Grant Beuchel #113327
420 S. San Pedro Street #311
Los Angeles, California 90013
(661) 428-7365
In Pro Per
GRANT BEUCHEL
Plaintiff,
vs.
LITTLE TOKYO LOFTS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION; DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,
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dj
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Defendants. »
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ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Case No. 18STCV09442
PLAINTIFF GRANT BEUCHEL’S
SUPPLEMENTAL FSC STATEMENT
FSC: SEPTEMBER 26, 2019
TIME: 8:30 A.M.
DEPT: 15
TRIAL: OCTOBER 2, 2019
TIME: 9:30AM.
DEPT: 15
HONORABLE RICHARD FRUIN, JUDGE
ACTION FILED: DECEMBER 24, 2018
TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR
Plaintiff Grant Beuchel hereby respectfully submits his “Supplemental Final Status
Conference Statement”, filed simultaneously with “Plaintiff"s Statement of Contested Issues”
pursuant tothe courts order of September 20, 2019 as follows:
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT
ae
(SUPPLEMENTAL)INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Beuchel’s original FSC statement is incorporated herein by this reference
including, but not limited to, a statement of the case; a discussion regarding the various causes
faction: evidentiary issues; a list of Plaintiff's witnesses; and requests for judicial notice. Thus
these discussions will not be duplicated herein.
PLAINTIFF'S STAKE IN THE OUTCOME
Plaintiff Beuchel isa 10- year owner of unit ¥311 located within the “Litle Tokyo Lofts”
(LTL) Association property which is near Little Tokyo but actually located in the heart of skid
row. Plaintiff does not expect a ‘perfect world” and did agree o accept certain risks when he
bought an ownership position in the LTL Common Interest Development (CID). For example,
Plaintiff accepted the risk that this CID does not have earthquake insurance and the chances thit
‘wll obtain such coverage is stim to rine, Another example, Plaintiff discovered that he could
not get ttle insurance on his 2 parking spaces during escrow because, according to the title
insurance company, they were a common area and thus not subject to coverage. Plaintiff
knowingly accepted these risks, as well as others, and bought an ownership interest
Plaintiff never agreed to the many risks complained of in his complaint on file herein
decrease in the
which have resulted in actual pecuniary harm to plaintiff and other owners;
quality of life residing within the premises; a decrease in value to the properts increased risk of
more personal injury lawsuits; and more fines and fees from the Department of Building &
Safety, ”Plaitffis very concemed that without some sort of intervention, judicial or otherwise,
itis only a matter of time before somebody becomes seriously injured ot loses their life
altogether. Plaintiff has already stated that he will prove atleast three (3) incidents that without
Plaintif’s intervention in avoidance, serious bodily injury and or death probably ‘would have
occurred.
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PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)
=FREQUESTS FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff's requests for judicial intervention fall primary into 5 distinct categories, and
while Plaintiffs not seeking monetary compensation, he has identified his requests for relief
generally herein as follows:
|A) Acourt finding that the Association eannot amend the CCR’ by promulgating an
stamended” set of Rules & Regulations which are in conflict, and an order declaring
those conflicts void. In short, the Association being unable to modify its CC&R’s for
tack of a 2/3rds vote of the owners', did nevertheless did thwart Civil Code Section
4205(d)? by incorporating those changes into an “amended” set of Rules &
Regulations.
B) A court finding that the Association is not enforcing its goveming documents
(specific sections as per proof) and for injunctive relief as will be defined and
outlined infra;
C) A court order enjoining the Association from using unlicensed and ‘uninsured
contractors when the law requires such licensure; and further enjoining them from
allowing said unlicensed and uninsured vendors on the property to do work
thereupon. Since the only vehicle entry onto the property (tothe loading dock and
garage area) is through a 24/7 guarded entry point, the Association could take
appropriate actions to prevent entry by obvious contractors and trades people;
) Ordering the Association to engage the services of a licensed contractor to inspect the|
property to discover illegal additions and modification to the property performed
or
1 4600. Vote required for granting exclusive use of common area by member - Unless the governing
documents specitya different percentage, the affirmative vote of members owning a 63st 67 percent of
the separate interest in the common interest development shall be required ‘before the board may grant
exclusive use of any portion of the common area to a member.
2 4205, Conflicts between documents - (a) conflict between governing documents and the law the law
shal prevail (b) conflict between articles of incorporation and the declaration (ie,, CCR’s) the
aan serra chal prevail; (e) conflict between the bylaws and the articles of incorporation the articles of
incorporation shall prevail and (d) conflict in operating roles and the bylaws, articles of incorporation, or
anccmraton (Le. CCR's); the bylaws, articles of incorporation or declaration (.e4 CCR’) shall prev
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)
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‘without the required permitting required by the Los Angeles Department of Building
& Safety; and when those illegal conditions are found, order the Association to bring
them into legal compliance within a reasonable time-frame;
E) A court finding that the Association is not maintaining the property in a “clean,
attractive & sanitary” condition as is required by CCR 2.1.1 with admonishment and
injunctive relief.
