Chapter XII
parcel so conveyed to him.
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
A. APPLICATION IN WRITING DULY SIGNED
BY APPLICANT
o Application must be in writing, signed
and sworn to by the applicant or by his
duly authorized representatives
o If more than 1 applicant, the application
shall be signed and sworn to by and on
behalf of each
o Full name, citizenship, status, residence
and post office address of the applicant
must be stated therein
o Also state whether the property is
conjugal, paraphernal or exclusively
owned by the applicant
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND
o Application must contain the description
of the land; number of parcels and
location thereof; nature of title thereto;
encumbrances, if any; occupants
thereon, names and addresses of
adjoining owners, if known; assessed
value of the property and the length of
possession
o Sec 14 PD No. 1529 allows 1
application by several applicants who
are co-owners
o Sec 18 PD No. 1529 allows 1
application covering several parcels of
land, provided they are situated within
the same province or city.
o If there is more than 1 applicant covering
several parcels of land over which they
are not co-owners , Sec 34 PD No. 1529
provides that the Rules of Court shall
apply by analogy or in character. Thus,
while there must be separate
applications to be filed, but if only 1
application is filed, there is then
misjoinder of causes of action and
parties which, if not objected to, will not
oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear
the application.
o The transferee of one of the parcels of
land covered by a single application
may continue, under an amended
application, the application as to such
If the amendment of the plan involves
increase in the Area, Substantial Change of
the Boundaries, or inclusion of additional
area, another Publication must be had
o Otherwise, if no publication is made, the
order approving the amendment is void; the
court is divested of its jurisdiction. If the
amendment results in the reduction of the
area, no further publication is needed.
Esqueta v. Director of Lands
o If amendments or alternations were
permitted in the description of land sought to
be registered, after the publication of the
application in the newspapers and the
issuance of the decree for the registration of
the property, on the petition of the interested
party, without new notifications and
advertisement whereby to make known to all
persons the said alterations and
amendments concerning the situation,
boundaries, and area of the land, the
mandate of the law would be violated
relative to the publicity of the proceedings
prescribed for the registration of real estate,
a publicity which permeates the whole
system of special trial established for the
registration of landed properties. Moreover,
third parties who have not had an
opportunity to present their claims, might be
seriously affected in their rights by not being
notified, it being natural and just that they be
not injured in consequence of the
rectification that is sought.
C. ATTACHMENTS TO APPLICATION
1. Tracing cloth plan or diazo polyester film
duly approved by the director of lands;
2. Copies of corresponding technical
descriptions
3. 3 copies of the surveyor’s certificate
4. All original muniments of titles in the
possession of the applicant which
proved his rights
5. Certificate in quadruplicate of the city or
provincial treasurer of the assessed
1
 value of the land, at its last assessment
for taxation or in the absence thereof,
that of the next preceding year.
However, in case the land has not been
assessed, the application may be accompanied
with an affidavit in quadruplicate of the fair market
value of the land signed by 3 disinterested
persons.
Chapter XIII
STEPS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER FOR
THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO LAND\
A. Survey of the land by the Bureau of Lands
or duly Licensed surveyor
o Must be drawn in a tracing cloth plan; and
approved only by the Director of Land
Management Bureau. Only the land
management bureau has the authority to
approve survey plans to be used in original
land registration proceedings.
B. Preparation and filling of the application
for registration by the applicant
o The application shall be filed before the RTC
of the province, city or municipality where
property is situated. It is then indorsed to the
MTC if there is no controversy over the land
or its value is less than Php 100,000. In
cases of delegated jurisdiction to the MTC,
the appeal shall be filed directly with the
Court of Appeals.
The Bureau of Lands must always be
furnished with a copy of the Petition and all
Pertinent Documents
o If the land is situated between boundaries of
two provinces, the application must be filed
with the appropriate RTC of the province
where the land is declared for taxation
purposes, if the boundaries are not defined.
If on the other hand, the boundaries of the
land are defined, a separate plan for each
portion must be prepared by the surveyor,
and a separate application for each lot must
be filed with appropriate RTC of the
respective province.
C. Setting of the date for the hearing of the
application by the court
D. Transmittal of the duplicate of the
application and the date of initial hearing
together with all documents attached
thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Registration Authority
Jurisdiction is acquired by the Publication of
the application in the official gazette.
E. Publication of Notice of Filing of
Application and of the Date and Place of
hearing once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines
o It is at this point that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
publication is done by the Administrator
who acts the clerk of court.
F. Service of notice upon contiguous
owners, occupants and those known to
have interests in the property by the
Sheriff
G. Filing of Answer or opposition to the
application by any person, whether
named in the notice or not
o Any opposition to the application must be
signed and sworn to; must state oppositor's
interest in the land and the grounds of
opposition. But substantial compliance is
allowed, when the opposition is unverified
and the defect was not objected to; when a
written appearance with opposition was
filed.
The written appearance with opposition
presented by petitioner was sufficient to give
him legal standing in court and would entitle
him to notice, as a matter of right
Nicolas v. Director of Lands and Camungao,
o the lower court dismissed a petition for
review of its judgment adjudicating the land
to an applicant, filed by an oppositor who
was not notified of the hearing, for the
reason that "[i]n the first place, the
opposition filed by him was not a valid
opposition because it was not sworn to as
required by the Land Registration Act. It was
simply a written appearance. In other words,
he failed to file his answer in due form.”
