERC issue an alert for the industry operators to review and reinforce
training of communications protocols to ensure that actions taken by all parties are coordinated
and follow the tenets of three-part communications. This includes ensuring that operators not
have music or other recordings that play when phones are put on hold, that operators have phone
mute capability to avoid background conversations from interfering with the call, that a hot-line
call etiquette guideline and training be held at each company, and that the call guidelines include
a post-event wrap-up call.
Recommendation: That NERC issue an Alert to the Transmission Operators regarding the
potential problems with analog EMS/SCADA limits due to transducer and /or CT saturation, and
request them to ensure there is sufficient margin to retain element loading observability above
equipment emergency limits.

Executive Summary
Recommendation: That NERC issue an Alert regarding the potential for splice failure due to
installation errors, suggesting incorporation of visual splice reviews in transmission line
inspection programs.
Recommendation: That NERC issue an Alert on the problems associated with the use of
communications in protective relay systems with time sensitive functionality, whether operated
by third party or internal company, with emphasis on the reliability and variability of the
characteristics of communications paths.
Recommendation: That NERC issue an alert for generation owners to review the over and under
frequency generator protection settings of all units 20 MVA and above, to assure that they
coordinate with their regional under-frequency or ride-through requirements. This review should
be performed whenever generator protection modifications are made to such units.
Recommendation: That NERC develop a standard/requirement regarding reporting electrical,

dynamics and machine and plant protection characteristics of non-conventional (e.g., wind, solar,
small hydro) generation data for use by the planning and reliability coordinators, with a threshold
of 1 MW per unit (consistent with Form EIA 860 reporting requirements).
It is essential that this standard be applicable to all existing and planned units and plants.
This development should be expedited, with a target completion date of the end of 2009.
Recommendation: That NERC include the September 18, 2007 system response in the
interconnection-wide study examining the nature and damping of low-frequency Eastern
Interconnection inter-area oscillations.

State of the System
S tate of the S ys tem

This section provides a description of the system at the time of the event. Following is a
summary of the significant and critical outages due to all causes (maintenance, construction,
forced).
Lines out of service

The DC bipole from North Dakota to the Duluth area, planned.
The DC tie from North Dakota to Montana, forced.
Four 345 kV and four 230 kV lines planned.
One of the two phase shifters between Manitoba and Ontario planned.
Ten 161 kV lines and one 138 kV line planned.
Five 115kV lines planned, one 115 kV urgent, and one 115kV Forced.
Also one 115 kV line was discretionarily opened due to lightning in the area.
Transformers out of service

Two 345/115 kV transformers, one forced one planned.
Three 230/115 kV transformers, all planned.
One 220/110 kV transformer planned.
Two 161/69 transformers planned.
One 161/41.6 transformer planned.
One 121/63 transformer planned.
There were also numerous breaker outages and 9 capacitor banks out of service.
Generation
There was 1186 MWs of generation on planned outage, 870 MWs of generation on urgent
outage, and 11 MWs of generation on forced outage. In general, pre-event, the system was not
under stress and conditions were consistent with early morning operation, with load growing.
Connections between Minnesota and Northern Wisconsin

At the time of the event, the 161 kV line from Duluth to Northern Wisconsin was out of service,
so the transmission path eastward was only on the 115 kV network.
A new Arrowhead – Stone Lake 345 kV line was not yet in service on September 18, 2007.
However, at the time of this report the 345 kV connection now exists between Arrowhead and
Stone Lake and the event analysis team has performed a sensitivity study with this line in service
(the line is beneficial).

State of the System
The next connection from Minnesota to Wisconsin is a 69 kV line, a long path from the north
Twin Cities Metro 115 kV network running northeastward to Wisconsin, to a station on the 161
kV network. This 69 kV line is normally in service (there are no Normally Open points on the
connection). This line was in service at the time of the event.
A 345/115 kV transformer in the east Twin Cities metro which connects to the 115 kV network
in the Twin Cities metro and Wisconsin was out of service.
Connections around the Twin Cities

With all lines in service, the 345 kV network around the Twin Cities has connections south and
east over 3-345 kV lines. The westernmost line runs from the southwest Twin Cities metro to
Mankato, south-west into western Iowa. The second line runs south from the southeast Twin
Cities metro to Rochester and then into eastern Iowa. The third line runs from the east Twin
Cities metro into central Wisconsin. At the time of the event the westernmost line was out of
service between Mankato and Iowa. The other two lines, one from the Twin Cities to Rochester
and the other from the Twin Cities to Wisconsin make up the Minnesota Wisconsin Stability
Interface (MWSI).
In addition to the 345 kV lines, several connections occur at 161 kV, 115 kV, and 69 kV. To
understand the initial stages of the event, it is useful to consider these in some detail.
With the 345/115 kV transformer in the east Twin Cities metro out of service the 115 kV from
Wisconsin and the 115 kV network in the northeast quadrant of the Twin Cities metro was
connected to the 345 kV system at remote stations in the north and south Twin Cities metro.
The next HV connection to Wisconsin is at 115 kV on a line from the 345 kV network in the
southeast Twin Cities metro to a station on the 161 kV network in Wisconsin. This line was in
service at the time of the event.
There are two 69 kV connections between Minnesota and Wisconsin south of the Twin Cities
metro. The first a three terminal line from the 115 kV network in the Twin Cities metro runs
eastward into western Wisconsin where 69 kV lines run north-east to the 161 kV network in
central Wisconsin and south back into Minnesota. Although there is a Normally Open point in
western Wisconsin, this line was closed at the time of the event. A second 69 kV line crosses the
river from Minnesota south of the Twin Cities metro into Wisconsin to a station on the 161 kV
network.
The next HV connection of interest is the 161 kV line that connects the 345 kV network from the
Rochester area west to the 115 kV network which continues north back to the Twin Cities metro.
Parallel paths to the out of service 345 kV line from Mankato to western Iowa are made up of a
161 kV line and a 69 kV line from Mankato to Southern Minnesota.
During the event the 161 kV and 69 kV connections mentioned above opened.

State of the System
Note that it is normal practice to run the 69 kV, 115 kV and 161 kV systems in a networked
configuration. System limits have been established considering the transfer of flows that can
occur under certain contingencies.
The lines described above are not the only connections from Minnesota. They are described to
provide a context for the initial slow stages of the event when lines were heavily loaded, voltages
were low but the system was not in a cascade situation.
Connections across South Dakota

There are numerous HVAC lines running out of the coal fields of North Dakota into Minnesota
and South Dakota. Also there are two HVDC outlets one to northern Minnesota and one to the
Twin Cities metro area. Below is a description of the lines of interest to this event.
There are two 230 kV lines and three 345 kV lines that run southeast from the generation in the
coal fields of North Dakota to eastern South Dakota. The western most 230 kV and 345 kV lines
connect at Fort Thompson from there two 230 kV lines continue to Sioux Falls. Two 230 kV
and one 345 kV lines also run south from Fort Thompson into Nebraska.
The eastern most 230 kV and 345 kV lines connect at Watertown where a 345 kV line continues
south to Sioux Falls. Two 230 kV lines run east from Watertown into the Granite Falls station in
Minnesota. Due to a bus outage at the Granite Falls station the 230 kV network in southwestern
Minnesota was not intact. Also there are two 115 kV lines that run south one from Waterton and
the other from Granite Falls to Sioux Falls.
The central 345 kV line from the coal fields runs southeast to Sioux Falls with an intermediate
station at Huron. At Huron there are two 230 kV lines that run to the southwest to Fort
Thompson and two 230 kV lines that run northeast to Watertown thus connecting the three 345
kV paths through the Huron station. Also two 115 kV lines run south into Nebraska from Huron.
At the time of the event the 230 kV lines from Fort Thompson to Huron and the 345 kV line
from Waterton to Sioux Falls where out of service.
The other line of interest runs from southwestern North Dakota south into south-central South
Dakota. This was the last line to trip to form the first island and the first line reclosed that tied
the island back to the eastern interconnection.
A new 345 kV line running east from Sioux Falls was not in service yet. Thus the lines leaving
South Dakota in this region were the 115 kV lines running south from Watertown, Huron and
Granite Falls. During the event six 115 kV lines running south of Watertown tripped. Also the
western most 230 kV and 345 kV lines from the coal fields tripped.
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario Ties

The remaining lines that tripped were in the northern portion of the system (North Dakota to
Saskatchewan 230 kV line, Minnesota to Ontario 115 kV line, Manitoba to Ontario 230 kV line
(with phase shifter), and then several lines between Manitoba and Saskatchewan and within
Saskatchewan).

State of the System
The 230 kV line from North Dakota into Saskatchewan connects to the 230 kV network in
southern Saskatchewan. The 230 kV network in Saskatchewan radiates out to the west to Regina
(two lines) to the east to southern Manitoba and two lines north to interior Saskatchewan.
The North Dakota to Saskatchewan tie line, the Saskatchewan to southern Manitoba tie line, and
one line to Regina all tripped.
There are four tie lines between Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Three out of four of these ties
tripped during the event.
Connections to Ontario
Ontario is connected to the MRO region through several phase shifters. A 115 kV phase shifter
connects Ontario to Minnesota and two 230 kV phase shifters connect Ontario to Manitoba. One
of the phase shifters between Ontario and Manitoba was out of service at the time of the event.
The remaining phase shifters tripped during the event.
Storm Issues
One issue that was originally considered to be a possible contributory factor was the weather in
the Twin Cities area. This has been reviewed by the Event Analysis team, which considered the
severity and extent of the storm. The Old Farmer’s Almanac Weather Data
(http://www.almanac.com ) for the day shows the following conditions.
Location Condition Sustained Wind Maximum Gusts

St Paul Municipal Airport Thunder and rain 14 mph 25 mph
Red Wing, MN Rain 15 mph 26 mph
Rochester, MN Rain 22 mph 33 mph
Faribault, MN Rain 16 mph 25 mph
Eau Claire, WI Rain and Thunder 11 mph 23 mph
Menomonie, WI Rain 17 mph 29 mph

State of the System
There were thunderstorms in the Twin Cities-Eau Claire area on September 18, 2007. The figure
below shows the location of strokes near the time of the event. None appear to be in the vicinity
of the lines that tripped early in the event. Based on wind speeds, the storm did not appear to
have damaging winds. The analysis team concluded that the storm was not a significant factor.
Figure SoS 1: Lightning Stroke Locations – September 18, 2007, 5:14 to 5:23

Summary of the Event
S ummary of the E vent

A review of the system response shows that the system underwent a range of conditions, with
under voltage, over voltage, under frequency and over frequency at various times. There was an
initial conductor failure, a subsequent protection failure, a slow cascade and then a very rapid
cascade, followed by over frequency generator tripping and then under frequency load shedding.
This was a complex event and, as a result, the analysis took more than the average time to
complete. The event had the following major phases:
• Multiple 345 kV line contingencies occurred within the first 38 seconds of the event.
Specifically, both 345 kV lines that form the Minnesota-Wisconsin Stability Interface
(MWSI) tripped and locked out within the first 38 seconds of the initiation of the event.
There was insufficient time after the first 345 kV line trip to re-adjust the system for the
second trip. Preliminary analysis indicates that after both lines had tripped, the system
was operating beyond dynamic stability, voltage, and thermal limits.
• North Dakota, Minnesota, Manitoba, part of South Dakota, and Saskatchewan separated
from the Eastern Interconnection.
• Saskatchewan then separated from Manitoba and North Dakota.
• Saskatchewan lost a significant amount of load and generation.
• Rapid coordinated reductions to generation and the DC schedule in Manitoba allowed
the frequency in the first island to return to near 60 Hz. This action enabled quick
restoration and stabilization of the bulk power system in the North Dakota, South Dakota,
Minnesota, and Manitoba area.
• Various MRO entities in the first island were reconnected to the Eastern Interconnection
in less than 10 minutes through automatic reclosing (with synchro-check) of a number of
the open transmission lines between that island and the Eastern Interconnection.
• Saskatchewan was reconnected to the Eastern Interconnection in 58 minutes.
Summary of Switching, Generation Loss and Load Loss

The following section summarizes the major impacts of the event. This is divided into
summaries of line losses, generation trips and load trips.
Line Trips
These are listed, for each voltage class, in the order of tripping.
Line Voltage Class Notes

345 kV from Twin Cities metro to Initial fault due to conductor/splice
345 kV
Rochester failure
West segment of 345 kV line from Twin
345 kV Protection failure - communications
Cities metro to central Wisconsin
East segment of 345 kV line from Twin
345 kV Automatic trip when West segment trips
Cities metro to central Wisconsin

Transformers at station at the junction of

the west and east segments of 345 kV
345/161 kV Loss of connected 345 kV system
line from Twin Cities metro to central
Wisconsin
345 kV from northwest Wisconsin to
345 kV Operator initiated
central Wisconsin
The western most line of three 345 kV
lines from the coal fields of North Dakota 345 kV Protection – Zone 2 POTT
to eastern South Dakota
Transformer in southwestern Nebraska 345/115 kV Operator initiated
230 kV line parallel to the western most
line of three 345 kV lines from the coal
230 kV Protection - impedance
fields of North Dakota to eastern South
Dakota
Phase Shifter between Ontario and
230 kV Protection - ∆P relay
Manitoba
230 kV line in far western North Dakota
230 kV Protection - POTT
and South Dakota
Tie line between North Dakota and
230 kV Protection – out-of-step
Saskatchewan
Southern 230 kV tie between
230 kV Protection – zone 1 out-of-step
Saskatchewan and Manitoba
Northern 230 kV tie between
Central 230 kV tie between
One of two lines from the North Dakota -
230 kV Protection - overvoltage
Saskatchewan tie to Regina
Continuation of Central 230 kV
Saskatchewan to Manitoba tie east into 230 kV Protection - overvoltage
Manitoba
161 kV line from the 345 kV network at
Rochester west to the 115 kV network in 161 kV Protection – zone 2
southeastern Minnesota
161 kV line from the 345 kV at Mankato
to the 161 network in south-central 161 kV Protection – zone 2
Minnesota
115 kV line from the 345 kV network in
the southeast Twin Cities metro east into 115 kV Protection – zone 2 - loading
Wisconsin
the eastern Twin Cities metro to the 115 Protection failure – unsupervised
115 kV
kV network in the northeast Twin Cities overcurrent
metro
the southeastern Twin Cities metro to the Protection – phase B fault due to tree
115 kV
115 kV network in the eastern Twin contact
Cities metro


the eastern Twin Cities metro to the 115 115 kV Protection misoperation
kV network in west central Wisconsin
Line from Duluth to Northwestern
115 kV Protection – zone 2
Wisconsin
115 kV from Sioux Falls north into
southwestern Minnesota. A parallel path
115 kV Protection - POTT
to the 345 kV lines from the North
Dakota coal fields to Sioux Falls
115 kV from Huron south into the 115 kV
network in southeastern South Dakota
(Sioux Falls area). A parallel path to the 115 kV Protection – no information
345 kV lines from the North Dakota coal
fields to Sioux Falls
Second 115 kV from Huron south into
the 115 kV network in southeastern
South Dakota (Sioux Falls area). A 115 kV Protection – zone 2 POTT
parallel path to the 345 kV lines from the
North Dakota coal fields to Sioux Falls
115 kV line from the 230 kV network in Protection – Direction comparison
115 kV
eastern North Dakota to Huron. blocking – no information
115 kV north of Sioux Falls into the 115
kV network in southeastern South
Dakota. A parallel path to the 345 kV 115 kV Protection – instantaneous zone 1
lines from the North Dakota coal fields to
Sioux Falls
115 kV from the 230 kV network in west
central South Dakota into the 115 kV
network in southeastern South Dakota. A 115 kV Protection – zone 2
parallel path to the 345 kV lines from the
North Dakota coal fields to Sioux Falls
Phase Shifter between Ontario and
115 kV Protection – out-of-step
Minnesota
69 kV line south of the Twin Cities metro
into the western Wisconsin 161 kV 69 kV Protection – over current
network
A three terminal 69 kV line from the Twin
Cities metro 115 kV network to the
Wisconsin 161 kV network and to a point
south of the Twin Cities
69 kV line from the northern Twin Cities
metro to west central Wisconsin
69 kV line from the 345 kV at Mankato to
the 161 network in south-central 69 kV Protection – zone 1, 244% current
Minnesota
The last line to trip to form the first island covering Minnesota, North Dakota, Saskatchewan and
Ontario was the 230 kV line in far western North Dakota and South Dakota at 05:21:25.201.

Saskatchewan remained in the first island until the opening of the central Saskatchewan to
Manitoba 230 kV tie line at 5:21:36.261.
The first island (without Saskatchewan) was reconnected to the Eastern Interconnection by the
closing of the 230 kV line in far western North Dakota and South Dakota at 5:29:37.418 (an
island time of about 8:11).
Saskatchewan was reconnected to the system with the closing of the northern Saskatchewan to
Manitoba 230 kV tie line at 6:19:51 (separated for 58:14).
Generation Loss
It is difficult to know the exact loss of generation during the event as records from some third
party generation were not available. The following table summarizes the generation capacity lost
(nameplate or seasonal rating) as well as generation lost at trip. Again, these are in chronological
order.
It should be noted that the simulation studies revealed the possibility that some additional
generation losses, in excess of those documented below, occurred during the event. In general,
these were small, distributed generators (usually wind), where a high voltage or feeder/collector
breaker did not operate, but the available data indicates that a loss of generation within a plant
did occur.
Generator Geographic
Rating / Load at Trip Comment
Area
37 / 20 Southeast MN Wind, no targets
110 / 36 – loss of 19 North central IA Wind (45 of 89)
Wind, unknown how
98 / 48 – loss of 40 North central IA much of the plant was
on-line
110 / 18 North central IA Wind (44 of 89)
50 / 22 North central IA Wind
Wind, unknown how
218.65 / 85.5 – loss of
Southwest MN much of the plant was
68
on-line
Wind, unknown how
260.98 / 21.9 Southwest MN much of the plant was
on-line
NUG, over-frequency
5/5 Saskatchewan
trip of connection feeder
2 / 0.06 Eastern ND No targets
27 / 22 Northwest WI Loss of field
9/2 Southwest MN Wind
15 / 2 Twin Cities metro No targets
8.96 / 5 Twin Cities metro Hydro, no targets

Generator Geographic
Rating / Load at Trip Comment
Area
150 / 149 Saskatchewan Over-frequency
20 / unknown Saskatchewan No targets
28 / 26 Manitoba Over-frequency
237 /198 Twin Cities metro Turbine controls
Lost because of Unit 1
118 / 39 Saskatchewan
trip
8/8 Manitoba Over-frequency
150 / 0 Saskatchewan Lock-out while off-line
Saskatchewan Tripped on reverse
85 / 0
power while condensing
Saskatchewan Tripped on reverse
85 / 0
power while condensing
300 / 0 Saskatchewan Lock-out while off-line
563 / 20 Northeast MN Turbine controls
350 / 9 Northeast MN Turbine controls
In summary, the earliest generation losses were on third party generation, gas and wind. Later
losses were more substantial in terms of lost capacity, even though the generation levels at trip
were small or zero. Approximately 3141 MW of capacity was affected during the event – about
2311 MW of conventional generation capacity tripped and 860 MW of non-utility generation
either tripped or may have been on-line in a plant where other units tripped.
Load Losses
Load was lost during the event for four main reasons – under-voltage load shedding, over-
voltage shedding, under-frequency load shedding, and loss of load consequential to line
switching. The load recorded losses were:
Load (MW) Load Geographic Area Comment

9 Northern WI Under-voltage
9 Manitoba Line switching
216 Saskatchewan Over-voltage
485.5 Saskatchewan Under-frequency
68 Saskatchewan Line switching
787.5 Total

Note that the initial island separation was accompanied with only 18 MW of load loss.
Disturbance Event Elements

