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 lſº &Sºf
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 Depository
RECE: vºo
MARO 31982
o,su, Lºraries

JANUARY 1982

|GEST

HELICOPTER
CHAMPIONS
 JANUARY 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 1

* * †
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Richard D. Kenyon
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 World Helicopter Champions, MAJ Bronislaw R. Maca

9 DA Aviation Update, BG Ellis D. Parker
14 DES Report To The Field: UH-1H Performance Planning
16 Telling It Like It Is
20 Hangar Talk: Final Exam, CW2 Gary R. Weiland
22 Army Aviation, A Partner In Space, Betty J. Goodson
24 Fully Modernized Cobras in the National Guard, LTC
Jerold L. Jensen
26 FAIP, An Acronym That Has To Be Earned, 1LT Edward
F. Schauberger and 1LT Jeffrey S. Alderfer
28 Developing A Training Program For Army
Aviators, MAJ William T. Carter
30 The Fighter/Interceptor Helicopter, MAJ Frank E.
Babiasz
33 Reporting Final
34 PEARL'S
36 Threat: Helicopters—The Soviet View,
CW4 Richard A. Davis
43 Glaciers, SP4 Mary Kathryn Henderson
45 Increasing Efficiency In Mobility Fuels, MAJ
Johnny J. Grice and CPT John R. Morrisette
48 Views From Readers

Inside Back Cover: RSI Report, Mr. Rush Wicker

Back Cover: ATC Action Line: Vignettes, CW4 Peter
C. McHugh
§ Cover: We feature the emblem of the United
#7 States Helicopter Team that won the Fourth World
º Helicopter Championship competition in Poland.
º Also shown is CW2 George Chrest who gained
- top individual honors as the world's best helicopter
pilot. Illustration by Paul Fretts

Honorable John A. Marsh Jr.

Secretary of the Army
Richard K. Tierney
Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General US Army Aviation Center
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the U.S Army Aviation Center Photos are U S Army unless otherwise
specified. Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders
unless otherwise stated Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the
Digest and to the author, unless otherwise indicated
Articles, photos and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited Direct
communication is authorized to Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P O Drawer
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981, in accordance with Army Regulation
31 O-1
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1 Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR, AG
Publications Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard. Baltimore. MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements. Initiate a revised DA Form 12-5
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, US
Government Printing Office washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription rates
are
º
A review of the prior year's accomplishments
will many times cause us to resolve to do better
in the new year. But there is one area wherein
members of the Army Aviation community simply
can't improve further. If you are among the World
Helicopter Champions, where do you go from
there? By now, everyone knows this is the title
earned by our team at the fourth international
competition held in Poland, but it is also the title
of Major Bronislaw R. Maca's article in this issue.
His words will give you the feeling you are there
as the U.S. team put their helicopters through
the strenuous and demanding events to bring
home the team title as well as the top position in
the individual standings.
A special awards ceremony for the team mem
bers was hosted by the Secretary of the Army in
November at Fort Myer, VA, to include a review
by members of the 3d U.S. Infantry, “The Old
Guard." Brigadier General Don Parker talks about
the occasion in "Department of the Army Aviation
Update." As the Deputy Director for Requirements
and the Army Aviation Officer in ODCSOPS, he
also covers other significant items of aviation
interest at the Pentagon level and plans to provide
us with future quarterly "Update" articles. This
should help to keep us all better informed as to
what is transpiring at the Pentagon level affecting
all of us in the aviation community.
Response from the field to our October 1981
“Digest" issue which examined helicopter air-to
air combat has been tremendous. Since all aspects
of that broad topic could obviously not be covered
in a single issue, you will see some follow-on
*articles in the months to come. We would hope
that you in the field who are training on and
testing these new concepts will send us your
contributions. We know that much has already
been done at Fort Hood—so let us hear from you.
This month we have “The Figher/Interceptor
Helicopter—A Concept for Today and Tomorrow"
by Major Frank E. Babiasz. Such an aircraft, he
declares, would provide the “most mobile Army
air defense system ever devised that is directly
responsive to the ground commander."
Whenever we talk about our aircraft and their
use, one item that always has to be considered is
the matter of fuel. And at today's prices, we need
to give it even more consideration. Our limited
and expensive supply is opposed by an unabated
and increasing demand, thus fuel conservation
January 1982
should be a topic of never-ending concern. Major
Johnny J. Grice and Captain John R. Morrisette
recognized the need for “a method for measuring
our fuel efficiency which would be congruous
for the total environment." The one they devised
is described in “Increasing Efficiency in Mobility
Fuels—An Approach to Energy Conservation."
The authors relate some of the actions taken at
Fort Rucker to decrease the use of mobility fuels.
This article is worthy of close scrutiny by every
member of the Army Aviation team because we
must save energy today to have enough for
tomorrow. Initiatives taken in 1981 at the School
alone accounted for a savings of more than one
million gallons of JP-4. But the Aviation Center
accounts for only 25 percent of the Army's flying
hours, so think how many more millions of gallons
Could be saved if all of our units apply equally
Stringent fuel conservation measures. We welcome
the sharing of your ideas in this area.
Now speaking of tomorrows, there are several
ahead of us in 1982. Let us challenge ourselves,
each and every one in Army Aviation to higher
standards of excellence in the coming year—on
the ground and in the air. Be it in safety, operations,
maintenance—in the motor pool or in the dining
facility, set and achieve only the highest of Army
standards. By so doing, Army Aviation, in this our
40th year of service to the nation, will continue
to establish a proud heritage for those who follow.
Happy New Year!!
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 ******ksºzea.
-
world HELICOPTER
T HE FOURTH WORLD Hel
icopter Championships
were held in Piotrkow Try
bunalski, Poland, 140 kilometers
southwest of Warsaw. The United
States Helicopter Team was
scheduled to arrive at Warsaw's
Okecie Airport at 1415 on 11
August 1981.
I had been in Warsaw since 6
August 1981, attending to the
- wºº "ºº"A
details of the team's arrival and
the last-minute changes to the
coordination effected in June
1981. I was sitting at the airport
director's office when a call came
in on one of his telephones. The
Galaxy, as it was referred to by
all the Poles, had penetrated
Polish airspace and was proceed
ing inbound. With me was the
Army's PIO team from Heidel
Major Bronislaw R. Maca
Directorate of Combat Developments
Fort Rucker, AL
-
berg, Germany, which was to
cover the arrival of the team and
the Army's participation in the
championships. Soon we de
parted for the domestic side of
the airport, where the C-5A would
park and offload. There was a
sense of excitement and antici
pation. I was particularly excited
since I knew how hard the team
had trained and prepared for this
U.S. Army Aviation Digest

competition and finally their much
awaited arrival in Poland was
going to materialize.
* The domestic ramp had been
cleared of all aircraft that usually
Occupy parking spaces there. A
large crowd of news reporters,
TV crews and airport personnel
was already there. Since Warsaw
International is considered a part
of the Polish border, the WOP
(border) guards were present
everywhere. Their military uni
forms and sidearms were a som
ber reminder as to where this
was taking place. Finally, the
landing lights appeared on the
horizon. As they got closer, it was
obvious that they belonged to
the Galaxy. The massive landing
gear touched the runway and a
shiver ran down my spine. I was
witnessing the largest aircraft in
the world, flying American colors,
landing in Communist Poland for
the very first time. It was a
historic event. All at once the
responsibility that the team mem
bers shouldered had grown to
enormous proportions. This was
the very first time. It was a
Aviation was going to demon
strate and display itself in a Com
CHAMPIONS
photo by Piotr Gawronski
January 1982
!
83 556R9
munist country. What an awe
some responsibility!
The colossal aircraft taxied
majestically onto the parking
ramp. Using the outside engines,
the Galaxy “turned on a dime.”
It looked so huge and powerful.
So American!
The welcoming party, includ
ing the American Ambassador
to Poland, approached the air
craft. Finally, the door opened
and the team came down the
stairs. Honorable Francis J.
Meehan, the U.S. Ambassador,
warmly shook hands with each
member of the team and the crew
of the C-5A. He also addressed
the team as a whole, welcoming
them to Poland and wishing the
team the very best in the up
coming competition.
I think it needs to be pointed
out here that the prevailing Pol
ish opinion of the American Sol
dier was very negative. It was
based not only on the “sloppy
Joe" image of World War II, but
also on the Communist propa
ganda. Well, what they were
witnessing was in drastic contrast
to that. The Americans looked
terrific. They were slim, trim and
º Big, bold letters on the tail booms
| l;0 ce ºn 22
young. Their immaculate groom
ing complemented their perfect
ly fitting uniforms. Wearing an
American flag on their shoulders,
they appeared very confident
and proud. The whole event
seemed like a craft with super
humans landed from another
world.
The American military earned
the immediate admiration and
respect of the Polish people.
(Somehow I feel they (the people)
had it all along, this was just an
opportunity to express it.)
After the necessary formali
ties of customs and passport
checks, the team proceeded to
offload their equipment. This was
probably the highlight of the
C-5A's arrival in Warsaw. The
Crowd watched in amazement as
the Galaxy knelt very gently be
fore them. The TV cameras came
to life as the nose of the aircraft
slowly started its upward move
ment, revealing the enormous
mouth and its interior cargo space.
The whole operation looked like
a demonstration of the free world's
technological achievements.
Silently the team went about
emptying this whale. Everyone
had his assigned duties and went
about them in perfect harmony.
To the amazement of the crowd,
the team pulled out 3 UH-1H
Huey aircraft, 4 OH-58 Kiowas,
1 M-880 truck and 2 X-4 con
tainers loaded with tools and PLL
(prescribed load list). In a matter
of 3 hours, the C-5 was emptied
and the team's aircraft were “dress
right, dressed" on the ramp. Let
me tell you, folks, they looked
good. All were painted Army VIP
scheme with glossy OD and white.
identified the proud men who
flew and maintained them. Red,
white and blue flags on each
fuselage somehow looked dif
ferent now. They looked brighter,
bigger and so beautiful!
Since the team could not pro
ceed to Piotrkow Trybunalski (the
 EVENT .
TIME ARRIVAL AND
RESCUE
o turn point 2
| turn point
“ EVENT 2.
PRECISION FLYING
finish
stort
takeoff ——
site of the championships) until
the 14th, the aircraft were repo
sitioned to a holding area on the
airfield.
The crowd received another
treat as the Galaxy started its
preparations for departure. The
ramp went up, the nose came
down and the whole aircraft got
on its feet. As the C-5 rotated on
takeoff and started a steep climb
out, I looked at my watch. It was
just past 1900 hours. Not too
shabby.
Walking through the terminal
on the way to my car, I noticed a
aerodrome
large crowd of people gathered
around a TV receiver. I could
barely see the TV screen through
the crowd. The national news
was on and the team's arrival in
the Galaxy was being covered
in detail. I watched the whole
program and listened to the can
did remarks by the viewing audi
ence. I was so proud to be an
American!
The team stayed in Warsaw
from 11 to 14 August. The objec
tive of arriving early was to get
over jet lag and to acclimatize to
local conditions. The team took
full advantage of this opportunity
to sightsee in Warsaw.
On the 14th, all the teams were
Scheduled to arrive at Piotrkow
Trybunalski. The organizer and
his staff worked very hard to
prepare for the championships.
A lot of preparations were done
at the last minute, because they
too had anticipated the events
in Poland to postpone or cancel
the championships. At about
1200 hours, the U.S. team led
by a Polish Mi-2 from Swidnik
factory, arrived at Piotrkow aero
drome. As expected, the host
team was already on the ground.
Later in the afternoon, the teams
from Russia, France, Great Bri
tain and West Germany arrived
in that order. Our only civilian
entry in the competition, Bell
206L from Bell Textron, arrived
with the West German team.
The next day's schedule start
ed with Colonel Alojzy Gorny,
the director of the champion
ships, welcoming all the partici
pants, wishing them great suc
cesses and introducing various
officials. Most of the day was
occupied by the many admin
istrative details, meetings, tech
nical checks of the aircraft and
local area orientation flights. A
pilot's meeting was held late in
the afternoon to cover in detail
tomorrow's first event of the
competition, the timed arrival and
rescue.
The official language of the
competition was English (the
working language was Polish);
however, the majority of the
material in the briefings was
given in Polish and then trans
lated. Although the organizer
provided each team with a trans
lator, complete translation was
an almost impossible task since
none of the translators were
pilots. Therefore, none of the
teams had the advantage of full
knowledge. None except the
U.S. team. Thanks to a very thor
ough and detailed “plan of attack"
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
 EVENT º
by our commander/coach Major NAVIGATION EXERCISE
Roy E. Mann, the U.S. team had turn point
native speaking linguists who
were full functioning members finish
of the team as well as aviators. drop point 2
The first event of the compe
tition was preceded by an Olym
pic style opening ceremony in
search area
the city's stadium. A crowd of
about 20,000 spectators was on
hand to witness the colorful pa
rade of the teams, welcomed by
Polish and FAI (Federation Aero
nautique Internationale) dignitar
ies, and an air show of balloons,
parachutists and fixed wing aero
batics.
The first event consisted of a
rather simple navigation course
(65 kilometers) with two turning
points, terminating at the stadium.
There, simulating the drop of a EVENT 4.
medicine parcel, the copilot had |HELICOPTER SLALOM
to lower a bottle of champagne
suspended on a 7-meter rope
through a 40 cm hole in a mock º --AL 4--
rooftop (see scoring chart). The ©" entry Tekeeſi
pilot was given both the takeoff
and arrival times. All the timing
was measured electronically to
1/100 of a second. The first aircraft
off the start line at the airfield
was a Polish Mi-2, second was a
Soviet Mi-2, third, a U.S. UH-1H
piloted by CW3 Earl Jewkes,
copilot was CW3 Robert Stolwor ertſ Finish

thy. As the Huey crossed the

finish line the announcer confirm
ed the unofficial finish time of
* 0.00 seconds deviation from the
given arrival time. It was an extra
ordinary accomplishment. Al
though CW3 Jewkes and CW3
Stolworthy were competing in
individual competition only, none
theless, as the first U.S. aircraft
across the finish line, they set
the pace for the competition with
this perfect 200 score. Another
perfect score was achieved by
CW3 Irwin Starrack and CW3
Robert Miller, flying for both team
and individual competition, with
0.40 seconds deviation (standard
round-off procedures apply, i.e.,
0.49 seconds—no penalty points,
0.51 seconds—one penalty point).
Backed by scores of 199 (CW2
George Chrestand CPT Stephen
Kee) and 195 (CW3 John Bailey
and CW2 Al Porter), the U.S. team
took a 9-point lead over the se
cond place British team at the
end of the first day of competi
tion. At the same time, in individ
ual standings, the United States
held the top three places. It was
a great day for our team and it
was obvious that the hard work
was paying off.
Monday, 16 August, was the
second event of the competition.
Precision Flying was the name.
Each aircraft had two ropes with
small weights attached to them,
directly beneath the pilot a 2
meter rope and behind him on
the rear skid crosstube a 3-meter
rope. The idea was to navigate a
set course keeping the 3-meter
weight on the ground and the 2
meter weight off the ground. The
Course was a 50 meter X 50 meter
Square with corridors 1-meter
wide and a 70-meter exit corridor
coming off at a 45-degree angle
from one of the corners. The pilot
was required to keep the front

January 1982
rope attachment point inside the
corridors and maintain constant
heading while navigating the
course frontwards, sidewards,
backwards and diagonally. Two
360-degree turns had to be ac
complished at two corners with
a given minimum rate of turn.
This was a timed event with the
maximum allowed time for com
pletion of 210 seconds. A last
minute change in the rules al
most put the U.S. team off bal
ance. The change allowed no
part of the copilot's body to be
outside the aircraft except his
head. This was in great contrast
to the way we practiced. How
ever, due largely to our tactical
training and the flexibility of our
crews, the U.S. team was able to
recover very quickly. The team
of CW3 Irwin Starrack and CW3
Robert Miller recorded a perfect
200 score as did CW2 George
Chrest and CPT Stephen Kee.
CW3 John Bailey with CW2 Al
Porter earned a 197 giving the
U.S. team a comfortable lead of
15 points. Two other U.S. crews
scored a perfect run in this event,
CW2 Scott Berrier with WO1
Robert McConnell and CW3
Roger Bodwell with CW3 John
Durkin. However, since they
were in individual competition
only, their score was not com
puted in the overall team score.
By the day's end, the United
States still maintained the top
three individual places: 1. CW3C
t
Starrack/CW3 Miller; 2. CW2
Chrest/CPT Kee, and; 3. CW2
Berrier/WO1 McConnell, who
had just joined the top three.
The most difficult event of the
competition was the third event,
the Navigation Exercise. I think
everyone knew that. Unfortun
ately, the Poles knew it also. It
consisted of a long navigation
course of 160 kilometers and an
8-kilometer-in-diameter circular
search area with entry and exit
points, a perfect semicircle navi
gation section, a pick-up point,
two drop points and a couple of
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
//

º ºr ATES HELITTPTER TEAM

Page 6, top to bottom: Members of the U.S. helicopter team offload

a UH-1 Huey from the C-5A Galaxy (photo by SFC Harold Hopewell)

The U.S. team military members, front row, left to right, SFC David
L. Young, CW3 Roger A. Bodwell, CW3 Robert L. Miller, CW3 Irvin
B. Starrak, CW2 Alan L Porter, CW3 John T. Bailey, SGT Charles R.
Poole, SGT Patrick O. Jackson, SP4 Robert A. Didrickson, SGT
Jimmie G. Mead, CW2 Scott E. Berrier, WO1 Robert E. McConnell,
SGT Paul D. Smith, CPT John W. Connors; back row, left to right,
MAJ Bronislaw R. Maca, CPT Karol J. Kawalec, CW3 Robert A.
Stolworthy, SP4 Robert S. Frazier, CW3 Norman T. Thompson,
CW3 Don E. Jewkes, MAJ Roy E. Mann, SGM John P. Traylor, CW2
Robbie D. Robinette, CW2 Ronald C. Whetstone, CW2 George D.
Chrest, CW3 John J. Durkin, PFC Bowman T. Wright, SP4 Ralph T.
Rogers, CW3 Ronald C. Rivera. Team members not pictured are:
CPT Stephen G. Kee, CPT Arthur C. Sippo, SGT Paul C. Nelson;
also International Assistant Judges LTC Herbert V. Kerner, CW4
Charles L. Proctor, CW2 Nick P. Walters

Page 7, top to bottom: CW3 John T. Bailey of the American team holds
his OH-58 Kiowa in position as his copilot, CW2 Alan L Porter, lowers a
bucket of water on a target in the middle of a table, the final test in the
slalom event (photo by SFC Harold Hopewell)

SP4 Scott Frazier, crewchief with the U.S. Helicopter Team, gives his
Huey a careful check before and after every flight (photo by Gary
Bloomfield)

During a break in competition at the World Helicopter Campionships in

Poland, WO1 R.E. McConnell (left) and CW3 Norman.T.Thompson, both
pilots with the U.S. Helicopter Team, “talk shop" with Russian female
pilot Natasha Kostaneva (photo by Gary Bloomfield)
World Champion Helicopter Pilot, CW2 George Chrest, U.S. Army
(behind) helps the former champion, Soviet pilot Vladimir Smirnov,
prepare for a ride in an OH-58 Kiowa helicopter during exchange
flights while the two were in Poland for the World elicopter Champion
ships. CW2 Chrest and other members of the U.S. Helicopter Team
won both individual pilot and team competition (photo by Gary
Bloomfield)
 turning points. The crews were
given start time, search area
entry time and scheduled arrival
time at the finish line. Along the
flight route and in the search area
were objects to be identified and
recorded. Some were photo
graphs and some were panel
markers (1 meter X 5 meters).
The time in the search area was
limited to 6 minutes. Oh, wait,
each crew received a map (with
course drawn), search area entry
time, arrival time and 8 photo
graphs: They were given these
exactly 5 minutes before takeoff.
Ready? Go!
Well, nobody did well except
the Poles. They placed seven of
CW2 George D. Chrest (left) and CPT Stephen G.
Kee hold high the trophy for First Place Individual
World Championship
º
"
their crews in the top nine po
sitions. (We found out the next
day by looking at an overprinted
T-shirt that Polish Championships
were held in the same place in
the spring.) Naturally, the Polish
team won event #3, Germany
took second, and the United
States third.
The overall team standings still
had us leading second place
Poland by 6 points, with West
Germany 8 points behind Poland.
Wednesday, 19 August, was
the last compulsory event of the
championships, the Slalom. It
was shortly before this event that
the U.S. team suffered its near
fatal blow. After the first event,
both Poland and Germany had
protested points that had been
deducted from their totals for
snaking (changing aircraft's atti
tude or heading during the final
5 kilometers of the course).
Following close examination,
the arbiter judges returned 25
points to Poland and 15 points
to Germany. This put the U.S.
team in third position, 19 points
behind the leader. Taking the
lead seemed such an impossi
ble task being 19 points behind
and with only one event left in
the competition. The team was
disheartened, but far from sub
dued.
The Slalom consisted of 12
gates, measuring 1 meter across
and 2 meters high and oriented
in different directions. The Ob
jective was to navigate a 6 kg
bucket of water suspended on a
5-meter rope through these gates
and then place the center of the
bucket as close as possible to
the center of a table (1 meter in
diameter and 2 meters high) at
the end of the course. Four min
utes was the time limit for this
event.
The team felt very confident
about this event. It was our strong
est and perhaps the most prac
ticed event. The day prior to this
final event, I told the Polish Ra
dio, during a live interview, that
I felt very confident our team
would win the competition in
spite of the set back (returning
points to the Polish and German
teams).
The pilots' briefing was held
with no surprises and the starting
order was confirmed. My confi
dence grew stronger as I learned
that the Polish team celebrated
its victory (the regained points)
with a lot of Polish vodka the
previous night. Just prior to the
start, the U.S. team members got
in a huddle by their aircraft. It
was now or never. A few words,
a few moments of silence then—
Let's do it!
They did it! Every crew put
out maximum effort with total
concentration and determina
tion. Not only did the U.S. team
make up the 19 points on the
Poles, it set them 20 points be
hind. Extraordinary! A gain of
39 points. The U.S. team also
gained three points on the Ger
man team. This catupulted the
Americans to first place only 2
points ahead of the German team
and 20 points ahead of the third
place Polish team. The United
States had the World Champion
Helicopter Team.
The crews that secured this
final victory were: CW2 George
Chrest/Cpt Stephen Kee—199
points, CW3 John Bailey/CW2
Al Porter— 199 points, and Mr. tº
John Williams/Mr. Morten Meng
— 199 points, both the latter from
Bell Helicopter.
The outstanding performance
by CW2 Chrest and CPT Keese
cured them the top position in
the individual standings.
In turn, CW2Chrest was desig
nated the World Helicopter
Champion pilot. Both CW2
Chrest and CPT Kee were award
 Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker
Army Aviation Officer, ODCSOPS, HQDA
Department of the Army
AVIATION UPDATE
O; OF MY CONCERNS while commanding
the 17th Aviation Group in Korea was being
able to keep my command current on all of the
many happenings in Army Aviation around the world.
Now that I am the Deputy Director for Require
ments and the Army Aviation Officer in the Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
(DCSOPS), I want to do everything I can to assist
field commanders in keeping their commands in
formed. As I view our aviation program from my
vantage point in Washington, there are numerous
activities taking place that many times we assume are
common knowledge in the field. Knowing that this is
not the case, I want to be sure that Department of the
Army (DA) level aviation actions are communicated
as widely as possible through the various forums we
have available.
This is the first of a series of articles that will be
entitled “Department of the Army Aviation Update"
and published quarterly in Aviation Digest. In at
tempting to outline the many facets of our aviation
program for you, I will be drawing from the monthly
meetings of our recently established Washington area
aviation “team.” A few months ago, representatives
from 25 different DA-level agencies met for the first
time to update each other on current activities, and to
share our best thoughts and ideas on where we are—or
should be—headed. The results of our first three
meetings have been extremely beneficial in allowing
for closer coordination of actions directly affecting
Army Aviation and in keeping me informed across
the entire spectrum of aviation issues. Much of that
$ information is passed on to you in this article.
Before doing so, however, let me briefly relate the
results of two very important events involving Army
aviators. We held our annual U.S. Army Aviation
Training Symposium and Policy Committee Meeting
at Ft. Rucker, AL, last November. For 5 days, the
Major Army Command (MACOM) aviation officers,
several group and battalion/squadron level command
ers, and representatives from many aviation units
worldwide met to study and propose resolutions to
some 75 issues affecting all aspects of our aviation
program. We heard keynote addresses from General
Robert M. Shoemaker, commander, U.S. Army Forces
Command, and Major General Guy S. Meloy III,
director of training, DCSOPS, that set the tone for
what proved to be an extremely productive session
for all involved. The hard work and insight of some of
January 1982
Army Aviation's best will definitely assist decision
makers at all levels to chart the course in policy and
program development for both the present and the
future. I will not go into detail here on the issues we
tackled because the Aviation Digest covered the
conference in the December issue and is planning a
more comprehensive article. Also, I am relying on
your representatives who participated to debrief you
on the results. I do, however, want to be sure that the
key issue transcending all others is clear to all: Army
Aviation must be fully integrated into every aspect of
the Army's combined arms training program. We
spent a lot of time talking about that one issue, and I
trust that each representative carried back to the
field a renewed vision for meeting our responsibilities
as a member of the Army combined arms team. We
are on our way, but must continue with dedicated
efforts if we are to measure up to what is expected of
uS.
The second event I want to highlight is the awards
ceremony held in November for the Army members
of our World Champion Helicopter Team which is
featured in this issue of the Aviation Digest in an
exceptionally fine article by Major Bruno Maca. He
did an outstanding job as executive officer of our
team. As most of you know, we sent a United States
team of our very best military and civilian helicopter
pilots to Piotrkow Trybunalski, Poland last August to
compete in the Fourth World Helicopter Champion
ships. Due to the hard work and flying skill of some
tremendously dedicated people, the United States
team won the championship and also had the winning
crew in Chief Warrant Officer, CW2, George Chrest
and Captain Stephen Kee. The significant accomplish
ments of the Army team members, so indicative of
the teamwork, professionalism and competitive spirit
that is integral to Army Aviation, were duly recognized
in a truly impressive awards ceremony at Ft. Myer,
VA. The ceremony was hosted by the Secretary of
the Army, the Army Chief of Staff and the 3d Infantry
(Old Guard), and was attended by many from through
out the Washington area. The Secretary of Defense,
the Honorable Casper Weinberger, was the guest
speaker and paid special tribute to those who so well
represented their country and Army Aviation in world
competition. It was definitely a fitting culmination to
many months of preparation and execution.
This quarter, I want to update you on several areas.
In our equipment research, development and acquisi
 . . . will enable the AHIP/NTSH to
designate targets for the HELLFIRE
. . . COPPERHEAD . . . and Air
Force Smart bombs.
tion, there is significant activity in almost every major
program.
• Army Helicopter Improvement Program/Near
Term Scout Helicopter (AHIP/NTSH). On 21 Septem
ber 1981, the Army announced the award of the devel
opment contract for AHIP/NTSH to Bell Helicopter
Textron of Fort Worth, TX. The contract calls for
improvements to OH-58 Kiowa helicopters in the
active Army inventory. The mission equipment to be
installed on the NTSH includes a mast-mounted sight
for day and night target acquisition and laser designa
tion from masked positions. The laser range finder/
designator will enable the AHIP/NTSH to desig
nate targets for the HELLFIRE missile fired from
the advanced attack helicopter, the COPPERHEAD
laser guided artillery munition and Air Force “smart
bombs.” The AHIP/NTSH also will be equipped with
a Doppler navigation system and improved communi
cations gear. Hover performance improvements will
be made to enable the system to meet worldwide
employment requirements that include Middle East
contingencies.
• AH-64 Apache. On 18 November 1981, the Army
System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC), chaired
by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, decided to enter
production on both the AH-64 and HELLFIRE. The
procurement program calls for 446 aircraft to be
delivered to the Army between fiscal year (FY) 1982
and the end of FY 1988. The Army production decision
will be presented to the Defense System Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC) early in February for final
approval. This decision is indicative of Army recog
nition of the tremendous combat multiplier potential
in aviation systems. We now face the task of preparing
for the training and employment challenge that will
confront us in fielding this impressive aircraft system.
• AH-1S Cobra. The contract for Phase I implementa
tion of the FLIR (forward looking infrared radar)-Aug
mented Cobra Tow Sight/Inproved Tow Missile System
(FACTS/ITMS) program was signed by the contracting
officer on 16 September 1981. Phase I is the program
analysis phase whereby the contractor provides analysis
for augmenting the telescopic sight with a FLIR module.
Contract dollar value for FY 1981 obligation is $1.8
million. FY 1982 funding requirements of $.9 million
were awarded 31 December 1981. Total Phase I contract
10
effort is estimated not to exceed $2.7 million.
• CH-47D Chinook. The Desert RAM (reliability,
availability, maintainability) test of the CH-47D was
completed at Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ, on
11 September 1981. The test lasted 43 days and
consisted of 80 flight hours during day and night
operations with internal and external loads in a sandy,
dusty, desert environment. The aircraft and crew
were exposed to natural heat with ambient temperature
121°F, cockpit temperature 132°F and frequent surface
temperatures above 140°F. No significant CH-47D
peculiar problems in a desert environment were
identified; and assessment of RAM, human factors,
safety, logistics supportability, aircraft capabilities
and maintenance personnel training on the CH-47D
in that environment has been determined successful
and satisfactory.
• UH-60A Black Hawk. The Black Hawk program is
on track, with continued efforts to “fine tune” where
necessary. Congress recently accepted the Army
proposal to produce 96 aircraft during FY 1982 to add
to the fleet. On 4 November, the 200th UH-60A was
delivered to the Army by Sikorsky. To date, Black
Hawks have been assigned to six U.S. Army combat
units and two training commands. They are operational
with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Ft. Camp
bell, KY; 82nd Airborne Division, Ft. Bragg, NC; 9th
Infantry Division, Ft. Lewis, WA; and combat support
aviation companies at Forts Stewart and Benning, GA.
Black Hawks are also assigned to Ft. Rucker, AL, for
pilot training and Ft. Eustis, VA, for maintenance training.
UH-60A aircraft will soon be delivered to selected
units in U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR).
• Improved GUARDRAIL V Contract Award. On
30 September 1981, the signing of the FY 1981 Improved
GUARDRAILV contract took place at the Electronic
Warfare Laboratory, Ft. Monmouth, NJ. This award
will procure the first of the Improved GUARDRAIL
V systems that will replace the GUARDRAILV systems
deployed in October 1978. Electromagnetic Systems
Laboratories, Sunnyvale, CA, is the prime contractor
with Beech Aircraft Corp., Wichita, KS being the sub
COntractor.
• Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE). A planning
conference was held with the ASE project manager
and the users (both Army and Marines) to develop a
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
requirements specification for an upgrade to the
AN/APR-39(V)1 radar warning receiver (RWR). The
siser has stated that the number one ASE priority is
the addition of a small processor (voice synthesized)
to the RWR which would incorporate millimeter wave,
laser warning, chemical warfare and interometer
information. This would permit the pilot, flying at
nap-of-the-earth (NOE), to be warned of a radar threat
without having to check an indicator on the instrument
panel. The Marines will fund the research and develop
ment effort in FY 1982, the Army will fund it in FY 1983
and, if all goes well, a production decision could be pos
sible in FY 1984. ASE contracts awarded recently include
the production of the AN/ALQ-156 missile detector
for the CH-47 and the AN/APR-39(V)2 SEMA Radar
Warning Receiver. Research and development con
tracts call for the design, integration, fabrication test
and qualification of three prototype Hover Infrared
Suppressor Subsystems (HIRSS) for the UH-60 Black
Hawk aircraft and an Infrared Countermeasures
Suppressor/Jammer installation retrofit kit for the
UH-1H.
• Night Fix. In view of the urgent need to fight at
night with night vision goggles, action has been taken
to achieve compatibility between the goggles and the
aircraft lighting systems. A plan of execution, called
Night Fix, was developed by the Army Materiel
Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM)
and has been implemented. During Phase I Night Fix,
the UH-1, CH-47, OH-58 and AH-1 aircraft will be
modified by a DARCOM team at selected field
locations. The modification adds blue/green lighting
filters to the current red lighting in these aircraft. The
Night Fix will meet the urgent requirement to fight at
night with night vision goggles. The following milestones
have been established for Phase I Night Fix Program:
15 October 1981 to
Prototype cockpits were
31 October 1981 modified at Corpus Christi
Army Depot (CCAD), TX.
1 November 1981 to CCAD fabricates and as
sembles kits.
July 1982
5 January 1981 to Kit application at establish
31 August 1982 ed sites.
In the area of commissioned aviator management,
the Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL, is moving full
speed ahead to assume its new role as the personnel
management proponent for Specialty Code (SC) 15,
as outlined in the new AR600-101. Concurrently with
organizing to meet this new requirement of decen
tralized proponency, Major General Carl H. McNair
Jr., Aviation Center commander, and his staff have
carefully evaluated the current accession methodology
and training program for our company grade aviators.
Briefings were presented recently to the Army Staff,
MACOM commanders, and to the Army Chief of
January 1982
Staff on the current status and options for the future
in these two areas. The Chief of Staff concurred with
the recommendation to continue bringing officers
into the aviation program in the three aviation specialties
(SC 15, 71 and 67J) and commissioning them into the
approved “carrier branches” as now programed in
the aviator management plan. He further concurred
with the plan to continue current efforts to improve
combined arms training for both aviators and ground
combat arms in our officer education system (Officer
Basic Course/Officer Advanced Course) and in our
unit training programs. The Transportation Center,
Ft. Eustis, VA, as the proponent for SC71 aviators, is
also actively pursuing its new personnel management
responsibilities.
The aviator training challenge is one that will always
be with us. The task is not easy. Not only are we faced
with the requirement to be technically proficient in
aviation systems that are becoming increasingly complex,
but aviators must know combined arms tactics better
than anyone on the battlefield. Obviously, initial entry
flight training just gets us started in learning the system–
the real proficiency comes with extensive hands-on
experience in the field. Likewise, the basic and advanced
courses are not structured to produce aviator tactical
experts. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRA
DOC) proponent schools that train aviators are
attempting to develop a curriculum that will integrate
air and ground tactics for both the aviator and their
Armor, Infantry, etc., contemporaries. But real exper
tise in combined arms employment comes from train
ing together at the unit level. Improvement is needed
on both sides in our field training programs. Aviation
commanders must “push” their capabilities and inform
ground commanders on how to employ aviation.
Conversely, ground commanders must “pull" aviation
into the ground scheme of maneuver and use the
aviation assets available to multiply their own capability.
The joint training opportunities are there. We must
discipline ourselves to take advantage of them during
every exercise.
Force Structure is receiving considerable emphasis
right now. The Total Army Analysis (TAA-88) Study
is examining the feasibility of converting all divisional
(except the 82d and 101st) TOE aviation units to the
Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) (CBAA) structure using
current and projected assets. The goal of this effort is
to provide data with which to make decisions regarding
the aviation force structure to be included in the FY
1984 to 1988 program objective memorandum (POM)
next spring. Any trade-offs necessary to achieve the
divisional CBAA structure that cannot be resolved by
TAA-88, plus the aviation structure for corps and
echelons above corps (EAC) will be addressed by the
ARCSA IV study scheduled to begin 1 April 82 with a
completion date of the end of 4th quarter FY 1982.
11
 In January 1982, the Army will begin
testing the concept of including aircraft
with its POMCUS equipment in Europe.
For aviation enlisted personnel, implementation of
CMF 67 (Aviation Maintenance) decisions continue.
In other areas:
Effective 17 August 1981, both enlistment and re
enlistment bonuses were increased for military occupa
tional specialty (MOS) 93J (air traffic control (ATC)
radar controller) and MOS 93H (ATC tower operator).
Anyone enlisting for one of these MOSs for 3 years
receives a $5000 bonus. Reenlistment bonuses were
increased to 4A (Soldiers with between 21 months
and 6 years service), 4B (6 to 10 years), and 4C (11 to
14 years). This equates to monthly base pay X 4 ×
number of years of reenlistment. Training rates have
doubled for FY 1982 and almost all quotas have been
filled. Further expansion of training rates is expected
for FY 1983. The Army has 197 air traffic controllers
currently TDY (temporary duty) to the Federal Aviation
Administration. They will be returning to their Army
jobs in phases during FY 1982.
TRADOC has recently approved and will conduct
an Aviation Life Support Equipment (ALSE) ASI Q2
training course. It will be conducted at Ft. Eustis,
with 12 classes scheduled each year. Quotas for FY
1982 classes will be nine per class with MILPERCEN
(U.S. Army Military Personnel Center) responsible for
filling four or five seats per class. Soldiers in grades
E5 through E7 possessing any of the 67 series MOSs
may apply for attendance in course number 860
ASIQ2 on DA Form 4187 which must be forwarded
through normal command channels to Commander,
U.S. Army MILPERCEN, Attention: DAPC-EPT-F,
2462 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22331. Appli
cants not on assignment instructions may be scheduled
to attend in a TDY and return status only if the local
command will fund the school. Soldiers on assignment
instructions will be scheduled in a TDY enroute status.
Those wishing to attend enroute to a new duty station
must apply in sufficient time to allow for forwarding
of application and amendment of PCS orders prior
to departure from losing command. This course will
replace the one at Chanute AFB, IL.
DA Circular 611-81-2, dated 1 March 1981, provides
instructions to implement enlisted MOS changes to
CMF 67. A new MOS, 67H Observaton Airplane
Repairer, was established to provide separate
identification for those positions and personnel
in units equipped with OV-1 aircraft. There was
12
no change for positions or personnel in units
equipped with utility/cargo airplanes, which
remain 67G.
Most of our developmental and operational testing
for major systems has been completed. The Advanced
Attack Helicopter operational test II was completed
on 28 August 1981. The only major tests projected for
the near future involve the Cobra FLIR-Augmented
Cobra TOW Sight (FACTS) and the near-term scout
helicopter (AHIP). Other tests recently completed,
underway or scheduled to begin soon include the
Helicopter Flotation Kit, UH-60 Flight Simulator (OT
II), Instrument Meteorological Conditions Simulator
(CEP), UH-60A Aeromedical Kit (OT IIA), Aviators
Night Vision Imaging System (ANVIS), XM-33 Pro
tective Mask, Air-to-Air Missile Concept Evaluation
Program, Night Hawk/Night Vision Goggle Weather
Minimums Test, MILES-AGES/AD, and the Helicopter
Oxygen System.
Mr. Joe Cribbins, the Special Assistant for Aviation
to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, remains
busy as always. In January 1982, the Army will begin
testing the concept of including aircraft with its
POMCUS (Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configur
ation In Unit Sets) equipment in Europe. Fourteen
AH-1S aircraft will be stored in a humidity controlled
environment as part of this test. Additionally, adding
a National Guard Aviation Repair and Classification
Depot (AVCRAD) to the POMCUS program is
planned. The mission of the AVCRAD would be to
facilitate the pipeline flow of aircraft to and from
Europe and to provide back-up depot level repair to
USAREUR aviation units. Out at Fort Lewis, WA,
the DCSLOG has asked Major General Robert M.
Elton, 9th Infantry Division commander, to evaluate
the need for a maintenance battalion versus the
company that is currently included in the CBAA
structure. The CBAA test is scheduled to begin in
February.
For aeromedical aviators; the aeromedical kit for
the UH-60A successfully passed its second operational
test (OT II) with the 326th Medical Battalion, Ft.
Campbell, KY in September. The first Black Hawk
for aeromedical evacuation units will be fielded
beginning in March 1982 with the kits installed.
National Guard (NG) aviators are excited about
some innovations in their aviation program. The most
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
recent was the formation of four AVCRAD round-out
units. During mobilization these units are assigned to
DARCOM to provide depot levelaviation maintenance.
Additionally, they have a real peacetime mission of
providing back-up AVIM (aviation intermediate main
tenance) and limited depot repair to NG aviation units.
In the training area, initial entry rotary wing training
quotas for the NG increase over the next few years to
205. By the way, if you missed the November 1981
issue of the Aviation Digest, I recommend you get a
copy. It has excellent coverage of the National Guard.
For our military intelligence aviators; TRADOC,
DARCOM and the Army Staff are in the initial stages
of evaluating requirements for SEMA-X, a replacement
platform for the OV-1 Mohawk and eventually the
RC-12 Huron. Additionally, development of the
Integrated Inertial Navigation System (IINS) continues
in an effort to provide an accurate avionics navigational
and positioning system to support the special electronics
mission.
The Aeronautical Services Office at Cameron
Station, VA, represents the DCSOPS in providing
liaison to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
I'd liked to highlight a few of the areas this office is
involved with.
Pressure on special use airspace (restricted areas,
etc): The ever increasing competition for use of the
national airspace is putting increased pressure on
Department of Defense requirements for special use
airspace. Increased aviation fuel costs make direct
routing increasingly important to the hard pressed
commercial carriers. Special use airspace frequently
causes deviations from direct routing. The constant
pressure on the FAA has the effect of continuously
eroding the availability of special use airspace through
procedural changes and increased segmentation. It is
imperative that the Army present a logical and credible
rationale for its special use airspace requirements as
well as being perceived as an efficient and cooperative
user of it. The FAA has begun a 4 year program for
a complete review of the National Airspace System
(NAS). This review could challenge military airspace
needs. While the Air Force owns most of the restricted
airspace, the Army has almost 100 areas that are also
under constant review. The DOD input to this review
will be through the DOD Advisory Committee on
Federal Aviation, of which the DCSOPS is the Army
member. DOD is trying to place an Air Force general
officer on the FAA executive Review Board of the
National Airspace System Study in an effort to ensure
that military needs are adequately considered.
The increased competition for the use of the national
airspace is further manifested in the increased emphasis
on strict adherence to Federal Air Regulations. All of
us need to make sure we know and comply with these
regulations.
January 1982
The FAA Administrator has selected Traffic Alert
and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) as the collision
avoidance system for the United States. The impact
on the Army will probably be to require an improved
transponder. A Mode S (data link) will be added at
sometime in the future. The Army may have to purchase
a TCAS I for its CONUS based U-21/C-12 fleet within
5 years at a cost of about $5 to $10 thousand per
aircraft.
The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Aviation program
is preparing to meet some real challenges in the near
future. The biggest source of aviators to fill Army
Reserve Aviation units and Individual Ready Reserve
(IRR) positions are former active component aviators.
The great majority of these officers are Vietnam
veterans who are moving toward retirement beginning
in 1987. Average USAR aviator age is almost 37
years. The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve plans to
conduct a brief survey among its 1400 aviators to get a
profile of the aging aviators' retirement intentions.
The profile will permit them to forecast the need for
initial entry training and recruiting efforts more
accurately. The December 1981 issue of the Aviation
Digest has several outstanding articles covering USAR
aviation. And, if you will be completing active service
in Army Aviation, you will be interested in the listing
on the outside back cover of the December issue. It
contains a listing of USAR aviation units and their
telephone numbers in 27 states. If you can't get a copy
of this issue write the editor at P.O. Drawer P, Ft.
Rucker, AL 36362. It's a wise decision to join one of
these fine units.
There are several aviation studies underway at the
Concepts Analysis Agency in Bethesda, MD. One of
these is the Apache, Black Hawk and Chinook Self
Deployment Helicopter (ABCD) Study, which began
in October 1981 and is scheduled to continue through
June 1982. The study plan has been approved, mis
sion profiles are being established and an ABCD
model development is on schedule. This study will
thoroughly review the subject of helicopter self
deployability in order to provide the Army with recom
mendations concerning BG Ellis D. Parker
the feasibility of heli
copters being flown to
OVerSeaS areas.
I trust that the infor
mation provided above
is of some use to you as
you continue to repre
sent Army Aviation, no
matter where you are
assigned. I look forward
to your comments or
suggestions as we contin
ue to expand our dia
logue together in the
months to come. Gº

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
UH-1H Performance Planning
|F ONYOUR LAST mission you had been given
an in-flight mission change to pick up a full load of
combat equipped troops, would you have known
what indicated torque at a 5-foot skid height hover
corresponded to an aircraft gross weight of 9,500
pounds? If you answer is NO, then you are the in
dividual who needs to keep reading. If your answer is
YES, read on anyway. You might be surprised!
Without quoting numerous statistics from our visits
to the field, one of the weaker areas found during oral
evaluations is the use of the Performance Planning
Card (PPC). The following paragraphs should clear up
any misunderstandings; and the reading will be enhanced
if, right now, you get yourself a cup of coffee, a-10
and a TC 1-135 aircrew training manual (ATM).
Task #1005 in the ATM states that the PPC (DA
Form 4887-R (1 Jun 80)) will be used, so now is a good
time to check whether your unit has a supply of current
PPCs and to dispose of all those obsolete cards lining
drawers and cluttering closets. The same task states
that the PPC will be computed for all takeoff and
landing operations to include, as a minimum, those
items preceded by an asterisk. How often have you
defaulted in that task? It takes about as long as it took
you to get the aforementioned cup of coffee to compute
and complete a PPC; so each time you fly, get your
copilot to get the beverages while you complete a
PPC.
Task #2002 in the ATM gives very explicit instructions
on how to compute performance for most of the PPC
asterisk items. Briefly outlined, to compute the maximum
torque available, use the chart on page 7-13 of the – 10
and note that this chart is for 30-minute operation. The
implications of using this chart as opposed to the
continuous operation chart on the next page is that the
14
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
SIANDARDIlATION
engine EGT (exhaust gas temperature) is likely to be
in the yellow range (610 to 625 degrees C) when using
maximum torque available. By intersecting the pressure
altitude and temperature in the top chart and moving
vertically downwards, the maximum calibrated torque
can be read. Turning to page 7-17 of the –10, the GO
NO-GO can be computed. Starting at the bottom left
chart, move vertically upwards from the maximum
calibrated torque available to the 50-foot out of ground
effect (OGE) line; move horizontally to the 5-foot skid
height line and then vertically downwards to read the
calibrated GO-NO-GO torque. Provided that you have
this figure (converted to an indicated torque) or less in
a 5-foot hover power check, you have sufficient power
to perform any maneuver in the flight envelope of the
aircraft at that density altitude. However, prior to nap
of-the-earth flight, an OGE hover check is required in
accordance with TC 1-135, Task #4008. Predicted
torque is computed by intersecting pressure altitude
and temperature in the top chart, moving vertically
downwards to the appropriate weight, horizontally left
to the 5-foot skid height line and vertically downwards
to read the calibrated torque. Predicted torque, unlike
maximum torque available and GO-NO-GO torque, is
not a function of engine performance; and there can
be a difference between predicted torque and the
torque actually indicated in a 5-foot hover due to
numerous errors, such as gauge inaccuracy, dirty main
rotor blades or wind.
Note #1 in Task #2002 states that certain GO-NO
GO torques equate to a gross weight in excess of 9,500
pounds and that the hover chart should be used to find
the torque setting that corresponds to 9,500 pounds.
Recent graduates from flight school may have heard
this referred to as “corrected GO-NO-GO" or “modified
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
GO-NO-GO"; but with no such nomenclature on the
new (and much printed) PPC, it was decided to call it
“Validation Factor.” Validation factor is computed by
intersecting pressure altitude and temperature, moving
vertically downwards to 9,500 pounds, horizontally
across to the 5-foot skid height line and vertically
downwards to read a calibrated torque. A number of
avid readers of FLIGHTFAX were slightly confused
by the last paragraph of this past July's STACOM #70
regarding validation factor. To clarify this matter, if in
a 5-foot hover, the indicated torque is more than the
predicted validation factor indicated torque, the aircraft
is likely to be in excess of 9,500 pounds. Land the
aircraft and either off-load cargo or recompute the
365F (weight and balance form) to confirm the weight
of the aircraft. If the weight is below 9,500 pounds,
then the GO-NO-GO may be used. (Remember GO
NO-GO is a function of engine power and validation
factor being a predicted torque could be inaccurate
because of dirty main rotor blades, etc.)
All calibrated torques are converted to indicated
values by the use of the chart on page 7-13 of the – 10.
Move vertically upwards from the calibrated torque
to the calibration factor obtained from the aircraft
engine data plate, then move horizontally left to read
the indicated torque.
Safe pedal margin can be computed from the hover
chart only if you have calm winds. If there is a wind,
then the cart on page 5-4.1 of the – 10 will be used. In
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL
January 1982
the upper chart intersect pressure altitude and temp
erature and move vertically downwards to the weight
of the aircraft. This point, by interpolation between
the given wind speed lines, will give a wind speed
below which there is a safe pedal margin. If the actual
wind is at or above that interpolated, note which lettered
sector the point is in, and turn the page. Select the
wind speed and move around to the point where it
enters the appropriate lettered sector and note the
radial; then do the same where it exits the lettered
sector. You should avoid placing the wind between
these two radials, relative to the nose of the aircraft at
a hover. Computing for a pinnacle landing at a pressure
altitude of 10,000 feet, outside air temperature of 0
degrees C, gross weight of 8,500 pounds and wind of
360/10, the chart shows its necessity if the most desirable
approach is 300 degrees.
There are a number of things wrong with the
Directional Control Margin charts of Change 6 to the
— 10, but DA Form 2028 action is in hand and there
will be a change in the near future.
Landing data need only be computed if there is
going to be a significant change in density altitude
(pressure altitude and/or temperature).
With the practice of computing performance for
each flight, it becomes second nature, and hopefully
this weakness found in many aviators will become a
strength. *—”
36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message
15
When it comes to Tº º
identifying the greatest GG)=>
º cause of Army air- C.
craft mishaps and placing
the blame squarely where it
belongs, nothing can
compare with . . .

tellingitikeitis

U.S. Army Aviation Digest

 ECHNICALLY speaking, all
mishaps are associated, directly
or indirectly, with the human
element. For example, when some
component of an aircraft fails
prematurely and produces a mishap,
the materiel failure can, in theory, be
attributed to the human element.
After all, somebody designed the
unit, determined the materials to be
used in its construction, manufac
tured it, and after inspecting and
testing it, issued it for use.
Although deficiencies in design
have, at times, produced catastrophic
results, most such deficiencies are
identified and corrected before any
serious mishaps can occur. As a rule,
the remedy appears in the form of an
MWO or as a replacement item.
On the other hand, the human
element is directly responsible for
some of the system failures which
often lead to mishaps. These result
from what might be termed voluntary
or willful human action--but one that
is not done with any intent to cause
problems. Usually this type of error,
although committed deliberately,
results from a lack of knowledge and
a lack of supervision.
Examples are numerous. One
concerns problems associated with
UH-1 trunnion installation. Following
a mishap that occurred when a
trunnion separated from the outer
swashplate, maintenance personnel
performed a one-time inspection of
their unit aircraft. Their findings
were significant. Common
discrepancies noted included the use
of screwdrivers or other unauthorized
tools to spread trunnion bore ears
during removal and installation of
trunnions; failure to properly align
trunnion slots with bolt holes; and
forcing retaining bolts in place by
pounding them with a hammer or
twisting them with a wrench when
bolt holes and trunnion slots were
improperly aligned. As a result,
trunnion bores were found to be
permanently distorted and housing
January 1982
ears as well as bolt threads and
shanks severely damaged.
Yet, the improper maintenance
procedures described were not
followed with any intent to induce
incipient failure or endanger the
safety of aircrews and equipment. On
the contrary, these actions stemmed
from a lack of knowledge and
understanding of the critical aspects
of these components and the need for
strict by-the-book maintenance. This
fact was illustrated when personnel
performing the one-time inspection
were found using the same improper
procedures. In fact, while performing
the one-time inspection, one
mechanic broke a section of a
trunnion bore ear when he pried the
ears apart with a screwdriver.
On the other hand, a great number
of mishaps are caused by the willful
and deliberate violation of ARs and
SOPs. One such example concerns a
UH-1 pilot who deviated from his
planned route and descended low
over a lake resort area. While flying
at an altitude that varied from about
50 to 100 feet agl, his aircraft struck
high tension wires and crashed.
Then, we have what may be
termed true or pure human error.
Unlike those described, this type of
error does not stem from lack of
knowledge, intentional violation of
regulations or from any unsafe act
willfully performed. It is simply an
error made inadvertently by an
individual. It may be one of
commission or omission. It may be
judgmental or mechanical. In any
event, the final result is often the
same: a mishap.
A prime example involved the
pilots of a fixed wing aircraft on an
administrative flight. The pilots
elected to fly at an altitude that would
provide the passengers the most com
fort. As they neared their destination,
they failed to increase their altitude,
as required, to clear mountain peaks
along their flight path. The end result
was impact with the side of a mountain.
This pilot error was compounded by
the actions of ground control person
nel who were changing shifts about the
time the aircraft should have been
climbing to the higher altitude.
Consequently, neither ground control
operator requested verification of the
aircraft's altitude.
Obviously, human error is not
restricted to pilots or to any single
area of activity. Maintenance
personnel are especially susceptible.
In one instance, the crew chief of one
aircraft that had departed the site
hurried to help another crew chief
get his aircraft airborne. In his haste,
he rushed into the spinning tail rotor
blades of the aircraft and was killed.
Since no one intentionally wants to
become involved in any kind of
mishap, what causes individuals to
make the errors that invite injury and
even death? No simple answer exists.
However, we do know that stress
plays a major role in causing mishaps.
Further, we can identify a variety of
stress factors that can induce human
error. Prime among these catalysts
are those associated with fatigue;
with the environment; with excessive
use of coffee, tobacco, alcohol and
other drugs, including those
obtainable over-the-counter; and with
a host of other factors such as those
related to the emotions as well as to
the tasks to be performed, their
number and complexity.
While stresses imposed upon an
individual are usually multiple in
nature, a single stress factor, if
sufficiently severe, can effectively
reduce a person's efficiency to a
point at which he can no longer
safely perform his job. Fatigue is just
such a stress. Further, it is universal
in nature. While those stresses
associated with the use of coffee,
tobacco, alcohol and drugs can be
avoided by not using these products,
everyone is subject to fatigue.
A prime example of the results
fatigue can produce concerns a U-8
pilot on an administrative flight. This
17
aviator was in excellent health. Not
only was he a highly skilled aviator
but also the most experienced in his
unit. And that was precisely why he
was selected to transport some VIP
passengers.
While the weather was not forecast
to be the best, it certainly was not
considered a threat, especially to a
pilot with his experience. The only
hitch was that the pilot selected had
completed a night cross-country flight
earlier that night and had gotten only
4 hours of sleep when he was
summoned to fly this mission.
Because of the nature of the flight
and the VIP personnel involved, he
accepted the mission.
The flight to his intended
destination was uneventful, and
shortly after discharging his
passengers, he began his return flight.
While en route, he encountered
deteriorating weather conditions that
under normal circumstances would
have posed no special problems for
him. However, in his fatigued state,
he was unable to cope with the
situation and a fatal mishap resulted
While weather was a definite factor
in this mishap, pilot fatigue was the
real cause. In fact, this mishap
epitomizes the following statement
made by LTC David H. Karney,
M.D., concerning fatigue:
“Fatigue is a significant hazard in
Army aviation. It reduces
crewmember efficiency and
contributes to reduced performance,
poor coordination, faulty memory,
slower reaction time and a decline in
perceptual abilities. Fatigue can lead
to overconfidence, poor judgment,
mistakes--even fatal accidents.”
The question that logically arises is
why experienced aviators accept
missions when they know they are
physically and mentally exhausted.
While we can't get any answers from
those who could tell us the most--the
ones involved in such fatal mishaps as
the one described--we can get the
reaction of other pilots assigned to
units in which such mishaps
occurred.
18
In one such unit, anxiety and
apprehension were found among the
pilots. Many of them felt that refusal
to accept all scheduled missions--
regardless of rest, forecast weather
conditions or copilot availability--
would adversely affect their Army
CareerS.
Training exercises provide ideal
conditions for nurturing a variety of
stresses, particularly if the exercises
are conducted on a large scale. And
it doesn't matter whether they take
place in the winter or in the summer.
Each type of climate and locale will
give rise to its own set of problems
that will affect both equipment and
personnel. A variety of stresses are
the result.
While stresses related to fatigue,
the operating environment, to drugs
and nutrition, to mission and tasks
can become quite formidable, those
associated with the emotions can
often be the deadliest. A person
affected by emotional stress may be
the only one aware of its presence. So
no help can be given him unless he is
willing to make the matter known.
Because the causes are usually of a
personal nature, the emotionally
distressed person is not likely to do
this. When you consider the variety
of stresses that can be imposed on an
individual, and their severity, it is
little wonder that, as one study
shows, human error has been
involved in approximately 80 percent
of all Army aviation mishaps. And
this percentage has remained
virtually constant for 20 years.
Although human error and all the
stresses associated with it are
extremely complicated matters--far
beyond the scope of this article--they
must be faced. Any element that is
directly or indirectly a key mishap
cause factor cannot be ignored. The
causes of stresses must be attacked,
and those stresses that cannot be
avoided must be coped with.
For maintenance errors that result
from a lack of knowledge, adequate
training, formal and OJT, and ample
supervision during the performance
of maintenance are the answer.
Human errors that stem from
willfully performed wrong acts are
considerably more difficult to
prevent. Dealing with this problem
entails dealing with each individual
on a one-to-one basis--a virtually
impossible task. For example, no one
can control the thoughts, intents, and
actions of another individual,
especially one who may be flying 100
miles away from his home station.
Nevertheless, this problem is a long
way from being unsolvable.
The prescription is formulated as a
directive and dispensed by the
commander under the careful
supervision of the safety officer. Its
main ingredient is discipline. It is a
no-nonsense policy that lets it be
known no violations of ARs and
SOPs will be tolerated. Any who
choose to break the rules will be held
accountable to the commander. But
for the remedy to be effective, two
conditions must be satisfied. The first
involves unit SOPs. These must be
realistically drafted and strictly
enforced.
The second condition requires the
active participation of the unit
commander, the safety officer, and
other key personnel such as the
operations officer, the maintenance
officer and unit IPs. Their job is to
set an example. No safety program
can be effective if it is based on a “do
as I say, not as I do” attitude. Should
disciplinary measures become
necessary, the commander should not
hesitate to take any appropriate
action deemed essential for safety.
The flight surgeon is also
indispensible--not only for diagnosing
and treating various disorders but
especially in the area of prevention.
He gives advice on measures to be
taken to cope with stresses posed by
a particular environment, and he
gives personal counseling in matters
concerning physical and mental
health. He is the one person who can
determine whether or not an
individual is physically and mentally
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
capable of safely performing all
required flight duties.
Finally, we come to those mishaps
caused by what we might term as true
or pure human error. How can you
keep from making those
unintentional mistakes that often
cause or contribute to mishaps? The
experts shun the implications
embodied in this question. And for
good reason. There is no simple or
pat answer. The fact is everyone is
subject to inadvertent error, and
everyone makes such errors with
regularity. Most do not affect our
safety, although some do. Examples
are numerous.
The experience of one individual is
especially helpful in showing not only
the ease with which human error can
occur but also to what lengths it can
extend. In his daily bathing routine,
this individual had established a
pattern he followed almost
religiously. After removing his outer
garments in his bedroom he would go
into the bathroom, take off his
underclothing, lift the lid to the
clothes hamper, deposit his
underwear, then proceed with his
shower.
All went well until one evening
when he had an important business
appointment to meet. Because of a
fairly tight schedule that day, he was
pressed for time and had to get ready
in a hurry. Hastily, he followed his
established routine by removing his
outer clothing before rushing into the
bathroom. There, he quickly took off
his underwear and without a second
thought, lifted the toilet lid and
promptly flung the undergarments
into the bowl.
His reaction? In his words: “It was
a feeling of complete helplessness.
The instant the clothes left my hand,
I knew what was happening, but I
was incapable of doing anything
about it. In a split second it was all
over, and I just stood there--dumb
founded at my own stupidity.”
Translated into aviation safety, we
find that types of missions to be
flown, number of personnel and
January 1982
aircraft involved, tasks required to be
performed and their level of
difficulty, along with a “laundry list”
of other factors, can pave the way for
human error. Therefore, all measures
possible must be taken to reduce the
possibility of human error from the
planning stage to mission completion.
The need for discipline to ensure
all ARs and SOPs are strictly
followed becomes obvious. Coupled
with this is the necessity to make
certain that pilots assigned are
thoroughly qualified for the missions
to be flown. Since either excessive
stress or stress of long duration can
adversely affect an aviator's
performance, every effort should be
made to eliminate or minimize all
undue stress factors possible.
Providing aviators with ample time
for rest and relaxation as well as with
any conveniences available and
encouraging them to get proper
nutrition are some of the ways
supervisors can help. Making every
effort to maintain morale at a high
level is another. While these
recommendations are simply a
starting point, they are invaluable in
helping to relieve pilots from
unnecessary pressure. They have
enough stresses to contend with when
they are flying their missions.
Should an aviator have a pressing
personal problem and fail to make it
known, he becomes a threat to
himself and to others. Since this type
of situation can arise within a unit, it
becomes imperative for supervisory
personnel to carefully monitor unit
aviators for any change in behavior,
personality, mood or attitude.
Although the appearance of one or
more of these symptoms in some
individual should in no way be
construed that the individual has a
serious emotional problem, it does
represent a warning sign that should
not be ignored.
Since close associates are usually
the first—and sometimes the only
ones--to detect such changes in
others, cooperation of aviators with
each other as well as with their ASO,
flight surgeon and their commander
is definitely in order.
Bear in mind that despite all that
has been said, all stress is not
harmful. In fact, a certain amount of
it is actually beneficial. In
moderation, slight tension or anxiety
generally causes a person to become
more alert and cautious. It is
excessive or prolonged stress that
causes problems and which must be
combatted.
What standard can be used to
determine the measure of success we
can expect to attain in eliminating
human error as a mishap cause
factor? Perhaps the following account
of a country lay preacher in the hills
of Kentucky can provide the best
answer.
Because the people living in this
rural area were thinly populated and
unable to support the number of
churches needed to serve them, a lay
preacher voluntarily made his rounds
weekly to nearby communities to
conduct church services. Usually, his
young son accompanied him. On
entering a small, weather-beaten
church before the service, the
preacher stopped, pulled out two
quarters from his pocket and dropped
them into the alms basin that was
placed at the entrance.
After the service, as he and his son
were saying their good-byes, an
elderly man who helped care for the
church approached them. He told the
preacher that theirs was a poor
community and couldn't offer much.
but it was their policy to give the
visiting preacher whatever was in the
collection plate. With that, he
dumped the contents of the alms
basin into the preacher's outstretched
palm--two quarters.
As the preacher and his son
resumed their trek home, neither
spoke a word. Finally, the youth
turned to his father, and in all
seriousness, remarked: “You know,
pa, if we had put more in, we would
have got more out!”
And that's just about the sum of it.
19
 . In extremely cold climates, it is a good idea to add
[Hiſ]NGſilſº needed oil to aircraft while the system is hot.
A. True B. False

. What causes most aircraft maintenance problems

in desert operations?
A. Continuous operation of aircraft at high power
settings in hot weather
B. Expansion and contraction resulting from
extreme variations in day and night temp
erature

C. Sand and dust

HAPPY NEW YEAR! To celebrate, I've prepared
this “Final Exam" for you, drawing from severalareas . Which effect is not produced by consuming coffee
to help you assess your professional knowledge. Have (caffeine)?
fun—and good luck in this New Year!
A. Sharper intellect and keener perception
B. Reduced reaction time

FINAL EXAM C. Hypertension

D. Decreased motor activity
CW2 Gary R. Weiland
Directorate of Training Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center . Blackout and possible unconsciousness may occur
Fort Rucker, AL if an aviator is subjected to an accelerative force of
5 Gs for how many seconds?
A. 2 to 3 B. 5 to 6 C. 15 to 20
. An aircraft flying in colder than standard air normally
will be lower than the altimeter indicates.
. An aircraft's usefulload is the difference between:
A. True B. False
A. Operating and basic weight
B. Operating and gross weight
. What is the predominant form of ice an aviator
may expect to encounterinstratiform cloudswhen C. Empty and gross weight
temperatures range from 0°C to -20°C2
A. Rime B. Clear C. Glaze 10. The weight of fuel used in warmup and taxi
should be included as part of the takeoff fuel
entry on DD Form 365F (weight and balance).
. Which type of altitude is defined as the altitude A True B. False
above mean sea level?