2
 o According to the Supreme Court, the written
appearance with opposition presented by
petitioner was a valid one, and sufficient to
give him a legal standing in court and would
entitle him to notice, as a matter of right. The
lower court erred in having chosen to ignore
the written appearance with opposition,
which was a substantial compliance with the
law, that requires a formal answer. In his
appearance-opposition, the petitioner
asserted that the land involved in the
application belonged to him by virtue of his
awarded Sales Application covering the
property of the applicant and of which an
administrative case had been instituted and
terminated in the Land Department on May
13, 1938, adjudicating the said property in
his favor, a fact which had been
categorically made known to the trial court,
when petitioner presented said appearance-
opposition, before the initial hearings of the
petition for registration filed by herein
respondents.
o In Nicolas, the Supreme Court stated that
"[wlith these allegations appearing in the
record, there was need for a formal hearing
of the petition for review, wherein the parties
should have been allowed to explain their
respective claims. How respondents had
come to court and said that they were in
continuous, open and notorious possession
of the properties since 1936, when upon the
other hand, petitioner claimed that he was in
possession, actual and physical, of the
same properties, since its award to him, by
virtue of a sales application, surely needs
more than a summary dismissal of the
petition."
Lack of, or defect in the verification of an
opposition may be waived by the adverse
party’s failure to make a proper and timely
objection thereto
Miller v. Director of Lands
G.R. No. L-16761. October 31, 1964.
A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate
which after survey, appeared to contain 411
hectares as per plan PSU-143798 was applied
for registration in the Court of First Instance of
Masbate on June 18, 1956 by John M. Miller and
Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was
held on June 20, 1957. The Director of Lands and
Bureau of Public Highways filed written
oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and
expressed verbal oppositions. All persons, except
the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in
default on July 8, 1957.
On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting
evidence and the private oppositors were given
five days to file written opposition. Of the 35
oppositors 28 filed written but unverified
opposition 1958. On August 20, 1958 applicants
finished adducing evidence and rested their case
On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors
presented their first witness. After his cross-
examination, counsel for applicants called the
court's attention to the lack of verification in the
opposition filed by the private oppositors and
moved to dismiss the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their
opposition. After parties had filed memoranda,
the court issued an order on January 13, 1959
dismissing the unverified opposition, without
pronouncement as to costs. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by order dated
November 18, 1959. The private oppositors have
appealed from both orders.
The requirement of verifying oppositions in land
registration proceedings is based on Sec. 34 of
Act 496
"Any person claiming an interest, whether named
in the notice or not, may appear and file an
answer on or before the return day, or within such
further time as may be allowed by the court. The
answer shall state all the objections to the
application, and shall set forth the interest
claimed by the party filing the same and apply for
the remedy desired, and shall be signed and
sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf."
Applicants failed to invoke this provision
seasonably. Without objecting to the unverified
opposition, they proceeded with the trial,
presented evidence and rested their case. Only
after the first witness of the private oppositors had
3
testified and applicants' counsel had cross-
examined him, was the defect of lack of
verification brought up. By that time, applicants
had waived the defect
"An objection to a want of verification must be
seasonably made.... The objection must be taken
before trial…The question cannot properly be
raised by an objection to the introduction of
evidence.
x o
Lack of, or defect in the verification of a pleading
may be waived by the adverse party's failure to
make a proper and timely objection thereto.
Where a party proceeds with the case as though
his adversary’s pleading were verified, he waives
the lack of verification of such pleading
X deemed adversely resolved with finality,
"The act of...proceeding to trial on the merits
withoutvobjection, is generally a waiver of all
uncertainties, ambiguities, irregularities, formal
defects, or faults or defects of any kind in the
pleadings of the adverse party.
x
"By going to trial without objection, a party may
waive the right to urge that his adversary's
pleading is not subscribed or verified…
Applicants contend that the defect could not be
waived because it resulted in the private
oppositors' lack of standing in the case from the
start.
This Court has already held unverified
oppositions sufficient to confer standing in court
to oppositors. In Malagum v. Pablo, a written
opposition not made under oath was dismissed
by the lower court. When oppositors sought from
this Court mandamus to have their opposition
reinstated, this Court denied the same for the
reason that petitioners "had appeared in the case,
had therefore standing in court, and the order
excluding their answer was in effect a final
determination of their rights" so that appeal and
not mandamus was their proper remedy
The Opposition's Nature of Interest need not
be in the Character of a Legal Owner
o It may be of a purely equitable nature as
when the oppositor is a beneficiary of a
Trust.
o The oppositor need not have the legal
character that would enable him to file the
application in his own behalf, as long as
he must have some claim on the
property.
All claims of third persons to the property
must be asserted in the registration
proceedings. If any claim to a portion
thereof is upheld, that portion segregated
from the property applied for, and is not
included in the decree of registration and
certificate of title subsequently issued to
the applicant. If it is included, the claim is
subject only to a petition for review of the
decree within one (1) year from its
issuance on the ground of fraud, under
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
De Castro v. Marcos
G.R.No. L-26093. January 27, 1969
The corrective powers of this Court are invoked in
this, an original petition for certiorari, to strike
down the reopening proceedings before the
cadastral court below X x x to annul said court's
orders rejecting petitioner's intervention for want
of personality to sue.
The litigation below commenced from the petition
of respondent Rufino Akia before the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City, acting as a
cadastral court, for the reopening of cadastral
proceedings, pursuant
to Republic Act 931. Respondent Akia there
sought the registration in his name of 15,922
square meters of land situated in the City of
Baguio.
Petitioner Virginia L. de Castro moved to
intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square
meters allegedly included in the 15,922
squaremeters of land specified in respondent
Akia's petition below.