Every system disturbance is an opportunity to learn more about how the electric system responds
to abnormal or extreme conditions. Event elements are classified by their severity of impact on
the overall disturbance:
• Initiating – the event failure mode that initiated that system disturbance.
• Contributory – these elements contributed to the severity of the event or prolonged its
effects.
• Causal – these elements are those without which the initiating event(s) would not have
developed into large system disturbance or cascade.
• Incidental – these elements simply occurred at the same time as the larger disturbance or
were found as a result of the event analysis.
The September 18 disturbance included the following event components. Their severity
classification is preliminary pending completion of the root cause analysis. They will be
cataloged and tracked in the NERC Event Analysis benchmarking database:
1. Mechanical Conductor Failure (initiating) — Phase A of the 345 kV line from the Twin
Cities metro to Rochester suffered a conductor and splice failure, dropping the phase to
the ground.
2. Protection System Misoperation (causal) — the west segment of the 345 kV line from the
Twin Cities metro to central Wisconsin tripped, due to a protection system misoperation.
The digital communications channels, including the utilities communications and two,
third party communications networks between the stations on this line segment had
varying channel delay times (different in each direction) that were not accounted for in
the line’s phase comparison system communication logic. There was also a secondary
factor involved. The relay system did not compare for the initial fault on the 345 kV line
from the Twin Cities metro to Rochester or for the second fault during the first reclosing
attempt (at the Rochester end). However, the relay did compare on heavy line load
current after the third fault had cleared following the second reclosing attempt (at the
Twin Cities end). The relay senses abrupt changes in current and voltage, and then
permits current phase comparison if the relay’s current level detectors are set below line
load. This comparison lasts for 0.150 to 0.200 seconds following the detection of abrupt
changes in voltage and current. This line tripped on load current after the fault had
cleared. Tripping of this line transfer tripped the east segment of the 345 kV line from
the Twin Cities metro to central Wisconsin and disconnected two 345/161 kV
autotransformers at the station at the junction of the west and east segments.
3. Protection System Misoperation (contributory) — A 115 kV line from the 345 kV

network in the eastern Twin Cities metro to the 115 kV network in the northeast Twin
Cities metro tripped incorrectly at the Twin Cities metro end only due to a relay system
logic failure. The line tripped via an unsupervised overcurrent relay element while

carrying 117% of its emergency rating (1,645 amps flowing into Twin Cities metro end
station). A zone 2 relay should have restrained that operation. Power flow sensitivity
analysis showed that the tripping of this line due to the misoperation accelerated the
cascade. See “Other Protection Problems” in the Equipment Performance section of this
document.
4. Relay Loadability (contributory) — A 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the
southeast Twin Cities metro east into Wisconsin tripped at 139% of its emergency rating
for a non-transient condition. This is not in keeping with the tenets of relay loadability
that are contained in Standard PRC-023 – Relay Loadability, which was approved by the
NERC Board and is pending approval by the FERC at this writing. That standard and the
relay loadability review that was performed by the industry following the 2003 blackout
call for lines to be able to withstand loadings of up to 150% of emergency rating without
tripping by relay action to allow operators time to readjust the system to alleviate the
overloads. During the 2004-2005 review of “operationally significant circuits of 100-200
kV,” the subject 115 kV line was not considered to be critical based on a system intact
base point.
Post-event analysis of the MWSI IROL indicates that prior to the start of the event MWSI
IROL would have been 1,700 MW for the system conditions on the morning of
September 18, 2007, including all the prior outages. The IROL is limited by undesired
tripping of the subject 115 kV line for the loss of the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities
metro to central Wisconsin. Since the subject 115 kV line is key to the determination of
the IROL, operations should prevent against tripping this critical element if the
contingent 345 kV line trips.
5. Wiring Error (incidental) — while analyzing the tripping of the above referenced 115 kV
line it was discovered that the DFR at the Twin Cities end was wired incorrectly, causing
currents to show 180 degrees out of phase.
6. Protection System Misoperation (contributory) – A 115 kV line from the 345 kV network
in the eastern Twin Cities metro to the 115 kV network in west central Wisconsin tripped
at the Wisconsin end concurrent with a line fault on the 115 kV line from the 345 kV
network in the southeastern Twin Cities metro to the 115 kV network in the eastern Twin
Cities metro. The logic in this legacy relaying scheme is susceptible to false tripping
when one end of a faulted line suddenly opens and shifts fault current in the network.
7. Protection System Misoperation (incidental) - The automatic reclosing function at the

Sioux Falls end of 115 kV line from Sioux Falls north into southwestern Minnesota
misoperated. The Sioux Falls end experienced a high speed synch check relay initiated
closure rather than its 15 second time delayed automatic reclosing. This end was closed
at the time that the Minnesota end reclosed at its 13 cycle auto reclose mark.
8. Relay Loadability (incidental) — A 69 kV line south of the Twin Cities metro into the
western Wisconsin 161 kV network tripped at the Minnesota end only due to an
overcurrent relay set at the normal rating of the line. The normal rating for this line is 48

MVA and its emergency is 53 MVA. The normal rating matches the 405.6 amp setting
of the overcurrent relay.
9. Wiring Error (incidental) — While analyzing the operation of the 230 kV line in far
western North Dakota and South Dakota at the North Dakota end, it was discovered that
the current polarities are reversed to the fault recorders on two other lines into this
station.
10. Protection System Design Error (contributory) — During the system restoration, with the
central 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba closed at the Saskatchewan end
and open-ended at the Manitoba end, over-voltage was sensed at the Manitoba end and a
transfer trip was sent to trip the Saskatchewan end of the line, and a cross-trip signal was
issued to trip the next line segment of the 230 kV line east in Manitoba. This was
determined to be an over-voltage logic design error in the Programmable Logic
Controller at the Manitoba end of the tie line. This logic error problem was encountered
twice during the restoration process, adversely impacting resynchronization of
Saskatchewan to the Eastern Interconnection.
11. Protection System Design Error (contributory) — During the system restoration, with the
southern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba line closed at the
Saskatchewan end and open-ended at the Manitoba end , over-voltage was sensed at the
Manitoba end by an over-voltage protection scheme that uses the tie line PT as a source.
Although the Manitoba end 230 kV bus voltages were normal, the over-voltage
protection tripped the entire Manitoba end 230 kV switchyard. A transfer trip signal was
sent to trip the Saskatchewan end of the tie line.
12. Unexpected Boiler/Turbine Control Action (contributory) — A Twin Cities metro unit
tripped on “low drum level.” The turbine-generator increased speed from 3,600 to 3,645
rpm, or about 101.2% of normal during the high frequency conditions of the first island.
The over speed condition persisted for approximately 8 minutes until the system
frequency returned to 60 Hz and the island reconnected to the Eastern Interconnection.
The subject turbine-generator governor responded properly to this increase by rapidly

closing down the steam inlet valves to the turbine. This abrupt load change, about 100
MW in 24 seconds, produced a spike increase in the unit’s boiler drum pressure, which in
turn caused the indicated drum level to decrease (“drum shrink”) below the safe operating
level. This was indicated as a trip on low drum level.
13. Over-Frequency Generation Protection Relay settings (causal to Saskatchewan

separation) — Generator over-frequency relays set within the no-damage range of unit
operation tripped 711 MW of rated capacity from 7 units. The no-damage range for unit
operation is defined by IEEE 50.13 standard. The settings of the over-frequency relays
were 60.5 to 61.0 Hz. which is less than the 102% over frequency continuous capability
of the machines. Undesirable tripping of generation in southern Saskatchewan because
of these settings was deemed to be causal in the separation of Saskatchewan from
Manitoba and North Dakota.

14. Protection System Misoperation (incidental) — The protection logic on a 230 kV line in
northwestern Manitoba, which had not tripped, initiated an automatic reclose via control
logic of the common ring bus breaker (230 kV breaker no. 10). This re-energized the
northern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba from the Manitoba end. The
Saskatchewan end of the tie was not reclosed. The auto-reclosing function for tie line
was not initiated by the line trip at 05:21:36.248. The auto-reclosing of the Manitoba end
of the tie line can be considered unintentional and has since been permanently de-
activated.

Sequence of Events
S equenc e of E vents
Details of the event
An overview map of the region affected is shown below.
Figure SoE 1: - Overview of the Event

Note: All times below are in Central Daylight Time (CDT) unless otherwise noted.
Initial Events of the Disturbance

At 05:14:54.135, the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities metro to Rochester tripped due to
mechanical conductor and splice failure on phase A (see Equipment Performance section). The
fault was correctly detected by the ground distance relays at both ends, as verified by the DFR at
the Twin Cities end and a second remote DFR. The line attempted to automatically reclose time
delayed once from each end and immediately re-tripped both times due to the permanent fault, as
noted below. Transmission Operators later made four unsuccessful attempts to manually reclose
the line by SCADA.

Sequence of Events
At 5:15:11.482, the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities metro to Rochester auto-reclosed at
Rochester and immediately re-tripped at 5:15:11.715. Approximately 15 seconds later
(05:15:29.961), the line attempted a second auto-reclose, this time from the Twin Cities end.
The line immediately re-tripped at 05:15:30.006.
At 05:15:30.204, the West segment of 345 kV line from the Twin Cities metro to central
Wisconsin tripped due to a protection system misoperation, then, by design, the east segment of
this 345 kV line was transfer tripped at 05:15:30.250. The variability in the digital
communication channel delay times between terminals of the west segment were not correctly
accounted for in the line’s phase comparison relaying channel control logic.
There was also a secondary factor involved; the relay was able to compare during high line load
currents for a short period of time following abrupt changes in system voltages and currents.
The relay did not compare for either the initial fault on the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities
metro to Rochester or for the second fault following the first reclosing attempt (at Rochester),
however; the relay did compare following the clearing of the third fault after the second
reclosing attempt (at the Twin Cities) when the line was carrying high line load current.
With these three 345 kV lines out of service, the system was being operated beyond dynamic
stability, voltage and thermal limits.
Note: These 345 kV lines make up the MWSI IROL flowgate.
Initial Cascade East of the Twin Cities

Over about the next 40 seconds, low voltages and high load current caused several underlying
115 kV lines and 69 kV lines to trip due to zone 2 or other relay action. There were a large
number of shunt capacitors switching on to raise the system voltage, mostly due to local voltage
control, but some were due to operator action.
At 05:15:38, a 69 kV line south of the Twin Cities metro that runs into the western Wisconsin
161 kV network line tripped at the Minnesota end only due to an overcurrent relay set at the
normal current rating of the line. The normal rating for this line is 48 MVA and its emergency
rating is 53 MVA. There is a section of 4/0 ACSR conductor in the first segment of this line
rated at 100 degrees C and 2 fps wind. The normal rating matches the 405.6 amp setting of the
overcurrent relay. 53 MVA corresponds to 443 amps at 69 kV. The digital relay setting data
indicates a 50ABC function set at 405.6 amps tripped the line. This setting is about equal to the
normal line rating. At the time of the trip, the digital relay indicates the line voltage was 65.8 kV
and line current 464 amps.
Power flow modeling shows a flow of 69 MVA (67 MW and -16 MVAR) at the Minnesota end
of this line and a voltage of 0.983 pu (67.8 kV) following the loss of the two 345 kV lines.
At 05:16:01.956, a 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the southeast Twin Cities metro east
into Wisconsin tripped at the Twin Cities end only by zone 2 relays due to elevated line loading
(139% of emergency rating). Note: this is a two segment line with a line-tapped transformer at

Sequence of Events
the mid terminal and terminates into a 115/161 kV transformer at the Wisconsin end. This line
reclosed at 5:16:32.411 and re-tripped at 5:16:32.586.
The power flow modeling indicates a voltage of 1.004 pu at the Twin Cities end and a flow of
304 MW and 83 MVAR on the line at the time it tripped. These values are very close to the
values of 1.023 pu, 283 MW, and 96 MVAR recorded by the Twin Cities end DFR.
There is an apparent impedance due to loading of Zrelay = 63.8 kV/1.483 kA = 43 ohms at 20º.
Based on a zone 2 setting of 65 primary ohms and an angle of maximum reach (max torque
angle) of 60º, the relay just picks up at 49.8 ohms at 20º. The conclusion is that the zone 2 relay
at the Twin Cities end correctly operated as the apparent impedance due to load current entered
the zone 2 function tripping characteristic.
Post-event analysis of the MWSI IROL indicates that prior to the start of the event MWSI IROL
would have been 1,700 MW. The IROL limited by undesired tripping of this 115 kV line from
the 345 kV network in the southeast Twin Cities metro east into Wisconsin for the loss of the
345 kV line from the Twin Cities metro to Central Wisconsin. Since this 115 kV line is key to
the determination of the IROL, operations should prevent against tripping this critical element if
the 345 kV line trips.
Tripping of this 115 kV line at 139% of its emergency rating for a non-transient condition is not
in keeping with the tenets of relay loadability that are contained in Standard PRC-023 – Relay
Loadability, which was approved by the NERC Board and is pending approval by the FERC at
this writing. That standard and the relay loadability review that was performed by the industry
following the 2003 blackout both call for circuits to be able to withstand loadings of up to 150%
of emergency rating without tripping by relay action to allow operators time to readjust the
system to alleviate the overloads. During the 2004-2005 review of operationally significant
circuits 100-200 kV, this 115 kV line was not considered to be an “operationally significant
circuit 100 to 200 kV” based on a system intact starting point.
The Event Analysis Team made a specific recommendation on these findings
Recommendation: That MRO begin the implementation of PRC-023 Loadability Standard

requirements for transmission lines and transformers operating at 100 kV and above. PRC - 023
has been approved by the NERC BOT and is currently awaiting FERC approval.
At 05:16:02.584, a 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities metro to the
115 kV network in the northeast Twin Cities metro tripped incorrectly at the eastern Twin Cities
end only due to a relay system misoperation. The line tripped via an unsupervised overcurrent
relay element while carrying 117% of its emergency rating (1,645 amps flowing into eastern
Twin Cities end). A zone 2 relay at the eastern Twin Cities end should have restrained that
operation. See the Other Protection Problems portion of the Equipment Performance section of
this report for further details.
The dynamics simulation indicates that current on the line at the eastern Twin Cities end was
1590 A (281.2 MW and 73.6 MVAR at 0.919 pu voltage) when the line tripped. This value is
consistent with measured values.

Sequence of Events
Power flow sensitivity analysis showed that the tripping of this line due to the misoperation
accelerated the cascade. For additional detail, see the Power Flow and Dynamic Analysis section
of this report.
At 05:16:03.890, a three terminal 69 kV line from the Twin Cities metro 115 kV network to the
Wisconsin 161 kV network and a point south of the Twin Cities tripped correctly at the southern
terminal due to line loading and low bus voltage causing the zone 2 relay function to trip. The
zone 2 relay function correctly operated as the apparent impedance due to load current entered
the zone 2 function tripping characteristic.
The dynamics simulation indicates that the apparent impedance entered zone 2 roughly 0.2
seconds after the trip of the 115 kV mentioned above at05:16:01.956.
At 05:16:04.66, the three terminal 69 kV line tripped at the Twin Cities end due to line loading
and low bus voltage causing the zone 2 relay function to trip. The zone 2 relay function at the
Twin Cities end correctly operated as the apparent impedance due to load current entered the
zone 2 function tripping characteristic.
Although there are no DFR records from the Twin Cities end of this line, the relay settings make
tripping on relay loadability probable, particularly when the southern terminal is opened. The
dynamics simulation corroborates that the apparent impedance entered zone 2 as a result of the
opening of the southern terminal.
At 5:16:05.040, a 69 kV line from the northern Twin Cities metro to west central Wisconsin
correctly tripped at the Twin Cities end due to the zone 3 relays set at 135% of the line’s
emergency rating.
The dynamics simulation indicates that the apparent impedance steadily tracked into the zone 3
relay characteristic during the time period from 5:16:01 to 5:16:05 as the parallel paths from the
Twin Cities area into Wisconsin opened one by one. In the simulation, the impedance actually
entered zone 3 about 0.3 seconds after the three terminal 69 kV line opened at its southern
terminal at 05:16:03.890.
The wind generation in a southeast Minnesota wind farm (total generation output of about 20
MW) tripped sometime between 5:16:00 and 5:16:12. The generation owner was not aware of
any unit trips on September 18; nor did the unit owner provide under voltage relay information.
In the simulations, voltage at the 69 kV point of interconnection dropped from 1.007 pu at

5:16:00 to 0.877 pu at 5:16:30 in the power flow simulation and 0.872 pu in the dynamics
simulation.
Within a minute of the initial 345 kV lines tripping, about 9 MW of load was automatically
shed due to under voltage at a northwest Wisconsin substation. This trip was the direct result of
the above series of lines tripping, leading to extreme loading on the phase shifter at Duluth and a
115 kV line from Duluth to Wisconsin, which caused a severe voltage depression in the area.
The UVLS correctly detected low voltage on the 34.5 kV bus of 30.8 kV, which matches the
setting of the UVLS 27S relay (89.2% for 5 seconds).

Sequence of Events
In the dynamics simulation, the northwest Wisconsin substation UVLS tripped the load at
5:16:07.375. The load was tripped by the third of five UVLS settings; that setting trips the load
if voltage drops below 0.79 pu for 2 seconds.
At about 5:17:08 about half of the turbines at a wind farm in north central Iowa tripped due to
sustained low voltage for 60 seconds. The generator under voltage protection relays for these
turbines are known to have an under voltage setting with a 60 second pickup timer, but the exact
voltage trip setting is not known.
In the dynamics simulation, the 161 kV bus voltage at the point of interconnection for the wind
farm dropped from 1.004 pu at 5:16:00 to 0.925 pu at 5:16:20 due to the increased power flow
through the area after several connections between Minnesota and Wisconsin opened.
Declining Voltages and Extreme Line Loadings

During the time period from 5:16:30 to 5:21:20, a large number of shunt capacitors automatically
switched in to support the decaying voltages that resulted from high flows through the limited
number of remaining connections between Minnesota and Wisconsin/Iowa. Although the system
was near a voltage collapse at this point (as evidenced by non-convergence of power flow
solutions in the simulations), it was not apparently unstable yet.
The presence of a leading power factor at some distribution stations in the Twin Cities area may
have played a significant role in preventing a voltage collapse; as the tap changers adjusted to
control distribution voltage, they actually increased reactive support to the transmission system
in the area. This effect is particularly noteworthy in the east Twin Cities metro area.
At 05:18:40, the 345/161 kV transformer in northwest Wisconsin was manually opened by

switching of the 345 kV line from that station to central Wisconsin. Operators initiated this trip,
following established procedures for fluctuating voltage and back-feeding of power from the 161
kV system to the 345 kV system at the northwest Wisconsin station.
Power flow simulations indicate that the transformer was loaded to 76 MW flowing from the 161
kV to the 345 kV system with 88 MVAr flowing in the opposite direction.
High-Speed Dynamic Cascade on 115, 161, 230, and 345 kV Systems

Extreme under-voltage and out-of-step conditions prevailed and the system cascaded from east-
to-west creating a North Dakota, Minnesota, Manitoba, Saskatchewan island by 5:21:26. The
dynamic phase of the disturbance began with the tripping a 115 kV line from the 345 kV
network in the southeastern Twin Cities metro to the 115 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities
metro.
At 05:21:20.440, the 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the southeastern Twin Cities
metro to the 115 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities metro tripped, after sustaining very high
flows for about 5 minutes. While carrying 203% of emergency rating, the line sagged into a tree,
causing a B phase-to-ground fault. The line later reclosed twice at 5:21:20.950, re-tripping at
5:21:21.073 and then again at 05:21:35.8, re-tripping 05:22:02.411.

Sequence of Events
At 05:21:20.950, the faulted 115 kV line automatically reclosed. Within 7 cycles, the line re-
tripped. About 4 cycles after reclosing, the B phase again made contact with the tree, causing a
single phase-to-ground fault.
At 05:21:21.050, the 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities metro to
the 115 kV network in west central Wisconsin tripped due to a protection system misoperation in
the presence of the fault on 115 kV line (see above at 05:21:20.440 and 05:21:20.950). A
detailed analysis of this misoperation is contained in the Equipment Performance section of this
report.
About 7 cycles after reclosing, the faulted 115 kV line (see above at 05:21:20.440 and
05:21:20.950) re-tripped to clear the B phase fault. When this line re-tripped, it blacked out a
portion of the system including a 115 kV station in the east Twin Cities metro where the Twin
Cities 345 kV and 115 kV and the Wisconsin 115 kV systems interconnect.
At 05:21:21.450, a 115 kV line from Duluth to northwestern Wisconsin correctly tripped by

zone 2 at the Wisconsin end due to real power out of the line (74.2 MW) and high reactive power
(92.5 MVAR) into the line in the presence of extremely low bus voltage (87.9 kV ph-ph or 0.76
pu).
In the dynamics simulation, the apparent impedance at the Wisconsin end entered zone 2 in the
second quadrant at about 5:21:20.75, which is approximately 0.3 seconds after the initial trip of
the faulted 115 kV line (see above at 05:21:20.440, 05:21:20.950).
At 05:21:21.690, the 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities metro to
the 115 kV network in west central Wisconsin (see above at 05:21:21.050) automatically
reclosed and stayed closed. This re-energized the 115 kV station in the east metro and kept it
tied to the Eastern Interconnection for the remainder of the disturbance.
At 5:21:22 output from a wind farm in north central Iowa abruptly dropped from 48 MW to 8
MW according to SCADA data. The units were likely tripped by generator protection under
voltage relays on the individual turbines that responded to the falling voltage associated with the
separation between Minnesota and Iowa. There was no reported tripping of the generation
collection feeders.
Because of a lack of power flow and dynamic model detail of the wind farm and its turbines, it is
not possible to determine exactly when the units would be expected to trip for such conditions in
simulations. Using an approximate representation of the plant in the simulation, the units were
modeled as having tripped at 5:21:21.65.
At approximately 5:21:22 the remaining on-line wind turbines at the first mentioned (above at
5:17:08 ) wind farm in north central Iowa were tripped by generator protection under voltage
relays on the individual turbines due to low voltage accompanying the separation between
Minnesota and Iowa. There was no reported tripping of the generation collection feeders.