A. Pressure B. Absolute C. True

11. Properly fitted aircrewmember body armor will
allow the aviator to support some of the armor
weight with his thighs while sitting.
. While conducting a tactical instrument flight where
the only navigational aid is a nondirectional radio A. True B. False
beacon (NDB), the slaved gyro compass of your
radio magnetic indicator fails. Given the following
instrument indications, what is the magnetic course, 12. The AN/PRC-90 survival radio set provides voice
in degrees, to the NDB? operation on what frequencies?
A. 60 121.5 and 243.0 MHz
B. 90 243.0 and 255.4 MHz
C.
D.
120
150 : 243.0 and 282.8 MHz
Only 2430 MHz

U.S. Army Aviation Digest

13. A pressure type altimeter with a QFE setting indicates defined as the elevation in the first 3,000
- altitude. feet of the landing surface.
A. Density C. Pressure A. Lowest B. Average C. Highest
B. Absolute D. True
19. Air traffic controllers issue instrument approach
clearances based on:

14. The time entered in the “ETE to ALTN” block of A. Known traffic

DD Form 175 (Military Flight Plan) is based on B. Weather

flight at: C. Weatherand only ifthe procedureisauthorized
A. Minimum en route altitude (MEA) for the D. Both A and B above
proposed route
B. The lowest instrument flight rules (IFR) cruising 20. An aircraft climbingata constantindicated airspeed
altitude above MEA using the odd-even rule will be increasing its actual velocity or true airspeed.
C. The last cruising altitude
A. True B. False

15. An Army aviator's acceptance of an approach 21. If an aviator suspects he is encountering retreating
clearance for a straight-in landing indicates:
blade stall, he should reduce power, airspeed
A. Final approach may be begun without first and RPM.
having executed a procedure turn
A. True B. False
B. Reported ceiling is suitable for initiating the
approach
. An operator's manual (Dash 10) examination is
C. Reported visibility or runway visual range a component of the Aviator Annual Proficiency
(RVR) is suitable for initiating the approach and Readiness Test.
D. Both B and C above
A. True B. False

16. A pilot may leave a helicopter with the engines 23. Which mode of flight permits the tactical employ.
operating if all controls are locked and there is ment of aircraft under low-ambient light conditions?
an operational requirement to leave the engines
Operating. A Night C. Night Vision Goggle
A. True B. False B. Night Hawk D. Both B and C above

This last question is quite complex and should only

17. RVR is the controlling visibility factor when be tackled by highly skilled aviators who have, at
published and reported for a runway. least, a few thousand flying hours under their belts.
A. True B. False 24. An aviator is taxiing out to the active for an IFR
departure and observes two flashing red lights
and one steady white light at the base of the
18. The touchdown zone elevation of a runway is control tower. What do the lights indicate?

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January 1982 21
 “For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, Saw the

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roºs estimated a 200,000 the primary missions of the Army ºice in charge of the security
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lies and wºre alsº made the rescue and recovery opera And when the cloud cover inted
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--- ºneers were able control elements at Edwards. ºne ºes
 Fully Modernized
Cobras In The
National Guard
Lieutenant Colonel Jerold J. Jensen
Army Aviation Advisor
Army Advisor Group
Salt Lake City, UT
On 10 April 1981 at the Bell Helicopter Plant,
Fort Worth, TX, Major General Van Hixson,
Adjutant General, Utah National Guard, accept
ed the first AH-1S Fully Modernized Cobra
helicopter produced for the National Guard. This
article is about the National Guard unit which
received that Cobra and the hard work and training
they accomplished in order to justify their selec
tion as the first recipient.
24
T HE SIGNIFICANCE of an Army National
Guard unit receiving a new and sophisticated
weapons system like the AH-1S Fully Modern
ized (FM) Cobra may go unnoticed by the masses, but
not so for members of the Attack Helicopter Troöp,
163d Armored Cavalry Regiment who view the event
as a reward for aggressively training to be ready. With
justifiable pride in their accomplishments, this unit
has overcome the normally disabling effects of a
major reorganization, equipment changes, personnel
turbulence, time and monetary constraints to arrive
at the forefront of the attack helicopter business.
Operating from the Army Aviation Support Facility
(AASF) at West Jordan, UT (a suburb of Salt Lake
City), the Troop is located in an ideal environment
for attack helicopter training. At the AASF, classroom
and other nonfield training is accomplished and aviation
maintenance is performed on unit aircraft. Pilot training
is conducted at a number of nearby training areas,
maximizing productivity from every available training
minute. Terrain flight qualification is conducted 10
minutes away at the state owned Camp W.G. Williams
training area or at Dugway Proving Grounds.
Helicopter gunnery training is accomplished 4 to 6
times annually on a superb range located 45 minutes
flight time away on the western edge of the Great Salt
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
Four generations of attack helicopters all in operation in the
Utah ĀRNG (left to right): AH-1S (Modernized Cobra), AH-1S
(Modified), AH-1G, UH-1M (M-22)
Lake. All of these training areas are capable of accom
modating multiple attack teams and joint air attack
teams in battle drill and live fire exercises.
The membership of the organization, like many
Reserve Component (RC) units, is drawn from a wide
cross section of the civil community. Found within
the ranks of the Troop are policemen, carpenters,
masons, lawyers, students, and business and community
leaders. Although coming from diverse backgrounds,
the Soldiers comprising this unit share a common
motivation in their desire to serve and to be a part of
the best.
Training is the primary ingredient in the glue that
binds the unit together. Without a good, challenging
training program, no amount of new equipment is
worth the individual sacrifice required for membership
in this or any other RC organization.
With no higher tactical headquarters immediately
accessible (the 163d Armored Cavalry Regiment is
located in Montana), the Troop must function inde
pendently to plan, organize, coordinate, support and
execute an ambitious training plan geared to both
individual and collective unit needs.
Individual training presents some unique challenges
for the Troop because a good many members are
prior service Soldiers, Sailors, Marines or Airmen
January 1982
with experience in nonaviation related fields. To deal
with this situation, each member is placed on an
individualized track, leading to military occupational
specialty qualification.
This program is expanded in the case of aviators
because it must include the multitude of aircrew
training manuals and other required training. Con
strained by time and training funds the AASF has
been given authority to conduct rotary wing qualifi
cation for unit members who already have military
fixed wing ratings. Additionally, rotary wing qualified
aviators are locally transitioned into the AH-1S series
aircraft. This U.S. Army Forces Command approved
program was locally prepared and is tailored to the
Reserve Component training environment.
Training to become proficient with new equipment
and munitions—in addition to keeping pace with
changes in doctrine, tactics and techniques— makes
for an interesting challenge. The Troop is justifiably
proud of its training accomplishments. It has been a
forerunner in joint air attack team training with Air
Force and Air Guard close air support units. Troop
pilots are experienced at firing under all light conditions.
They are particularly adept at night firing under their
own 2.75 inch illumination rocket and also with artillery
illumination fired by Utah Guard units. Training
emphasizes operations in a high threat environment
where radio communication may be impossible and
the ability to communicate by visual signals may
make the difference between mission success and
failure. Speech security and IFF(identification friend
or foe (radar)) equipment are installed in Troop aircraft
and are used as a matter of course.
The Troop ventures outside the local training
environment whenever possible for combined arms
training and thus far has sharpened its skills during
multiple Air Force Red Flag exercises, plus others
such as JRX Border Star 81 at Ft. Bliss, TX.
With acquisitions of the AH-1S (FM) a major unit
goal has been achieved; however, this is not viewed as
the end. Rather it is a springboard for total readiness.
As long as the requirement exists for a well-trained
organization of mounted cavalry, the Attack Helicopter
Troop, 163d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Utah National
Guard will be there. *—”
25
 an acronym that has to be earned
First Lieutenant Edward F. Schauberger
First Lieutenant Jeffrey S. Alderfer
F. IS NOT a four-letter word.
It is an Air Force acronym for a
first assignment instructor pilot. This
is an individual who, upon grad
uation from flight school, remains
there to become an instructor. Al
though a common occurrence in
the Air Force, where a large per
centage of fixed wing instructor
pilots are FAIPs, this is relatively
new to the Air Force helicopter
world—with only five at this writing.
The Air Training Command's 3588th
Flying Training Squadron (FTS) at
the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft.
Rucker, AL, has been using FAIPs
for about 4 years.
The mission of the 3588th FTS is
broad and multifaceted. Squadron
personnel monitor Air Force stu
dents through the Army Initial Entry
Rotary Wing (IERW) program and
rotary wing qualification course,
conduct Air Force unique flight
training, provide administrative
assistance to Air Force students and
serve as their sponsors and advisors.
A close association is maintained
with the Army Aviation Center's
director of training and doctrine to
assure the continued quality of
academic and flight instruction. Of
the 20 permanent party personnel
assigned to the squadron, 15 are
26
and
United States Air Force
3588th Flying Training Squadron
Fort Rucker, AL
instructor pilot (IP) qualified.
Air Force students come to the
3588th in the last month of their
IERW program to learn those pro
cedures unique to the Air Force.
Ninety-seven were graduated in
fiscal year (FY) 1981 with a like
number expected in FY 1982.
Being selected to remain at Ft.
Rucker as an Air Force IP involves
a great deal of work. The student
must have a good record in flight
school, express a strong desire to
stay at the Army Aviation Center,
and have a positive attitude and
disposition. FAIPs are selected very
carefully from among the numerous
volunteers, and only the most prom
ising prospective pilots are offered
the opportunity to return to Ft.
Rucker as instructors. After grad
uation, IP selectees begin the addi
tional training to prepare them to
upgrade to instructor pilot status.
Advanced helicopter training
begins with a tour at the 1550th
Aircrew Training and Test Wing at
Kirtland AFB, NM, at the Military
Airlift Command Instructor Pilot
Lead-In Course. During their stay,
prospective instructors fly as observ
ers on syllabus training flights in
each type helicopter the Air Force
owns and operates at Kirtland.
Those flights are not to gain profi
ciency but to help them understand
how the Air Force uses helicopters
and what their future students must
be ready to learn.
The next stop is at Fairchild AFB,
WA, for land and water survival. If
the FAIP is an Air Force Academy
graduate, the land survival already
will have been completed and water
survival training is done at Home
stead AFB, FL. Upon completion
of survival training, it's back to Ft.
Rucker for the flying and instruc
tional phases of the upgrade program.
Army contact program of instruc
tion (POI) is first and presents a
real challenge. POI is 25 hours of º
concentrated and demanding in
struction conducted by a profes
sional and experienced staff of Army
aviators. FAIPs are required to fly
the UH-1 Huey from the left seat
and concurrently analyze the ma
neuvers verbally so as to become
comfortable with the increased vis
ibility from the left seat and to gain
additional confidence. Emergency
handling is stressed, as the POI
instructors don't hesitate to simulate
an engine failure at just the “right”
moment. Many inflight problems,
whose solutions become second
nature, are included. The instructors
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
*First Lieutenant Brian K. Livie, below right, an
Air Force FAIP at the Army Aviation Center, Ft.
Rucker, AL, goes over a UH-1 Huey preflight list
with two Air Force students, Second Lieutenants
Robert E. Hawvermale, left, and Paco F. Burrell

Helicopter procedures unique to the Air Force

are taught to students of that service in the last
month of flight training at the Army Aviation 4
Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, by Air Force instructor
pilots. First Lieutenant Edward F. Schauberger,
at right (foreground), is a FAIP (first assignment
instructor pilot). Second Lieutenant M. A. Stank
is the student

also play the student role and em
phasize the unexpected things a
student might do.
The academics cover the Huey
systems and give a good background
in instructional techniques. FAIPs
come away from contact POI with
a solid foundation and a fair assess
ment of their own capabilities.
Air Force upgrade encompasses
contact, instruments, remote area
operations and formation proce
dures. The pace is quick but is geared
to the individual. The program ends
with an Air Force Review and Certi
fication Board conducted in the
3588th FTS by the commander and
other instructors. Successful com
pletion of upgrade results in a rating
as an Air Force helicopter instructor
pilot.
The majority of a FAIP's work
lies in teaching Air Force instrument
procedures while sharing the busy
airspace of the Ft. Rucker instru
ment training area with the Army
instructors and students. Air Force
instrument procedures differ slightly
from the Army's, and it is sometimes
difficult to maintain and conform
to two sets of regulations.
The first day on the flight line at
the Army Aviation Center is met
with a little anxiety, and it helps to
have an understanding student. A
FAIP has to set some ground rules
and establish some credibility with
the student because the instructor
is flying with age group peers and
has little rank or extensive experi
ence to claim as an advantage.
In addition to flying duties, many
of the squadron IPs are academic
instructors and also perform various
squadron functions. Each IP spon
sors an Air Force class going through
the Army Aviation Center flight
school. This is found to be a very
rewarding experience and enriches
students' training and the instructors'
understanding of the students' ac
tivities.
Other rewards for a FAIP at Ft.
Rucker are many. This is one of the
few positions where Air Force offi
cers can interface with another
branch of the service. It gives a
firsthand look at Army organization
which may prove helpful in any
future joint service exercise or
endeavor.
Being an Air Force FAIP is a
very positive and practical exper
ience. Instructing is often tiring and
exasperating, but always rewarding.
Like other instructors at the Army
Aviation Center, the Air Force
FAIPs take pride in being “Above
the Best.” <-->

January 1982 27

- - Fºurt-tertºv-ºu
from major Army commands who were considered
experts in aviation training was formed in 1976.
It was chaired by Brigadier General Charles E.
Canedy, aviation officer, Office, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Military Operations, and was known as
The Blue Ribbon Panel. It tasked the Infantry,
Armor, Transportation, Intelligence and Aviation
Schools to analyze the present-day aviation
employment doctrine and to submit a proposed
tactical and mission task list for the various aircraft
systems. The panel combined that input and
formulated a task list for each system, consisting
of basic aircraft tasks, tactical/special tasks and
mission tasks. Based on that, the U.S. Army
Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL, was told to
develop a TASK, CONDITIONS, STANDARDS
list to be used in a preliminary validation by the
6th Air Cavalry Combat Brigade (ACCB) at Ft.
Hood, TX, beginning 1 March 1977.
Using the results from the preliminary validation,
the first ATMs were published as "test" manuals
in October 1977. In February 1978, DA appointed
the Aviation Center the overall proponent for the
ATMs with the responsibility to write, publish
and monitor them. The other Schools were to
furnish tactical task requirements based on the
employment role of the aircraft systems.
28
improvements based on a year's experi
the field, the manuals were completely
nand a second draft was printed in October
improvements were incorporated and the
proved manuals were printed and distrib
h late 1980 and early 1981. As new doctrine,
ment and just better ways of doing things
cognized, they will be included in revisions
manuals.
* ATM standardizes aviator training through
he Army. It provides criteria for unit command
consider when they evaluate unit training
- S. When used with the Army Training and
Evaluation Program (ARTEP), it provides com
manders with the tools necessary to relate individ
ual aviator training with unit mission training,
thus allowing them to allocate resources most
efficiently to achieve readiness. Although the
ATM standardizes aviator training, commanders
are given discretionary authority over about one
third of the tasks.
Use Of ATMs. How can unit commanders develop
aviator training plans which are valid, use resources
efficiently and are realistically attainable (a very
important consideration)? To do that, a systematic
approach is essential. A system that has worked
for me uses five different steps. Keep in mind
that I am not suggesting commanders must
personally do all of this. The unit's entire chain of
command should be involved, but the command
ers are the leaders and must fully participate. I
have arranged the wording to produce the acronym
METER– it Stands for:
• Mission analysis
Evaluation of current capabilities
Training shortfalls listed and prioritized
Establish short-range and long-range goals
Resource requirements and constraints
considered
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
 Mission Analysis. The ARTEP is the primary source
for unit mission tasks. The TOE (table of organi
zation and equipment), command guidance, con
º
tingency plans and geographic location all must
be consulted and considered. All unit leaders
must be thoroughly knowledgeable of their mis
sions. If you are not confident that this is true,
then you might consider it as a topic for your
leader development training program. Also, this
is a good place to mention that your tactical standing
operating procedure (TSOP) should complement
the above documents.
Now that the missions are fully understood,
the analysis continues to determine what individual
unit members must be proficient at doing. Natur
ally, this should include all unit personnel; but I
will limit my discussion to aviators. One technique
is to assemble all aviators (large units may want
to break down into groups), write the missions
on a chart, and challenge the aviators to identify
every task necessary in the performance of the
unit mission. Write all the tasks on the chart below
the unit mission. Continue this process until all
unit missions have been analyzed. When this is
complete, begin with the first mission and deter
mine which aviator duty position(s) is associated
with that mission.
With such an analysis, the commander can
easily designate Flight Activity Category (FAC) 1
and FAC 2 positions. The results are posted to
each aviator's "Aircrew Training Record" as
appropriate; and in accordance with TC 1-134,
those tasks become mandatory for the aviator.
The benefits of this approach are obvious. Besides
being a learning experience for everyone, it takes
advantage of the collective knowledge and
experience of the aviators and assures enthusiastic
support for the training program.
Evaluate Current Capabilities. This may be the
most difficult and subjective element of the process.
The natural tendency to be critical of everything
may result in wasting training resources on areas
where no training is needed. Consequently, this
will leave less time and fewer resources to spend
in areas where training is most needed.
Using the charts where aviator tasks are related
to the unit mission tasks, evaluate the unit's
collective aviator strengths and weaknesses in
each task listed. Assign a plus (+) value where a
task is rated as a strength and a minus (-) for a
weakness. Individual prejudices should be guard
ed against. For example, some may want to
downplay the importance of a task such as tactical
instruments. The relative importance of a task is
best left until later, as priorities are listed.
January 1982
Training Shortfalls Are Listed And Prioritized. The
results of the above process should be recorded
and priorities established. At this point, the com
mander must integrate other aviator training
requirements such as continuation training for
Aviation Readiness Level (ARL) 1 aviators and
mission training for ARL 2 aviators.
Establish Short-range and Long-range Goals. It
is absolutely essential that an organization have
realistic goals. They must be clearly stated, and
known and understood by organization members.
Short-range goals should concentrate on getting
the most combat readiness for the least expen
diture of training resources. Long-range goals
should maintain and improve readiness.
To be effective, the goals must be attainable. A
short-range goal might be: Achieve aviator readi
ness C-rating of C-1 within 90 days. Since this
requires that at least 85 percent of MTOE-required
aviators be ARL 1, personnel turnover may make
this impossible in that timeframe. You may want
to modify this goal to a short-range goal of C-2
and a long-range goal of C-1 within 180 days.
Resource Constraints Must Be Considered. While
your training plan should be challenging and
ambitious, it must also be attainable under fore
casted conditions. Most essential is a careful
comparison of flying hours, instructor pilots, firing
ranges, ammunition, expected aircraft availability,
etc., with estimates of those requirements to
accomplish your training plan. Shortfalls do not
necessarily mean changing the plan. Your higher
headquarters may be able to help. In any case,
your capabilities and limitations will be recognized.
Summary. In summary, you can see that aviator
training does not end with the ATM. A vital link
between the ATM and good aviator training
programs is provided by unit commanders and
their training staffs. It is only at this level that
decisions about priorities and unique unit require
ments can be dealt with. There are probably many
different approaches to aviator training that are
as good or better than the foregoing; however,
feel that any system that does not involve the
aviator in the development process is not going
to produce optimum results.
Editor's Note: Mr. Jim Patton, Training Literature
Division, Directorate of Training Developments,
Ft. Rucker, AL 36362, AUTOVON 558–4619/4588,
is the point of contact for questions and/or
Comments about the ATMs. <-A
29
*
Radical concepts or ideas normally are met with severe skepticism or rejected immediately because people are not
comfortable with uncertanties. Some time ago—a colleague and good friend–Captain Carl Daschke and I began
working on a think paper to be presented for whatever conceptual value it might hold for combat development
requirements. Unfortunately, Captain Daschke was reassigned before extensive work could be done. Some of his ideas,
in conjunction with my own convictions, remained on numerous draft copies and scraps of paper. This article reflects
those ideas on an air-to-air helicopter and one possible manner in which it can be used. I am not convinced the concept
this article presents is the ultimate solution to the question of helicopter air-to-air. I do believe it will stimulate thought
in not only the aviation community, but also within the Army's branches and in the other military services.

the
FIGHTER/INTERCEPTOR
HELICOPTER
A CONCEPT FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW

Major Frank E. Babiasz

Threat Branch
Directorate of Combat Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL

A.…. WARFARE historically has be

longed to the U.S. Air Force and undoubtedly will
continue to be an Air Force role in the future. However,
the possibility of helicopter air-to-air engagements con
tinues to loom and to be the subject of ongoing contro
versy and misunderstandings. It is time not only to
dispel the controversy and misunderstandings; it is
time for the aviation community to develop the
needed concepts and tactics for the helicopter to
fight the air-to-air role as part of the combined arms
team.
Before discussing that role, it is necessary to address
the threat. Where tactical aviation is concerned, it
comes in many forms: air defense, artillery, surface
to-air missiles (SAMs), etc. Numerous articles published
in the Aviation Digest over the past year have explained
in detail their significance.
While not discounting this threat, I will focus only on
the Soviet attack helicopter and Soviet high perform
ance (HP)/close air support (CAS) aircraft, for it is
here that the air-to-air threat to our helicopters lies.
First, assume that all Soviet armed helicopters (Hind
and Hip) and all Soviet high performance close air
support aircraft, because of their known onboard
ordnance, have the technological capability to destroy
U.S. helicopters. This fact is undeniable. But destroying
U.S. helicopters is not their primary mission. Both
armed helicopters and HP CAS aircraft are tasked
with providing close air fire support for tactical ground
operations. As such, they represent a serious threat
to the armor and infantry forces that U.S. tactical
aviation supports. Accordingly, helicopters working
closely with these ground elements become part of
the target array. Employment of helicopters near the
forward line of own troops (FLOT) places them in a
target area subject to air attack; hence, the air threat
to U.S. Army tactical aviation.
How will U.S. ground forces counter the Soviet air
threat? To answer, let's look at how we are arrayed on
the battlefield. Using the active defense, we plan to
fight a battle along a wide division front (50 to 70
kilometers). This is accomplished by the use of company
and battalion battle positions which contain a mixture
of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles/improved TOW
vehicles and aviation. To defeat the air threat, they
will depend on their organic weapons such as antiair
craft machineguns (i.e., 50 caliber) and short range
SAMs. These systems have limited capabilities. The
antiaircraft machineguns have limited range; gunners
must optically acquire and track the target, and they

30 U.S. Army Aviation Digest


are minimally effective against sophisticated aircraft.
As for the Redeye/Stinger SAM, although it possesses
an infrared homing device, gunners must first optically
acquire targets. Its use on the dirty battlefield from a
position being targeted with artillery, including smoke,
will be extremely restricted. Additionally, both Soviet
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will attempt to
maintain maximum standoff range.
Regarding the division level short range air defense
systems, we again lack a sufficient number of systems
to be totally effective. For example, our current force
structure demands that the 50 to 70 kilometer division
front be protected by the division's air defense battalion
which is composed of eight Chaparral and eight Vulcan
systems. This gives us 32 Redeye teams and 16 Vulcan
and Chaparral systems over a broad front to protect
our forward ground forces and the associated tactical
Army Aviation. Compare this to the Soviet's 120 SA-7
Grail missiles, 16 ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns, 16 SA-9
Gaskin surface-to-air missile systems, and 20 SA-6
Gainful or SA-8 Gecko missile systems over a 15 kilo
meter attack frontage. I, and many others, believe in
this critical area, U.S. forces are severely lacking.
As for our aviation assets, we fare no better than do
our ground forces. Our fielded systems (AH-1 TOW
January 1982
The views of the author do not
purport to reflect the positions of
the Department of the Army nor
the Department of Defense
º
Illustration by Dave Deitrick
Cobras and OH-58 Kiowa scouts) do not possess an
effective antiair system. I believe that cries of “chance
encounter” will not be the norm on either today's
battlefield or that of the future. The Soviets have
placed great emphasis on close air support in recent
years, especially in the attack helicopter field. It seems
that sheer numbers alone support the opportunity for
frequent encounters between U.S. helicopters and
Soviet CAS aircraft. Present tactics encourage evasive
action should. U.S. helicopters be spotted by enemy
aircraft. This, of course, will dictate that we temporarily
abort our primary mission until the air threat subsides.
Such mission abort procedure can have immediate
effects on the ground commander's battle plan.
Of course, there is the Air Force. But, the Air
Force is badly outnumbered and will have its hands
full trying to establish local air superiority. This mission
will be further complicated by the fact that NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) airfields will be
among the Soviet's high priority targets. The fighter/
interceptor helicopter (F/IH) meets this challenge.
First, I will define a fighter/interceptor helicopter: I
envision this aircraft to be a modified version of the
AH-1 Cobra. It will have extensive avionics, to include
the ability to operate day and night, in all weather
31
conditions and, most importantly, contain an air
intercept radar. As for armament, I recommend a 30
millimeter nose gun for “close encounters,” two Aim
9 Sidewinders (which have been successfully test fired
from Cobras by the U.S. Marines), four to eight air-to
air Stinger missiles, and a 2.75 inch flechette rocket
on each outer pylon. Also, if payload permits, a larger
fuel capacity for extended loiter time is needed. The
front seat will need a heads-up display and would
provide for the gunner with the back seat for the pilot.
The bottom line is that Army Aviation could not
only protect itself but also could function as part of
the division's air defensive assets. Additionally, we
also could complement the Air Force by periodically
establishing our own air superiority, at the lower
flights levels, as we are highly capable of operating
under the Soviet's air defense umbrella. This is a func
tion the Air Force cannot do well. A helicopter, equipped
in the manner I described, will accomplish three
significant missions: (1) Protect our antitank helicopters
from the Hind and other air threats; (2) augment the
division's air defense capability; and (3) complement
the Air Force in the ability to maintain local air
superiority. Other advantages to this type of system
are that it provides:
• The most mobile Army air defense system ever
devised that is directly responsive to the ground
commander.
• A helicopter platform which is fast, elusive
and—able to hide, strike and hide—unlike present
air defense systems.
• Helicopters which when specifically armed for
air-to-air missions are the best systems for counter
ing enemy helicopters.
• Friendly heliborne operations security from enemy
air interdiction.
• The ground commander a system that can rapidly
counter enemy rear area heliborne operations.
Up to this point, I have described the threat, suggested
a means to counter that threat, and stated how the
F/IH would benefit not only Army Aviation but also
division air defense and the Air Force. I now will
describe F/IH tactics.
First, I foresee little change in the area of operations
in which tactical aviation would be employed. In
order to protect our antitank helicopters we must be
away from, yet close enough to, the ground forces to
provide air defense coverage. This is not a problem
because our current employment techniques place us
near the ground forces. Additionally, our employment
near the FLOT places the F/IH in the area we can
expect to see Hinds, Hips and HP CAS aircraft
attacking. Even our flight mode, whether contour or
nap-of-the-earth, will basically remain the same.
Additionally, it must be stressed that our mobility,
32
speed and maneuverability make the helicopter an
ideal platform for an air-to-air system. There were a
lot of grumbles in the late 1950s when Army Aviation
started experimenting by placing various types of
armament on helicopters. By now many of those
disbelievers have either joined the ranks of the believers
or have faded away.
Finally, I will address where and how the fighter/
interceptor helicopter fits into our present force
structure and its primary mission. As I stated earlier,
it will augment the division's air defense systems;
therefore, it should be part of the air defense battalion.
The aviation battery would contain six F/IH aircraft
and operate in teams of two during tactical operations.
Limited maintenance would be performed by the
battery support personnel, with any major repairs
going to the division aviation battalion's maintenance
company. As an integral part of the division's air
defense assets the F/IH would have the primary mission
of local air defense in support of ground operations.
In addition to its own onboard radar, the F/IH would
be tied into the air defense radar network. Therefore,
it could be used to immediately reinforce any area
where the air threat is of paramount consideration.
Remember, the F/IH's airspeed (in excess of 200
kilometers per hour) allows it to be onstation within
minutes, even when the division occupies a wide
frontage.
A secondary mission of local air superiority could
be dictated by the division commander. Using all six
F/IH aircraft onstation simultaneously would provide
sufficient firepower, in conjunction with other systems,
to clear the lower flight levels (3,000 feet and below)
of hostile aircraft for limited periods.
Another mission would be the protection of the
division's AH-1 TOW Cobra and OH-58 Scout aircraft.
This mission too would be based on the division
commander's perception of the air threat to the attack
helicopters. As I would endorse future scouts to be
armed with air-to-air systems for attack team self
defense, the F/IH could augment the scout's capability
as well.
Army Aviation is a recognized part of the combined
arms team, but Army Aviation has more to offer. We
must continue to be innovative. Yes, I have read of
suggestions advocating the XV-15 VSTOL (vertical
short takeoff and landing) and the Air Force OV-10
Bronco as a Hind killer. I believe some of these
proposals have merit. However, I am firmly convinced
that the helicopter has more advantage in combating
any slow speed or HP CAS air threat than either of
these two systems. The services and branches of services
must set aside historical roles they sacredly consider
their own and plan for the future. It is only through
innovative means that we can not only meet the
threat but also defeat it. *—r
U.S. Army Aviation Digest

r REPORTING
FINAL
Late NewsFrom ArmyAviation Activities
FROM FORT RUCKER
40th Birthday. The 40th anniversary of Army
Aviation and Ft. Rucker will be celebrated 3 to 6
June 1982. A wide range of events is planned,
and details on the schedule will be announced
soon. Plan now to attend.
10th Birthday. Army Aviation's only altitude
(Hypobaric) chamber has been in operation 10
years, and 16,881 students have been trained in it.
Operated by the Physiological Training Servi
ces, Aeromedical Activity, Army Aeromedical
Center, the chamber, which is a 10 × 25-foot
specially equipped block house, simulates a
reduction in pressure at higher altitudes. The
training stresses the recognition of symptoms
of hypoxia that the student aviators feel, as well
as acquainting them with what happens when
they ascend to altitudes above 10,000 feet and
then return to ground level.
Graduation Speakers.
• Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton Jr.,
deputy commanding general for training, Army
Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe,
VA, spoke to graduating members of the Warrant
Officer Senior Course in November.
“Warrant officers have proven themselves a
necessary and vital part of our United States
Army; however, ... recognition of warrant officer
contributions has been, for the most part, minimal,"
General Becton said. That condition is being
changed, though, because the Army has made a
new commitment to its warrant officers that has
resulted in improved personal and professional
growth, compensation and recognition.
• Major General John W. Woodmansee Jr.,
deputy commanding general, V Corps, U.S. Army
Europe, addressed two graduating aviator classes
recently.
“Army Aviation of the 80s and 90s will be one
of the most important arms in the U.S. Army," he
said, telling the graduates that they will be on
the forward edge of technology as field personnel
and will benefit from the new armament and
weapons systems being used in Army Aviation.
(USAAVNC-PAO)
January 1982
FROM FORT BRAGG
The Golden Knights Want You. The Army
Parachute Team, the “Golden Knights,” needs
qualified warrant officers to pilot the team's YC
7A Caribou and U-21 Ute aircraft. Applicants
should have 500 hours military multiengine fixed
wing time and a current fixed wing instrument
qualification with 100 hours of instrument time.
A 3-year assignment to the Golden Knights
involves extensive flying and travel throughout
the United States as a personal representative
of the Army, thus requiring the highest standards
of military bearing and appearance.
Interested aviators who are eligible for reassign
ment and who have at least 3 years of retainability
should contact Major James H. Correll II, AUTO
VON 236-4800/.4828, or Captain Bob Ozbolt,
AUTOVON 237-6638, or write: Commander, U.S.
Army Parachute Team, Box 126, Ft. Bragg, NC
28307.
FROM FORT CARSON
MAST Award. The 571st Medical Detachment,
commanded by Major Richard C. Bulliner, has
received the Wright Brothers Foundation Mem
orial Award for the assistance it has given the
civilian community during the past year. Recog
nition of the MAST (Military Assistance to Safety
and Traffic) work occurred during the 12th annual
Colorado Aviation Hall of Fame banquet.
In the 12 years it has been organized, the
detachment has flown more than 2,100 missions,
ranging from aiding stranded hikers to airlifting
premature babies. (4th INF DIV PAO)
FROM. QERMANY
Award Time For Dustoffs. Six years of accident
free flying (1975 to 1981) have earned the 421st
Medical Company (Air Ambulance), Nelligen,
Germany, the most prestigious air-safety award
granted by the Department of the Army.
The DA Award of Excellence was presented at
a November ceremony in Stuttgart to Lieutenant
Colonel Walter L. Berry, 421st commander, by
Major General Floyd W. Baker, commander of
the 7th Medical Command.
Represented by the Award of Excellence are
44,786 hours flown to evacuate medical emergen
Cies and to move medical people, equipment
and supplies, in the support of field training.
(7TH MED COMD PAO)
33
 PEARLS
Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown
Debbie Bacle
Emergency Locator Transmitter
Use of emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) in
Army Aircraft is a continuing matter of concern that
is growing rapidly in the aviation community. As
outlined in PEARL in last month's issue of the Aviation
Digest, each aviation unit should evaluate its respective
need for ELTs and forward its request for use of these
items, with justification, through the appropriate chain
of command to CDR TSARCOM, ATTN: DRCPO
ALSE.
More SPH4 Adhesive Problems
More problems have surfaced regarding the adhesives
used in the reapir of the SPH-4 flight helmet. In par
ticular one adhesive, national stock number (NSN)
8040-00-753-4800, which is used to install the replace
ment energy absorbing liner, seems to be causing the
most difficulty. This two-part epoxy is apparently too
strong and too persistent; once used, it cannot later
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63720 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 314-263-3307
34
-
º
--
º
i.
-
---
ºSºº
º---
Photograph by Tom Greene
be removed without damage to the fiberglass helmet
shell, consequently rendering the entire helmet
unserviceable. Natick Laboratories (NLABS) is working
on the selection of a new adhesive which will be
established in the supply system and which will be
reflected in a change to TM 10-8415-206-13, “Operator,
Organizational, Direct Support Maintenance Manual
for the Helmet, Flying, Protective, Model SPH-4.” In
the meantime, to resolve the immediate problem, it is
suggested that one of the following two adhesives be
used: Part No. 45748, manufactured by the Swift
Adhesive Company, 4615 So. West Freeway, Suite
605, East Houston, TX; or Part No. 45748, Code
97.427, Gentex Corporation, P.O. Box 315, 8th Ave.,
Carbondale, PA. Both of these adhesives are of a
water base and are easy to remove when necessary.
Both may be ordered from S9T. Point of contact
(POC) for further information is Mr. H.A. Tetreault,
TSARCOM Directorate for Maintenance, AUTOVON
693-3171 or Commercial (314) 263-3171.
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
 Decompressed Trioxane (Again)
In the January 1979 edition of PEARL we reported
** a very serious problem having to do with the fuel,
compressed trioxane, NSN 9110-00-263-9865, a com
ponent of Army aircraft survival kits. Apparently the
same problem still exists. If the foil wrapper containing
the fuel bar is punctured, the fuel turns to a white or
blue powder and spreads throughout the survival kit,
contaminating everything else contained in the kit.
Trioxane fuel is composed primarily of metaformal
dehyde, which is highly toxic and if ingested constitutes
a medical emergency. Since the inner case of the
survival kits contains water, rations and eating utensils,
the probability of inadvertent ingestion of trioxane
residue is high. Due to the seriousness of this matter,
it is strongly suggested that all Army survival kits be
subjected to an immediate one-time inspection for
trioxane fuel residue. If any such residue is found,
the trioxane bars should be removed and the kit cleaned
in accordance with TM 55-1680-317-23&P. All trioxane
fuel bars should be inspected for punctured foil
wrappers; those with punctured wrappers are unservice
able and should be replaced. When trioxane bars are
repacked in the survival kits, they should be sealed in
ziplock bags, NSN 8105-00-837-7755, to prevent future
contamination. (Thanks to CW2 Charles Gibson, U.S.
Army Safety and Standardization Board, USAREUR,
for this info.)
New ALSE Checklists
Checklists, including complete preflight and calendar
inspection procedures, are now available for all survival
kits used in Army aircraft. They are obtainable through
normal publications supply channels under the numbers
listed below:
TM 55-1680-317-CL-1
Individual Hot Climate Survival Kit
NSN 1680-00-973-1861
TM 55-1680-317-CL-2
Individual Cold Climate Survival Kit
NSN 1680-00-973-1862
TM 55-1680-317-CL-3
Individual Overwater Survival Kit
NSN 1680-00-973-1863
TM 55-1680-317-CL-4
SRU-21P Aircrew Survival Vest
NSN 8465-00-177-4819
January 1982
TM 55-1680-317-CL-5
OV-1 Aircraft, Hot Climate Survival Kit
NSN 1680-00-148-9234
TM 55-1680-317-CL-6
OV-1 Aircraft, Cold Climate Survival Kit
NSN 1680-00-148-9233
TM 55-1680-317-CL-7
OV-1 Aircraft, Overwater Survival Kit
NSN 1680-00-140-3540
TM 55-1680-317-CL-8
OV-1 Aircraft, Survival Vest
NSN 1680-00-187-5716 (Small)
NSN 1680-00-205-0474 (Large)
All of these publications are dated 24 August 1981.
Many thanks to Mr. James Dittmer, TSARCOM
Directorate for Maintenance, whose tireless efforts
made these checklists possible.
Questions and Answers
We recently ordered and received several of the
training devices, blind flying hood, channel vision,
personnel. NSN 6910-00-608–7137, as listed in Depart
ment of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 310-12, “Index and
Description of Army Training Devices." Unfortun
ately, these items do not fit the SPH-4 flyer's helmet
as they are supposed to, and consequently do not suit
our needs. What do we do with these hoods and how
can we get the kind we can use with the SPH-4?
(Becky Barber, USAR Aviation Support Facility, No.
Syracuse, NY)
Obviously, DA PAM 310-12 is in error. The item
listed therein is not the correct blind flying hood for
use with the SPH-4 helmet; it is, in fact, for use with a
baseball-type cap. The correct piece of equipment
for use with the SPH-4 is the hood, blind flight, NSN
6910-00-525-8199, which is available from B17 at a
cost of $6.09 each. In addition, action has been taken
to delete the incorrect item from the DA pamphlet.
As for what to do with the hoods you have already
received, treat them as you would any other items—if
you can't use them, turn them in. POC at this office is
Mr. Tommy Vaughn, AUTOVON 693-3307 or Com
mercial (314) 263-3307. -gº-4
35
 rt in

Đſº
CW4 Richard A. Davis
B Co., 15th MI Battalion
Fort Hood, TX

“Victory in present day warfare will go only to the

side that has completely mastered its weapons and
equipment and the art of waging war, and also possesses
high moral and fighting qualities.”
Lt. Gen. A. Dunin of
The Soviet Tank Forces

HELICOPTERS- the Soviet View

URING 1978, THE United States became experiments, tests and exercises, with many strap-on
concerned over the rapid buildup of the kits on older aircraft, were tried before the Mi-24
helicopter fleet in the Union of Soviet Socialist Hind was introduced into operational units (figure 2).
Republics. It was discovered that the Soviets had doubled
their force during 1977; expanded their helicopter FIGURE 1: Relative production rate estimates (United
fleet three-fold as of June 1978; and were expected to States/Soviet Union)
continue. By early 1980 they were able to build more U.S. U.S.S.R. USSR/US
1972-74 1972-74 1972-74
helicopters than the U.S. Army will build during the Average Average Average
entire span of the AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Black *

Hawk programs. Tanks 462, 3,000 6.5:1

In 1978, Anthony R. Battista, head of the House APC 860 4,400 5:1
Armed Services Research and Development Subcom- -

mittee staff, noted that helicopters represented the */ 170 1,200 7:1
last area in tactical weaponry in which the United Helicopters 920 710 1:1.3
States held a production lead over the Soviets (figure Fighters 540 930 1.7:1
1). They have an annual production capacity of 1,600
helicopters and were expected to increase annual "Pºº O 10

production (however, some sources indicate production Submarine Diesel Power 3 5 1.7:1
has declined some since 1978). Surface Ships 11 39 3.5:1
During and just after World War II, the Soviets
found that
offense using air
brought powerHowever,
success. during a combined
it wasn't arms
until ºve: Sºlºle.
Power with Ballistic Missile O 6

successful helicopter operations in Southeast Asia * Includes 475 M60A2 retrofit in 1973-74. Average M60A1 production was
and the Mideast wars that they started to take a long, 303 per year.

hard look at helicopters. It is believed that manv

Glossary
AAH advanced attack heli- ESM/ECM electronic warfare sup- NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
copter port measures/elec- NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
ADF automatic direction tronic countermeasures R Republican
finder ft feet SAS stability augmentation system
Alabama kg kilograms SHP shaft horsepower
armored personnel km kilometers SSBN nuclear powered ballistic
carrier |b pound(s) missile submarine
air traffic control LTG lieutenant general TV television
antitank guided missile m meters US United States
Soviet Combat Recon- ml mines USSR Union of Soviet Social
naissance Vehicle mm milliºneters istic Republics
colonel mph miles per hour

U.S. Army Aviation Digest

 Mi-1 Hare
The first mass produced helicopter designed by the
Soviets was the Hare (same as Polish SM-1). It was
designed by M.L. Mil (December 1947) and flew its
maiden flight in October 1948. By the mid-1950s, it
was operational in frontal aviation units.
Mi-2 Hoplite
With the advent of the turbine-powered aircraft,
the Soviets saw a need to use this new technology and
developed the Hoplite with two 400 SHP turbine
engines. The Hoplite made its maiden flight during
August 1965. It didn't appear to be capable of carrying
armament; however, several have been seen with
antitank missiles on each side and a cannon mounted
on the cockpit's side. In this mode, it could be used
independently as a reconnaissance vehicle. The Hoplite
can carry 8 to 10 combat troops or can be used as a
medevac to carry four wounded on stretchers, one
medical corpsman (with equipment) and the crew.
The Mi-4 was the first medium-sized helicopter to
enter the inventory. It was designed in 1951 to lift
between 1,200 and 1,600 kilograms of cargo or 8 to
12 armed Soldiers. There is also an armored version
with strap-on pods containing a 12.7 mm machinegun.
-.
Mi-8 Hip
The next helicopter to appear in frontal aviation
was the Hip. It was designed to replace the Hound,
found a place through the 1960s quickly and entered
service with Aeroflot in great numbers. Since it is
equipped with large rear doors, this helicopter is
capable of transporting at least three Soviet rifle
squads and small vehicles. The Hip is further proof
that general-purpose aircraft can be armed. Variants
have been observed with 12.7 mm machineguns, four
57 mm rocket pods and ATGMs. Moreover, each
window in the cargo section is equipped with a support
to-hold Infantry weapon.
January 1982
It was a surprise to western observers when great
numbers of the Hook and Harke began to appear in
frontal aviation during the late 1960s. The Hook's
performance was impressive with a world circuit speed
record of 211.4 mph and a cargo load capacity of
26,500 pounds (with one-third fuel load).
Mi-24 Hind
The star of the show was the Hind introduced in
1974. In the cockpit of the Hind-A, the pilot and
copilot sit back with the weapons-systems operator
up front. In Hinds D and E, the pilot sits behind and
above the gunner. The cargo area can carry 8 to 14
fully armed troops. The speed of an operationally
configured Hind-A is to be verified, but on 18 July
1975 a helicopter of the same type set a speed
record of 334.461 kilometers per hour. Prime vari
ants now in service are the Hind-D and Hind-E.
The Hind-A has a 12.7mm machinegun in the nose
and less sophisticated aiming system. Hinds A and D
mount four 32-shot, 57mm unguided rocket pods and
four AT-2 SWATTER ATGM rails. Air-to-ground
missiles and bombs up to 250 kg can be carried also.
The range of the 57 mm rockets is approximately
1,200 m, and the SWATTER has a range of approxi
mately 3,500 m. Both can penetrate armor.
The Hind-D mounts a large caliber, four-barrel,
Gatling-type machinegun; an all-weather sighting
system; low light TV; and a laser rangefinder.
The Hind-E is similar to Hind D except spiral ATGMs
replace SWATTERS. It is assumed that the Soviets
feel a multirole capability helicopter fits better into
their battle plans than the single-role type; for example,
the AH-1 Cobra built by the U.S.
H elicopter usage has become a widespread phe
nomenon in the Soviet Army. As early as 1953, they
were using helicopters to land troops in exercises. In
1959, Soviet tacticians described how they used heli
copters to adjust artillery fire at night. Since 1976, the
Soviet Air Force has received increased attention
37
 FIGURE 2: Soviet Helicopters
ExCL
NATO ROTOR8 MAX 8PEED MAX RANGE 8ERVICE CARGO PA38ENGER º
DESIG- CODE LENGTH MEIGHT LEVEL FLIGHT FULL LOAD CELING CAPACITY ACCOMMO
NATION NAME (FEET) (FEET) (MPW) (MILE8) (FEET) (POUND) DATIONS ARMAMENT REMARK3

Mi-1 Haſe 39.5 12.5 106 147 5,000 2-3 NA Older aircraft COunter
part to OH-58A
Mi-2 Hoplite 39.1 12.3 136 105 13,755 1,543 8 Can carry up to 2600 Replacing Mi-1
DOunds Of Chemicals
Mi-4 HOUnd 55 14.4 130 265 11,800 3.650 16 Machinegun in Older, widely exported.
nose utility helicopter
Mi-6 H00k 108.7 32.3 186 404 14,750 26,450 65 Two machineguns Troop Carrier and
in nose heavy transp0ſt
Mi-8 Hip 60 18.5 161 264 14,760 8,820 24 Up to Six external Widely exported troop
rocket pods, Caſtler
AIGMS, MG in nose,
bombs

Mi-10 Haſke 107.8 32.2 124 155 9,843 33,075 28 NOne Flying Crane also troop
Carrier Version
Mi-12 Homeſ" 122 41 163 310 11,500 66,000 200 NOne World's largest helicopter,
Caſſies troops and Caſg0
together
Mi-24 Hind 57 14 190 240+ 14,500 6,380 8-10 Machinegun in Soviet attack helicopter
nose, antitank
guided missiles, air
to-Surface missiles
and/Or b0mbS

“Never entered Series production

steadily due to the expanding role of the helicopter.
This is evidenced by force structure changes and
equipment modernization efforts. Due to increased
use of the helicopter, commanders at all levels have
become aware of how helicopters and their tactics
can be used against them. Until 1976, most of the
Soviet's helicopter fleet was used in observation or
rear area cargo roles. Now, we find that many new
tasks are assigned and new tactics developed.
Corps Level Maneuvers
Kavkaz-76. In January 1976, the USSR Ministry of
Defense announced that corps level maneuvers, code
named Kavkaz-76, would be carried out in the
Transcaucasus Military District from 25 January to
6 February. It was said to involve nearly 25,000 soldiers.
The maneuver featured conventional Soviet operations
with emphasis on mountain operations and employment
of several relatively new items of equipment, most
notably the Hind gunship. The exercise wasn't, by
Soviet standards, particularly remarkable if you're
looking at number of troops. Previous exercises used
as many as 100,000 troops.
Sever-76. Less than 4 months following completion
of Kavkaz-76, the USSR announced its intention to
hold another exercise— code named Sever-76. This
exercise was conducted opposite the NATO northern
region and included nearly 25,000 soldiers. It empha
sized operations in marshy, rugged terrain typical of
the northern regions. Air assault operations occupied
a prominent place in the exercise. Armed Hindgunships
and Hip transport helicopters conducted at least two
tactical assault landings. An assault crossing of the
Vuoksi River was carried out with heavy heliborne
and artillery support, and part of Sever-76 was carried
out in a simulated nuclear environment.
Shield-76. From 9 to 16 September 1976, the
Warsaw Pact held its first widely publicized maneuvers,
code named Shield-76, in 4 years. It took place in
Western Poland and involved Soviet, Polish, East
German and Czechlslovak forces. The exercise's troop
strength was about 35,000. Tactical play in the exercise
featured heliborne operations in conjunction with
the Pact's tank and motorized infantry operations.
One source noted that, “Those rotary wing aircraft
are acquiring an increasingly broad range of combat
employment."
The Soviet 1976 training yearsaw what they described
as three large-scale exercises. As Krasnya Zvezda
(Red Star) put it, “The emphasis in the current training
year is a campaign to achieve further improvement in
combat readiness to improve the quality of combat
performance as well as persistent mastering of new
equipment and weapons. Through the entire period
of training, considerable attention is focused on

38 U.S. Army Aviation Digest

 problems of tactics.” This statement was reflected in
the above exercises. All involved continued exercising
gº and testing of new equipment and concepts (including
armed helicopters and heliborne assault operations)
but were no more than tactical in scope.
Karpaty-77. The first publicized exercise of 1977
was Karpaty-77 (27,000 troops) held in the L'vov
Lutsk-Rovno area of the Carpathian Military District
from 11 to 16 July. Again, operations by Hind attack
helicopters in an antitank role were noteworthy. The
exercise scenario saw southern units—said to be
somewhat superior in forces and means—attack
northern troops who (despite heavy resistance) had
their defenses penetrated, failed to halt a southern
river crossing and withdrew in the face of unsuccessful
counterattacks. Pursuing southern units, after a chase
of several hundred kilometers, overtook northern
forces and engaged northern march security elements
and hastily brought up reserves in a meeting engage
ment. Southern superiority and combat initiative
ultimately won the war.
Joint Maneuvers
There is no way to estimate accurately the number
of maneuvers on the basis of press reports; however,
we believe that the Soviets and their allies have
conducted far more joint maneuvers than those
reported in the Warsaw Pact press or coming to the
attention of the West European press.
Helicopter Operations (Soviet)
The Soviets seem to be very serious about helicopter
operations and have found what they believe to be
the best tactics to employ them. In mid-1978, according
to the International Defense Review , the Soviets
employed more than 5,000 helicopters (3,800 in the
military fleet and 1,200 used by Aeroflot and the
*.
KGB (Soviet secret police and intelligence agency).
This is a threefold increase in 4 years, and it points
out the fact that the Soviets recognize that the helicopter
is critical to Soviet mobility. The Soviets have built
great numbers of helicopters, and theirs are some of
the best in the world.
Offensive Operations
Analyzing the experience of the 1973 Mideast War
and Vietnam, the Soviets concluded that the defense
based on new armament systems, particularly anti
tank and antiaircraft missiles, has obtained great
superiority over the offense. Soviet tactical planners
could also foresee the use of other new weapons not
yet checked in a combat situation; e.g., missile artillery,
remote mining and nuclear mine obstacles. It is believed
January 1982
that, with missile artillery bombardments of given
areas with small but highly destructive antitank and
antipersonnel mines, the whole tactical situation in
these areas can be inmobilized and forces crossing
this area will sustain considerable losses. These factors
make success of offensive operations of the ground
forces doubtful unless mass use is made of the helicopter
to promote neutralization of the new obstacles.
Mass Employment Operations
Consequently, mass employment of helicopters is
becoming a necessity in tactics of ground forces.
After overcoming obstacles and landing troops,
helicopters can return to rear bases to be used over
and over. However, if helicopters do not return to the
rear they can be used to support frontline troops
continuously. The Soviets feel this is most promising!
Tactical Operations
Airmobile raids have become one in a variety of
new Soviet tactical operations. This type operation is
used to penetrate quickly into enemy positions, destroy
objectives, take prisoners, capture documents and
weapons and return immediately to friendly positions.
The same principle can be used to move artillery
close to enemy lines, open fire suddenly, destroy
enemy positions and return to the rear safely.
Cargo Helicopter Operations
Helicopters are also used to deploy troops rapidly
after a nuclear attack. Soviet troops may be landed in
15 to 20 minutes after a nuclear strike. The troop
helicopter is being used to provide rapid crossing of
water barriers and to secure the opposite side so that
bridging operations can be undertaken. They deliver
and spread antitank and antipersonnel mines. The
Soviets are ever expanding their use of cargo helicopters
in new roles. The influence of the U.S. airmobile
concept is very apparent in Soviet writings on the
subject. Colonel Belov, a writer on Soviet military
affairs, stated, “Airborne units are organized in new
combined arms entities with combined reconnaissance
and antitank sections. Landing forces can land with a
high degree of combat readiness. All this makes assault
operations a mass means of armed conflict.” Many
Soviet writings about air assault presuppose the
possession of air superiority or supremacy.
Heliborne Operations
In all operations (including heliborne), Soviet ground
forces are responsible for their own defense. That's
why they arm most of their aircraft or have provisions
39
for troops onboard to provide fire from the aircraft.
Tactical Airlift Operations
It is estimated that each helicopter regiment in the
Soviet Air Force has sufficient assets to conduct a
tactical lift of a motorized rifle battalion, relying mainly
on helicopters such as the Hook, Hip and Hind. This
is the most likely unit to use in any type air assault
because of its assigned weapons and equipment. This
type unit could fight in a behind-the-lines situation.
Airmobile Operations
Let's examine a typical airmobile operation in detail.
The Soviets feel that a tactical heliborne operation
can be planned and launched in a matter of hours.
During early stages, the unit will increase its recon
naissance of the objective. Then the size of the assault
force would be determined based on the type operation.
Chosen elements would be issued special equipment
needed. Once the force has been briefed thoroughly,
they board helicopters in dispersed areas. En route to
the objective and escorted by helicopter gunships,
they will use areas held by friendly troops and then
enter enemy territory at the last possible time under
the cover of tactical air (tacair) support, if available.
Tacair stays with them through the initial landing.
Hopefully, the enemy territory flown over has been
suppressed or neutralized.
After landing, the force would deploy; lift helicopters
would return to their bases; and the bulk of the ground
force would attack its objective. Other elements of
the attack force would engage other security forces
used in protecting the objective; another element
would attack enemy transportation and communica
tions and surveillance sites; and one element would
attempt to cut off withdrawal routes and intercept
any possible reinforcements.
Special Helicopter Missions
Once the operation is complete, the force would
attempt to return to friendly lines or wait until friendly
troops advance to link up. Deployment of the Hind
has increased (immeasurably) the Soviet's ability to
conduct such operations and any other type mission.
Other types of special missions for helicopters include:
• Communications relay.
• ESM/ECM (electronic warfare support measures/
electronic counternmeasures).
• Psychological operations.
• NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) recon
naissance.
Survivability in Combat (Helicopter)
Despite armament and flexibility, the Soviets are
aware that helicopter survivability in connbat is vital
and cannot be ignored because of rapid development
of air defense weapons. Accordingly, Soviet helicopters
can be expected to avoid heavy troop and weapons
concentrations to the maximum extent unless sufficient
tactical air and artillery suppressive fires are available
to reduce effectiveness significantly.
Russia's Drive Toward Supremacy
In March 1977, then outgoing Defense Research
and Engineering Director, Dr. Malcolm R. Curry,
admitted to Congress that the Hind-D was a surprise
to western intelligence officials. He noted that Russia's,
“determined drive towards supremacy in deployed
military technology has not abated.” He also confirmed
indirectly that the Soviets had already tested a new
long-range, fire-and-forget missile. He then told
Congress that the Army's new advanced attack
helicopter (AAH), “when deployed would only match
currently (1977) developed Soviet systems in attack
capability.” Dr. Curry added, “The Hind-D is the most
heavily armed assault helicopter in the world and
carries sophisticated weapons delivery and fire control
equipment.”
Even though Soviet helicopter production has
increased sharply in recent years, NATO's output
exceeded the Warsaw Pact by 40 percent in 1974 and
1975. But that changed in 1976, as a result of a dramatic
change in Warsaw Pact helicopter production, which
was twice the United States output.
United States Versus Soviet Attack Helicopters.
The Hind differs from U.S. attack helicopters in
many respects. It's bigger than the Cobra, carries
more armanent and serves as a combination scout
attack-transport helicopter. The Soviets feel that having
three different aircraft perform these roles would
cause an air traffic control (ATC) problem especially
at night or in marginal weather conditions. One reason
the Soviets want long-range missiles is that their doctrine
requires attack helicopters to stay as far as possible
from units being attacked even though contour and
nap-of-the-earth flying are emphasized.
Cockpit Instrumentation on Hind
The Hind's instrumentation is said to be about the
same as U.S. helicopters with some advantages in a
few areas. These include:
• ADF navigation on at least three stations with
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
 continuous readout for X and Y coordinates and
a map display so they can be plotted very quickly.
R • A stability augmentation system (SAS).
• Three generators.
• Two electrical systems that use 800 cycles to
reduce the size and weight of wiring harnesses
and generators and permit electric rotor blade
deicing on all blades
• Bulletproof, flat antiglare cockpit windows.
• Twin turbine engines.
• Rotor blade deicing.