POINTS & AUTHORITIES RE: Failure to Enforce Governing Documents
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Restrictions on the use of Jand should be carried out to
e the legitimate desires of the coven: ies
The court stated in Hannula vs. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal 2d. 442 (1949), in pertinent part:
“Restrictions on the use of land will not be read into a restrictive
covenant by implication, but if the parties have expressed their
intentions to limit the use, that intention should be carried out, for
the primary objective in construing restrictive covenants, a5 i
construing all contracts, should be to effectuate the legitimate
desires of the covenanting parties.”
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Associations can initiate and defend legal actions in matters
that involve enforcement of the governing documents
‘Through their board of directors, associations can initiate and defend legal actions in
matters that involve enforcement of the governing documents*, and if they fail to do so, an
> Plaintiff requests that the court take judicial notice of the provisions of the CC&Rs pursuant to
Evidence Code §452(h)..
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)
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individual owner can bring an action to compe! their enforcement and seek injunctive relief
pursuant to Civil Code Section 5975* which states:
(@) The covenants and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable
equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and shall inure to the benefit of
nd bind all owners of separate interests in the development. Unless the
declaration states otherwise, these servitudes may be enforced by am
‘owner of a separate interest or by the association, or by both.
(b) A governing document other than the declaration may be enforced by
the association against an owner of a separate interest or by an owner of a
separate interest against the association.
(6) In anaction to enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party
‘shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
(Emphasis Added)
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Injunetive relief is an appropriate remedy.
‘As the court stated in Posey vs. Leavitt. 229 Cal App. 3" 1236 (1991), in pertinent part:
‘Under well-accepted principles of condominium law, a homeowner can
‘sue the association for damages and an injunction to compel the
‘association to enforce the provisions of the declaration. :
Any owner who believes that the association is not discharging its
duty to enforce the restrictions has an individual cause of action against
the association......(7 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 20:58, pp.
198-131. 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) § 495, pp. 672-
673.)
[Emphasis Added]
See Also, Ekstrom v Marquesa at +h Beach Homeowners Ass'n (2008) 168 CA4th
1111, 1125 (“[W]hen an association refuses to enforce its CC&R’s, a homeowner may seek
an injunction compelling it to do so.” [Emphasis Added]
«Civil Code §5973. Enforcement of Governing Documents. (Old Section 1354) (Added by Stats. 2012,
Ch. 180, See: 2, Effective January 1, 2013. Operative January 1, 2014, by Sec. fh 180)
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)
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Physical or financial harm are not required to
support an enforcement action and injunctive relief
No physical damage or financial harm need be shown in a CC&R enforcement action, and
proof of substantial damages from violation of a covenant is not an essential foundation to
the court's exercise of discretion in granting an injunction. Biaginivs. Hyde, 3 Cal. App 3d
877, 880 (1970) ("tis true that proof of substantial damages from violation of a covenant
is not an essential foundation to the court's exercise of discretion in granting an
injunction.") [See Also Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App. 2d 682, 690-691 (" ‘Where equitable
relief is sought, proof of actual or substantial injury is not essential, the establishment of a
violation of a uniform building restriction being all that is necessary to entitle a
’ ‘The propriety of affording equitable relief by injunction
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised according to the
14 CalJur.2d,
complaining owner to relie
circumstances and exigencies of each particular case.’ [Citation omitted}
Covenants, § 128]
v :
Safe Harbour
Defendants appear to be taking the position that they have done everything within their
power to enforce the governing documents all to no avail. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's belief
that this is a wholly specious argument since many other CID’s do not appear to have this same
problem, and giving defendants every benefit of doubt, Plaintiff suggests alternative relief in
the form of a Safe Harbour. Assuming that the Defendants find themselves in a position where
they cannot comply with the courts affirmative injunctive relief order, (i.¢., an order requiring
them to enforce certain provisions of the governing documents or else face fines & fees
payable to the court) Plaintiff shall accept the relief sought in his FSC statement page 10,
paragraph 12 which states:
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)
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Order the parties to “meet & confer” and choose among them 2 third-party
neutral property manager to observe the Association and all ofits vendors
pessist them in coming back into compliance with the law and general
veandards in the industry. If the parties are unable to choose a third-party
heutral property manager, each party wil submit to the court up 10
persons or legal entities thatthe party contends would be appropri along
Poth the persons background qualifications and expected costs associated
With the same. The court then may choose one of the submitted names to
verve the Association and at the expense of the Association.”
‘Asa quick aside, the board of directors at the present time is short one (1) member and
Plaintiff is willing to agree to have the “neutral property manager” sit on the board as a voting
member until such time that his or her services are no longer needed.
VI
Enforcement and Alternative Relief
Plaintiff has performed hours of legal research and has determined tothe best of his
ability thatthe standard relief in a failure to enforce an “equitable servitude”S is by way of
injunctive relief.