XXX XXX XXX
4
To give a party standing in a Court of Land
Registration, he must make some claim to the
property
o Court declared that mere citizens could
have no interest in public land. At about the
same time, this Court also held that to give
a party standing in a court of land
registration, he must make some claim to
the property.
o Archbishop of Manila v. Barrio of Sto.
Cristo: Court pronounced that although an
opponent in a land registration proceeding
could not show title in himself, he was not
discapacitated from opposing the
registration sought by another. Plain was
the statement there that "[a]ll that is
necessary to enable anyone to exert the
faculty of opposition is that he should
appear to have an interest in the property."
And, so this Court added, "it is immaterial
whether this interest is in the character of
legal owner or is of a purely equitable
nature as where he is the beneficiary in a
trust." Later, this Court described a
homesteader who had not yet been issued
his title but who had fulfilled all the
conditions required by law, as a person
who should be regarded as asn equitable
owner of the land. Similarly, a purchaser of
friar land has an equitable title to the land
before the issuance of the patent.
o Pitargue v. Sorilla: laid down the principle
that a bona fide applicant of public land
may protect his right of possession and sue
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer or
pursue any Suitable remedy provided by
law. Indeed, an awardee in a sales
application is authorized to take
possession of the land to enable him to
comply with the requirements of the award
before title can be issued.
o A homestead entry segregates the
homestead from the public domain and
divests the Director of Lands of control and
possession thereof except if the
homestead application is finally
disapproved and the entry annulled or
revoked.
o persons who claim to be in possession of a
tract of public land and have applied with
the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have
the necessary personality to oppose
registration
o an award under a sales application has "the
effect of withdrawing the lands of the public
domain that were' disposable' by the
Director of Lands
o Under Republic Act 931, the petition for
reopening is narrowed down by the specific
conditions therein set forth. It bears
repetition say that said petition is possible
"only with respect to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved,
leased, granted or otherwise provisionally
or permanently disposed of by the
Government. The statute made it
abundantly clear that judicial proceedings
shall be reopened only, if the cadastral
court "shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with."
Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation,
lease, grant or any provisional or
permanent disposition by the government
of the land claimed should suffice to bar
reopening.
o Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must
be recalled, is an awardee in the public
bidding held upon her own township sales
application. Of course, the award up to now
has not been fully implemented because
she has not yet complied with one condition
imposed on her. But, if the award is not a
permanent disposition, it is at least a
provisional one, enough to prevent
reopening by respondent Akia as to the
land disputed.
Persons who may file opposition
o A homesteader who is qualified to be
issued a patent may file an opposition.
Likewise, a purchaser of friar land before
the patent is issued, an awardee of sales
application, or an applicant for sales
patent may file an opposition. Once an
opposition is filed, no default may be
entered against the one who filed the
opposition, even if he failed to appear
during the initial hearing.
o Director of Lands v. Santiago: the
Supreme Court quoted Sec. 34 of the
Land Registration Act, and as adopted in
Sec. 151 of the Public Land Act: “ Any
person claiming an interest, whether
5
 named in the notice or not, may appear
and file an answer on or before the return
day, or within such further time as may be
allowed by the court. The answer shall
state all the objections to the application,
and shall set forth the interest claimed by
the party filing the same and apply for the
remedy desired and shall be signed and
sworn to by him or by some person in his
behalf.
o In the said case, it appears that "on
February 19, 1974, or prior to the
issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing,
an opposition was filed by the petitioner
Director of Lands to the original
application for land registration of
respondent Garcia. That verified
opposition was precisely the answer
referred to in the above-quoted section,
for, as therein alleged by the Director of
Lands, neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee
simple ofthe parcels of land applied for;
neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest, have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
the lands in question for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the
present application; that the said parcels
of land are a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, and that, therefore, the same
should be declared part of the public
domain. As a matter of fact, under the
Property,Registration Decree, issued on
June 11, 1978, which supersedes all
other laws relative to registration of
property, the word used is "opposition"
and not "answer."
If an Opposition or Answer is filed based on
Substantial Grounds, it was Improper for the
Judge to Declare the Oppositor in Default
because he failed to appear on the day set for
the Initial Hearing
o Thus, the opposition or answer, which is
based on substantial grounds, having
been formally filed, it was improper for
the respondent Judge taking cognizance
of such registration case to declare the
oppositor in default simply because he
failed to appear on the day set for the
initial hearing. The pertinent provision of
law which states: "If no person appears
and answers within the time allowed, the
court may at once upon motion of the
applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a general default to be
recorded ...," cannot be interpreted to
mean that the court can just disregard the
answer before it, which has long been
filed, for such an interpretation would be
nothing less than illogical, unwarranted,
and unjust. Had the law intended that
failure of the oppositor to appear on the
date of the initial hearing would be a
ground for default despite his having filed
an answer, it would have been so stated
in unmistakable terms, considering the
serious consequences of an order of
default. Especially in this case where the
greater public interest is involved as the
land Sought to be registered is alleged to
be public land, the respondent Judge
should have received the applicant's
evidence and set another date for the
reception of the oppositor's evidence.
The oppositor in the Court below and
petitioner herein should have been
accorded ample opportunity to establish
the government's claim."