Primary Role of Hind

One of the primary roles of the Hind is that of an
antitank weapon. LTG Reznichenko, a respected
Soviet author, wrote, “They are superior to other
antitank weapons in terms of field of vision, maneuver
ability and firepower. They are capable of hitting
armored enemy targets while remaining out of reach
of antiaircraft weapons. The correlation between
tank and helicopter losses is 12:1 or even 19:1 in the
helicopter's favor, according to practical experiments.”
General Reznichenko also feels that modern warfare
has acquired an exceptionally strong antitank weapon
in the helicopter. He said, “Let the tanks aim their
machineguns at them. Helicopters will be able to
strike first from afar. The crew has everything required
to destroy the tanks; the most accurate sights, missiles
plus combat skills.”
after the mission is completed, the impression of the
rubber protector is clearly visible on the operator's
Basic Antitank Helicopter Formation face.
This formation is apparently a flight of four with
the flight commander bearing a large portion of the
responsibility for the mission's success. The commander Hind's New Antitank System
gives the command for the turn in to the final approach The Soviets envision that the helicopters will
to the target and ensures that each of the crew has approach targets at a height of 5 to 10 m, then pop up
mastered the various aspects of the mission before from 20 to 100 m to fire at targets from ranges between
the aircraft takes off. There is extensive use of simulators
2,000 to 3,000 m. This process should take between 20
to practice aiming ATGMs. Everything is coordinated to 30 seconds. It has been reported, in Jane's All the
and practiced on the ground. The firing approach is World's Aircraft, that a new antitank system is under
carefully calculated ahead of time so that there is no development for the Hind with a fire-and-forget guided
requirement for position keeping. During the attack, missile and an optical-contrast TV seeker which has
all attention must be on the target with the helicopter a range of about 5 miles.
kept as stable as possible.

Fire Support/Antitank Roles

Special Optical Devices
The helicopters are painted camouflage green on
top and blue underneath. They are equipped with
special optical devices that enable the weapons operator
to see tanks even though they are camouflaged and
hidden among trees. The requirement for the weapons
operators to keep their eyes pressed against the
viewing device during the attack is so intense that,
Soviet combined arms commanders must know the
capabilities of fire support helicopters as well as they
know those of artillery. They should know the
characteristics of armament installed on helicopters
and when it is used against different targets. These
commanders must work out methods of calling
helicopters forward, guiding them to the targets and
maintaining uninterrupted communications.

January 1982 41
 Colonel Savkin (Soviet), in Principlesofoperational
Art and Tactics, stated, “Armed helicopters can
operate as accompanying fire for tanks and for infantry
in personnel carriers. Moreover, they can attack as
part of the forward detachment and advance guards,
cover the rear and flanks of friendly forces, disrupt
the movement of enemy reserves and destroy small
enemy reconnaissance units.”
Russia's Follow-on Attack Helicopter
In January 1978, U.S. Representative William L.
Dickinson (R-AL), after talking about the Hind-D,
told a meeting of the American Helicopter Society in
Washington, “The Russians have a follow-on attack
helicopter which is thought to be equal to or better
than the Hughes AH-64.”
The first Hind was not spotted until 1974. If it is
true that five variants of it now exist, as some people
seem to think is the case, the Soviets have turned out
a new model of attack helicopters about every 10
months. Between 1974 and 1977, more than 450 Hinds
became operational. At that rate, an average of 15
per month is being produced with no indication of
slowing down.
Armed Helicopter's Role
In a book published in 1972, Colonel Savkin begrudg
ingly admitted, “The armed helicopter may turn out
to be a means of fundamental change in the nature of
ground combat. Although the helicopter is not ideally
suited to this role, it nevertheless possesses those
characteristics which most ensure superiority in mobility.”
Helicopters, particularly armed ones, have become
very much an integral part of Soviet combined arms
operations. It appears that, after a thorough analysis
of helicopter operations in Vietnam and the Mideast
wars, the Soviets have developed a unique Soviet
approach to helicopter employment. They have adopt
ed and modified numerous other aspects of foreign
concepts, rejected others and added their own war
fighting philosophy. In so doing, they have created a
formidable force of helicopters.
Limited Life of Soviet Helicopters
The biggest weakness of Soviet helicopter designs,
as most U.S. rotary wing experts see it, is their limited
life of operational durability. If Soviet helicopters fly
100 to 500 combat hours, they are satisfactory. They
don't feel that a war will last that long. And to emphasize
the folly of fine tuning their helicopters for multi
thousand hour reliability, which characterized U.S.
military design standards, the Soviets point to the
massive number of U.S. helicopters lost in Southeast
42
Asia (most after short lives in the field). According to
Armed Forces Journal (December 1976), 4,869 heli
copters were lost in the Vietnam War (2,281 due to
hostile action and the rest due to operational causes).
Although flown by Soviet Air Force pilots, Soviet
helicopters, with their variety of cargo and attack
capabilities, are not Air Force weapons. They form
an integral and important part of the combined arms
doctrine, whose employment in battle will be dictated
by the Soviet ground commander of tactical forces,
and have adapted surprisingly well to the new Soviet
theory of war.
Soviets Adaptation to Helicopters
It is clear that adaptation by the Soviet forces, in
the use of helicopters since the end of World War II,
has been successful. This gives them increased mobility,
maneuverability, striking power, surprise and fire power.
Large units and operational formations are able to
deal with tactical and operational tasks on their own.
The Soviets appreciate the effectiveness of modern
antitank defense and realize the necessity of achieving
such total surprise and maintaining such a high rate of
advance that the enemy would never have time to
establish its antitank strongpoints or forces in the
first place.
One of the main threats to the ability of a mobile
unit to survive was considered air power; therefore,
measures for improving antiaircraft systems, at the
expense of updating other ground support equipment,
were undertaken in the 1960s.
Inadequate Tactics and Equipment (Soviet)
Forced to meet political requirements in the 1970s,
the Soviets found it necessary, not only to be able to
win the next war, but to do it very quickly! Along with
this realization, they decided that both tactics and
equipment were not adequate to the task. Equipment
was nonexistent or in short supply and often was
unsuitable for its intended use.
Summary
The sum of the above efforts demonstrates how the
Soviets plan to win a war quickly. Their plans are not
unique or original, and they recognize that there are
enormous problems which will hinder execution of
their plans.
However, if the Soviets are successful in achieving
surprise, shock or disrupting political stability prior
to the outbreak of war and catching an enemy half
mobilized, undeployed or ill prepared, then their troops
(with only a mediocre level of training) will achieve
desired results during an offense!
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
 - I. an SP4 journalist in the
U.S. Army; and, when I joined the
Army, I was told I would have lots
of “exciting experiences.” But, I
never thought that one of those
experiences would be flying up to
the Alaskan glaciers in a UH-1H
Huey helicopter.; I was given the
opportunity to fly up to the glaciers
with Captains Elious E. Zenon II
and Philip A. Trueblood, Head
spa Mary Kathryn Henderson quarters and Headquarters Com
HHC, 222d Aviation Battalion (CBT) pany, 222d Aviation Battalion, Ft.
172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska) Wainwright, AK.
Fort Wainwright AK 99.703 Being the adventurous type that
-
-
I am, I decided to take the oppor
º tunity. I loaded up my winter gear
and headed to the hangar at 0830
hours. The process for taking off in
the helicopter was more work than
I'd ever expected. The pilots and
crewchiefs had many duties to per
form before we could even start
the engine.
The pilots first called to find out
what the weather report was for
the area in which we would be flying:
they then filled out the proper forms,
plotted the flight on the maps and
filed their flight plan. This process
took an hour or so. Then it was out
to the aircraft and I was ready for
the takeoff, but then CPT Zenon
explained that he was doing a pre
flight on the aircraft. (Preflight is a
functional check that the pilot per
forms on the aircraft before starting
out.) The pilots thoroughly checked
the helicopter for any discrepancies.
“A thorough preflight may take
a little extra time,” said CPT Zenon,
“but if we don't take the time, there
may never be any more time to
take. It's imperative to take time to
check and see if the helicopter is in
excellent condition,” he added. I
took his words of wisdom to heart
since it was my life that was going
up in the helicopter. I was then
given a passenger briefing by the
pilots and the crewchiefs; I felt some
what assured of a safe flight.
Finally both captains were in the
pilots' seats and the crewchiefs were
checking the helicopter as the engine

43
started. Everything checked out
okay, everyone was aboard and we
were cleared for takeoff, so off we
Went.

I put a flight helmet on so I could

listen to what the pilots and crew
chiefs were saying to each other
and to the tower, because this was
my first helicopter flight—and I
wanted to learn all I could. I was
confused by all the numbers and
words they were saying to each
other, but I knew they meant some
thing important. I knew then that
being a pilot was more than flying a
helicopter.
The flight to Ft. Greely, AK, was
very scenic. Being in the helicopter
gave us the opportunity to fly lower
than I'd ever flown, and I captured
some very beautiful pictures. The
ride was very smooth and everything
seemed to be gliding by us. The
doors were open while we were
flying, and it seemed as though the
hills and rivers were close enough
to touch. Captains Elious E. Zenon and Philip A. Trueblood preparing for takeoff
As we prepared to land at Allen
Army Airfield, Ft. Greely, I got
ready for what I thought was going the tents partially over. I was told safely on land. I hopped out of the
to be a rough landing. We hovered this frequently happens when pilots helicopter and all you could hear
barely above the ground for a few are unable to land on an airstrip was my camera clicking. There I was,
seconds and then, to my surprise, and the landing area is limited. We ice under my feet and the sunbeaming
the aircraft touched down with had some hot coffee and then flew down on my face, standing on the
hardly a motion. I learned that you up to Gulkana Glacier. glacier-Oh if they could see me now,
don't just shut the helicopter off The weather was clear and the was my only real thought.
and get out. The blades twirled for scenery beautiful, this too was a We dropped off our passengers
several minutes as the crewchiefs surprise to me. Being in Alaska and to head on up the glacier and our
got out to inspect and ensure that having been told by everyone to mission was completed.
everything was running smoothly. prepare myself for extreme cold, I On the way back, we flew high (ºr
The pilots then turned buttons and expected only the worst weather enough to get some pictures of the
flipped switches until the aircraft possible. While flying over the gla clouds and low enough to get pic
was completely shut down. While cier I heard the pilots say, “do you tures of the forest and water areas.
the pilots checked in and filled out see anywhere to land down there?” The things we could do in that
the flight plan and necessary forms, I perked right up. Every terrible helicopter were fascinating. The
the helicopter was being refueled. thing I had ever heard about flying pilots were most impressive with
There are many extra things to do flashed before my eyes. Could they their flying performance to a person
and usually these things go unnoticed do it? Would we crash? Will I live who was taking their first flight ever
by passengers. to see tomorrow? I mean here we in a helicopter.
The flight to the Summit Lake are on Gulkana Glacier and they've Finally we landed at Wainwright
Lodge area proved as scenic as the never landed here before. Again Army Airfield at 1800 and as the
rest of the trip had been. We landed the landing area was limited, so it aircraft was being shut down I
at Summit Lodge where the 4th seemed to me. We flew over the reflected on the day's events. This
Battalion, 9th Infantry had tents set area several times to make sure of opportunity gave me a chance to
up for glacier training. While landing the landing potentials, suddenly I see what the flying life is like. It
the aircraft, we proceeded to blow opened my eyes and there we were, truly was an “exciting experience.”

44 U.S. Army Aviation Digest

Increasing Efficiency
in Mobility Fuels
An approach to energy conservation
T HE ARMY ENERGY Plan
was published in February
1978. It established energy
conservation goals and short- and
long-term objectives. Rather than
maintain an energy posture of zero
growth, this dynamic program called
for reduced energy consumption
to the year 2000 as well as a reduction
in the Army's dependence on scarce
and nonrenewable fuels. Although
the Army had consistently per
formed well against the previous
prevailing goals, it was clear that
newer, more 1nn OVative COnServa
tion measures were required.
In accordance with this new man
date, all levels of command have
placed increasing emphasis on mon
itoring energy consumption and
generating new initiatives to increase
the efficiency of energy use. It is
particularly within the field of mo
bility fuels that many of these effic
iency-increasing steps can be ap
plied, thus ensuring a more effective
rate of return on our training dollars.
January 1982
Directorate of Industrial Operations
Due to the large volume of avia
tion training conducted at the U.S.
Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC),
we at Ft. Rucker, AL, are especially
concerned about mobility fuel con
sumption. Because of our sizeable
aircraft fleet and its huge fuel con
sumption rate, Ft. Rucker is the
largest single user of mobility fuel
within the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
community. Our increased student
load and the attendant increase in
our flying hour program have not
only resulted in a significant con
sumption of mobility fuels but also
have offered us numerous oppor
tunities to increase fuel efficiency
through a judicious conservation
program.
Recognizing our tremendous con
sumption of fuels in Army Aviation
training and related support, we
promptly determined our need to
develop a method for measuring
our fuel efficiency which would be
congruous for the total environment.
Major Johnny J. Grice
and
Captain John R. Morrisette
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
A stepwise method for establishing
such an efficiency measurement is
outlined below.
STEP 1: Determining A Baseline.
Because of the obvious differences
in aircraft which comprise the Avi
ation Center training fleet, some
standard had to be developed against
which all aircraft fuel consumption
could be compared. The bulk of
our aircraft fleet consists of UH-1
Hueys, and they consume most of
our fuel. Thus, the UH-1 was se
lected as the baseline aircraft. Since
the actual fuel consumption rates
of each aircraft are known, the UH-1
was assigned an arbitrary fuel con
sumption factor of 1.0000. All other
aircraft consumption rates were
then divided by the UH-1 rate and
expressed as a factor of the baseline.
For example, the CH-47 Chinook
uses more than four times the
amount of fuel per flying hour than
does the UH-1. Specifically, the
CH-47 fuel consumption factor is
45
 14 Mettle

m
--im FY 1980-11.211 -

FUEL
AIRCRAFT CONSUMPTION Hº-º; •
TYPE FACTOR

TH-55
OH-58
O. 1704

0.2765 12 MBTUs
12 15.
–
––
UH-1 (BASELINE) 1.000
|-
OV-1 1.6174
11 MBTU
T-42 0.3156 º 10.951 |
U-21 O.9469

CH-47 4.04.04 10 MBTUs | | || ".

UH-60 1.6414
AH-1 1.0469

AVERAGE 1.2285 | 9 MBIUs

1st QUARTER 2d QUARTER 3d QUARTER 4th QUARTER

FIGURE 1: Fuel consumption factors FIGURE 2: MBTUs consumed per training hour

4.0404, as shown in figure 1. It is We call this result the total flight
imperative that this first step-de hour equivalent by aircraft. These
termining a baseline—be computed
carefully because it is against this
standard of fuel consumption per
hour that all calculations will be
made. Additionally, maintaining
accurate and consistent data cannot
be overemphasized. The results of
the program will only be as valid as
the data used to calculate them. It
should be pointed out that such a
baseline could be computed for any
other fuel consuming vehicle in the
Army inventory.
STEP2: Computation of Totals.
In step two we merely multiply
the fuel consumption factor that
we have computed for each aircraft
by the number of hours that aircraft
was flown during the time period.
figures are then totaled for our entire
aircraft fleet.
STEP 3: Determination Of Fuel
Efficiency.
The final step merely requires
dividing the total Million British
Thermal Units (MBTUs) consumed
during a time period by the total
flight hour equivalent for that same
period (found during step 2). The
result is a number which represents
MBTUs consumed per equivalent
training hour. This equivalency
Serves as a common basis for com
parison, since the actual hours flown
by type aircraft vary greatly from
month to month. This procedure,
then, provides a highly reliable
indicator of fuel efficiency. Figure
2 shows a comparison of our progress
during fiscal year 1981 as compared
to FY 1980, and figure 3 provides a
sample format for computations.
N ow that we have a reliable basis
for comparing fuel efficiency,
we can consider some of the initia
tives undertaken by the Aviation
Center to conserve this important
resource. Although some of these
actions may seem at first glance
trivial, the impact of their implemen
tation has been tremendous. Some
of these actions, briefly described
below, are to:
• Maximize the use of our flight
simulators; i.e., use them in
stead of aircraft when possible.
• Stress flight planning as a posi
tive method of reducing fuel
consumption on every flight.

FIGURE 3: Equations used

FUFL CONSUMPTION RATE FOR TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

sIEP FUEl CONSUMPTION RATE FOR UH-]

E FUEl CONSUMPTION FACTOR

STEP 2 | FUFL CONSUMPTION FACTOR x ACTUAL FLIGHT HOURS = EQUIVALENT FLIGHT HOURS

MBTUs CONSUMED
STEP 3 | EQUIVALENT FUGHT HOURS
- MBTUs PER TRAINING HOUR

U.S. Army Aviation Digest

FIGURE 4:
A typical 5,000-gallon fuel tanker and UH-1 helicopter during refueling operations.
Fuel-saving initiatives resulted in enough.JP-4 saved during FY 1981 to fillmore than -

200 such tankers

• Require pilots to receive instru initiatives resulted in a direct savings hour. Any ideas you have to help us
ment clearances prior to start of 135,545 MBTUs. This equates to achieve this goal would be more than
ing the aircraft engine, thus an actual savings of more than one welcome.
reducing running time at engine million gallons of JP-4, at a cost of Although the Ft. Rucker model
idle. almost $1.4 million. is in some respects unique due to
• Increase the number of rapid This savings, however, serves only our extensive aviation training pro
refueling points at tactical sites, to point out the direction in which gram, the steps outlined above can
thus minimizing the length of we need to move. With other antici nevertheless be adapted to any type
ground refueling time and pre pated initiatives, we expect to signif unit. It is hoped that this article
cluding shutdown/runup idling icantly improve our position in the will spark some energy conservation
time. months ahead. Our goals at Ft. Rucker ideas on other installations, partic
• Accomplish closed circuit rapid for FY 1982 are an additional im ularly regarding efficiency in mobility
refueling at engine idle rather provement in mobility fuels efficiency, fuels. Please send your ideas to:
than at operating revolutions in order to reduce our consumption Editor, Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer
per minute. below 10 MBTU per flight training P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362. Hºmº
• Minimize debriefing time in the
cockpit while the engine is
running. FIGURE 5:
• Consolidate administrative mis
Aircraft being refueled using closed-circuit rapid refueling (CCRR)
sions and demonstration flights, during training. Accomplishing CCRR refueling at engine-idle
i.e., where possible, perform RPM is one of the fuel saving initiatives employed by USAAVNC.
these missions in conjunction Increasing the number of CCRR points resulted in fewer delays
with aircrew training manual and more fuel saved
(ATM) training flights.
While the above list is by no means
exhaustive, it does provide an indica
tion of the direction we are headed
at the Aviation Center. Through these
and other initiatives, we have man
aged to decrease our MBTU con
sumption per flight hour from 11.277
in FY 1980 to 10.833 in FY 1981
(figure 2). This is an improvement of
3.9 percent MBTU per flight hour.
What does this increased efficiency
mean to the Army? Specifically,
during FY 1981 our fuel conservation

January 1982
 VIEWS FROM READERS
Editor:
Would you please be so kind as to
direct this letter to the appropriate
department whereby I may obtain a
copy of an article printed in a past issue
of the Aviation Digest.
The article I seek a copy of is entitled,
“How to Crash by the Book.” I was
advised that it is in the September and
November issues for the year 1977. I
understand it is an excellent article on
the loss of effectiveness of the tailrotor
of an observation type helicopter. I would
very much like to have a copy.
If you cannot furnish me a copy
perhaps you would be kind enough to
advise me where I can obtain a copy. I
will be most happy to pay any reasonable
charge for the service. If a copy is
available, please mail to the above
address. Thank you!
Robert L. Ayers
3 Bellamy Court
Champaign, IL 61820
If possible, I would like several back
issues, as well as a subscription.
CPT Harry Belil
New Breed Publications Inc.
Naneut, New York, NY 10954
• Annual subscriptions are available
by sending a remittance of $22,00027.50
for overseas addresses) to: Superin
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office,Washington,DC20402.
You may obtain official distribution
in your unit (Active, Reserve or National
Guard) if it is on pinpoint distribution.
The unit should submit DA Form 12-5
in accordance with instructions on that
form to: Commander, AG Publications
Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Balti
more, MD 21220. If your unit is National
Guard, and not on pinpoint distribution,
it should submit its request through its
state adjutant general.
CORRECTIONS
The article “HangarTalk" in the October
1981 issue of the Aviation Digest con
tained an error. The correct response
to question 9, “Personnel wearing ear
plugs during high-continuous noise
conditions can hear both direct voice
and radio communications better than
a person not using earplugs," should
have been choice “A”—True, as indi
cated in the reference, TC 1-20, pages
7-4 and 7.9.
In the November 1981 issue of the
Aviation Digest the name of the author
of the article, “Cobra Vs. Hind," was
erroneously carried as Captain Dale
W. Moffatt. It should have read Captain
Alan W. Moffatt. The Aviation Digest
apologizes to Captain Moffatt for any
embarrassment this may have caused.

• The article you refer to first was

printed in September 1977 under the
title “How to Crash by the Book," and
was reprinted in the November 1978 The Aviation Digest re
issue under the title, “OH-58 Tail Rotor grets that the cutlines were
Stall." It was reprinted because of a transposed for two of the
flight simulators in the
visit to the Safety Center by an Army November 1981 issue.
aviator who credited it with possibly They appear correctly at
saving his life. When he encountered left.
tail rotor stall in an OH-58, he remem
bered the original article and applied
UH-1FS AH-1FS
what he had read in the Aviation Digest
to accomplish a safe landing.

Editor:
I have read a copy of your publication
(for the first time) while at the convention
of the AUSA in Washington, and, I
found it very interesting.
WANTED: Humorous or human interest anecdotes about
Army Aviation for use in the June 1982 issue of the Aviation
Digest to help observe the 40th Birthday of Army Aviation.
Send your contributions to Editor, at the address below.

Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362

48 U.S. Army Aviation Digest

 RSI Report
-
T HE ELEVENTH meeting of the Ouadripar
tite Working Group on Aviation (11th OWG/
AVN) was held in Montreal, Canada, 14
through 18 September and was attended by Amer
can, British, Canadian and Austrailian (ABCA)
delegates. It was the consensus, both before
and after the meeting, that the agenda was the
most challenging ever undertaken by any CWG
working group. The scope of the agenda was di
versified, addressing both materiel and operational
agreements for current and future requirements.
Each nation's delegates approach their individual
taskings with a positive attitude and a feeling
that their efforts will contribute to the Overall
goal of achieving standardization and interopera
bility among helicopter forces that participate in
the land battle. A summary of the more important
accomplishments of the meeting is
T The delegates reported that their nations
have generally approved a draft Ouadripartite
Objectives (OO) for Army Aviation; prior to the
development of this OO, standardization agree
ments for Army Aviation were based on COs for
other branches of the Army. This development
will allow OWG/AVN to relate more to the needs
of Army Aviation.
T The Ouadripartite Advisory Publication (CAP)
was introduced as a new type publication for the
ABCA program. This publication allows nations
to share information where standardization is
not feasible. Several of the existing concept papers
were recommended for development as OAPs.
T Each of the nations reported general accept
ance of OSTAG 645, Cross-Servicing of Heli
copters Engaged in Land Operations. This agree
ment is being staffed within NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) as a standardization agree
Iºment (STANAG). The purpose of the STANAG is
to establish a means by which one nation's
helicopter can receive services from and by
another nation's ground crews, primarily in emer
gencies.
T The United Kingdom delegate proposed a
new agreement for the standardization of tactical
approaches and departures from field sites. The
purpose of the agreement is to develop a standard
procedure to be used during joint operations.
Nations will comment on the draft when circulated
by the United Kingdom.
S 22.
e
21 NS
}st
Mr. Rush Wicker
- The age-old problem of airspace management
over the battlefield was addressed. Each nation
voiced its position. The United States presented
an operational concept for airspace management
based on the Division 86 concept. The delegates
agreed to review the paper and provide comments
We hope that this draft concept will provide the
basis for airspace management doctrine within
the ABCA alliance.
T Each of the nations expressed increased
interest in aircraft survivability equipment (ASE).
The draft concept paper on ASE was approved
and action was initiated to develop two OSTAGs
on specific items of ASE.
E Based on presentations received at the 11th
OWG/AVN meetings, the working group identified
the need to develop concept papers for future
requirements. The following concept papers were
Initiated by the working group.
• Helicopter battle damage repair require
ment to the year 2000.
Family of aerial vehicles for land forces in
the year 2000 and beyond.
Aviation life support equipment to the year
2000.
Aircraft recovery concepts to the year 2000.
Improved maintenance concepts up to the
year 2000.
• Avionics requirements to the year 2000.
The 12th meeting of OWG/AVN will be held in
March 1982. During the interim, draft agreements
and concept papers will be circulated to the
appropriate agencies for comment. Some of these
agreements will be ratified by the nations. These
agreements will then be incorporated into national
documents which will contribute to achieving
the goal of the standardization program. Hopefully
in the future if you should participate in a multi
national operation, you will find that the equip
ment of other nations is interoperable with your
own and their operational procedures are the
Same a SyCUIS. Laº:
If this article has generated any questions or
requirements please contact Mr. Rush Wicker
by writing: Commander, U.S. Army Aviation
Center, ATTN: ATZO-D-CC, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362.
Nº. 72
* | *
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
VIGINETTES
CW4 Peter C. McHugh
Aeronautical Information Specialist
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
WHEN THE MOCA isn't! Most Army aviators can
quickly provide a definition of both minimum en
route IFR altitude (MEA) and minimum obstruction
clearance altitude (MOCA) – that is to say they know
that MEA is:
“The lowest published altitude between radio fixes
which assures acceptable navigationalsignal coverage
and meets obstacle clearance requirements between
those fixes. The MEA prescribed for a Federal Air
way or segment thereof applies to the entire width
of the Airway, segment or route between the radio
fixes defining the Airway, segment or route."
(Ref FLIP GP)
And they know that MOCA is:
“The lowest published altitude in effect between
radio fixes on VOR Airways, off-airway routes, or
route segments which meets obstacle clearance
requirements for the entire route segment and which
assures acceptable NAV signal coverage only within
25 statute miles (22.5 NM) of a VOR."
(Ref FLIP GP)
One would infer from the definitions above and
particularly the use of the words “Federal” and VOR,
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
and also the figure, that there exists a deviation from
these generally accepted definitions. The wise aviator
should know how the symbology depicted in the figure
can legitimately occur.
The definitions above certainly cannot apply in
this case since the designated MEA on V1 is 6,900
feet lower than the MOCA. If MEA assures radio
reception for the entire route and MOCA for only
22.5 NM from each facility how can MOCA be higher
than MEA? How is it that V18 shows only a MOCA
with no MEA?
Obviously some definitions other than those above
apply to this particular example which was extracted
from a low altitude en route chart from the Caribbean
Area. Reference to section C, theater flight data and
procedures, of the Caribbean and South America En
Route Supplement provides the following definitions
under the title “cruising altitudes.”
“(MEA)—the minimum en route as established and
published by a responsible national agency will be
shown in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace.”
(Ref FLIP C&SA En Route Sup)
“(MOCA)—Those altitudes which provide 1,000 feet
clearance in non-mountainous and 2,000 feet clearance
in mountainous terrain within 22 NM of any point on
the intended flight path in uncontrolled airspace, or
within 10 NM of any point on the intended flight path
when shown in controlled airspace. MOCA may be
shown in conjunction with MEA in uncontrolled air-.
space to call attention to a requirement for caution in Y
flying at the MEA. USAF/C&SA MOCA are based
upon elevation data contained on current USAF ONC
charts and when published represent a minimum terrain
clearance altitude rather than a MOCA in the true
sense as defined by FAA."
(Ref FLIP C&SA En Route Sup)
The same discrepancy of definition exists in the
European Theater, Pacific Theater and in Africa.
Minor differences in application occur in each area
and all aviators must make themselves aware of these by
reference to the appropriate En Route Supplement.
¥r U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1982–546-037/110
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ATC ACTIONLINE

and also the figure, that there ex

VIGINETTES these generally accepted definiti
should know how the symbology
CW4 Peter C. McHugh can legitimately occur.
The definitions above certa
Aeronautical Information Specialist
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity this case since the designated
Aeronautical Services Office feet lower than the MOCA. Iſ
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
reception for the entire route
22.5 NM from each facility how
WHEN THE MOCA isn't! Most Army aviators can than MEA? How is it that V18
quickly provide a definition of both minimum en with no MEA?
route IFR altitude (MEA) and minimum obstruction Obviously some definitions o
clearance altitude (MOCA)—that is to say they know apply to this particular example
that MEA is: from a low altitude en route chal
“The lowest published altitude between radio fixes Area. Reference to section C, t
which assures acceptable navigational signal coverage procedures, of the Caribbean a
and meets obstacle clearance requirements between Route Supplement provides the
those fixes. The MEA prescribed for a Federal Air under the title “cruising altitud
way or segment thereof applies to the entire width “(MEA) — the minimum en ro
of the Airway, segment or route between the radio published by a responsible na
fixes defining the Airway, segment or route." shown in both controlled and ur
(Ref FLIP GP) (Ref FLIP (

And they know that MOCA is: “(MOCA)—Those altitudes w

“The lowest published altitude in effect between clearance in non-mountainous a
radio fixes on VOR Airways, off-airway routes, or in mountainous terrain within 2
route segments which meets obstacle clearance the intended flight path in unc
requirements for the entire route segment and which within 10 NM of any point on th
assures acceptable NAV signal coverage only within when shown in controlled airs
25 statute miles (22.5 NM) of a VOR." shown in conjunction with ME
(Ref FLIP GP) space to call attention to a requ
flying at the MEA. USAF/C&
One would infer from the definitions above and upon elevation data contained (
particularly the use of the words “Federal” and VOR, charts and when published repre
clearance altitude rather than
sense as defined by FAA.”
(Ref FLIP

The same discrepancy of d

European Theater, Pacific T
Minor differences in applicati
and all aviators must make them
reference to the appropriate E

Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria. "

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FEBRUARY 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 2
§
=/
Yºr Yº Yºr S. Y
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Richard D. Kenyon
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 The Wishing Well, GEN Hamilton H. Howze (Retired)

6 Who's Going To Teach Aviators How To Fight? LTC (P)
James W. Lloyd
10 Views From Readers
11 Aviation Personnel Notes: Additional Specialty Desig
nations Underway For Year Group 1975
12 150th Air Traffic Control Platoon, CW2 Frederick W.
Stetson
14 Hangar Talk: FM 1-30, Meteorology For Aviators, CW2
Gary R. Weiland
15 The Personality Disordered Individual in Aviation Units,
LTC Brian H. Chermol
18 If The Shoe Fits, CW3 John E. Cattilini
20 PEARL's
23 Threat Branch, MAJ William F. Voth
27 DES Report To The Field: The Army Standardization
Program
29 Homecoming Mission For the 6th Cav, CPT LeRoy
K. Neel
30 Reporting Final
33 How To Get The Aviation Digest page 45
34 Total Electrical Failure In A UH-1—Then What? Roger
F. McPheeters
36 Training—The Key Ingredient, MAJ Harold J. Brecher
and CW3 Robert E. Browning &\tº:
38 An Alternate AH-1 TOW Training System, CPT Bruce &
Coons §
42 Prepared To Survive, SFC (P) W. Dave Goldie and Mr. ts
Colin Hale #
45 Arming The Aeroscout, Col Robert S. Fairweather Jr. º
48 ATC Action Line: AR 95-10! What Is It? Mr. Carl Gray º;
Inside Back Cover: ETM Catalogs
Cover: Crew with CH-47 Chinook, part of the
Army Aviation's contribution to the combination Honorable John A. Marsh Jr.
of firepower with mobility that General Howze Secretary of the Army
wishes will be present—the top priority for success Richard K. Tierney
in combat. Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training. maintenance, operations, research and development.
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General. U S Army Aviation Center
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the US Army Aviation Center Photos are U S Army unless otherwise
specified Use of the masculino pronoun is in ended to include both genders
unless otherwise stated Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the
Digest and to the author, unless otherwise indicated
Articles, photos and items of Interest on Army Aviation are invited Direct
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981. in accordance with Army Regulation
310-1
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1 Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR, AG
Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard. Baltimore, MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements. Initiate a revised DA Form 12-5
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire perso...al copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents. US
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 Annual subscription rates
 | T IS ONLY FITTING that this issue of the Avia
tion Digest begin with a tribute from the entire
Army Aviation community to one of our most
y
senior aviators, General Robert M. Shoemaker,
who retired this month.
General Shoemaker, commander of the U.S.
Army Forces Command since 1978, has rendered
distinguished and valuable service to the Army
and the Nation for 36 years. Army Aviation was
indeed fortunate to number him among our ranks.
His contributions to aviation have been many—
beginning with his assignment to Combat Develop
ments at the Aviation School upon graduation
from flight training in 1960 and continuing through
a long series of assignments of greatly increased
responsibility—almost all of which touched directly
on the readiness of Army Aviation.
From the very inception of the airmobile concept
wherein he was the G3 of the 11th Air Assault
Division through the combat fielding of the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in Vietnam, General
Shoemaker played a crucial role in aviation
employment. Within the 1st Cavalry, he served
as the commander of the 1st Battalion, 12th
Cavalry, commander, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry
(then the only air cavalry squadron in the Army);
assistant division commander and finally division
commander. These assignments ably prepared
him for the even greater responsibilities to follow
as commanding general, III Corps and Fort Hood,
deputy CG, FORSCOM and ultimately, com
mander of FORSCOM, the Army's largest field
command today.
But in addition to these key commands, his
service was also interspersed with other challenges
equally important to the future of Army Aviation.
As chief of the Plans and Programs Division in
the Office of the Director of Army Aviation, he
was deeply involved in developing the future
structure for the aviation force. As the deputy
commanding general of MASSTER at Fort Hood,
he directed the study and test of Army Aviation
applications in a high threat air defense environ
ment on a mid-intensity battlefield—paving the
way for the tactical applications we know so well
today.
Through it all, he has set a dynamic pace toward
which each of us might aspire, focusing our orien
tation on our mission and training to perform that
mission. Army Aviation is a far stronger and more
viable fighting force today for the contributions
of General Shoemaker. And although now retired,
we look forward to hearing more from him in a
future issue of the Digest as he reflects on Army
Aviation—then and now.
FEBRUARY 1982
Another of our very distinguished retired general
officers comes to print in this issue. General
Hamilton H. Howze, the chairman of the Army
Tactical Mobility Requirements (Howze) Board
that spawned the airmobile division, makes some
very salient points on soldiering and leadership
in “The Wishing Well (Or What I Hope Is Going
On In Army Aviation)." This is a very thought
provoking piece in the inimitable style of one of
Army Aviation's early pioneers—a must for all to
read and heed.
For both Generals Shoemaker and Howze,
training was the name of the game. So it is appro
priate that this issue should feature some other
articles that stress the need for different kinds of
training. There's “If The Shoe Fits...?" by CW3
John E. Cattilini which cuts deeply—if the shoe
fits. A bit lighter but still most informative is
“Prepare to Survive" by SFC W. Dave Goldie
and Colin Hale. Then LTC (P) James W. Lloyd
asks a stimulating question, "Who's Going to Teach
Aviators How to Fight?" LTC Lloyd's thoughts
are echoed by many and some significant training
changes are in the offing as a result of just such
concerns in the field and in the “Schoolhouse."
These are but samples of the good reading
offered for you this month. Remember, this is
your magazine, so keep your articles and Sug
gestions coming. We welcome input from you on
all matters affecting our aviation program—training,
safety, maintenance, operations—so that others
in the Army Aviation community will be better
informed and accomplishment of our total mission
will be enhanced.
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL

Time
Wishing
WeII
Or what I hope is going on in Army Aviation
WAS ASKED BY Major General Carl McNair
(commander of the Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker,
AL) to write this article. Otherwise, it would not
have been written, for I am pretty remote now
from the Army and no longer have a burning desire to
fix anything. But this is not to say that I wish the Army
and its aviation anything but the very best, nor does it
mean that I have lost any faith in what light aircraft
and their crews and support people can do, if they are
properly trained and motivated, on the battlefield.
If I were still in active service I'd devote much
study and thought to the increased lethality of modern
weapons. Weapons effectiveness, of course, works
both ways—it sometimes serves to prolong the life of
a weapon's operator. The ability of the attack helo,
for example, to detect and quickly kill the enemy
tank or gun contributes to its own survivability, but
the accuracy and lethality of the enemy weapon
obviously is an opposing factor. Lethality, moreover,
has a major effect on tactics, an effect which must be
determined as accurately as possible, not simply for
the north European plain but also for mountainous
areas and, especially, for open country and the desert.
General Hamilton H. Howze
United States Army, Retired
Tactics that would have worked 10 years ago may not
work now; tactics impractical 10 years ago may now
be the way to go. Some things (certain varieties of
information, for example) that once required great
effort, often at great hazard to get, are now mechanically
achieved.
In this era of change, however, I would guess that
two prime tactical precepts would still hold true:
• However strong firepower may be or become, the
combination of that firepower with mobility is still the
number one prerequisite of success in combat. The
best definition of mobility that I know of comes from a
pre-World War II lecture by a German Captain—Anton
Frhr. von Bectolsheim–at Ft. Sill, OK: “Mobility
means quick decisions, quick movements, surprise
attacks with concentrated force; to do always what
the enemy does not expect, and to constantly change
both the means and the methods and to do the most
improbable things whenever the situation permits; it
means to be free of all set rules and preconceived
ideas. We believe that no leader who thinks or acts by
stereotyped rules can ever do anything great, because
he is bound by such rules. War is not normal. It
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
cannot therefore be won by rules which apply in
peacetime."
That is the thought of genius. If the French had
read and believed it they would not have been surprised
by the Blitzkrieg of 1939. Any American combat arms
officer—including of course the aviator—who reads
it and understands and abides by it in training and
battle will be far more effective than he would otherwise
be.
It may be said that the prime source of mobility is
the mind of the commander. But a primary means of
mobility on the modern battlefield is Army Aviation.
A commander's use of mobile forces, ground and air,
must be conditioned by an acute understanding on
his part of the realities of the battlefield—including
an appreciation of the accuracy and killing power of
present day armaments, his—and the enemy's.
By reason of its speed, its flexibility, its relative
immunity to what has been called the “tyranny of the
terrain" and its own lethal capacity, Army Aviation
will be a vital tool of the successful commander. It
follows, obviously, that every combat commander
should become adept in its use. And that means
practice.
• Coordination of effort also grows in importance.
As long as I was in the Army I felt that we were
derelict, at all levels of command, in the pursuit of
combined arms training. Although I cannot base an
opinion on personal observation, I suspect it is true
now. If it is true, it is equivalent to putting a football
team into a game with separately trained linemen and
line backers and pass receivers and running backs,
but with little or no practice scrimmage. During World
War II, many a commander fought his battle without
the benefit of some of the forces under his command
supporting him. He forgot them, for lack of practice
in the coordinated use of the several varieties of
combat power.
Once during that war I was part of an exploiting
tank force supposed to go through a bridgehead to be
established by infantry (of another division) on the far
side of a narrow but swift river. The infantry got
across the assault bridges in fair shape, but German
defenders, dug into small hills a hundred yards or so
on the far side of the river, mowed our people down,
terribly, and captured many of the survivors. That
afternoon I talked to two of the assault battalion
commanders, back in their original assembly areas,
who reported that their line companies counted only
about twenty effectives each. I asked what the artillery
plan had been, resulting in a dialogue approximately
as follows:
“Well, it fired in front of us for awhile, and then it
lifted.”
“Is that all you know about the artillery fire plan?”
“Yes, that's all.”
FEBRUARY 1982
-
A CH-47 viewed through a fish-eye lens
What's more, during the attack the complete
divisional tank battalion sat idle in reserve, whereas
there were numerous spots, sheltered by a 4-foot-high
dike on the near side of the river, from which the
tanks could have provided extremely effective direct
fire support on the enemy machinegun bunkers. So, a
miserably failed attack and lots of dead American
Soldiers. The point is that combat is hectic, frightening
and therefore mind-numbing, and unless leaders are
thoroughly conditioned by training in the use of all
means available, they won't use them.
Because they operate in a different medium, tactical
aviation units are prone to look on their activities as
being relatively independent of ground operations.
Nothing, I suspect, could be further from the truth. It
isn't simply a matter of Scout and assault and attack
helicopters helping the ground forces, it is a matter of
each element, ground and air, helping the other.
Teamwork, with the emphasis on “Team." As a single
example, the attack by attack ships on an enemy tank
force should habitually be protected not only by anti
helicopter helicopters but also by tank and artillery
fire, perhaps including the use of smoke. Some care
must be taken not to obscure the target of helicopter
attack, of course, but some obscuration is better than
allowing the tanks and their accompanying ack-ack
to devote their full attention to shooting down
helicopters. And it might be said that dust and smoke
close by the tanks will affect the accuracy of their fire
much more than it affects the fire of the distant helos.
When both helos and tanks are equipped with the sort
of sight that penetrates smoke and dust, obscuration
will be less of a factor, but the enemy tanks and guns
will still suffer from our supporting fire, one important
effect of which will be distraction. It is hard to
concentrate on one enemy when three of them are
shooting at you.
Maybe that last paragraph amounts to preaching to
the choir. I’ll withdraw the sermon and apologize for
 . . . combat is hectic, frightening and mind-numbing and unless
leaders are thoroughly conditioned by training in the use of all
means available, they won't use them.

it if I should learn that every Army command containing In our country the commitment of the individual
attack helicopters puts its ground force and aviation Soldier is developed in many ways. We can save lots
units through such a drill (it need not always involve of time and space by saying that it is largely the
live fire) at least once monthly. Otherwise I'll not product of leadership.
believe they know how to do it. I won't attempt here a discussion of the very broad
And, of course, that is just one of many combined subject of leadership, but confine myself to a relatively
arms operations that need practice, lots of practice. small aspect of it—the preparation of Soldiers in what
The single problem of who and where the commander might be called the character of battle. Green troops
of the combined effort should be requires resolution, react to the shock of battle in extraordinary ways,
by practice. some of them ludicrous, some of them absolutely
For years the Army has suppressed its premonition disastrous. Army leadership and foresight should
that air-to-air conflict between helicopters would do all it can to cushion the shock. To quote Mr.
ultimately become a part of warfare. Now that a Churchill, “In war, what you don't dislike is not usually
heavy production of Soviet armed helicopters—faster what the enemy does.”
and more heavily armed than ours—is a reality we Through no fault of its own, today's leadership has
had better get the matter out on the table. How to essentially no experience in three important aspects
cope with the Russian Hind and Hip will require lots of combat against an enemy equipped about as well
of thought and ultimately practice and the development as ourselves, because the last such war, against the
of doctrine. Simulators also are required to help teach Germans and the Japanese, ended more than 36
our pilots how to do the job. An encouraging start in years ago. Missing is the knowledge of how it feels
this general regard is the first six articles, each to be shelled by heavy artillery or of being bombed
extraordinarily well written, in the October 1981 issue or strafed, of the effect such unattractive propensities
of this magazine. That issue merits reading by every can have on our combat operations, and of how to
combat professional, ground or air (copies are available deal with a number of the new, more lethal weapons.
by writing to Editor. Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P.
Ft. Rucker, AL 36362).
Though tactical training, including combined arms
training, is an obvious requirement for the battlefield
success, there are others: discipline, proficiency in
arms, physical conditioning, maintenance and the
conservation of supplies—particularly ammunition.
I'll skip all those and talk a bit about the moral
preparation of the individual for the exigencies of
battle.
Napoleon said that the moral is to the physical as
three is to one. I take that to mean that the commitment
of the Soldier to his task is three times as important as
his arms and equipment.
The point is worth remembering. It accounts for
the countless instances in which a physically weaker
force has run a stronger opponent right off the
battlefield. It is one of the reasons why the Soviet
Union, the Communist Chinese and even the Taiwan
Chinese put political officers—commissars—in the
combat units. Anathema to us, but it works for them.
 Because the initial experience of air or artillery
attack is a severe one, troops need to be told about it.
This need led the British in the last great war to
publish a pamphlet, “Learn To Be Bombed." It actually
was quite reassuring in its statistics on casualties, and
encouraged the British military to accept such a
blow—not with great pleasure, but at least without
panicking.
Some sort of preparation would help the uninitiated
in dealing with many things: the effect of the new
weapons, the confusion of battle (which too often
leads to friendly troops shooting at each other and at
their own aircraft), the immense friction that always
accompanies combat operations, the necessity for
simplicity and accurate wording in battle plans and
instructions, the requirement for drive (perhaps I
should write it DRIVE) in the commander; also, how
to react to the unexpected (a frequent requirement),
why some units fight better than others, why some
junior commanders get so fond of their units that they
are reluctant to commit them to a dangerous mission,
and how to deal, even with the ridiculous. In the big
war, this last took the form of enemy vehicles, confused
and lost, happily joining our columns marching down
the road, or by-passed enemy troops, in the late evening,
getting into our chow lines.
In the next war these may not bother you but you
may be entertained by a fully armed and pugnacious
enemy attack helicopter landing on one of your pads.
If he wakes up to his error before you do he may wipe
out a half-dozen of your birds before anybody can
stop him. If this seems far fetched, be advised that
more than once, in the early 1940s, Japanese naval
A squad of troops boards a UH-60A Black Hawk helicopter
|
-
-
aircraft tried to land on U.S. carriers; and on one
occasion a German horse artillery battery trotted,
unchallenged in the gathering dusk, through the
scattered bivouac of one of the author's tank companies.
The more fluid the situation, the more often these
beguiling little events will occur.
In the last great war some American units landing
(sometimes unopposed) on a foreign shore spent much
of the first night shooting at the sound of land crabs
scuttling through the grass. In the process they killed
some of their officers and NCOs who were trying to
make them quit shooting. They would not have done
any of that had they been forewarned.
In a word, I'd hope that in our aviation platoons
and troops and squadrons there would be a certain
amount of directed war talk—what it's apt to be like
and what to guard against. And perhaps higher
headquarters should develop some lesson plans, much
as I hate 'em.
One thing that senior aviation officers still in service
know a great deal about is the heavy incidence of
helicopter accidents in the Vietnam war. It is inevitable,
I should think, that a good part of this came from
pilots unused to the atmosphere of active combat
operations. Perhaps our present young pilots need to
be cautioned against the effect of strain on their
flying techniques.
Of course war in fact is not all bad, though I don't
know anyone who wasn't glad when the last big one
ended. Troop morale can actually be very high during
a war—but only in those units that have developed
real competence in the art of fighting. Movies and ice
cream have absolutely no bearing on the matter.
 a few months at a carrier branch
basic course.
We need to do some serious soul º
Lieutenant Colonel (P) James W. Lloyd searching as we think about what
Deputy Director the reversal of these percentages
Directorate of Training Developments means. The carrier branches have
United States Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL never taught, nor do they now,
combined arms tactics for the SC
15 officers in their courses. That is
not meant as a slam directed toward
the Infantry, Armor, Artillery or
Air Defense Schools: Those folks
are in the business of developing
company grade officers who are
skilled and knowledgeable in the
tactics and employment of weapons
systems peculiar to the branch. It
may be asking too much of a young
Infantry lieutenant to expect him
Who's going to understand the complex back
ward planning sequence of an air
to teac aviators assault operation. Still, who is going
to teach that and the myriad of
how to fight 2 other aviation tactical tasks to the
aviator? And how will the Infantry
lieutenant know how to lead his
unit in order to have a proper tactical
HEAVIATION CENTER The Aviation Center now pro disposition when he lands in the
is chartered and resourced poses to add 4 weeks to the IERW objective area on an airmobile
to conduct flight training. Course in an attempt to place greater operation—if he is not exposed to
For 27 years, Army helicopter pilots emphasis on the combat skills need such instruction in the basic course?
have been trained at Ft. Rucker, ed by our aviators on the modern In years past, the Army aviator
AL. Hundreds of Air Force rotary battlefield. In short, given the current learned about the combined arms
wing pilots and Allied officers from Ft. Rucker mission and resources battle through a combination of
more than 60 nations have received (people, dollars, aircraft and time), branch schooling, ground assign
the finest “hands-and-feet” flight the Aviation Center is doing, or at ments and aviation on-the-job train
training in the world. The success least proposing to do, about all it ing (OJT). The OJT was possible
of our World Championship Heli can to develop the aviator's ability because the young aviator, prior to
copter Team attests to the claim to fight and survive on the battlefield. his first flight assignment, had spent
that our flight training is the best in Still, there is, and will be (even up to 5 years as a combat arms
the world. Thirty-nine thousand with the improved/lengthened IERW platoon leader, assistant staff officer,
Army aviators have soloed, auto Course), a huge void in aviation company, battery or troop executive
rotated and graduated from the training. In fact, there are several officer or possibly even commander.
Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) voids. In 1980, almost 80 percent of He may well have been a battalion
Course. the commissioned officer aviation S-3 or at least have had experience
Over the years, the Program of students had served up to 60 months in the S-3 arena. He brought to his
Instruction (POI) has attempted to on a ground assignment prior to aviation assignment a good working
address tactical flight techniques. beginnng their flight training. As a knowledge of the AirLand Battle
Some of us learned how to pick up result of a 1979 Chief of Staff deci field. He understood fire support
messages with a string and plumb sion to make Aviation (SC-15) an planning and how it was devised to
bob dangling out the window of an accession specialty, the 1981 ratio support the scheme of maneuver.
O-1. We had a “tiger” course during of experienced versus inexperienced He knew what was meant by key
the Vietnam era, and through it students flip-flopped; only 20 per terrain, decisive objective and the
stressed tactical instruments. We cent of those commissioned officers many other terms through which
even did some air assault training coming to Ft. Rucker had any pre operations orders are written and
during the 1960s and early 1970s. vious Army experience, other than executed. Thus, yesterday's inex

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

perienced aviator brought with him
a base of knowledge upon which he
could expand. He knew tactics up
to battalion level, and OJT was an
effective and practical way to learn
the way brigades and divisions con
ducted combined arms operations—
and he needed to know brigade and
division operations. Remember, the
aviator needs to understand the
AirLand Battle up to two levels
higher than his ground contempor
ary. Aviation companies support
brigades; and to provide that support,
the air mission commander (quite
likely a captain) must understand
the brigade scheme of maneuver and
fire support plan and have a working
awareness of the division's tactical
plan.
So, the education, training, ground
experience and aviation OJT system
worked–yesterday. But yesterday
is gone; and when the Army Chief
of Staff (CSA) decreed that aviation
would be an accession specialty, he
also pronounced us to be a combat
arm. That was more than 2 years
ago. The personnel folks accepted
the CSA decision, and now they pro
vide 80 (plus) percent of our commis
sioned officer aviation students
straight from the carrier basic
course. These lieutenants are ac
cessed as SC-15, not 11, 12, 13 or
14. While upon commissioning they
pin on the insignia of a carrier
branch, they are not, nor will they
all likely ever be, qualified or as
signed as Infantry, Armor, Artillery
or Air Defense officers. The Officer
record brief and the Military Per
sonnel Center (MILPERCEN) com
puter shows these lieutenants as 15s.
It is very unlikely that many of them
will serve in an additional ground
assignment with a combat arm other
than aviation—and why should they?
Aviation is a combat arm. Artillery
is a combat arm; Air Defense is a
combat arm. Officers in those branch
es do not serve with Infantry, Armor
or Aviation units. Yet, the Artillery
and Air Defense officers are full
members of the combined arms
team. They are taught, in their basic
FEBRUARY 1982
“We can learn to fly and shoot, but periods
for teaching us how to integrate the mobility
and firepower in combined arms operations
are quite limited.”
and advanced courses, how to em
ploy the weapons organic to their
particular branch in support of the
AirLand Battle. They learn more in
their units and on staffs. If there are
courses to teach the other combat
arms officers how to lead their troops
and employ their weapons, should
not we have a similar course for
aviators?
The advanced attack helicopter
(AH-64 Apache) may prove to be
the single greatest force multiplier
on the battlefield. The UH-60 Black
Hawk and CH-47D Chinook provide
giant leaps forward in terms of lift
and mobility. Even the current AH
1S Cobra (fully modernized) sig
nificantly improves our total force
antiarmor capability. Our aviators
will be able to fly and fight those
systems because they will be taught
how to do that at the Aviation Center
and in the units—so, what is wrong?
What is wrong is that an under
standing of the dynamics of the Air
Land Battle is not being taught—or
at least not being taught enough.
We can learn to i, and shoot, but
periods for teaching us how to
integrate the mobility and firepower
in combined arms operations are
quite limited. Just as bad, the ground
commanders formal instruction is
similarly limited. Here we are, Army:
the best trained helicopter pilots in
the world, flying the best equipment
our nation can afford to buy for us,
and we are not training together,
probably because no one has taught
us how. Until we learn, we cannot
expect the aviator to be able to
truly maximize the combat power
at his disposal. The aviator can kill
what he sees, but what he kills may
not be a priority target because he
does not fully understand the tactical
concept. He can fly from A to B,
but because of factors such as gun
target lines or positioning of air
defense systems, which can sanitize
airspace, the route from A to B
might better have been planned and
flown in a different manner.
What can we do about this void?
Rather, what must we do? First, we
have to understand and accept the
Chief of Staff decision: the old days
of extended ground duty tours in
every grade with other combat
branches are over. Two major fac
tors influenced the 1979 decision,
and they are even more valid today.
First, the cost of aviator training,
initial and advanced, is so high it
almost dictates use of company
grade aviators to fill cockpit posi
tions. Second, systems complexity
and the tactical techniques (nap-of
the-earth (NOE) and tactical instru
ments, for example) demand almost
full-time attention in order to main
tain proficiency. We have to max
imize our return on the functional
training investment and use of these
valuable aviation resources. You
do not do that by waiting until an
officer has 5 years' service to train
him to fly. Additionally, you cannot
sustain unit readiness by arbitrarily
alternating the aviator back and
forth between aviation and ground
assignments. Remember, we do not
rotate Artillery officers from bat
teries to Infantry units. Junior Ar
tillery officers serve as liaison and
forward observers with Infantry and
Armor units, and aviators, although
not normally provided the TOE slots
like their artillery counterparts,
perform liaison duties also. This
provides for the close integration
of all elements of the combined
arms team. So we have to believe
what the Chief said: Aviation is an
accession specialty and a combat
arm. -
The next thing we have to do is
revamp the combat arms basic and
advanced courses in an effort to
teach future ground commanders
how to integrate aviation into their
scheme of maneuver and fire support
plans.
The Infantry and Armor officers
learn mechanized/tank team and
task force operations and then learn
how to plan and use artillery. Does
it not make sense that they should
at least learn the basics of aviation
employment? We do not have to
make them experts, but they have
to have a working knowledge of
how this force multiplier (aviation)
can be employed effectively, just
as they now understand how to
employ artillery. The billions of
dollars invested in aviation dictate
that the combat arms schools POIs
fully integrate aviation-related
training.
Next, we need to address the void
in aviation oriented AirLand Battle
tactical training. In so doing, we
will realize our training time and
money are not efficiently applied
through having SC-15 lieutenants
learning tank maintenance and tank
gunnery in the Armor officer's basic
course. While some techniques and
principles are similar, the systems
are not. We will realize that learning
tactics necessary to be a successful
Infantry platoon leader will not
necessarily satisfy the demands of
an aviation platoon leader's job. In
looking at what we are teaching
SC-15 officers at carrier basic cours
es, we will discover that the leader
ship instruction is oriented on the
relationship between the officer and
enlisted without really addressing
the warrant officer. Hopefully, we
will understand that the commis
sioned aviator not only deals with
enlisted personnel but interacts with
and leads warrant officers and other
commissioned officers. For ours is,
by TOE, an officer intensive en
vironment. Leading enlisted Soldiers
is not, never has been, and never
will be the same as leading chief
warrant officers who have 18 years'
service and 5,000 flying hours.
How are we then to correct this
critical situation of carrier branch
training? With an aviation branch?
No! We already have that—in every
thing but name, training and insignia.
The name and insignia raise so many
emotions and so much passion that
I prefer not to let the smoke screen
caused by that emotion and passion
cover the real requirement—training.
In the working Army, we do not
wear our green blouse enough to
be concerned about what insignia
is mounted below the US. The name
tags on our flight suits do not indicate
branch, so I contend that the ques
tion of insignia is relatively unim
portant–relative to the big issue
training. We already have a branch
personnel management system. Those
folks at MILPERCEN believed the
Chief of Staff, and aviators are now
managed and assigned as aviators.
The void is still in training.
I do not even care where the
training is conducted. Ft. Knox or
Ft. Benning could be resourced to
develop and conduct a combined
arms track, in their respective basic
courses, for aviators; or, one of those
schools could be resourced to estab
lish an aviation basic course; or, we
can give the Aviation Center the
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 resources and add an aviation basic
course to the current “hands-and
-
feet” functional flight training POI.
It just does not matter too much
where it is done. It could be some
where under a big oak tree! What
matters is that we get on with it.
We need a program to teach the
AirLand Battle. We need to ensure
that our young aviators develop an
appreciation for the complexity of
combined arms operations. We must
thoroughly prepare our aviators with
the knowledge of tactical operations
so that, upon learning to fly and
shoot, they will be able to fully
employ their aircraft and weapons
systems as an integrated part of the
scheme of maneuver and fire sup
port plan. We have to give them
some leadership training relative to
that commissioned and warrant
officer intensive environment that
they are about to enter. In short,
we have to carefully analyze the
tasks which face today's company
grade aviator, those tasks above
the ones required to fly and shoot.
Then we need to proceed to develop
FEBRUARY 1982
some course, somewhere, to teach
the things he will have to know to
accomplish those tasks.
What we do not want to do is
establish an isolated “pure” aviation
course. We do not need to teach
safety, maintenance and standard
ization per se. Those things are
important, vitally important, but they
are already taught in other functional
courses. The danger is that aviation
commanders are rated on their
ability to prevent accidents, maintain
Department of the Army standards
of availability and pass standardiza
tion team evaluations. This fact
reinforces the need to teach future
brigade and division commanders
what Army Aviation can do so that
aviation units within the division
will not spend all their time and
energy on safety, maintenance and
standardization.
Concurrent with all of the above
changes, we need to force aviation
and ground units to train together.
The low level intensity of the early
years of the war in Vietnam allowed
us to learn how to work together—
on the battlefield—after the war
started. That luxury will not likely
be possible in the next conflict. We
must learn how to fight together
now. One of the ways we can force
true combined arms training is to
write Army Training and Evaluation
Programs (ARTEPs) which require
it. Integration of aviation is not
simple, and few commanders will
voluntarily try to do it on an ARTEP.
If the ARTEP required a mechanized
Infantry commander to plan for and
utilize attack helicopters, he would
learn to do so and the aviation
leaders would learn how to maximize
the effectiveness of their weapons
systems. If Armor commanders were
required to resupply fuel and am
munition with UH-60s or CH-47s,
they would learn how to do so, and
the aviators would learn how to fly,
fully loaded, tactically.
As it is, unfortunately, we are
going our separate ways and not
integrating our training nearly so
much as we should. Ground units
are maneuvering in two directions
and planning for artillery support,
while the aviators are doing auto
rotations in the traffic pattern at
night and flying NOE on their ap
proved training routes. How much
longer can we afford to conduct
such separate training? We must
bring it together every day.
Who's going to train our aviators
to fight? Here we are, Army Avia
tion—a full fledged member of the
combined arms team, a combat arm
with great lethality, mobility and po
tential—partially trained and under
utilized. Our aircraft and weapons
systems cost us too much of our annual
budget to allow continuation of the
present state of affairs. Accept the
Chief of Staff decision, teach future
ground commands how to employ
aviation, teach us how to maximize
our firepower and mobility through
indepth understanding of the dy
namic AirLand Battlefield and make
us all train together so that we can
get on with what a peacetime Army
is supposed to be doing-preparing
for war. *—”
 VIEws FROM READERs ſº
Editor:
I am stationed in Germany with the
Second Detachment of SOTAS. I just
got here and I am interested in reading
some of the literature published on
SOTAS. I would be happy if you could
send me copies of articles published
about SOTAS.
SP4 Gordon A. Blake
U.S. Army SOTAS, Det 2
APO New York O9326
Editor:
Within the military community, the
question often arises as to whether or
not the Army aviator is capable of
meeting and defeating the threat on
the mid-intensity battlefield of the future.
Further, the very credibility of training
at the Army Aviation Center is often
challenged. As a former commander of
the 6th Battalion (USAAVNC), where
I dealt directly with the training of
aspiring aviators, and currently as the
ACofS, G1, 2d Infantry Division, Korea,
where I have the opportunity to observe
some of those same officers now serving
as bona fide Army aviators in a tactical
environment, I feel that I am in a strong
position to render fair judgment on the
quality of training offered at Fort Rucker
and the quality of officers recently
graduated from flight school.
It has been an especially gratifying
experience to observe, over the past
several months, the recently graduated
Army aviator now assigned to the 2d
Infantry Division's 4th Squadron, 7th
Cavalry, or 2d Aviation Battalion
(Combat). In each case I have witnessed
a rapid transformation from inspired
novice to capable, motivated professional.
I have taken part in in-depth discussions
with these officers, male and female
alike, observed their activities on various
types of missions and listened as unbiased
judges with impressive military back
grounds praised the caliber of aviators
within the 2d Infantry Division. Each
case has added resolve to my belief
that our Army is still producing that
quality of individual capable of accepting
and conquering the challenge of tomor
row through dedication and sacrifice
today—in fact, better than ever before.
It is often overlooked, especially in
the student environment, that there is
Articles from Ha Aviation Digest requested in these letter have ºccº; mailed. Readers can obtain copies of meterial
indeed an assignment that could place
aviators in a day-to-day tactical environ
ment—the 2d Infantry Division! Our
aviators are confronted with a tense
situation where we are face to face
with the enemy 24 hours a day; and,
the potentiality for conflict must be
considered prior to preparing for each
mission along the DMZ. Here in Korea,
our aviators are daily flying in the face
of an armed, aggressive and well trained
enemy dedicated to our defeat. I do
not know of a more effective proving
ground for our young aviators than that
which exists in the “Land of the Morning
Calm."
The quality of our aviators? Perfect
and improving! The quality of training
at Fort Rucker? Impressive! I believe
that it is time for the line units throughout
the entire United States Army to stand
up and render a hearty, “Thanks, Fort
Rucker," for the caliber of officer produced
by the Aviation Center. Moreover, it is
essential that our line leaders fully
manage these combat aviators as an
integral part of our combined arms
team—particularly in light of a personnel
system for aviators which had been ill
defined and unforgiving over the past
two decades.
LTC W.F. Reilly Jr.
ACOfS, GI
2d Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96224
Editor:
Our firm has been specializing for
more than 10 years in military master
planning, and we have been under
contract with the U.S. Army Engineer
Division, Europe, for the last 3 years to
assist in updating numerous U.S. Army
military community master plans in both
Germany and Italy.
During our research and investigation
into the Army Aviation assets, we have
attempted to decipher the requirements
associated with the ARCSA III program,
and just recently were informed about
the ACAB program. You published an
article in the July 1980 issue of Army
Aviation Digest explaining the details
of this program, and we are wondering
if we could get a copy of this and any
other information which would assist
us in the further development of aviation
facilities.
º º
We anticipate subscribing to your
Digest as it is a very informative publica
tion.
James F. Bosick
Vice President
Robert G. Muir and Associates A.I.A.
Colorado Springs, CO 80903
Editor:
I sure enjoyed the October issue of
the Digest (air-to-air combat). I am an
IP in an attack company. Approximately
18 months ago, with the help of the
U.S. Marine Corps, I set up an air-to
air combat training program. We have
enjoyed great success since beginning
this training. In the past year we have
learned many lessons; for example: A
trained air-to-air crew can evade or
defeat any untrained crew, flying a
superior aircraft, OH-58 vs AH-1/AH-1
vs A-10. I am currently compiling 13
months of experiences and lessons
learned for an upcoming article. It is
about time Army Aviation awoke to
the air threat! If anyone wishes more
information concerning helicopter air
to-air combat training contact:
CW3 Mike Hicks
D CO 82 CAB
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307
AUTOVON 236-2614
Editor:
I am an Army aviator (warrant
officer) and have been collecting your
magazine since 1977. Since graduating
from flight school last November, I have
missed numerous issues. Can you please
send me any of the following? I really
hate to break up my collection! (I use
them constantly for reference); November,
December 1980 and January 1981 until
present.
Being in the “real Army,” I’ve been
too busy to collect them from work.
(Also, by the time I do get an issue, it's
usually too beat up for my collection).
I really love your magazine—it's the
greatest: Keep up the outstanding
coverage of “our profession!”
WO1 Anthony M. Pereira
5709 Friedman Street
Ft. Hood, TX 76544
 AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES.”