Sequence of Events
simulations. In the simulation, the units were modeled as having tripped at 5:21:21.75, using an
approximate representation of the plant.
At approximately 5:21:22 all of the on-line wind turbines at a third wind farm in north central
Iowa tripped. The feeders connecting the turbines also tripped. The trips were likely due to
under voltage protection on the feeders. The farm’s output was 22 MW at the time.
simulations. In the simulation, the units were modeled as having tripped at 5:21:22.01, using an
At 05:21:22.890, a 161 kV line from the 345 kV network at Rochester west to the 115 kV
network in southeastern Minnesota correctly tripped at the Rochester end due to zone 2 on line
loading. There are no digital relays or digital fault recorders at either end of this line to confirm
this likely event only electro-mechanical relay targets.
In the dynamics simulation, the apparent impedance at Rochester entered zone 2 at

approximately 5:21:22.35 as a result of the widening angular separation between Minnesota and
Iowa.
At 05:21:23.060, a 161 kV line from Mankato to south-central Minnesota correctly tripped at

both ends by zone 2 directional comparison relays as the swing impedance migrated into their
tripping mho characteristic circles. This migration occurred in about 17 cycles. The southern
terminal 161 kV voltage was at 70.7 kV when the line tripped.
In the dynamics simulation, the apparent impedance at Mankato entered zone 2 at approximately
5:21:22.0 as a result of the widening angular separation between Minnesota and Iowa.
At 05:21:23.330, a 69 kV line from Mankato to the 161 network in south-central Minnesota

correctly tripped on zone 1 immediately after the 161 kV line from Mankato (see above at 05:
21:23.060) opened. The current was 244% of the line emergency rating at 1,470 amps, with real
power flowing out and reactive power flowing into the southern terminal with the 69 kV voltage
at about 40.7 kV when the line tripped. This line auto-reclosed about 5.76 seconds later and
tripped on zone 1 again.
At 05:21:23.780, a 115 kV line from Sioux Falls north into southwestern Minnesota correctly
tripped at both ends by permissive overreach transfer trip on loading. The line automatically
reclosed both ends at 05:21:24.080 and the Minnesota end re-tripped at 05:21:24.160. The
Minnesota end is a 13 cycle high speed reclose and operated as designed. The Sioux Falls end
reclosed too fast - possibly by an incorrectly operating synchronism check function. The Sioux
Falls end designed automatic reclosing is time delayed 15 seconds.
In the dynamics simulation, the apparent impedance at the Minnesota end entered zone 2 at
approximately 5:21:23.7 as the angular separation between northern MRO and the rest of the
Eastern Interconnection continued to widen.

Sequence of Events
Recommendation: Review and mitigate the sync-check function misoperation at the Sioux Falls
station.
At 05:21:23.835, the western most line of three 345 kV lines from the coal fields of North
Dakota to eastern South Dakota correctly tripped via its zone 2 permissive overreach transfer trip
scheme due to line loading and very low voltage (0.73 pu at the south end and 0.82 pu at the
north end).
In the dynamics simulation, the apparent impedance entered zone 2 at the north end at about
5:21:23.5. Although a 100 MW load adjustment was required in the simulation in order to match
the observed rate of angular separation between Minnesota and Iowa, the angular separation
across the Dakotas appears to increase too quickly in the simulation with this same load
adjustment.
At 05:21:23.916, a 115 kV line from Huron south into the 115 kV network in southeastern South
Dakota (Sioux Falls area) tripped at Huron at 5:21:23.916 and at the south end at 5:21:23.921.
No further information was available for this operation.
At 05:21:23.930, a second 115 kV line from Huron south into the 115 kV network in
southeastern South Dakota (Sioux Falls area) correctly tripped at the south end via zone 2
permissive overreach transfer trip scheme (POTT). The south end operated when a permissive
signal was received from Huron. However, since the Huron zone 2 relay de-asserted (dropped
out) before permissive trip was received from the south end, there was no trip at Huron.
At 05:21:23.933, a 115 kV line from the 230 kV network in eastern North Dakota to Huron
tripped at the northern end, dropping 22 MW of load. This is a three terminal line protected by a
directional comparison blocking (DCB) protection system.
At 05:21:24.061, a 115 kV line north of Sioux Falls into the 115 kV network in southeastern
South Dakota tripped via instantaneous zone 1 relay functions at both ends due to extremely low
voltage (21.5 kV on both 115 kV buses) and increasing current.
At 05:21:24.065, a 230 kV line in central South Dakota tripped at its southern end by impedance
protection functions.
In the dynamics simulation, the apparent impedance at the southern end entered the zone 2
characteristic at 5:21:23.835 when the western most line of three 345 kV lines from the coal
fields of North Dakota to eastern South Dakota tripped (see above at 05:21:23.835).
At 05:21:24.08, the 115 kV line from Sioux Falls north into southwestern Minnesota (see above
at 05:21:23.780) automatically reclosed high-speed at both ends.
The auto reclose function at the Sioux Falls end of the 115 kV line misoperated. The Minnesota
end has a 13 cycle (0.21 second) high speed reclose and a 15 second time delayed reclose in the
event the 13 cycle reclose fails. The Minnesota end will also reclose automatically via
synchronism check. The Sioux Falls end has a 15 second automatic reclose and synchronism
check. The Sioux Falls terminal may have been a synch check relay failure because its

Sequence of Events
automatic reclosing is time delayed by 15 seconds, yet the Sioux Falls end was closed at the time
that the Minnesota end reclosed at its 13 cycle auto reclose mark.
Between 5:21:23 and 5:21:24, nine wind turbines tripped at a southwestern Minnesota wind
farm by under voltage relays during the disturbance. The time of the trips was not recorded, but
according to the dynamics simulation, it is likely that the trips occurred between 5:21:23 and
5:21:24 in response to the voltage drop which accompanied the angular separation of Minnesota
and Iowa. In the simulation, the wind farm generation tripped at 5:21:23.66, using an
5:21:24, the second and third wind farms in southwestern Minnesota trips.
Most of the wind generation connected to these two wind farm stations disconnected when
exposed to the low voltages that accompanied the reclose and re-trip of the 115 kV line from
Sioux Falls north into southwestern Minnesota (see above 05:21:23.780 and 05:21:24.08). This
generation is comprised of a large number of different wind farms with different owners.
A DFR at one of the wind farms was able to observe some of the wind output drop. For the three
feeders that the DFR monitored, there was no appreciable change in real power output until 0.1
or 0.2 seconds before the 115 kV line from Sioux Falls north into southwestern Minnesota
tripped at 5:21:23.78. The real power output then fluctuated significantly until the 115 kV line
reclosed at 5:21:24.08. Within 0.02 s, the real power flow on one of the feeders dropped to zero
and essentially remained there. The real power flow on the second feeder actually increased at
this time, but it gradually ramped down to about 15% of pre-disturbance levels. The third feeder
had zero flow for the entire duration of the event record.
An approximate model of the wind generation in southwest Minnesota was used in the
simulation.
At 05:21:24.086, a 115 kV line from the 230 kV network in west central South Dakota into the
115 kV network in southeastern South Dakota tripped at its northern end via zone 2 protection.
There are no relay settings records, relay event records, or DFR records available for this
operation. This line has a mid-line tapped station.
A second parallel 115 kV circuit did not trip during the disturbance.
In the dynamics simulation, the apparent impedance at the north end entered the zone 3
characteristic of the relay at approximately 5:21:23.55.
At 05:21:24.113, the Manitoba - Ontario 230 kV tie line correctly tripped via Delta P relay
operation (set to trip for a change of 100 MW) that detected a 100 MW increase in flow to 220
MW from Manitoba to Ontario in less than 4 seconds. At the time of its trip, the voltage at the
Manitoba terminal was down to 208 kV (about 0.90 pu).
In the dynamics simulation, the flow on this line was 116 MW from Manitoba to Ontario at
5:21:20 and increased to 216 MW at 5:21:24.00.
Prior to the event, one of the two 230 kV lines was out for maintenance.

Sequence of Events
This tie line tripping initiated an automatic power order reduction on the Manitoba Hydro and
DC systems.
At 05:21:24.166, the 115 kV line from the 230 kV network in eastern North Dakota to Huron
(see above at 05:21:23.933) auto-reclosed at the north end. The line had remained closed at the
Huron end.
First Island Formed with Island Frequency Rising to 60.8 Hz

At 05:21:24.16, the 115 kV line from Sioux Falls north into southwestern Minnesota (see above
at 05:21:24.08) re-tripped via zone 1 due to out-of-step conditions. The fact that the line had
reclosed into this out-of-step condition is indicative that there was a synch-check failure during
the reclosing.
At 05:21:24.228, the 115 kV line from Huron south into the 115 kV network in southeastern
South Dakota (Sioux Falls area) reclosed at the Huron end. The south end had previously closed
at 05:21:24.089. At 05:21:24.277, the subject 115 kV Line re-tripped at the south end.
At 05:21:24.38, the115 kV tie line between Minnesota and Ontario tripped by an out-of-step trip
function at the Minnesota end only.
At 05:21:24.462, the 230 kV line in central South Dakota (see above at 05:21:24.065)
automatically reclosed at its southern end.
At 05:21:24.511, the Forbes DCAR relay (Delta Current Admittance Relay) initiated a power
order reduction on the Manitoba Hydro DC converters at Dorsey.
In the simulation, the model for this relay initiated a DC reduction signal at 5:21:22.758, which
is more than 1.75 seconds before the actual DCAR signal was issued during the event. The
discrepancy may be due to inaccuracies in the Forbes SVC modeling.
At 05:21:25.194, the 230 kV line in central South Dakota (see above at 05:21:24.065 and
05:21:24.462) tripped at both ends (zone 1 with an apparent impedance swing very close to the
northern end bus).
At 05:21:25.201, the 230 kV line in far western North Dakota and South Dakota correctly
tripped at the North Dakota end for an incoming out-of-step condition via its permissive
overreach transfer trip scheme (POTT) with step-zone distance protection scheme.
Note: While analyzing the operation of this line, it was discovered that the current polarities are
reversed to the fault recorder at the North Dakota terminal on two other lines into this station.
The tripping of this line completed the separation of the first island, consisting of Minnesota,
North Dakota, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and parts of South Dakota and Montana, from the
Eastern Interconnection.

Sequence of Events
At 05:21:25.292, an IPP feeder in southwest Saskatchewan tripped due to over-frequency. The

feeder has over-frequency protection set at 60.5 Hz for 0.5 seconds. There was a 5 MW
generator on the feeder.
At 05:21:26, one unit in a northwest Wisconsin plant tripped due to generator loss-of-field
protection while trying to compensate for an over-voltage condition in the area.
Recommendation: That the loss of field settings on the generators at this plant be reviewed to
assure loss of field relay coordinates with excitation system controls and does not trip for stable
power swings.
This unit is represented using only a classical generator model in the dynamics case; therefore,
the dynamics simulation could not provide any insight into the causes of this trip.
At 05:21:26.511, two valve groups on Manitoba Hydro DC Bipole 2 were blocked by over-
frequency relays that were set at 60.8 Hz. This was caused by over-frequency in the island. In
the dynamics simulation, the frequency reached 60.75 Hz at 5:21:26.4.
At 05:21:28.218, the 69 kV line from Mankato to the 161 kV network in south-central

Minnesota (see above at 05:21:23.330) automatically reclosed into an out-of-step condition.
At 05:21:29, a 345/115 kV transformer in southwest Nebraska was manually opened on the low
side as part of the reconfiguration for the Western Nebraska to Western Kansas flowgate per the
operating guide.
At 05:21:29.090, the 69 kV line from Mankato to the 161 kV network in south-central

Minnesota (see above at 05:21:23.330 and 05:21:28.218) re-tripped at the southern end via zone
1 protection for an out-of-step condition.
At 05:21:29.590, the 115 kV line from the 230 kV network in west central South Dakota into the
115 kV network in southeastern South Dakota (see above at 05:21:24.086) auto-reclosed at the
northern end. The line had remained closed at the south end.
At 05:21:32, the 161 kV line from Mankato to south-central Minnesota (see above at
05:21:23.060) was reclosed at the southern end only, leaving the line energized to Mankato,
where it was armed for synch-check auto-reclose.
At 05:21:33.978, the Forbes SVC controls abruptly limited the reactive power output to 200
MVAr after 10 seconds of operation at its overload limit. Prior to that control action, the Forbes
SVC was absorbing about 370 MVAr to compensate for the overvoltage in the island.
At 05:21:34.723, two units in southern Saskatchewan tripped due to over-frequency generator

protection. The units had their generator over-frequency protection set at 60.5 Hz for 10
seconds. The setting of these overfrequency relays is less than the continuous no-damage range
for unit operation as defined by IEEE 50.13. Machines by this standard must have 102% over

Sequence of Events
frequency continuous capability, therefore; this generator trip should be considered a

misoperation due to a setting design deficiency.
In the simulation model, the frequency at each of these units indeed increased above 60.5 Hz at
5:21:24.85 and remained above 60.5 Hz for 10 seconds.
At 05:21:34.723, the heat recovery steam unit for a generator in central Saskatchewan tripped
due to over-frequency generator protection. Because there is no waste heat bypass capabilities
on the gas turbines at this combined cycle plant, loss of the first unit resulted in the loss of five
additional units at 05:22:33. As indicated above, this generator trip should be considered a
misoperation due to a setting design deficiency.
In the simulation model, the frequency at this plant indeed increased above 60.5 Hz at 5:21:24.71
and remained above 60.5 Hz for 10 seconds.
At 05:21:34.735, a third unit tripped in the plant in southern Saskatchewan (see above at
05:21:34.723) due to over-frequency generator protection. The unit had its generator over-
frequency protection set at 60.5 Hz for 10 seconds. As indicated above, this generator trip
should be considered a misoperation due to a setting design deficiency.
In the simulation model, the frequency at this unit indeed increased above 60.5 Hz at 5:21:24.85
At 05:21:34.764, the fourth unit at the southern Saskatchewan plant (see above at 05:21:34.723
and 05:21:34.735) tripped due to over-frequency generator protection. The unit had its generator
over-frequency protection set at 60.5 Hz for 10 seconds. As indicated above, this generator trip
should be considered a misoperation due to a setting design deficiency.
In the simulation model, the frequency at this unit indeed increased above 60.5 Hz at 5:21:24.77
At 05:21:35.272, the 230 kV line between Saskatchewan and North Dakota tripped by out-of-
step relaying during the system dynamic swing initiated by the loss of the generation in southern
Saskatchewan. The line tripped at the Saskatchewan end at 5:21:35.272 and at the North Dakota
end at 5:21:35.32.
In the simulation, the apparent impedance for this line entered the inner characteristic of the out-
of-step relay at the Saskatchewan end at 5:21:35.0.
At 05:21:35.8, the 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the southeastern Twin Cities metro
to the 115 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities metro (see above at 05:21:20.440 and
05:21:20.950) automatically reclosed at the southeastern end only.
Saskatchewan Begins Separation from Manitoba and North Dakota

At 05:21:36.109, the southern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba tripped by
distance relays at both ends. Relays operated in Zone 1 for an out-of-step condition. Tripping of

Sequence of Events
this line also tripped feeder loads (approximately 68 MW) in southern Saskatchewan, as well as
the 230 kV circuit switcher at that load. At the time of the trip, the Manitoba end 230 kV bus
voltage was 79.4 kV (0.3452 pu). The line tripped at the Manitoba end at 5:21:36.109 and at the
Saskatchewan end at 5:21:36.123.
In the simulation, the apparent impedance for this line entered zone 1 at 5:21:35.85.
At 05:21:36.248, the northern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba tripped at both
ends via impedance relays in zone 1 for an out-of-step condition. At the time of the trip, the
Manitoba end 230 kV bus voltage was 60.2 kV (0.2618 pu). The line tripped at the
Saskatchewan end at 5:21:36.248 and at the Manitoba end at 5:21:36.367.
In the simulation, the apparent impedance for this line entered zone 1 at 5:21:36.0.
At 05:21:36.261, the central 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba tripped at both
ends by impedance relays that operated in zone 1 for an out-of-step condition. The line tripped
at the Manitoba end at 5:21:36.261 and at the Saskatchewan end at 5:21:36.327.
When this line tripped, it completed the isolation of Saskatchewan, forming a separate island.
At 05:21:36.674 the local 230 kV stub line at the Manitoba end of the northern tie line (a stub
line to the south) control logic reclosed a common ring breaker. This inadvertently re-energized
the northern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba from the Manitoba end.
Saskatchewan did not reclose their end. The logic that caused this re-closure has been
permanently deactivated.
At 05:21:36.691 the central 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba (see above at
05:21:36.261) auto-reclosed at both ends, in an out-of-step condition. Line dead time was
approx. 20 cycles. The Saskatchewan end reclosed at 5:21:36.691, and the Manitoba end
reclosed at 5:21:36.638. This re-closure was incorrect. The logic that resulted in re-closure has
been corrected.
At 05:21:37.027 both ends re-tripped due to an out-of-step condition. The Saskatchewan end
tripped at 5:21:37.099, and the Manitoba end tripped at 5:21:37.027.
The above sequence of tripping and reclosing is shown in Figure SoE 2 below. Voltage
remained on the line after current subsided. The voltage was oscillatory as observed on the
condensed time DFR. The line has a transformer in series with it as a part of the line at the
Saskatchewan end. Voltage oscillations continue up until the line automatically reclosed at the
Manitoba end at 05:21:36.639 as the current trace from the Manitoba end shows transformer
magnetizing current. It appears this re-closure re-energized the transformer at the Saskatchewan
end. The oscillations appear to be caused by the transformer reactance and the line capacitance
ringing.

Sequence of Events
Figure SoE 2: Saskatchewan - Manitoba 230 kV Tie Line Tripped, Reclosed and Retripped
during Out-of-Step Conditions
Saskatchewan Separation is Completed

The loss of all interconnections to Manitoba and North Dakota caused the Saskatchewan power
system to be islanded. The island was deficient in generation by about 824 MW (892 MW
generation or import – 68 MW load lost).
Frequency decayed to a low of approximately 58.43 Hz. Four of five Saskatchewan under-
frequency load shed stages were observed to operate per design. The load shed scheme tripped
about 485.5 MW of load immediately. This amounted to approximately 25.4% of the load in
Saskatchewan at the time. Saskatchewan frequency immediately began to recover. It should be
noted that some customers in Saskatchewan may have under-frequency protection applied for
protection of their equipment. Settings and operation of this equipment is unknown to the event
analysis team. It has generally been assumed that application of this type of equipment is
comparatively small in the Saskatchewan load shed scheme. Actual load lost due to under-
frequency conditions may, however, exceed expectations based on under-frequency protections
applied in Saskatchewan. It should also be noted that the large decrease in system load would be
expected to result in a significant decrease in transmission system losses.
From 05:21:37.036 to 05:21:38.490, a number of feeders throughout Saskatchewan tripped

through UFLS stages 2 and 3, resulting in the loss of about 229 MW of load.
From 05:21:38.549 to 05:21:44.939, ten feeders tripped in the Saskatchewan island with the
loss of 152 MW of load. The over-voltage protection on those feeders is typically set at 1.13 pu
for 1 second.