Private Persons may not File an Opposition
on behalf of the Government
o In such a case, they do not have
personality because the land belongs to
the State; simply put, private persons
cannot represent the interests of the
government.
o Roxas v. Cuevas: If it is the opinion of the
appellant that the land awarded by the
judgment to the petitioners does not
belong to private individuals but to the
Government, it follows that the
appellants, as respondents residing in
Calauang, can have no interest in said
land, as they are not the Government but
mere citizens. Since the land belongs to
the State, and since the lower court has
not so held it in its judgment, the
6
 aggrieved party would be the State and
not a mere citizen, and it is the State that
would have been entitled to appeal from
the judgment and not the respondents of
Calauang or any other private individual
to whom the representation of the State
or the Insular Government has not been
entrusted The Insular Government, duly
represented at the trial by the Attorney-
General, has not appealed before us, nor
have we to decide any question
connected with the rights of the State or
of the Insular Government. In order that
an application for registration of the title
of ownership in the Court of Land
Registration may be objected to,
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496,
the opposition must be based on the right
ofdominion or some other real right
opposed to the adjudication or
recognition of the ownership of the
petitioner, whether it be limited or
absolute; and if none such rights of the
respondent have been injured by the
judgment, he can not have, on his part,
the right to appeal from the said
judgment, whatever it may be, as neither
the said act nor any other law on this
matter grants any one the right to appeal
on behalf of another\ party and not in his
own name and by reason of his own
interest. It is only the legal personal right
of the respondent, prejudiced by the
judgment of the lower court, that can be
considered by this court upon appeal. No
right of their own being claimed by the
respondent, and inasmuch as the
decision they seek from this court is one
that the land adjudicated by the lower
court is the property of the Government,
there is no way for his court to consider
and decide as to a right which has not
been claimed in the appeal by the party
prejudiced, which in the present case
would be the Insular Government,
represented by the Attorney-General,
who has not appealed from the said
judgment
Even if the Government does not Oppose, the
applicant is still bound to prove
o The government may oppose, as the
land is presumed to be owned by the
State. Even if the government does not
oppose, the applicant is still bound to
prove his title to the land; the applicant is
not assured of a favorable decree if he
fails to prove his title.
o Republic v. Sayo: it appears that the
principal document relied upon and
presented by the applicants for
registration, to prove the private
character of the large tract of land subject
of their application, was a the National
Library dated August 16, 1932 to the
effect that according to the Government's
of Isabela issued in 1896, the property in
question was registered under the
Spanish system of land registration as
private property of Don Liberato Bayaua.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that
Spanish document cannot be considered
a title to property it not being one of the
grants made during the Spanish regime,
and obviously not constituting primary
evidence of ownership. It is an
inefficacious document on which to base
any finding of the private character of the
land in question.
o The Court further elucidated that the
mere initiation of an application for
registration of land under the Torrens Act
is not proof that the land is of private
Ownership, and not pertaining to the
public domain. It is precisely the
character of the land as private which the
applicant has the obligation of
establishing. For there can be no doubt
of the intendment of the Land
Registration Act, Act 496, that every
applicant must show a proper title for
registration; indeed, even in the absence
of any adverse claim, the applicant is not
assured of a favorable decree by the
Land Registration Court, if he fails to
establish a proper title for official
recognition.
o In Republic v. Sayo, it appears that the
decision of the Registration Court a quo
is based solely on the compromise
agreement of the parties. But that
compromise agreement included private
persons who had not adduced any
7
 competent evidence of their ownership
over the land subject of the registration
proceeding. Portions of the land in
controversy were assigned to persons or
entities who had presented nothing
whatever to prove their ownership of any
part of the land. What was done was to
consider the compromise agreement as
proof of title of the parties taking part
therein, a totally unacceptable
proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension
to persons who had not submitted any
substantiation at all of their pretensions
to ownership, founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they
had rights and interests over the land.
o The assent of the Directors of Lands and
Forest Development to the compromise
agreement did not and could not supply
the absence of evidence of title required
of the private respondents.
o As to the informacion posesoria invoked
by the private respondents, it should be
pointed out that under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode
of acquiring title to public lands, subject
to two (2) conditions: first, the inscription
thereof in the Registry of Property, and
second, actual, public, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of the land for
twenty (20) years (later reduced to ten
years) but where, as here, proof of
fulfillment of these conditions is absent
the informacion posesoria cannot be
considered as anything more than prima
facie evidence of possession.
Motion to Dismiss
-Motion to dismiss is proper in land registration
proceedings, as when the land applied for was
already litigated and declared as being owned by
the movant.
-In (Valisno v. Plan) the SC held that the Land
Registration Act does not provide for a pleading
similar to corresponding to a motion to dismiss.
-Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows
the application of the rules contained therein in
land registration proceedings in a suppletory
character or whenever practicable and
convenient.
A Motion to Dismiss is Proper, if it is shown
that the Court did not have Jurisdiction over
the Land that had been previously registered
in the name of the movant
-In (Duran v. Oliva) the SC sustained the
dismissal of the application for registration of
therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed
by five oppositors, it having having been
indubitably shown that the court a quo did not
have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought
to be registered in appellants’ name had
previously been registered in the names of the
oppositors.
Default
-In case no opposition is filed, then the allegations
in the application are deemed admitted by the
purported claimant. The claimant is deemed to
have forever lost his right in the land.
-the failure of the plaintiff, if he ever had any
interest or title in said land, to appear and oppose
the registration of the same or to question the
registration in his name during a period of one
year after the certificate of title had been issued,
operates to exclude him forever from questioning
the title granted under the Torrens system.
The failure of the plaintiff and her husband,
despite the Notice of the Publication and
Posting by the Sheriff of the Notice of Hearing,
to oppose the defendant’s application for
registration will bar them from questioning
the action of the Court on the application
-In (Esconde v. Barlongay) the SC cited the
statement of the RTC Judge, “A land registration
proceeding which is in rem, is valid and
conclusive against the whole world. The failure of
the plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice
of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the
8
notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant’s
application for registration will bar her from filing
this action”.