Additional Specialty Designations

Underway for Year Group 1975
T. ADDITIONAL specialty designation pro
cess has begun for officers in year group (YG)
75. The process will culminate in June 1982,
when these officers receive notification of their
additional specialties.
Officers in YG 75 (84 to 95 months of Active Federal
Commissioned Service as of 30 September 1982) will
be receiving a preference form and instructions from
their military personnel offices (MILPOs) in December.
When completed and returned through the MILPO
to MILPERCEN (Military Personnel Center), prefer
ences will be reviewed as a part of each YG 75
officer's file evaluation.
The additional specialty designation process is more
complex than most officers realize. Career managers
must consider an officer's experience, assignment
history, educational background and any unique
qualifications the officer may have. A decision must
then be made based on these factors and Army
requirements. In many cases these factors are com
patible and the additional specialties received by the
officers match their backgrounds and preferences as
well as meeting the needs of the Army. Sometimes
Army requirements do not coincide with the additional
specialty preferred by the officer. At the end of the
process, the Army must have the right number of offi
cers in each specialty based on projected requirements.
Career managers may have to designate some officers
from YG 75 into specialties in which Army requirements
exceed the number of officers who have indicated a
preference for those specialties. The goal is to minimize
the number of captains who will be assigned specialties
which they did not include as preferences while at the
same time meeting Army requirements. <-->

TRAINING EXTENSION COURSE

TEC is the sure way any soldier can learn. There are TEC ſessons
for almost every MOS (Military Occupational Specialty). WCOs can use
TEC to train one soldier or a group of soldiers at their own pace. Repeat
a lesson if necessary. TEC will improve chances for higher SOT scores,
promotions and more pay. Ask your CO or WCO/C about TEC (Training
Extension Course) today!

FEBRUARY 1982 11
 CW2 Frederick W. Stetson
150th Air Traffic Control (ATC) Platoon
Vermont Army National Guard
Burlington, VT

150th Air Traffic

Control Platoon
Wr ERMONT NATIONAL
Guardsmen have never been
officers and enlisted personnel.
“That's initiative,” General Cram said,
air traffic control services, to include
tower, approach control radar, ground
short on initiative and “and we can't fight initiative.” control and terminal navigation aids.
Yankee ingenuity. As early as 10 Vermont's ATC platoon is as The platoon also provides en route
May 1775, a band of rugged moun signed for training to the 50th Ar air traffic regulation and flight fol
taineers led by Ethan Allen staged a mored Division, a unit that includes lowing assistance.
daring, surprise raid and captured aviation elements from Vermont and Several months after the Vermont
Fort Ticonderoga from the British, New Jersey. Most of the year, the platoon was organized in late 1979,
an important Revolutionary War platoon supports Company A (-), one key piece of equipment was
victory. 150th Aviation Battalion based in not available through military supply
In a small but significant way that Burlington, VT, a city of 50,000 channels: a mobile control tower
tradition continues. Faced with only 90 miles south of Montreal. (AN/TSQ-70). Not only was this
shortages of essential equipment, Like the Guard's 12 other ATC facility needed for air traffic con
members of the state's 150th Air platoons, the Vermont unit's mission trol, but also it was needed to house
Traffic Control (ATC) Platoon went is to provide all-weather, tactical communications and meteorological
out and bought their own. Then
they upgraded what they were able The 150th ATC Platoon's ground control approach site at Ft. Drum, NY
to buy or salvage; helped train teams
of air traffic controllers; and devel
oped an effective unit with 100
percent strength.
The result: Vermont's 31-member
ATC platoon is considered one of
the best trained and best prepared
in the National Guard. Even though
some of the equipment was unauth
orized, Major General Reginald L.
Cram, then the state's adjutant
general, supported this unusual
personal effort by the platoon's

12 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 It may be that the 150th ATC Platoon, Vermont Army
-National Guard, has the only homemade mobile control
tower in the Army. Platoon members turned a recreational
camper into a serviceable facility

equipment, including radios, altim
eters and a wind measuring set.
But, members of the 150th ATC
platoon saw a way to solve this
problem. They pooled their resour
ces and purchased a 14-foot rec
reational “camper,” mounted it on
an M-880 truck, added antennas,
camouflaged and modified it for
tactical, in-the-field operations.
There were other examples of
extra effort and innovation. Under
the supervision of Staff Sergeant
Raymond Smith, the platoon mem
bers, often working during off-duty
hours, rebuilt a complete communi
cations package, including ultrahigh
frequency, frequency modulated
and very high frequency radios. The
unit's TPN-18 precision approach
radar includes equipment cast off
from the Navy in the late 1950s.
The set is mounted on a modified
flatbed trailer; most sets are designed
for special platforms with adjustable
legs for rapid field deployment. But,
the inconvenience of the modified
trailer has not gotten in the way of
this unit's training.
Tactical, in-the-field exercises,
classroom instruction and special
assistance from the Signal Support
Company, 256th Army Maintenance
Support Facility, Ft. Rucker, AL,
have all been important to the unit's
success, according to Captain Joseph
Gwyer, platoon leader. Twelve
enlisted men have graduated from
the Army's Air Traffic Control
School at Ft. Rucker. Ten others
are participating in various ATC
Schools or training programs.
Tactical training is essential to
assure the safe movement of the
aircraft the 150th ATC Platoon
supports. The unit can also provide
services and advisories nearly iden
tical to those available at most radar
equipped Army airfields or com
mercial airports. And the respon
sibilities are no less demanding.
“There's about 22 mandatory trans
missions that are given from the
time you pick up an aircraft entering
your airspace until the time the skids
are on the ground,” Smith noted.
If activated under the Army's
existing organizational structure, the
ATC platoon would be one of three
assigned to a Headquarters Com
pany; and the company would be
assigned to the 29th ATC Battalion,
Glen Arm, MD, Major John L.
Papier, commander. Captain Edwin
Congdon, also a Vermont National
Guardsman, commands the company.
Captains Congdon and Gwyer say
there's a concerted, ongoing effort
to procure the best available equip
ment for ATC platoons across the
country. ATC equipment is the
responsibility of the U.S. Army
Communications Command, Ft.
Huachuca, AZ. The command con
siders and evaluates all National
Guard equipment requests alongside
those from active Army units.
While awaiting further equipment
upgrading this fall, the Vermont
ATC platoon continues to train,
only a few miles from picturesque
Lake Champlain and a 20-minute
flight from the majestic Green
Mountains. It's sometimes hard to
imagining this beautiful, recreation
minded state as a tactical environ
ment. But, there's no imagination
needed to find “home base” when
guided by the “well-equipped" mem
bers of the 150th ATC Platoon.

FEBRUARY 1982 13
|H|ſ|NGſilſº USE THE FOLLOWING HOURLY SEQUENCE
WEATHER REPORT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
5 AND 6.

FTK4SCTM9 BKN250VC2RF132/58/56/1817/993

5. What is the ceiling at Godman Army Airfield

(FTK)?
A 400'
B. 900'
C. 2,500
“Hangar Talk” is a quiz containing questions based on
publications applicable to Army Aviation. The answers are at
the bottom of the page. If you did not do well, perhaps you 6. What is indicated by the “2R-F" in the weather
should get out the publication and look it over. report?
A. Visibility 2 miles, rain, light fog
B. Visibility 2 miles, rain, thin fog
FM 1-30 C. Visibility 2 miles, light rain, fog

Meteorology for Army Awiators 7. How are visibility and wind velocity reported in
aviation surface weather observations?
CW2 Gary R. Weiland
Directorate of Training Developments A. Both reported in statute miles
U. S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL B. Both reported in nautical miles
C. Visibility reported in statute miles, wind velocity
1. A warm front is the trailing edge of a retreating in nautical miles (knots)
mass of cold air.
A. True B. False
8. In aviation weather reports, the height of the base
2. In which direction do warm fronts usually move of each cloud layer is measured in hundreds of
feet —
in the Northern Hemisphere?
A. West to east A. Above ground level (AGL)
B. Southwest to northeast B. Above mean sea level (MSL)
C. Southeast to northwest C. Pressure altitude
D. South to north
9. What is the average forward speed (knots) of
tornadoes?
3. What type of fog is formed when warm, moist
air moves over a colder surface? A. 10
A. Radiation C. Upslope B. 20
B. Advection D. Steam C. 40
D. 60
4. If flight through a thunderstorm cannot be
avoided, at what altitude above the temain should 10. When an aircraft is flown toward a region of
most storms be penetrated? lower pressure, a crosswind from the left will be
A 4,000 to 6,000 encountered.

B. 6,000' to 8,000 A. True

C. 6,000' to just below the freezing level B. False

(Z)p I-1 eled V ‘OI / I I I pue ZI-II seled O L. (I).98 () I eled V ‘b’ (2)QI-Leued v ‘I
(I)60I tº eled 'O 6 £I-II eled O 9 qt-8 eued a 'g 08-I W:
(I) e II-II eled V '8 qL I-II eled 'O ‘g (t)at-4 eled 'd 'z
SH: M\SNV

14 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Lieutenant Colonel Brian H. Chermol
Chief, Behavorial Science Specialist Branch
Behavorial Science Division
Academy of Health Sciences
Fort Sam Houston, TX
it:
Flight surgeons, company commanders and first sergeants
must understand the psychiatric definitions, the process
and elimination procedures outlined in AR 40-501 to
preclude the administrative disarray brought before the
Aviation Medical Board!
the
Personality
Disordered
Individual
in aviation units
A primer for commanders
and flight surgeons
ITHIN EVERY society ther are indi
viduals who experience chronic diffi
culty in adjusting to marriage, jobs
and interpersonal relationships in
general. Many achieve a marginal adjustment in
a stable civilian community but, upon entering
active duty, find that their coping skills, social
skills and personality structure are inadequate to
FEBRUARY 1982
permit adjustment to the stress of military life.
While their level of functioning has not deterio
rated to the point of psychosis or other acute
disorganization of personality, their style of func
tioning is obviously incongruent with that of their
peerS.
When examined by mental health professionals,
they are diagnosed as a personality disorder.
Such a diagnosis implies that the individual
exhibits deeply ingrained, maladaptive life
long behavioral patterns that are often
recognizable at adolescence or earlier. Their
etiology often appears to be rooted in their social
learning experiences as children. They developed
their particular lifestyle early as a coping response
to their environment. Since this life style is a life
long pattern, such individuals rarely develop the
more typical psychiatric Symptoms; e.g., depres
sion or anxiety. Such symptoms are displayed
only when the individual's lifestyle is challenged,
proves completely ineffective oran external agent
attempts to change it—all of which could occur
in a military setting. Since the individual rarely
experiences subjective distress, most person
ality disordered individuals are requested or
ordered to be evaluated because of problems in
interpersonal relationships. It is often the indi
viduals' peers, supervisors or spouse who feel
discomfort in their presence rather than the indi
viduals themselves.
15
 Personality
Disordered
Individual
Some of the more common Subtypes of person
ality disorder are:
• Paranoid (hypersensitive, rigid, jealousand
suspicious of others)
• Schizoid (emotionally unresponsive, shy,
seclusive and withdrawn)
• Cyclothymic (periods of elation alternating
with periods of depression without obvious ex
ternal causation)
• Explosive (sudden outbursts of rage and
verbal or physical aggression)
• Obsessive-Compulsive (over inhibited,
rigid and overly conforming)
• Hysterical (emotionally unstable, overre
active, dependent and self-centered)
• Asthenic (low energy, apathy and incapacity
for enjoyment)
• Antisocial (impulsive, irresponsible, selfish
and in conflict with society)
• Passive-aggressive (resentfulness, pro
crastination and stubbornness)
• Inadequate (inept, lack of stamina and poor
adaptability)
• Immature (childish, irresponsible and self
centered)
• Passive-dependent (indecision, poor stress
tolerance and emotionally clinging)
Sexual deviations, alcoholism and drug depend
ence are also forms of personality disorders, but
their distinct method of identification, processing
and disposition in the Army precludes their
inclusion in a general discussion of personality
disorders.
The aviation unit commander and flight surgeon
must be familiar with Army Regulation (AR) 40
501 to understand the Army's policy regarding
personality disorders.
Chapter 2 states that individuals who have been
diagnosed as having an antisocial, immature,
dependent or inadequate type personality disor
der to such a degree that it interferes with their
social, school or occupational adjustment will
be considered medically unfit for enlistment or
induction.
16
Chapter 3 states the personality disorders are
not a physical disability and, therefore, are not
medically disqualifying for retention on active
duty. However, it further states that when an
Individual's personality disorder prevents effec
tive performance of duty, that individual should
be considered administratively unfit and elim
inated from active duty.
Chapter 4 states that diagnosis of a personality
disorder is disqualifying for flying duty and all
classes of flight physical examinations.
Aviators diagnosed as having a person
ality disorder are disqualified from flying
(Chapter 4), but they may remain on active
duty if they can perform other duties ef
fectively (Chapter 3).
Confusion often arises because once a Soldier
has been diagnosed by a psychiatrist as having a
personality disorder, then that Soldier ceases to
remain in medical processing channels. No fur
ther medical disposition is possible-only the
unit commander can decide whether or not to
seek elimination through administrative command
channels (AR 40-501). The Army's policy is
that persons with personality disorders will
not be processed through medical channels
and are not medically disabled—for the pur
poses of discharge. There are three possible
reasons for this decision.
First, since by definition a personality disorder
is a life-long pattern which usually started in child
hood, it had to exist prior to entering active duty.
To classify it as a medical disability might entitle
the Soldier to receive disability pay and benefits
for a condition for which the military had no
responsibility.
Second, while research suggests that many
other psychiatric disorders may have a biochem
ical component in their causation and may be
treated, in part with psychoactive drugs, little
Such evidence exists for the personality disorders.
Therefore, it is best viewed as a psychological
problem which the motivated individual can
control or overcome. Thus personality disorders
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
are viewed as different from other forms of
disorders in which free will appears to be less an
element.
Third, personality disorders represent the least
severe form of mental disorders and many Sol
diers would be eliminated from active duty if this
diagnosis alone was sufficient for release. By
requiring command input, many are retained on
active duty. For example, a Soldier with a mild
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder may
be an asset to the unit, particularly in finance or
other career fields where such traits are valued.
Thus, by requiring the diagnosis and commander's
evaluation, the process tends to benefit both the
Army and the individual.
Only a few individuals diagnosed as having a
personality disorder voluntarily report to an Army
mental health facility. Many are referred by unit
commanders for a command evaluation; some
are referred by the flight surgeon for medical
consultation; and others report because of the
threats of the spouse, suggestion of peers or
poor job performance ratings. Unit commanders
should complete Department of the Army (DA)
Form 3822 or a local form (e.g., U.S. Army Aviation
Center Form 44) for the mental health facility.
This form will be returned to the commander
containing a response and diagnosis (if appro
priate). Flight surgeons requesting consultation
by a mental health facility should senda Standard
Form 513. A response and diagnosis will be
returned to the flight surgeon on the same form.
Once the individual has been evaluated by
mental health personnel, the flight surgeon will be
notified regarding personnel who require a flight
physical; e.g., aviators, aircrewmembers and air
traffic controllers. The flight surgeon will then
decide whether or not the individual should be
grounded (AR 40-501).
For personnel who were evaluated at the unit
Commander's request, the commander can decide
whether the individual remains in the unit or is
administratively discharged—assuming a person
ality disorder was diagnosed. If the individual's
FEBRUARY 1982
flight status has been terminated, the unit com
mander can choose to have that person remain
on active duty but must change the Soldier's
military occupational specialty to one that doesn't
require a flight physical.
Most individuals who have been diagnosed as
a personality disorder and who the commander
feels cannot adjust to military life will be dis
charged under the provisions of AR 635-200.
Under this regulation, the commander must have
had the mental health facility conduct a mental
status evaluation (DA Form 3822) and must
attempt counseling and rehabilitation (waived
under certain conditions). The commander should
be able to document evidence of the Soldier's
inability to adjust to military discipline and living/
working conditions. Commanders may want to
use the Trainee Discharge Program or Expedi
tious Discharge Program in lieu of the unsuitability
process.
The presence of individuals exhibiting moder
ate-to-severe symptoms of a personality disorder
is a threat to the efficient functioning, esprit de
corps, harmonious interaction and military disci
pline of a military unit. Due to additional stress
and the need for small unit teamwork and coop
eration in aviation units, the presence of such
disturbed individuals is even more detrimental.
Therefore, when Soldiers demonstrate an un
willingness or seeming inability to adjust, com
manders should take the necessary action to
eliminate them from Service.
Flight surgeons can eliminate the personality
disordered aviator from flight status; however,
the aviation unit commander, in conjunction with
the first sergeant and other supervisors, has the
primary responsibility for the identification, duty
evaluation and possible elimination of personality
disordered individuals from Service. cº-º
Lieutenant Colonel Chermol was assigned to Community
Mental Health, U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, Ft. Rucker,
AL, when he wrote this article.
17
 Glossary severed just below the elbow. Weak
AAPART annual aviator proficiency PIC pilot in command
ened by the spasms that still clenched
and readiness test SIP standardization instructor
his stomach, he stumbled back to
AR Army regulation pilot
ATM aircrew training manual TC training circular his jeep, the images of the crash
IFE instrument flight examiner UT unit trainer scene indelibly burned in his brain.
IP instructor pilot WO warrant officer “LTC Elliot! Shall I repeat the
NOE nap-of-the-earth question?” The sharpness of the
voice snapped Thomas Elliot back
to reality. He became acutely aware
that his palms were moist, his shirt
sodden at the armpits and his fingers
trembling.
“Sorry sir. Please say again,” LTC
Elliot replied.
The sharp voice resumed. “Col
onel, I ask you again; in your judg
ment, was Mr. Peters fully qualified
to be a pilot in command for this
mission?"
How many times had he heard
that question, not about Peters in

If the particular but about pilots in gen

eral? He thought about the last
standardization meeting that he had
conducted. Now there had been a

Shoe real conflict of opinion! After 2 hours

of discussion, argument and outright
disagreement, he had terminated
the meeting with his two standardi
zation instructor pilots rather
brusquely.

Fits “Gentlemen, I understand what

you are saying. The fact remains,
however, that AR 95-1 does not
specify a need for a PIC program as
detailed as the one you propose.
“Actually, it doesn't require a PIC
program perse, at all. Furthermore,
you yourselves tell me that TC 1
135 has no PIC evaluation guide
lines specified although it goes into
CW3 John E. Cattilini great detail for pilot, UT, IP, SIP
FWMEO 82-2 and IFE evaluations. Obviously, the
Fort RUCKer, AL proponent agency doesn't see a need
for a separate PIC evaluation either.
The troop commanders feel that
you are taking too much time from

A SMALL TONGUE of yellow

flame ſlickered momentar
ily in the midst of the black
ened, twisted wreckage. In the
stillness, the creak of contracting
metal could be heard as it cooled in
the night air. The greatest attack
on the senses, however, came from
the overpowering stench of charred
flesh. LTC Elliot momentarily lost
his balance as his foot turned on
something yielding in the short
brush. Bending low and playing his
flashlight beam at his feet, he sud
denly turned away and became
violently ill as he realized that what
he had stepped on was a forearm
and gloved hand that had been
other duties and causing excessive
maintenance downtime for worn
skid shoes by requiring all this
additional PIC training. Frankly, I
agree with them. If an individual
can pass a pilot AAPART evalua
tion, that should be sufficient to
qualify him as a PIC. As of now, we
will follow AR 95-1 to the letter.

18 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

The commander or his designated
representative will appoint a PIC
for each flight or series of flights. If
an aviator is current, and has passed
his pilot AAPART evaluation, then
he may be designated as a PIC at
any time.”
LTC Elliot couldn't believe that
it had only been 3 weeks since that
meeting. He could still hear the
arguments of the standardization
officers as if they had been voiced
yesterday.
“Yes sir, but there is also nothing
in AR 95-1 that prohibits us from
having a stringent PIC program.
Most of our pilots can perform all
the maneuvers mechanically correct.
Most of them can even recite all
the emergency procedures by rote.
But getting them to explain their
understanding of those procedures
is something else again. What we're
advocating, sir, is a most difficult
program to define. You, as the
commander, are placing your trust
and confidence in an individual
when you appoint him a PIC. You
are saying that you believe in his
ability to exercise good judgment
and above average skill in all phases
of flight under all weather condi
tions. You are saying that he has
the ability to cope with all situations
required to safeguard his aircraft,
his life and the lives of his crew and
passengers.
“With that in mind, it becomes
necessary for us to instruct and
evaluate a multitude of intangible
areas beyond the specified ATM
tasks. To the best of our ability, we
need to evaluate knowledge and
judgment, as well as performance,
for each potential PIC in our unit.
Does this individual know his own
limitations? Does he consciously
determine his course of action in
all situations, or does he just pay
more attention when things get
tense? Is he totally mission oriented,
or does he temper his decisions by
considering safety factors and air
craft limitations? And finally, if he
does all this, does he always project
a professional attitude toward flying?
FEBRUARY 1982
One of the most important roles of
the PIC is that of an unofficial
instructor. What he has learned
through experience, those things we
call technique, must be passed on
to the copilots with whom he flies.
He must be willing to share the
lessons he has learned in a compe
tent manner. We really believe, sir,
that this kind of program would be
the single most important step we
could take to eliminate, or at least
reduce, those accidents classified
as obvious pilot error. The additional
time spent training highly qualified
PICs will be worth every minute if
it prevents even one mishap.”
Until two nights ago, when he
had had to survey that smoldering
wreckage, LTC Elliot had been sure
that his own position was correct.
That accident never should have
happened. Although young, Mr.
Peters was pretty sharp. After all,
he had almost 600 hours, and had
been here in the unit for 4 months
now. Who would have thought a
simple sling-load mission could have
such disastrous results? Mr. Peters
had flown that particular route
several times before although never
as a PIC and never with a sling
load. The accident board made a
preliminary determination that the
crew had not allowed additional
height for the length of the sling
load.
Although the aircraft had cleared
the wires, the external load made
contact with the wires right at the
attaching point. At 70 knots airspeed
and that low altitude, Mr. Peters
had no chance to correct for the
violent nose-down pitch of the air
craft. The UH-1 Huey pivoted like
a giant pendulum and dove into the
ground. The transmission separated
when the main rotor blade struck
the ground, rupturing the fuel cells
at the top and flooding the crew
compartment with 700 pounds of
JP-4 before bursting into flames.
There were no survivors in the crew
of three.
LTC Elliot had not slept much
since that night. His sleeplessness
was attributable in part to vivid
images of the crash scene. That,
coupled with the look in Mrs. Peters'
eyes when he had told her of her
husband's death, was enough to rob
anyone of sleep.
LTC Elliot became aware of the
sharp voice once again as it said,
“Sir, for the last time, would you
please answer the question as stated
by the board?”
LTC Elliot glanced once more at
the folder on the desk in front of
him. The folder was open to a copy
of Peters' last gradeslip. The date
on the gradeslip was 4 weeks old, 6
days before the last standardization
meeting. The completed comment
slip seemed to leap out at him. It
read: “WO1 Peters completed all
maneuvers satisfactorily. His know
ledge of the local reservation is
adequate. He tends to rush through
some maneuvers without planning
far enough ahead, especially NOE
decelerations and turns during con
tour flight. It is recommended that
WO1 Peters be given an additional
30 to 60 days mission-oriented train
ing within his troop before being
recommended for a PIC evaluation.”
Looking up at the board members
seated in the front of the room, LTC
Elliot cleared his throat and began,
“In answer to your question, sir, at
first I thought . . . .”
This story is pure fiction. The
names are creations of the author.
Although fiction, all the elements
of truth from previous incidents
everywhere in the aviation com
munity combine to make this a very
possible occurrence. The reader is
tasked to mentally edit whatever
minor details are necessary to match
similar incidents with which he may
be familiar. It is the author's hope
that all those who could be cast in
the role of LTC Elliot would ponder
this hypothetical event and perhaps
reconsider their policies. For those
who have never been in a similar
situation and believe their policies
do everything to prevent it, congrat
ulations, and best wishes for your
continued success. -ā-f
19
 Nettie Garth
Emergency Locator Transmitter
There have long been arguments both for and against
the use of Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs)
in Army aircraft. In fact, our first article on this
subject was published in PEARL in October 1979.
Sure, we have signal devices such as the flares, signal
mirror and survival radio, but how effective are these
items if you crash, are unconscious or have broken
bones, and are unable to use them?
We feel that you should again be made aware of the
current DA policy pertaining to ELTs as stated in DA
Msg, DAMA-RQD, 241910Z Jul 81. “Has DA contin
ues to support ELTs for aircraft in remote or isolated
areas and other areas where a bona fide need exists.”
20
photo by Tom Greene
The article appearing in the August 1981 Aviation
Digest entitled “Emergency Locator Transmitters
. . . Why wait?" again identified the ELT as a viable
means of locating and rescuing downed aircrew
personnel and their passengers. Further, based upon
the Army's mishap experience, where delay in effecting
rescue has resulted in loss of life and excessive time
and money expended for search and rescue, the interest
in ELTs is growing rapidly in the aviation community.
We therefore suggest that each aviation unit evaluate
its respective need for ELTs and forward its request
for use of these items, with justification, through the
appropriate chain of command to CDR TSARCOM,
ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE. This information will be used
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
to assess the extent of interest and need for ELTs
within the aviation community. (Reprinted from
PEARL, December 1981)
ALSE Activities
The aviation life support equipment (ALSE) Manage
ment Steering Council held its latest meeting 28 to 30
October 1981 in Natick, MA. In attendance were
representatives of The Surgeon General, Development
and Readiness Command, Training and Doctrine
Command, Forces Command, U.S. Army Safety
Center, Army National Guard, and the Office of the
Chief Army Reserve. Of the many agenda items
discussed, the following programs are of particular
significance to aviation personnel in the field.
• Helicopter Crewmember Flotation Kit concerns
the development of a leg mounted or back pack type
vacuum packed one-person life raft for aircrew
personnel. Since several problems were identified
during the Customer Service Test, the program is
now in a “hold” status.
• The Helicopter Oxygen System involves the devel
opment of an oxygen system which would be available
for Armywide application to all helicopters. The system
is now under development and prototype systems will
be available shortly.
• The Aircrew Cold Weather Clothing System
concerns the evaluation and identification of a suitable
antiexposure suit for immediate use by Army helicopter
crews. This requirement is now under development
and has been accelerated 1 year ahead of the projected
developmental timeframe.
• The Flyer's Gloves, Extreme Cold Weather will
start into development during fiscal year 1982.
• The Aircrew Survival Armor Recovery Vest
involves the development of a new survival vest
specifically designed for Army helicopter aircrews.
This developmental effort is scheduled to begin shortly.
• The Survival Environmental Packets involve the
development of improved survival equipment or com
ponents which are carried in the survival vest. This
developmental effort is due to begin shortly.
• The Aircraft Modular Survival Kit System con
cerns the development of a modular survival kit system
which will interface with present and future airframe
designs and which will replace the currently issued
survival kits. Approval is expected shortly for this
developmental effort.
These are only a few of the efforts underway in the
ALSE field. We will keep you updated on these and
other developments as they occur.
New TM Adopted
U.S. Air Force Technical Order (TO) 14P3-5-81,
FEBRUARY 1982
“Use, Inspection, Fitting and Maintenance Instructions
for the Antiexposure Assembly, Type CWU-21/P,”
dated 1 May 1969, has been adopted by the Army.
Technical Manual (TM) 10-8475-200-12 is now available
through normal publications supply channels.
New Visual Signals For Survivors
The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consul
tative Organization (IMCO) have jointly adopted a
new—and simplified—set of signals for use by survivors
when signaling to aircraft. The new signals are only 5
in number, replacing a long-standing group of 18
signals. ICAO has incorporated the new code in Annex
12, Search and Rescue (SAR) to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. This amendment to Annex
12 became effective on 15 April 1981 and the signals
became applicable for aeronautical use on 26 Novem
ber 1981. IMCO will include them in the first amend
ment to the IMCO SAR Manual, the basic of which is
to be issued shortly. (Adapted from Flying Safety, the
U.S. Air Force Safety Magazine, September 1981)
According to the U.S. Air Force Inspection and
Safety Center, Norton AFB, CA, the five new signals
(shown in the figure) have been adopted for aviation
use worldwide. It is vital that all Army aviators be
aware of this new visual signal code; proper use of
these signals could mean the difference between life
and death in a survival situation.
code
message symbol
1 require ossistonce V
2 require medical ossistonce
3 no or negotive N
4 yes or offirmotive Y
5 proceeding in this direction
New Visual Signal Code for survivors
ALSE Pamphlet Update
We have been receiving a number of phone calls
inquiring about the validity of our ALSE pamphlet
which was originally published in 1977 and updated in
21
PEARLS
1978. This publication contains a complete description
of the Aviation Life Support System (Section 2), a list
of the various sources of supply for ALSE items (Section
3), a list of references (Section 4), a list of ALSE and
related items of equipment by national stock number
(NSN) (Section 5), and a list of ALSE and related
items of equipment alphabetically by nomenclature
(Section 6). Although much of the information in the
pamphlet is outdated, much of it is also still pertinent
and still useful to personnel working with ALSE. We
are in the process of completely revising and updating
this publication, and we expect it to be in print and to
be disseminated in the near future. Until that time,
continue to use the 1978 edition for reference purposes.
Signal Kit Problem
A serious problem has been reported concerning
the signal kit, personnel distress, PN A/P 225-5A,
NSN 1370-00-490-7362, L119, which is a component
Of the SRU-21/P survival vest. The M-207 flare launch
ers in some of these kits have been found with the
collets flush against the inner housing wall, thus
necessitating the use of extreme force to insert and
remove the signal flares from the launcher. It is feared
that such a condition may result in the round remaining
in the launcher after firing, leading to a heat buildup
which may cause the round to explode and thereby
injure the operator. Those defective launchers identified
thus far bear PN OL489.1()5(); however, aſſ M 207
launchers should be checked to ensure that the flare
rounds can be inserted and removed without the use
of extreme force. Units finding defective launchers
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue survival gear write PFARL, DARCOM, ATTN
4300 Goodfellow Blvd. St. Louis, MO 63720 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 of Commercial 3 14-263-3307
22
should report the details to the U.S. Army Armament
Readiness Command (ARRCOM), ATTN: DRSAR
QAS-P, on DA Form 2415, Ammunition Condition
Report. Point of contact (POC) at ARRCOM is Mr.
Tom Bilyeu, DRSAR-QAS-P, AUTOVON 793.4851
extension 219; POC at TSARCOM is Mr. Jim Dittmer,
DRSTS-MCAPL, AUTOVON 693-31 12.
Questions and Answers
We have replaced many bent, broken or otherwise
unserviceable antennas on our AN/PRC-90 survival
radios. What should we do with the antennas we have
replaced? Is there some procedure for getting these
items repaired so that they may be used again? It
seems a waste to throw away an item costing in excess
of $27,00 simply because of some torn rubber insulation.
(CW3 John Vasco, 2/10 Air Cav, 7th Inf Div, Ft. Ord,
CA)
We agree that it seems a waste to throw away such
an expensive (and sometimes hard-to-get) item as this
antenna when it would appear that minor repair could
restore it to service again. Be that as it may, both the
Air Force and the Army Communications-Electronics
Command confirm that no overhaul procedures exist
for the antenna, AN/PRC-90 radio, NSN 5820-00-371
6806LS. The primary reason for this is the cost of
repair in both materials and manhours versus the cost
of replacement. As for what to do with the antennas
you have replaced, since they are expendable and
nonrepairable, throw them away. -à-4
DRCPO-ALSF.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Major William F. Voth
Chief, Threat Branch
Directorate of Combat Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
I F YOU ARE a longtime Aviation Digest reader,
you may remember the February 1980 threat
article which described the four-member threat
team at that time. We've come a long way baby! We
now have nine assigned and have recent authori
zation for a GS-12 civilian position, Intelligence Re
search Specialist, which we hope to fill soon.
Threat articles, identified by our threat logo as
seen above, have become a familiar and, we hope,
helpful part of almost every Aviation Digest issue
over the years. Since “know your enemy” is one of the
most basic laws of successful warfare, knowing may
well save your life and will certainly help you do a
better job!
To get the threat information you need and want
directly to you, please take a minute to jot down your
ideas, questions or comments, on the attached ques
tionnaire. We would especially like to know what subjects
you want to see in future Aviation Digest articles.
Providing current threat information to the aviation
sector of the combined arms team through briefings
and publication of threat items and articles in military
periodicals is one of our important missions; we have
several others which directly and indirectly benefit
you, the combat aviator. We serve as the single point
of contact for threat at the U.S. Army Aviation Center
at Ft. Rucker, AL. This threat management function
includes maintenance of the Center Threat Reference
Library which contains the latest, all source, finished
products from numerous intelligence agencies. This
threat information, including briefings, is also available
to you through your local threat representative or
intelligence officer (see the threat training article in the
April 1981 Aviation Digest). Our Threat Reference
Library is the major source of information for the
many articles and briefings we are called upon to
produce.
FEBRUARY 1982
Our task of supporting the Army Aviation materiel
acquisition process in all stages is our interface in the
combat development (CD) community. At Ft. Rucker,
threat drives the CD train. We enjoy the total support
and confidence of the CD structure and participate
fully on the CD team. Ongoing actions include: the
advanced attack helicopter (AAH)/semiactive laser
HELLFIRE missile system (SALHMS), light helicopter
experimental (LHX) and the Stinger air-to-air missile
concept evaluation program.
In addition to supporting the resident Training and
Doctrine Command System Managers (TSM) for the
major systems acquisition, threat support, in large
measure, is being given to the Army Aviation mission
area analysis (AAMAA). We currently have three
action officers working full time on this project. Since
the major thrust of AAMAA is to identify and analyze
the deficiencies facing Army Aviation in the near and
far term, all of Ft. Rucker's combat developments
community is centering on this action as a number
one priority. Threat Branch has produced a detailed
threat chapter of the study and has also played the
Red forces of the battle wargame from which Red/Blue
loss exchange ratios (LERs) are derived. These LERs
demonstrate the capabilities of present and future
Blue systems against projected threat systems.
The third major mission area of Threat Branch is
training and training development. We give guidance
for and review of lesson plans for threat content
validity. In this capacity, we also monitor threat
instruction in coordination with the Department of
Academic Training. Our branch is becoming more
involved in review of all training literature and audio
visual products containing threat portrayals. You can
also blame us for those threat questions on the aviator's
written examination.
Divided among us are 13 areas of subject matter.
Each analyst specializes in several of these and is, there
fore, the point of contact in that subject area. Page 24
shows these and the analysts responsible.
Threat Branch is a busy place. We do a lot of
traveling to both gain and give threat information.
We receive numerous calls daily from aviators request
ing answers to threat questions; and while a lot asked
for is unclassified, often a visit to our office or a secure
telephone call is necessary due to the classification of
the material (ask your local Special Security Office for
the AUTOSEVOCOM number). In this regard,
one of our primary missions is getting current threat
information to you through publication of threat articles
and assisting you in requesting threat training material.
Any suggestion how to better do this would be welcomed.
Write: Director of Combat Developments, ATTN:
ATZQ-D-CT, Ft. Rucker, AL36362. AUTOVON 558
3506/5671; commercial 205-255-3506-5671. Let us hear
from you.
23

Major Frank E. Babiasz
Military Intelligence (35/15)
2,5,6*
Captain (P) E. Gary Campbell
Military Intelligence (15/35)
3,6,10,12*
Sergeant First Class
Richard K. McNeal
Military Intelligence
Analyst (96B40)
4,7,11*
1-Nuclear,Biological and
Chemical Warfare
2-Tactics and Doctrine
3-Order of Battle, Mid/Far East
4-Order of Battle, Europe
-
Major William F. Voth Major Bronislaw R. Maca
Infantry (15/35) Infantry (15/35)
2,5,6,12,13* 5,7,10°
Captain David Bales Captain (P) Don R. Faint
Military Intelligence (15/35) Military Intelligence (35/37)
1,2,4,6* 8,9,12*
Specialist 5th Class Captain Dale L. Radtke
Janet L. Garofalo Military Intelligence (15/35)
Military Intelligence 2,8,9*
Analyst (96B20)
1,3,13”
* Areas of expertise
5- Tactical Air Defense 10-Current Intelligence
6- Tactical Aviation 11-Field Artillery
7- Ground Vehicles
12-Materiel Acquisition Process
8-Electronic Warfare 13-Data Base Management
9. Directed Energy Weapons
 (ISAAVNC THREAT BRANCH

Questionnaire
What do you think of our threat articles P
D good D o.k. DBad

2 Which threat articles from past issues were outstanding P

...not so outstanding P

3. threat articles helpful to you in unit training P Dyes

Comment
[]no

4 What threat subjects would you like to see addressed in future articles P

How would you assess the level of emphasis on threat awareness in your unit P
[T] satisfactory Dunsatisfactory How can we help ?

Prioritize threats to U. S. Army Aviation by numbering the following one through nine
(1 = highest threat):
– Radioelectronic Combat — Artillery
– Small Arms – Tactical Air Defense (ZSCI 23-4, SA-7,SA-9)
— Antitank Guided Missile — Soviet “Army Aviation" (air-to-air)
– Tank Main Gun — Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare
— Directed Energy Weapons (laser, particle beam, EMP)

7 Do you have any questions, comments or requests P

(optional) rank, name

duty position
unit address
AUTOVON
along line at right fold and mail postage free

FOLD

Department of the Army

U.S. Army Aviation Center
ATTN: ATZQ-D-CT POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
Ft. Rucker, AL 36362 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DOD 314
OFFICIAL E USINESS

PENALTY FOR PRivate use $3do

TO: Commander
U.S. Army Aviation Center
ATTN: ATZQ-D-CT
Fort Rucker, AL 36362

FOLD

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
The Army Standardization Program
PEACETIME ARMIES prepare for war!
Training in the tasks of war is the sole tool
a peacetime army has at its disposal to
ensure that when war occurs, the army is
able to meet its obligation.
One of the most difficult tasks facing a
commander in a peactime army is that of
determining just how well trained his unit
really is. Measurement of a unit's, crew's
or individual's readiness is essential for
decisions relative to training requirements.
“Checkrides, annual aviator proficiency
and readiness test, aircrew training manual
and dash 10” are all terms aviators are very
familiar with through the Aviation Standard
ization Program outlined in AR 95-1. The
Aviation Standardization Program permits
Commanders of aviation units to monitor
their aircrew proficiency and accurately
measure the training requirements needed
to bring their units to full combat readiness.
The success of the aviation side of their
Commands rests with “worldwide standard
ization.” From the flying standpoint, the
commanders know each aircrew will per
form the same aircrew task exactly the
same way, even if a new person just arrived
from another unit the day before.
It is unfortunate that flying tasks do not
comprise the entire spectrum of the com
mander's responsibility for training. Main
tenance, supply activities, mess activities
and logistical requirements for his unit are
among the many other tasks that have to
be addressed in his readiness thinking.
There are many tasks in the unit that do
not COme under the umbrella of the Aviation
Standardization Program. The commander
FEBRUARY 1982
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
STANDARDIIATION
cannot afford to ignore these when asses
sing his unit's Overall readiness position.
The Chief of Staff recognized the need
to Standardize all Soldier and crew tasks
where possible and recently directed the
implementation of the “Army Standardi
zation Program.” The Army Standardization
Program is a tool that will eventually assist
the commander in seeing the training
battlefield.
The similarities between the Army Stan
dardization Program and the Aviation Stan
dardization Program are many and the
purpose of each is essentially the same.
The basic goals of each program are:
Provide a measurable standard for tasks
that can and must be performed the same
throughout the Army; train Soldiers and
Crews as a minimum to meet that standard;
permit no deviation from the standard that
WaS Set.
The program is an extension of the Bat
talion Training Management System, Sol
dier's Manual and ARTEPs (Army Training
and Evaluation Programs) and impacts on
all military specialties. Chapter 5, AR 350
1 outlines the program. The initial steps
have been completed and identification of
those tasks that can be Standardized is
being conducted at this time.
Examples of tasks currently under con
sideration for standardization that directly
affect aviation are: “Passage of navigation
information, hand signals during forward
area refueling operations, tactical lost
communications, listening silence pro
cedures, target hand-off procedures and
aerial observer training.” Numerous other
27
 ANALYIE PROVIDE CONDUCT
[TRAD0C/unit) [TRAD0C) [TRAD0C/unit)

performance
select test ºrdin to
critical meet
to sks training standards
materials - -

EWALUATE

evaluate
effectiveness
KEY of training
())) initial action General Concept of Training
A-2 feedback

tasks have been suggested and are under topics and procedures suggested for inclu
consideration by the responsible agency sion in the program. If you have a task,
for inclusion in the Army Standardization topic or procedure you would like to submit
Program. for Consideration, address it to the Director
“Training Management in Battalions,” TC of Evaluation and Standardization, ATTN:
21-5-7, is a tool used by commanders to ATZQ-ES-E, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362. We
set up their training programs (see figure). always welcome your inquiries on any
It outlines a four-step general concept of subject affecting aviation. The Director of
training. The Army Standardization Program Evaluation and Standardization would like
is currently in the first phase of this model. to acknowledge and thank those in the
The intent is to reach the evaluation phase aviation community who responded to the
and complete the loop back to the trainer. recent “Report to the Field” on tactical
Once this loop is completed, the trainer instruments. There were many well pre
has a tool which will assist him in evaluating sented suggestions and all are being care
his unit's training needs. TC 1-134 asks the fully considered. -º-'
questions, “Are my Soldiers ready for war
today?”; “Is my unit capable of performing
Wou wanna
-N
its mission and surviving on the modern
battlefield?” It goes on to point out, “The bear from me 2.
answers to these questions must guide the
commander informulating his unit's training
program.” The Army Standardization Pro
gram coupled with the Aviation Standardi
zation Program will add a measure of confi
dence to the Commander's answers to these
questions.
The U.S. Army Aviation Center at Ft.
Rucker, AL, has established a Branch
Standardization Committee to review tasks,

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention 36,362. Or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
on an area of major importance. Write to us at Commander, 255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL 558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message

28 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 Fort Supply

Fort Gibson
Fort Reno
whipple Barracks -- Fort Werde
Fort Apache
ſ camp Radziminski
-
Fort McDowell -- k - fort tularoa stakeſ, • Fort sin ºrt Artue
Fort Yum Glu M oro Caliente - Mº Fort Craig Plains º-ºº!, Captain LeRoy K. Neel
{. Fort Thomas
san Carlos • Fort stanton
Camp Gºº -
Fort Huachuca
Fort Bayard
Fort Grant

-
| * \fort McR
rºfort cºming
Menae) º Fort Griffin
º
Public Affairs Officer
-

Fort Bowie ſº El Paso a Fort hood 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)
- 3. Fort Hood, TX
Fort Quitman- $os Fort concho ~3% *º, Yº.
- / fortstockton" - Fort McKawett *
Fort loavis -
| camp Pina colorado - otona - camp *~ º,

* chihuahua
Fort Ringgold

FOR THE 6t In CAW

TO THE WEST of Ft. Hood, TX, in an even more TX. With the situation discussed, the cavalry troopers
arid part of Texas, lies the city of Ozona, population took to the sky for a first hand look at the problem.
4,500. Surrounded by steep-walled mesas and deep Once onstation, the crew and riggers examined a
arroyos, the ranchers here graze only 60 head of metalic bar framed cubic box (hexahedron) filled
cattle per section of land (640 acres). Cactus and with celestial electronic data collecting equipment of
pampas grass are the most prevalent flora in this about 15 feet by 5 feet in size and weighing more than
region, and new-found oil is the latest topic of conver 3,000 pounds. This payload, belonging to the Federal
sation of its inhabitants. Republic of Germany, had been mounted on the
The 6th Cav, historically, is not unfamiliar with this gondola of a gas filled balloon and was crossing Crockett
area, and recently was called on once again to lend County when its mission was terminated and the gas
assistance. The circumstances were different however was allowed to escape. A parachute mounted to the
than when the 6th was headquartered at Forts McKavett, frame brought the equipment safely to the ground
Stockton and Davis during the Mexican Expedition and it finally rested on a steep banked escarpment on
and Indian Wars periods of the 1800s. the Amos Owens Ranch. Trucks and four-wheel drive
The request for assistance arrived and the Wagon vehicles tried in vain to recover it. “I can see why
Masters of D Troop, 34th Support Squadron, 6th nothing else can retrieve it,” said PFC Hill, “but with
Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) rallied to the call. With this bird's capabilities we'll have no problems.”
their workhorse, the CH-47 Chinook readied, the Enter the Wagon Masters—The pilots sized up the
crew consisting of the pilots, CPT Steve Misseldine situation from the ground, issued orders to the riggers
and CW3 Ron Bender; the flight engineer, SGT Lester and departed for their helicopter, parked on top of
Hayse and the crewchief, PFC Ray Hill, departed Ft. the mesa. On determining the center of mass, the
Hood with III Corps riggers, SGT Gary Baker and riggers affixed straps to the equipment, placing a metal
SP4 James Coffey aboard. ring near the top for the helicopter hook to grasp. As
The 2-hour flight was uneventful and contact was the Chinook hovered above the structure and lowered
established in Ozona with a representative of the its cable, the hook was securely fastened to the ring.
National Scientific Balloon Facility, located in Palestine, Slack out of the cable, the CH-47 hoisted the equipment
and carried it to a predetermined spot on the valley
A 6th Cav Chinook embarks on a unique mission floor where it was lowered in a place accessible to
trucks.
With the mission completed, the huge aircraft flew
back to Ft. Hood.
“This mission was an excellent training vehicle for
a recovery crew," said CW3 Bender. “With the close
nature of the work involved, the slope of the mountain
in relationship to the helicopter blades, it required
more pilot/crew coordination than the usual flat terrain
missions.”
“These missions never fail to increase our knowledge
of recovery techniques,” added SGT Hayse.
The troopers of the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)
once again came to the rescue in a territory they
helped to protect more than a century ago. imº

FEBRUARY 1982 29
 REPORTING FINAL
Late MewsFromArmyAviation Activities

Four Decades of Service

Plan now to attend the celebration of Army Aviation's 40th
anniversary from 4 to 6 June at Ft. Rucker, AL. There will be
Something for everyone to enjoy among the numerous events
planned. Those include displays of Army aircraft and related systems
and nonaviation equipment; tours and open houses at training,
<& research and museum facilities; ROTC demonstrations; social >
gatherings; a carnival and bazaar; dedications and a memorial service.
More details will follow in the Aviation Digest. Further informa
tion can also be obtained by contacting the 1st Aviation Brigade
Planning Committee, ATTN:CPT Shelton, 1st Aviation Brigade, Ft.
Rucker, AL 36362. Telephone AUTOVON 558-3190/3405 or com
mercial (205) 255-3190/3405.

FROM WASHINGTON today the highest ranking military officer of Hispanic

New FORSCOM Commander. Lieutenant Gen
eral Richard E. Cavazos, a nominee for the rank
of four-star general, has been named to command
the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) at
Ft. McPherson, GA, moving there from his present
position as commander of the III Corps and Ft.
Hood, TX.
At FORSCOM he will succeed General Robert
Shoemaker who retired this month.
General Cavazos' new responsibilities will
include exercising command control of the num
bered continental United States (CONUS) armies,
the major combat and combat-support troop units
in CONUS, Alaska and Puerto Rico, and of units,
installations and activities that are principally
related to FORSCOM's readiness and defense
missions.
He received his ROTC commission on grad
uation from Texas Tech University in 1951 and is
heritage in the Defense Department.
(ARNEWS 134)
Rescue Assistance. Five helicopters from
Davison Army Airfield, Military District of Wash
ington, were dispatched 13 January to participate
in the recovery operations after a jetliner out of
National Airport crashed in the Potomac River.
The first UH-1 Huey with a hoist onboard arrived
at the Scene about 20 minutes after notification
was received at Davison. Because helicopters of
the National Park Service were already operating
out of the confined crash site, only one of the
Army aircraft was used to transport a survivor to
the hospital. However, the Hueys were on standby
until about 9 p.m.
Commander of Davison Army Airfield, which is
adjacent to Ft. Belvoir, is Colonel Willis R. Bunting.

30 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 TWO FIRST.S. 2LT Sheryl Rozman, left, is the Oregon
Army National Guard's first woman helicopter pilot. She is
assigned to Det 1, HHD, 141st Support Battalion at the Army
Aviation Support Facility, Salem, OR
FROM MARYLAND
New Management Structure. The Air Traffic
Control Combat Support Activity (7th Signal
Command), Ft. Ritchie, MD, has been formed to
attain a more intensified management of tactical
air traffic control. (PAO)
FROM FORT RUCKER
A Fourth of the Way There. A $10,000 pledge
from Northrop Corporation has raised the Army
Aviation Museum Foundation's fund drive to the
$500,000 mark which is one-fourth of the $2
million needed for the construction of a facility to
house the museum!
“The new building will give the Army Aviation
fº community a place of pride for displaying its
history," explained Ed Brown, director of develop
ment of the foundation and coordinator of the
fund drive. He noted that the structure will be
large enough to contain the museum's entire
inventory of aircraft, now numbering more than
100.
Individuals, units, industries, etc., are urged to
make a tax-deductible contribution to the fund.
The address is the Army Aviation Museum Founda
tion, Inc., P.O. Box H, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362.
Presentation of the Northrop pledge, to be
paid next year, was made by Mr. John Richardson
of the firm's home office in Century City, CA.
That $10,000 is in addition to the more than
$52,000 that has already been contributed by
Northrop Worldwide Aviation Service, Inc., a
FEBRUARY 1982
. . . CW2 Mary C. Slaughter, right, is the first woman to
attend and graduate from the Aviation Warrant Officer Advanced
Course at Ft. Rucker, AL. CW2 Slaughter is assigned to the
U.S. Army Student Detachment, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IN
corporation subsidiary which has the aircraft
maintenance contract at Ft. Rucker.
Graduation Speakers.
• Rear Admiral John G. Wissler, commander,
Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, MD,
challenged 64 newly rated helicopter pilots to
leave a legacy for succeeding generations of
military aviators.
The shape of that legacy, he said, will depend
on how the aviators manage their careers and
resources, as well as how they lead others.
• Major General James F. Hamlet (U.S. Army,
Retired) told graduates of a recent Aviation Officer
Safety Course that they must be leaders in the
Safety field and place high safety standards on
their units.
A former deputy inspector general of the Army,
and one of the last Army Aviation Liaison Pilots
to retire, General Hamlet said that the aviation
safety officer's duty is one that never ends.
(PAO)
FROM NEW YORK
Contract Awarded. The Army Communications
Electronics Command, Ft. Monmouth, NJ, has
awarded Telephonics Corporation, Huntington,
NY, a contract calling for the development,
fabrication and testing of 52 communication
system controls, together with associated test
sets, for universal application in Army aircraft.
Production versions of the airborne Controls will
initially be installed in the AH-64A Apache.
31
FROM COLORADO
MAST Rescue. There were no reindeer or
sleighbells, but when the UH-1 Huey helicopter
from the Ft. Carson Military Assistance to Safety
and Traffic (MAST) team made its appearance
29 December, it brought the best possible gift to
the four survivors of a private plane that crashed
Christmas Eve in the mountains near Buena Vista.
The evacuation of the injured people was made
from a small rock ledge on the mountainside.
Weather conditions were heavy snow and high
winds.
MAST crewmembers, who are assigned to
Carson's 571st Medical Detachment, were CW3
John Pariury, pilot; 1LT Gary Buhler, copilot,
SGT Daniel Redd, crewchief; and SP5 Brent
Evans, medic. (ARNEWS 157)
FROM GERMANY
One of a Kind. At the Heidelberg Army Airfield,
61 men and women work around-the-clock to
keep more than 7,000 Army pilots and their
passengers safe. They are in the 59th Air Traffic
Control Battalion's Army Flight Operations Detach
ment (AFOD), the hub of Army flight operations
in Germany and the only unit of its kind in the
World.
AFOD's job is to coordinate Army air traffic
with Air Force, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), commercial and private air traffic.
And when something goes wrong, it becomes
the vital link between the pilot in trouble and
help.
The service to the aviator begins when the
flight is planned. The teletype section at AFOD
links up all Army airfields with the rest of the
flying world, and the more than 2,000 messages
received daily help with that planning.
(Martha Rudd, 5th Signal Cmd PAO)
REUNION INFORMATION
6th Cavalry Brigade. A reunion for the 6th
Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) will be held at Ft.
Hood, TX, 16 to 17 April. For further information,
contact CSM Willie J. Bethay at AUTOVON 737
301.0/5950/5802, or the PAO at 737-4494. Com
mercial numbers are 817-684-3010 and 817-685
4494. (BDE PAO)
57th Fighter Group. Information about members
of the 57th Fighter Group who served from 15
January 1941 through 7 November 1945 is sought
by Wayne S. Dodds, P.O. Box 10428, Glendale,
CA, 213-240-6868. The first reunion for the group
since World War II is being planned. (Dodds)

IN MEMORY OF. Jean Monk places a nameplate bearing the name

of her late husband, CPT Donald G. Monk, on the "In Memoriam"
plaque of the Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc., during a
ceremony at Ft. Rucker, AL. Looking on is LTC William E. Woodson,
commander of the Army Aviation Development Test Activity
(USAAVNDTA) at the post. The aviator was killed in April 1979
while testing the XM-130 chaff system which dispenses shredded
aluminum foil to distract enemy radar controlled weapon systems.
Personnel of the USAAVNDTA donated S100 to the Museum
Foundation in CPT Monk's memory.