Sequence of Events
At 05:21:41, cogeneration units in south-central Saskatchewan tripped (over-frequency is

suspected). These units typically are generating less than the load at the site.
At 05:21:41.198, a unit at a hydro plant in northern Manitoba tripped on over-frequency. The

unit’s over-frequency protection was set for 61.0 Hz. A sister unit at the plant, with similar over-
frequency protection did not trip. The non-trip of the second unit should be considered a
misoperation, most likely due to noisy network data input to the overfrequency relay and/or relay
measurement/setting tolerances.
The five units at this plant are represented as a single lumped generator in the power flow and
dynamics models. In the dynamics simulation, the frequency of these units exceeded 61.0 Hz
only one time, during a 0.12 second period from 5:21:36.41 to 5:21:36.53. This frequency
excursion occurred during oscillations that followed the separation of Saskatchewan from
Manitoba.
At 05:21:42.39, a Twin Cities metro unit tripped on “low drum level.” the turbine-generator
increased speed from 3,600 to 3,645 rpm or about 101.2% of normal during the high frequency
conditions of the first island. The over speed condition persisted for approximately 8 minutes
until the system frequency returned to 60 Hz and the island reconnected to the Eastern
Interconnection.
The turbine-generator governor responded properly to this increase by rapidly closing down the
steam inlet valves to the turbine. This abrupt load change, about 100 MW in 24 seconds,
produced a spike increase in the unit’s boiler drum pressure, which in turn caused the indicated
drum level to decrease (“drum shrink”) below the safe operating level. This was indicated as a
trip on low drum level.
At 05:21:46.560, one of two 230 kV lines from the North Dakota - Saskatchewan tie to Regina
tripped on overvoltage at the tie line end at 05:21:46.560, and the Regina end at 05:21:46.905
due to over-voltage conditions. Tripping of the 230 kV line at Regina also resulted in
disconnecting the two lines from the Regina 138 kV bus. This occurred due to the prior outage
condition of a breaker at the Regina station. The two 138 kV lines did however remain
connected together through a 138 kV breaker at the Regina station.
By 05:21:47.047, a total of 216 MW of customer load (11.3%) in Saskatchewan had been

tripped by feeder over-voltage protection. The additional loss of load resulted in an excess of
generating capacity and, therefore, a high system frequency in Saskatchewan of approximately
60.83 Hz. It should be noted that some customers in Saskatchewan may have over-voltage
equipment protection; those settings and operation of that equipment is unknown to the event
analysis team. Actual load lost due to over voltage may exceed expectations based on over-
voltage protection applied in Saskatchewan.
At 05:22:02.348, a two-phase-to-ground fault (tree contact) reignited on the 115 kV line from
the 345 kV network in the southeastern Twin Cities metro to the 115 kV network in the eastern
Twin Cities metro (see above at 05:21:20.440, 05:21:20.950 and 05:21:35.8) (still opened-ended
at the east end). The fault was cleared at 05:22:02.411.

Sequence of Events
Simulation
Actual (DFR)
Figure SoE 3: Oscillations In Island Following 2-Phase-to-Ground Fault on

the 115 kV Line
The re-inception and clearing of this fault provided a significant jolt to the power system,
initiating oscillations within the larger island. Although the initial amplitude of the oscillations
in the simulation and recorded data is similar, the simulation model shows much better damping
and a much higher oscillation frequency than was actually recorded.
At 05:22:33, 5 additional units (gas) in the central Saskatchewan plant tripped. The loss of the
first unit (steam) at 05:21:34.723 due to over-frequency generator protection caused the tripping
of the additional units. The gas turbines tripped because there is no waste heat bypass capability
on the gas turbines at the combined cycle plant for loss of the waste heat recovery steam unit.
At 05:22:34, a hydro unit in south east Manitoba tripped. In the simulation, the frequency of this
unit increased above 60.5 Hz at about 5:21:24.9. Although the frequency remained above 60.5
Hz for much of the next minute, it did drop below 60.5 Hz at two distinct times (5:21:35 and
5:21:57). In both cases, the frequency rose back above 60.5 Hz after a few seconds.

System Event Response
R es toration
After the first island was formed at 05:21, several entities were taking action to stabilize and
reduce the high frequency condition. Companies were reducing generation and the Reliability
Coordinator requested the HVDC line in Manitoba to back down.
The North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Manitoba island was resynchronized to the rest
of the interconnection in less than 10 minutes. The island was automatically synchronized with
the closure of the 230 kV line between western North Dakota and South Dakota at 5:29:37.418
and then several more lines reclosed automatically by design.
High voltages on open-ended tie lines between Saskatchewan and Manitoba caused
misoperations of some protection schemes, hampering resynchronization of Saskatchewan to the
Eastern Interconnection. Saskatchewan was reconnected about 58 minutes after the inception of
the event when the northern 230 kV tie line between Saskatchewan and Manitoba was
successfully reclosed at about 06:20 by SCADA.
Final load restoration in Saskatchewan (estimated to be 260,000 customers) was completed by

08:41, some 3 hours and 17 minutes after the inception of the event.
The 345 kV line from the Twin Cities to Rochester was returned to service after repairs were
completed to the phase A conductor.
Review of the U.S. Restoration Process

Restoration of connections between islanded systems should always follow established
procedures in order to avoid potential equipment damage from closing into out-of-step
conditions. If Balancing Authorities or Transmission Operators have any reason to suspect that
there may be an islanding condition, they should contact the Reliability Coordinator first before
re-closing circuits. This is true even if the equipment is intra-Balancing Authority.
The team also notes that islanded operation would have been extended due to the significant
coordination that would have been needed had a controlled reconnection of the island occurred
per the PSR manual. The coordination to re-connect the island would require a conference call
between Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in both islands and identification of
actions needed to reconnect the island (i.e. the restoration manual requires that the formed island
be stable in frequency and voltage prior to reconnecting and, once the island is stable,
Transmission Operators need to agree on a point of interconnection).
Due to flows in excess of continuous ratings on two 161 kV lines in south west Wisconsin,
prolonged island operation could have resulted in further cascading, islanding, and possibly load
shed in the Western Wisconsin area.
Throughout the first several minutes of the disturbance, operators in the Dakotas were not fully
aware of the extent of the disturbance and were not aware of the islanding that had occurred.
These operators had information that a separation had occurred between North and South Dakota
but thought that they were still connected to the rest of the Eastern Interconnection.

At 05:22 the operators initiated a call to the Reliability Coordinator to determine the system
status. During the brief call, the operators were informed that there were major southward 345
kV lines out but the Reliability Coordinator didn’t confirm the islanding condition.
The operators made the decision to arm the auto-reclose scheme on the 230 kV line between
western North Dakota and South Dakota and at 05:29, this line closed automatically, paralleling
the large island with the Eastern Interconnection. The operators participated in the BLAST call
initiated by the Reliability Coordinator at 05:31 am CDT but gained very little additional
information concerning the condition of the grid. At this point the Transmission Operators in the
Dakotas continued to restore their area of responsibility.
It should be noted that the initial re-closure of the 230 kV line between western North Dakota
and South Dakota by the operators, which resynchronized the island to the Eastern
Interconnection, came about because a supervisory command had been issued and the auto-
reclose synchro-check was armed. Re-closure was successful because the two systems were
more or less at the same frequency and phase angle.
The Reliability Coordinator has indicated that given the system conditions of the island
following action in Manitoba to correct frequency, other lines, per design, would have
automatically reclosed about the same time or shortly thereafter, had the 230 kV line between
western North Dakota and South Dakota not reclosed first.
In parallel with the actions of the Transmission Operators in the Dakotas, the Reliability
Coordinator prioritized communications and emergency actions. The Reliability Coordinator
conducted several discussions with and coordinated with Transmission Operators in Minnesota
and Manitoba in the first several minutes of the event. These discussions led to island frequency
correction, enabling rapid resynchronization of the island to the Eastern Interconnection.
There was no coordinated effort to implement the restoration of the island to the Eastern
Interconnection.
At 05:25:09.961, operators reclosed the 230 kV line in central South Dakota at the northern end
via SCADA.
At 05:25:14, operators reclosed a second parallel 230 kV line in central South Dakota at the
southern end via SCADA. This restored service to the 3 MW load at the southern end.
Manitoba/Minnesota Island Reconnected to Eastern Interconnection

The initial reconnection of the Manitoba/Minnesota Island to the Eastern Interconnection
occurred when the 230 kV line between western North Dakota and South Dakota reclosed via a
supervisory control command that had armed the auto-sync-check reclosing of the line.
A breaker at the North Dakota end closed at 5:29:37.418. A supervisory command to close had
been issued moments earlier, arming the breaker close cycle on auto-sync-check. The South
Dakota end of the line had not tripped during the separation.
Closing of this line reconnected the Manitoba/Minnesota Island to the Eastern Interconnection.

Once this line was closed, several lines in Minnesota that had tripped during the separation were
returned to service automatically on sync-check supervised re-close.
At 05:30:06, The 161 kV line from Mankato to south-central Minnesota auto-reclosed by synch-
check at Mankato; the southern end had previously reclosed at 5:21:32.
At 05:30:07.862, the 115 kV line north of Sioux Falls that runs into the 115 kV network in
southeastern South Dakota was re-energized when a breaker at the southern end was closed by
operator supervisory control.
At 05:30:08, a breaker at the Rochester end closed by auto-synch check on the 161 kV line from
the 345 kV network at Rochester west to the 115 kV network in southeastern Minnesota. The
line had only tripped at the Rochester end.
At 05:30:21.555, the 115 kV line north of Sioux Falls that runs into the 115 kV network in
southeastern South Dakota (see above at 05:30:07.862) was returned to service when the breaker
at the northern end was closed by operator supervisory control.
At 5:30:25, the west segment of the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities metro to central
Wisconsin auto-synch check reclosed at the east end. The west end (Twin Cities end) of the line
had auto-reclosed after the initial tripping of the line, leaving the east end armed for auto-reclose
by synch-check.
Due to the 345 kV breaker and bus configuration, this reclosing automatically reclosed a 345/161
kV Transformer at the east end, returning it to service (the 161 kV side had not opened during
the disturbance). This reclosing also re-energized a second transformer at the east end from the
high side (the 161 kV side had tripped).
At 05:30:28.583, the 115 kV line from Duluth to northwestern Wisconsin auto-reclosed and re-
tripped at the Wisconsin end only via zone 2 distance relays.
At 05:30:32, the 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the southeast Twin Cities metro east
into Wisconsin auto-reclosed and re-tripped at the Twin Cities end only via zone 2 distance
relays.
At 05:30:37, 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities metro to the 115
kV network in the northeast Twin Cities metro synch-check auto-reclosed at the east end. The
line had not tripped at the west end, leaving it armed for auto-reclosing at the east end.
At 05:31:30, the second 345/161 kV transformer at the east end of the west segment of the 345
kV line from the Twin Cities metro to central Wisconsin was reclosed on the 161 kV side by
Transmission Operator SCADA. This reclosing returned the transformer to service because the
high side had been re-energized with the closing of the west segment of the 345 kV line from the
Twin Cities metro to central Wisconsin at 05:30:25.
At 5:32:49.634, a breaker at the southern end of the 230 kV line in central South Dakota was
closed by Transmission Operator SCADA. The north end had been reclosed by SCADA at
5:25:09.961.

At 5:32:50.660, breakers at Mankato were opened due to overloading on a 161/115 kV

transformer at Mankato. This de-energized the Mankato to south-central Minnesota 161 kV line
and the transformer (see above at 05:30:06).
At 5:32:59, the western most line of the three 345 kV lines from the coal fields of North Dakota
to eastern South Dakota was re-energized by a breaker closure by Transmission Operator
SCADA at the southern end. It returned to service at 5:32:50 when a breaker was closed at the
northern end via Transmission Operator SCADA.
At 5:34:24, the 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the southeastern Twin Cities metro to
the 115 kV network in the eastern Twin Cities metro (see above at 05:22:02.348) was re-
energized with a breaker closure at the east end via Transmission Operator SCADA. The line
was returned to service when breakers at the south end were auto-synch-check reclosed.
At 5:37:25, a breaker at Rochester was reclosed via SCADA at Rochester on the 345 kV line
from the Twin Cities to Rochester. It immediately re-tripped due to the permanent fault caused
by a failed conductor on phase A.
At 05:41:29, the 115 kV line from the 345 kV network in the southeast Twin Cities metro east
into Wisconsin (see above at 05:30:32) was reclosed via SCADA and immediately re-tripped via
zone 2 distance relays at the Twin Cities end. The Wisconsin end had remained closed during the
disturbance. At 05:42:13, a second breaker at the Twin Cities end was closed by SCADA and
held restoring the line to service.
At 05:44:23, the 115 kV line from Duluth to northwestern Wisconsin was successfully reclosed
via SCADA at the Wisconsin end restoring the line to service. The line had remained closed at
Duluth end during the disturbance.
Saskatchewan and Manitoba Attempt to Resynchronize the

Saskatchewan Island
From 05:52:36 to 06:19:41, Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan and Manitoba made
several unsuccessful attempts to resynchronize their systems. The reclosing attempts were
hampered by severe high voltage when the lines were energized but open-ended. Several
combinations of reclosing sequences were tried before they were successful.
Other restoration events continued throughout the system during this period.
At 05:52:36.396, operators in Saskatchewan attempted to synchronize to Manitoba on the

Central 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba. A breaker at the Saskatchewan end
was closed and tripped immediately due to over-voltage protection logic at the Manitoba end.
During the attempt to reclose this tie line the next segment of the line east was crossed tripped by
a relay misoperation at the Manitoba end of the tie line. After the tie line was closed at the
Saskatchewan end, open-ended voltage at the Manitoba end was too high (1.122 pu, over 258
kV, for an over-voltage relay setting of 1.085 pu). The over-voltage protection scheme was
supposed to insert a line shunt reactor (reactor was already on-line) and then transfer trip back to

the Saskatchewan end, however; at 05:52:50.499 a logic error in the over-voltage protection
scheme cross-tripped the next segment east, dropping 9 MW of load at the Manitoba end of the
tie line.
At 05:52:56.644, the tie line was transfer-tripped back to the Saskatchewan end. This was the
last procedure in the over-voltage scheme to reduce overvoltage via cross tripping the tie line.
The incorrectly crossed tripped line segment and the 9 MW of load in Manitoba were restored by
SCADA first closing the east end of the line segment at 5:54:32.533and then the west end at
5:56:49.787.
At 5:59:10.270, a 115 kV line from Huron south into the 115 kV network in southeastern South
Dakota (Sioux Falls area) (line tripped at 05:21:23.930) was returned to service via SCADA by
closing a breaker at the south end the Huron end had not tripped during the disturbance.
At 06:00:20.916, the 115 kV line from Huron south into the 115 kV network in southeastern
South Dakota (Sioux Falls area) reclosed at the south end. The line had auto reclosed at the
Huron end at 5:21:24.179.
At 06:00:41.000, Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan attempted to synchronize to

Manitoba on the northern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The breaker at the
Saskatchewan end did not close and the attempt failed. At 06:01:43.000, Transmission
Operators in Saskatchewan again attempted to synchronize to Manitoba on the northern 230 kV
tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba. This time, a second breaker at the Saskatchewan end
did not close and the attempt failed.
At 06:03:48.000, the east segment of 345 kV line from Twin Cities metro to central Wisconsin
was re-energized by closing a breaker at the west end via SCADA, a breaker at the east end
remained open.
At 06:06:40.022, the southern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba was reenergized
from the Saskatchewan end, but re-tripped due to over-voltage protection at the Manitoba end.
During the attempt to reclose the southern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba, at
6:06:45.306, over-voltage protection logic at the Manitoba end correctly tripped a breaker on the
next 230 kV line segment east causing this line to be open-ended and de-energized the 230 kV
switchyard at the Manitoba end of the tie line. No load was interrupted because it was being fed
by the 69 kV network.
When the southern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba was reenergized from the
Saskatchewan end at 06:06:40.022, the open-ended voltage at the Manitoba end was too high
(1.178 pu, over 271 kV). The over-voltage protection setting of 1.100 pu was exceeded. This
condition was supposed to initiate a shunt reactor insertion (the reactor was already on line), and
then transfer trip back to the Saskatchewan end. The over-voltage protection logic operated
correctly. A cross-trip signal was sent to the Saskatchewan end to reopen the southern 230 kV
tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba at 6:06:47.389.

At 06:08:59, the east segment of the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities metro to central
Wisconsin was closed by SCADA at the east end restoring the line to service. The west end had
previously been reclosed at 6:03:48 by SCADA.
At 06:09:16.000, Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan initiated a second attempt to

reenergize the southern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba. This left the line open-
ended at the Manitoba end
Transmission Operators in Manitoba manual synch-check a breaker at the Manitoba end to close
at 06:09:21.514 (initiated at 6:09:10.896), reestablishing part of the 230 kV and 69 kV networks
in southwest Manitoba
The 230 kV load transformer at the Manitoba end of the tie line was tripped at 06:09:26.231 by
over-voltage protection although the bus voltages were normal. The over-voltage protection
scheme uses the tie line PT as the voltage source, although that line was open-ended at the
Manitoba end. The 230 kV station at the Manitoba end of the tie line completely tripped open.
At 06:09:28.381, the southern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba re-tripped at the
Saskatchewan end via transfer trip from the Manitoba end over-voltage protection scheme that
used the open-ended line’s PT. Open-ended voltage on the line at the Manitoba end rose above
271 kV (1.180 pu). The over-voltage protection setting of 1.100 pu has 5 second time delay plus
about 2 seconds for transfer trip.
At 06:13:25.284, Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan closed the Saskatchewan end of the

central 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba in a second attempt to reclose the line.
The open-ended voltage at the Manitoba end was too high (1.116 pu, over 256 kV). The over-
voltage protection setting of 1.085 pu was exceeded, which was supposed to initiate a shunt
reactor insertion (reactor was already on line), and then transfer trip back to the Saskatchewan
end. However, a logic error in the over-voltage protection scheme inadvertently cross-tripped the
next segment east, dropping 9 MW of load at the Manitoba end of the tie line a second time.
At 06:13:46.889, the tie line was transfer-tripped as the last step in the over-voltage protection
scheme.
The incorrectly crossed tripped line segment and the 9 MW of load in Manitoba were restored by
SCADA first closing the east end of the line segment at 6:14:41.102 and then the west end at
6:16:30.829.
At 06:17:46.000, the Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan attempted to synchronize to

Manitoba on the northern 230 kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba a third time. The
breaker at the Saskatchewan end did not close and the attempt failed.
Saskatchewan Resynchronized to Manitoba

After several unsuccessful reclosing attempts, the Saskatchewan island was resynchronized to
Manitoba and the rest of the Eastern Interconnection at about 06:20 when the northern 230 kV tie
between Saskatchewan and Manitoba was successfully reclosed by SCADA.

At 06:19:41.715, Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan successfully closed the northern 230

kV tie between Saskatchewan and Manitoba at the Saskatchewan end by SCADA. Manitoba
Transmission Operators had reclosed the Manitoba end earlier.
Reclosing this line successfully resynchronized Saskatchewan to the Eastern Interconnection.
At 06:26:25, the north end of the 345 kV line from northwest Wisconsin to central Wisconsin
was closed by SCADA, reenergizing the line and the 345/161 kV Transformer at the north end.
The south end of the line remained closed during the disturbance.
At 06:36:05.527, Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan energized the line from the North
Dakota - Saskatchewan tie to Regina from the Regina end.
At 06:36:10.331, the line tripped at the Regina end due to over-voltage conditions at the open-
ended south end.
At 06:47:13.574, the tie line between Ontario and Manitoba was reenergized from the Manitoba
end by Transmission Operators in Manitoba. Transmission Operators in Ontario then closed the
Ontario end with an 11 kV voltage differential.
At 07:02:00, the 115 kV tie line between Minnesota and Ontario was returned to service when
the Transmission Operators in Minnesota re-closed the Minnesota end. The Ontario 115 kV end
had remained closed during the disturbance.
Before 7:37:41, all 66 kV feeder breakers at the Manitoba end of the southern Saskatchewan to
Manitoba tie line had been tripped open. At 7:37:41.614, the 230/66 kV transformers were re-
energize via a 230 kV breaker closure to the 230 kV line to the east of the station. At
7:44:05.650 the Saskatchewan to Manitoba tie line was re-energize from the Manitoba end. At
7:44:43.452 the remaining 230 kV line out of the Manitoba station was returned to service.
At 07:45:29.692, the Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan reclosed the southern

Saskatchewan to Manitoba tie line from the Saskatchewan end. Transmission Operators in
Manitoba had successfully energized the line at the Manitoba end at 07:44:05.650. At 07:46:43,
Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan closed the low side circuit switcher at a midpoint
terminal on the tie line energizing the 230/72 kV transformer and proceeded to pick up the feeder
loads. The 230 kV side had been reclosed at 07:45:26.262 before the 230 kV was returned to
service.
At 07:49:13.301, Transmission Operators in Saskatchewan re-energized the central

Saskatchewan to Manitoba tie line via SCADA from the Saskatchewan end. Transmission
Operators in Manitoba successfully closed the Manitoba end of the tie line at 7:51:41.308
returning the line to service.
At 08:42:34, the North Dakota to Saskatchewan tie line was re-energized from the North Dakota
end via SCADA 08:30:21, energizing the line to Saskatchewan. Breaker closure by SCADA at
8:42:34 returned the circuit to service.