-Under Sec. 38 of Act 496 … Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto … It shall be conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the Insular Government and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice or citation or
included in the general description “To all whom
it may concern.” That under said section, this
decree became conclusive after one year from
the date of the entry, is not disputed. On the
contrary, this Court has invariably ruled that
“Land Registration is a proceeding in rem, and
binds all persons known and unknown.”
-It is a settled doctrine that when a decree of
registration has been obtained by fraud, the party
defrauded has only one year from entry of the
decree to file a petition for review before a
competent court, provided that the land has not
been transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value. Said sec. 38 categorically declares that
“upon the expiration of the said term of one (1)
year, every decree or certificate of title issued in
accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible.
-it has been held that a claimant having failed to
present his answer or objection to the registration
of a parcel of land under the Torrens System or
to question the validity of such registration within
a period of one year after the certificate of title had
been issued, had forever lost his right in said land
even granting that he had any right therein.
A Default Order shall be entered against those
who did not file answer/opposition
-A default order shall be entered against those
who did not file answer/opposition. A defaulted
party loses standing in court. However, a default
order may be lifted upon motion filed BEFORE
judgment. A defaulted party CANNOT claim that
is not bound by the judgment, as the proceedings
are in rem.
-in (Cachero v. Marzan) the SC ruled that the
Genovas were and are bound by the order of
default issued in Land Reg. Case No. N-824, a
proceeding undoubtedly in rem in character. That
default order was entered “against the whole
world,” with the exception only of the parties who
had appeared and filed pleadings in the
registration case, namely: Bernardino Marzan,
Cipriano Pulido, Magno Marzan, Hilario Marzan
and the Bureau of Lands. The Genovas were
charged with knowledge of the Cacheros’
application since notice of the application had
been published in accordance with law. They
could and should have taken part in the case to
assert and prove their rights over the property
subject thereof. The fact that they did not, cannot
operate to exclude them from the binding effects
of the in rem judgment rendered in the
proceedings.
Notwithstanding absence of Opposition from
the Government, the petitioner In Land
Registration is not relieved of the burden of
proving the Imperfect Right or Title Over the
Land
-in (Director of Lands v. Agustin) … The petitioner
is not necessarily entitled to have the land
registered under the Torrens system simply
because no one appears to oppose his title and
to oppose the registration of his land. He must
show, even though there is no opposition, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute
owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in
registering property under the Torrens system,
simply because there is no opposition offered.
Courts may, even in the absence of any
opposition, deny the registration of the land under
the Torrens system, upon the ground that the
facts presented did not show that petitioner is the
owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is
attempting to have registered.
-the plaintiff having lost his right to claim any
interest in the lots or parcels of land in question,
by virtue of his (a)failure to present any opposition
to the registration of the same under the Torrens
system, or (b) to question the validity of such
registration within a period of one year thereafter
he has forever lost his right therein, if he ever had
any.
9
H. Hearing of the case by the Court and
presentation of evidence.
-Republication or amendment of technical
description of land is necessary when there is
SUBSTANTIAL increase of the area of the land.
If the increase is merely MINIMAL, no
republication is needed.
-it is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in
cases where the original survey plan is amended
during the registration proceedings by the
addition of lands not previously included in the
original plan should publication be made in order
to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the
registration of the area that was added after the
publication of the original plan.
Once the Registration Court has acquired
Jurisdiction over a Certain Parcel of Land,
that Jurisdiction attaches to the Land
described in the application
-The settled rule, further, is that once the
registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a
certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the
registration proceedings in virtue of the
publication of the application, that jurisdiction
attaches to the land or lands mentioned and
described in the application. If it later shown that
the decree of registration had included land or
lands not included in the original application as
published, then the registration proceedings and
the decree of registration must be declared null
and void in so far---but only in so far --- as the
land not included in the publication is
concerned.
The Burden of Proof is on the applicant
because the presumption is that all Lands
belong to the State
-In (Director of Lands v. CA and Manlapaz) the
SC emphasized that the burden is on applicant to
prove his positive averments and not for the
government or the private oppositors to establish
a negative proposition insofar as the applicants’
specific lots are concerned.
Land Registration Courts have the Authority
to act not only on Applications for Original
Registration of Title, with Power to Hear and
Determine all questions arising upon such
Applications
I. Promulgation of the judgment by
the court.
-Land registration court may decide not only non-
controversial issues but contentious issues.
Under sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided
that “Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of titles to
lands, including improvements and interest
therein and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.”
-aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change
has simplified the registration proceedings by
conferring upon the RTCs the authority to act not
only on applications for original registration but
also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.
-Even while sec. 107 of P.D. No. 1529 speaks of
a petition which can be filed by one who wants to
compel another to surrender the certificates of
title to the Register of Deeds, this does not
preclude a party to a pending case to include as
incident therein the relief stated under sec. 107,
especially if the subject certificates of title to be
surrendered are intimately connected with the
subject matter of the principal action. This
principle is based on expediency and in
accordance with the policy against multiplicity of
suits.”
Unlike Ordinary Civil Actions, the
adjudication of land in a Cadastral or Land
Registration Proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until
after the expiration of one (1) year after the
entry of the Final Decree of Registration
10
-In addition, the Land Registration Authority and
the Land Management Bureau have the duty to
render reports on, among others, the status of the
land applied for, which could be submitted before
or after judgment, but not beyond the lapse of the
one (1) year period from the issuance of the
decree.
-Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of
land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one
(1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. This Court, in several decisions, has
held that as long as a final decree has not been
entered by the Land Registration Commission
(now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
-In (Gomez v. CA), petitioners contend that the
report of respondent Silverio Perez should have
been submitted to the court a quo before its
decision became final. But were we to sustain this
argument, we would be pressuring respondent
land registration officials to submit a report or
study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat
the reglamentary deadline for the finality of the
decision.
The Doctrine of Res Judicata Applies in Land
Registration and Cadastral Proceedings
-In (Vencilao v. Vano) the SC held that a final
judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case
between the same parties and their successors in
interest litigating upon the same thing and issue,
regardless of how erroneous it may be.
-In order, therefore, that there may be res
judicata, the following requisites must be present:
(a) The Former judgment must be final;
(b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties;
(c) it must be judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of cause of action.
- It is settled that notwithstanding the difference
in the form of two actions, the doctrine of res
adjudicata will apply where it appears that the
parties in effect were litigating for the same
thing. A party can not, by varying the form of
action, escape the effects of res adjudicata
-Well settled is the rule that a party can not by
varying the form of action, or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape
the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated
between the same parties or their privies.
-Accordingly, a final judgment in an ordinary
civil action, determining the ownership of
certain lands is res adjudicata in a registration
proceeding where the parties and property are
the same as in the former case
-But are there identities of parties in this case
before us and the former registration
proceedings? Identity of parties means that the
parties in the second case must be the same
parties in the first case, or at least, must be
successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the former action or
proceeding, or when the parties in the
subsequent case are heirs
Judgment of Dismissal of an application is
Not Res Judicata, and the unsuccessful
applicant may file another proceeding for the
registration of the same land.
JOSE P. HENSON vs THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS
G.R. No. L-10812
FACTS:
11
In the year 1904 an application (No, 466) was
filed by Pedro Pamintuan and others in the Court
of Land Registration asking that certain real
property located at Bulu, in the barrio of Santa
Catalina, pueblo of Angeles, Province of
Pampanga, be registered in conformity with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act.
Opposition in due form was made by the military
authorities in the Philippines on behalf of the
United States of America, on the ground, among
others, that part of the land was located within the
bounds of a military reservation. The Solicitor-
General also appeared for the Government of the
Philippine Islands and likewise opposed the
registration of said land. This application
remained pending in the Court of Land
Registration for several years, in the course of
which Mariano Vicente Henson and his wife
Maria Asuncion Leon y Santos were substituted
as parties in place of the original applicants. The
application was first decided favorably to the
applicants, but this judgment was reversed by the
Supreme Court upon appeal; and the cause was
remanded for further proceedings, with leave to
present an amended application and new plan,
with a view to establishing the boundaries of 92
hectares of which the court declared they were
owners. The cause was then heard again upon
additional proof in the Court of Land Registration.
The court came to the conclusion that the parcel
of which the applicants were supposed to be
owners could not be identified and that no part of
the land included in the application could be
registered in their names. Judgment was
accordingly entered, upon October 29, 1909,
dismissing the application. Several months later
the applicants made an ineffectual attempt by
motion to have the judgment opened in order that
they might present still further proofs of their title.
No appeal was taken by the applicants either from
final judgment or from the judgment disallowing
the motion.
Upon October 20, 1912, Jose P. Henson filed his
application in the present proceedings, praying
that the land which had been the subject of the
former proceeding should be registered in his
name. It appears that the title which he asserts is
derived by transfer from his father. The
Commanding General, of the Philippines'
Division, in due time appeared as opponent on
behalf of the Government of the United States, as
did also the Director of Lands, on behalf of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, each being
represented by the Attorney-General. The
opposition of the Commanding General is
primarily based on the contention that part of the
property mentioned in the application lies within
the boundaries of the old Military Reservation No.
10 and that no claim had been filed with respect
to this land within the period fixed by law for the
presentation thereof. In the opposition of the
Director of Lands reliance is chiefly made upon
the undisputed fact that the land which is the
subject of the application is the same as that
which was involved in Expediente No. 466 of the
Court of Land Registration, to which reference
has already been made, and that the
predecessors in interest of the present applicant
were the applicants in said proceedings when
final judgment of dismissal was rendered therein.
This opponent accordingly in his opposition relies
upon the judgment therein entered as a bar to the
present proceeding. law library
ISSUE: whether the judgment of the court in
dismissing an application for the registration of
land operates to debar the unsuccessful claimant
and persons deriving title under him from
renewing the application later in a different
proceeding; or stated in another way, does such
a judgment constitute res adjudicata as between
the applicant and a person who has successfully
opposed the application?
HELD:
We are not insensible of the fact that weighty
considerations may be adduced in favor of the
proposition that a matter once litigated should not
again be drawn in question between the same
parties. Interest rei pibllicae ut finis si litium. This
saying is undoubtedly well supported by
experience, and no judicial tribunal will lightly
ignore its precept. It is believed, however, that
when reference is had to the purpose and
practical application of the Land Registration Act,
considerations of public interest will be found
largely to preponderate in favor of the doctrine
announced in this decision. To hold that a decree
dismissing an application for the registration of a
parcel of land precludes the applicant and his
successors in interest from ever afterwards
renewing the application, if the party who
opposed the original proceeding or his
12
successors see fit to make further objection,
would lead to consequences much impairing the
usefulness of the system of registration created
by said
In passing upon applications of this character the
courts are constantly compelled to deny the
registration of titles which are comparatively good
though technically imperfect; and it is important
that as defects are cured by the effluxion of time
or discovery of new evidence, the owners, usually
the persons in possession, should again present
their titles for registration. Rare abuses may
possibly occur, and sometimes a disappointed
litigant, not having possession, may maliciously
harass the occupant of a coveted parcel of
ground. This inconvenience, or danger, in our
opinion by no means offsets the beneficial results
to be attained by encouraging owners to bring
their land under the operation of the land
registration law with all convenient dispatch. Of
course, no one could question the right of a
person to renew his application upon acquiring a
new title; and we now hold that the application
can be renewed notwithstanding the applicant
stands upon the same title that was previously
rejected.