AVIATION DIGEST AWARDS. MG Carl H. McNair Jr., seated,

commanding general, Ft. Rucker, AL, discusses the award
winning article written by MAJ Michael L. Brittingham, second
from right, which appeared in the October issue of the Army
Aviation Digest. Other monthly award winners are, from left,
CW2 Gary R. Weiland (July), "Hangar Talk"; CW3 Carl D.
Everhart and Michael G. Sanders, Ph.D. (August), coauthors
of "Aviation Warrant Officer Retention: A Matter of Concern";
MAJ Brittingham, "Smart Guys Win: The Thinking Man's
Guide to Helicopter Aerial Combat"; and MAJ Gordon L.
Rogers (September), "Aviation Warrant Officer Retention:
The Factors which Influence. The Decision. To Leave." Each

writer received a Certificate of Achievement from the magazine

and an engraved pen from the post Thrift Shop. CW3 Orion T.
King, now stationed at Ft. Hood, TX, was coauthor with MAJ
Rogers. (photograph by SP4 Denise Starr)
 HOW TO GET THE

Aviation/DIGEST
The U.S. Army Aviation Digest is an official Department of the Army publication.

Active Army
Official distribution is handled by The Adjutant General. Active Army, National Guard and
Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution should request both initial issue and revisions
to accounts by submitting DA Form 12-5. Detailed instructions for preparing 12-5 can be
found on the back of the form. Submit the completed 12-5 to:
Commander
USA AG Publications Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220
National Guard units not on pinpoint distribution should submit their request through their
state adjutant general.

Navy and Marine Corps

Submit your request to:
Director, Navy Publications and Printing Services
Building 157-3 ATTN: Distribution Branch
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374

Air Force
Use local Air Force funds and submit request for paid subscriptions as outlined in the last
paragraph below.

Coast Guard
s Units submit your request to:
U.S. Coast Guard (OSR-2/73)
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20590

Official distribution is not made to civilian organizations. However, the Aviation Digest
maintains a limited number of exchange subscriptions for other technical publications.
Request for an exchange should be made by letter, enclosing a copy of the publication
proposed to be exchanged, to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Fort
Rucker, AL 36362.

Paid subscriptions for the Aviation Digest are available from:

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402
Annual subscription rates are $22.00 domestic and $27.50 overseas.

FEBRUARY 1982 33
ToTAL ELECTRIC FAILURE.

ww HAT WOULD YOU do

if you had an electrical fire/failure
while flying instrument flight rules
(IFR) in a UH-1 Huey and lost all
the electrical system? What then?
Could you keep the right side
up? Or would you go into a grave
yard spiral or roll inverted and kill
yourself and others? Could you
handle this? Many Huey pilots have
wondered!
When I started flying Hueys, I
often wondered why they weren't
equipped with the vacuum-operated
turn needle. I haven't figured it out
yet. Whatever the reason, if you
lose your electrical system, you will
be forced into instrument flight
without a horizon, radio magnetic
indicator (RMI) or a turn needle.
The turn needle would not fail
instantly, but would within 30 to 45
seconds, depending on the condition
of the bearings in the instrument.
I never became overly concerned º
about this situation until one day, I
departed Dothan, Alabama, en route
to Tennessee, with another pilot in
a Cessna 310.
On takeoff I noticed that the
magnetic compass had an air bubble
just barely visible across the top. I
wasn't too concerned since it had a
lot of fluid left, was working perfectly
and I had seen this before in other
aircraft.
As we climbed on an IFR clear
ance into the clouds (about 2,000
feet above ground level) departure
control cleared us to maintain 6,000

34 - U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


IN THE UH-1
feet. I smelled an odor resembling
kerosene in the cockpit as we con
tinued to climb. It got stronger, and
I noticed that the fluid level in the
compass was dropping quite rapidly.
This meant the magnetic compass
would be nearly dry and very inef
ficient shortly. I checked and found
that fluid was running down into
the radio instruments. The odor of
kerosene was extremely strong, so
I opened both cabin air vents to get
more air. Still the odor was strong;
it smelled as if I had stuck my nose
in the gas filler neck of a Huey.
Fluid was running out the front
of the instrument panel directly
below the radio package and drip
ping on the throttle quadrant. The
fumes were so strong I felt they
could be explosive or the fluid could
start a fire in the instrument panel.
I immediately shut all electrical
systems off, picked up my portable
standby II very high frequency (VHF)
transmitter-receiver, plugged it into
the external antenna and called
approach control. I advised them
of our predicament, requested to
reverse our course and to descend
to visual flight rules (VFR) condi
tions. They cleared us, and we
reversed our course, descended to
VFR conditions, cancelled our IFR
flight plan and landed.
The Cessna had a vacuum-oper
ated turn needle, which we wouldn't
have had in a Huey. This made me
really think about what we would
have done if we had been IFR in a
FEBRUARY 1982
helicopter that didn't have an elec
trical system.
Shortly thereafter, while instruct
ing instrument students in a TH
13T Sioux, I asked various advanced
students to try flying the helicopter
with the horizon, RMI and turn
needle inoperative. They would:
• Use only the ball, airspeed,
altimeter, vertical speed and mag
netic compass.
• Maintain their altitude with
collective.
• Maintain airspeed and heading
with cyclic.
• Keep the aircraft trimmed with
the ball.
I found in both the TH-13T and
later in the Huey that if the student
stayed calm and held a heading east
or west, that the pilot could continue
flying the helicopter and not come
near losing control. They could even
turn to the north or south, reverse
direction, change heading, let down
and climb the first time if they stayed
calm, and made small movements
with the cyclic and collective, mon
itored their instruments and were
careful.
The most critical part of turning
is turning from north, since starting
from this direction the compass is
not representative as to which di
rection you are turning. However,
understand the magnetic compass
and compass turns and keep your
bank equivalent to one-fourth to
Mr. Roger F. McPheeters
Crystal River, FL
Mr. McPheeters was a Department of the
Army Civilian flight instructor at the U.S.
Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, AL,
when he wrote this article.
not more than one-half standard
rate (equal to 4 to 7 degrees bank,
preferably 4 to 5 degrees in a Huey).
Do not try to climb or descend while
turning if possible. This throws the
helicopter into a bank (left or right
on its own) and makes you have to
move the cyclic farther to maintain
the same attitude. If this additional
cyclic is applied in the wrong direc
tion, by misinterpreting your non
electrical instruments, it could be
fatal under IFR conditions.
All climbs and descents should,
if possible, be made on a heading of
east or west with the ball centered.
This way you'll note any turn on
your magnetic compass almost im
mediately (which indicates you're
in a bank). Make all movements of
the cyclic (left or right) smoothly,
slowly and very small. Do not make
large changes of collective, since it
will require larger and quicker
movements of the cyclic laterally.
If you feel you are getting into
trouble in a turn, roll out slowly
and hold a heading (any heading).
Then start your turn again carefully,
very carefully.
After trying this several times (30
minutes or so) under a hood in VFR
conditions, you will find it builds
your confidence. And if you're ever
forced to turn off the electrical system
or it fails, you'll not have the tendency
to panic. You'll know if it's possible
to fly the helicopter without an
electrical system.
Try it, it's a confidence builder!
35
 This article is not intended to dwell on how to train. The shelves
are filled with volumes on that subject. Rather, it points out a
unique malady among many utility helicopter units—training
Starvation.
TRAINING -
the Key Ingredient
Major Harold J. Brecher
Materiel Developments Division
Directorate of Combat Developments
and
CW3 Robert E. Browning
Combat Skills, Lowe Division
Directorate of Training and Doctrine
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
CENTEDITIONS OF THEAviation Digest
have featured a number of well-written ar
ticles graphically portraying the capabilities
and employment of threat weapons. The articles have
illustrated quite clearly what can be expected on
tomorrow's battlefield. However, their main emphasis
has been focused on attack helicopter operations. It
is this element of Army Aviation that has the mission
to defeat the heavy armored forces of the enemy.
Our attack helicopter units are organized and trained
specifically to provide the commander with the mobility
and firepower needed to concentrate forces at decisive
points to attack and defeat the enemy. All of their
efforts are expended toward that one objective and
rightfully so, but what about the other aviation elements
that will be moving about the battlefield? Do they
have the equipment and training necessary to survive
a mid/high intensity conflict?
Utility helicopter crews, for example, have a number
of diverse missions. The emphasis of their training is
not channeled toward a single objective. It is divided
among several mission areas such as troop and logistical
36
movement, aeromedical evacuation, command and
control, target acquisition and intelligence gathering.
As a result, tactical training for these crews is general
in nature rather than highly specialized.
Of all those elements of battle which determine
the success of a conflict, the single most important
contributing factor is training proficiency. This can
be historically proven. In the 1973 Mideast War
both sides had excellent equipment; however, the
highly trained Israeli forces held the advantage.
Once they were fully mobilized their well-trained
personnel and effective combined arms tactics turned
the tide of battle in their favor. Even though the
utility helicopter crews do not plan to meet the enemy
on every mission, their training proficiency must be
high enough for them to survive the modern threat.
Army Aviation is expected to operate at and across
the forward line of own troops. This means more than
just attack and aeroscout aircraft. Who will insert the
ground forces? Who will deliver the urgently needed
ammunition and supplies or insert the TOW ambush
teams? These will be critical missions which aviation
must be able to guarantee if it is to keep its newly
recognized place as a combat arm. Aerial deliveries
of personnel and equipment are real missions which
we have now; and in order to accomplish them, we
must be highly proficient with the aircraft and equip
ment that are in the current inventory.
This is not intended to be an article on how to train.
The shelves are already filled with volumes on that
subject.
It is meant to point out that utility helicopter units
often fall victim to a unique malady which few others
have-training starvation. This comes from numerous
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
flying hours being used to move personnel and
equipment to and from the field or unit training areas
or to fly other administrative missions which may not
be specifically directed toward training.
This time, which is invested in administrative
missions, must be constructively used to the maximum.
Training managers need to be innovative and imagin
ative. Missions should be tailored to provide for training
the crews to fly the way they will fight through injecting
appropriate tasks/maneuvers where possible in those
administrative missions.
Proper pre-mission planning must be accomplished
to derive the most from each flight hour. The basic
skills of terrain flight navigation and nap-of-the-earth
(NOE) flight operations cannot be overemphasized.
However, the basic principles of these tasks can be
incorporated into any mission, regardless of altitude
flown.
There are some tasks which do not readily lend
themsleves to incorporation into administrative
missions. One such example is operation of the onboard
survivability equipment. Aircraft survivability equip
ment covers a wide range of threat areas, from radar
directed weapons and infrared missiles to the individ
ual Soldier on the battlefield.
In the case of radar warning and suppression,
operation of the AN/APR-39(V)1 and AN/APR-44
can be accomplished without the use of special training
aids or unique areas. Most units, whether in the United
States or overseas, are located near a ground controlled
approach or other friendly type radar. A friendly
radar will activate the radar warning receiver and,
with the proper training attitude, this can be used to
practice operation of the radar warning receiver and
to perform necessary evasive maneuvers. Training of
FEBRUARY 1982
this type will stimulate a free exchange of thought and
information within the unit and, to a degree, improve
the combat readiness of all members.
If you are fortunate enough to be located near a
friendly air defense artillery (ADA) unit, it might be
possible to establish a cooperative training program
which will benefit both the ADA unit and yours. This
type of program will add a sense of reality for the
aircrews as well as increase the proficiency of the air
defense crew in tracking helicopters.
If your unit's aircraft are equipped with the M-130
chaff dispenser, radar suppression training can be
accomplished. This training can be combined with
evasive maneuvers either verbally or through the use
of the chaff practice round which dispenses confetti
instead of the normal chaff particles.
Infrared suppression training can be accomplished
in conjunction with NOE and other evasive maneuvers
to avoid or break infrared lock on; this also should be
a part of discussions of threat formations and tactics.
The proper technique is discussed in TC 1-135, “Aircrew
Training Manual, Utility Helicopter.”
These are but a few examples of methods used to
accomplish training in these tasks.
Supervisors at all echelons can start to develop an
effective program of alternate training methods which
will maximize precious training hours and dollars. A
good place to start is by comparing your current
program to that suggested in Chapter 9 (Army Aviation
Unit Survivability Training) of FM 1-2, “Aircraft Battle
field Countermeasures and Survivability.”
Remember, training—to acquire and retain combat
proficiency—is the number one ingredient affecting
mission accomplishment and survivability on the
battlefield. +in
---
37

An Alternate
AH-1 TOW
Training System
HE AH-1S COBRA heli
copter was one of the pri
mary weapons systems that
participated in the joint test of tac
tical aircraft effectiveness and sur
vivability in close air support anti
armor operations (TASVAL). The
joint test was conducted during the
summer months of 1979 by the U.S.
Army Combat Developments Exper
imentation Command (USACDEC)
at Ft. Hunter Liggett, CA (see
references).
As TASVAL was the largest and
most sophisticated computer-mon
itored field experiment ever con
ducted at Ft. Hunter Liggett, CDEC
instrumentation design engineers
were required to design and fabricate
a complex and sophisticated instru
mentation system that would collect,
process, evaluate and display vast
quantities of data on a near real
time basis. In addition to the micro
processor-based instrumentation
system that processed and passed
38
Captain Bruce Coons
data between the central computer
complex and the participating ve
hicles, key weapons systems such
as air defense units and aircraft also
were equipped with video (tele
vision) instrumentation systems to
record on videotape simulated battle
engagements for later study. Post
mission analysis of the engagements
provided detailed data about target
identification, tracking, aim error,
masking and other parameters. The
video recording system on the AH
1S Cobra helicopter recorded the
same image that the gunner saw in
the telescopic sight unit (TSU). The
engagements recorded during the
TASVAL test provided valuable
insights into target acquisition and
tracking procedures. The video
system designed for the AH-1S in
TASVAL may have some useful
training and operation applications.
This article will describe the video
recording system used on the AH
1S and how it was employed.
System Description. The figure
on page 40 is a block diagram of the
video recording system used on the
AH-1S aircraft during TASVAL. As
indicated, only the video camera
itself was mounted in the gunner's
cockpit. The remaining components
were attached to a shock-mounted
aluminum pallet assembly that slid
in and out of the aircraft ammo
compartment in place of the ammu
nition box. This arrangement fa
cilitated rapid and convenient re
moval of the instrumentation system
for testing or maintenance.
The AH-1S video recording system
consisted of several components and
subsystems:
• Video Camera—The camera
used in the TASVAL AH-1S Cobra
video instrumentation system was
a modified Edo-Western Corp, mod
el CH-1431 miniature camera head.
The TV camera is a rugged, mini
ature, two-piece unit designed for
applications where size and weight
are important and high resolution
and dependable operation are essen
tial even under extreme environ
mental conditions. The camera head
is 2% inches in diameter and 9 inches
long, and weighs about 3 pounds.
The camera was mounted in a spe
cial, locally fabricated mounting
bracket in the gun camera port on
the lower part of the TSU. The
camera and its associated control
cable projected slightly from the
TSU into the area between the
gunner's knees, causing minimum
interference. The video camera in
this application needed no separate
lens since the optical processing
necessary was supplied by the TSU.
A single multiconductor control
cable, connected to the rear of the
camera, was routed between the
gunner's knees, along the bottom
of the seat, through a modified in
spection panel near his left foot,
through the upper part of the turret
and finally through the ammo belt
passageway into the ammo compart
ment to connect to the camera
control unit mounted on the video
instrumentation pallet.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

• Camera Control Unit (CCU)—
The camera control unit was the
second part of the camera system.
It was an Edo-Western Corp, Model
CCU-1430 airborne TV camera con
trol unit designed to operate with
the 1431 camera head. The CCU is
about 7.75 by 5.25 by 3.35 inches
and weighs 3 pounds. The CCU
takes the primary power, develops
the voltage and various synchroni
zation and control signals needed
by the camera head and outputs a
standard EIA RS-170 composite
video signal. The control unit is
designed for airborne and other
extreme environmental conditions.
The control unit interconnects with
the camera head by means of the
single multiconductor cable.
• Video Time Code Generator
(VTCG)—Post-trial data reduction
required that events recorded on
video tape be accurately time-tagged
to provide correlation with data
collected by the central computer
and other means. This was achieved
by using an IET model D3025.15
VTCG manufactured by Impossible
Electronic Techniques, Inc. The IET
VTCG is a standard, off-the-shelf
unit used primarily in commercial
FEBRUARY 1982
video systems. Its output consists of
hours, minutes, seconds and tenths
of seconds digits interleaved with the
composite video signal so as to place
the numerals on the monitor screen.
The VTCG has provisions for stack
ing the time numerals either vertically
or horizontally, and adjusting their
size and placement on the monitor
screen. The unit's primary power sup
ply requires a nominal 28VDC and
also includes an internal 9VDC re
chargeable battery used to power the
internal clock when primary power
is disrupted.
The VTCG is manufactured with
a series of push buttons that are
used to manually present the VTCG
to a given time. Although this man
ual time synchronization is accept
able in most cases, it was too cumber
some to meet the TASVAL require
ments. Modifications were made in
the VTCG to enable the units to be
automatically preset and synchro
nized with CDEC's Range Timing
System, which is traceable to Nation
al Bureau of Standards standard
time station WWV. This provided
for accuracy and resolution of the
time-tagging on the video tape to 0.1
second. The VTCG also has the
capability of adding a “flag" numeral
on the display when requested by
an external signal. In the case of
the TASVAL AH-1S system, a nu
meral “1” appeared in the lower
left corner of the screen to indicate
that a simulated tube-launched,
optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW)
missile had been launched and was
in flight. By observing the presence
of this flag, data analysts were able
to determine when the TOW was
launched and watch the target being
tracked throughout the flight time
of the missile.
• Video Tape Recorder (VTR)—
The composite video signal from
the camera, with the time characters
added by the VTCG, was applied to
the input of a TEAC V-1000 AB
N Airborne Video Cassette Record
er. The TEAC VTR is especially
rugged for airborne application and
weighs about 30 pounds. It uses
convenient 3/4-inch video tape cas
settes for ease of loading and un
loading tapes. The VTR was mount
ed on the shock-mounted aluminum
pallet in the ammo compartment.
The VTR has provisions for external
remote control of record/standby
functions, will provide an end of
tape signal and has the capability
of two separate audio recording
tracks. These and many other fea
tures make it especially well suited
for airborne video instrumentation
systems.
• Power–To power the video
instrumentation system, as well as
all other CDEC instrumentation
systems onboard the AH-1S, CDEC
instrumentation engineers designed
and fabricated the instrumentation
power supply (IPS).
The IPS contained several stages
of electronic filters to reduce the
electrical noise from the vehicular
direct current power system. This
clean power was used to power the
instrumentation systems. The power
also was used to trickle-charge
dedicated, rechargeable instrumen
tation batteries whenever the vehicle
charging system was operating.
When the vehicle engine was off,
the instrumentation system continued
39
to be powered from the dedicated
instrumentation batteries. The IPS
also provided a number of safety
features, overcharge protection, and
high and low voltage warnings.
The IPS received the aircraft pow
er from the nonessential buss, through
a circuit breaker and switch located
on the pilot's breaker panel. Fil
tered power from the IPS was used
to charge two 14VDC aircraft Nicad
batteries mounted in the ammo com
partment. The batteries were con
nected through a heavy-duty con
tactor relay wired to the control
panel in the pilot's cockpit. In case
of an emergency, the pilot could
turn off power to the instrumentation
power supply from the aircraft
power buss and simultaneously
isolate the instrumentation batteries.
This was considered the best config
uration for flight safety purposes.
All instrumentation components,
6UNNER'S COCKPII
ED0.
[ WESIERN
CAMERA HEAD
GUN CAMERA PORT
AIRCRAFT
PWR
tº
40
including the video camera, VTCG
and VTR, derived their required
28VDC power from the IPS.
System Employment. The video
recorder in the AH-1S was con
trolled by the onboard micropro
cessor contained in the instrumen
tation system. The microprocessor
was in turn electrically connected
to the firing circuits of the aircraft
through a fire interface module.
Simulated TOW launch was deter
mined by sampling the voltage ap
plied to the silicon controlled recti
fiers that normally fire the squibs in
the TOW missiles. This voltage
would appear if and only if a TOW
missile were selected, a simulated
missile was in the launcher, the
aircraft was in prelaunch constraints
and the trigger was pulled. In short,
a signal would appear only if an
actual missile would have been fired
if it had been in the launcher.
|
WIDE0 INSIRUMENIATION SUBSYSTEM
*U,
ar.
WIDE0 +
SYNC WIDE0
CCU
M|CAD BAII MICAD BAII
When the TOW missile was
launched, the microprocessor would
turn on the video recorder for a
preset period of time (normally 26
seconds). It would also cause the
VTCG to place a numeral 1 “flag”
on the video screen for the duration
of the flight time of the TOW missile.
At the end of the period the recorder
would be placed in the standby mode
and wait for the next engagement.
The video data were examined
by data analysts and used to verify
the following parameters:
• Number of engagements
• Target identification and aspect
angle for each engagement
• Calculation of range and missile
flight time for each engagement
• Target posture, exposure and
breaks in line-of-sight for each en
gagement
• Time of occurrence for each
engagement
IASWAl AH-1S COBRA
—
WID IN
PWR IFI WIC6
WID OUT "FLAG”
CONTROL
WIDE0 +
TIME
TEAC W-1000 ABN
AIRBORNE
WIDEO CASSETTE RECORDER
AMM0 wnmu.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Potential Training Applications.
The video recording system used
º during TASVAL could have several
applications in unit training. During
TASVAL, Cobra crews eagerly
awaited arrival of the video tapes
for post-mission debriefing. The
system also provided a means for
the aviator to observe the view seen
by the gunner, who was “head down”
in the TSU during various ma
neuvers. Combat units having video
systems on their aircraft during
training exercises and tests probably
would find that post-mission de
briefing would be facilitated, mis
takes noted and corrected and the
effectiveness of training increased.
A video system for unit training
purposes probably would not need
the accurate time-tagging required
for TASVAL, so the cost of the
system would be reduced. Also,
since there are no power-sensitive
components in the video systems,
power could be supplied directly
from the aircraft nonessential buss
through appropriate circuit breakers.
Approximate costs for the various
video system components are:
• Edo-Western Camera $3,500
Head, Control Unit
and Interconnecting
Cable
• TEAC V-100 AB-N $5,300
Airborne Video Cas
sette Recorder
• Video Cassette Tape $20
(Ea)
Various power cables, connectors
and mounting brackets would prob
ably add another $200 to the cost.
The camera mounting bracket and
aluminum pallet used to mount the
video components in the ammo
compartment are simple assemblies
that can be fabricated in any medium
size support shop. Wiring to aircraft
power is within the capability of a
local avionics shop. Thus, total cost
for an operational video recording
system for an AH-1S aircraft should
be in the $9,000 to $10,000 range.
This could be a worthwhile invest
ment to increase the training effic
iency of a combat unit. sº->
FEBRUARY 1982
Captain Bruce Coons is a 1970 sponsible for the conceptuali
graduate of Clarkson College of zation, design, fabrication and
Technology in Potsdam, NY. A installation of the instrumentation
Signal Corps officer, he is a system in the AH-1S.
graduate of the Signal Corps
Officers Advanced Course and REFERENCES
the Joint Service Telecommuni
“TASVAL,” September 1979, U.S.
cation Systems Staff Officer Army Aviation Digest
Course at Keesler Air Force Base,
“JAAT,” October 1979, U.S. Army
MS. When the article was written
he was assigned as a communi Aviation Digest
cations-electronics engineer with “Airborne Antitank Capabilities
Instrumentation Command, U.S. Scrutinized, Part I,” November 1979,
Army Combat Developments Ex Defense Electronics
perimentation Command, Ft.
“Airborne Antitank Capabilities
Hunter Liggett, CA. During Scrutinized, Part II,” December
TASVAL Captain Coons was re 1979, Defense Electronics
The Army Aviation Center has developed a
requirements document for a similar training
device called the HITMORE (Helicopter
Installed Television Monitor Recorder). It will
consist of a TV camera, recorder, onboard
monitor, necessary mounting brackets and
electrical wiring assemblies. The HITMORE
differs from the TASVAL equipment
discussed by Captain Coons in this article in
the following ways:
• Total system weight will not exceed 50
pounds.
• Onboard equipment will not interfere
with crewmembers or aircraft mission
capabilities (other than weight).
• Live ammunition firings are recordable.
• The pilot/instructor may observe the
gunner's view through the gunner's
telescopic sight unit on the onboard
monitor at the same time as the gunner.
Costs for the total HITMORE system are
similar to those of the TASVAL equipment.
Fielding of the HITMORE if approved
through higher echelons would probably be
in fiscal year 1984.
Training Analysis and Design Division
Directorate of Training Developments
Fort Rucker, A
41

Dangling 120 feet below a helicopter in flight is not a
favorite location for most flyers, but it beats having
to walk out from a crash site—or does it!
42
SFC (P) W. Dave Goldie
Public Affairs Office
HQ, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)
Colin Hale
Public Affairs Office
U.S. Forces Panama
Iº: jungles and
large bodies of water. That's
the terrain members of the 210th
Aviation Battalion, 193d Infantry
Brigade (Panama) fly over. It's their
enemy and they have to be prepared
to conquer it—that is a fact they
live with on each mission.
To help with that preparation,
the battalion started intensive sur
vival and evasion (S&E) training
for all aviation crewmembers last
summer. Developed jointly by the
210th's staff and Ft. Sherman's Jungle
Operations Training Center (JOTC),
the two-phase course contains a
series of classes designed to sharpen
survival skills while increasing con
fidence and knowledge of the spe
cialized survival equipment carried
on the helicopters.
PHASE I
O n the first morning of instruc
tion the crewmembers learned
vertical extraction techniques, using
JOTC's newly designed jungle oper
ation extraction system (JOES) hook
up. That procedure called for stu
dents to learn how to tie a “Swiss”
rappelling seat, then rig a special
series of knots in a standard rappel
ling rope that could be lowered from
a rescue chopper to personnel
downed in the jungle. The JOES
was selected for the new course
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
because it uses equipment easily
carried on every mission—a short
piece of rope for the seat and a
snap link.
Each person was required to slip
the rigged end of the lowered rope
around his body and snap it into
the rappelling seat. Then the heli
copter lifted as many as four people
at a time out of the dense foliage
and, carrying them dangling from
the 120-foot rope, took them to a
safe landing zone (LZ), lowered
them to the ground, then landed
and picked them up.
Next the students learned about
land navigation, a necessary skill
because immediate location and
extraction after a crash is not always
possible. After receiving 2 hours of
instruction and being divided into
teams, they were transported deep
into the jungle and told to find four
locations before walking back to
the JOTC. Their only provisions
were a compass and some water.
This portion of the first day's
instruction started at 1530 hours.
All participants navigated the 4,000
meter course, finding all points and
arriving back at the JOTC before
midnight. That's an accomplishment
most Continental United States
(CONUS)-based infantry battalions
that undergo jungle training can't
claim!
The next morning the slightly
weary crewmembers received inten
FEBRUARY 1982
sified jungle living lessons. They The “downed" UH-1H sits on a
learned about both life-threatening ridgetop landingzone amid the
and life-sustaining plants, foods and jungle of Fort Sherman
animals found in the jungle. Proper
use of the aviator's survival vest
equipment and the hot climate
survival kit carried in the 210th's
aircraft was also taught.
As the last portion of Phase I,
hands-on instruction was given on After a night in the jungle, the
the second of the constant crash crew hurries to the waiting
UH-1H
threats, survival in the water.
Classes on how to use the one
man and seven-man life rafts were
combined with training on how to
build field expedient flotation de
vices. Then the students entered
the water. Wearing water wings,
they were required to swim to, enter
and exit each type of raft, then swim
back to the dock.
PHASE II
n this portion of the S&E course,
UH-1 Huey helicopter crews were
briefed on the scenario being played,
on necessary radio procedures and
frequencies and on safety require
mentS.
The students were told they were
to fly a visual reconnaissance mission
Over the exercise area. After takeoff,
they would be advised by radio of
their targeted LZ. They were to
have 10 minutes to find it and to
radio the Army Forces (ARFOR)
Pre-A Red To survive

of their location as a “downed” air

craft. After landing, the crew had
another 10 minutes to clear the
helicopter and seek concealment
in the jungle. Exercise rules pre
cluded the downed aircraft's crew
members from making contact with
the ARFOR within 500 meters of
the LZ; so the aviators knew they
had a jungle trek of at least that
length ahead of them, evading the
enemies and looking for the friend
lies. Most of them took much farther
than 500 meters!
One crew made contact with
ARFOR within 2 hours of leaving
their LZ. That was about the same
amount of time it took for Soldiers 3.
of the 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault), working as infantrymen
for the exercise, to find the crew's
helicopter and set up a perimeter
to protect it.
Contact with the ARFOR oc
curred in the late afternoon, but
that didn't mean getting out of the
jungle for the Huey aviators. Instead,
they spent the night moving through CW3 David Ciocca (above, right) con
the jungle, reaching the pickup point centrates on the next turn of the rope
as he learnstotie the "JOES" extrac
the next morning where a helicopter
awaited to return them to Ft. tion rig used in rescuing downed
Sherman. aviators. Talking him through the knots
is the system's inventor, SFC Carol
Frady (center) from the Jungle War
GETTING READY fare Branch at JOTC
The “downed" crew and the evaluation
66 he possibility of an emergen officer compare map positions (left)
cy landing is not something JOTC's jungle living expert, SFC Ray
we look forward to,” Captain Gary Aylesworth (below) dis
cusses food sources
Bryant, training officer for the 210th
Aviation Battalion, said, “However, available in the jungle
it is a reality; and we intend to be
prepared for it.”
Every member of the battalion
will complete both phases of the
survival and evasion training, with
annual sessions planned to ensure
indoctrination of newly assigned
|
personnel.
AJOTC spokesman said the two
phase module is being refined for
submission to higher headquarters
|
with the possibility that it might be
incorporated as standard training
for all flight crews, just as jungle
training is for CONUS-based infantry
units. ++-

44
 The opinions expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any
Department of Defense agency

Colonel Robert S. Fairweather Jr.

** TRADOC System Manager, Scout Helicopter
Fort Rucker, AL

AIRMING THE AEROSCOUT

HERE HAS BEEN a long not afford to carry weighty armament be used for self-protection against
term controversy about arm systems. The unsophisticated small threat helicopters. The ASH pro
ing the scout helicopter and calibre systems that they could carry gram was subsequently deferred in
the issue often becomes emotional. provided little useful firepower. favor of the more affordable Army
So that I make my personal view At any rate, no case was made Helicopter Improvement Program
known at the start, I will simply for arming the scout helicopter (AHIP), which is designed to pro
state that I see some utility in the during the Vietnam years. This lack duce a nearer term improved aero
concept of an armed aeroscout. of justification did much to influence scout. However, the concept of an
Please understand that this is a the absence of stated armament air-to-air missile was retained in the
personal belief and not the reflec requirements in the required oper AHIP requirement document as a
tion of any Army position on the ational capability document of the desired feature. To provide this
subject. In fact, there is no clear Advanced Scout Helicopter (ASH) capability, AHIP design specifi
established Army position, although when it was written in 1974. The cations require airframe hard points
the tendency during the last decade ASH program was terminated in and the inclusion of space, weight
has generally been to steer away 1976 and then reestablished in 1978. and power for an air-to-air missile
from armament. Subsequently, an ASH Special system in the basic airframe design.
The lessons learned in Vietnam Study Group was formed and it Philosophically, it is a simple step
concerning scout armament were determined that strong justification to move from the concept of arming
somewhat inconclusive and often existed for an air-to-air missile to the aeroscout with an air-to-air self
in opposition to each other, thus OH-58C, modified for a special test, accommodates the
leading to the conflicting emotional M27E1 7.62 mm minigun and M158 7 tube 2.75 inch rocket pod
views that are prevalent today. An
often cited argument against arma
ment is that young scout pilots
strayed from their scouting missions
and attempted to single-handedly
kill the enemy. On the other hand,
some argue that where leadership,
training and discipline governed unit
operations, the weapons were of
some value in providing suppressive
fires for self-protection.
Probably the most serious prob
lem was the inadequacy of the hard
ware. Under the hot day conditions
of Vietnam, the aeroscouts could

FEBRUARY 1982 45
protection system to arming it with
an air-to-ground system. The ques
tion is, can we support this step in
terms of doctrine and equipment?
From a doctrinal standpoint, it is
not too difficult to postulate logical
armed missions for aeroscouts serv
ing in attack team, air cavalry, field
artillery aerial observer (FAAO) and
special mission roles. A description
of these conceptual missions is as
follows:
AeroSCOUtº
Specific armed missions for aero
scouts on attack helicopter teams
could include the following:
[1] Protect the team from enemy
attack helicopters. This mission has
already gained support because it
is recognized that enemy helicopters
might pose a serious threat. One
concept is to arm aeroscouts with
air-to-air missiles. However, close
encounters may also require rapid
fire cannons.
[2] Protect the team from enemy
air defense systems. Although the
aeroscout could be specifically armed
to kill air defense systems, I think
the cost, developmental time and
weight penalties would be excessive.
The aeroscout always has the capa
bility to direct attack helicopter fires,
artillery and other forms of firepower
against such targets to kill them. If
he is armed to meet other mission
requirements, he will probably have
sufficient firepower to provide sup
pression in the event the team comes
within close range of an air defense
site.
[3] Protect the team from tanks,
armored fighting vehicles, antitank
rockets/missiles and small arms. In
intense, dynamic and fluid battle
situations it is not unreasonable to
expect attack teams to be suddenly
threatened by the fires of ground
maneuver force elements, in spite
of nap-of-the-earth (NOE) standoff
tactics. If some of the attack heli
copters on the team must be kept
46
in constant overwatch to meet such
threats, their firepower is then not
available for the main mission of
killing tanks. It would seem that by
arming the aeroscouts to either
suppress or destroy the ground
maneuver fire elements which Sud
denly appear and threaten the team,
the team would be more mission
effective. Survivability of the valu
able attack helicopters also would
be enhanced because they could
reposition into a better defensive
posture while being covered by
aeroscout fires, rather than having
to disadvantageously expose them
selves to protect the less costly
unarmed scouts.
[4] Augment the attack team's
firepower. It is quite possible that
the attack team may be faced with
a target rich environment where
target detection is not a problem.
Armed aeroscouts would serve two
purposes under these conditions.
First, they would enhance the team's
ability to service targets. Second,
by virtue of being armed, the aero
Scouts would become a direct threat
to the enemy, thus requiring him to
direct firepower against them. This
would relieve some of the pressure
on the attack helicopters, and con
tribute to their survivability. As a
minimum, the aeroscouts would
need a gun system capable of killing
lightly armored vehicles, but an
antitank missile might be more
desirable.
AeroScouts assigned to air cavalry
teams accomplish many of the same
tasks as those on attack teams.
However, air cavalry missions differ
somewhat from those of attack
helicopter units and are more ori
ented towards surveillance, recon
naissance, intelligence and economy
of force. Additionally, the air cavalry
aeroscouts are the primary air ve
hicles used to accomplish most air
cavalry missions and the few attack
helicopters available usually protect
the scouts. Specific air cavalry armed
aeroscout missions might include:
[1] Self-protection. This mission
would be accomplished as already
described for attack team aero
scouts. Since the air cavalry aero
Scouts would, on many occasions,
move into unknown situations, they
would have an even greater need
for self-protection capabilities.
[2] Reconnaissance by fire. Armed
reconnaissance always has been a
valid mission. Currently, aeroscouts
have to call on the fires of their
supporting attack helicopters. The
delay in coordinating and directing
attack helicopter fires results in an
increased risk to the aeroscout, and
the attack helicopters must expose
themselves when engaging the tar
gets. If the aeroscout is armed, he
can probe by fire and can suppress
while disengaging from any return
fire that he draws. The attack heli
copters can remain concealed until
the nature of the target is fully
developed. For reconnaissance by
fire, the aeroscout could be equipped
with a gun, or perhaps rockets.
[3] Economy of force. As previ
ously mentioned, the attack heli
copter firepower currently available
to the air cavalry team is austere.
By arming the aeroscouts, the team's
firepower would be significantly
enhanced and would result in a more
realistic capability for economy of
force operations. The nature of
armament would depend largely on
the threat that the team is to face,
and the availability of artillery and
close air support.
Since the FAAO would normally
be dedicated to adjusting conven
tional artillery, COPPERHEAD or
other fires using standoff techniques,
it would not have the same arma
ment requirements as the two other
type aeroscouts. Self-protection, of
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 ºf
course, would remain a valid mis
sion. Two additional missions are
worthy of consideration:
[T]Field artillery battery defense.
Although field artillery batteries are
positioned behind the forward ma
neuver elements, it is quite possible
that they could be threatened during
fast moving enemy actions. Armed
FAAO aeroscouts could provide a
means for rapidly augmenting self
defense fires of the artillery batteries
to either cover their withdrawal or
buy time for reinforcement.
[2] Nuclear convoy protection.
Armed FAAO aeroscouts would be
a valuable asset to help protect
ground and aerial nuclear weapons
convoys, especially in forward com
bat areas, or where guerrilla opera
tions are possible. The use of armed
aeroscouts would preclude the need
to pull assets from attack helicopter
units.
Special
Mission
Aeroscouts
The applications for armed aero
scouts in special mission roles are
only limited by the extent of one's
imagination. The two roles that are
most obvious include:
[1] Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)
advance elements. Since aeroscouts
are relatively small compared to
attack helicopters, thus being more
easily transported in airplanes, they
lend themselves well to being part
of RDF advance elements. They
could accomplish the necessary
scouting functions while also pro
viding highly mobile firepower to
augment the advance maneuver
elements. Also, they would be useful
FEBRUARY 1982
OH-6A, modified for a special test, is armed with the
M27E1 7.62 minigun and the M1587 tube 2.75 inch rocket pod
to assist in maintaining the security
of ports and airfields established to
handle the arrival of the RDF main
body and follow-on logistics support.
Counter terrorist operations.
The relatively easy air deployability
of armed aeroscouts would make
them especially suitable to provide
aerial firepower for short duration
raids, ambushes, rescue missions and
diversions.
The above armed aeroscout mis
sion requirements are somewhat
diverse and would call for a wide
range of armament options. These
options might include air-to-air Sting
ers, TOW (tube-launched, optically
tracked, wire-guided) missiles, 2.75
inch rockets, light machineguns (7.62
mm) and 20 to 30 mm rapid fire
cannons. Since most of these arma
ment systems are in the inventory,
or could be made available, the main
requirements would be to develop
a universal mount to attach the
systems to the airframe hardpoints,
and to develop a universal sighting
system. Universal mounts and sights
would allow the operators to tailor
their aeroscout armament systems
to meet mission requirements. Some
times, no armament may be needed,
or density altitude conditions might
preclude the use of armament.
Whether loaded with armament
or not, the aeroscout would certainly
benefit from the acquisition capa
bilities of the sight. In time, product
improvements could be developed
to improve night operational capa
bilities, to incorporate laser range
finders, and to adapt radar locating
interferometers for aeroscout use.
When the mast mounted sight be
comes a reality, the armament sys
tems should be integrated with it.
The foregoing should give you
some feel for the potential missions
that can be assigned to armed aero
scouts, and how they might be
armed. I have summarized the ad
vantages below:
• Armed scouts would increase
the total killing power of Army
Aviation on the battlefield and would
provide for more tactical flexibility.
• Attack and air cavalry team
protection, and FAAO self-protec
tion would be better assured.
• The pressure of enemy weapons
concentrated against attack helicop
ters would be reduced.
• Dual capability aeroscouts would
be more easily air transportable and
in greater numbers than attack
helicopters, thus providing for a
more rapid aerial firepower response
in contingencies.
• Universal mounts and sights,
along with a mix of armament op
tions, would allow commanders to
tailor in response to the threat.
As always, nothing comes free,
and there are some disadvantages.
The following come to mind:
• An armed aeroscout would
require a qualified gunner/observer.
This would have to be a capable
individual who is well trained.
• The addition of armament would
increase logistical support require
ments in the units to which the
helicopters are assigned.
• The armament systems and
their ammunition would create air
craft space, weight and power pen
alties.
• Units with armed aeroscouts
would have to be well led, trained
and disciplined to avoid improper
use of the scout assets.
• If the armed aeroscout require
ment is not properly articulated, it
could be viewed as a threat to attack
helicopter developmental programs.
You may have noted that the
advantages that I have listed are
equaled in number by the disadvan
tages. This does not necessarily
imply that the disadvantages negate
the advantages. All of the disadvan
tages can be overcome within rea
sonable bounds of cost or effort. A
review of existing technology shows
that it is feasible to arm scout
helicopters, and valid missions and
roles can be identified. All things
considered, it may be a good idea
for the Army to fully explore the
potential for arming aeroscouts.
47
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
AR 95-10! What Is It?
Mr. Carl Gray
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA
E; 15 August 1981 a new Army
regulation came into being. This is AR 95-10,
the regulation pertaining to NOTICES TO
AIRMEN (NOTAMs). Have you seen it? More im
portantly, have you read it? Let's take a brief look at
some of its main features. Its purpose is to prescribe
policy, procedures and responsibilities for U.S. Army
Aviation activities using the U.S. Air Force and FAA
NOTAM systems; and it applies to all active Army,
Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve aviation
activities having aviation assets and navigational aids.
There are two NOTAM systems (FAA and DOD)
which exist to provide you, the user, with the latest
information affecting aeronautical information pro
ducts, NAVAIDs, landing areas and facilities.
The Air Force NOTAM system is managed by the
CNF at Carswell AFB, TX, and provides NOTAM
protection only for that data published in DOD FLIP.
However, you should be aware that not every airfield
listed in the FLIP IFR Supplement is covered by AF
NOTAMs (e.g. Corona Muni). The symbol in front of
the airfield tells the extent of the Air Force NOTAM
coverage. AFCNF uses the AFTN, COMEDS and
AUTODIN circuits to issue and receive NOTAM
data. By the way, are your circuits getting overloaded
with the free use of abbreviations and acronyms used
in this article? If so, take a look at chapter 1 of AR 95
10 and it will explain and define what these mean.
The FAA distributes two types of NOTAMs—
NOTAM D and NOTAM L. NOTAM D is limited to
time-critical information that would affect a pilot's
decision to make or continue a flight. NOTAM L is
mostly advisory or nice-to-know information that can
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
48
be given to pilots on request. NOTAM Ls are given
local distribution (normally within 200 miles).
Each AAF/AHP within FAA's jurisdiction will be
assigned a tie-in FSS and must issue its NOTAMs
through that FSS. To ensure complete dissemination,
all qualifying NOTAMs must also be sent to the AFCNF.
All NOTAMs that qualify as a NOTAM D should
automatically be carried by the Air Force system.
The HOW and WHEN you send NOTAMs will be
found in chapter 4 of AR 95-10.
Some individual responsibilities are:
Commanders of Army Airfields and Heliports:
• Establish procedures to issue/receive NOTAM
data.
• Ensure that pilots and operations personnel know
how to use the system in their area.
• Ensure that each NOTAM is prepared and issued
as explained in paragraph 4-4 of the regulation.
Pilots:
• Review all pertinent NOTAMS before each flight.
• Report to operations any error in aeronautical
publications or any hazards to flight.
• Understand the NOTAM system.
ATC/Facility Chiefs:
• Have written agreement with the airfield com
mander concerning the issuance of NOTAMs.
• Ensure that base operations personnel take proper
NOTAM action on reported NAVAID facilities.
• Establish timely followup action on the status of
existing ATC NOTAMs.
• Keep operations personnel informed of any haz
ardous conditions.
If there is anything in the AR you don't understand,
or if there is something which you feel should be a
NOTAM but the regulation doesn't cover it, the Army
maintains a liaison NCO at the AFCNF for just such
situations. He is SFC Jim Doverspike and he can be
reached at AV 739-7841/7842. Do not hesitate to call.
*: U S Govt RNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1982 546-037 11
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
CATALOGS
|N EARLY 1981, there were thou
sands of separate products either in the
field or in various stages of development which
were intended to support the Armywide training
effort. In addition, there was no single source of
information on what these products were, how to
get them or how to use them.
The U.S. Army Training Support Center (ATSC),
Ft. Eustis, VA, set out to do something about it.
The Center launched a program to identify the
entire range of training support materials in the
field and eliminate those items which were obso
lete, impractical or duplicates of other products,
while establishing a single, automated catalog
system to provide trainers and training managers
with a ready reference source of training materials
available to support both individual (MOS) and
collective (ARTEP) training.
The ATSC project was recently completed with
the publication of a series of Extension Training
Materials (ETM) catalogs which are now being
automatically distributed to every unit in the Army.
The series of 77 catalogs, published as Department
of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pams) in the 350
series, is keyed to the existing ARTEP program,
which means that Army field units will receive
only the one catalog which directly supports its
own ARTEP. An additional catalog, scheduled
for publication, will be based on the enlisted
MOS structure and is intended to support Table
of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units (which
are not included in the ARTEP program) and
individual training requirements.
What it all means to the unit commander or
training manager is that a practical reference
tool is now available at the unit level which
provides easy-to-use information on what training
support products are available, what specific skills
or tasks each product supports, and simple
instructions on how to order items not already on
hand in the unit.
Typically, each ETM Catalog devotes separate
chapters to products in support of common tasks,
general subjects, MOS training and collective
(ARTEP) training. Additional chapters cross-ref
erence product availability to specific Training
and Audiovisual Support
Centers (TASC) worldwide, and pro
vide detailed ordering information for all
products to include those not carried in the TASC
system.
The results of the reduction effort are incorpor
ated in the ETM Catalogs, giving commanders
and training managers a reference source which
is accurate in addition to being useful.
ATSC officials emphasize that the training
product reduction and catalog projects are not
simply one-time efforts. Both functions are re
maining under ATSC management, and have
already been incorporated into an automated
system designed to maintain control over the
development of training support materials while
providing the means for periodic revision of the
catalog series.
With the ETM catalogs now in the field, the old
familiar service school catalogs, and separate
catalogs for such items as Training Extension
Courses, have become a thing of the past. The
entire range of exportable training products is
included in the new ETM Catalogs, making
continued publication of separate catalogs for
separate products unnecessary. The lone excep
tion is the course catalog for the Army Corres
pondence Course Program administered by the
Army Institute for Professional Development.
which is also an element of ATSC.
Because of the individual nature of the corres
pondence course program, course catalogs will
continue to be published separately.
Point of contact for ETM catalogs is Major
Ronald W. Krisak, Army Extension Training. U.S.
Army Training Support Center. Ft. Eustis, VA
23604, AUTOMON 927-355.2/2240, -
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:nºt Take Wo Chao.625.
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 MARCH 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER3

Yºr Yº Yºr
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Richard D. Kenyon
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 Give Us Our Guns & Optics, 1LT Ronald M.

Buffkin
6 AHIP—Your New Aeroscout, How You Got It And
What You Got, LTC R. A. Neuwien Jr.
11 AHIP— Aeroscout Of The Next War, MAJ Laurie
Pope
14 When Does An IP Take The Controls?
The Problem With IPS
17 Reporting Final
20 PEARL'S
23 1981 Aviation Digest Coverage
- 27 Threat: The Unit Threat Officer, CW3 Robert
E. Browning
28 What It's All About, CPT Ronald B. Brown
- 30 We Can't Wait For Improvement, CW3 Clifford
S. Berg Jr.
32 DES Report To The Field: Crewmember
Standardization
34 ALSE Or ELSE, LTC Clarence Suggs ||
35 GUARD SLOTS
page 6 & 11 36 Hangar Talk: DOD FLIP General Planning, CW2
Gary R. Weiland
37 Views From Readers
38 Keeping The Apache Flying And Fighting, MAJ coº:
Troy J. Roop
o
sigº
42 An Endangered Advantage, MAJ Everette L. c

Roper Jr. §
48 ATC Action Line: FLIP Supplement: 'P' Fields,
Mr. Dennis Newport
i•
e

Cover: This is an artist's conception of the AHIP

aeroscout that is currently being developed for
the Army by Bell Helicopter Textron. The articles
on pages 2, 6 and 11 describe the need, employ Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.
ment and characteristics. Illustration by Paul Fretts Secretary of the Army
Richard K. Tierney
Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention training maintenance operations research and development
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General U S Army Aviation Center
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the US Army Aviation Center Photos are U S Army unless otherwise
specified Use of the masculinc pronoun is in ended to include both genders
unless otherwise stated Material may be reprinted provided credit is qiven to the
Digest and to the author unless otherwise indicated
Articles photos and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited Direct
communication is authorized to Editor U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P O Drawer
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981, in accordance with Army Regulation
31 O-1
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1 Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR AG
Publications Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore MD 21220 For any
change in distribution requirements initiate a revised DA Form 12-5
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
tner state adjutant general
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire perso, a copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents US
Governºnent Printing O". ::: *ashington DC 20402 Ann … . . . , ptºn rates
 L. US HEAR from you" is a request I
*frequently make of you in the Digest. And I am
pleased with the responses and your many
suggestions on ways in which we can enhance
Army Aviation's contributions to the combined
arms team.
In no other single area, however, has there
been as much input as on the question of an
improved scout helicopter. Your voices—our
voices—have now been heard, and the AHIP
development is today a reality. As a testimony to
that and to bring you “up to speed" on this vital
aviation issue, this month'sDigest features articles
delineating the scout need, its fulfillment and
purpose.
First Lieutenant Ronald M. Buffkin is the author
of “Give Us Our Guns and Optics." In it, he very
tellingly relates his reasons for believing that the
OH-58 Kiowa needs a target acquisition system
and adequate armament. Further, he explains
why he, as an aeroscout pilot, has a critical
requirement to have the proper equipment to
perform his job.
Similar pleas were heard and recognized as
far back as 1972, declares Lieutenant Colonel
R.A. Neuwien in “AHIP, Your New Aeroscout."
He describes the involved course of action which
started in 1978 and eventually led to the Army's
entering “into full-scale engineering development
to provide you, the user, with . . . the Army
Helicopter Improvement Program aeroscout." LTC
Neuwien also gives detailed descriptions of the
aircraft's capabilities.
Once we have the AHIP on station, how is it to
be used? Major Laurie Pope answers that question
in “AHIP–Aeroscout of the Next War." According
to Major Pope, the improved aeroscout “will fight
in three organizations: attack helicopter Compa
* nies, air cavalry troops and division aviation
companies," and he discusses each of those
employments.
Maintenance concepts are another important
aspect that must be considered when a new aircraft
is procured. “Keeping the Apache Flying and
Fighting" by Major Troy J. Roop relates those
concepts for the AH-64, which is now in its testing
stage.
When the final decision is made that a new
item of equipment is necessary to enhance mission
accomplishment, it is not simply a matter of going
to an industry source and making a selection.
Materiel development and acquisition procedures
take time. Meanwhile, what do we do? Major
Everette L. Roper Jr. addresses that point with
respect to air-to-air combat in “Helicopters—An
-
MARCH 1982
Endangered Advantage." He very appropriately
addresses improvements that can be made now
in training, tactics and equipment to help ready
Army Aviation for such combat—even before we
get the more modern and more capable tools for
the task.
As Major Roper notes, every iota of benefit
must be obtained from our aviation training. We
believe visits by the Aviation Center Training
Analysis and Assistance Team (ACTAAT) are a
boon to that achievement. Thus we are now
introducing a new feature for the magazine,
“ACTAAT Connection." While our Aviation Center
ACTAAT team is relatively new, there are few
units worldwide that have not been touched by
its presence. And significantly, the team's objective
is not to inspect, but to assist—and much assis
tance has been given.
In this new feature, issues acquired by the
team from aviation field units will be commented
on as a timely means of sharing this information
with the Army Aviation community. We hope that
all will benefit from this; for in reality, we don't
find any really new problems in our business—they
just appear in different places. The "ACTAAT
Connection” will let you hear how other units
have already overcome the challenges you are
now facing.
Another bonus for you this month is a subject
area index of the Digest’s articles for 1981. This
is in response to the many requests we've had
for such a listing, and it has been placed at the
centerfold so it can be easily pulled out to Save.
Let us know if this meets your needs.
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 LT Buffkin's article below is an
excellent statement of the need
for a betterscout helicopter, from ºf
the user's standpoint. Read it,
then read the two following ar
ticles on the Army's AHIP aero
scout. Afterwards, judge for your
self as to whether or not we are
headed in the right direction to
make a scout that can see, kill
and Survive.

Colonel Robert S. Fairweather Jr.

TRADOC System Manager
Scout Helicopter
Fort Rucker, AL

GIVE
US
OUR GUNS
& OPTICS
An aeroscout's urgent
plea for increasing
our combat effectiveness

First Lieutenant Ronald M. Buffkin

Aeroscout Section Leader *
B Company, 501st ABC
APO New York O9326

photographs by the author

As A YOUNG OFFICER con

cerned with winning the first battle
of the next war, I've always been
told, “Train the way you are going
to fight!" Like most aviators, I think
I had the best flight instruction in
the world. This training prepared
me to do my job better than any
opposing Soldier could do his or
hers. All this added up to me as an
Army aviator fitting nicely into the
combined arms scheme.

SGT D. Edwards uses the XM-21 stabilized Monoculars

in the OH-58A to help adjust fires from indirect weapons
-
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Way back in flight school at Ft.
Rucker, AL, I received my baptism
3 of fire on the Army Aviation Center's
academic battlefields of published
doctrine and textbook tactics. My
intructor pilot, a veteran of a war
10 years past, spent many hours
imparting his skill and knowledge
to me. I studied long and hard to
master the tasks of the demanding
Aeroscout Course in the Combat
Skills phase of initial entry rotary
wing training. When they pinned
on my wings, I couldn't wait to get
to my unit and really begin learning
to be an effective scout.
Well, I've been in Army Aviation
long enough now to see that there
are two things in the Army's scout
vehicle that urgently need to be
addressed. I know there are more
than a few opposed camps con
cerning the OH-58 Kiowa; but if we
are going to take ourselves seriously
then these two problems need to be
corrected before the next war.
First, there is no effective target
acquisition system on the OH-58.
Second, there is absolutely no ade
quate armament on the OH-58.
Before anybody dismisses me as
just another scout who's sore be
cause I don't fly “snakes” or Black
Hawks, let's look at what I do in
combat. My job falls into basically
one of two different categories of
aeroscout missions. One is when
I'm working as an air cavalry aero
scout in an air cav troop. In the cav
role, my mission is to see the battle
field for the commander. I do this
by a variety of tasks such as con
ducting reconnaissance, participat
ing in security operations, rendering
reports, locating pickup zones and
landing zones and adjusting indi
rect fires and tactical air support.
The other category is the attack
aeroscout in an attack helicopter
company. As an attack scout, my
primary mission is to acquire targets
while coordinating the movements
of attack helicopters. In an attack
company, not only do I acquire the
targets for Big Brother, but I also
assist in the search, identify targets,
MARCH 1982
adjust and coordinate fires and even
provide security for the AH-1 Cobras
when they fire.
In both the air cav and attack
mode then, I have to be able to
“see.” Whether I'm trying to provide
early warning for a larger force on
a screen or selecting key targets
during an enemy armor penetra
tion, I need to visually make contact
with the bad guys. This is where we
are seriously lacking now. We do
not have an adequate system to
enable aeroscouts to see.
To quote Field Manual (FM) 17
50, “Attack Helicopter Operations”:
“Priorities are: Detection and identi
fication of the enemy at maximum
possible distances from the friendly
main body to prevent engagement
of the main body under adverse
conditions—unwarned, poorly de
ployed, not poised to fight.” That's
a tall order for the aeroscout to
accomplish considering what we
now have to do it with. The scouts
in my section have basically four
methods of “seeing” the enemy.
The first method is most common
although severely limited. It's the
standard “two per aviator" eyeball.
The aeroscout's eyeball has a great
field of vision, needs no batteries
and usually there are two sets in the
cockpit. It can be taught to look for
visual clues and indicators on the
battlefield, thereby increasing the
chance for seeing the enemy first.
A CW3 in my scout section once
spotted an armored personnel car
rier (APC) hiding under a haystack
at 1,200 meters in very poor visibility.
He used nothing more than the
naked eye backed up by years of
experience. He gave me a six-digit
grid for the vehicle; and since the
front windshield of my OH-58 was
submerged under a thin sheet of
rainfall, I did a pedal turn to look
out my side door. That opening
provided a much better view of the
battlefield since I'd taken the door
off that morning and there was no
Plexiglas to collect water. I still
couldn't spot the APC–which brings
up my point about the eyeball. If
my best scout could acquire targets
only out to around 1,200 meters
using the naked eye, then the eyeballs
are severely limited by their range.
If FM 17-50 asks for the scouts to
see the enemy at the maximum
distance possible, then the naked
eye falls critically short of the task.
At the great distances and ideal
ranges we will enjoy for the engage
ment of targets over here in Europe,
we cannot afford to be limited by
the short range of the eyeball. In all
the major training exercises where
we've had “aggressor" armor play,
the use of the eyeballs invites contact
at dangerously close ranges.
The next method we use for target
acquisition is the standard military
issue binoculars. While they are
great for use by ground forces in a
fixed location, an OH-58 just in
herently vibrates too much for them
to be practical in nap-of-the-earth
flight. Occasionally I've had to land
and dismount my observer and send
him to a position to safely watch. In
that situation, the standard binoc
ulars come in quite handy. In fact,
an aerial observer in the ground
mode with a pair of binoculars is a
very sound and effective technique.
However, hand-held binoculars are
just not suitable for use from the
cockpit of a moving helicopter. The
field of view is also limited in the
binoculars; in most, it's about 40
degrees which does not lend itself
to aeroscout work.
As a third method, we currently
have the XM-21 Stabilized Monoc
ulars. They are battery powered,
with 10x magnification and about a
7.5 degree field of view. These are
our best and most preferred pieces
of target acquisition gear. They are
light and handy and even have a
battery strength indicator to show
if you have enough power to operate
the gyros inside. My complaint about
the XM-21 is that you have to
constantly press a rubber button to
activate the stabilizing mechanism
and even then the stabilized view
you get has to be held relatively
still. Just like with the standard binos,
it's difficult to scan an area; and the
pilot gets no visual input as to what
the observer sees.
Fourth is a technique we've found
to be very effective although it's
akin to putting the cart before the
mule. In a situation where the scout
sees a possible target or something
out there that he can't confirm, he'll
have his Cobra unmask and use the
telescopic sighting unit (TSU) to
zoom in on the target. Although
this method can't be used in every
situation, it clearly demonstrates the
lack of the OH-58 to do its job—to
see for the Cobra. Let's face it, when
a Cobra has to acquire its own targets
and look because the scout can't,
something is wrong in the system.
The TSU, as used in the AH-1,
would probably be too heavy to
mount in the cockpit of an OH-58.
It weighs about 176 pounds as a
single unit but a reconfiguration to
conform to the weight and balance
loading of an OH-58 would have
great tactical implications for the
scout. We would be able to see
farther, with better accuracy and a
greater degree of security. Perhaps
a similar, lighter system is the answer.
A fifth technique I didn't mention
will probably be used often in com
bat. It is the old joke about marking
the target with the “burning '58.”
Unless an adequate optical system
is provided for the aeroscout to meet
the demands of the modern battle
field, we'll be making contact on
the enemies' terms. The valid mis
sion we should perform would be
negated by our inability to see.
The next area that prevents the
aeroscout from being more effective
is the total absence of armament.
The OH-58 is essentially a combat
vehicle expected to function in the
Sattle arena with no weapons. We
know that the modern battlefield is a
highly lethal place where unarmed
argets won't last long. The OH-58 in
ts present configuration cannot pro
ide active self-protection nor can
t perform an active security role
or a vulnerable Cobra while the
lobra is firing.
Even if a Cobra is in a position to
overwatch the scout, there will be
times when having an armed scout
will make the difference between
the aeroscout continuing his mission
or being shot down. With just about
every threat weapon system from a
foot Soldier with an AKM to a T-72
battle tank as a likely air defense
weapon, the scout with onboard
weapons can best ensure his own
survival.
Too many times in training I've
looked down through my chin bub
ble to see an infantryman pointing
an M-16 at me. In that situation, we
need firepower right then and there
to break contact and continue our
mission. The time it takes to ma
neuver away or go pick up a Cobra
could be fatal. With my own fire
power, I can best deal with what
affects me and influence the situa
tion much more effectively than as
an unarmed scout.
In situations where I'm providing
security for a Cobra launching its
missiles, an armed scout is a must.
Because the attack helicopter crew
is so involved with the firing of its
tube-launched, optically-tracked,
wire-guided (TOW) missile, their
attention is divided among several
tasks, including their own security.
My particular job in the unarmed
role is to unmask when the Cobra
does and alert him of any fire he
may not see directed at him. Even
with advance warning from its APR
39 RWR against radar directed
threat weapons and an active infra
red (IR) countermeasure in the
ALQ-44 IR Jammer (on the AH-1S
Fully Modernized Cobra), the Cobra
is still in a dangerous position.
Let's suppose that during a multi
ple helicopter engagement by my
unit, I spot the signature from a
Swatter antitank guided missile that's
fired at one of my Cobras. Now I
can do two things: I can say nothing
to the Cobra and hope the TOW
hits its target before the Swatter
hits the Cobra, or I can alert the
Cobra crew about the Swatter and
if they respond quickly enough they
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
can avoid the Swatter as well as RIGHT: The author standing beside
abort their servicing of an enemy his OH-58 during a training exercise
in West Germany (FRG). 1 LTBuffkin
target with the TOW. What I would is an aeroscout section leader in B
prefer to have happen is to be able Co. (Attack), 501st Avn Bn (CBT) in
to lay out suppressive fire on the Ansbach, FRG
Swatter operator by using my own
weapons, thereby denying him visual BELOW: Sometimes it is necessary
acquisition and guidance. With some to dismount the observer. Here, SGT
D. Edwards, an aerial observer in
type of weapon, I could keep similar the scout platoon of B Co., 501st
threats off the Cobra long enough Avn Bn (CBT), leaves his OH-58A
for him to effectively fire his TOWs. and uses his XM-21 Stabilized Monoc
This would provide a greater degree ulars to get a better look at the
enemy
of security for the Cobra than is now
offered in the scout's unarmed role.
BOTTOM: SGT Edwards uses the
Referring to FM 17-50 again: “If
it is desirable to maintain contact XM-21 from the cockpit of the
OH-58
with the enemy, this should be done
with scout aircraft so that tank killing
aircraft are not exposed to enemy
fire any longer than is absolutely
necessary.” What this is saying
basically is that aeroscouts are
expected to remain in the battle
area longer than anybody else. That
tells me that I'm going to be exposed
to enemy fire longer than any other
helicopter, but I'm supposed to do
that unarmed and possibly without
any attack helicopter support. I like
to take myself seriously, and I'm
saying that to print that advice for
the use of unarmed scouts is not
being realistic.
In conclusion, there is an urgent
need to fill this void in my capability
as a scout. I have a valid requirement
to be able to see and provide my
own fire that is not met by present
gear that I'll have to fight with. I
believe that my job as an aeroscout
is one of the most important in Army
Aviation today. Isincerely hope that
the impetus to bring about the
changes needed now will not have
to wait on lives being needlessly
lost.