Reclosing this line completed the reconnection of Saskatchewan to the rest of the Eastern
Interconnection.
Between 13:48:12 and 13:50:07, the 230 kV line to Regina was returned to service and the
Regina switchyard reset to pre-event configuration.
08: 41 — F inal load R es toration in S as katc hewan

Final load restoration in Saskatchewan (estimated to be 260,000 customers) was completed by
08:41 CDT, 3 hours, 17 minutes after the inception of the event.
At 17:21:00 The 345 kV line from the Twin Cities to Rochester was returned to service after
repairs were completed to the phase A conductor.
The Saskatchewan Internal Recovery Process

The MRO Event Analysis Team did not study the system restoration process within
Saskatchewan in depth. An internal report prepared by SaskPower detailed their restoration
efforts during the event.

R es toration Obs ervations and R ec ommendations

System Restoration Manual and Procedures
During the September 18 event, one of the on-duty Reliability Coordinators performed a
transmission system assessment and identified system islanding. The Reliability Coordinator
then started BLAST call communication. The process for interconnecting an island was not
followed properly. There was no communication for island interconnection and the
interconnection checklist was not utilized. The various Transmission Operators and Reliability
Coordinators were at different levels of awareness regarding the state of the system. One
Transmission Operator spoke with a Reliability Coordinator who was not yet aware of an
islanding condition. The senior Reliability Coordinator recognized the islanding conditions
immediately, however, conditions were changing rapidly and the Reliability Coordinator staff
did not have the opportunity to compare notes on the system configuration. Transmission
Operators did not contact the Reliability Coordinator regarding the closing of the 230 kV line in
western North Dakota to South Dakota since they were under the impression that their system
was not straddling an islanding condition.
The Event Analysis Team made specific recommendations on these findings.
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators in MRO review procedures and monitoring to

ensure that identification of an islanding condition is communicated to all system operators
without undue delay.
restoration procedures to assure that the coordinated plans minimize adverse conditions during
restoration (e.g., adverse flows, equipment damage, delays), particularly when reconnecting from
islanded conditions.
system restoration procedures to assure that they have flexibility and adaptability for multiple
scenarios, including non-worst case situations, i.e., other than a blackout condition.
It is suggested that interconnection between islands should follow the appropriate procedure for
interconnection described in the system restoration manual. If Balancing Authorities have any
reason to suspect that there may be an islanding condition, they should contact the Reliability
Coordinator first before re-closing circuits. This is true even if the equipment is intra-Balancing
Authority.
The team also notes that had a controlled reconnection of the island occurred according to the
PSR manual, island operation would have been extended due to the significant coordination that
would have been needed. The coordination to re-connect the island would require a conference
call between Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in both islands and identification
of actions needed to reconnect the island (i.e. the restoration manual requires that the formed
island be stable in frequency and voltage prior to reconnecting and, once the island is stable,
Transmission Operators need to agree on a point of interconnection). The Reliability
Coordinators would also be involved in the coordination of the island closing process during
restoration.

S ys tem E vent R es pons e

The frequency of the Eastern Interconnection and the first island (Minnesota-Manitoba) was
recorded by the Virginia Tech FNet system frequency data recorders (FDRs). Unfortunately,
there were no FDRs in the Saskatchewan island. Figure SER 1 clearly shows the island
separation and reconnection. It also shows the frequency recovery of the Eastern Interconnection
and the return of the island to near 60 Hz, which enabled the reconnection.
Minnesota/Manitoba
Island Frequency
Eastern Interconnection
Frequency
Figure SER 1: Frequency of Eastern Interconnection and First Island
The NERC Resources Subcommittee will be conducting additional analysis of the frequency
response aspects of the September 18, 2007 disturbance.
Primary Governor Response

For many years, dynamics models have been known to overestimate generator governing
response. This overestimation is particularly pertinent to the September 18, 2007 event, where
the dynamic analysis suggests that actual on-line governing response is only about 20% of the
response presumed by dynamics modeling. Figure SER 2 below shows that simulated generator
response had to be reduced by 80% of the original model in order to achieve correlation.
The discrepancy between modeled and actual governor response can be attributed to two
possibilities: the models themselves are in error and/or the actual governor response has
deteriorated significantly from expected behavior. The magnitude of the discrepancy is serious
and can lead to overly optimistic system performance results in dynamics studies.

Actual (DFR)
Simulation with 20%

governor response
Simulation with
original modeled
governor response
Figure SER 2: Effect of Governing Response on Dorsey Frequency
Recommendation: That the NERC Resources Committee review the primary governor response
on the Eastern Interconnection.

Power Flow and Dynamic Analysis
P ower F low and Dynamic A nalys is

Power Flow Case Creation and Benchmarking
Power flow and dynamics analysis were used to simulate the event. This analysis was useful to
estimate quantities that were not directly measured and for gaining an understanding of the
interaction of system components in the sequence of events. Wherever possible, the power flow
and dynamics models were benchmarked to measured system quantities.
Power Flow Model

In the course of creating the power flow model, it was found that many distribution sites in the
Twin Cities area had a leading power factor, even at the sub transmission level. It is believed
that this condition is the result of distribution capacitors switching in on a timed schedule early in
the morning in anticipation of morning load pickup.
It took several months to build a power flow model that both represented system conditions in
and near the MRO region at the start of the disturbance and was compatible with dynamics
modeling data. Furthermore, errors in the translation of system condition information into the
model were repeatedly discovered throughout the course of the study. An efficient translation of
power system telemetry data from EMS systems to dynamics study models does not exist. The
fact that the situation has not improved since the August 14, 2003 blackout study indicates that
the utilities have not fully implemented the tenets of NERC Blackout Recommendation 24 from
August 14, 2003 which states:
“The regional reliability councils shall within one year establish and begin
implementing criteria and procedures for validating data used in power flow
models and dynamic simulations by benchmarking model data with actual system
performance. Validated modeling data shall be exchanged on an inter-regional
basis as needed for reliable system planning and operation.”
Recommendation: That the Reliability Coordinators in MRO develop a process to efficiently

translate power system telemetry data from state estimator and SCADA system historical data
into power flow and dynamics study models (system snapshots) for use in event analysis and
modeling benchmarks.
Power Flow Analysis

The sequence of events between 5:14 AM and 5:21:20 AM was simulated using power flow
analysis. Initially, a constant PQ load model (constant real and reactive power) was used;
however, the power flow solution failed to converge after the events between 5:16 and 5:16:30.
To perform the analysis, the load model typically used for dynamics (generally 100% constant
current for real power, 100% constant impedance for reactive power) was used. This load model
was supplemented with an LTC tap changing model to approximate LTC tap actions. The
actions were approximated as occurring about one minute after significant events.

The lack of convergence with the standard power flow load model suggests voltage collapse, but
some LTC changes actually increased critical sub transmission bus voltages as some distribution
stations had load with a leading factor, as noted above. Operators were switching in capacitors
during this time as well. The modeling and simulation team thus concluded that there was not a
voltage collapse during this time period (5:17 to 5:21); rather, there was a voltage depression (the
voltage did not run away).
The power flow model obtained at the end of the analysis was used as the starting point for the
dynamics analysis beginning at 5:21:20. Another dynamics simulation was also performed for
the time period between 5:16:00 and 5:16:30 by using the 5:16:00 power flow model.
Dynamic Analysis
The simulation of the fast cascade was done by a transient stability study with key system
responses (frequency, major line flows, major station voltages) being benchmarked against
actual system values. This work highlights model deficiencies and provides important
corrections to the initial sequence of events.
Dynamics analysis was applied to two time periods: the time period from 5:16:00 to 5:16:30 and
the time period from 5:21:20 to 5:22:40, which modeled the formation of the islands in the MRO
region.
At the time this disturbance analysis began, the available dynamics model for the Eastern
Interconnection was found to be deficient. The representation for one area in this case was found
to be several years out of date and represented units that were retired well before the September
18, 2007 disturbance. Many machine models were missing or out of date. Numerous additional
errors were found as well.
Other issues were present in the dynamics data itself, including the presence of several classical
machine models for small generators that modeled infinite inertia. Many models for wind farms
were questionable (classical generators), and most did not represent any of the low voltage and
high frequency relays that tripped the turbines during the disturbance. One HVDC model was
implemented in a non-standard fashion, which caused confusion. Many of these errors have
been perpetuated through the MMWG process and have persisted for years. To proceed with the
study, the data was adjusted by comparing it with similar machine models that worked properly.
Consequently a study of generator governing response and inter-area oscillations could not be
completed in a timely fashion for this report.
Some of the wind models do not self-initialize; that is, the dynamics models do not calculate the
initial state values for the model internally and instead rely on an external program to calculate
these values.
Large numbers of capacitors switch automatically within 10 to 15 seconds of detection of voltage

changes, however; these capacitor control systems are not represented in the dynamics models
nor are dynamics models readily available. (The fast switched capacitors, which operate within
approximately 1 second, are represented.)

Some of the issues that must be addressed are:

• The generator dynamics models should initialize error-free for any dispatch within the
stated power flow limits of the unit.
• No deviations from the starting state should be present after a 20 second simulation with
no disturbances (no-fault test).
• The power system model should return to essentially the pre-disturbance equilibrium
approximately 60 seconds after a mild disturbance with no switching (disturbance test).
The Event Analysis Team made specific recommendations on these findings
Recommendation: That NERC, the Regional Entities, Planning Authorities, and Reliability
Coordinators develop a method to thoroughly review and check data for interconnection-wide
power system dynamic models for data errors – review and correct data errors with owners, and
disseminate corrections to planners, transmission operators, and reliability coordinators
throughout the interconnection.
Recommendation: That NERC work with the Planning Authorities and wind model developers to
include the initialization calculations in the models and make them suitable for case libraries.
Recommendation: That Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators include dynamic

models of the capacitor switching controls in the transient stability models where appropriate.
This information should be available to planning authorities and reliability coordinators
throughout the Eastern Interconnection for proper modeling in operational dynamic studies.
Power Flow and Dynamics Analysis Findings

Some significant discrepancies between the modeled system response and the measured system
response were observed. The reasons for and impacts of these discrepancies are still being
studied and they will be addressed in a supplemental report.
• Although some capacitors switched out in the Twin Cities between 5:18 and 5:21, it was
not possible to remove these capacitors in the study model because the voltage and
reactive flow profiles began to deviate significantly from measurements.
• The measured effects of the 161 kV line from the 345 kV network at Rochester west to
the 115 kV network in southeastern Minnesota line trip on power flows and voltages did
not correlate well with the modeled response. In particular, the increase in real power
flow on the Mankato to south-central Minnesota 161 kV line is too large in the simulation
when compared to DFR data.
• It was necessary to reduce load by about 100 MW in Minnesota to improve simulated

frequency correlation to measured frequency around 05:21:24.
• The model showed significant overvoltage conditions following the separation in

southern Minnesota; the measured voltage rise was not nearly as large.

• The measured output of an SVC in northern Minnesota did not track the modeled
response. The parameters for the SVC in the starting dynamics model produced a
response that was not representative of the actual behavior of the device. Parameter
adjustments were made in order to obtain a more suitable response. In addition, the SVC
model does not represent the overload limiter function that clips the SVC output after
sustained high output for 10 seconds.
• The DCAR relay activated more than 1.75 seconds earlier in the dynamics simulation
than actually occurred during the disturbance.
There have been issues on time resolution. For example, the 161 kV line from the 345 kV
network at Rochester west to the 115 kV network in southeastern Minnesota trip has a big impact
on the simulation and no DFR recording of the event was available. The timing had to be
inferred from records at other stations.
There is a need to estimate governor response that isn’t available. The models tend to over-
estimate governing and there is a lack of data on which units had active governing. There is too
much response to high frequency resulting in a lower peak in the simulation than shown on the
system recordings.
Recommendation: That NERC initiate a dynamic model validation regime of the generators and
other dynamic responsive equipment to benchmark the models against observed behavior during
system disturbances.
Post-Event Analysis on MWSI Limit

Normal Contingency Consideration
The purpose of this analysis was to calculate and verify the MWSI flowgate limit on September
18, 2007 during the various stages of system conditions. This analysis was undertaken using the
system models refined during the modeling and simulation phases of this event analysis.
The MWSI IROL is made up of two 345 kV lines, the first runs south out of the Twin Cities to
Rochester, the second (a two segment line) runs from the Twin Cities east into central
Wisconsin. Prior to the start of the event, MWSI IROL would have been 1,700 MW. The IROL
is limited by undesired tripping of a 115 kV line which also runs from the Twin Cities into
Wisconsin for the loss of the 345 kV line into Wisconsin. Since the 115 kV line is key to the
determination of the IROL, operations should prevent against tripping this critical element if the
345 kV line trips.
The 345 kV line from the Twin Cities to Rochester tripped at 05:14:53. At that time, the MWSI
limit would have been 650 MW. This limit is necessary to prevent the possibility of tripping of
the 115 kV line for loss of the 345 kV line into Wisconsin as well as preventing a potential∆P
relay operation that would trip the 230 kV tie lines between Manitoba and Ontario.

At 05:15:30, the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities to Wisconsin tripped. At this time, the MWSI
flowgate flow measurement went to 0 MW and the MWSI flowgate could no longer be utilized
to monitor system reliability.
At 06:08:59, the east segment of the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities to Wisconsin was
restored. Post-event stability simulation shows that MWSI flowgate limit would have been 750
MW. The analysis shows that generation being on-line near the east end of the line allowed the
higher transfer across the MWSI flowgate (higher than 650 MW) because it reduces the amount
of energy that flows across the 115 kV line. That 750 MW limit would have been applicable
until the time the 345 kV line from the Twin Cities to Rochester was restored at 17:21:00. On
September 18 a limit of 650 MW was used in this time period.
The following table shows the summary of the applicable MWSI limits.
Violation Observed
Limiting
Time MWSI Limit when MWSI flow is
Contingency
Above Limit
Pre-event limit (prior to
345 kV line from the Trip 115 kV line from
Twin Cities to Rochester
IROL – 1,700 MW Twin Cities to Twin Cities to Wisconsin
345 kV line trip at
Wisconsin trip on zone 2
05:14:53)
Trip 115 kV line from
345 kV line from the
Twin Cities to Wisconsin
05:14:53 – 05:15:30 650 MW Twin Cities to
on zone 2 along with 69
Wisconsin trip
kV underlying lines
MWSI is not the
05:15:30 – 06:08:59
applicable flowgate
Trip 115 kV line from
345 kV line from the
Twin Cities to Wisconsin
06:08:59 – 17:21:00 750 MW Twin Cities to
on zone 2 along with 69
Wisconsin trip
kV underlying lines
Due to the time needed to run a stability study, the Reliability Coordinators and the Transmission
Operators did not recalculate the MWSI dynamic limit between 05:14:53 – 05:15:30. However,
the 650 MW limit is consistent with the limit used by Reliability Coordinators and the
Transmission Operators during the September 18 event between 06:08:59 and when the 345 kV
line from the Twin Cities to Rochester was restored at 17:21:00.
The post-event analysis showed that if the 115 kV line from the Twin Cities to Wisconsin could
have been kept within its short term emergency rating, cascading outages and uncontrolled
separation would not have occurred.
N-2 Contingency Consideration

A loss of the Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV and Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV is not
normally run in the operational study as there is no known common mode between the two
facilities. However, this disturbance revealed an underlying protection-based linkage that

resulted in a near-simultaneous loss of those system elements. To determine the applicable limit
for that situation, the simultaneous opening of both 345 kV lines was studied.
To protect for this N-2 case, the MWSI limit would have been 1,050 MW. Flows above 1,050
MW would cause an undesired tripping of the 115 kV line from the Twin Cities to Wisconsin on
zone 2 protection. This limit is significantly lower than the 1,700 MW IROL calculated above.
Potential Lessons Learned

During the post-event analysis, detailed relay models were added for the underlying system
along the Minnesota-Wisconsin border. The original model had generalized relay characteristics
for those lines. Utilizing the generalized relay characteristics could result in an incorrect MWSI
limit. The detailed relay models have now been incorporated in the dynamic model used by the
Reliability Coordinator for operational analysis.
In addition, the detailed relay model on the Manitoba Ontario interface was not appropriate. The
study package sets the ∆P relay setting assuming that both phase shifters are in service at all
times (there is an interface limit based on a change of 100 MW). During the September 18
disturbance, one of the phase shifters was not in service and the package could have been
programmed to automatically adjust the∆P relay setting. The study package results in a more
pessimistic result where the relay trips with ∆P
a o f 5 0 MW wh ereas, in reality, th e ∆P relay
would have tripped for changes of 100 MW.
Recommendation: That Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators in MRO and NPCC
modify the representation of the∆P limit between Manitoba and Ontario, as a function of the
number of phase shifters in service and recognizing other pertinent system conditions. This
information should be available to planning authorities and reliability coordinators throughout
the Eastern Interconnection for proper modeling in operational dynamic studies.
Sensitivity Analysis
The following information on sensitivities was current as of October 31, 2008
As part of the Modeling Sub team’s analysis, multiple sensitivity studies were identified by the
Operation Analysis Sub team to determine the affect of significant system changes during the
September 18, 2007 event. These sensitivities were either prior outages or line trips that occurred
during the first two minutes of the event.
Arrowhead – Stone Lake 345 kV Line Addition

The Arrowhead – Stone Lake 345 kV line was under construction when the September 18th event
occurred. A sensitivity study was done to determine the effects on the system had this line been
in service.
There was a significant reduction in all of the key flows with the Arrowhead – Stone Lake line in
service. At these reduced flow levels, zone 2 relays will not pick up on any of these lines and the
cascading tripping of September 18th would likely have been avoided.

345/115 kV transformer in service at Generation Plant in East Twin Cities Metro

A 345/115 kV transformer at a generation plant on the east side of the Twin Cities metro area
was out of service on September 18th due to a failure, which occurred in January 2007. While it
is not likely that this transformer could have been replaced by September 18th, a sensitivity
analysis was run to determine this outage’s effect on the event.
The additional 345 kV source at the plant drastically off-loads the two 115 kV lines feeding the
plant substation. During the disturbance, one of the 115 kV lines tripped due to a relay
misoperation at the plant station. The relay scheme was susceptible to misoperation in the
presence of current over 1,600 amps. With the transformer in service, the resulting flow on the
115 kV line is well below the unsupervised overcurrent setting of 1,600 amps, making it unlikely
that the line would have tripped. Also, the flow on a remote 115 kV line is well below its normal
rating, which indicates it would likely not trip due to excessive sag into a tree as it did on
September 18th.
However, the flow into Wisconsin on the 345 kV path increases due to the stronger 345 kV
source at the plant and is heavily overloaded. The 115 kV line from Duluth to northern
Wisconsin is also extremely overloaded. The impedance trajectories for these two lines do not
get into their respective zone 2 mho circles at these flow levels. It is unlikely that the system
could have been operated at this point for very long.
Mankato to Southern Minnesota 345 kV Line Outage

A sensitivity study was done to determine the effects on the system had this line been in service.
Line flows are relatively unchanged between the two cases, but the case with the line in-service
did not indicate line trips other than the two 345 kV lines and the next line a 69 kV line. To
investigate this further, dynamic simulation was needed.
The minor reduction in flows seen on the fourth line to trip, the 115 kV between the Twin Cities
and Wisconsin, when the Mankato to southern Minnesota 345 kV line is in-service is just enough
to keep the impedance trajectory outside the zone 2 mho circle. The change between cases was
less than 4%. While tripping would not occur at this point, any increase in flow on the 115 kV
line would surely result in this line tripping on zone 2 relay operation.
The Mankato to southern Minnesota line outage had minimal effect (2-4.5% change) on the post-
contingent line flows after the initial 345 kV line trips. Considering this small change, it was
determined that the line outage was a minimal factor in the events of September 18th.
Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV Tripping on Relay Misoperation

The Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line trip 30 seconds after the Twin Cities to Rochester 345
kV line had a large impact on the progression of events on September 18th. A sensitivity study
was done to see the resulting line flows had the second 345 kV line not tripped. The sensitivity
program indicated that no trips would have occurred after the initial 345 kV line tripping.

Had the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV not tripped the resulting flow on all of the bulk lines
from Minnesota – Wisconsin were below their normal ratings. At these levels, none of these
lines should have tripped and further cascading would not have occurred.
230 kV Bus Outage in West Central Minnesota

Several 230 kV lines terminate at the subject bus in west central Minnesota. Two 230 kV lines,
and a 230/115 kV transformer were all out of service on September 18th.
For the bus in-service, the tripping sequence and line flows at the time of trip are basically
unchanged from the base case. This minimal effect on line flows shows that the bus outage had
almost no impact on the events of September 18th. It is likely that the event would have
progressed similarly even if the bus had been in service.
115 kV Line in the Northeast Twin Cities Metro Not Tripping on Unsupervised
Overcurrent
A sensitivity analysis was run without the line trip at 5:16:02.584 to analyze the system response,
particularly the post-contingent line flow on the next 115 kV line which tripped on September
18th due to a tree contact when it was heavily overloaded as a result of the subject 115 kV line
trip. Even without the subject line tripping, the 69 kV ties to Wisconsin will still trip by zone 2
relay. This isn’t surprising, since the subject line is not a direct parallel path for any of these
circuits.
With the line staying in service, the flow on the subsequent 115 kV line reduces considerably to
below its normal rating. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that the line would have sagged
into a tree, however; multiple other lines are overloaded over 160% of their respective normal
ratings. At these high flow levels, it is unlikely that the system could be reliably operated for any
extended period of time.
HVdc Runback
The modeling and simulation team noted that a fast dc runback would have made a big
difference in this event. Such a procedure would need to be automatic, not manual, due to the
short amount of time in which it must take place.