When the Decision Attains Finality, the Court
Directs the Issuance of the Decree of
Registration
J. Issuance of an Order by the Court declaring
the judgment final and instruction the Land
Registration Authority to issue the decree of
registration in Accordance with Section 39 of
P.D. 1529
HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS vs MARIA
DE ERQUIAGA DE BANUVAR ET. AL.,
G.R. No. L-22110
DOCTRINE:
“The decision of March 24, 1938 had long
become final and executory as no appeal was
taken therefrom. The certification of the acting
provincial land officer of Masbate, dated March 8,
1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by
the Director of Lands or any private oppositors
from the decision rendered." The notation found
at the foot of the last page of the reconstituted
decision, showing that the La Urbana, Inc.
excepted from that decision, did not have the
effect of perfecting an appeal. An appeal was not
perfected by the mere notation, "Con mi
exception." The judgment rendered in a land
registration case becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days to be counted from the
date on which the party appealing receives notice
of the decision.
The decision of March 24, 1938 having
become final and executory, it devolved on both
the respondent court and the Land Registration
Commission to cause the issuance of a decree to
the person adjudged entitled to registration, that
is, as ordained, "el registro del lote No. 1, con
todas sus mejoras, y con excepcion de las
citadas mejoras pertenecientes al opositor
Cristobal Marcos" in favor of the applicant La
Urbana, Inc., or its successor-in-interest Santiago
de Erquiaga, or the private respondent De
Banuvar who substituted Santiago de Erquiaga.”
The court retains jurisdiction over the case
even after the lapse of the appeal period, but
not beyond the 1-year period from issuance
and Entry of Decree of Registration
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, ET. AL., vs CA
G.R. No. 77770
DOCTRINE:
“Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of
land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one
13
(1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. This Court, in several decisions, has
held that as long as a final decree has not been
entered by the Land Registration Commission
(now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.”
The Decree of Registration may be reviewed
on the ground of Fraud, and Petition on that
ground must be filed within 1 year from Entry
of the Decree.
K. Entry of the decree of registration in the
Land Registration Authority.
It is not the court but the Land of Registration
Authority which issues the decree of confirmation
and registration. 1 year after the issuance of the
decree, it becomes inconvertible and and
amendments of the same will not be allowed
except merely in case of clerical errors.
Meanwhile, the decree of registration may be
reviewed on the ground of fraud and petition on
that ground must be filed within 1 year from the
entry of decree.
A Torrens Title issued on the basis of a
Judgment that is not final is a nullity.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs CA
G.R. No. 102858
DOCTRINE:
We rule that execution pending appeal is not
applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is
fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent
purchasers may be misled into purchasing real
properties upon reliance on a judgment which
may be reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment
that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the
explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act
which requires that a decree shall be issued only
after the decision adjudicating the title becomes
final and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds concerned
issues the corresponding certificate of title.
Consequently, the lower court acted without
jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering
the issuance of a decree of registration despite
the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a
quo.
An Indirect or Collateral Attack on a Torrens
Title is not allowed
Purpose of Torrents Title:
a. To quiet the land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality
Once a title is registered, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the “mirador su
casato”, avoid the possibility of losing his land.
When can be a torrents title be collaterally
attack?
Where a person obtains a certificate of title to a
land to another and he has full knowledge of the
rights of the true owner. He is then considered
guilty of fraud may be compelled to transfer the
land to the defrauded owner.
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY vs
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-68741
DOCTRINE:
Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing
with property covered by a torrens certificate
of title are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. When there is
nothing on the certificate of title to indicate
any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the
purchaser is not required to explore further
than what the torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat
his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 545 [1985]).
FACTS:
Spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards sold
for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses
Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and
Amelita Magcamit as evidenced by "Kasulatan
14
Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with right to
repurchase was recorded in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna on December
6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972
the sale was made absolute by the spouses Vivas
and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for
the sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was
paid upon the execution of the instrument,
entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after
being credited with the P30,000.00 consideration
of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the
balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the
moment that the certificate of title is issued. From
the execution of said Kasulatan, private
respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse
and open possession of subject property.On
February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title
No. T-1728 covering the property in question was
issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas
and Lizardo without the knowledge of spouses
Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and
Amelita Magcamit.On April 30, 1975, spouses
Vivas and Lizardo executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing
the latter to mortgage the property with National
Grains Authority.
Issue: Whether or not violation of the terms of the
agreement between the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo, the sellers, and spouses Melencio
Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita
Magcamit , the buyers, to deliver the certificate of
title to the latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a
breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and
right acquired by petitioner NGA, an innocent
purchaser for value.
Held:
No.
Under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered
owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance
of a decree of registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of
title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those
noted on the certificate and any of the
encumbrances which may be subsisting, and
enumerated in the law. Under said provision,
claims and liens of whatever character, except
those mentioned by law as existing, against the
land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are
cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and
the certificate so issued binds the whole world,
including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs.
Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209 [1915]; Snyder
vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]).
Under said ruling, if the purchaser is the only
party who appears in the deeds and the
registration of titles in the property registry, no
one except such purchaser may be deemed by
law to be the owner of the properties in question
(Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
It does not appear that spouses Melencio
Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita
Magcamit claim falls under any of the exceptions
provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which
can be enforced against National Grains
Authority.
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank
is not required before accepting a mortgage to
make an investigation of the title of the property
being given as security (Phil. National
Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang Villalon, 139
SCRA 570 [1985]), and where innocent third
persons like mortgagee relying on the certificate
of title acquire rights over the property, their rights
cannot be disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA
489 [1985]).
The Issuance of a Decree of Registration is
part of the Judicial Function of the Courts and
is not a mere ministerial act that may be
compelled through mandamus.
VALMONTE & JACINTO vs NABLE
G.R. No. L-2842
Doctrine:
"It should be borne in mind that the adjudication
of land in a registration or cadastral case does not
become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final
decree. Within this period of one year the decree
15
may be reopened on the ground of fraud and the
decree may be set aside and the land adjudicated
to another party. As long as the final decree is not
issued and the period of one year within which it
may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision
remains under the control and sound discretion of
the court rendering it."
AFALLA & PINAROC vs ROSAURO, ET., AL.
G.R. No. 42315
Doctrine:
"As long as the final decree is not issued by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office in
accordance with the law, and the period of one
year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision
therein rendered continues to be under the
control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it."
CAPIO vs CAPIO
G.R. No. L-5761
Doctrine:
“ That the adjudication of land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
after the entry of the final decree; that as long as
the final decree is not issued and the period of
one year within which it may be reviewed has not
elapsed, the decision remains under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside
the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to
another party."
Although the final decree is actually prepared by
the Chief of the Land Registration Office, an
administrative officer, the issuance of the final
decree can be hardly be considered a ministerial
act for the reason that said Chief of the Land
Registration Office acts not as an administrative
officer but as an officer of the court and so the
issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and
not an administrative one.
L. Sending of Copy of the decree of
registration to the corresponding Registrar of
Deeds by the Land Registration
M. Inscription of the decree of registration in
the registration book and the issuance of the
owner’s duplicate certificate of the original
certificate of title to the applicant by Registrar
of Deeds upon payment of the prescribed
fees.
The Original Certificate of Title Shall be a True
Copy of the Decree of Registration.
The original certificate of title shall be a true copy
of the decree of registration. It shall state:
a. Full names of all persons whose interest
make up the ownership of land
b. Civil Status
c. Name of their respective spouses, if
married
d. Citizenship
e. Residence
f. Addresses.
g. The fact that the land was originally
registered
h. The record number
i. Original Certificate of Title number
j. Volume and page of the registration book
in which it is found.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs CA
G.R. No. L-57757
DOCTRINE:
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property acquired
during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this
case, it appears on the face of the title that the
properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the
property is registered in the name of a spouse
only and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to
said spouse. 12 And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when
the title is in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved. 13
FACTS:
16
Donata Montemayor is the administrator of 30
parcels of land of her late husband who died
intestate. Several portions of such land were
mortgaged to PNB as security for certain loans
availed by Salvador Vitug, Salvador Jaramilla and
Pedro Bacani, respectively. The loans were never
paid so the bank foreclosed all the mortgaged
properties. PNB as the highest bidder, purchased
the lots, and subsequently sold the same to the
Vitugs and the Fajardos.
Meanwhile, Donata executed a contract of lease
for a lot covered by TCT to her sons Pragmacio
and Maximo. After a few years, the same brothers
filed an action for partition and reconveyance with
damages in the CFI Pampanga against the PNB,
the Vitugs, the Fajardos and Marcelo Mendiola,
the special administrator of Donata’s intestate
estate. They claimed that the 30 oarcels of land
form part of the conjugal property of the spouses
Donata and Clodualdo and they claim a share
interest of 2/11 of ½ thereof. They assailed the
mortgage of said properties to the PNB and
subsequent public auction.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court of
appeals erred in not recognizing the
conclusiveness of the certificate, of title, as
provided in act 496, as amended (the land
registration).
HELD:
No.
When the subject properties were mortgaged to
the PNB they were registered in the name of
Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the
torrens certificate of title covering said properties
the mortgage loan applications of Donata were
granted by the PNB and the mortgages were duly
constituted and registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds.
In processing the loan applications of Donata
Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on
what appears in the certificates of title and no
more. On its face the properties are owned by
Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no
reason to doubt nor question the status of said
registered owner and her ownership thereof.
Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances
covering the same.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a
person dealing with a registered land has a right
to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man make
such inquiry.
A Torrents Title concludes all controversy
over ownership of the Land covered by a Final
Decree of Registration
MERCADO vs LIWANAG
G.R. No. L-14429
DOCTRINE:
Article 493 provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be alloted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Appellants except to the application of this
provision in this case for the reason that in the
deed of sale sought to be annulled the vendor
disposed of a divided and determinate half of the
land under co-ownership. The argument, as far
as it goes, seems to be tenable. What a co-owner
may dispose of under Article 493 is only his
undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right
to divide the property into parts and then convey
one part by metes and bounds. Lopez vs. Ilustre,
5 Phil. 567; Gonzales, et al. vs. Itchon, et al., 47
O.G. 6290; Manresa, Vol. 3, 7th ed. p. 630.
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