MARCH 1982
HOW YOU GOTITAND WHAT YOU GOT
Lieutenant Colonel
R.A. Neuwien Jr.
Assistant TSM Scout Helicopters
Fort Rucker, AL
T. ARMY JUST entered into
full scale engineering development
to provide you, the user, an excellent
new system—the Army Helicopter
Improvement Program (AHIP)
aerCSCOut.
I can assure you that the Army
has gone to great lengths to ensure
the new system will meet our aero
scout needs. While there were a lot
of people involved in the selection
process for the AHIP, I'll put my
name down high on the user's repre
sentative list for future blame if this
new system does not meet our aero
scout helicopter needs.
Your probable questions at this
point are: What procedures are used
to acquire a new system, and what
will be the capability of the AHIP
aeroscout? I'll address both of these
questions in order.
Materiel acquisition is the process
that develops and fields systems to
meet a stated user's requirement.
User materiel requirements are
developed after it has been deter
mined a void in our capability to
fight and win cannot be filled by
changes in doctrine, organization,
training or personnel. In the case
of the AHIP, the need for a new
aeroscout had been articulated since
1972. For various reasons, too num
erous and complex to deal with in
this article, the aeroscout need was
not filled during the 1970s. However,
progress towards this goal started
when the 1978 Advanced Scout
Helicopter (ASH) Study Group
culminated with an Army Systems
Acquisition Review Council (ASARC)
in November 1979. At this review,
it was determined that, although
the need was great, a new develop
ment ASH was too costly and the
best course of action would be to
incorporate the ASH mission equip
ment into an existing Army helicopter.
With this guidance, the user com
munity, led by the TRADOCSystem
Manager (TSM) for Scout Helicop
ters, wrote the AHIP Required Oper
ational Capability (ROC). (As you
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 TSM-Scout Helicopters and PM
2- - - - - - -A Advanced Scout Helicopter ensured
II il that the RFP reflected the AHIP
PROCUREMENT
==== STAFF li ROC.
Il II
th AS H 1- = *- - - - - - -w The SSEB is part of the procedure
II PROJECT -- used to evaluate the contractors'
II MANAGER II H r- - - - - - -

W- - - - - - -/
T —l-
ſpºrtion i DIRECTOR
TECHNICAL
AREA
FIGURE 1: SSEB ORGANIZATION
(2)
Giº) [ºf] [H]
• ATTACK HELICOPTER MISSION
• AIR CAVALRY MISSION
• FIELD ARTILLERY AERIAL OBSERVER
MISSION
• MAINTAINABILITY
• TRANSPORTABILITY
FIGURE 2: SSEB OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY
know, the ROC is the formal doc
ument that states the specific user
requirement.) The AHIP ROC was
used by the developer, DARCOM's
AVRADCOM Program Manager
(PM)—ASH, to write the AHIP Re
quest for Proposal (RFP). The RFP
translates the user's stated require
ments into a document against which
contractors develop their written
proposals. These proposals are eval
written proposals. (In the AHIP case,
= 1. LEGAL "
the RFP was a 3/2-inch thick docu
ment and the proposals, one each
for Bell Helicopter Textron (BHT)
and Hughes Helicopters Interna
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATION tional (HHI), averaged more than
AND SUPPORT 80 pounds per copy.) The SSEB
conducted a word by word evalua
tion of the proposals and reported
STAFF ASSISTANT
MANAGEMENT
its findings to a Senior Advisory
Council (SAC). The Council briefed
the Source Selection Authority
(SSA), who made the award decision.
DIRECTOR DIRECTOR The AHIPSSEB convened on 1
OPERATIONAL C0ST L061STICS April 1981 and lasted for about 5
SUITABILITY AREA AREA AREA
months. During this time, an in
depth evaluation was conducted of
both the BHT and HHI AHIP propo
sals. Figure 1 depicts the structure
Of the AHIPSSEB.
As you can see, the Board has a
chairman, deputy chairman and
0PERATIONAL four areas of evaluation. Of the four
SUITABILITY
AREA areas, Operational, Technical and
Logistical are “scored" areas with
the Cost area being a straight evalua
tion and comparison of the cost for
each proposed system.
My position was director of the
Operational Suitability (Op Suit)
Area. Figure 2 is the detailed struc
SAFETY ture of this area.
MAN/MACHINE INTERFACE
The Op Suit Area was staffed by
TRAINING
handpicked user representatives.
PERSONNEL
The proponent centers for the AHIP
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Aeroscout, U.S. Army Armor Cen
ter, Ft. Knox (Attack and Air Cav
alry); U.S. Army Field Artillery
Center, Ft. Sill Field Artillery Aerial
uated by a Source Selection Evalu Observer (FAAO); and U.S. Army
ation Board (SSEB) and they are Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker (Avia
contractually binding upon the win tion Systems), were well represented
ning contractor. in the Op Suit Area. The range of
The two key factors that ensure talent included majors with attack
development of a system that will and cavalry backgrounds, to include
meet the user's requirements are the authorship of the appropriate FMs;
accurate translation of the ROC into a former commander of the Aero
the RFP and the SSEB procedures. scout Branch, Department of Flight
In the AHIP case, the close coordi Training, Directorate of Training and
nation and cooperation between the Doctrine, U.S. Army Aviation Center;

MARCH 1982
 improved thrust tail tutor
(3) • TARGET ACQUISITION SYSTEM
high agility main tutor - MASTMOUNTED SIGHT (TV, FLIR, LASEP
ºr
N RANGEFINDER AND DESIGNATOR)
- AUTOMATIC TARGET HAND OFF
N
• ARMAMENT
\ - *-
- SPACE, WEIGHT, POWER FOR ATAS
SURVIVABILITY
- RADAR WARNING RECEIVER
- IR SUPPRESSION AND PAINT
• COMMO
- IFM, IFM/VHF, UHF, AND
PROVISIONS FOR HF/SSB
• NAVIGATION
- DOPPLER AND LR-80
- VISUAL NAVIGATION DISPLAY

FIGURE 4: MISSION EOUIPMENT

scºut mission communicatiºn

and navigation systems (5) • WROC (FPM)
- 2000/700 650
- 4000/959 500
• ENDURANCE (HRS) 24
mission-tailored cockpit • FORWARD FLIGHT (KTS) 112

FIGURE 3: AHIP FIGURE 5: FLIGHT PERFORMANCE

CHARACTERISTICS

training developers; combat devel basis for their presentation to the the capability of each proposed
opers; maintenance instructors; U.S. SAC and for preparation of a final AHIP to complete the attack, air
Army Forces Command air cavalry written report. cavalry and Field Artillery Aerial
unit personnel; captains and chief Time and space do not allow for Observer missions. Here again, mock
warrant officers with maintenance an in-depth discussion of the eval missions were conducted performing
and training backgrounds; scout and uation that the Op Suit Area con each of the aeroscout major func
attack SIPs; and personnel with ducted. However, a good example tions.
current unit experience. The AHIP is the man/machine interface factor The competition between the two
SSEB used a four-step process to of the configuration analysis ele contractors (BHT and HHI) was
accomplish the evaluation. The first ment. The RFP required each con well fought. Both did an excellent
step was to ensure all the stated tractor to include in his proposal a job of presenting their proposals to
requirements were met and that the cockpit mockup. This mockup was the SSEB. It was determined both
proposals were clear and complete. used extensively to evaluate the the BHT and HHI proposed AHIPs
During this step of the evaluation, man/machine interface acceptability could accomplish the assigned
the Board communicated with the of each proposed AHIP. Some of missions. In the final analysis, the
contractors through written questions, the things that were done included overall operational capabilities of
which were then answered by the conducting “dry run" missions using the BHT AHIP were judged to be
contractors. The next step was fact various size crewmembers, wearing significantly superior. On 21 Sep
finding sessions with the contractors different degrees of flight gear to tember 1981, the U.S. Army signed
and Board members sitting across include night vision goggles, CBR a contract with BHT for production
the table to ask questions and equipment, “chicken” plate and of five AHIPs for full scale engineer
provide answers. After fact finding, arctic gloves. Based upon this part ing development.
the contractors updated their pro of the evaluation, both contractors Now the second question—What
posals which were re-evaluated by made changes to their cockpit layout; are the capabilities of the selected
the Board. The third step was nego and we were able to determine which AHIP aeroscout?
tiation, again across the table, to cockpit configuration best met our Figure 3 is a drawing of the AHIP.
deal with the updated proposals. requirements. In the Mission Per This drawing shows the major areas
After negotiation (the fourth step), formance Element, we used five of improvement over the OH-58
the contractors submitted their best areas of performance (avionics, Kiowa.
and final proposals, which the Board visionics, flight and handling, sur Figure 4 contains a list of the
again evaluated and used as the vivability and armament) to evaluate AHIP mission equipment. The

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


multifunction displa
mast mºunted sight
cºntrºl "Q
º|
FIGURE 6: COCKPIT CONFIGURATION
acquisition, detection and desig
nation range for the TV, FLIR and
laser designator are classified, but
they provide adequate standoff
ranges and are compatible with AH
1S Cobra and AH-64 Apache heli
copters. The automatic target hand
off system provides a voice data
burst message that contains all the
information needed to complete a
target handoff.
Provisions for air-to-air armament
are included in the AHIP. The
required space, weight and power
for an air-to-air Stinger (ATAS)
missile system involve the incorpora
tion of several hardpoints on both
sides of the helicopter, the missile
launcher, the fire control and sighting
system and two missiles. Communica
tions are greatly enhanced by the
addition of NOEspecification radios.
The visual navigation system is com
posed of a navigational doppler, an
LR 80 heading reference system and
a laser rangefinder. The updating of
the navigational doppler is processed
in the onboard dual mission com
puters and is presented on the multi
function displays (MFD). The data
presented provides checkpoints,
MARCH 1982
T radar warning
T T
-
multifunctiºn display
E.
-
stand-by | - ---
flight instruments º - o º
data entry
keybºard -- I - º vertical scale instruments
stability
and contral
augmentatiºn
system
current location and heading and changing. While not shown, other
distance to the next checkpoint. human factor improvements in the
Figure 5 contains the AHIP's flight cockpit are: fore and aft adjust
performance characteristics. Most ments of the cyclic, capability to
of the numbers in this figure are self adjust pedals farther forward than
explanatory. All are at mission gross OH-58 A/C, adjustment of the right
weight of 4,016 pounds. This weight side armor seat plate for elbow
includes the space, weight and power room, and outward bowing of the
for two air-to-air missiles and the greenhouse for more headroom.
associated fire control systems. Figure 7 depicts the mast mounted
Figure 6 is that of the AHIP cock sight (MMS) with its components.
pit control/display system. The The round shape of the MMS (2.
“guts" of this system are the two 1.5” in diameter and weighing 125+
MFDs. There are four primary pounds) is the best design for low
MFD modes. These are: TV or radar cross section. The eyes (win
FLIR imagery, visual navigation dows) are 32 inches above the top
display, flight parameters and of the rotor hub.
communication information. In FIGURE 7: MAST MOUNTED SIGHT
addition, emergency procedures,
preformat messages and mainte
nance data can be called up on the 7 - º:
laser
finder
MFD. Both the pilot and copilot/ daysight-- /: y esignator
g
observer MFD have the same capa
bilities. Other items of interest, as
horesight Nº.
shown, are: remote frequency dis mechanism gyros
play, vertical scale instruments, and N
stability and control augmentation FLIR
(3 axis Stabilization Control Aug mightsight
stabilized platform assembly
mentation System). Also note on
the collective head the four keys
that allow hands-on radio channel
9
 mast mounted sight.
\ 110 hp tail rotor gearbox

FIGURE 8: DYNAMIC SYSTEM

* *
~

-
º
3. ** º,
º, larger
vºtal r0tor
º blades

transmission

Figure 8 presents the dynamic 10,000 HOUR LIFE

system of the AHIP. In part the No DALLY MAINTENANCE
outstanding performance of the HIGH CONTROL POWER
AHIP can be attributed to the 650 ELAST0MERIC BEARINGS
ALLOWS BLADE FOLDING
SHP engine and larger tail rotor
with a 110 HP tail rotor gearbox.
Figure 9 is the soft-in-plane main
rotor hub. Not only does it hold the
FIGURE 10: COMPOSITE MAIN ROTOR BLADE
four main rotor blades, but note
the elastomeric bearing that elim
inates our current OH-58 blade grips • FIBERGLASS CONSTRUCTION
and the associated “leaking seals.” • MACHINE WOUND
- LIGHTWEIGHT-50 LBS
Figure 10 shows the pretwisted,
tapered, composite main rotor blade.
This blade is a scaled down version
10,000 Hour. LIFE
of the Bell 412. DAMAGE TOLERANT
Figure 11 is of the AHIP engine. • FIELD REPAIRABLE t;
Note the 650 HP output and the
drive system that allows us to use
this power.
This improved aeroscout reflects
the absolute dedication of the de
velopers to the requirements of the
users. The evolved modifications • QUALIFIED
- IN PRODUCTION
to the OH-58 greatly improve the • 650 HP
handling qualities of the airframe
and enhance the mission capabilities
of the aeroscout crew.
For the first time in the history of
Army Aviation, the scout will have MULTIFUEL QUALIFIED
a “mount” that matches the riders' ELECTRONIC FUEL CONTROL

(scout helicopter crew's) skill, cour

age and imagination.

10 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


AEROSCOUT of the NEXT WAR
Major Laurie Pope
Assistant TSM Scout Helicopters
Fort Rucker, AL
HE WEATHER COULD have been worse, Lieu
tenant Blackford thought as he inched the mast
mounted sight between the ice covered branches of
the tree. They looked like pines, but in the dark, it
was hard to tell. Using the FLIR, Teater, his observer,
slowly scanned the woodline. Glancing down on his
multifunction display, Blackford could see that the
tree would obstruct the view to the right, so as Teater
continued to scan, he got ready to reposition the
helicopter.
Inching downward, he marveled at the controllability
the big tail rotor and SCAS (stability control augmenta
tion system) gave him—not squirrelly like the old A
models he had flown back at Campbell. Teater pointed
to a shallow depression on the side of the hill to the
front. Easing into it, they debated the pedigree of the
attack team leader who had pulled them out of their
warm sleeping bags 2 hours ago. War was supposed
to be hell, but it wasn't supposed to be this cold. They
both wondered if the heaters worked in the T-72
tanks they were seeking. When the APR-9 started
MARCH 1982
strobing, Blackford knew that he should have hugged
the ground closer as he quickly cleared himself to the
right and shifted laterally behind the hill. In this cold
air, that 650 horse engine has lots of power to spare,
he thought.
Pedigrees and cold now forgotten, Blackford expertly
maneuvered his AHIP into the saddle on the other
side of the hill. As he inched upward again until the
objective area came back into the multifunction display,
he quickly planned his exit in case the APR-39 started
singing again. There they were—one, two, three T
72s—but no sign of the ZSU. Mentally relating the
target location to the AH-64s waiting eagerly in the
firing position, Teater ranged the first T-72 with the
laser, released the range and azimuth to the computer,
and with several nimble strokes completed the target
handoff message and sent it to CW3 Jensen in the AH
64. While waiting for Jensen to respond, Blackford
notified the team leader they had contact. Patterson,
in the other AH-64 and slavering for his first kill,
monitored the target handoff message and was viewing
the target area through his TADS. Spying the ZSU,
he told Blackford that he had a clear shot at the ZSU
and could kill it autonomously. Blackford okayed
that as Jensen's message to “Sparkle" came back to
Teater. Aligning the crosshairs on the tank, Teater
switched the mast mounted sight into autotrack and
punched the laser designator. Seconds later he observed
the HELLFIRE's impact and watched the bright orange
ball of flame violently throw the turret from the T-72.
“They don't need their heater now," Teater chuckled,
as Blackford eased his AHIP into another position,
his gut telling him that Patterson, panting for blood,
was going to get his fool self killed.
This scenario is not the pipe dream it was a few
years ago. In fact, after long recognizing the need for
an improved aeroscout, the Army has entered a contract
with Bell Helicopter-Textron to produce an aeroscout
that is capable of doing what was described in the
scenario—and more.
The Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP)
will provide the Army with an aeroscout that is capable
of providing timely detailed reconnaissance, battlefield
information, command, control and firepower manage
ment to commanders. Equipped with modern mis
sion equipment, it is emerging as a lethal weapons
system that will integrate firepower and mobility to
contribute decisively to the outcome of the next war.
The AHIP aeroscout will fight in three organizations:
attack helicopter companies, air cavalry troops and
division aviation companies.
The attack helicopter company fights in teams
(figure 1), usually with a mix of three scouts and five
attacks. The team leader in the attack team operates
from the AHIP aeroscout. He is responsible for the
operational employment of the team. He assigns fight
11
 FIGURE 2: AIR CAVALRY TEAM
ing positions, target arrays or sectors to the elements
of the team.
The team leader coordinates with ground elements,
artillery and Air Force assets as necessary, leaving
the attack element AHIPs free to locate, acquire and
laser designate targets for attack helicopters. The
AHIPs do this by viewing the battle area through
their mast mounted sights, identifying targets, trans
ferring the target information to the attack helicopters
and then laser designating the target for engagement
by HELLFIRE.
12
This procedure allows the attack helicopter to
unmask only long enough to fire the missile, thereby
increasing the probability of its survival. Each of the
AHIP aeroscouts when equipped with an air-to-air
weapons system can provide mutual protection against
Hind helicopters and other aerial threats.
Employment of the air cavalry teams (figure 2)
differs somewhat from attack helicopter team employ
ment. The focus of air cavalry is on conducting recon
naissance and gathering battlefield information. Air
cavalry teams are composed of scout/attack helicopter
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 BATTALION
FDC

BAT TERY

(3)
FIGURE 3: FIELD ARTILLERY AERIAL OBSERVER EMPLOYMENT

mixes that the commander feels are dictated by the further protection, as does the agility provided by the
mission, enemy, terrain and available assets. larger engine and transmission. Improved radios and
Attack helicopters in the team are there to protect digital data transmission capability will greatly improve
the scouts and provide a source of limited firepower. the battlefield information flow. With the navigational
Each AHIPaeroscout can laser designate for HELLFIRE Doppler, the AHIP crew is able to accurately locate
or COPPERHEAD and adjust close air support. itself and whatever it observes.
The third primary role for the AHIP is to serve as a The AHIP aeroscout fills the void existing in the
Field Artillery Aerial Observer (FAAO) platform (figure Army Scout capability. It incorporates new technology
3). The FAAO AHIPs in the division aviation company into an already existing airframe, dramatically increas
also use their mast mounted sensors to acquire targets ing the mission capability while reducing crew workload.
at standoff distances. They employ nap-of-the-earth It comes at an affordable cost and will be available
(NOE) techniques similar to those used by scouts in years before a new development aircraft would enter
attack helicopter companies and air cavalry troops. The the battle. But most importantly, it provides the Army
FAAO adjusts conventional artillery essentially the Scout crew a machine that matches its skill and will
same way as any artillery observer does. He enters the enable it not only to survive, but to win!
TACFIRE net using the Automatic Target Handoff
System that is part of the mission equipment package
of the AHIP. COPPERHEAD engagements require
the FAAO to laser designate for the COPPERHEAD
projectiles. He does this by acquiring the target through
his mast mounted sight and placing the laser spot on
the target within the COPPERHEAD seeker's foot
prints. If multiple targets exist, the FAAO shifts the
laser spot after the first impact, guiding successive
rounds to specific targets within the area.
The small size of the AHIP, the ability to use the
mast mounted sight while hiding behind cover and
concealment and the continuous employment of NOE
tactics make the AHIP difficult to detect. The infra ARMY HELICOPTER IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
red suppressors and radar warning receiver provide

MARCH 1982 13
When do 0S all
Aś FILES include
many cases where IPs
have allowed students to
go too far before taking control
|P take t he of the aircraft.
Here's a problem that no
Controls? doubt comes up many times
daily in every unit. Our psy
chologists tell us that mere
recognition of a problem is the
us wºn sartly cºmita
most powerful factor in its
ultimate removal. To attempt an
all-out assault on the problem
here would be difficult, to say
the least, but perhaps we would
benefit by merely bringing it
into the open and conducting a
general discussion.
The feeling held by most IPs
seems to be that while the
student has the controls, the less
yakking and riding of the
controls by the instructor, the
better. This idea is good in its
basic concept, but to be
effective it must be applied in
specific cases rather than on a
general level. General applica
tion to all students is apt to
make the instructor a slave to
the idea, so that when he should
take the controls away from the
student in a tight situation his
The problem
with IPs
O ONE CAN argue about
N the importance of the IP's
role in Army aviation.
Not only is he knowledgeable,
experienced, and proficient in
matters related to flight, but he is
also skilled in imparting this
knowledge to others. And he
didn't gain this knowledge and
experience overnight. It required
a lot of time and effort. Once he
14
reaction is not fast enough.
This hesitancy to assume
control of the aircraft by the
instructor could well be a result
of experiences which most
student pilots had in flight
training. The instructor who was
always on the controls and
always talking was to be
shunned like the plague, and few
if any students ever went
through the flight program
without running into one of
these characters. The student
who has had such experiences is
very likely to go to the other
extreme when he finds himself
in the position of instructor.
This seems to be true of most
new IPs. With time and
experience they soon learn the
ropes and develop a more
realistic attitude. So it is with
the new instructor that this
problem seems to prevail. By
new instructor we don't
necessarily mean “junior.” Many
of the senior officers, upon
finding themselves in the
position of instructor for the
first time or after a long absence
from instructing, are just as
prone to this reaction as the
has made the grade, the bulk of
the responsibility for safe and
efficient training of other pilots
seems to be dumped into his lap.
In the process, it is sometimes
forgotten that instructing pilots is
vastly different from other
teaching assignments.
A student in college, for
example, may fail every exam and
eventually “wash out” of the
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
junior officer pilots.
As a general rule, it is safe to
say that whenever there is doubt
in the instructor's mind as to the
safety of a particular phase of a
maneuver he should assume
control of the aircraft. Now this
Statement may sound ridiculous
to some because it sounds so
trite and obvious. But the sad,
well-documented fact is that not
enough instructors believe it.
There seems to be sort of a
hypnotic effect on some
instructors when confronted
with a tight situation. Search
your memory, you IPs, and see
if you can't recall similar
hypnotic spells on your part
where if you had it to do over
again there wouldn't be any
hesitation. Then there are those
Occasions where you knew darn
well it was going to be close but
you just couldn't bring yourself
to take over. You decided on
the spur of the moment to
chance it—to bull your way
through. It's sort of the same
kind of mixed-up thinking that
many pilots use when they
decide to try to salvage a lousy
landing. It's just mixed-up
course—and the college. But he
doesn't take the classroom or the
building in which it is located
with him when he leaves. Nor
does his departure have any
physical effect upon the
instructor or the remaining
students. This is not the case with
flight training. One small student
error at an inopportune moment
in flight can literally “wash out”
the aircraft along with the
student, the IP, and any other
occupants who may happen to be
on board.
Similarly, a college professor
may inadvertently make an error
while solving some mathematical
MARCH 1982
thinking and in many cases an
out-and-out case of inability to
make a fast decision.
The real trick of course is to
be able to anticipate rough
situations just moments away
and then take over. There
should be no excuse whatever
for an IP allowing events to take
their natural course when there
is the slightest doubt in his mind
as to the outcome of the
maneuVer.
In an autorotation, for
instance, if there are trees
between the point where the
throttle is cut and the intended
recovery spot, an instructor
should be able to tell as soon as
a descent is established whether
or not the student is going to be
close to the trees. If it is going to
be close the instructor should
either tell him to go around or
take over himself. There is no
excuse in this world to allow the
autorotation to continue if there
is any doubt at all about
proximity to the trees. Yet this
continues to happen almost
daily. Ask any IP if this isn't
true. Along these lines a student
should initiate his own go
problem and no real harm is
done. He simply locates the error
and makes corrections. The IP,
however, does not enjoy the same
kind of luxury. Any error on his
part can produce results that
might range from mild to
catastrophic. Yet, the IP is just as
human and just as prone to
making an inadvertent error as is
the college professor.
Basically, the issue is how can
the IP prevent an emergency
situation—and a possible
mishap-from developing as a
result of a student error, and how
can he avoid making mistakes of
his own?
around if things aren't right. He
has a responsibility here as well
as the IP.
In many flight situations when
the student isn't performing the
maneuver just right, the
instructor can afford to let him
keep the controls and learn for
himself. The good instructor
should learn to distinguish
between these situations and
give the student as much leeway
as is consistent with safety of the
aircraft. There is no better way
to learn than to get fouled up
and get yourself unfouled by
your own efforts. But wrecking
an aircraft isn't in this category,
and if the instructor is worth his
salt he won't allow a student to
get into such a mess.
It hurts a man's pride to have
the controls taken away from
him just when he thinks he has it
wired, but the responsibility that
goes with signing for an aircraft
that costs several hundred
thousand isn't small. Instructor
and student alike should realize
this, and the instructor should
be given the benefit of the doubt
when he acts accordingly. *—”
IP overconfidence in SPs
Late corrective action by the IP
is almost always a factor when
mishaps occur because of some
improper action on the part of
the SP. In the majority of these
cases, the delay was the result of
Overconfidence in the SP's
abilities. Such overconfidence in
another's ability has caused many
an IP to relax his guard and
permit a situation to develop
beyond his ability to control it.
To accomplish his job, the IP
must allow the SP to go as far into
a particular maneuver as possible
before assuming control of the
aircraft. If he takes over too
15
early, the student fails to gain the
necessary experience. If he waits
too long, a mishap results. Add to
this any sudden, unpredictable
control inputs an SP might make
at some critical point in a
maneuver, and the possibility of
the IP preventing a mishap
further decreases. What, then,
can be done to reduce the risk of
training mishaps?
The commander's responsibility
First, commanders should
insure each IP is properly
qualified and proficient in the
area of training in which he is to
engage. Then, commanders
should make certain IPs are in
good health both physically and
emotionally. Next, insist that
during transition training the IP
demonstrate a maneuver before
having the SP attempt it—regard
less of the experience level of the
SP.
Make sure aircraft are properly
serviced and maintained so that
no mechanical problems are
added to the IP's concern.
Finally, provide the best
supervision possible to insure
regulations and SOPs are
followed and to discourage the
16
performance of any unauthorized
maneuvers. From this point,
responsibility for the safe conduct
of training flights rests primarily
with the IPs themselves.
The IP's responsibility
It is the IP's responsibility to
insure he is proficient in his area
of training responsibility, and that
he is physically and emotionally
capable of performing his duties.
After all, no one is better
qualified to provide this
information than the IP himself.
And while he must be confident
in his abilities, he must guard
against any tendency towards
overconfidence. Simply stated,
the IP must remain aware of his
capabilities and not exceed them.
Similarly, the IP must guard
against developing excessive
confidence in the abilities of a
student pilot undergoing training.
On the contrary, he should expect
the unexpected and be prepared
to take corrective action.
Further, the IP should make
sure he is aware of any potential
hazards that may exist and remain
observent for any additional ones
that might possibly arise during
flight. He must constantly
monitor the SP and remain close
to the controls when the SP is
performing any critical
maneuvers. And it goes without
saying that he should not allow
himself to be swayed into
demonstrating any unauthorized
maneuver. In a nutshell, he is to
obey all regulations and SOPs
related to his mission.
Finally, he must rely on his best
judgment as to when he should
assume control of the aircraft.
This is one area of operation that
cannot be dictated or covered by
rules. The IP must depend on his
knowledge, training, and
experience to guide him as to
when he must make the decision
to “take over.”
Yes, the IP is an important
member of the Army aviation
team. As a matter of fact, he is
invaluable—indispensable. But he
is also human. As such, he is not
infallible. Commanders must
never treat him as if he were by
demanding more of him than can
be reasonably expected. And
what is even more important, the
IP must always remain aware of
his fallibility. Knowing that he
can make mistakes is his best
defense against making them. *-*.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Tº REPORTING FINAL
Late/NewsFromArmy/Aviation Activities

FROM WASHINGTON
New for Warrant Officers. "Aircraft Armament
Maintenance Technician–4D-SOIE" is the title
of a new course now being taught at the Army
Transportation School, Ft. Eustis, VA. It is for
active duty aviation warrant officers who are
qualified in MOS 10OEO and 16OAO and who
will be assigned as aircraft maintenance tech
nicians upon graduation.
More than 440 hours of academic instruction
on weapon systems and subsystems are given in
the 12-week, 3-day course. Its graduates are
awarded SQl “E” in both MOSs and incur a 12
month service obligation.
Each class will be limited to nine persons, and
the next starting date is 16 April. Training officers
can receive quota and schedule information from
MILPERCEN's Aviation Programs Branch (SGM
Merritt), AUTOVON 221-8156. (DAPC-OPA-V)
Army Aviator is JCS Chairman Nominee. General
John W. Vessey Jr. has been nominated by
President Reagan to be the next chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has been the Army's
vice chief of staff since July 1979.
The four-star general, the only Army aviator
ever named for this position, is scheduled to
succeed retiring JCS chairman Air Force General
David C. Jones 30 June.
General Vessey was a first sergeant when he
received a battlefield commission for his actions
at Anzio Beachhead, Italy, in 1944; so the 59-year
old general now has over 37 years' active commis
sioned service. (ARNEWS 221)

FROM FORT RUCKER

Graduation Speakers.
• Major General Patrick M. Roddy, director of
program analysis and evaluation, Office of the
Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC, told members
of graduating flight classes that the Army's ability
to attract sufficient numbers of qualified recruits
under its volunteer concept at a cost the nation
can afford is "fast becoming a social and political
problem of major proportions." He advised the
newly rated helicopter pilots, including his daughter,
2LT Leslie M. Roddy, that their responsibility, as
future leaders of the Army, is to be informed
about the issues involved.
5,000 Chinook Hours. CW4 Mack Maclaren, left, accepts
an award for the 5,000 accident-free hours he has flown in a
CH-47 Chinook helicopter, including 2,812 combat hours.
Major Robert Taylor, commander, 242d Aviation Company,
Ft. Wainwright, AK, presented the specially designed plaque
from Boeing Vertol, manufacturer of the Chinook CWO Maclaren,
a standardization instructor pilot for the 242d, graduated
from flight school in 1967 and from CH-47 transition training
in 1968 at Ft. Rucker, AL.

MARCH 1982 17
 REPORTING Command Visit. Brigadier General L.J. Riley, center, com
manding general, 7th Signal Command and Ft. Ritchie,
FINAL MD, receives information on the air traffic control operations
at Hooper Stagefield, Ft. Rucker, AL, from SFC Ronald J.
Stayrook, facility chief. At right is SP5 Noel W. Taylor, ATC
Late NewsFrom Army Aviation Activities tower operator. The general was visiting the Army Communi
cations Command at Ft. Rucker.

• Major General James N. Ellis, division en

gineer of the South Atlantic Division, Army Corps
of Engineers, Atlanta, GA, advised 59 graduating
Army aviators that their training “is aimed at one
purpose, success on the battlefield." To attain

Hail and Farewell. Colonel Robert A. Bonifacio, left, is

the outgoing president of the Army Aviation Board, Ft. Rucker,
AL, and his successor is Colonel Robert A. Wagg, right. The
change of command, as well as COL Bonifacio's retirement,
occurred in January. One of 10 TRADOC boards and test
activities established for operational testing, the Aviation Board
is involved in the test and evaluation of aircraft, armament,
electronics and related aviation equipment from the user's
point of view.

º
|| -

18 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

that success, a professional Soldier must be
characterized by commitment, confidence, candor
and courage, he said. (USAAVNC PAO)

FROM FORT BRAGG

Safety Awards. Six aviation units earned the
post aviation safety award for accident-free flying
in 1981.
Lieutenant General Jack Mackmull, commanding
general, XVIII Airborne Corps and Ft. Bragg,
presented the plaques recently to representatives
of: Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
Army Garrison; 517th Transportation Company,
A, C and F Companies, 82d Aviation Battalion;
and B Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry.
The 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82d Airborne
Division, also received the FORSCOM Com
mander's Trophy for the best aviation safety record
throughout FORSCOM for the second year in a
roW. (VEITH, PAO)

FROM MOFFETT FIELD

Contracts Awarded by Army Research and

Technology Laboratories.
• Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United Technolo
gies, has received a 3-year, $6,413,000 contract
to develop and demonstrate the manufacturing
technology for making a totally composite main
rotor blade for the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter
at a much lower cost than the current blade with
metallic spar. The contractor will seek equal or
improved fatigue life, bullet damage tolerance
and radar Cross section.
• Hughes Helicopter will develop two experi
mental systems that provide the Army's attack
helicopters with the ability to spot and engage
both stationary and moving targets in adverse
weather and battlefield conditions that preclude
use of elctro-optical systems. The 48-month,
$3,784,550 contract is called the pod-mounted
Helicopter Adverse Weather Fire Control-Acqui
sition Radar (HAWFCAR) system. (RTL PAO)
LIFESAVERS IN JAPAN. Operating as the only emergency
FROM FLORIDA medical evacuation unit in the Kanto Plain, Japan's greatest
lowland which spreads east from the mountains of central
Conference Date. The fourth Interservice/ln Honshu to the Pacific and on which stands Tokyo, is a primary
dustry Training Equipment Conference and Exhi mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Detachment at Camp Zama.
bition will be held 16 to 18 November at the Minutes are precious in a lifesaving situation, and detachment
Hyatt House near Orlando. The conference members pride themselves on being able to quickly answer
provides a forum for the exchange of information any medical emergency 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Four of
the people who help provide this service are (above) crewchief
on the latest technology plus management and
Sergeant Ronald Hand and (below) pilots Chief Warrant Officers,
topics of interest to the users of training equipment. CW3, Raymond H. Christ, left, and Anthony Marbois, center;
(IITEC) and medic Staff Sergeant Osmundo Hurtado, right.

MARCH 1982 19
 PEARLS
Another ELT Save
On 24 December 1981, a party of five persons
departed Texas in a single engine civilian aircraft
bound for Colorado ski country. Due to a series of
mistakes on the part of the aircraft's pilot, this flight
was to end in tragedy. However, as you will see, things
could have turned out much worse for all concerned
if it had not been for the presence of an emergency
locator transmitter (ELT) onboard. The pilot's first
mistake on this ill-fated ſlight was neglecting to file a
20
Carol Stein
photo by Reid Roger sº
flight plan. This fact alone would cause many of us to
question his judgment and flight experience.
The second mistake the pilot made was flying into
a region of high mountains in the middle of winter.
Even the most experienced pilots are extremely cautious
about facing the many hazards associated with winter
mountain flying, including high altitude, ice, fog and
the gale force downdrafts which are especially
prevalent on the eastern slopes of the Rockies. Some
of these mountain downdrafts have been estimated at
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
more than 300 miles per hour, and many inexperienced
pilots have ſound themselves and their aircraft suddenly
meeting the ground with little or no warning. And, of
course, the high altitude required does nothing to add
to the performance of a piston type aircraft engine.
But back to the particular flight in question. For
reasons as yet unknown, the aircraft crashed in snowy,
mountainous terrain. Apparently there were no serious
injuries to those onboard. At this point the pilot made
his third and final (and fatal) mistake. Shortly after
the crash he left the aircraft in search of assistance, in
spite of the fact that most pilots have been taught to
stay with their aircraft until reasonably sure that rescue
was not forthcoming. He has not been heard from
since.
Three days later—on 27 December—another aircraft
flying in the area detected a weak emergency signal
from the downed aircraft's ELT. A search of the area
was initiated after the signal location was confirmed.
Army helicopter crews assisted in guiding foot patrol
searchers to the area of the signal, where they found
four frostbitten survivors huddled in the wreckage of
the single engine aircraft. The four were airlifted to
safety.
This is but one case of many where the ELT was
directly responsible for the location of a downed
aircraft and the subsequent successful rescue of the
survivors. (Ed Daughety, DARCOM Project Office
for ALSE)
First Aid Kit Inspection
Many questions have arisen regarding who is
responsible for the inspection of the first aid kits
contained in the survival vests and survival kits used
by Army aircrews. Paragraph 10-7 of TM 55-1500
328-25, “Aeronautical Equipment Maintenance Man
agement Policies and Procedures,” clearly identifies
medical personnel as responsible for the inspection
of aircraft first aid kits. However, no publication
specifies who is to inspect the first aid kits in aircrew
vests and survival kits. TM 55-1680-317-23&P,
“Organizational and DS Maintenance for Army
Aircraft Survival Kits,” states simply that “qualified”
personnel are responsible for preventive maintenance
checks and services on all survival kits. Currently,
within the Army, only medical personnel are considered
“qualified” personnel for the purpose of first aid kit
inspections. The Army has few aviation life support
equipment (ALSE) personnel who are trained to
perform the required inspections. It is the position of
MARCH 1982
this office that, where feasible, medical personnel
should perform the inspections on those first aid kits
contained in survival kits and vests; however, in the
absence of medical personnel, the inspections of those
kits may be accomplished by trained, designated ALSE
personnel. Point of contact (POC) at this office is Mr.
A.B.C. Davis Jr., AUTOVON 693-3307.
Long-Acting Nasal Sprays
Recent ALSE inspections have revealed that a
number of aircrew personnel are keeping bottles of
long-acting nasal sprays in their survival vests and
first aid kits. Personnel in the office of The Surgeon
General confirm that long-acting nasal sprays are
extremely powerful and that frequent usage of this
medication may result in the temporary grounding
of flight personnel. These sprays are administered
on a case-by-case individual basis and should be
used with great discretion, and only when recommended
by authorized medical personnel.
Basis Of Issue For First Aid Kits
Some confusion exists pertaining to the number of
first aid kits, general purpose, panel mounted, national
stock number (NSN) 6545-00-919-6650, required for
the UH-1 Huey helicopter. This is due to an apparent
conflict in publications concerning this item. AR 95
1, “Army Aviation: General Provisions and Flight
Regulations,” refers you to “the appropriate aircraft
operator's manual." TM 55-1520-210-10, “Operator's
Manual: Army Models UH-1D/H and EH-1 Helicopters,”
states that four of the subject first aid kits are provided
in each aircraft. However, TM 55-1500–328-25,
“Organizational, Direct Support, and General Support
Maintenance Manual: Aeronautical Equipment
Maintenance Management Policies and Procedures,”
states that first aid kits will be installed in the quantities
specified in CTA 8-100. Finally, CTA 8-100, “Army
Medical Department Expendable Supplies,” specifies
one first aid kit “per crew compartment in Army
aircraft; five passenger seats/capacity or fraction
thereof.” In an attempt to eliminate the confusion,
this office, in conjunction with the U.S. Army Safety
Center (USASC), Ft. Rucker, AL, is attempting to
change AR 95-1 and all aircraft dash 10s to require
the number of first aid kits specified in CTA 8-100.
POC at this office is Mr. Ed Daughety, AUTOVON
693-33()7.
21

PEARLS
Helicopter Oxygen System
Many Army Aviation units are required to fly in
mountainous and other high altitude areas where the
use of oxygen equipment is absolutely necessary.
Currently, these units have two oxygen systems available
to them through the Army supply system. The first
system available is the oxygen system: in-flight portable,
NSN 1660-00-148-9218. This item is listed under line
item number (LIN) N40820 in Chapter 8 of SB 700-20,
and is designed for use in the UH-1 and other
helicopters. This system may be easily transferred
from aircraft to aircraft and provides adequate oxygen
for complete aircrews while in flight. The second
system available is the regulator unit, oxygen system:
walk-around, NSN 1660-00-700-9776. This item is listed
under LIN R67841 in Chapter 8 of SB 700-20, and can
be used with almost any aircraft in the Army inventory.
This system can be carried by the individual aircrew
member both onboard while in flight and off the
aircraft when engaged in high altitude operations,
such as rescue. Although some aviation units are
using approved commercial-type, locally procured,
oxygen systems, the two listed above are the only
ones available through regular Army supply channels.
POC at this office is Mr. Rainy Bell, AUTOVON 693
33()7.
Send TEm In!
In order for you to ensure your survival in an
emergency situation, you must be sure that your ALSE
is the best that the Army can possibly supply to you.
And in order for you to ensure that this ALSE is the
best, you must be sure to report any deficiencies in
the quality of the equipment provided to you. Unless
you, the user, provide timely and accurate information
on equipment problems, the agencies which procure
and manage this equipment will not be aware of these
problems and consequently will not be able to take
corrective actions. You must be sure to submit quality
deficiency reports (QDRs) on Standard Form 368 to
the appropriate agency. Similarly, if you feel that an
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN DRCPO-ALSE.
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63.120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 314-263-3307
22
item of equipment is not performing its function
properly, or if you think an item can be improved, be
sure to submit an equipment improvement recom
mendation (EIR), also using Standard Form 368, to
the appropriate agency. Remember, QDRs and EIRs
don't work unless you send 'em in!
That “Other” First Aid Kit
It has come to our attention that some units in the
field are substituting the survival kit, individual, NSN
6545-00-139-3671, for the survival kit, individual, tropical
NSN 6545-00-782-6412, in the SRU-21/P survival vest.
According to personnel in the Directorate of Medical
Materiel, Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC),
Philadelphia, the two first aid kits are not interchangeable.
The kit being substituted is intended to be issued to
personnel—other than aircrews—who may become
stranded in isolated areas. This kit does not contain
certain items deemed necessary for aviation personnel,
such as a compass, antidiarrhea tablets and iodine.
Only NSN 6545-00-782-6412 should be used in the
SRU-21/P survival vest. POC for further information is
LTC Olander, Directorate of Medical Materiel,
DPSC, AUTOVON 343-7107.
Questions and Answers
We have recently been informed that the AN/PRM
32 and AN/PRM-32A radio test sets, which we use to
test our AN/PRC-90 radios, no longer require calibra
tion. Is this true? If so, where has this information
been published” (SSG Michael E. Buckley, 5th Aviation
Battalion, Fort Polk, LA)
The information you received is quite true. The
U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command
(CECOM) has confirmed that the calibration require
ments for both the AN/PRM-32 and the AN/PRM
32A radio test sets (NSNs 66.25-00-803-3399 and 66.25
01-013-9900, respectively) have been deleted. This
action was taken due primarily to the fact that the Air
Force, which manages both items, requires no
calibration on them. Information to this effect was
published on page 47 of the October 1981 edition of
PS magazine (issue number 327) and will be reflected
in the next issue of TB 43-180-1. POC at CECOM for
further information is Mr. Art Rose, AUTOVON 992.
2332.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
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Aviators?
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The Unit Threat Officer
ITH THE INCREASING complexities of the
modern battlefield a large majority of aviation
unit commanders have found it necessary to establish
the extra duty of unit threat officer.
While it is widely known that each officer contributes
to the successful accomplishment of the unit's mission
by the efficient management of his or her extra duty,
no one has the potential for offering a greater
contribution than that of the unit threat officer.
As it becomes more and more widely recognized,
threat training is affecting every aspect of unit training.
The unit threat officer is therefore becoming a more
prominent factor in the successful accomplishment
of the unit's mission.
With the growing importance of this position,
selection of the individual by the unit commander is
critical. It would be ideal if every aviation unit had a
rated, school-trained military intelligence officer
assigned as the unit threat officer. While this is the
ideal situation it is far from the realistic One. This
duty, therefore, falls usually to the aviation warrant
officer; this extra duty is ideal for the aviation warrants.
It is totally relevant to his primary specialty and,
when approached with enthusiasm, will constantly
sharpen his skills in employment of the aircraft as a
total weapon system. A bold and imaginative threat
training program will increase unit effectiveness. The
unit commander can further increase the return on
the investment by allowing the threat officer to attend
one of the many schools which are available from the
various services.
With the threat scenario constantly changing, an
Armywide program might be the best approach. This
could lead to an additional skill identifier which would
allow the individual to be properly identified in much
the same manner as a safety officer. Whereas each
unit has an authorized position for a safety officer,
it also could have a position for a threat officer.
While this discussion of the possible creation of another
skill identifier and special handling of additional
personnel may seem unnecessary, let me remind you
that threat is the foremost driving factor of unit training.
It is foolish to train for a threat that does not exist. It is
equally foolish to train for the wrong threat. In addition
to the aforementioned reasons, it will help to
MARCH 1982
CW3 Robert E. Browning
Warrant Officer Senior Course 82-1
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
standardize threat training throughout the Army and,
as an added benefit, will be career enhancing to the
aviation warrant officer. This individual who has long
been accepted as the professional aviator will be
afforded the opportunity to advance and increase his
contribution to the accomplishment of the unit's mission.
At this point, you may be wondering where the
battalion S-2 would fit into this plan. The battalion S-2
remains the center of the intelligence effort. As a
trained expert he will direct the overall intelligence
program to ensure the smooth integration with the
battalion's mission. To ensure proper support to all
units in the battalion, the S-2s must necessarily be
concerned with many areas and cannot devote their
entire effort toward one unit. Also, with the dramatic
speed of the advance of technology no one person can
keep abreast of all the changes of the different weapon
systems. It is in this area that the aviation warrant
officer, acting as the unit threat officer, can be most
effective. The unit threat officer, through proper coordi
nation with the S-2, can concentrate on those threats
which are perceived to be of the greatest interest to the
unit. This type of area concentration will lead to a well
established base from which to draw. The S-2 can rely
on each unit's threat officer to provide him with in
depth, up-to-date information on a specific threat.
This would allow the S-2 to manage from a staff level
the overall intelligence program. The unit threat officer
will be able to provide unit members with up-to-date
information directed specifically at their unit and its
mission, thereby efficiently utilizing the unit's valuable
training time. The unit threat officer will be able to
recognize potential threats because of personal detailed
knowledge of the unit's mission and capabilities. The
unit threat officer could then advise the unit commander
as to the impact of each threat on the unit's ability to
perform its mission. The unit commander then decides
on the best approach to ensure the ability of the unit
to support the overall mission of the battalion.
Now that these thoughts have been put forth, it is up
to the aviation unit commanders to use their aviation
warrant officers in an area which will benefit both.
Remember, you have depended on their advice in the
past; why not expand their usefulness and reap the
harvest for the future? *-*
27
 JOINT ARMY, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTER
SERVICE MISSION AND EQUIPMENT TRAINING IN
AN AMPHIBIOUS/MOUT ENVIRONMENT

What it's
All About
Captain Ronald B. Brown
Assistant Division Aviation Officer
7th Infantry Division
Fort Ord, CA

l, 1959, THE Army Avia
tion School's Combat Develop
ments Office completed a study
organizing the development ob
jectives for Army Aviation through
1970. The future growth in the
organization of Army Aviation
and its proposed airmobility
concepts and doctrine were out
lined. Vietnam had extended a
great deal of knowledge and
experience to the consideration
of that doctrine and would con
tinue to present formidable chal
lenges to concepts and equip
ment being used by the ground
commander and major designers/
builders of our next generation
aircraft.
As the Vietnam conflict inten
sified, operations involving inter
service participation presented
even greater challenges to the
ground force commander involv
ing an array of problem areas
seldom before experienced. Ter
minology was often a stumbling Aviation Battalion, took the sword
block in the interpretation of a in hand and perpetuated the
“frag order" or specific support
roles. Differences in equipment
often left the task force com
mander with the burden of a
reeducation process in order to
fully benefit the ground com
mander with the appropriate sup
port and firepower needed to
optimize battle plans. Tactics
used by the various interservice
elements needed consolidation
and standardization in order to
bring together a cohesion of all
elements concerned.
The lessons learned were in
valuable as well as the comrad
ery experienced by each parti
cipant whether officer, noncom
missioned officer or enlisted.
One of the primary lessons
learned was that of continued
liaison and joint training by all of
the service branches; this can
at the least generate a positive
atmosphere for success.
A Company, of the 7th Combat
lessons learned from joint train
ing. On 1 June 1981, A Company
deployed nine UH-1H Huey heli
Copters to the coastal and moun
tainous region of Camp Pendle
ton Marine Corps Base in south
ern California. The weather was
typical of the terrain, offering low
lying fog in the morning hours
along the coast and hot semi
humidtemperatures in the moun
tain areas. Our mission was to
perform individual, platoon and
Company size training using all
the skills and experience here
tofore accumulated as Army avi
ators. But this wasn't enough.
An element of suspicion was
introduced which when confront
ed could either create greater
Confidence in our overall mission
readiness, or prove to be a shad
ow to our total mission employ
ment capabilities. Vietnam had
determined that the eventuality
of joint interservice operations
was real. Just as real are the
eventualities for such operations

28 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

(1)The morning of the assault and rescue attempt, with the
aircraft secured topside, Marine Amphibious Assault/Rescue
forces come aboard.(2)With the objective in mind, the last
aircraft bids farewell and presses on toward the enemy
shoreline.(3)Upon reaching the shoreline, the flight carefully
prepares to enter the prebriefed route toward the objec
tive @As the mission progresses, the flight passes over
secretly positioned amphibious and armor vehicles standing
by should the aircraft take decisive defensive fires by the
enemy.(5)/At a secret location deep in enemy territory, the
flight rendezvous with prepositioned friendly forces for
final arming and refueling (6) As the Marines contemplate
what lies ahead and their mission orders, the door gunner
alertly scans the air route perimeter for possible enemy
detection.(7)Once over the objectives, the Marine assault
force rappels to the building tops to begin the rescue
attempt.(3)The extraction having begun, the aircraft begin
their long and dangerous flight back to sea having sustained
few casualties.(9)As the flight deck crew directs the aircraft
onto the pitching deck, the crew breathes a sigh of relief as
those rescued contemplate their return to freedom.

in the future in a mid-range
environment.
A Company participated with
the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines in
an airmobile rescue operation
in a MOUT (military operations
on urbanized terrain) environment
with no prior briefing as to the
tactical situation or requirement.
Just as in a “real world" scenario,
A Company was alerted to fly to
a specific assembly area and
from the ground floor receive a
mission brief as though the situa
tion were totally secret and with
out warning. I am pleased to
acknowledge that A Company
not only accomplished the tasks
as briefed, but also surpassed
all expectations of both Army
and Marine Corps evaluators.
The exercise described above
demonstrates the need for con
tinual liaison and joint training
with the other military services.
For just as A Company partici
pated in an exercise using Ma
rine tactics and incorporating
Army nap-of-the-earth flying
techniques without any prior
knowledge of the tactical scenario,
Army aviators worldwide may
possibly be called upon to aug
ment or roundout the firepower
and mobility of a joint task force
should the world situation dictate.
A Company departed Camp
Pendleton for North Island Naval
Air Station, on Coronado Island
(located at San Diego) on 6 June
1981. There we participated in
onboard ship landing qualifica
tion. Each aviator in turn per
formed approaches, landings and
aircraft launches on the USS
Dubuque, an LPD (amphibious
transport dock) provided by Sur
face Forces of the Pacific Com
mand, U.S. Navy. The interchange
of ideas, missions and responsi
bilities again broadened the mis
sion readiness capability of A
Company. As an aviation combat
assault company, the mission
performed by A Company the
week before, with the Marines,
most probably would have been
initiated from the decks of a Navy
surface vessel. As such, the need
for selected Army Aviation units
to maintain currency in over-the
water, Shipboard qualification
becomes of paramount impor
tance.
A Company was awarded
plaques by both the Marine
Corps and the Navy for out
standing performance in accom
plishing the mission at hand.