Operational Analysis
Operational A nalys is
Operating Guides
In normal operations, the Reliability Coordinator and its Transmission Operators work together
to create operating guidelines for their system operators. The operating guides are classified into
three different categories:
• Standing Operating Guide
• Temporary Operating Guide
• Emergency Operating Guide
Standing Operating Guides are reviewed by the Reliability Coordinator and the appropriate
Operating Review Working Group. This type of guide is standing and permanent for a
significant length of time. Standing guides go through annual review and five-year review.
Temporary Operating Guides are reviewed by the Reliability Coordinator and the appropriate
Operating Review Working Group. This type of guide is temporary and not permanent. It is
often put in place due to planned or forced outages.
Emergency Operating Guides are written by the Reliability Coordinator in response to forced
outages. This type of guide is temporary and not permanent. It is often put in place due to forced
outages.
Operating Guide Development

The operating guide development includes:
• Identification of the need of standing, temporary or emergency operating guidelines
• Coordination of operating guide development
• Approval and acceptance of operating guide from the Reliability Coordinator, impacted
Transmission Operator, and the appropriate Subcommittees and Working Groups.
Reliability Coordinator Procedures – Outage Management

The Reliability Coordinator employs its manual for “outage operations” which describes the
process of outage coordination.
The normal process for transmission outage submittal is:
All Transmission Operators must submit their long-term planned maintenance outage schedules
for transmission facilities 100 kV and above to the Reliability Coordinator for a minimum of a
rolling one-year period. These plans must be submitted as planned outages and updated on a
quarterly basis.
Transmission Operators must submit outage schedules for facilities less than 100 kV if such
facilities are modeled in the Reliability Coordinators node-breaker Network Model in order to

facilitate better representation of the system topology. These outages will be evaluated to
determine if the outage request will result in unreliable system conditions.
Each outage is evaluated in the context of all other outages present in the outage scheduler for
the day in question.
The off line PSS/E security assessment for the next-day uses projected peak loads with the
scheduled transfers and expected generation pattern. An additional forward-looking analysis is
performed using early morning off-peak load and morning-peak load. These analyses include
PV analysis for stability interfaces.
In the real time environment, the Reliability Coordinator utilizes EMS to monitor and assess the
system. There are different types of assessments performed during the Real Time horizon to
determine reliability of the system. These assessments include:
• Real Time Alarming function that monitors the pre contingency state of the
system
• Real Time Contingency Analysis that monitors the post contingency state of the
system
• Real Time P-V Analysis is also done to determine the margin on voltage stability
in the stability interfaces.
Applicable Guides
During the September 18 islanding event the Standing Operating Guides and appropriate
Temporary Operating Guides were available to the operators.
There were no Emergency Operating Guides issued during the event due to the short time
available in which to develop an emergency guide. The Reliability Coordinator log shows that
the Transmission Operator and the Reliability Coordinator performed a study following the rapid
restoration of the North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota and Manitoba island and determined
the MWSI limit to be 650 MW with the Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV line out of service.
System conditions at the time of the event were within the limits proscribed in the guides.
Communications
The 9-18 Operational Analysis team examined inter-control center voice, MCN, and RCIS
communications that occurred just prior to, during, and post the 9-18 event. At the time of the
analysis, the team felt that written transcripts of voice recordings were unnecessary.
To complete the analysis, the team reviewed the voice recordings at their respective control
centers and paraphrased the conversations, and in some instances, discussed the conversation(s)
with participating operators from which to gain additional understanding. The conversations
were synchronized with the sequence of events to allow the team to judge the current system
situation vs. the operator discussions.

Communications and Operator Actions Highlights

Review of the communications reveal that prior to the event, the operator activity was typical for
an early morning business day. System Operators were discussing and performing scheduled
switching, informing neighboring control centers in regards to work planned for the day, etc.
Between 05:14 and 05:18 Transmission Operators began calling neighboring System Operators,
the nature of the calls was to make each aware of the 345 kV line trips, and the current status of
the lines. Other System Operators began to call each other inquiring to the nature and status of
the system. Several conversations indicated that System Operators were putting capacitor banks
in-service to return voltage to near nominal levels.
Most control centers were in the midst of shift change during the event. This made additional
operators available to assess and handle telephone calls. At 05:18:40, a transmission operator in
Minnesota called the transmission operator in Wisconsin to notify them that they were opening a
345 kV tie in northern Wisconsin. A second System Operator in Minnesota opened the tie in the
midst of the conversation.
During a conversation between the Reliability Coordinator and the Transmission Operator in
Wisconsin, they discussed lines that tripped and scheduled outages. Transmission Operator
suggested that separation had occurred, the Reliability Coordinator states Minnesota-Iowa
separation, however, did not mention total separation (this conversation took place just prior to
separation; the team believes that the system was still tied via the WAPA system.)
05:21-05:22 Separation and Islanding occurred during this period
Transmission Operator in Minnesota called their merchant to start CT’s in Wisconsin to support
Northwest Wisconsin, during the call the frequency increased. Systems separated. They discuss
the frequency increase, and the output drop of plants in central Minnesota. Decide against
ramping units back up due to system frequency.
A Hydro Generation Operator (GOP) in the Dakotas called its Balancing Authority Operator,
notifying them that the hydro unit condensed (went to zero output). The Balancing Authority
Operator instructed the GOP to return the unit to service and to load to 81 MW. The Balancing
Authority Operator also informed the GOP that the balancing area was changed to constant tie
line control, and was off bias/frequency control.
At about this time, the Reliability Coordinator staff that was not participating in this call
recognized that separation and islanding had occurred.
A Transmission System Operator in Northern Minnesota immediately recognized islanding due

to a frequency of 60.8 Hz and output at a plant in north east North Dakota dropping by 300 MW.
The Transmission System Operator contacted several large Generating stations in North Dakota
and recommended that the GOP do whatever was needed to stay on-line.
Between 05:22 and 05:25 Transmission Operators discuss initiating a run back of the North
Dakota to Twin Cities HVdc Bipole. The call was regarding balancing the dc line with the
generating units that had already ramped down. A Transmission Operator in Minnesota called

Manitoba Hydro and recommended runback of 500 MW. They then immediately called the
Reliability Coordinator to recommend Manitoba Hydro runback.
Between 05:25 and 05:27 the Balancing Authority Operator directed the North Dakota Hydro
GOP to return its plant to AGC. The return of the system frequency to below 60 HZ was noted.
In another conversation the Reliability Coordinator indicated they were attempting to increase
generation and re-confirmed that system separation and islanding had occurred.
At 5:29:37.418 the 230 kV line in western North Dakota and South Dakota, closed and the
island was reconnected to the Eastern Interconnection.
The BLAST call was initiated by the Reliability Coordinator at 05:31.
The call got off to an unsystematic start. After roll call a brief inaccurate description of the
separation was given, this was followed by a comment period. In general, the comments were in
reference to problem solving rather than a systematic discussion of system status. The call was
then interrupted by the Senior Reliability Coordinator and an accurate description of the island
and lines defining the boundary followed. Then an organized discussion period was held. At
this time, the Reliability Coordinator learned of the separation of SPC from Manitoba and North
Dakota. At this point, an Operator put his phone on hold to accept an incoming call and a
recorded company advertisement began playing. An effort was made to talk over the noise but
was difficult for the participants to communicate, moreover, several operators did not put their
phones on mute and inter-control center talk was picked up, adding to the confusion. The
Reliability Coordinator eventually terminated the call and said they would contact operators
individually. There was no post-event discussion to ascertain the status of each company and
identify any remaining issues.
05:48-05:57
Manitoba and Saskatchewan Transmission Operators communicated and proceeded with
restoration of the tie lines. An attempt was made to energize the ties from Saskatchewan. The
lines consequently tripped by over voltage. The Saskatchewan Operator stated that over voltage
was a high concern on their system due to loss of load. Voltages of 260 kV to 277 kV were
reported at their Manitoba interface stations. The Saskatchewan Operator reported that because
of local problems the southern 230 kV tie line could not be restored at this time. The Manitoba
Operator requested that Saskatchewan lower their voltage. There was some mis-communication
here.
N-2 Considerations for Stability Limited Interfaces

The Twin Cities area has three 345 kV lines leading east and south into Wisconsin and Iowa. On
September 18 one of those lines was out of service and no study was made for concurrent loss of
the other two.
The near-simultaneous loss of the Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV line and the Twin Cities to
Wisconsin 345 kV line is not a contingency that would normally be studied in planning or
normal operating studies because there is no apparent, direct physical or electrical linkage

between the lines. However, because the Mankato to southern Minnesota 345 kV line was out of
service, it would have been prudent to analyze such an outage combination, not because it was
anyway more likely to occur, but because the potential consequences might be far more severe
and unacceptable. In figure OA 1 below, the planned outage of the Mankato to southern
Minnesota 345 kV line moves the risk level from the lower left quadrant toward the upper left
quadrant.
Figure OA 1: Risk Assessment Management
Such risk evaluation for abnormal operating conditions is even more critical where the interface,
such as the MWSI, is stability limited. Understanding the severity of the consequences cannot
be accomplished without analysis. Also, such analysis of critical interfaces requires more than a
list of pre-defined contingencies (usually based on system-normal conditions) to be run by an
automated process. It requires human intervention based on experience to identify those
contingencies that are relevant given the system condition.
Current Practice
Operational studies follow the established NERC standards and Regional criteria. For Real Time
Operations, the Reliability Coordinator currently does not normally run N-2 contingencies for
thermal analysis, however; the Reliability Coordinator currently does some single-line-to-ground
fault with breaker failure for transient dynamic analysis
In operational planning, the Reliability Coordinator routinely performs a coordinated seasonal

assessment prior to the start of every season. The process identifies potential N-2 contingencies
that would result in IROL violation. This process looks for and documents voltage and thermal
criteria violations.

Risks
In the expansion planning of the system, and in operational planning, considering outages, it is
important that the risks associated with severe disturbances be understood and mitigated to the
greatest extent possible.
If, in fact, critical N-2 contingencies do show unacceptable responses, then according to NERC
Standard FAC-014-01, the Planning Authority must determine the contingencies to be respected.
It is far more critical if the interface is stability limited, rather than thermally limited, because the
response times needed are likely to be shorter than operator intervention or constrained dispatch
can achieve.
The historical probabilities of false tripping and of breaker failure in the MRO footprint are not
known. Thus, the requirements within the MRO region for consideration of specific events
should be determined through an analysis of historical trips and problems.
Recommendation: That the MRO Standards Committee, along with the MRO Reliability
Coordinators and Planning Coordinators, review the regional criteria for contingencies to be
considered in the establishment of system limits on stability-limited interfaces, to ensure that N-2
events, breaker failure events, and protection misoperation events reflect the historical
performance of the system.
Monitoring of MWSI
The MWSI flowgate is a PTDF flowgate that sums the flow on the Twin Cities to Rochester 345
kV line and the flow on the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line. When both lines trip, then the
PTDF flow on the MWSI flowgate becomes 0 MW. This 0 MW is less than the flowgate limit
and could provide a false sense of security.
This is an industry-wide issue. Currently many Transmission Operators utilize a proxy Power
Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) flowgate approach to measure how much margin there is in
the transmission system with respect to voltage stability or transient stability issues. When all
the elements that make up the PTDF are out of service, then the PTDF would read 0 MW.
When a proxy PTDF consists of one element, then the loss of that one element would leave flow
measurement = 0 MW and the impacted Transmission Operator needs to measure system
security with another proxy flowgate.
When a proxy PTDF consists of multiple elements, the chances of losing all elements at virtually
the same time is small; therefore, the risk that the PTDF flowgate would read 0 MW is less than
that of a one element PTDF. For MWSI, which has 2 elements, it took an N-2 contingency to
make the PTDF flowgate read 0 MW.
The analysis group noted that a smart/intelligent alarm could be considered to provide
information to the Reliability Coordinator in the event of loss of all elements of an IROL PTDF
flowgate. The alarm would identify to the Reliability Coordinator that all elements of the PTDF
flowgate have tripped and there is a measured 0 MW flow.


Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO
investigate and implement a process to capture and hold pre-contingency flows on PTDF
interfaces.
Reliability Coordinator’s Capability for Dynamic Security Evaluation

The Reliability Coordinator currently utilizes the Northern MAPP Studies Package to calculate
the dynamic stability limited flowgates (i.e. MWSI, North Dakota Export (NDEX), and
Manitoba Hydro Export (MHEX)).
This study package is based on PSS/E off line power flow and transient dynamic studies.
The Reliability Coordinator does not currently have the ability to perform real time transient
security analysis. Currently the Reliability Coordinator has the following capability:
• Quicknet Topology Processor
This tool is part of the EMS system. It takes the SCADA data and processes the
information to identify changes in generator, transformer and line status (in/out of
service). This application is separate and does not rely on the State Estimator. The
topology processor runs roughly every 10 seconds and it will alarm the Reliability
Coordinator whenever there is a change in the status of a generator/transmission element.
In addition, it also calculates and updates Real Time LODF numbers. This Real Time
LODF is used as a backup tool in the event that Real Time Contingency Analysis does
not solve.
• Real Time Contingency Analysis
This tool is part of the EMS system. It runs breaker to breaker contingencies utilizing
multiple distributed servers. The Reliability Coordinator models all N-1 breaker to
breaker contingency and selected N-2 tower contingencies that are included in their
procedure. The result of this application is then processed by a custom built application
(RTCA Tool). This RTCA Tool provides graphical alarms whenever there is a
contingency that would have overloaded transmission elements.
• Operating Guide Monitoring Tool (OGM)
This is a custom-built tool that monitors IROL PTDF flowgates. The tool utilizes
SCADA data as its input and it alarms the Reliability Coordinator whenever there is an
element of the PTDF FG that trips. Once the tool senses the trip of one line, it performs
calculation to identify how much generation re-dispatch is needed to bring the system to a
secure state.
Note: This tool was not programmed for N-2 or loss of all elements of a PTDF flowgate.
This tool can be modified to include the scenario for loss of all elements in PTDF
flowgate and provide guidance for Reliability Coordinator to initiate emergency
generation re-dispatch.

An on-line transient dynamic assessment tool would provide real time assessment of system
security. However, the tool would only simulate a list of predefined fault scenarios. Currently, a
scenario of losing both the Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV line and the Twin Cities to
Wisconsin 345 kV lines are not included in the off line PSS/E stability simulation.
Furthermore, if it had been in use during this particular event, the computation time would have
been in the 2 to 3 minute range, resulting in little time for the Reliability Coordinator to review
the results and take action on the basis of the results. The only way that the on-line tool would
have been useful is if the tool had the following capabilities:
• A scenario programmed for the loss of both the Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV line and
the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV lines (the N-2 situation),
• Enough computing power to be able to run transfer analysis and a transient dynamic
study and show result to the operator within the time frame of 30 seconds (between the
first event and the second event).
Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators investigate alternatives for development of an

on-line dynamic security assessment tool.
Initial Communications and Separation Recognition

This event was fast moving. The initial trip occurred at about 5:14, leading to separation, and
reconnection was established within about 15 minutes after that trip. The general tone and
emotion observed during the voice recordings was professional, concise, and direct. The team
believes that the System Operators performed and communicated very well. Moreover, it was
evident that the System Operators were familiar with each other and had firm knowledge of the
system topology and its nuances. The Transmission System Operators on the Minnesota-
Wisconsin interface communicated immediately and effectively after the Twin Cities to
Rochester 345 kV and the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV trips. The nature of the calls was to
make each aware of the 345 kV line trips, and the status of the lines.
Initially, many operators were assessing and working to stabilize their system and to restore
voltage to within normal limits. In an effort to stabilize Northwest Wisconsin, manual
intervention by Operators in Minnesota was taken and the 345 kV tie in northern Wisconsin was
opened. This was done while notifying Operators in Wisconsin in the midst of implementation.
It was clear when reviewing the voice recordings that several Operators realized immediately
that an island had formed. This immediate recognition led the Transmission System Operators to
direct Generator Operators and Balancing Authorities properly, thus preventing the development
of island(s) within an island, or perhaps island collapse.
It was also clear that Operators were acutely aware of the influence of the Manitoba - US tie and
the North Dakota to the Twin Cities DC Poles in regards to island stability. The Reliability
Coordinator, in consultation with the appropriate Transmission Operators, directed a 500 MW
run back of Manitoba - US tie. Moreover, Transmission Operators directed a further reduction of

generation at a large central Minnesota plant. These actions stabilized the island and facilitated
reconnection to the Eastern Interconnection.
Also evident in the voice recordings is that System Operators not part of the separated island
were aware that an extreme event had occurred, with some theorizing that separation had
occurred and an island had formed. Moreover, Operators and the Reliability Coordinator
discussed the Reliability Coordinator contingency results, conservative operations, and outages
scheduled to start that morning (agreed to postpone them until a later time.)
No follow up message was sent in regards to the islanding. Although no follow-up informational
call was initiated by the duty Reliability Coordinator, as indicated in the initial conference call,
the Reliability Coordinator did hold a conference call at 12:00 CDT with Balancing Authorities
and Transmission Operators to summarize the known portions of the event.
During the event analysis process some comments were received indicating that improved
system monitoring might have improved the time it took to recognize that an island had formed
and its extent.

develop a plan for enhanced Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data collection in the region, with
the goal of enhancing island separation identification, restoration and post-event analysis.
Recommendation: That NERC issue an alert for the industry operators to review and reinforce
training of communications protocols to ensure that actions taken by all parties are coordinated
and follow the tenets of three-part communications. This includes ensuring that operators not
have music or other recordings that play when phones are put on hold, that operators have phone
mute capability to avoid background conversations from interfering with the call, that a hot-line
call etiquette guideline and training be held at each company, and that the call guidelines include
a post-event call.
Reliability Coordinator’s Situational Analysis Capability

This section documents and discusses pertinent tools available to the Reliability Coordinator:
SCADA Alarm
This tool is part of the EMS system. The application would alarm whenever there is a change in
a digital status of SCADA point that comes through ICCP. This includes a change in
telemetered breaker status and switch status. This tool would also alarm whenever there is an
analog SCADA point that is beyond its criteria. This includes bus node voltages beyond its
high/low warning, normal, and emergency criteria as well as line/transformer/interface flow
above its warning, normal and emergency criteria. The EMS alarm system is set up into buckets
and the alarms are color-coded: Alarm Bucket #1 is for transmission elements 200 kV and above,
Bucket #2 is for transmission elements in the range of 100-200 kV and Bucket #3 is for
transmission elements at 100 kV and below. In addition, Buckets #4 to 8 are categorized for
Balancing Authority Reserve Alarm, Balancing Authority ACE Alarm, Balancing Authority

Frequency Alarm and Applications Alarm. The applications alarm provides an alert for any
ICCP communication or any application degradation.
SCADA Regional Map (USA 345)

This tool is part of the EMS system that is custom built for the reliability footprint. The tool
provides the Reliability Coordinator with a geographical representation of the state of the system.
Included in the map are transmission line and interface flows, bus voltages, status of
transmission line (in/out of service), regional frequency, generation output MW, and generation
status (in/out of service). The tool also incorporates graphical representation of alarms:
• Line/interface flow above its warning limit would be blinking

• Line that just changes status (from in to out of service) would also be blinking
• Bus voltage beyond its criteria would have a blinking arrow (up/down)
• Changes in the breaker status in substation would cause the substation to blink in the map
• Frequency beyond its limit
Note: This regional map that shows the reliability footprint was very useful in identifying the
islanding situation and the island border during the September 18 event. All the lines that
tripped had blinking alarms and around the boundary there was indication of voltage alarms as
well. These two indications along with the frequency meter aided the Reliability Coordinator to
quickly identify the island boundary.
Quicknet Topology Processor

See description in the Reliability Coordinator’s Capability for Dynamic Security Evaluation
discussion above.
RTNET (State Estimator)

This tool is part of EMS system. The Reliability Coordinator has dedicated 24 x 7 EMS
engineering support on site to monitor and maintain the application. The state estimator also
provides alarms for any transmission line or bus voltage violation. The state estimator runs each
90 seconds. Every half hour the EMS cases are saved off. It may be beneficial for the modeling
team to have a case saved off, based on triggers or disturbance criteria, such that the case is not
lost or overwritten.

investigate and implement a method if feasible for retaining state estimator cases based on
manual or automatic triggers.
Summary:
Compared to the 1998 event, the Reliability Coordinator currently has significantly more
visibility of the state of the transmission system. The regional map tool that shows the entire
reliability footprint was very useful in identifying the islanding situation and the island border

during the September 18 event. All of the lines that tripped had blinking alarms and around the
boundary, there was indication of voltage alarms as well. These two indications along with the
frequency meter aided the Reliability Coordinator to quickly identify the island boundary.
Transmission Operator Situational Awareness

The MW data on the Rochester to Wisconsin 161 kV line at the Rochester terminal froze at a
level just below the alarm limit (201 MVA) for the duration of the islanding period (~10
minutes).
The Transmission Operator received a high MVA alarm on the line at Rochester just prior to the
island separation when the flow reached 225 MVA and then cleared the alarm when the flow
dropped to 196 MVA.
At the time of the separation, the flow spiked to 280 MW, but the data point froze at 193 MW
during the island condition. Actual flow remained about 280 MW for the duration of the island.
Thus, the Transmission Operator did not receive an overload alarm at Rochester. However, an
overload alarm was received at the Wisconsin terminal.
A field test confirmed the cause of the data freeze was because the flow exceeded the EMS full-
scale value, which was 252 MW (EMS limit). The Transmission Operator’s EMS does not
alarm saturation states, but a “bad” quality code was displayed on the Rochester EMS display
next to the 161 kV line flow.
The Transmission Operator’s State Estimator will automatically recognize bad quality codes,
identify the point as an abnormal state and not use it as a valid measurement. However, with the
multiple contingencies that had occurred, it was unlikely that the SE was functioning at this time.
Flows at the other terminals on this line were accurate, thus, the correct line flow on the
Rochester terminal could have been manually calculated.
Based on flows on the on the other 161 kV terminals of this 3 terminal line, the line flow at the
Rochester terminal was estimated to be about 90 MW higher than what the value was displayed
to the Transmission Operators.
If the islanding event had lasted 1-5 minutes longer, there was a significant risk of a fault on the
161 kV line due to excessive sag. The loss of this line would have resulted in an island in
Wisconsin.
Recommendation: That NERC issue an Alert to the Transmission Operators regarding the
potential problems with analog EMS/SCADA limits due to transducer and /or CT saturation, and
request them to ensure there is sufficient margin to retain element loading observability above
equipment emergency limits.