‘The problem is that when a person claims they are unable to do a task, for whatever
reason, its difficult to insist that they do it because it creates an enforcement nightmare, at
teast when the order requires an affirmative action as opposed to an order 10 refrain from
acting.” Also, it isnot fai to ask this court to “babysit” the person so ordered.
Plaintiff proposes a solution above in section “V". Plaintiff will agree and stipulate that
if the defendant accepts the Safe Harbour option, and follows any reasonable recommendations
Ea Ae be iar gett rachind 7
5 CCR’s are not contracts in the typical sense, but rather, ‘equitable servitudes running with the land.
‘There are two categories of restrictions-those found inthe CC&Rs (equitabie servitudes) and those later
adopted by an association's board of directors (rules & regulations), Restricts found in the CC&Rs are
waar ith very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact tht each individual unit
TRimer purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions tbe posed," while rules and
regulations are subjected toa reasonableness analysis. Villa del Las Palmas vs. Terifai, 33 Cal App 4" 73
2004)
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)of the neutral third-party property manager, that this shall be sufficient vo comply with the
courts affirmative injunctive relief orders.
s-asecond means of altemative relief, and honestly this isnot all hat the Plaintiff had
envisioned as judicial relief in this action atthe time his complaint was filed, the court could
simply make a finding that particular section ofthe governing documents was not being
enforced by the Association and admonish them that their stantory duties require them to
enforce, This admittedly is an order without any “teeth” whatsoever, Put Plaintiff will do his
vest to-work with that order to obtain enforcement which i, after al, the ultimate goal. It is
possible that a simple acknowledgement by a judge is enough to convince the ineonvincible
and to console the inconsolable. Of course, some kind of enforcement mechanism would be
better.
[Although all courts do have inherent powers of equity, these Powers should only be
exercised when there is no altemative remedy provided by code for the situation®, and here
emcees :
6 {his beyond dispute that "Courts have inherent power to adopt any suitable method of practice, both in
ordinary actions and special proceedings, ifthe procedure is not specified by statute or by rules adopted
by the Judicial Council. (Citation.]" (Citizens Utilities Co, ‘Superior Court (1963) 59-Cal.2d 805, 812-
£13, 31.Cal Rpt. 316, 382 P.2d 356.) That inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable
a anicalaver all proceedings connected with pending litigation in ort fo re the orderly
cant tration of justice (See Hays v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal 260, 264-265, 105 P.2d 975.)
‘Thus, courts are permitted to formulate rules of procedure where jus ‘demands it. (Adamson v.
Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.34 50, $09.) The Legislature has also recognized the authority of
erericg manage their proceedings and to adopt suitable methods of practice. (See Code Civ. Proc.. § §
128, 187; Rutherford v. Owens-llinois, nc. (1997) 16 Caltth 33 967, 67 Cal.Rptr.24 16, 941 P.2d
1203) Tis also wel established that courts have fundamental Tinherent equity, supervisory, and
caeistative powers, as well as inherent [237 Cal Rptr.3d.592] power control litigation before them.
(Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.Appth 1362, 1377, 5 Cal. Rptr,2d 882.) In addition to their
(herent equitable power derived from the historic power of equity court all courts have inherent
supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to fay 96) their duties, and which exist apart
operon statutory authority. (Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.dd 626, 636-637, 150 Cal. Rptr, 461, 586
24.942.) However, even with this authority, courts must ead ‘carefully when creating new procedures
Eeappellate courts will not authorize new procedures of dubious ‘constitutional validity. (In re Amber S.
(1993) 15 Cal,App-th 1260, 1266, 19 Cal Rp.24 404.) “Nor may we bless procedural innovations
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)
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there is a remedy provided by code, to wit, injunctive relief. However, the code does not
provide for a“safe harbor” alternative to this situation. Since plaintiffs allowing such an
alternative relief to exist, then the court under the umbrella of equity, may allow for that
alternative remedy to the defendants if they choose to take advantage of it with the
understanding that there is no obligation on the part of the defendants to do so. Such an
alternative form of relief would essentially negate any argument by defendants that they could
not comply with the courts affirmative order for whatever reason they may, in the future,
attempt to articulate,
‘Although a probate case, the court in Schwartz v, Lawson, 062708 CA APP2, B191484
found that the courts inherent equitable powers could be used to employ a “ess extreme
remedy.”
VI
Other Issues
‘The discussion of remedies set forth above will resolve most but not all of the issues
presented inthis case, Plaintiff will stil call upon the court to make judicial findings regarding
Civil Code Sections 4205, 4360, 4600, 4605 & 5975, assuming thatthe parties cannot stipulate
‘amongst themselves to resolve these other issues.
Respectfully Submitted,
Beuchel
In Propia Persona
inconsistent with the will ofthe Legislature or that usurp the Legislature’s role by fundamentally altering
Criminal procedures." (People v. Lujan (2012)211 CalAppth 1499, 1507, 150 Cal.Rowr.34 727.)
PLAINTIFF'S FSC STATEMENT (SUPPLEMENTAL)