MARCH 1982 29
 CAN'T WAIT
FOR IMPROVEMENT
CW3 Clifford S. Berg Jr.
247th Medical Detachment
National Training Center
Fort Irwin, CA

ARMY HELICOPTER aviators are not training Priorities

with their personal protective nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) equipment. This unwillingness to
train with the equipment is the result of four human
factors and two equipment factors. The four human
factors deal with awareness, priorities, training and
confidence. The equipment problems deal with the
chemical protecive overgarments and current methods
of storing the protective masks in the aircraft.
Awareness
Much of the Army Aviation community lacks a
strong sense of urgency and appreciation for the NBC
environment, due perhaps to the lack of a thorough
understanding of the intent and capabilities of the
Warsaw Pact threat. That lack, in turn, stems from
inadequate NBC training at battalion level and below.
NBC threat awareness instruction is the first step to a
well organized NBC training program, and may be
provided by the battalion S2. A shifting of training
priorities must follow close behind.
Aviation trainers have to give sufficient priority to
operations in the NBC environment, and it's generally
accepted that in-flight NBC training is necessary. They
also know, however, that it is very unpopular. Because
of the “it will never happen to me” attitude of much of
the aviation community, it is often difficult to convince
aviators that practice is urgently needed. Another
possible reason for this lack of training emphasis is
that very few units conduct evaluation of in-flight
tasks under full mission oriented protective posture
(MOPP) conditions.
Training
Aircrew training manuals (ATMs) in the past
suggested or required very little flight with the mask
worn and did not task the individual pilots to perform
actual flight maneuvers under full MOPP conditions.
This is the reason the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft.
Rucker, AL, has initiated a program to include NBC

30 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

conditions in the ATMs. Further, command policies
usually combine with strict safety overtones, which
severely restricts such training. Most routine helicopter
training missions do not include flight tasks under full
NBC conditions. This could be done, however, with
some additional planning and preparation to take full
advantage of flight training opportunities.
Confidence
As a rule, crewmembers lack confidence in their
NBC equipment. They feel the protective gear is not
to be trusted. This feeling may or may not be justified,
but the attitude persists. More familiarity with that
personal NBC protective equipment through more
intensive training is one way to remove that distrust.
Cºns in personal equipment is not the only
problem. Aviators also doubt their leaders' ability to
get accurate and timely enemy NBC threat information
on the battlefield. If the leaders don't have access to
real time NBC reports, the in-flight MOPP level
requirements are difficult to ascertain. The only
alternative to this situation is to insist upon a full
MOPP. This means that full NBC protective equipment
must be worn anytime chemicals have been used in the
theater or are threatened in the theater. Flights under
full MOPP conditions drastically increase crew
members' fatigue. This fatigue rate is a very important
factor, and is given a very high priority in the research
and development of NBC protective equipment.
Unfortunately, the equipment available today dis
courages crewmembers' use of the gear because it
does cause high fatigue levels.
Protective Equipment
The NBC protective equipment is very uncom
fortable to wear in flight. First, the overgarments are
bulky, restrictive in nature and add to the probability
of heat injury. Second, the protective mask increases
the weight load on the wearer's neck and causes the
facial area to sweat. Third, the protective mask reduces
vision in the areas of acuity, depth perception and
peripheral vision. Moreover, the mask restricts head
movement in closed-in areas such as a helicopter
cockpit. Many of these problems can be limited by
effective training, but it requires diligence and perser
verance by unit trainers.
MARCH 1982
Protective Mask Storage
Current methods of storing the protective masks in
the helicopter are unacceptable to most aviators. As
a matter of fact, attack and scout helicopter crews do
not have a designated place to store their personal
protective masks and have to use a location which
denies immediate in-flight access (ammo bay). Accord
ing to current doctrine, in-flight access to the protective
mask is not a consideration. When threat intelligence
or NBC reports indicate a need for the mask, it will be
put on prior to flight. Thus, if chemicals have been
used in the theater or are a viable threat as in Europe,
the NBC protective ensemble including the mask will
be worn for all missions. During a post-crash evacuation
if the NBC equipment is not being worn or readily
available it will most likely become separated from
crewmembers. This will cause problems escaping and
evading through a contaminated environment unless
the full ensemble is worn.
An apparent increase of interest in the NBC
environment is quite noticeable at higher levels of the
Army. Some commanders in the aviation community
are directing their subordinate leaders to place more
emphasis on the NBC threat. With the shifting of
training priorities and the proposed ATM changes,
unit trainers will include flight tasks under NBC
conditions. With additional involvement the aviation
community will also develop a respect for the Warsaw
Pact NBC threat. Restoring pilot trust and confidence
in the NBC equipment will come through actual flight
with the system. Proficiency will be the end result.
Industry is working on a more comfortable protective
mask and a light, cool, flame hardened, protective
overgarment. We will not be able to change the “when
in doubt wear it” doctrine with a protective mask until
we have cockpits with overpressure. Facing bleak
facts is always difficult. The bottom line is that the
helicopter crewmembers cannot wait for future
equipment improvements to begin their NBC training.
Summed up in the words of a concerned aviator: “If
we're not doing it now, we're dead!" agº-4
31

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
Crewmember Standardization—a followup to last month's coverage of “The Army Standardization Program. ”
A BRIEF REVIEW of recent FLIGHTFAX publications
will reveal some interesting facts pertaining to crewmember
standardization deficiencies which were contributing factors
to aircraft mishaps. During Aviation Resource Management
Surveys (ARMS), crewmember standardization has been
noted to range from outstanding to nonexistent.
What is crewmember standardization? Crewmember
standardization is similar to the aviator standardization
program but pertains to nonaviator personnel”. It is the
quality assurance program that provides the aviator with a
knowledgeable and professional crew.
Whom does it affect? The program impacts on all who
are supported by the aviation unit and directly influences
total crewmember coordination and professionalism.
AR 350-1, ARTEPs (Army Training and Evaluation
Program) and the Soldier's Manuals require standardized
procedures be used. The following are excerpts from AR
350-1:
“5-1. General. The Army Standardization Program ensures
that common operational, tactical, logistical, administrative
and training tasks, drills, and procedures will be performed
in a single prescribed manner throughout the Total Army.”
“5-2. Objectives. The objectives of the Army Standardization
Program are as follows:
a. Standardize the procedures used by soldiers and units
to operate, maintain, and fight major weapon and equipment
systems.
b. Identify those basic tasks that can and should be
performed in the same manner and to the same standard in
like units throughout the Army.
c. Reduce the effects of personnel turbulence following
reassignment within the same or to a different unit.
d. Enhance cohesion by reducing locally modified practices
and procedures.”
“5-3. Policy.
a. The Army Standardization Program will be implemented
in all Active Army and Reserve Component units Armywide.
b. Tasks, drills and procedures of this program will be
performed in the manner and to the standards prescribed in
Army publications.”
The following is a brief synopsis of “crewmember” related
mishaps extracted from FLIGHTFAX:
[] Volume 9, number 35, 17 June 1981. The following is a
direct quote from this FLIGHTFAX:
“Aircraft lifted slingload, and strain was applied to sling
straps. Crewchief was looking at load through cargo hook
* All personnel required to perform any task as part of an aircraft crew, whether officer or
enlisted. Examples: crewchief flight engineer, medic door gunner, aerial observer, etc.
32
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
SIANDARDIIATION
hole. One of the nylon straps broke and snapped up through
cargo hole, hitting and severely bruising crewchief's eye.
Crewchief was not wearing helmet visor down, and load
may have been incorrectly rigged.”
This individual was very lucky. He could have completely
lost his sight or incurred other serious injury. Chapter 8 of
each operator's manual requires a crew briefing be conducted
to ensure a thorough understanding of individual and team
responsibilities. The briefing should include, but not be
limited to, copilot, flight engineer, crewchief, mission crew
operators, and ground crew responsibilities, and the coordi
nation necessary to complete the mission in the most efficient
manner. In the Aviator Qualification Course and the Instructor
Pilot Course, wearing the visor down during external load
operations is a highly emphasized item during the crew
briefing. After one leaves the formal course of instruction,
what happens to these standard procedures? Are they
forgotten? Should you not check your crew briefing to
ensure that it covers this important item?
[] Volume 10, number 7, 11 November 1981.
This mishap involved an aircraft during ground taxi. The
mishap review commentary states that, due to their position,
neither the ground guide nor the crew chief could properly
judge the required distance to clear the aircraft for a turn.
The pilot was told he was clear to turn. The aircraft struck
a telephone pole causing $105,000 damage.
[] Volume 10, number 13, 13 January 1982.
This is another ground taxiing mishap. Both nonaviator
crewmembers were attempting to provide adequate clearance
instructions from inside the aircraft. The aircraft was taxied
into a utility pole causing $595,000 damage.
Maneuvering in proximity to obstacles requires good
crew coordination. Standard procedures and terminology
must be used to ensure understanding among all crewmembers.
D Volume 9, number 21, 11 March 1981.
This FLIGHTFAX states: “The crew may have misidenti
fied which engine (multiengine aircraft) was malfunctioning.”
The engine was secured; then the other engine fire light
came on and the other engine was secured.
All crewchiefs and flight engineers must be knowledgeable
of emergency procedures. If the emergency procedure
requires additional crewmember information to be provided
to the pilot(s), the crewmember must be fully knowledgeable
of the procedure and how to perform the required task.
[] Volume 1(), number 10, 2 December 1981.
The service member boarded to ensure all passengers
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
had properly secured their seatbelts. He felt the aircraft
vibrate, and saw the ramp was being moved up. He motioned
to the crewchief that he was going to exit. vaulted over the
ramp, and fell 25 feet to the ground. He had jumped over
the ramp, thinking the aircraft was still on the ground:
however, a maximum performance takeoff was being made.
This brings several questions to mind. Where was the
crewchief, and what was he doing? Why wasn't the “service
member” stopped? What about the before-takeoff checklist
item “crew, passenger and mission equipment check”
There are numerous reports of crewchiefs who have
crawled under the tailboom of a parked aircraft while the
rotor was turning. It is inconceivable that an individual
would jeopardize his life just to get to the other side.
How many times have personnel used improper refueling
procedures or worn protective clothing improperly?
During engine starts, crew personnel are seen performing
fire-guard duties, positioning themselves in the turbine engine
disintegration critical area.
The list is lengthy and most of us can say we have heard it
all before. These are examples of problems that continuously
involve crewmember standardization and coordination. The
type aircraft involved is irrelevant. It is just as important for
the OH-58 pilot and crewchief or CH-47 crew to have
standardized operational procedures. All crewmembers must
realize they are a team. No team is effective unless it
practices together and everyone knows exactly what is
expected.
How can data be obtained about crewmember standardi
zation? Each aircraft operator's manual, aircrew training
manual, soldier's manual, and ARTEP manual provides
information on the performance of required tasks. For total
crew integrity, each crewmember must know the information
relative to these tasks. The pilot must know what the crew
is to perform; likewise, the crewchief must know what is
expected for each task.
How to get started? Who directs the program? Crewmember
standardization belongs at the unit level. It is the supervisor's
responsibility to implement and manage the program. It
has been a general practice for the “candidate” crewchief
or flight engineer to receive the required training in the
unit. The quality of training is totally dependent on the
person in charge and those who are responsible to train the
individual. Possibly, some classroom instruction is provided:
however, under normal circumstances the instruction is
“one-on-one” and hands-on training is on-the-job.
Quality control is really the heart and goal of the
crewmember standardization program. Before the individual
is released to assume crew duties, he is evaluated by a
supervisor on ability to do the required tasks during a flight.
Once these have been demonstrated satisfactorily, the
individual may perform crewmember duties.
Continued standardization is affirmed by spot checking
(no-notice evaluations) periodically. The unit aviators also
serve as quality control personnel to support the program.
The program doesn't require additional personnel. Although
the unit trainer and instructor pilots are the key members in
the aviator and unit training program, this program should
not be additional work for them. Ideally, this program
should reduce the UT and IP workload and allows them to
concentrate on aviator training.
Units that have an active crewmember standardization
program have impressive results. It is immediately apparent
as you approach the flight line that professionalism exists.
In light of the lives lost and cost of mishaps, something must
be done to prevent recurrence. Every unit has the opportunity
to in plenient a crewmen ber standardization program. The
reward is increased safety and outright professionalism.

C(DºDN
A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
HEAVIATION CENTER Training
Analysis and Assistance Team
(ACTAAT) was formed in order to es
tablish and maintain an effective com
munication link with aviation field units
and to collect data pertaining to the
training effectiveness of the Aviation
Center. The ACTAAT visits provide
an opportunity for field units to provide
input into the training programs of the
Aviation Center thus increasing training
effectiveness and producing a final pro
duct which readily meets the needs of
those units. In the area of assistance, may be conducted. Current plans call
the team provides training support for annual visits to units in Korea and
materials and briefings on Aviation USAREUR (U.S. Army Europe) with
Center training plans and programs. It the remaining units being visited every
further serves as a point of contact at 30 to 36 months. This feature, the
the Aviation Center for information ACTAAT Connection, is an effort to
exchange and field feedback. provide timely information to all Army
During the first 18 months of its Aviation and air traffic control units.
existence, the ACTAAT team con The Aviation Digest will carry at least
ducted visits to numerous U.S. Army one ACTAAT Connection each month.
field aviation and air traffic control covering all matters relating to Army
units. However, time and funding affect Aviation. This month's covers National
the frequency with which these visits Guard Slot and appears on page 35.

MARCH 1982 33
 HESEASON IS winter in One of the northwestern
states. The weather is visual flight rules (VFR),
2,500 foot ceiling and 5 miles visibility with an
approaching cold front and forecast of snow and
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) after 2000

OR ELSE hours. At about 1700 hours an Army National Guard

(ARNG) aviator and his qualified observer prepare to
return to the Army Aviation support facility (AASF)
after supporting brigade headquarters on an all-day
field training exercise. A walkaround inspection and
Why Aviation LifeSupport startup are completed using the checklist, and the 1
hour and 30 minute flight to home station begins. The
flight will be flown over several miles of uninhabited
Equipment and Training? area, and the aviator is unable to maintain radio
communication at the altitude he must fly.
About 45 minutes into the flight, over heavily wooded
and uninhabited terrain, the engine fails and the aviator
is forced to autorotate into the trees. The main rotor
LTC Clarence Suggs Ill blades contact the trees on descent causing the mast
Aviation Safety Specialist
National Guard Bureau and transmission to separate from the aircraft. The
observer suffers fatal injuries and the pilot receives
some cuts, bruises and a compound fracture of the
ankle. The aviator drags himself out of the aircraft
and hobbles to sit at the base of a nearby tree to pull
himself together and contemplate his situation. As
the aviator looks into his survival vest he is thinking of
all the times he meant to replace the worn, broken,
lost or damaged items and replace the batteries in his
survival radio. There is no cold climate aircraft kit
onboard, for money was not programed for its purchase.
With night and a cold front bringing snow, strong
winds and decreasing temperatures, this aviator's
outlook for survival is grim, to say the least.
You can write the conclusion to this story from
your own personal experience. Will you be prepared
to survive when faced with a similar situation?
The ARNG Aviation Division's interest in aviation
life support equipment (ALSE) goes back several years.
The Aviation Division realized a need for ALSE to
provide the aviator with the proper equipment to
cope with a survival situation. It didn't take long to
further realize this equipment would have to be
inventoried, inspected and maintained if it was to be
in a serviceable condition for its intended purpose.
The original idea of having the aviator or crewchief
responsible for his ALSE did/does not work. Time
change items in the vest presented a particular problem,
as the user was seldom aware of the required changes
to his kit. Other items in the vest were not maintained
satisfactorily. Helmets were transported and stored in
automobile trunks and worn without subsequent inspec

34 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

tions until something on the helmets failed.
The initial thrust of the ALSE program by the
Aviation Division was toward the procurement of
equipment. As more equipment reached the hands of
the user in the states, it became increasingly apparent
something had to be done to maintain the vast amounts
of costly equipment. Since the Army did not offer any
programs of instruction in ALSE, the Air Force and
Navy training programs were considered for attendance
by ARNG personnel. The Air Force school at Chanute
AFB, IL, provided some necessary training on like
items of equipment, but taught Air Force supply/pro
cedures, used Air Force publications and regulations
and covered many items of Air Force equipment not
in the Army inventory.
The Air Force training helped meet the need, but a
growing requirement for an Army school continued.
The Aviation Division looked at various instructional
programs for ALSE training during the period from
1974 to 1979. The effort to have an ARNG ALSE
training program proceeded in earnest in 1979 with
the approval of a program of instruction (POI) and
the programing of the funds necessary to conduct the
training at the National Guard Professional Education
Center (NGPEC), Camp Robinson, AR.
The POI included classes in supply, procurement,
issue, inspection and maintenance of ALSE. Survival
was taught as a classroom subject to show the practical
need for ALSE and methods of using the equipment.
The class length was 6% days. The overall response to
the classes was excellent.
At this writing, 115 ARNG technicians and full
time manning (FTM) personnel have received training
at NGPEC. Every ARNG AASF, Army Aviation Flight
Activity and Aviation Classification Repair Activity
Depot now has a technician trained in ALSE. There
are many excellent ALSE programs now in existence
at our ARNG aviation facilities, with two key factors
being present. First, the facility commander recognizes
the need for ALSE and directs the program by providing
technician time to work on ALSE, and the required
work space, storage facilities and budgetary support
for procurement of necessary equipment. Second, the
technician assigned the ALSE responsibility shows a
keen interest in the program, pursues the program with
diligence and innovative ideas and puts in many, many
hours of hard work.
Where do we go from here? The ARNG Aviation
Division formed an ALSE Committee to pursue the
ARNG ALSE program needs. This committee consists
of members of the three branches of the Aviation
Division–Logistics; Operations and Training, Safety;
MARCH 1982
and the Multi-Media Group. The ARNG ALSE
Committee has prepared and submitted budgetary
proposals for funds to provide additional manpower
and equipment. A proposal also has been submitted
for a survival field training exercise for selected ARNG
technicians to instruct them in the proper care and
use of ALSE in a field environment.
ALSE training has begun, but we have only scratched
the surface. With the introduction of more sophisticated
equipment necessary for survival on the modern
integrated battlefield, increased training on mainte
nance and field use of ALSE will be required. Jºr
CGºiºsºs)N
A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
GUARD SLOTS
ISSUE: When the National Guard sends an individual
to flight school and for some reason he fails to complete
the course, why does the National Guard pay the full
cost and not get reimbursed the difference or awarded
an additional slot?
COMMENT: Flight school quotas are requested
from Headquarters, Department of the Army by the
National Guard Bureau (NGB) and controlled by the
NGB school's branch. The individual unit does not
fund for initial entry rotary wing (IERW) courses
but is given the authority and dollars to send an
individual to IERW by the NGB. The NGB gives
these school quotas to the states each year. If the
students selected by the states/units fail to complete
the course, it is not a question of refunding money,
there is none to be refunded; IERW is a NGB funded/
controlled program. The question for the individual
unit/state is how to obtain another quota for the
unit/state. Normally none are available. (Directorate
of Evaluation and Standardization, ARNG-LNO)
35
 |H|ſ|NGſilſº 5. The general term “airspeed" as used in pilot/
controller communications refers to
airspeed.
A. Indicated C. True
B. Calibrated

6. When flight is conducted at the minimum

obstruction clearance altitude (MOCA), accept.
able navigational signal coverage is assured
only within statute miles of a VOR.
“Hangar Talk” is a quiz containing questions based on A. 15 B. 25 C. 40
publications applicable to Army Aviation.The answers are at
the bottom of the page. If you did not do well, perhaps you
should get out the publication and look it over. 7. When in radar contact, aviators are not required
to report leaving an assigned holding fix or
point unless specifically requested by air traffic
DOD FLIP control.

A. True B. False
General Planning
CW2 Gary R. Weiland 8. Minimum sector altitudes (MSA) depicted on
Directorate of Training Developments approach charts provide at least feet of
U. S. Army Aviation Center
obstacle clearance within a mile radius
Fort Rucker, AL
of the navigation facility upon which the pro
cedure is predicated.
1. An airportadvisory area is the area within
miles of an airport without a control tower or A. 1,000, 10 C. 2,000, 10
where the tower is not in operation and on B. 1,000, 25
which a flight service station is located.
A. 3 B. 5 C. 10 9. What services are provided to arriving VFR
(visual flight rules) aircraft by Stage II terminal
radar facilities?
2. An Army aviator acting as his or her clearance
authority for a flight should sign which block(s) A. Traffic advisories and vectoring
on the DD Form 175 (Military Flight Plan)?
B. Sequencing
A. Pilot in Command
C. Separation
B. Approving Authority D. A and B above
C. Both A and B above E. A and C above

3. When conducting a standard formation flight, 10. The estimated time en route (ETE) Army pilots
the flight leader will set his transponder for enter on an IFR (instrument flight rules) flight
normal squawk and wingmen will -

plan (DD Form 175) is the time planned to fly

from takeoff to the destination aerodrome,
A. Turn transponders off C. Squawk low
exclusive of the time required for the approach
B. Squawk standby D. Squawk 0000 at the destination and planned en route delays.
4. Which DOD FLIP publication provides a list of A. True B. False
VOR (VHF omnidirectional range) airborne
checkpoints? The article, “Hangar Talk,” in the December 1981 issue
A. Area Planning Documents contained an error. The correct response to question 5,"Upon
B. General Planning arrival at an airfield, when should an aviator change to the
-
ground control frequency?” should have been choice"D"—Only
C. En Route Supplements when instructed by tower. The reference is the Airman's

D. Flight Information Handbook Information Manual, paragraph 235.

(I) qçI ual 'Z-5 eled V ‘OL (9) (I) 21z-G eled a 'L pIG-G eled V b £z 25ed to 'I
GQ-Z afied O 6 zz-Z afied a 9 (£) eqZ-G eled a £
ZZ-Z afied a ‘8 g-Z 25ed v 'g 8Z ual zºt eled a 'z S83/WSNV
 VIEWS FROM READERS

Editor: Editor: Editor:

Please forward one copy of the article Request one copy of Part I (The I am enclosing the attached poem
written by MAJ R.W.P. Patterson on Origins) of the “From Balloon to Black and artwork which I hope you can print
OPFOR training in the November 1980 Hawk," forward aeromedical evacuation in a Views From Reader's column.
Aviation Digest. story ... (Part II was excellent).
1LT Wayne P. Johnson
WO1 Michael P. Slattery Colonel Richard B. Stuart, M.D. Ft. Rucker, AL
D Co. 82d CAB Commander
Ft. Bragg, NC U.S. Army Medical Department Activity
Ft. Polk, LA
At times in sunlit solitude of drifting clouds,
º | as turning on the wind I flew,
Editor: climbing I've gazed down upon a windswept broken shroud.
Request one copy of each of the four Hovering where, as I looked 'round, motionless it seemed
articles concerning aviation warrant above the spinning earth I've untold passed.
officer retention, entitled as follows: There joined with fleeting speed, as if in distant dream,
my agile craft on high once more,
“A Matter of Concern” Aug. 81 with Rotor in the Green.
“The Facts Which Influence The
Decision to Leave” Sep 81
“An Evaluation of Demographic
Items” NOV 81
“A Matter of Action” Dec 81

Thank you for your consideration.

CW4 Norman R. Patterson
Aviation Safety Officer
ACT 3d ACR
Ft. Bliss, TX

Editor:
Please forward a copy of “Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical Training and
Development” which was published in
the August 1981 issue, and also a copy
of “Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Decon
tamination Problems,” published in the
October 1981 issue.

Mr. Terry Patton

HQ, 102d U.S. ARCOM
St. Louis, MO
illustration by Paul Fretts
• Wayne P Johnson 1981

Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362

MARCH 1982 37
The Apache undergoing preflight
 Keepin
Flvina and
*śg
I. AH-64A APACHE was de
signed from the wheels up to be the
most combat effective aircraft the
Army has ever developed. The
aircraft is a day/night, all weather
fighter capable of operating any
where in the world. The AH-64A
was designed to be almost invulner
able to 12.7 mm and have a low
vulnerability to23 mm high explosive
incendiary rounds. The rugged con
struction and design tend to maxi
mize the crashworthiness of the
aircraft whereby there is a 95 percent
probability of crew survival asso
ciated with a 42 foot per second
vertical impact. One of the goals is
to “save the crew and repair the heli
copter to fight again." Seems like a
simple enough comment; however,
the inevitable question is: Can it be
MARCH 1982
+!
A
Major Troy J. Roop
TSM Attack Helicopters
Fort Rucker, AL
done within logistics and maintenance
concepts already established in the
Army?
The underlying guideline which
governed development of concepts
for the maintenance to be performed
on the AH-64 was that it should be
performed at the level where it is
economically sound and where it
will contribute most to the aircraft's
combat effectiveness. AR 750-1,
“Army Materiel Maintenance Con
cepts and Policies,” provided the
regulatory framework. To do this
has required the maximum use of
modules, direct exchange proce
dures and built-in fault detection/
location system (FD/LS). The pre
ceding concepts were applied to
the entire AH-64A system which
includes the basic helicopter, avi
onics, armament and peculiar ground
support equipment. Test, measure
ment and diagnostic equipment, and
common ground support equipment
were limited to the maximum extent
possible tojust those items currently
in the inventory or items being
developed as part of other programs.
In addition, the aircraft design is
such that maintenance character
istics are enhanced by providing
easy access to components and by
reducing the need for special tools,
stands and power supplies.
Aviation unit maintenance
(AVUM) for the Apache is essen
tially the same as for the other Army
aircraft. Basically all preventive
maintenance functions associated
with dailies, phases and special
inspections are acco inplished at
39
 Tie ApacTie win cowlings opened and ready Tor Inspection

* --
* tº true
* --
***.*.*.
º
* The *recº-f**wuaea to nor
finºpes.
d car * **pass erre
eartº, º, rota tes
** º tºn ** the t
-
ºº::
o-r ºr
ºver
the ºstra *cº.º.
***"...uºla
es -

* , eds
*-lish tea. "p with

typical page sequence from the Apache maintenance manual

AVUM. The maintenance functions
associated with this preventive main
tenance include cleaning and minor
adjustments and removal and re
placement of line replaceable units
(LRU) which are found to be defec
tive through onboard FD/LS. Basic
helicopter maintenance functions
are limited to inspection, cleaning,
adjusting, repairing and structural
repair authorized by the mainte
nance allocation chart (MAC). Main
tenance functions associated with
the engines, hydraulics, power train
and rotor are limited to diagnostic
procedures, minor repair and re
placement of major LRU assemblies
and components. Subsystem main
tenance functions are limited to
preventive maintenance, external
adjustments and operational checks,
using support equipment authorized
by the MAC. The Apache also has
the capability to detect subsystem
malfunctions using FD/LS, self-test
or built-in test equipment, as appli
cable. Repair functions associated
with faulty subsystem LRUs are
limited to removal and replacement.
Apache repair efforts at aviation
intermediate maintenance (AVIM)
are focused on tasks associated with
the repair of components or assem
blies for return to AVUM and the
direct exchange program. AVIM
provides the capability to inspect,
troubleshoot, diagnose, test, adjust,
calibrate and align components and
assemblies such as electrical com
ponents, hydraulic components,
instruments, propulsion and drive
train systems. AVIM also will have
the capability to repair selected
components and assemblies which
do not require extensive machinery
or rework. A somewhat new twist
is the ability to repair modules at
AVIM using the AN/MSM-105(V2)

40 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Automatic Test Station. The repair
of modules at AVIM will, at the
present time, be limited to the iden
tification and replacement of faulty
printed circuit boards (PCB). The
repair of PCBs and modules requir
ing the Electro/Optical augmenta
tion (E-0) to the AN/MSM-105(V2)
will be accomplished only at AVIMs
located at corps level.
Depot maintenance for the Apache
will include the overhaul/repair of
components, assemblies and other
selected LRUs. For the first 3 years
after fielding, the depot maintenance
function will be performed by Hughes
Helicopter Incorporated. This par
ticular approach will allow for an
orderly transition for the Army to
assume depot maintenance functions
at the completion of the contractor
depot support effort.
The technical manuals (TMs) that
will be used by the maintainers of
the Apache may well be the most
innovative TMs ever developed. The
manuals are easy to understand and
even easier to use. They are designed
using an Illustration Step Que
Technique. This technique gives
an illustration of the area of interest
with all detailed instructions ex
plaining the task on the same page.
The TMs for the Apache have
proven to be so effective that they
are now being used as examples for
development of other manuals.
At AVUM the only new military
occupational specialty (MOS) re
quired will be 67R, Advanced Attack
Helicopter Repairman. At AVIM
the only new MOS will be 35C,
AN/MSM-105(V2) Automatic Test
Station Operator. As new aviation
systems are fielded, the 35C will
support them using the AN/MSM
105(V2). As a consequence, the
AN/MSM-105(V2) will become less
peculiar to the AH-64.
The above explanation should
have brought home the point that
the AH-64A Apache has been de
signed to be maintained within the
framework presently in use in the
Army. There are no extraordinary
measures or "super studspecialties”
MARCH 1982
Crashworthiness
ROLL BAR EFFECT
RECESSED CRASH RESISTANT
PROTECTS CREW
PROTECTED
SENSORS ls 2–
FUEL SYSTEM STATIC MAST
RETAINS ROTOR
LOAD
COLLAPSIBLE
ABSORPTION LOAD ABSORBING
TURRET MOUNT LANDING GEAR
STRUCTURE
AWOIDS CREW
Reliable, Available, Maintainable
INDEPENDENTLY
REMOVABLE
LOW
DYNAMIC
WIBRATION —-
COMPONENTS
N0 LUBRICATED
BEARINGS IN
'STATIC MAST
INCREASES
TRANSMISSION LIFE
FAULT DETECTION/
L00ATION SYSTEM
needed to ensure its availability for reliability, availability and maintain
full combat duty. The above points ability standards established for it.
were brought out during the recently The troops of Delta and Echo Com
completed Operational Test II (OT panies accomplished all tasks oper
II) conducted at Fort Hunter-Liggett, ating within the Army's approved
CA. Troops from Delta and Echo maintenance and logistical concepts.
(AVIM) Company, 7th Aviation In short, the development of
Battalion, were trained to maintain maintenance concepts for the Apache
the prototype AH-64s before the has been thorough and has progress
start of OT II. Their performance ed with an eye toward total support
during this very important test was for the total system. Maintainability
magnificent. It was indicative of the was and is a critical element of the
performance which has always Apache design; this total system
characterized Army Aviation main approach (which has been ade
tenance personnel. They proved quately tested and demonstrated)
beyond doubt that the AH-64A will enable Army Aviation to keep
can be maintained in a field environ the Apache flying and fighting under
ment, under simulated combat con the most adverse and austere battle
ditions, and still meet or exceed all field conditions. -º-f
41
 ** ºzzazzazzº”
/…///44%
%
=º
Unless we accept the inevitability of helicopter
air-to-air combat, our Army Aviation doctrine is ſ - º
susceptible to the same fate of negligence as that
of the armor force following World War I. History
has generally shown that the best effective
counter to most weapons systems is a like
weapon. Soviet developments in equipment and
training indicate a high probability of extensive
use of helicopters, which increases the likelihood
of air-to-air encounters with U.S. helicopters.
Even though we currently have numerical
superiority, we have several shortcomings in our
preparedness for air-to-air combat between heli
copters. The major areas of needed improvement
are training, tactics and equipment. While improve
ments are underway, there are some interim
measures we can take to further enhance our
readiness. Fundamental to these improvements is
a basic change in philosophy. Unless we take
action now and begin seeking needed
improvements, we may repeat history at very high
CoSt.

Don't REDX Helicopters

An Endangered Advantage .
Major Everette L. Roper Jr.
Executive Officer
4th Squadron, 12th Cavalry
5th Infantry Division (Mech)
Fort Polk, LA
T. WAR IN Vietnam clearly established the
helicopter as an integral member of the combined
arms team. In succeeding years, doctrine and tactics
have continued to evolve in a dynamic fashion.
Because we did not continue to develop doctrine for
the tank force, it lagged behind the armor forces of
other nations between the world wars. Ironically,
helicopter doctrine is susceptible to the same fate of
negligence if we do not take action soon in the area of
helicopter air-to-air combat.
Over the past 6 to 7 years, military professional
journals have been interspersed with articles warning
of our lack of preparedness for the advent of combat
between helicopters. Unfortunately, the reaction of
many to this warning (this author included) has been
one of casual dismissal as nonfunctional to our mission.

42 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 Perhaps an objective appraisal may be a more prudent
course of action.
ſº Combat against fixed wing aircraft will be deliberately
- - -
Www.arº ****-a, - excluded from this appraisal. This
omission is not intended to belittle
**---- the high-performance fighter as a threat to heli
copters. However, it is felt that the best course of
action when encountering enemy fighters is, and will
continue to be, reliance on our own Air Force and
| employment of existing passive countermeasures as
outlined in FM 1-2.
Over the course of history, weapons system develop
ment has shown, in most cases, that the best defense
against a particular weapon is a like weapon. For
example, the best tank killer is another tank; the best
--, defense against artillery is counterbattery fire;
the best air defense is fighter aircraft; the best
- antisubmarine weapon is another submarine;
| and, in the final analysis, the rifleman's most dan
gerous foe is the enemy rifleman. Similarly,
ground weapons systems are developed
with varying balances of three characteris
tics. These are mobility, firepower and
armor protection. The attack helicopter
simply represents a trade-off of virtually
all armor protection for a quantum advantage
in mobility and, thus, has added a new dimension to
the ground battle. It follows logically that the best
defense against such a system would be one with
similar characteristics.
SOVIET VIEWPOINT
One need only examine recent Soviet developments
to appreciate their recognition of the importance of
the helicopter on the modern battlefield. Lieutenant
General Gatsolayev warned of the extensive helicopter
4, threat facing Soviet forces and called for increased
air defense measures. Lieutenant General Bayanov
highly praised the performance of Soviet helicopter
forces during the Berzina Exercise in early 1978. This
exercise is a good example of the extent to which
helicopters are integrated into Soviet tactical exercise.
Colonel M. Belov, a prolific writer concerning Soviet
helicopters, has advocated the use of airmobile warfare
in conjunction with airborne operations. More recently,
he has placed considerable emphasis on combat against
helicopters. He believes that helicopters are highly
effective weapons platforms, with observation and
maneuver capabilities superior to other combat
vehicles. Therefore, it will be necessary to use practically
all available weapons to destroy them. He suggests
that the best weapon against the helicopter is the
helicopter itself, and a future war between well equipped
MARCH 1982
armies is bound to involve helicopter battles. He
further suggests that in the future, a requirement will
arise for a one-man, high-speed combat helicopter,
armed with cannon and missiles for the purpose of
fighting aerial battles. More salient examples of Soviet
use and awareness of helicopters are the combined
operations in support of Cuban forces against the
Somalis in the recent Ogaden War and the extensive
helicopter operations in Afghanistan.
PROBABILITY
Given the increasing Soviet propensity for use of
helicopters, several scenarios exist in which helicopter
air-to-air combat is imminent, if not inevitable. The
first of these is the meeting engagement. As our air
cavalry units conduct forward reconnaissance in the
covering force area (CFA), there is a high likelihood
of encountering Soviet helicopters in support of their
reconnaissance forces. Engagements between the
helicopters are apt to follow.
Once the situation in the CFA has developed, the
division commander will be required to mass forces
at the expected point of the main breakthrough attack.
Extensive reliance will likely be placed on attack
helicopter units to assist in the coverage on the wide
frontages made necessary by the concentration of
forces. Here again, in an economy of force role there
is a high probability of encountering and fighting
opposing Soviet helicopters.
As the enemy begins his main attack to achieve a
breakthrough, he will probably send large airborne
and airmobile forces deep into the rear area to attack
logistics and command centers. Since the vast majority
of ground combat elements will be committed forward
in the main battle area, the corps and division
commanders' most effective counter may well be
their attack helicopter units. This is particularly true
if the enemy assault can be detected early enough to
be attacked while still en route. Although it can be
argued that these enemy aircraft would be the
responsibility of air defense units and U.S. Air Force
aircraft, it is very likely that the Air Force will have
more pressing problems; and air defenses are generally
spread very thin, particularly in Europe.
Conversely, U.S. attack helicopters could be required
to operate deep in the enemy's rear area in the conduct
of raids in attacks against following echelons, or in
the exploitation. In such cases, the enemy may well
counter with his helicopters, as they are his most
mobile asset with which to combat our helicopters.
Finally, weather conditions, particularly in Europe,
may be such that Air Force close air support would be
43
An Endangered Advantage
negated, while attack helicopters could still operate.
In this situation, both sides would rely heavily on the
firepower of their attack helicopters. Each would
logically serve as a defense against the other.
PREPAREDNESS
If helicopter air-to-air combat is that likely, we must
turn our attention to our own readiness for such combat.
A review of Military Balance recently showed that the
United States held a significant numerical advantage
(more than double) in total numbers of helicopters.
However, this may well be an endangered advantage. It
should be noted that the Soviet force has grown rapidly
in the last decade. If helicopters follow the course of
other weapons, their numerical deficiency is only
temporary. Furthermore, they have developed the Mi
24 Hind, one of the most heavily armed attack helicopters
in the world. Included in its armament is a 12.7 mm gun
in the nose (4-barrelled in the Hind D); 128 – 57 mm
rockets, 4 Swatter or Sagger antitank missiles, or 4–500
pound bombs, or 4 pod cannons. The 1979-80 Military
Balance shows an increase of 270 Mi-24s over the last
edition. This is a substantial increase compared to our
own procurement rates.
In spite of our numerical superiority, several
shortcomings exist in our preparedness for air-to-air
combat. The first of these is doctrine. Essentially,
when encountering enemy aircraft our actions are
defensive, employing evasive action and detection
avoidance. Second, training for air-to-air combat is
virtually nonexistent in Army units. Training is made
more difficult by the fact that no tactics for aerial
combat have been published. Third, existing aerial
weapons systems are not very effective against aerial
targets, particularly beyond 1,000 to 1,200 meters.
This is not to imply that nothing is being done. In
November 1977, the Army conducted the Air Combat
Engagement (ACE) Program, which pitted a UH-1M
Huey against an AH-1 Cobra in a one-versus one test.
Results showed that an aerial threat required even
greater division of attention in the cockpit. After
numerous simulated engagements, response time was
44
found to be less than 10 seconds after detection. As
expected, the advantage went to the aircraft that was
first to place quick and accurate fire on its opponent.
Similarly, insertion of nontest personnel resulted in
immediate crew degradation.
A joint Army/Air Force test, development and
evaluation (TD&E) program to determine the tactical
problems associated with engaging armed attack
helicopters is ongoing. This program, known as
J-CATCH for Joint Countering Attack Helicopters,
is being conducted in several phases. Phase I conducted
in May 1978 at Langley AFB, VA, evaluated helicopters
against various fighter weapons systems. Phase II at
Ft. Rucker, AL, pitted a red force of 2 CH-3s and 4
UH-1Ns against a blue force of 3 AH-1S Cobras and 2
OH-58A scouts. One of the findings of the ACE Program
was the need for force-versus-force study. Phase III of
J-CATCH at Eglin AFB, FL, pitted fighters against
the red helicopter force. The lessons learned from
Phases II and III were then brought together for a joint
evaluation in Phase IV at Eglin. Phase V will test air
defense and ground combat units against the threat
force. This will be followed by Phase VI, which will
combine all forces to include A-10s. Instrumented
results from J-CATCH should assist in developing
new tactics and techniques. However, publication of
training literature is likely to be 2 to 3 years away, even
if everything goes according to schedule with no inter
service disagreements. In the interim, we continue
with our shortcomings unless we make a concerted
effort to improve.
IMPROVEMENTS
What, then, can be done in the near term? Three
major areas warrant consideration—training, tactics
and equipment.
Training is the area which can be influenced most
readily by unit commanders. The first training step
should be an increased knowledge of aircraft character
istics. Aviators should know the strengths and weak
nesses of their aircraft, including operating limitations
and capabilities, emergency procedures and weapons
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 ****---- -----
24.2// 44.4%mºſº Ž
aw 2.//
characteristics. They must be made aware of the threat.
Threat training should be designed to give aviators a
working knowledge of the extent of the threat and the
characteristics, tactics and techniques of employment
of threat aircraft.
All of the training discussed above can be conducted
on a unit level in a classroom environment. However,
training for air-to-air combat also should be conducted
in the field. Foremost in this area is the use of aerial
targets during gunnery training. This could be accom
plished in any of several ways. A group of large
balloons could be raised and lowered from a target
bunker downrange. Helicopter silhouettes could be
attached to moving target cars on existing tank gunnery
ranges. Drones could be used in conjunction with air
defense unit gunnery. Aerial targets towed by heli
copters could be used. On gunnery ranges, concurrent
training could be conducted in such things as aircraft
recognition, range estimation, and actions on contact,
as well as any of the classroom instruction listed
above. Obviously, all of these would require extensive
initiative, planning and coordination on the part of
the trainer.
Air-to-air combat between helicopters should also
be incorporated into field training exercises. Normally,
the first response to this suggestion is that opposing
forces operating at nap-of-the-earth (NOE) altitudes
create a safety hazard. While this is true, this type of
exercise can be adequately controlled by “chase ships”
operating at altitude. Also, a graduated training process
of one on one, two versus one, two versus two, etc.,
would enhance crew proficiency and safety.
Realism could be added by coordination with other
services, allies or National Guard units with different
types of aircraft, to form aggressor helicopter units.
On a centralized basis at corps level or higher, an
exercise similar to the Tactical Air Command “Red
Flag” exercise could be developed.
It has been suggested that the Army develop an
organization equivalent to the Navy's “Top Gun”
program, one consisting of a few selected officers
extent that the enemy is engaged at the time and
place of our choosing. Friendly strengths of speed,
who would develop tactics and techniques and then
train selected aviators from various units. This program
could be centralized at the Aviation Center at Fort
MARCH 1982
Rucker, AL, or operated as a mobile training team
from a major command headquarters. In any case, it
is imperative that the aviation community proceed
with realistic and innovative training in aerial combat.
Virtually everyone who has written on the subject
agrees that training is a key element in air-to-air
combat.
An argument can be made that a significant shortfall
in training will exist as long as there are not any
established tactics. Nonetheless, we should forge ahead
using whatever tactics are available, developing new
ones by experimentation and incorporating changes
as they are published. As valid conclusions become
available from tests, such as J-CATCH, they should
be published, even if in the form of preliminary results.
Dissemination could be through training circulars,
draft manuals, journals or by classified means if
necessary. Refinement could then occur as results
are scientifically validated.
It should be noted, though, that many of our existing
techniques are appropriate for air-to-air combat.
Movement techniques outlined in FM 17-50 and FM
17-95 are just as valid against an enemy helicopter
threat as they are against the ground threat. As indicated
in FM 1-2, maximum use should be made of the
combined arms team. Enemy attack helicopters can
be engaged by preplanned artillery, tactical air, air
defense weapons or fire from friendly ground units.
All of this adds up to teamwork with other members of
the combined arms.
Common sense dictates other principles for aerial
combat. Maximum use should be made of terrain and
airspace. Whenever possible, the sun should be used
to impair the enemy's vision. Concealment is facilitated
by operating in shadows and with a terrain backdrop.
In those cases where contact is in a friendly air defense
environment, or in an area where enemy air defenses
are sparse, initiative may be gained by altitude. Every
attempt should be made to control the battle to the
45
An Endangered Advantage
maneuverability, and smaller size should be capitalized
upon and enemy weaknesses exploited.
In addition to tactics, enhanced readiness requires
consideration of certain equipment improvements.
There is no question that the introduction of the AH
64 Apache into the inventory will be a step in the right
direction. Its ability to carry 16 HELLFIRE missiles,
76 2.75 inch rockets, and 800 rounds for its 30 mm
cannon makes it a formidable platform. However,
other equipment advances are also essential.
The first requirement often proposed is that of an
air-to-air missile for our attack helicopters. This is a
very controversial issue. It has been argued that the
mission of attack helicopters is to support the ground
commander as a part of the maneuver force, and that
the addition of air-to-air missiles would only detract
from this capability. On the other hand, some feel that
a requirement exists for an air-to-air engagement
capability that could be provided by a light, fire and
forget missile, such as the Stinger, which would weigh
less than the HELLFIRE antitank missile. The require
ment is probably valid and can best be filled by a
lightweight, multipurpose missile. Undoubtedly,
technology can provide such a missile without sig
nificant degradation of the antitank capability.
Others feel that use of attack helicopters for air-to
air security would be too costly. Thus, the solution lies
in arming scout aircraft for this mission. Off-the-shelf
aircraft have been suggested in order to avoid the
expensive research and development process.
If this approach is the answer, why not go to a
single-seat “fighter chopper"? The idea of single-seat
fast, maneuverable, armed helicopters in large numbers
has been suggested before. Although this may seem a
bit farfetched, it certainly should not be ignored or
discounted as not being a viable concept.
Other minor equipment changes could be accom
plished now. The ACE Program showed a need for
relocation of cockpit switches to decrease engagement
times. Rearview mirrors, which could be helpful in
other areas, may prove vital in air-to-air combat.
Improved munitions might well enhance the effective
ness and range of cannon and machinegun fire.
46
CONCLUSION
Perhaps even more fundamental than equipment
improvement and development of tactics is a basic
change in philosophy. Rather than employing “clearly
defensive” actions or relying primarily on other systems
for engagement, we should employ violent offensive
tactics. This is not to say that we should attack threat
helicopters for the sake of attack alone, nor does it
imply a change of primary mission. It is simply that
when enemy helicopters are encountered on the
battlefield, and undoubtedly they will be, the first
course of action should be an immediate and vehe
mently executed attack. Field Marshall Rommel once
said,
“I have found again and again that in encounter
actions, the day goes to the side that is first to
plaster its opponent with fire."
Failure to do so may result in a valuable asset falling
prey to the enemy.
It has been said that “Victory in the helicopter
battle will belong to those possessing the initiative,
foresight and the technologically modern machines
needed to carry out the task.” Unless we accept the
inevitability of helicopter air-to-air combat, and begin
seeking new doctrine and tactics and better training
and equipment, we may find ourselves in the same
state of preparedness as our armor force was at the
beginning of World War II. The price for rectifying
such a state would be repaid in saving lives of American
Soldiers. -º-f
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bahnsen, John C. and Peter F. 15. Knight, Robert C.Air-to-Air Defense

Bahnsen, “A Swarm of Locusts,"
Armor, March-April 1977, pp. 42
43.
Baird, Robert L., CW3, "Air Com
bat—Something Old—Something
New." U.S. Army Aviation Digest
April 1979, pp. 1-5.
Bayonov, P., LTG, “Air Operations
at the 'Berezina Exercise." Soviet
Military Review, November 1978,
pp. 18-19.
Beasley, Lonnie S., “Why Air-to
Air Missiles on Attack Helicopters,"
U.S. ArmyAviation Digest August
1978, pp. 20-21.
Belov, M., COL, “Air Landing
Forces." Soviet Military Review,
January 1979, pp. 22-23.
—. “How to Fight Helicopters."
Soviet Military Review, September
1979, pp. 18-19.
—. “Logistics Air Mobility." Soviet
Military Review, November 1978,
pp. 22-23.
Browne, Edward M., BG, “On the
Attack Helicopter." U.S. Army
Aviation Digest, January 1979, pp.
2-7.
Cox, Ronald, CPT, “Helicopters in
Aerial Combat." U.S.Army Aviation
Digest, May 1977, pp. 8, 9, 28.
10. Crowley, Charles C., “Air Combat
E * U.S. Army Aviation
Digest, May 1978, pp. 2-3.
11. Gatsolayev, V., LTG, "When Heli
copters Are Airborne.” U.S. Army
Aviation Digest, September 1974,
pp. 8-13. Reprinted from Military
Herald, No. 11, 1973.
12. Haering, George, “Analogies and
Implications from Fixed Wing
ACM." U.S. Army Aviation Digest.
April 1978, pp. 7-11.
13. “Hind-D," Army Aviation, Army
Aviation Association of America,
March 1977, pp. 22-23.
14. Jossen, Harvey, DAC, “Air to Air
Combat." U.S. Army Aviation
Digest, July 1974, pp. 12-14.
for Attack Helicopters. USACGSC,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1976.
“The Lenin Helicopter Regiment."
Soviet Military Review, April 1979,
pp. 18-19.
17. Metzler, John J., “Helicopters in
Soviet Forces." Military Review,
October 1979, pp. 54-63.
18. Military Balance, 1979-1980. The
International Institute for Strate
gic Studies. London: 1979, pp. 6,
11.
19. Miller, Retsae H., “Air Superiority
at the Treetops." Military Review,
March 1979, pp. 2-9.
20. Rommel, Erwin, The Rommel
Papers. New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Company, 1953, p. 7.
21. Urback, Walter Jr., "Behind the
Hind," U.S.Army Aviation Digest,
April 1977, pp. 4, 5, 26.
22. U.S. Department of the Army, Field
Manual 1-2: Aircraft Battlefield
Countermeasures and Survivability.
Washington, 7 July 1978, pp. 40
58.
23. U.S. Department of the Army.
Training Circular 1-4: Helicopter
Gunnery. Washington, 30 Sep
tember 1976.
24. U.S. Department of the Army.
Training Circular 17-17: Gunnery
Training for Attack Helicopters.
Fort Knox, Kentucky, 31 December
1975, pp. 1-35.
25. Wallimont, Joe, “J-CATCH." TAC
Attack, March 1979, pp. 24-28.
Van Pelt, Richard S., CPT, and
Douglas H. Madigan, “The Armed
Helicopter-What's Next?"Armor,
March-April 1975, pp. 12-15.
Aviation Digest Air-To-Air Articles
Jossen, Harvey F., “Air-To-Air Combat," July 1974.
Baird, Robert L., CW3, “Check Six or Checkmate,"
October 1977.
“Army's First Air-To-Air Symposium,” December
1977.
Haering, George, “Analogies And Implications
From Fixed Wing ACM," April 1978.
Crowley, Charles C., CPT, "Air Combat Engage
ment," May 1978.
Baird, Robert L., CW3, “Air Combat: Something
Old—Something New," April 1979.
Daschke, Carl E., CPT, “Air-To-Air . . . Fact Or
Fiction,” October 1979.
Daschke, Carl E., CPT, “How To Fight Helicopters—
Soviet Style," January 1980.
Babiasz, Frank E., MAJ and Daschke, Carl E.,
CPT, "Antihelicopter Operations," May 1980.
10. McNair, Carl H. Jr., MG, “Helicopter Air-To-Air
Combat Operations—The Big Picture,” October
1981.
11. Reinsprecht, Josef, CPT, "Helicopter Air-To-Air
Combat—The Concept," October 1981.
12. Brittingham, Michael L., MAJ, “Smart Guys Win:
The Thinking Man's Guide To Helicopter Aerial
Combat," October 1981.
13. Stacy, John Michael, MAJ, “To Kill A Hind," October
1981.
14. Belov, M., COL, “How to Fight Helicopters," October
1981.
15. Moffatt, Alan W., CPT, “Cobra Versus Hind,”
November 1981.
16. Babiasz, Frank E., MAJ, “The Fighter/Interceptor
Helicopter," January 1982.
17. Fairweather, Robert S. Jr., COL, "Arming the Aero
scout," February 1982.

MARCH 1982 47
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
FLIP Supplement:
“P” Fields
ATTAWE DO now chief? There's a big mean
looking so and so with a tanker parked in front
of our bird and he says we got to pay him four bucks
“landing fee” before we can bug out.
This subject has come up several times recently so
we figured a little education might be appropriate.
The “P” designation in FLIP Supplement airport data
means “Public” in the sense of being opposite to
“Private.” The “P” assures unrestricted operation of
facilities and landing rights at those locations where
public money has been invested under various federally
funded aviation development programs. At most “P”
fields there is an area provided for free parking of
government aircraft if the pilot requests it; however,
there is no real guarantee that some fee will not be
charged. As an example, at one of the major Washington,
DC airports, if the pilot does not specifically ask for
the government ramp (which is way out in the south
40) and “inadvertently” parks on one of the commercial
areas leased to the Fixed Base Operators (FBO), he
will be subject to fees unless a purchase is made. At
many locations parking is free unless tiedown is required
or your stay will be longer than 1 or 2 hours.
Other conditions that may generate a landing or
user fee to transients are the basing of five or more
government aircraft at an airport, or a quota system
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
48
Mr. Dennis Newport
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
based either on movements (300 or more) or gross
weight (movements times weights, if in excess of 5
million pounds) in a calendar month. The key to this
type of limitation is usually the official business only
or PPR note in the supplement data for joint civil/mil
itary fields. The AOPA has identified 26 different
categories of fees that may be charged to civil aircraft
at so-called “Public Fields.” Some of these may be
levied on you if you don't ask for the free spot.
To avoid problems with fees the following may be
helpful:
• Check FLIP for fee information while planning
your flight. If in doubt, call in advance.
• Contact tower, FSS or FBO (unicom) for informa
tion on public (free) parking after landing.
• At civil fields ascertain obligation prior to leaving
aircraft unattended.
• When possible, bill landing or user fees to the
government. Reimbursement for cash payment
may be difficult.
Tell us like it is for a change. We’ll investigate and
validate, and take action in FLIP so others don't “get
took.”
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1982–546-037/112
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 - -

--
| º -
-

. - - -

º - -
-
|

40th Birthday of ARMY AVIATION

and FORT RUCKER
THE U.S. ARMY Aviation Center will celebrate the 40th
anniversary of Army Aviation and Fort Rucker 4 to 6 June 1982.
Plans for the historic event are now firm and scheduled events are:
Early arrivals, Thursday, 3 June, are invited to participate in
a golf tournament, tour the Army Aviation Museum and meet
friends at an Early Bird social.
Friday, 4 June: This will be the first full day of planned activities.
The morning highlight is the 1st Aviation Brigade 10K run. Open
houses/informational displays of training, research and
museum facilities, and a carnival will be ongoing throughout
the day. Plans for the afternoon include JRROTC drill team
performances and a brigade review and retreat ceremony. In the
evening there will be various social events including a
Grasshopper reunion.
Saturday, 5 June: Saturday's schedule will begin at Cairns
Army Airfield where a band concert, static displays and the Army
Aviation Air Display-Yesterday and Today— will fill the
morning. That afternoon the open houses/informational displays,
carnival, dedication of the new Army Aviation Museum site and the
memorialization of the Warrant Officer Career College will take place.
The formal AAAAAviation Ball will be held Saturday night.
Sunday, 6 June: Sunday morning there will be a memorial service at
the main post theater followed by a brunch at the Officers'
Club from 1000 to 1300 hours to close the
anniversary celebration.
Personnel planning to attend should write to Commander,
1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: 40th Birthday Planning
Committee, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362, for information relating
to accommodations or other matters. Also, more information
will be included in future issues of the
Aviation Digest.
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 APRIL 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 4

Yºr Yº Yºr
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Richard D. Kenyon
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 The Attack Helicopter School and Center Of The Future,

COL David L. Funk
9 How Long Can We Fight? MAJ Charles R. Poulton ||
12 Threat: Warning: The Threat Branch Has Determined
That Soviet ATGMs Could Be Hazardous To Your
Health, MAJ Frank E. Babiasz
14 Regarding Rotors
17 Army Aviation Mission Area Analysis
18 DES Report To The Field: FY 1981 Class A Mishaps
20 PEARL'S
22 U.S. Army Aviation Training Symposium/Policy Com
mittee Meeting, MAJ Kirk M. Knight and Mr. Robert L.
Ledbetter
24 ACTAAT: HITMORE VS. GACP
25 Christmas Captions
26 16th ATC Battalion In The Field, Mr. Richard P. Fulton
31 Tower Talk: Aviation Weather, Mr. Ronald B. Jackson
32 Reporting Final
35 Views From Readers
38 Heliborne Electronic Warfare System, COL Robert S.
Fairweather
40 Confidence Vs. Competence, Mr. Wilburn A. James
42 Deepwoods, MAJ Michael T. McCourt
44 ATC Action Line: The Third Ingredient, Mr. Ken Arnold

Cover: An AH-64 used to train aviators in terrain flight #

;
techniques and tactics at Ft. Tusi, “The Attack Heli- #
copter School and Center of the Future." The story &
begins on page 2

Honorable John O. Marsh J.

Secretary of the Army
Richard K. Tierney
Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention training, maintenance operations research and development
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General U S Army Aviation Center
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the US Army Aviation Center Photos are U S Army unless otherwise
specified use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders
unless otherwise stated Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the
Digest and to the author unless otherwise indicated.
Articles photos and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited Direct
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Department of the Army 14 October 1981, in accordance with Army Regulation
31 O-1
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Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from tº e º ºr tendent of Documents US
Gavarrh mant Print ºr rh T.: ... . . . . a chºr retrºr. Inf – --> - - - - -------------- --------
 t has been my observation during more than
26 years of aviation service that Army Aviation
continues to grow in its contribution to our
Army on the battlefield—not only because of the
dynamics of our mission but because of the initia
tive and innovation of our people. The word
"inertia" simply doesn't apply, while "high energy"
is quite descriptive of the Army Aviation team.
The need for change in Army Aviation is constantly
recognized and is most often met with the “forward
looking" suggestions that come from all echelons
of our community.
Indicative of such innovative thinking is our
lead article by Colonel David L. Funk which
describes “The Attack Helicopter School and
Center of the Future." What a thinkpiece it is—from
the location, facilities, units and curriculum for
this futuristic training establishment, to the
concluding plea that the resulting benefits would
be significant enough to override our age-old
Obstacle and nemesis—COST!
Colonel Funk's article is, however, evidence
of a recurring question: We will fight as we have
trained, thus should we not do our best to train as
we plan to fight? The National Training Center is
doing much for us in this area insofar as our
sister combat arms are concerned, but it has yet
to develop its full maturity with the integration of
Army Aviation and other critical elements of the
tactical formula for victory. Thus, Colonel Funk's
proposal of a new orientation on aviation training
lends even more visibility to this issue and can
perhaps be viewed as an answer to the questions
raised in the February Digest by General Hamilton
H. Howze (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel (P)
James W. Lloyd about the need for Army aviators
to be trained to fight.
Another concern expressed in this month's
reading is “How Long Can We Fight?" by Major
Charles R. Poulton II. He suggests that an attack
helicopter company's TOE be augmented by an
additional flight platoon for rearming/refueling
purposes. This would "provide the responsiveness
and flexibility needed to get maximum effective
ness from our attack helicopter assets," an effect
iveness that cannot be realized on tomorrow's
battlefields from the present resupply arrange
ments, Major Poulton states. While the final
solution may not lie simply in adding more "people
and things," it does surface the fact that a fix may
be required for more sustained operations. This
was also recognized in the recently completed
Aviation Mission Area Analysis. As our level of
commitment increases, so must our support Slice
increase, especially in Class III and Class V. What
are your thoughts on solving this problem? Is
Major Poulton's proposal the answer? Read on
and think about it.
But still further changes for Army Aviation,
APRIL 1982
particularly in the training area, are presented by
Major Kirk M. Knight and Mr. Robert L. Ledbetter
in their account of the work accomplished at the
“1981 U.S. Army Aviation Training Symposium/
Policy Committee Meeting." They relate for you
the principal issues which have already been
acted upon or that will be resolved in the near
future.
Field expedients are often necessary to Optimize
training within the resources available, and Mr.
Richard P. Fulton Writes about the “16th ATC
Battalion in the Field." His description of the
activities of the air traffic controllers and Other
personnel of the 16th as they participated in
GOLDEN SABER V, a corps-level training exer
cise at Ft. Hood, TX, gives a splendid insight into
the critical function performed by our ATC units,
our tactical controllers—and how they get the
job done.
Hopefully, you will take away from this issue
the observation that Army Aviation continues to
experience both change and challenge, a premise
ably supported by several of our authors this
month and certainly attested to by our 40 years
of heritage. But your appreciation of this fact will
be even more pronounced if you are able to
attend the 40th birthday observance of both Army
Aviation and Ft. Rucker to be held at the Aviation
Center 4 to 6 June 1982. You are all invited to
attend the many ceremonies, events and displays
which will vividly portray the 40 years of progress
of Army Aviation. A schedule of activities appears
on the inside back cover of this issue. But if you
cannot attend, I would hope that Army Aviation
units and personnel worldwide would pause briefly
in the hurried pace of their commitments and
recognize this chronological milestone in our
history. Forty years and still growing—because
of the tremendous initiative, dedication and
perseverance of those serving today and those
who served before.
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 C Ieuoſo plaeG “I Mun-
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 J ohn Black slides his Apache slightly to the right to unmask the TADS. His front
seater, Bubba Claypool, acquires numerous targets, picks a T-80, goes to narrow field of
view on the FLIR, lases, fires a HELLFIRE, tracks, destroys the target followed by an
immediate remask by John Black. The entire engagement takes less than 28 seconds in
total darkness in a forbidding, rugged high desert environment.
Black and Claypool receive a recall message on their DMD, recycle off the nearest
FARP with the rest of their platoon, fly 150 nautical miles at high speed, using terrain
flight techniques, to a holding area known only as a stored way-point in their Doppler/GPS.
Upon arrival, they are ordered to attack another threat force which is in contact with a
friendly ground force. Upon arrival at their attack position, with an assist by their section
leader and his mast mounted sight equipped scout, they break mask to engage. Radar
and laser warnings fill their CRT. An immediate remask followed by a lateral shift of 600
meters and going hot with their “Music" (radar jamming) cured the problem. As they are
completing their last engagement, one of the overwatching scouts reports hostile attack
helicopters closing at their 10 o'clock. Their section leader engages with an air-to-air
Stinger to cover the disengagement.
Warrant Officer Candidates Black and Claypool are receiving their combat
indoctrination in the world's most realistic attack helicopter team training
environment–Ft. Tusi, NV*. . .

... the ATTACK HELICOPTER SCHOOL

ond CENTER of the Future

*...* HE U.S. ARMY Attack Helicopter
School and Center was established in
December 1986 as a TRADOC instal
lation at Ft. Tusi, NV, on the former
site of Wendover Air Force Base. This instal
lation, the first named for a warrant officer
attack helicopter pilot, is also the home of
the 14th Cavalry Brigade (Attack Helicop
ter) which provides the school troops, air
craft and logistics support for the School
and Center. The isolated location of Ft. Tusi
may shock new arrivals; but this very isola
tion is one of its most desirable features.
Live fire ranges and uninhabited day/night

* Fort Tusi was named for CW2 Ronald L. Tusi. CW2 Ronald
L. Tusi was one of the most highly decorated aviators in the
Vietnam conflict. His awards included the DSC (for a record 5
tank kills in 1 day at An Loc in April 1972), Silver Star with 2
OLCs, DFC with 7 OLCS, Bronze Star with 3 OLCs, 71 awards
of the Air Medal and numerous Vietnamese awards. CW2 Tusi
served two tours in Vietnam as a member of a U.S. Navy Seal
Team and three tours as an Army Cobra pilot. He holds the
U.S. Army record for tank kills by helicopters (all with 2.75
inch FFAR) and was one of the most proficient standardization
instructor pilots in the force. CW2 Tusi died as a result of a
Cobra wire strike accident at night during a CDEC Night Owl
Experiment at Ft. Hunter Liggett, CA, in 1974.