Manitoba and Saskatchewan reconnection

Manitoba and Saskatchewan had trouble re-syncing to each other. Some of this was due to
miscommunication. Within a short period of time this was resolved and each had a clear
understanding of the plan.
System Separation and Reclosing Drills

The following information was gathered from the Reliability Coordinator 2007 Drill Report.
The last area wide restoration drill was conducted on October 9th and 10th and was repeated on
the 23rd and 24th to allow for a wider target audience. Participants in the drill included all
companies within the Reliability Coordinator footprint as well as neighboring companies
The goals of the drill were:
• Discuss emergency and restoration compliance
• Plan practical training for emergency response and restoration techniques
• Develop an understanding and coordination of restoration practices
• Address standardization across the Reliability Coordinator footprint
The drill adequately addressed the needs to practice restoration from different starting points
rather than simply bringing the whole footprint up from a blackout. The drills are more than
adequate and do a good job at simulating conditions and getting utilities communicating. They
also get every ops department talking about restoration
Review of Recommendations from 1998 Disturbance in MAPP

Although the 1998 event and the 2007 event involved a similar set of initial lines tripping (a trip
of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line with a prior outage of the Twin Cities to Rochester
345 kV line) they are different mainly in the time the operators had to react between the two
events. In 1998 there were over 30 minutes between the events and the main focus of the 1998
report was on actions to take when there is time available. The 2007 event had only
approximately 30 seconds between trips where the operators did not have sufficient time to react.
One recommendation that may have helped was the implementation of on-line dynamic security
assessment. This topic has been addressed elsewhere in this report.
Since the timing of the two events was different there is not much that can be compared between
the events.

Equipment Performance
E quipment P erformanc e
Hardware
Line Conductor Failure
The first transmission line to trip was the Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV line. The failure
occurred approximately 1/3 of the way along the span, 177 feet south of a structure at a
splice/connector. The conductor was one of two bundled conductors. Both ends of the failed
conductor contacted the ground. The splice where the failure occurred was installed in 1966.
A section of the failed conductor was sent to an independent consultant for analysis to determine
the cause of the failure. The analysis determined that thermal runaway of the nearby connector
caused the failure. The root cause of the failure is resistance build-up. It was determined that the
conductor had not been scratch brushed before the aluminum sleeve was compressed.
The lab stated that scratch brushing of aluminum conductors is critical to long-term connector
reliability. Failure to scratch brush is the root cause or a strong contribution factor to most
connector failures that the lab has analyzed. It was also concluded that the charge of filler
compound was insufficient to provide effective water blocking.
The lab also tested the free span conductor three (3) feet from the failed connector. It was found
to be partially annealed but annealing was not severe, therefore; it is unlikely that high-
temperature operation was a significant factor in the connector failure. There is also some
possibility that annealing was due to overheating of the core after breaks in the aluminum strands
forced excessive current onto the core.

Recommendation: That NERC issue an Alert regarding the potential for splice failure due to
installation errors, suggesting incorporation of visual splice reviews in transmission line
inspection programs.
System Protection
The event revealed protection problems on several systems.
The problem that led to the loss of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line arose from the
1
design of the secondary protective relaying system on this line. It contained a segregated phase
comparison relay that communicated using a combination of the Transmission Operator’s digital
communication in series with two digital communication providers (third party leased lines).
Phase comparison compares the phase angles of line currents at one end of the line with a
received signal that reproduces phase angles of line current from the other end of the line. The
local end is intentionally delayed a time equal to a reasonable representation of the average
1
The Transmission Operator refers to their two high-speed protection systems on 345 kV lines as
primary and secondary. Each is a separate protection system and neither has priority.

channel time of the communication system. The phase comparison relay is intended to compare
current phase angles only when there is a fault in the power system. To accomplish this, it gets
“turned on” by a level of measured current which is a setting of the relay (also known as a fault
detector). Testing revealed that the communication system time delay is different from the Twin
Cities to Wisconsin versus the delay from Wisconsin to the Twin Cities. Testing also revealed
that the channel delay times are variable. It has been concluded by the Transmission Operator
that this variability is beyond the relay channel delay capability due to the use of switched digital
communication channels. These channels are provided internally by the Transmission Operator
and externally by two, third-party communication providers. The Transmission Operator test
report indicates “….. delay times can be significantly different in the SONET network, depending
on the communications routing. This communication path uses three different networks, any and
all could introduce variable communication time delays. Regardless of how the timing tests turn
out, it is believed this particular communication path is not conducive to proper operation of this
relay protection system whether digital or tone communications are used…”
At the time of the event, a configurable setting within the relay assumed that the channel times
would be the same in both directions. The phase comparison portion of the secondary protection
has been disabled on this line leaving its distance relay protection in service. On other lines that
use the same protection package communicating over leased lines, the Transmission Operator is
considering other secondary protection options.
The operation of the protective relaying on the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line was
reported as “the second apparent misoperation of this line relay in six weeks”. An investigation
by the relay analysis group has looked at whether or not the previous misoperation was related to
the problems encountered on September 18. The previous misoperation was not the same sort of
misoperation as that which occurred on September 18. The Transmission Operator investigated
the first misoperation and was able to reproduce the problem. The problem was linked to a bad
power supply. A power supply was replaced and the relay was then tested and the problem did
not recur. The protection system was considered operational.
The Relay Analysis Team was concerned about the performance of the relay package because
the communications problem did not occur on the initial fault on the Twin Cities to Rochester
345 kV line but it did when the line attempted to reclose. The voltage and current quantities seen
by the relay were quite different for the two faults, due to the differing system configuration
(Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV line in service, then out of service). The matter was referred
by the Transmission Operator to the relay manufacturer for an opinion.
Protection Communications
The discussion above indicates that it is critical to know the characteristics of the communication
system being used for protection. This is the not the first time concerns about third party
communications has arisen in system event analysis. During the work of this Event Analysis
Team, comments have also been received that expressed concerns that communications systems
owned by the transmission owners or leased by transmission owners, based on switched digital
communication technology, such as Synchronous Optical network (SONET) technology are
subject to reconfiguration during communication failures may also be subject to the same
problem. Thus, the following recommendation is not specific to September 18, 2007.

Recommendation: That NERC issue an Alert on the problems associated with the use of
communications in protective relay systems with time sensitive functionality, whether operated
by third party or internal company, with emphasis on the reliability and variability of the
characteristics of communications paths.
Other Protection Problems

Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV Line Trip at Wisconsin
At 05:21:21.050 the Twin Cities (east metro) to Wisconsin 115 kV Line tripped at the Wisconsin
end – tripped during the re-energization of a 115 kV line in the southeast Twin Cities metro. The
trip was concluded to be incorrect.
The Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV line’s high speed protection is directional comparison
blocking (DCB). DCB logic allows for a trip of the measuring relay’s associated circuit breaker
if there is no “block” signal from the other end of the line. A block is sent if the phase distance
reverse zone relay, KD-11, sees a multi-phase fault external to the protected line or if there is
line ground current via the IOS element above a setpoints. There is a ground directional element
that will “stop” the block signal a very short time after it is “started” by the non-directional IOS
ground relay start element. For faults involving ground, this device controls carrier via its 3I0
(summation of IA + IB +IC line currents) measuring relay element, the IOS. IOS operates on RMS
ground current to start carrier (block tripping). It is a fast pickup and fast drop out relay.
This “start block – before stop-block” logic is for security against false tripping. The 85P relay
identified in the relay targets for this line trip is a carrier control auxiliary relay indicating a trip
via DCB occurred.
Analysis and Conclusions

There is no DFR at the Wisconsin terminal so this analysis is based on electro-mechanical relay
targets, the Wisconsin terminal SEL 121 G record for the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV line,
and the DFR record from the Twin Cities end. The SEL 121 G record shows a momentary
assertion of the 21-3 zone 3 function of the SEL 121G relay as the apparent impedance seen by
the relay momentarily enters its tripping characteristic.
The Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV line is protected by a directional comparison blocking
high speed relay scheme (DCB) using KD 10 impedance relays looking forward and KD-11
relays looking in the reverse direction and directional ground relay trip and blocking relays.
Backup protection at the Wisconsin terminal is an SEL 121G relay and the backup protection at
the Twin Cities is phase and ground electromechanical relays. The DCB scheme uses the
forward looking impedance relay for multi-phase fault detection and a directional ground
overcurrent relay for phase-ground faults detection. The carrier control is initiated by reverse
looking impedance relay KD-11 for multi-phase faults and a non-directional IOS ground
overcurrent relay element set at 200 amps at both ends of the line for ground faults.

An analysis of the Twin Cities DFR and Wisconsin Terminal relay records indicate that the
Wisconsin terminal of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV line opened slightly before the
faulted 115 kV line in the southeast Twin Cities metro cleared its phase-ground fault. Just after
the faulted 115 kV line was automatically reclosed a second time, the Wisconsin terminal of the
Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV line was experiencing load current flowing into this terminal.
When the fault re-established on the 115 kV line in the southeast Twin Cities metro, there was a
“turn around” in current at the Wisconsin terminal as it now began to supply current towards the
faulted 115 kV line. It is theorized that this reversal in current (mostly load current and very
little 3I0 ground current), and commensurate rapid decline in bus voltage at the Wisconsin
terminal caused a momentary operation of the zone 2 KD-10 relay at the Wisconsin terminal.
This conclusion is based on the knowledge that the zone 3 measuring function of the backup
digital relay at the Wisconsin terminal asserted momentarily. Analysis of the DFR record
indicates the reverse zone KD11 blocking relay at the Twin Cities and the Wisconsin terminal
did not operate at either end of the line during the turnaround. The Twin Cities blocking relay
did not operate mostly because the Twin Cities terminal voltages were relatively healthy. IOS
relays at both ends most likely did operate, but intermittently, as the phase current began to “turn
around” during the 115 kV line fault.
The reason why the zone 2/KD10 relay targeted at the Wisconsin terminal is not known for
certain. It is theorized that the relay responded to transient current reversal and extremely low
voltage as the fault re-ignited. It is theorized that the momentary dropout of the carrier start IOS
elements that measure 3I0 line relay current permitted the trip as the zone 2 KD10 relay contacts
were closed.
The momentary dropout of the carrier start IOS elements that measure 3I0 line relay current
permitted the trip as the zone 2 KD10 relay contacts were closed.
A review of newer DCB schemes should be undertaken to see if they would withstand this type
of transient current reduction condition. The protection of this line is via legacy relays. Due to
the critical nature of this line, especially in light of there being no autotransformer at the Twin
Cities terminal, the installation of digital relays with modern carrier control capability is
indicated. This is especially true because of the low current contribution of 3I0 current from the
Wisconsin end of the line.
This is an undesirable trip. It is not certain that this is an indication that the zone 2/KD-10 relay
at the Wisconsin terminal misoperated or that it operated as designed due to transient conditions.
The latter being unusual for impedance relays, however, the current reversal was also
accompanied by an extreme reduction in voltage at the Wisconsin terminal.
Recommendation: That the Transmission Operator review the directional comparison blocking
(DCB) scheme on the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 115 kV line to determine the ability of the
scheme to withstand the type of transient current reduction condition found on September 18,
2007.

Performance of Automatic Reclosing

Transmission line automatic reclosing is an integral part of reliability. Auto-reclosing is mostly
used to restore transmission lines and distribution feeders that have faulted (see Guideline on
Recommended Transmission Reclosing Practices in the MRO Area Draft 11). Some surveys
have indicated that 90% of transmission line faults are transient. Automatic reclosing then
restores these lines to service following the fault. Automatic reclosing is a control function. It is
not always successful due to control related issues, but is successful about 80% or more of the
time. This means that over 70% of the time transmission lines are returned to service without
any operator assistance. Further, the return to service can be as fast as 0.5 seconds and usually
within 1 – 15 seconds. Another benefit of automatic reclosing is to return a line to service
should it false trip coincident with a fault on another line.
Automatic reclosing takes several forms. Its forms can be characterized by speed of operation,
whether the line is re-energized by the auto-reclosing relay, or whether the auto-reclosing relay
restores the current carrying capability of the line. The latter is often augmented by a
synchronism check function. On re-energizing the line, the automatic reclosing relay usually
senses dead line voltage on those lines of higher voltage (138 kV and above). Lower voltage
transmission lines usually use bus voltage and do not have line side voltage transformers with
which to detect a dead line. From an operations perspective, it is most important to know that
the line, once suddenly de-energized by protective relays, has been re-energized successfully.
Even if the line is not restored at both ends, the knowledge that the line is alive eliminates any
doubt by the operator that the line is serviceable. To restore current carrying capability, having
been automatically re-energized at one line terminal, the other terminal reclosing relay checks for
acceptable voltage, and possibly acceptable phase angle, then it initiates the automatic reclose.
Transmission Operators have different strategies on closing the second line terminal. The
following two example strategies deploy synchronism checking:
• Arm auto-reclosing and allow the lines to reclose when the synchronizing relays have
acceptable system voltage, frequency and phase conditions.
• Arm auto-reclosing only while an operator is in the SCADA control screen for a station.
This is disarmed as soon as the operator looks at another station.
Automatic reclosing is critical to maintain and improve system stability. In this event, the four
State and two Province island separated when the last of the 31 lines tripped due to loss of
synchronism. That 230 kV line was re-closed at 05:29:37.418, and within the next 48 seconds,
three lines automatically reclosed via synchronism check:
• Mankato to south-central Minnesota 161 kV at 05:30:06
• Rochester to southeastern Minnesota 161 kV at 05:30:08
• West segment of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV at 05:30:25
There was no auto-reclosing of the east segment of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line and
this interconnection was not restored for another 38 minutes by operator action.

The following describes the performance of the auto-reclosing for lines operating at 115 kV and
above.
• Lines that had Automatic Reclosing attempted: 16 lines
• Lines without Automatic Reclosing: 13 lines
• Lines that were successfully automatically Re-energized but no through path restored: 2
lines
• Lines that automatically restored though paths: 7 lines
• Lines that were unsuccessful in automatically Reclose Attempts: 7 lines
The 345 kV through path from the Twin Cities to Central Wisconsin was open for 53 minutes
and 29 seconds without the ability to automatically reclose this path. It is recommended that the
Transmission Operators conduct a study to determine if this path can be automatically reclosed
following a trip of either of these lines. Further this study should determine when the west
segment cross-trip scheme can be removed now that Arrowhead – Stone Lake 345 kV line is in
service.
The interconnection between Manitoba and Ontario does not have automatic reclosing. The
Saskatchewan sub-island did not auto-reclose with Manitoba or North Dakota. The auto-
reclosing of Mankato to south-central Minnesota 161 kV line reconnected Minnesota to Iowa
and the west segment of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV auto-reclosing also restored the
interconnection with Iowa and western Wisconsin.
Recommendation: That the MRO Protective Relay Subcommittee (PRS) reclosing guide under
development address the reclosing technologies necessary to automatically restore lines from a
wide area perspective balanced with addressing individual line re-closings.
Recommendation: That the Transmission Operators conduct a study to determine if the Twin
Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV path can be automatically reclosed following a trip of either or both
of these lines.
Saskatchewan Protection
Over-Frequency Generator Protection
Nine generators were fitted in 2005 with new protection packages, with the over-frequency
setting of 60.5 Hz (for 9.98 seconds) and 61.3 Hz (for 0.1 seconds). During the disturbance five
of these units tripped by over-frequency (the other units with over-frequency protection were not
running). Prior to the commissioning of the new packages, the units were primarily protected by
governor action, with control valves closed at 63 Hz (through normal governor action) and over-
speed tripping at about 65 Hz. Subsequent to the event, the new over-frequency protection that
caused this tripping has been disabled on all of these units and the generation operator is
continuing to review setting requirements and coordination.

Conclusions
The following information was provided by SaskPower and it was not reviewed further by the
Event Analysis Team.
1. The disturbance was initiated by islanding causing sustained over frequency conditions in
the MRO region. SaskPower thermal generation was tripped by over frequency
protections as per generator protections applied.
2. The under frequency load shed scheme was observed to operate as designed. Actual
generation lost including interconnection flows amounted to approx. 46.7% of SaskPower
area load. The load shed scheme tripped approx. 25.4% of area load.
3. Feeder over/under voltage protections tripped an additional approx. 216MW (11.3% of
area load) due to system over voltage conditions which occurred after all stages of the
load shed scheme operated. Tripping of the feeders caused the over voltage problem on
the grid to become worse, however, had tripping of the feeders not occurred a total
system collapse may have occurred.
4. Operators had significant difficulty dealing with the system over voltages which occurred
subsequent to load shedding. All reactive control equipment available was utilized to
reduce voltages. Generating units at all locations were absorbing MVArs from the
system (i.e. in an under excited state).
5. Restoration of the system by operators was accomplished very rapidly with all customers
returned to service in about 3 hours 20 minutes and all grid lines returned to service in
approx. 8 hours 29 minutes. Considering the magnitude of the disturbance, operators did
an exceptional job of restoring the system. Support received from neighboring utilities
was also instrumental to the rapid system recovery and was greatly appreciated.
Generation Performance
Conventional Generation
Generating units tripped as the large island began to split apart. In total, 17 generators tripped
representing 1882 MW rated (1641 MW output). Before the Saskatchewan island formed at
05:21.25, 5 units tripped totaling 632 MW rated. After Saskatchewan islanded, another 12 units
tripped totaling 1250 MW rated. The major cause for unit trips was prime mover trips related to
boiler and heat – 1134 MW rated from 8 units. The second major cause was over-frequency
relays set within the no-damage range of unit operation – 701 MW rated from 7 units.
The no-damage range for unit operation is defined by IEEE 50.13 standard as indicated below.
The settings of the over frequency relays were 60.5 to 61.0 Hz. which is less than the 102% over
frequency continuous capability of the machines.

Figure EP 3: Excerpt from IEEE Standard 37.102-2006 – Guide to Generator Protection
Recommendation: That NERC issue an alert for generation owners to review the over and under
frequency generator protection settings of all units 20 MVA and above, to assure that they
coordinate with their regional under-frequency or ride-through requirements. This review should
be performed whenever generator protection modifications are made to such units.
Recommendation: That Generation Owners within the MRO identify the overfrequency tripping
setpoints of all generators and that MRO then investigate the reasons for all generator
overfrequency relays that are set below the continuous rating of the generators. The affected
Balancing Authorities should be notified of all changes throughout this process.
Wind Generation Performance

In the course of the simulation of the September 18, 2007 event, discrepancies in the way the
island was formed were noted between the recorded response of the system and the simulation.
In particular, the rate of frequency rise was significantly different.
Subsequent work revealed that several wind generators had been on-line at the time of the event
and several appear to have tripped off due to under-voltage. Data on the wind generation
running and on the trips that occurred is nowhere as detailed or as complete as that available for
conventional generation. In some cases, although no feeder-collector protection operated, it is
apparent from SCADA scans that generation was dropped by those wind farms; on-turbine
protection systems may have operated.

With the best available data on the wind generation in the system, augmented by best guess
estimates of missing data are used in the simulation, the response of the model moves closer to
that of the system.
This experience has led to several significant realizations and recommendations that are being
shared with the industry through the NERC Integration of Variable Generation Task Force.
Among the problems found to date are:

• Data linking names of owners, names of plants and interconnections in the actual system
are confusing, perhaps incomplete and inadequate
• Breaker switching records from the transmission operators are insufficient to identify
generation starts or trips, since many units are tripped within the wind farm collector
systems and the farms, as a whole, do not trip.
• Many of the interconnections are at 69 kV or lower, which may not be represented in the
models and which may be networked
• Data records regarding important wind unit protection and restart settings (over and under
frequency, over and under voltage) are incomplete.
• Such protection settings are critical to the performance of the overall system. It is thought
that many of these settings are manufacturers initial settings, settings which may be
inappropriate or detrimental to the overall system performance
• Many units are not well documented since their size puts them below the currently
mandated threshold for registration and reporting. However, due to the large and
increasing number of small units on the system, the aggregated response of the machines
is very important.
• Dynamic machine and control data tends not to be made available due to claims of
proprietary design by the manufacturers and/or owners.
• Some models have been made available which act as “black box” models – with no way
to verify appropriate responses or to predict how the models will respond to severe
conditions.
• Often data is not made available until the units go into commercial service– restricting
the essential work of the planning coordinators.
There are several observations that can be made:

• There are essentially only 4 types of wind generators in use, categorized by WECC as:
o Type 1: Cage rotor induction generators
o Type 2: Induction generators with variable rotor resistance
o Type 3: Doubly-fed asynchronous generators with rotor-side converter
o Type 4: Full-power converter interface
• It is feasible, therefore, to develop general models for these types of machines, with
variations perhaps needed to reflect the vintage of each unit.

• Such models would improve the overall system representation and minimize the need for
“black box” or proprietary models
• The reporting threshold is far too high to capture distributed generation (of all types)
when they are concentrated in parts of the system.
Through the work on this simulation, the following have been identified as the most important
data required for correct system modeling.
1. Wind Farm Name(s) (All)
2. Number of turbines
3. Location in the study models (WTG PSS/E Bus Number/Name and Unit ID)
4. WTG Make and Model (if more than one type on the same feeder, provide the percentage
of each make and model)
5. WTG Under frequency trip set-points (in Hz) and pick-up times (in seconds) at the
turbine or at the feeder if more restrictive
6. WTG Overfrequency trip set-points (in Hz) and pick-up times (in seconds) at the turbine
or at the feeder if more restrictive
7. WTG Under voltage trip set-points (in P.U.) and pick-up times (in seconds) at the turbine
8. WTG Overvoltage trip set-points (in P.U.) and pick-up times (in seconds) at the turbine
9. Maximum MW output of the farm
10. Automatic restart parameters
11. Feeder impedances and network diagram
12. Transformer impedance and available taps
13. Voltage controls (capacitors, SVCs)
14. Year and month of installation
15. Dynamics models
Within MRO there are good records of all but items 4,5,6,7, 10 and 15 – these are items that can
impact the response of the system in very significant and important ways.
In the context of the September 18 event, a decision was made early in October to use the best
available data, including manufactures standard data and settings, in the simulation work. It was
decided that a more general data request, based on the list of 15 items given above, would be too
time consuming and expensive for the event analysis process (field work would be required).
However, given the importance of distributed generation, its projected growth and the rising
concerns about system performance, a recommendation is being put forward for the industry, not
just for MRO.

Recommendation: That NERC develop a standard/requirement regarding reporting of distributed

generation data for use by the planning and reliability coordinators, with a threshold of 1 MW
per unit (consistent with EIA 860) or lower.
It is essential that it be applied to all existing and planned units and plants.
HVdc System Responses

During the event there were two major HVdc systems operating; the Manitoba system
transmitting energy from northern Manitoba to southern Manitoba and a DC line between North
Dakota and the Minneapolis area.
The third major system, a DC line between North Dakota and the Duluth area, was out of service
due to maintenance being performed on the generation feeding this system.
An HVdc scheme has the ability to be controlled very rapidly and both systems responded as
designed to the disturbance.
The different responses of the two systems reflect the nature of the systems – the Manitoba
system connects two asynchronous systems, the other is embedded in the bulk ac system.
DC line between North Dakota and the Minneapolis area

The damping control on the line is designed to provide damping to the ac system for small signal
events. I t is disabled if the frequency at the generation feeding the link is outside a 0.25 Hz band
around 60 Hz for more than 2 seconds. Previous system events indicated that there could be a
power oscillation on the dc system if the control stayed in service under those conditions.
The frequency control helps to stabilize the generation if that generation were to be isolated (not
remain at 60 Hz). This is to respect the limited off-nominal frequency operation capability of the
units. Since the frequency in the North Dakota system was above 60.25 Hz, the frequency
control operated correctly by increasing the HVdc power order. Note that this does not imply an
increase in power generation in the island that formed. Rather it resulted in a redistribution of the
power flow over the ac and HVdc lines.
Manitoba DC System
The Manitoba system with its asynchronous generation can and did respond differently.
At 5:27, the Reliability Coordinator requested Manitoba Operators to reduce exports to the US
by 500 MW. This was implemented as a series of 50 MW ramped HVdc power order
reductions, with a total reduction in the order of 260 MW required to reached the target of 60 Hz.
(at 5:31).
The Manitoba system had several other responses to the event. Firstly, there was a transient dc
power order reduction resulting from the inverter station (in southern Manitoba) phase angle
damping controller. The maximum damping reduction was in the order of 411 MW, achieved

just after HVdc reductions for the Manitoba-Ontario tie trip and the SVC on the 500 kV in
northern Minnesota were initiated, and 419 MW just after Manitoba-Saskatchewan separation
occurred. Damping varies as the phase angle at the invertor changes. This reduction washes out
over time. This damping control had a positive effect on the system in the island over-generation
situation.
Secondly, there was a permanent dc power order reduction on the order of 123 MW in response
to the opening of the Manitoba – Ontario tie. The third permanent dc power order reduction (407
MW) was in response to an indication that the SVC in Minnesota had lost voltage control.
Lastly, in response to over frequency conditions at the inverter, two valve groups on Bipole II
were blocked, resulting in a further dc power order reduction of about 200 MW. Thus there was
a permanent reduction of 730 MW plus a maximum variable damping reduction of 420 MW.
In the Manitoba case, dc power order reductions are transferred to the generation in northern
Manitoba which operates asynchronously to the Eastern Interconnection. The generators (hydro
units) were built to operate up to 40% overspeed (84 Hz), with rapid frequency control through
governor action, so power reductions on the ac system do not lead to transient flows in another
part of the system (in contrast to the other HVdc systems).

Root Cause Analysis
T ec hnic al Dis c us s ions

DFR Locations
There were a number of events that were not captured by digital recording devices. The MRO
guide for the installation of Disturbance Monitoring Reporting Requirements was reviewed to
determine if this guide can support the addition of recommended new or replacement disturbance
monitors. The guide is quite broad in scope and is judged to be adequate to meet all of the below
recommendations.
Two regional procedures have been posted in the MRO manual for the following NERC BOT-
Approved Standards:
• PRC-002-1: Define Regional Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting Requirements
• PRC-012-0: Special Protection System (SPS) Review Procedure
The links to these posted procedures are at:
http://www.midwestreliability.org/documents/MROManual/Section%205.2%20-
%20NERC%20Standards.pdf
Note that even though the applicable entity of these standards is the RE (formerly known as
RRO), both of these standards set guidelines and regional criteria for the MRO Registered
Entities. Additionally, two regulatory-approved NERC standards (PRC-015-0 and PRC-018-1)
directly reference the regional procedure/criteria laid out in PRC-002-1 & PRC-012-0. For
example, an SPS owner must submit new or modified SPS schemes to the MRO in the manner
laid out in the MRO procedure for PRC-012-0. Similarly, Transmission Owners and Generation
Owners have an obligation to install disturbance monitoring equipment according to the regional
requirements in the MRO procedure for PRC-002-1.
The above requirements should be reviewed and monitoring equipment be installed at those
stations within MRO that do not yet have them. MRO has a 4 year implementation plan to add
monitoring devices per these standards. The MRO Protective Relay Subcommittee should
review the implementation of the 4 year plan. Consideration to elevating the priority of
installing monitoring equipment or upgrading existing monitoring equipment should be given to
the below list of substations. The lack of monitoring equipment led to difficulties in being able
to completely model and analyze the event.
Recommendation: That Transmission Owners, in conjunction with the MRO Reliability

Assessment Committee include the additional identified locations in the MRO list of locations
for disturbance monitoring equipment (DME, digital relays or digital recorders) installation
and/or upgrades within the MRO four year plan:

Root Cause Analysis
Inter-Area Oscillations
During each major system perturbation (e.g., each islanding event) during the September 18,
2007 disturbance, inter-area oscillations were observed across the Eastern Interconnection.
These oscillations were detected by a number of phasor measurement units (PMUs) and the
Virginia Tech frequency data recorders (FDRs), in their FNet system. Figure TD 1 below shows
one of the oscillations captured by an FDR in the Twin Cities area and Figure TD 2 shows the
initial spectral analysis of those oscillations.
Figure TD 1: Inter-Area Oscillation Observed by Twin Cities Frequency Data Recorder
Figure TD 2: Initial Spectral Analysis of Observed Inter-Area Oscillations

Root Cause Analysis
Similar oscillations have been observed in a number of disturbances in the Eastern

Interconnection. Study groups have been formed in the past to study these oscillations (SS-38 of
NPCC); however, in recent years little to no work has been done in this field due to other
priorities. NERC is initiating analysis of the inter-area oscillations of the Eastern
Interconnection as part of its Modeling Improvements Initiative.
Recommendation: That NERC include the September 18, 2007 system response in the
interconnection-wide study examining the nature and damping of low-frequency Eastern
Interconnection inter-area oscillations.

Root Cause Analysis
R oot C aus e A nalys is

This work is underway, with nothing conclusive to report at this time. A supplementary report
will be written when the root cause analysis work is complete.
Major Contributing Factors

The following discussion has been written without benefit of the formal root cause analysis
process and is subject to revision.
The major contributing factors to the initial island creation are:

• The initial conductor failure on phase A of the Twin Cities to Rochester 345 kV line and
• The protection failure on the west segment of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line.
Subsequent to the loss of these two lines, in the absence of an automated mitigation scheme or
any predefined operator actions to reduce the export from Minnesota to Wisconsin, overloading
of additional lines was unavoidable.
The major contributing factor to the isolation of the Saskatchewan system and the subsequent
load shed in that system was over-frequency relays on several major thermal units that tripped
these units after the system frequency was above 60.5 Hz for 10 seconds. The protection setting
was a default setting in a new protection package. The trip point could have been set higher.

System Improvements
S ys tem Improvements
Arrowhead – Gardner Park 345 kV Line
This new line was first announced in April 1999, to relieve the Minnesota – Wisconsin interface.
Had a stronger interconnection existed at the time of the June 25, 1998 system disturbance where
over 60 transmission lines and 4000 Megawatts of generation tripped out of service across the
region, the impact of the initial event would not have been nearly so severe. The impact of this
1998 event on the residents and businesses of the region, coupled with an event in 1997
involving Cooper generating station, was a major factor in gaining stakeholder support for a
project first recommended in the 1980s: the Arrowhead-Weston (A-W) 345 kV Project.
A component of the post-disturbance analysis of the September 18, 2007 event was an
assessment of the impact the Arrowhead-Weston line would have had on the event, if the line
had been in service well ahead of schedule. If the line had been in service the September 18
event would have ended after the tripping of the third line, a 69 kV line south of the Twin Cities
between Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Protection Changes
The secondary relay package on the west segment of the Twin Cities to Wisconsin 345 kV line
was changed out on April 11, 2008 with a POTTs scheme that is immune to high speed tripping
for a communication problem.

Post-report Tasks
P os t-report T as ks
Some important work remains, which could not be fully reported at the time of this report,
namely:
• Root cause analysis for all aspects of the event.
• Completion of the re-establishment of a base model for the event, incorporating
the load and generation dispatch, the outages and the external conditions
• Continuation of modeling and simulation work with emphasis on explaining the
discrepancies between the model and the measured system responses.
• Development of redacted communication material.
When the major remaining work on root cause analysis, and modeling and simulation is
complete the results will be provided in the form of supplementary reports.

Appendices
A ppendic es
A — Acronyms and Definitions
B — Event Analysis Team

Appendix A — Acronyms and Definitions
A ppendix A — A c ronyms and Definitions

Acronym Description
ACE Area Control Error
AFC Automatic Frequency Control
ALTW Alliant Energy West
ATC American Transmission Company
BA Balancing Authority
CDT Central daylight time
DCAR Delta Current Admittance Relay
DCB directional comparison blocking
DFR Digital Fault Recorder
DPC Dairyland Power Cooperative
DPR Digital Protection Relay
DULTT Direct Under-reaching Line Transfer Trip
EMS Energy Management System
ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas
FAST Fast Action for Secure Transmission
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FTL Frequency Trigger Limit
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GOP Generation Operator
GPS Global Positioning System
GRE Great River Energy
HVdc High-voltage direct current
Hz Hertz (frequency measure – cycles/second)
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IROL Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit
ITC International Transmission Company
LSE Load Serving Entity
MAPP Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
MCN MAPP Communication Network
MEC Mid-American Energy Company
MH (MHEB) Manitoba Hydro (Electric Board)

MHEX Manitoba Hydro Export

MISO Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator
MP Minnesota Power
MPC Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.
MRO Midwest Reliability Organization
MVA Mega Volt Ampere
MW Megawatt
MWSI Minnesota – Wisconsin Stability Interface
NDEX North Dakota Export
NERC North America Reliability Corporation
NMORWG Northern MAPP Operating Review Working Group
NPPD Nebraska Public Power District
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSI Net Scheduled Interchange
Northern States Power d/b/a/ Xcel Energy (Control Area and Balancing
NSP
Authority)
OASIS Open Access Same-time Information System
OS Outage Scheduler
OTP Otter Tail Power Company
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
POTT Permissive-Overreaching-Transfer-Trip
PSS/E Power System Simulator for Engineers (power flow and stability)
PTDF Power Transfer Distribution Factor
pu Per unit
RC Reliability Coordinator
RCIS Reliability Coordinator Information System
RE Reliability Entity
RPU Rochester Public Utilities
SCED Security Constrained Economic Dispatch
SDX System Data Exchange
SOL System operating Limit
SONET Synchronous Optical Network
SPC SaskPower – Saskatchewan Power Corporation

SPP Southwest Power Pool

SPS Special Protection System
SVC Static VAr Control
TLR Transmission Loading Relief
TO Transmission Owner
TOP Transmission Operator
UDS Unit Dispatch System
UFLS under-frequency load shed
UVLS under-voltage load shed
WAPA Western Area Power Administration
WPS Wisconsin Public Service
XEL Xcel Energy

Appendix B — Event Analysis Team
A ppendix B — E vent A nalys is T eam

Project organization
The project work was undertaken by a team of MRO region company employees and NERC
staff and contractors.
The project is being led and monitored by a three person Steering Committee comprising D. G.
Chapman, Ph.D., P. Eng., an employee of TransGrid Solutions Inc. (TGS), of Winnipeg,
Manitoba, under contract to the MRO; S. L. Berg, an employee of the MRO and R. W.
Cummings, NERC Director of Event Analysis and Information Exchange.
There were several teams in place:
• Sequence of Events – R.W. Cummings (NERC) and D. G. Chapman (TGS)
• Operational Analysis – T. Beach (ATC)
• Modeling and Simulation – E. Allen (NERC)
• Relay Analysis - T. Wiedman (NERC contractor)
• Root Cause Analysis – D. Lucas (NERC contractor)
• Low-frequency oscillations – R.W. Cummings (NERC)
Participants in the analysis

The following people have contributed to this work:
Name Company
Tim Beach ATC
John Ratajczyk ATC
Kerry Marinan ATC
Bob Roddy DPC
Jerry Iverson DPC
Juan Villar FERC
Kumar Agarwal FERC
Kevin Wierzbicki FERC
Romulo Barreno FERC
Navjot Kaur FERC
Tom Ferguson Ferguson Consulting
Clint Burrow GRE
Terry Harbour MEC
Jim Kane MH
Lyndon Miller MH
Dede Subakti MISO St. Paul

Appendix B — Event Analysis Team
Name Company
Tom Jones MISO Carmel
Brian Van Gheem MISO Carmel
Kyle Hart MISO Carmel
Tony Rowan MISO St Paul
Kris Ruud MISO St Paul
Mike McMullen MISO St. Paul
Zhixin Miao MISO
Peter Schommer MP
Tim Bartel MPC
Shel Berg MRO
John Seidel MRO
Salva Andiappan MRO
Adam Flink MRO
Alan O’Neal MRO Consultant
Bob Cummings NERC
Bob Stuart NERC
Earl Shockley NERC
Ed Ruck NERC
Eric Allen NERC
Jessica Bian NERC
Tom Wiedman NERC Consultant
Ron Gunderson NPPD
Luis Leon OTP
Gerry Steffens RPU
Jeremy Sutton RPU
Walter Omoth SaskPower
Doug Chapman TransGrid Solutions
Earl F. Cass WAPA
Robert Chapman WAPA
Ed Weber WAPA
Dan Belk WAPA
Todd Sarkinen Xcel Energy
Dean Schiro Xcel Energy
Leo Ganser Xcel Energy
Mark Tiemeier Xcel Energy
Rich Quest Xcel Energy

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MIDWEST

September 18, 2007

MRO’s Analysis of the

December 11, 2008

Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................................................8

State of the System..................................................................................................................................................... 17

Summary of the Event ............................................................................................................................................... 22

Sequence of Events .................................................................................................................................................... 31

Restoration Observations and Recommendations .................................................................................................. 55

System Event Response ............................................................................................................................................. 56

Power Flow and Dynamic Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 58

Operational Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 66

Equipment Performance ........................................................................................................................................... 78

Technical Discussions ................................................................................................................................................ 90

Root Cause Analysis .................................................................................................................................................. 93

System Improvements ............................................................................................................................................... 94

Post-report Tasks ....................................................................................................................................................... 95

Appendix A — Acronyms and Definitions .............................................................................................................. 97

Appendix B — Event Analysis Team ..................................................................................................................... 100

Page 2 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

There were 12 Balancing Authorities involved:

There were two Reliability Coordinators involved:

Page 3 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

• Analyzing this bulk power system event

• Reviewing the sequence of events

Terms and abbreviations used in this report are contained in Appendix A.

• American Transmission Company, LLC

Page 4 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

• Dairyland Power Cooperative

The Analysis Process

Page 5 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Page 6 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Date & Time 05:14:54 CDT September 18, 2007

Lowest / Highest 60.87 Hz at approximately 5:21:26 CDT

Page 7 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

E xec utive S ummary

The event had the following major phases:

Page 8 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Line and Transformer Trips

Page 9 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Initiating, Causal, Contributory Factors

Mitigating Impact of System Improvements since the Event

Page 10 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Recommendations for Reliability Improvement

The key text in the Advisory was:

Transmission Operators, Planning Authorities, and Regional Entities should be aware

Page 11 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

The key text in the Recommendation was:

Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators

Recommendation: That Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators include dynamic

Page 12 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Generator Owners and MRO

Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators in MRO review procedures and monitoring to

This review to be completed by June 1, 2009 with a report submitted to MRO.

Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators in MRO develop a process to efficiently

Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators investigate alternatives for development of an

This review is to be completed by January 1, 2010 and documented in a report to MRO

Page 13 September 18, 2007 Event in MRO

Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators

Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO review

This review to be completed by June 1, 2009 with a report submitted to MRO.

Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO review

Recommendation: That Reliability Coordinators and Transmission Operators in MRO