APRIL 1982
 - - - -

pºol of narrºne
NOE courses abound. To the east and southeast, Ft.
Tusi adjoins Dugway Proving Ground and the Hill Air
Force Base Range which provide hundreds of square
miles of flat to rolling desert terrain. Farther to the
east, Ft. Douglas, UT, provides hilly to mountainous
forrested terrain with impact areas suitable for live fire
in an environment not unlike central Europe. To the
west the entire state of Nevada presents itself as one
big NOE training area with numerous government
owned ranges suitable for both live fire and maneuver
of armored vehicles.
Another benefit of this isolated location is the almost
total lack of distractions which would impact adversely
on training. Aside from some occasional activity on
the nearby Bonneville Salt Flats, the nearest possible
distracting element is the rather staid Salt Lake City,
100 miles due east. However, recreational activities
for the outdoorsman abound; some of the world's
best hunting, fishing, skiing and mountaineering areas
are within easy reach.
Brigadier General Bob Striker became the first
commandant concurrent with the establishment of the
Center. He gathered around him a group of bright
attack helicopter leaders of proven ability. All had
demonstrated leadership in the recent Southwest Asian
war. All instructors and a very high proportion of the
members of the 14th Cavalry are veterans of that
same conflict. The selection of the cavalry brigade as
the school support organization was based on its own
outstanding combat record, particularly its fast moving,
deep penetration night attacks in the Iranian highlands.
The organization of the cavalry brigade has been
modified to fit its school support mission. The 1st
Battalion of the Attack Helicopter Regiment is organ
ized and equipped as a standard AH-64 Apache unit;
but all personnel are super talented, combat veterans
of demonstrated capability. In addition to providing
demonstration support and test players for attack
helicopter operational/force development tests, the
1st Battalion is a highly capable RDF unit.
The 2d Battalion of the Attack Helicopter Regiment
contains all AH-64/AHIP instructor pilots and training
aircraft. All students in courses using these aircraft
are also assigned to this battalion.
The 3d Battalion of the Attack Helicopter Regiment
is equipped with AH-1X Cobra and OH-58D Kiowa
aircraft. “A” Company is an active Army organization
which functions as the training unit for the low side of
the high/low mix. “B” Company is a Utah National
Guard unit which drills on site, while “C” Company is
a USAR unit from Arizona which takes its summer
training at Ft. Tusi.
The 14th Maintenance and Support Battalion provides
aircraft maintenance and logistical support for the
brigade. One company of the battalion is a Nevada
National Guard unit oriented toward maintaining 3d
Battalion Cobras and OH-58Ds.
The brigade organization also includes the normal
pathfinder, aeroengineer and S&T companies which
have both school support and combat readiness
missions. One platoon of each of these companies is a

GLOSSARY
ADA air defense artillery FAC forward air controller OPFOR Opposing Force
AHIP Army Helicopter Improvement FACTS FLIP augmented Cobra TOW Sight PNVs Pilot's Night Vision System
Program FARP forward arming and refueling point Pol program of instruction
ANVIs aviation night vision imaging system FFAR folding fin aerial rocket PT physical training
ASE aircraft survivability equipment FLIR forward looking infrared RDF rapid deployment force
CAS close air support FLOT forward line of own troops REFORGER Return of Forces To Germany
CDEC U.S. Army Combat Developments RF radio frequency
FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command
Experimentation Command FTX field training exercise RRRP REFORGER Reverse REFORGER
CDR commander - Program
COHORT cohesion operational readiness GPS global position system - s&T supply and transport
and training HELLFIRE Helicopter Launched Fire and TADs Target Acquisition Designation
COL colonel Forget System
CONUS continental United States JAAT joint air attack team TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked,
CRT cathode ray tube MMS mast mounted sight wire-guided
DFC Distinguished Flying Cross NBC nuclear, biological and chemical TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
DMD digital message device NOE nap-of-the-earth Command
DSC Distinguished Service Cross OCONUs outside continental United States USAAHs U.S. Army Attack Helicopter School
EW electronic warfare OLC oak leaf cluster USAR U.S. Army Reserve

4 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

local Army Reserve organization.
Attached to the brigade for school support only is a
Combined Arms Battalion. This organization is
composed of one tank/infantry company with one
“blue” platoon and two OPFOR platoons, an ADA
battery (OPFOR), a helicopter company (OPFOR)
and a range instrumentation company.
sº
Ft. Tusi facilities include those normally associated
with its previous role as an Air Force bomber training
base. However, runways, ramps and hangars have
been upgraded and modernized to facilitate attack
team training and provide adequate support for C-5,
C-141 and A-10 aircraft used in RDF and JAAT
operations and training. The primary attack helicopter
range, located just east of the post, has been fully
instrumented and equipped with RF, EW and laser
emitters. This range is the primary force on force
training and evaluation facility.
Desert, mountain and temperate survival training
camps have been established on suitable terrain in
the local area. Prior to conducting any phase of flight
training at Ft. Tusi, all aircrewmembers must success
fully complete training in each of these camps.
Combat mission simulators for AH-1X, AH-64B and
AHIP are provided. These simulators work through a
central computer which facilitates section level training
by permitting interaction between cockpits. This permits
tactical play prior to going “for record” on the fully
instrumented range. Savings on aircraft fuel, parts
and munitions are significant while training time is
reduced by cutting en route time to zero. The ability
to “play back" each tactical mission is also a great
AH-64B prepares to unmask for a direct fire HELLFIRE engagement on one of the live fire ranges at Fort Tusi
APRIL 1982
assist in training the teams and sections since they can
learn from their own mistakes.
The Attack Helicopter Center's athletic facilities
are among the Army's finest. Physical fitness is stressed
constantly in each POI. Night, NOE attack missions
place heavy demands on each crewmember physically.
Therefore, the highest standards of performance are
required, not only during monthly PT tests but during
other physically demanding activities such as survival
training, orienteering, the cavalry stakes and various
*A*
All training at Ft. Tusi is heavily influenced by
lessons learned in Southwest Asia. Indeed this very
establishment of the Attack Helicopter Center was
based on the need, identified in combat, to both
expand and standardize the tactical training of the
attack force. Training areas used previously did not
offer sufficient maneuver and live firing areas to provide
for the expansion required to accomplish those tasks
identified as critical to total force effectiveness.
The program of instruction for the Attack/Scout
Helicopter Basic Course (the single most important
course offered at the USAAHS) is tailored to receive
input from both initial entry volunteer students who
have completed primary, basic and instrument flight
training at Ft. Rucker, AL, and a limited number of
high quality aviator volunteers from both active and
reserve component units. All are prescreened at either
Ft. Rucker or home stations by the USAAHCscreening
team. Screening includes a series of both mental and
physical tests which determine the volunteer's aptitude
as an attack or scout aviator. Motivation and ability
-
- -
-
-
- -
-
 -- -
º -
-
- - - -
Eſcofºo of ºurgeº
to act in a high stress environment are two of the most
significant discriminators used during the screening
process.
All students attempting this course must successfully
complete a 4 week preflight phase which serves as an
additional screening gate while providing detailed
knowledge of subjects required prior to entry into the
flying phases. This preflight phase is structured to
intentionally place all students under stress for
significant periods. Training days are long (12 hours +)
and a significant percentage of that time is accomplished
during hours of darkness. Physical conditioning and
basic soldier skills are continually stressed. Map read
ing, orienteering, individual weapons qualification,
armor tactics and OPFOR training make up the bulk of
the syllabus. Field training is emphasized with armor
and OPFOR operations being nearly all of the “hands
on" variety. Students participate in force-on-force
armor operations as tank and ADA crewmembers
primarily with the OPFOR. During this training they
learn not only basic threat tactics but work against
friendly attack/scout helicopters flown by students
from the preceding class.
Survival training is also accomplished during phase
one. [Note: Everyone who flies at Ft. Tusi must
complete survival training prior to leaving the traffic
pattern. This training is accomplished at each of
three survival training sites: the desert site is located
on the Ft. Tusi reservation; the European (temperate
zone) site is at Ft. Douglas, UT (125 miles east of Ft.
Tusi); and the mountain site is in the Watasch
Mountains (30 miles east of Ft. Douglas). Three days
and nights are spent at each site learning appropriate
survival, escape, evasion and rescue techniques. During
survival training the students seldom sleep, while being
placed under long periods of stress requiring real
world decisionmaking. This physically demanding
training takes place during the last 10 days of phase
one and is designed to take advantage of the students'
physical and mental preparation received during the
early weeks of training.
Those who successfully complete phase one then
move on to the 6 weeks of aircraft transition training
in either the AH-64B, AH-1X or AHIP. Both ground
and flight training are oriented toward producing a
pilot capable of flying and fighting the aircraft in a
terrain flight environment during daylight or darkness
and during periods of adverse weather.
The first 6 weeks of flight training is basic aircraft
transition. Aircraft time is minimized during this phase
by heavy reliance on combat mission simulators and
part task trainers for PNVS, TADS, FACTS and MMS.
Aircraft systems and attack team tactics receive
emphasis during ground school training.
The second phase of flight training consists of 4
weeks of day/night target acquisition, gunnery and
PNVS or ANVIS single ship, on local ranges.
During the next 6 weeks, section and platoon tactics
are stessed on the intrumented range. Day/night
force on force and live fire scenarios are played in an
NBC/RF/EW environment. Use of aircraft survivability
equipment and coordination with ground forces is
habitually stressed. Both air-to-ground and air-to-air
tactics are played extensively. For the first time coordi
nation with Air Force FACs and CAS aircraft is
played during force on force missions. By using the
instrumented ranges, crews can be debriefed in great
detail after each mission, with the tape playback from
the range instrumentation providing a framework
for evaluation.
The final 2-week period consists of a FTX during
which combined arms and JAAT tactics are empha
sized again on the instrumented range. During this
phase, crews, sections, platoons and companies are
formed that live and fight in the field for the entire
period. Leadership positions are occupied by students
and are rotated daily. Students are responsible for
mission planning/coordination, briefings, leadership
and debriefs. Missions are flown day and night over
varying terrain. Both force on force and live fire
missions are executed. During this phase stress is high
and sleep is limited; short reaction times will be
COmmon.
One of the most innovative courses offered is the
Tactics and Weapons Instructor Pilot Training Course.
Each active and reserve component attack battalion
and cavalry squadron sends one attack and one
scout pilot to Ft. Tusi to this course annually. The
course is offered once each quarter to facilitate unit
scheduling around major FTXs, range periods, etc.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
The purpose is to provide each unit with a fully
standardized individual who can provide local instruc
tion in the latest tactics and techniques.
This 4-week course is structured as follows:
• One week of orientation with a complete update
on individual aircraft tactics, target acquisition,
and gunnery both day and night (air-to-ground
and air-to-air) on the instrumented range in an
RF/EW/NBC environment.
• Two weeks of section, platoon and company
tactics in a force on force scenario.
• One week in the same environment on a combined
arms FTX which incorporates JAAT and all
available threats. During this exercise the students
plan, lead and critique all missions.
One of the most vital courses of the curriculum is
a 1 week precommand orientation for all ground
combined arms battalion and brigade commanders.
Based on recent combat experience, this course fills
a deep knowledge void. Commanders at all levels
must have an appreciation for attack helicopter
capabilities and limitations. They must also develop
a close working relationship with attack aviation to
fully exploit the balanced combined arms team concept
through mutual support during normal field training.
All team members must continually train together if
they expect to win together on the battlefield. Using
a football analogy, it makes little sense to train groups
of tackles, guards, halfbacks, etc., then expect them
to work well as a team during the big game.
Other courses include AHIP, AH-1X, AH-64B
Instructor Pilot, Aeromine Laying, Pathfinder Basic,
Aeroscout Crewman (19D2F), SAR Paramedic (less
medical training) and AHIP, AH-1X, AH-64B Air
transportability and Self-Deployment.
sº
In addition to the various formal courses of
instruction, both the Center and the 14th Cavalry
participate in the REFORGER Reverse REFORGER
Program (RRRP). Under this program each active
CONUS attack helicopter battalion rotates to Europe
every 2 years (reserve component battalions rotate
every 3 years). These battalions use the aircraft and
support facilities of a European-based battalion and
spend most of their time in Europe in the field
learning the missions and tactical techniques appropri
ate to their wartime reinforcing missions. The displaced
European-based battalions rotate to the Attack Heli
copter Training Center for live fire and force on
force training on the instrumented range. This program
coupled with the Tactics and Weapons Instructor
Pilot Course enhances force standardization while
APRIL 1982
providing training in European weather and methods
to the CONUS-based force. The high standards of
training demanded at the Attack Helicopter Center
thus become the standards of the total force. All
CONUS-based active and reserve component battalions
also rotate through the Center for similar training,
but this is scheduled by FORSCOM based on require
ments of specific units. Those organizations located
at installations where the training environment is
relatively adequate rotate less frequently than those
located where live fire and force on force training
cannot be accomplished. Roughly one-third of the
Center's aircraft, facilities and range time are devoted
to rotational training.
Ft. Tusi is also the home station of the Attack
Helicopter Regiment. During the development of
the Army's COHORT plan in the early 1980s, an
attack helicopter regiment was established. All attack
helicopter battalions in the Army are numbered
battalions of that regiment.
The “Colonel of the Regiment” (a highly decorated
retired colonel with broad attack helicopter experi
ence), the “Regimental Command Sergeant Major"
and a small administrative staff are in residence at
Ft. Tusi. They maintain the regimental records and
history, maintain the regimental museum, establish
and maintain regimental traditions and travel widely
to visit the battalions of the regiment. Formal and
informal regimental functions (dining-ins, tattoos,
parades, happy hours, etc.) form the basis for much
of the social life of its members. Officers, warrant
officers and enlisted troopers, with rare exceptions,
will spend their careers within the framework of the
regiment. Rotation between battalions is accomplished
only when requested by the member or as required to
fill OCONUS requirements. Each battalion of the
regiment has a “home” post, with the first, second
and third battalions being stationed at Ft. Tusi as
organic components of the 14th Cavalry. A member
of the regiment can reasonably expect to spend most
of his career at the CONUS post of his choice except
for required schooling and tours with overseas battalions.
Even during overseas tours, however, the member
feels at home because regimental traditions, standards
and operational techniques are common to all
battalions. In addition, he knows that his dependents
will be supported and assisted by the regiment at
home station if he is on an unaccompanied tour.
The regiment takes care of its own.
Another common bond is formed early in the
career of most members of the regiment since all
officers and warrant officers and most enlisted troopers
are trained at Ft. Tusi. Upon graduation from their
initial courses of instruction at Ft. Tusi, members are
inducted into the regiment at a formal tattoo conducted
by the colonel of the regiment. Regimental crests
and distinctive insignia are presented to each member
by the colonel and command sergeant major of the
regiment as he stands in front of the regimental colors
during the torchlight tattoo (very appropriate for an
organization that conducts most of its business at night).
Since there is no distinction in the regiment between
Active and Reserve Components, or National Guard
and Reserve, attack helicopter personnel are con
sidered as equal partners. Reserve Component
personnel receive the same training and are inducted
simultaneously with the Active Army members upon
graduation. This offers a significant side benefit.
Since the regimental ties are so strong, a very high
percentage of those personnel leaving the service prior
to retirement tend to affiliate with a Reserve Compon
ent battalion of the regiment and continue to provide
an important service to their country.
Regimental ties, blazer patches, lapel pins, etc.,
available only to members of the regiment through
the regimental museum fund, form very visible recogni
tions links between members of the regiment who
share both common traditions and training.
The esprit of the regiment is based on a common,
very demanding training program, high standards
AH-1X crew maneuvers down one of the many day NOE courses at Fort Tusi
and the feeling of belonging to an elite group of
skilled professionals.
The bottom line result of the establishment of the
Attack Helicopter School and Center is that the
quality of the attack helicopter force has increased
dramatically. Initial entry crew selection and training
has been upgraded, standardized and expanded to
the point that each graduate is ready to fly and fight
as a team member when he leaves Ft. Tusi. The combina
tion of the Tactics and Weapons Instructor Pilot
Training Course and the REFORGER Reverse
REFORGER Program has upgraded force effective
ness and standardization. These training initiatives,
combined with the esprit and sense of belonging de
veloped by the establishment of the attack helicopter
regiment, have served to exploit the true potential of
the attack force.
While it may seem that establishment of a separate
Attack Helicopter School and Center violates the
traditional way of doing business within the Army (in
the past, schools and centers have been branch specific
and attack helicopters do not fit that description), it
should be remembered that the potential force contri
bution of attack helicopters exceeds that of most
branches. Couple this with the increased combat
effectiveness realized by more realistic, comprehensive
training and force standardization and the rationale
for the rather extreme, costly course of action becomes
clear. Benefits far exceed costs. &B->
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 OW URRENT ATTACK heli
copter TOEs provide for a limited
organic rearm or refuel capability.

f ONG
Once the basic load of fuel and
ammunition is expended, the attack
helicopter is totally dependent upon
rapid and timely replenishment, if
it is to continue as an effective
weapons system. In the past, Army

A N WE Aviation has relied on permanent,

fixed bases to rearm and refuel

§ G T 2
aircraft. This system was used almost
exclusively in Vietnam, the location
of the last major use of attack aircraft
on a scale likely to be used in future
conflicts. The logistical support
required to supply aircraft ammuni
tion and fuel in Vietnam was monu
mental. Large-scale operations re
Major Charles R. Poulton II quired stockpiling huge quantities
of Class III and V in secure areas.
Commander, D Company
229th Aviation Battalion (Attack Helicopter) These supplies were brought to the
Fort Rucker, AL staging areas by elements that were
not organic to the aviation unit. If
these nonorganic elements, for what
ever reason, failed to arrive with
Class III and V, the mission could
not be accomplished.
We are working under the same
concept today in many cases, but
with a world situation that demands
attack helicopter units be able to
fight day and night in sustained
combat. In order to carry out this
GLOSSARY
requirement, we must have a flex
ible and responsive rearm/refuel
ASP ammunition supply point
Class III POL-petroleum and solid capability. Lack of an organic cap
fuels ability can neutralize attack heli
Class V ammunition
DS direct support copter companies more quickly and
FARP forward arming and refuel effectively than any current or
ing point
FFAR folding fin aerial rocket projected OPFOR threat.
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM fully modernized Sometimes the situation requires
GTW gross takeoff weight that attack helicopters engage armor
mm millimeter
MTOE Modificaiton Table of Or vehicles well beyond U.S. ground
ganization and Equipment forces. At other times, the attack
NOE nap-of-the-earth
OPFOR Opposing Force helicopter company/battalion is put
POL petroleum. oils and lubri in reserve and committed at the
cants
TOE table of organizaiton and point of the major penetration. At
equipment
TOW tube-launched, optically tack helicopters have a tremendous
tracked, wire-guided capability to put “steel” on armor
vehicles. In the target rich environ

APRIL 1982

--- ---
z Headquarters ſ Service
Platoon Platoon
Proposed Reorganization of Current Attack Helicopter Units
ment envisioned, being able to
neutralize the targets properly re
quires a rapid rearm/refuel capability.
Secure, fixed bases to rearm and
refuel will be so far behind the FLOT
that quick turnaround will be im
possible. The attack aircraft will
have limited time onstation in this
scenario due to large quantities of
fuel used to and from the battle
area. The FARP provides the rapid
turnaround required to keep maxi
mum pressure on the enemy and
ensure efficient target servicing.
These FARPs must be highly mobile
and be able to move several times
during a 24-hour period if they are
to survive on the modern battle
field. In practice the FARP works
extremely well because, in many
instances, an attack unit has one or
two CH-47 Chinooks in DS to pro
10
Attack
Helicopter
Company
--- ---
º ſº Aeroscout
Platoon | Platoon
s N
vide the necessary fuel and ammuni
tion. The CH-47s can usually keep
up with the Class III requirements,
if they remain with the unit and in a
flyable status. Unfortunately, we
don't usually play the very important
resupply of Class V. The tonnages
required are astronomical and the
people necessary to handle this large
quantity are not available.
If we fight, all attack, air cavalry
and assault helicopters will be com
mitted. It is reasonable to assume
each unit will not have dedicated
CH-47s. These aircraft are in short
supply, and the corps commander
has other high priority requirements
for air resupply. If the attack heli
copter companies fail to keep con
stant pressure on the enemy, he
will be able to bring such over
whelming combat power on U.S.
I
---
s º -
|| ||anºliºling Poin
| (FARP) Platoon J
ground forces as to cause numerous
penetrations. Depending on the
terrain, this could allow the enemy
to fan out in multiple directions
making the containment difficult
to impossible. An attack helicopter
unit will fail to keep pressure up for
two reasons: attrition, and lack of
prompt rearm and/or refuel when
needed. With the heavy demands
made on the supply system during
combat, it is reasonable to expect
many breakdowns to occur; but
none will have such devastating and
far-reaching effects as the inability
to rapidly rearm/refuel our attack
helicopter assets.
A very important aspect of attack
helicopter operations, in using the
AH-1S (Fully Modernized) Cobra,
is usually overlooked, The gross
takeoff weight of an AH-1S (FM) is
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
10,000 pounds on a cool day. On a
typical warm summer day it will be
limited to around 9,600 to 9,700
pounds GTW. The average AH-1S
(FM) in the attack configuration of
M200A1 Pods, 4 TOW launchers
(each launcher can carry 2 missiles),
M19720 mm gun, 2 pilots, full load
of fuel (about 1,700 pounds) and no
ammunition, weighs around 9,700
pounds! It's quite obvious that we
must trade fuel for ammunition. The
minimum ammunition needed to
attack known armor targets might
consist of 450 rounds of 20mm (302
pounds-absolutely necessary for self
defense), 8 TOW missiles (328
pounds) and no 2.75 inch FFARs
(to save weight). I realize that dif
ferent units will use other config
urations, but the ammunition weight
will remain close to what I show
here.
In the warm day situation above,
the aircraft can take off when fuel
has burned down or reduced to 1,070
pounds. In a typical mission profile
of hovering in/out of ground effect,
en route cruise, NOE, holding at
flight idle and attacking, our fuel
consumption will average 650 pounds
per hour. Based on this rate, we
have about 1 hour and 35 minutes
from takeoff to flameout. This will
vary as conditions change, but my
point is to show that there isn't much
time available from takeoff to target
engagement and return for rearm/
refuel, particularly at NOE speeds.
If the FARP, for whatever reason,
is not where it is supposed to be,
there's very little flying time left to
find it.
The attack helicopter company
must have a responsive rearm/refuel
capability organic to the unit to
achieve maximum success in com
bat. This capability must have the
same mobility as the attack aircraft
it will support which, by design,
rules out ground transportation as
approved in the Division 86 Air
Cavalry Attack Brigade.
Current wheeled or tracked ve
hicles cannot move the great dis
tances and provide the rapid re
APRIL 1982
sponse needed in FARP operations talion/squadron or brigade/group
to meet the attack helicopter mis commanders as necessary for as
sion requirements of the division saults, resupply, etc. However, it
and corps commanders. If we rely must be made available to return to
on ground transportation to supply the attack unit as it is committed to
the FARP, then we limit the mobility action. With the limited flight time
of the attack helicopter unit to that available to our attack aircraft,
of the ground vehicles. If an attack having dedicated UH-60 crews that
unit is sent from one brigade to train with the unit on a daily basis
another or one division to another and having them completely under
and is required to fight upon arrival, stand how they integrate in the
can we reasonably expect a wheeled overall scheme of maneuver, is
or tracked FARP to reposition and imperative. The teamwork and co
be functional prior to aircraft fuel ordination required to ensure suc
exhaustion? Can we expect the cess can be achieved only through
supported brigade to respond in the daily unit training of dedicated
time frame required to keep constant personnel under the control of the
pressure on the enemy? I think unit commander. Using UH-60s from
not—at least not often enough to assault units would end up being a
fully exploit the attack helicopter hit and miss proposition that would
to the maximum extent possible. be almost as unacceptable as our
I propose that an additional flight current philosophy toward FARP
platoon be added to the attack heli operations.
copter company TOE that consists The dollar cost of this additional
of eight UH-60 Black Hawk heli platoon is high. We may have to
copters. The platoon would be reduce the total number of attack
commanded by a captain, have 2 units to achieve the required trade
lieutenant section leaders and 13 offs. Aircraft and the required sup
warrant officer aviators. The primary port are expensive. If we are to
function of this unit would be to expect the attack helicopter units
provide fuel and ammunition on a to provide the lion's share of enemy
sustained basis to the attack unit. armor destruction, then we must
This UH-60 platoon could break tailor those units with the necessary
down into two sections of four air assets to enable the mission to suc
craft each and provide two highly ceed.
mobile FARPs which will allow the The addition of a UH-60 platoon
attack aircraft to keep heavy pres to the attack company for FARP
sure on enemy forces continuously. operations would provide the re
This platoon would have the POL sponsiveness and flexibility needed
section and the armament section to get maximum effectiveness from
(currently in the service support our attack helicopter assets. There
platoon) under its control to run is no other viable option that provides
the FARPs, along with additional the rapid turnaround time required;
personnel necessary to load ammuni concurrently it allows us to mass
tion in the ASP off load and break our attack aircraft to achieve maxi
down the ammunition in the FARP mum combat effectiveness. Would
for rapid reload of the aircraft. not 8 attack units capable of sustained
(These people are extremely criti combat for 12 to 15 hours (or until
cal.) The flexibility/mobility of this the crew is exhausted) be better than
platoon would allow it to displace 10 attack units that may only be
hourly if necessary and be in opera able to fight for 1 or 2 hours because
tion within 10 minutes after arriving they can't get rearmed and/or re
in a new location. fueled? Many will say we can't afford
When the unit is not committed to do this! I say, if we expect to win
for an attack mission, this UH-60 the next conflict, can we afford not
platoon could be used by the bat to'? -º-'
11
 Major Frank Babiasz
Threat Branch
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
ANTITANK GUIDED missiles (ATGMs) may
be the most underrated threat to helicopters on the
modern battlefield. Everyone is aware of the existence
of these high technology missiles in an effort to make
armor obsolete on the battlefield. However, many
feel, as they are obviously antitank weapons, their
employment against helicopters is highly improbable.
Think again! The Soviets have long recognized the
threat that the U.S. attack and scout helicopters present
to their armor and mechanized forces, and have stated
that all weapons would be employed to counter them;
this includes antitank guided missiles.
Although not optimized as an antihelicopter weapon,
ATGMs have many advantages in this role. First,
unlike radar directed systems, no indication is given
to the pilot that he is being tracked or fired upon.
Even if the ATGM firing is observed, it will be difficult
to determine if the aircraft is the target. Second,
except for obscurants, evasive maneuvers are the
only countermeasure available. Third, ATGMs are
very accurate at extended ranges. And finally, the
sheer number of ATGMs in the Soviet maneuver
units make them a formidable helicopter threat.
Over the years, the Soviets have placed additional
emphasis on ATGMs which has resulted in increased
numbers within Soviet maneuver units. For example,
almost all of the 96 BMPs (Russian infantry combat
vehicles) in a motorized rifle regiment are armed with
12
AT-4
AT-3 SAGGER ATGMs. Additionally, there is an or
ganicantitank battery consisting of nine BRDMs (Russian
reconnaissance vehicles) with long-range AT-5 SPAN
DRELATGMs. Coupled with numerous manpack and
heliborne ATGMs, it is easy to see that these systems
will proliferate the battlefield.
One major disadvantage of the ATGMs vs helicopters
is its low velocity. For example, the AT-3 SAGGER has
an average velocity of 120 meters per second over its
3,000 meter flight path. This equates to a 27 second
time of flight, at maximum range. Thus, the slow
velocity of the missile greatly enhances aircraft
survivability. Again, this survivability is based purely
on the aircrew's ability to visually acquire the missile.
However, as Soviet ATGM technology improves, we
can expect significant changes in velocity, accuracy
and target tracking.
Aviators must keep in mind that tracking a fast
moving target, laterally (i.e. a helicopter at 100 +
knots) would be almost impossible using present day
ATGMs. However, when at a hover, nap-of-the-earth,
or flying directly towards a target, helicopters could
become lucrative targets.
In conclusion, it is imperative that aviators be familiar
with all threat systems, even those that are not
considered to have a dedicated antiaircraft role. An
ATGM fired at a hovering helicopter could definitely
prove “hazardous to your health.”
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 AT-1 SNAPPER
The AT-1 SNAPPER was intro
duced in the early 1960s. The SNAP
PER is a manually controlled missile
with guidance commands from a
wire link. This missile is considered
obsolete by the Soviets and has been
replaced by the AT-2 SWATTER
and AT-3 SAGGER.
AT-2 SWATTER
The AT-2 SWATTER is a radio
guided missile with a heat warhead
which exists in three versions (AT
2A, AT-2B, AT-2C). The AT-2A
and AT-2B models have manual
command-to-line-of-sight (MCLOS)
guidance while the AT-2C SWAT
TER incorporates a semiautomatic
command-to-line-of-sight (SACLOS)
guidance and is purely a helicopter
launched version. The SWATTER'S
range (all models) is 3,500 meters
and its estimated armor penetration
is 500 mm of rolled homogeneous
steel.
AT-3 SAGGER
The AT-3 SAGGER is a wire
guided missile which has a shaped
charge HEAT (high explosive anti
tank) warhead and exists in two
versions (AT-3 and AT-3C). The
AT-3 and AT-3C SAGGER are
almost identical except for missile
guidance which the AT-3 versions
have as MCLOS versus the AT
3C's semiautomatic. The SAGGER's
range is 3,000 meters and can
penetrate armor of up to 400 mm
(estimate). The missile (both versions)
can be launched from a variety of
ground and airborne platforms.
AT-4 SPIGOT
The AT-4 SPIGOT is a wire
guided, tube launched, semiauto
matic command-to-line-of-sight mis
sile with a HEAT warhead, and exists
in only one version. Similar to our
Own TOW missile, the AT-4 has an
estimated range of 2,000 meters and
is estimated to penetrate 500 mm
of rolled homogeneous steel. The
SPIGOT is employed in a tripod
mounted model and may be employ
ed as auxiliary armament on the
BMP and BMD.
AT-5 SPANDREL
The AT-5 SPANDREL is a wire
guided semiautomatic command-to
line-of-sight missile with a HEAT
warhead. Presently, the AT-5 is only
found mounted on the Soviet BRDM
2 vehicle; however, it is expected
to replace many of the SWATTER
and SAGGER systems. The missile
has a range of 4,000 meters and an
armor penetration capability of 500
to 600 mm (estimated) of rolled
homogeneous steel.
AT-6 SPIRAL
The AT-6 SPIRAL is a tube
launched, semiautomatic command
to-line-of-sight missile mounted only
on the Mi-24 Hind-E helicopter.
Little information is known about
the SPIRAL; however, it is estimated
to have a greater velocity and range
than existing Soviet ATGMs.

AT-2A AT-2B AT-2C AT-3 AT-3C AT-4 AT-5 AT-6

SWATTER A SWATTER B I SWATTER C SAGGER SAGGER C SPIGOT SPANDREL SPIRAL

Missile =
Length (mm) 1,160 1,160 1,160 864 864 K1,200 K1,200 Unknown
Diameter (mm) 150 150 150 120 120 K134 K134 Unknown
Weight (kg) 26.5 29 Unknown 11.3 11.3 7 (est) 7 (est) Unknown

Average Velocity
m/sec) 150 150 150 120 120 150-200 150-200 300
(est) (est) (est)

Range (m)
Maximum 2,500 3,500 3,500 3,000 3,000 2,000 (est) 4,000 (est) Unknown
Minimum 500 500 Unk 500 500 100 (est) 100 (est) 100 (est)

Warhead HEAT HEAT HEAT HEAT HEAT HEAT HEAT HEAT

Guidance MCLOS MCLOS SACLOS MCLOS SACLOS SACLOS SACLOS SACLOS

Trackin Target Optical Optical Optical Optical Optical Optical Optical Optical
g Missile Optical Optical IR Optical IR IR IR IR

Command Link RF RF RF Wire Wire Wire Wire RF

First-Round Hit
Probability (%) 67 67+ 90+ 61 90+ 90+ 90+ 90+
(est) (est) (est)

Launch Platforms/ | BRDM 4+ || BRDM-2 4-H. HIP E 4. MANPACK 2 I BRDM-2 14| MANPACK (2?) || BRDM-2 15 HIND E 4
Unit of Fire HIP E 4 HIPE 4 IHIND A/D 4 BRDM-2 14 I BMP/BMD 4 I BMP/BMD (47) (est)
(rounds) HIND A/D 4. HIND A/D 4 BMP/BMD 4 || HOPLITE 4
HARE 2. HARE 2 HOPLITE 4 || HIP F 6
HOUND 4 HOUND 4 HIP F 6 || HIND A/D 4
 |ſ)
U.S. ARMY SAHIW CHNIHR

14 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 HEN YOU START ponder
ing the reasons behind the
incidence of rotor accidents
among people who have a clear
idea of what can happen when a
blade hits a tree, another blade,
or somebody's head, you almost
always run into the same old sad
song that provides the sound
track for about every other area
of aviation accidents. Accidents
take place when a person trained
to do a thing the right way forgets
his training.
There are at least eight basic
types of rotor accidents, and if
you put your mind to it you
probably wouldn't have too much
trouble uncovering a few more.
Eight will do for a start. They
are —
• Rotors striking personnel
• Rotors meshing
• Rotors picking up ground
items—debris, tarps,
ponchos, and the like
• Rotorwash-caused mishaps
• Rotors hitting trees
• Vehicles with antennas
driving under rotors
• Formation rotor strikes
• Attempted starts with tied
down rotors
Everybody in the helicopter
end of Army aviation knows this.
Yet the accidents keep happening
just the same.
Head-on collision
It's a rare day when anyone in
Army aviation is hit by a blade.
Sometimes, yes. But not often.
However, just about everybody in
the Army sooner or later comes
into close contact with
helicopters—but not everybody in
the Army is in aviation.
An infantryman being hauled
into and out of combat training
exercises or being ferried from
point A to point B can't be
expected to concentrate on the
deadly possibilities of a rotor. He
has his mind on other things.
Any helicopter passenger can
appreciate the fact that a blade
can remove his head if he gets in
APRIL 1982
its way. But does he stop to think
that when a helicopter lands on a
slope, the uphill rotor can sweep
the ground close enough to mow
the grass? Hell-bent to get clear of
the aircraft, can he forget that
helicopters come equipped with
blades fore and aft and that you
don't approach one from the
rear? There have been instances
of uninstructed soldiers being
knocked for a loop because they
didn't realize that a lazily
revolving power-off blade packs a
lot more wallop than it looks like
it does. These are the things you
don't have to overlook more than
once when you're dealing with
rotors. Encounters with blades
have a nasty way of being once
in-a-lifetime experiences.
Only a short while back a crew
chief walked into the tail rotor as
the aircraft was being run up for a
voltage regulator check, and
that's all she wrote. There have
been more instances than
anybody likes to think about of
infantrymen who have been
struck, sometimes fatally, in head
on collisions with the uphill sides
of blades.
Sometimes a person who is
excited, apprehensive, or concen
trating on his own particular job
can overlook a warning. But
normally a warning does the trick
and it is the Army aviator's
responsibility to see that his
passengers are fully warned.
Concern for passengers should be
as much a part of an aviator's
standard procedures as concern
for the aircraft.
In the other area of rotor
accidents, when helicopters get
tangled up with each other or
groves of trees or foreign objects,
or blow each other into the
ground, you can almost always
uncover violations of procedures.
Somebody has forgotten what he
knows, has ignored what he
knows or has sailed cheerfully
ahead in the face of what he
doesn't know. The result is just
about always the same.
Let's look, for instance, at the
business of foreign objects. No
aviator has yet reported hitting a
flying saucer with his rotor, but
just about everything else you can
name has been encountered from
time to time.
The real trouble comes when a
hovering helicopter picks up
assorted debris off the ground in
its rotorwash and throws it into
the blades. The cure, like most
cures, is simple. You don't have
to be a Sherlock Holmes to reach
the conclusion that if there are
no loose objects lying around for
the rotorwash to pick up, no
damage can be done.
Hurricane force
At cruise speed, a rotor at its
center is traveling at about 360
rpm, give or take a few. The
blade's tips are revolving at just
about the speed of sound.
This means that air—a lot of
it—is being hurled down at what
amounts to hurricane force. The
pocket-sized hurricane a
helicopter kicks up below, in
addition to picking up loose
material and causing helicopter
suicide, can raise sand with
anything else which gets in its
way. You might say in this respect
that helicopters are their own
worst enemies.
A typical example of what this
can bring on was the UH-1D
hovering for takeoff which got
such a severe buffeting from a
descending CH-47A that it was
nearly thrown to the mat like an
outweighted wrestler. A quick
autorotation by an alert pilot
saved the day in this case. A
similar incident caused severe
damage to another Huey's skids
and underside.
Every sensible helicopter crew
keeps in mind that everywhere
they go they are taking along
their own pocket-sized typhoon
and that, unless they keep a sharp
eye, they can bring on a mess of
trouble for some poor soul who is
trying to deal with the hurricane
15
his own machine is kicking up.
Mishap mixture
The kindest thing to be said
about most of the other
categories of rotor-induced
mishaps is that the people
involved as a rule weren't having
one of their better days. Or, if
you're a stickler for the bald
truth, you would have to admit
that somebody goofed. There are
many kinds of rotor mishaps, and
they all share one common
factor, the human one.
When a person behind the
wheel of a jeep sporting an
antenna longer than a bamboo
fishing pole blithely drives under
a helicopter with its rotor turning,
you can offer long odds that his
mind was not on the job at hand.
The same goes for the unknown
hero who left a pair of needle
nose pliers on a tail boom, right
where they could fall into the
rotor when it started fanning
around. This incident wouldn't
have happened, at that, if the
pilot had made an adequate pre
flight. And there has been more
than one occasion when engines
have been started with the rotor
blades still tied down.
Simple carelessness? You can
say it again, and you can also
make a note of the fact that
where helicopters are concerned
it doesn't take much of a blooper
to bring on a major disaster.
Aside from the occasional goof
off which brings on the crash, too
many helicopter mishaps
involving rotors come from a lack
of intelligent foresight—the
failure to look ahead to the
possible consequences of a minor
error.
Take the case of loose objects
in the aircraft itself. Even a paper
cup can cause trouble if it blows
out the door and into the rotor at
the wrong moment. Also, more
than once a door has come loose
and hit the rotor when it became
accidentally unlocked, or
16
somebody failed to install the
safety lock pin. Anything
unsecured in a helicopter is a
rotor hazard.
An OH-58 pilot was flying with
the doors removed. The back seat
cushion blew out of the
helicopter and sheared both tail
rotor blades. The pilot could not
control the aircraft and was killed
in the crash.
Rotors are the most accident
prone part of any helicopter. If
there's one thing for certain in
this world, it is that when one
loses a blade in flight you can't
bring it home in a power-off glide
the way you might a fixed wing.
Blow a blade anywhere—in the
air or on the ground—and you've
had it. If you're lucky you can
pick up the marbles and go home.
Anyway things turn out, you're
out of commission.
Proper care of rotors is there
fore not only of prime
importance, but is, sad to say,
easy to overlook. A helicopter
pilot, with rotors above and
behind him and no wings as a
measuring device, can drift into
the danger zone if he lets his
alertness fail him for a split
second.
Rotor accidents can be
eliminated only when aviators are
constantly concerned with the
possibilities and alert to the
dangers. Constantly. It doesn't do
much good to think about sound
rotor procedures at stated
intervals and forget about them
the rest of the time. Sound rotor
procedures have to be a daily
affair. The penalties for lapses are
too great. There aren't any areas
of aviation in which you can
safely ignore sound procedures,
but when it comes to rotors,
constant alertness is absolutely
critical to your health.
Where helicopters are
operating, skies are more
crowded than a subway at the
rush hour. It's easy for the pilot
whose alertness is the tiniest bit
off to stick his rotors where they
don't belong. To protect himself,
he must always be on the lookout
for the other fellow and he has a
right to expect the other fellow to
be on the alert for him. It's a
matter of teamwork on the part of
all hands, the way just about
everything in the Army must
operate if the job is to be done in
topflight, professional style.
Finally, a helicopter pilot
doesn't have to be told that what
can be only a minor mishap for
fixed wings can turn into
something fatal for helicopters.
Nobody with brains enough to
tie his own shoelaces wants a
rotor-inspired mishap on his
hands for any reason—personnel
strikes, blades meshing, or
anything else.
An ounce of prevention doesn't
cost anything at the corner
drugstore, but the pound of cure
can set you back a king's ransom.
Alertness and foresight, taken
three times daily, are guaranteed
to prevent rotor headaches. Ask
the person who's had one...º-
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 was undertaken to identify correc
tive action opportunities. This effort
included participation by subject
matter experts in the area of training
and doctrine, training developments
and combat developments from the
Aviation Center; the materiel de
velopment community; and avia
AVIATION tion systems managers. Nonmateriel
corrective action opportunities were
MISSION
preferred since they are usually the
AREA
ſº ANALYSIS
(AAMAA)
quickest and cheapest to implement.
Only when such opportunities were
exhausted were materiel actions

\dº- -
considered. With additional staffing
and review, a set of recommended
corrective actions for each deficien
cy was produced.
The results of this 1-year effort

| were examined for appropriateness

and completeness by the Army's
senior management during the Army
Aviation Systems Program Review
Study Branch II
(AASPR) in March 1982. This re
Directorate of Combat Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center sulted in guidance from the Vice
Fort Rucker, AL Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA)
on major aviation issues and actions
THE ARMY AVIATION Mission combat service support missions. which gives direction to Army avia
Area Analysis (AAMAA) recently Corrective actions to overcome tion developments for the next 3 to
has been completed and published these deficiencies were recommend 4 years. Aviation users and develop
by the U.S. Army Aviation Center, ed based on a thorough analysis of ers will follow through by preparing
Ft. Rucker, AL, Directorate of opportunities presented by changes the Army Aviation Development
Combat Developments. This com in doctrine, organization, training Plan for the VCSA's approval, detail
prehensive study effort examined or materiel. ing the recommended actions neces
the role of Army Aviation as an The identification of deficiencies sary to implement the AASPR gui
integral part of the Army's combined in Army Aviation's ability to counter dance and providing those capabi
arms team of the future. As depicted the projected threat was accom lity improvements most critical to
by the AAMAA logo, the analysis plished through evaluation of inputs the force as a whole.
considered all aspects of Army from other mission area analyses, Thus, the first steps of a contin
Aviation through the use of a front input from the field and wargame uing process in the advancement of
to-rear conceptual approach orient simulations conducted at the Avia aviation as an integral member of
ed on the future threat. tion Center and the Combined Arms the combined arms team have been
The AAMAA identified Army Combat Developments Activity completed with the publication of
Aviation deficiencies across the (CACDA) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. the Army's first, in-depth analysis
broad spectrum of combat, combat Once the deficiencies were assimi of its premier arm for deep at
support and combat service support lated, an extensive research effort tack—Army Aviation. dº
operations in the performance of
close combat, fire support, air de MISSION SYSTEMs AVIATION
fense, combat support, intelligence AREA t PROGRAM - -: DEVELOPMENT
ANALYSIS REVIEW PLAN
and electronic warfare, command
(DEFICIENCIES) (GUIDANCE) (ACTIONS)
and control, communications and
JANUARY 82 MARCH 82 SEPTEMBER 82

APRIL 1982 17

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD lºgº.
º' 1977
3.1
3.0
2.9
FY81 . .
CLASS A:
MISHAPS:
ARMY AviaTION logged 1,632,790 flight hours
in fiscal year (FY) 1981, and recorded 43 Class A
fH
aircraft mishaps and 26 fatalities. The mishap rate
was 2.63 per 100,000 flying hours. Figure 1 displays in
graphic form the mishap rates for FY 1977 to the
present, with FY 1981 showing a reversal of the
downward trend of the two previous years.
The frequency of Class A mishaps and fatalities by
aircraft type is shown in figure 2. UH-1 aircraft flew
more than half the hours logged by Army Aviation. It
was involved in about 44 percent of all Class A mishaps
and 54 percent of all fatalities. The UH-1 recorded a
Class A mishap rate of 2.32, which was well below the
Armywide rate.
For the third consecutive year, the OV-1 was the
only fixed wing aircraft that was involved in a fatal
mishap. During that period, whenever ejections had
been attempted, they were successful.
Figure 3 indicates Class A mishaps by rank and
flight hour experience. It is evident that aviators with
low flight time experience were involved in several
mishaps; however, it is still the experienced aviator
who remains the main mishap producer.
CONCLUSION:
The 1,632,790 flight hours logged in FY 1981 were
the most flown by Army Aviation since 1974. This
18
U.S. ARMY
1978 1979 1980 1981
F"Iº
–-
Fis
º ºº
FIGURE 1: CLASS A Mishap Rate
costs, as indicated by the rising mishap rate.
2–º-
sizable increase in flight activity was not without its
The Army's instructor pilot (IP) force had a significant
effect on the year's mishap rate. Whereas in FY 1980,
they were involved in about 5 percent of the mishaps
and no fatalities, they were involved in about 30
percent of the mishaps and 35 percent of the fatalities
in FY 1981.
Mishaps involving pilots and instructor pilots
indicated that deviations from standardized procedures
were contributory cause factors. Nonstandard pro
cedures were apparent in the FY 1981 mishaps which
are shown in figure 4. The table also makes note of
the repetitive nature of the cause factors for the past 3
years.
The eight cause factors represent 50 percent of the
Class A mishaps and 39 percent of the fatalities which
occurred in FY 1979, 1980 and 1981. The recurring
problem areas offer the aviation standardization and
safety communities opportunities for improvement.
Command interest and application of resources by
unit standardization, training, safety and medical
personnel should make a positive impact and a re
duction of the recurring cause factors.
Other Class A mishap cause factors which have
surfaced in FY 81 (not factors in FY 79 and 80)
indicate deviations from standardized procedures.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 TE TE

* # | = | #2 | f | #s º

É
º
e
E is
- # Sº E
$2.HE
#
º
#
$275
=
º
#
$2Tº
#
tº sº
# £5 #53 || F | ##| || 3: EE | #:
UH-1 817,895 || 5009 || 19 || 44 || 14 || 53.8 2.32 :a E3
OH-58
AH-1
294,567
109.751 T
1804 ||
672 T
7 T162
9 || 21
T2
4 || 153 || 305 || |x
TTT53T |35
#
## | #
# #
## | #
# # #
# |##
CH-47 55,806 TT348T2 5 1 39 TT352
U-21 50,742 || 311 || 1 22 1.97 || | W) 6 || 140 4 || 15.4 434 2766
OH-6 37,420 || 2.29 || 1 2.2 || 1 39 || 267 || || W2 9 || 21.0 8 || 308 || 1991 || 29.88
UH-60 33.748 || 207 || 2 5 592 || | W3 16 || 37.2 8 || 308 || 3131 || 3406
OV-1 22,535 | 1.38 || 1 22 || 2 7.7 || 4.43 || || W4 1 2.3 0 00 || 3571 4200
CH-54 6,406 39 || 1 22 || 2 77 | 1561 | TO3TTOTT232 6TT230 TTT27g TT3T30
OTHER 202,920 | 1243 || 0 0 || 0 0 || 0 DAC 1 23 O OO T5347 T44.
TOTALS | 1632,790 | 100 || 43 || 100 || 26 || 100 2.63 43 || 1000 || 26 || 1000 || 2159 || 32.2

FIGURE 2: CLASS A Mishaps and Fatalities by Aircraft FIGURE 3: CLASS A Mishaps by Rank and Experience

• Two simulated single engine mishaps and two determine their validity in relation to the previously
fatalities: One of the single engine mishaps was the discussed eight problem areas and the four areas
result of the IP overloading the trainee and the training unique to FY 1981.
scenario beyond the capabilities of the IP, the student ... require pre-mission and performance planning
and the machine. The impractical nonstandardized for all missions.
approach to emergency maneuver training proved . . . continue to monitor the training and mission
fatal to both aviators. The other mishap resulted from scheduling of the less experienced aviators to enhance
a maneuver attempted outside the operational envelope their professional development.
of the aircraft and beyond the capabilities of man and ... continue to emphasize the conditions necessary
machine. for a standardized autorotation. At 100 feet above
• Two mishaps while developing new routines for ground level (AGL):
exhibition: One mishap was caused by diversion of (1) be in a position to make the intended landing
attention of both flight crewmembers. The other area.
maneuver was aerodynamically impractical. (2) have a normal rate of descent.
• One tachometer generator failure: The tachometer (3) have the rotor in the green.
generator failure was mistaken for an engine failure (4) have the proper airspeed.
by the instructor pilot. The mishap indicated consider For an autorotation with turn, lane alignment must be
able lack of familiarity with emergency procedures achieved by 200 feet AGL.
and a breakdown in flight standardization. . . . exercise appropriate disciplinary measures in
• One taxiing into obstructions: There is a saying the control of “over-spirited” aviators.
in aviation, “There is no excuse for a taxi accident.” In
this instance, the crew was relying on nonstandard II. All maintenance personnel adhere to “by-the
procedures while ground taxiing in an area with limited book” procedures. *4
clearance. This type of mishap can only produce a
negative impression of the PIC's (pilot in command's)
FIGURE 4: Repetitive Cause Factors
ability and reflects in a similar manner on his supervisor.
There were 11 mishaps as a result of materiel failure FY 1981 FY 1979, 1980, 1981
or malfunction. These “other" type mishaps were Cauş0 mishap |fatalities fatalities
responsible for six fatalities and one missing aircraft
1. Wiſe 10
and crew. The necessity for close supervision of main
2. Tſee Strike 6
tenance procedures is indicated.

RECOMMENDATIONS
[O]loweſ
I. Commanders, operational personnel and trainers...
tion
examine their standardization programs and

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention 36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander, 255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL 558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message

APRIL 1982 19

-
-
- methods of communication are unavailable to us.
Carol Stein photo by Reid Rogers
The Art Of Survival
On a cold night in December 1981, a U.S. Air Force
F-4 Phantom departed its base on a routine training
mission. The aircraft and its crew were both equipped
with the latest survival equipment and the crew was
well versed in the techniques of survival—just in case.
Over the Atlantic Ocean, just east of Cape Fear,
NC, it happened! The aircraft became disabled in
flight and the crew was forced to eject. “The water
was cold, as you would expect during this time of
year,” one crewmember reported later, “but my life
raft deployed just like the TM said it should.”
Unfortunately, while attempting to enter his raft,
this crewmember lost both his food and his water. He
considered this only a minor inconvenience, since he
still had his waterproof survival radio to talk to the
search and rescue teams, which he knew would shortly
come to rescue him. He did become a bit concerned,
however, when he discovered that the radio didn't
work—it was waterlogged.
Our unlucky crewmember now found himself without
food, without water and without means of communica
tion. He knew there were plenty of fish available for
20
food, but he also knew from his survival training that
he shouldn't eat any food without having water available
to aid in digestion. This also was of little consequence
to him, however, since he was still convinced that his
rescue was imminent.
After 4 days, the official search and rescue effort
was suspended. The crew was presumed lost.
On the sixth day, our by now very hungry and
thirsty crewmember spotted a coastal fishing boat. By
waving, yelling and falling out of his raft, he was
finally able to attract enough attention to get himself
rescued. Shortly thereafter, the search for the second
crewmember was resumed. He has never been found.
The lesson to be learned from such a survival
experience is this: We should never take for granted
that we will be rescued immediately. Once we are
safely out of our aircraft and down to earth, we
should be prepared to be in a survival situation
indefinitely. We must manage to obtain enough food
and water to keep us alive. And we must devise ways
to communicate with would-be rescuers if our standard
These are all part of the “Art of Survival." (Ed Daughety,
DARCOM Project Office for ALSE)
The Incredible Shrinking Helmet
Recently, aircrew personnel from Ft. Campbell,
KY, were involved in cold weather exercises in Alaska.
While there, they discovered a rather bizarre phenome
non. It seems that their SPH-4 flight helmets, when
left out in the extreme cold, shrank to the point where
they couldn't even be donned! Consequently, personnel
actually had to warm their helmets before they could
attempt to use them.
Anyone who has a car or boat made of fiberglass
knows that this material contracts considerably when
exposed to cold and expands when exposed to heat.
Since the shell of the SPH-4 is made of this very same
fiberglass, you have to expect that the same physical
laws would apply to it.
So, remember, just as you would “keep your powder
dry,” make sure to “keep your helmet warm.” And if
you are really disturbed by the fact that your helmet
shrinks and expands, don't hesitate to submit a quality
deficiency report (QDR) on a Standard Form 368 to:
Commander, TSARCOM, ATTN: DRSTS-MCFT,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ALSE School Update
We have been informed by the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) that the Army
Aviation Life Support Specialist course 860-67( )
ASI Q2 is now open to personnel in other than 67
series military occupational specialities (MOSs). In
addition to those in the 67-series (aircraft maintenance),
personnel in MOSs 71P (flight operations coordinator),
91B (medical specialist),96H (aerial sensor specialist)
and 98J (EW/SIGINT noncommunications interceptor)
are now eligible for this 5-week course conducted at
the U.S. Army Transportation School, Ft. Eustis, VA.
As of yet, however, only 67-series personnel can be
awarded the additional skill identifier (ASI) Q2.
We have also been informed that almost all classes
for fiscal year (FY) 1982 are full, including those
quotas for the Air Force school at Chanute AFB, IL.
Quotas for the Ft. Eustis course will be increased to
180 in FY 1983 and to more than 200 in FY 1984.
In addition, the one class (#8, 22 June to 28 July 82)
at Ft. Eustis designated as an officer class is also full.
The status of officer classes for next year is unknown
at this time. Point of contact for further information
is Mr. Dick Allen, ALSE course coordinator, U.S.
Army Transportation School, AUTOVON927-2113.
Radio Pocket Shortage
The U.S. Army Support Activity, Philadelphia, has
informed us that the pocket, radio, survival vest,
national stock number (NSN) 8415-00-442-3616, is
temporarily unavailable for issue. Stocks of this item
have been exhausted due to increased requisitioning
by Army activities. The effective date of supply for the
pocket, which is used to accommodate the AN/PACRC
90 radio, is 1 July 1982. Limited assets may be available
sooner to supply some high priority requisitions.
Pending availability, all requisitions for this item
submitted to Defense Personnel Support Center, source
of supply S9T, will be held on backorder. Point of
contact for further information is Ms. G. Lyles, AUTO
VON 444-2537.
Visor Track Problem
In the March 1981 issue of PEARL, we told you
about the new track, visor, interchangeable, NSN.8415
01-083-8372, used on the SPH-4 flight helmet. A problem
has arisen concerning the use of that visor track. It
seems that when the lens is in a full down position, and
the pilot tries to move the lens to the full up position,
the lens tends to bind in the track. When additional
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN DRCPO-ALSE.
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63.120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 3 14-263-3307
APRIL 1982
force is applied to the lens, it jumps out of the track,
leaving the pilot blank faced and lensless.
Should you experience such a problem, replace the
new interchangeable visor track with the original visor
track assemblies. NSN 8415-00-410-4668 (right hand)
and NSN 8415-00-410-4669 (left hand). If these replace
ment tracks are not available, continue using NSN
8415-01-083-8372 until the replacement tracks are
furnished. Point of contact for further information is
Mr. H.A. Tetreault, TSARCOM Directorate for Mainte
nance, AUTOVON 693-3171 or Commercial (314).263
3171.
New Direction On Lensatic Compasses
Lost and bewildered when it comes to compasses?
Here'ssome information for your guidance and protection.
Lensatic compasses manufactured before 1962 contain
radium, a hazardous material. Compasses made after
1962 use tritium, which is less hazardous. The old radium
compasses were recalled in 1969, but some of them are
still in the field. If your unit has any of these old radium
lensatic compasses, DISPOSE OF THEM IMMEDI
ATELY! Refer to Army Regulation 385-11 for
instructions.
It's simple to identify the old compasses. They
will either not be marked with an NSN, or marked
with an NSN other than 6605-00-846-7618 or 6605
00-151-5337.
If you are still uncertain, use a gamma radiation
survey meter (AN/PDR-27 or equivalent) to measure
the gamma field emitted by the compass. The old
compasses will emit a measurable gamma field; the
new ones will not.
If you need further guidance, write Commander,
ARRCOM, ATTN: DRSAR-SF, Rock Island, IL
61201, or call Mr. Byrom Harris, AUTOVON 793
3383/3483.
Obsolete Seat Belts
All supply personnel should take a second look at
any requisitions you may be submitting for the belt,
aircraft safety, NSN 1680-00-787-4299 or NSN 1680
01-054-6531. The resource code for both of these
belts has been changed from PA to PZ (obsolete).
Do not requisition either of the NSNs above.
Do requisition NSN 1680-00-447-9504 when replace
ment belts are required. Point of contact for further
information is Mr. R. Halsted, TSARCOM Director
ate for Materiel Management, AUTOVON 693-3769
or Commercial (314) 263-3769. *mº
21
1981 U.S. Army Aviation

TRAINING SYMPOSIUM/Policy Commit

CoMBINED ARMS training, doctrine and for issues, this year's representatives acted directly
coordination was the theme that existed through on those issues to be voted on by the Policy
out the 1981 U.S. Army Aviation Training Symposi Committee.
um/Policy Committee Meeting held in November That concept allows discussion input to issues
at the Aviation Center. by non-Policy Committee organizations and indi
The meeting, hosted at Ft. Rucker's Lake Lodge, viduals and subject matter experts, as well as by
brought together representatives of major Army voting Policy Committee members. This inter
commands, Department of the Army agencies action, using an organizational approach, has
and the combined arms team. The two interfacing assured thorough discussions and consideration
conferences each occupied 2% days of a full of alternatives by the aviation leaders and imple
week of discussions and presentations. mentors who are directly affected by the decisions.
Mandated and attended as outlined in AR 95 The symposium thus allows expansion from a
1, the Policy Committee meets annually to resolve pure standardization meeting to a forum which
aviation standardization issues. This DA level allows discussion of many different facets of Army
forum acts to resolve issues submitted by subordi Aviation and assists the Policy Committee by
nate aviation standardization boards that cannot prediscussing and refining each issue.
be solved or resolved at local or MACOM level.
This year, field units submitted 77 issues concern
ing many aspects of aviation standardization, TRAINING SYMPOSIUM
policy and training. The opening events included remarks and
The Training Symposium concept was intro updates to the 150 members by Aviation Center
duced during the 1980 meetings and improved directorates and several DA agencies. (Aviation
and refined for 1981. While last year's symposium Digest, December 1981, page 17, reported the
used the Army Aviation Training Study as a basis pertinent opening remarks of several general
officers and guest speakers, including special
remarks by General Robert M. Shoemaker, CG,
GLOSSARY FORSCOM.) Of particular interest was a multi
agency presentation entitled “Training for the
AR Army Regulation IFE Instrument Flight Integrated Battlefield," which discussed historical,
ARTEP Army Training and Examiner
present and future training for aviation operations
Evaluation Program IFR instrument Flight
ATM Aircrew Training Man- Rules
in an NBC environment.
ual IP Instructor Pilot Four work groups, chaired by COLs David Allen,
BG Brigadier General MACOM Major Army Command
CG Commanding General MG Major General
Bruce Gibbons, William Kuykendall and Joseph
COL Colonel NBC Nuclear. Biological, Rutkowski, addressed issues grouped by the func
CP Copilot Chemical
tional lines of standardization, training, rotary
DA Department of the SEMA Special Electronic
Army Mission Aircraft wing training and fixed wing training. Aviation
DES Directorate of Evalu- SIP Standardization In Center subject matter experts attended as needed
ation/Standardization structor Pilot
FORSCOM Forces Command UT Unit Trainer to provide information and data for those subjects
VFR Visual Flight Rules that were discussed. A series of issue status boards

22 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 Major Kirk M. Knight
Directorate of Training Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Meeting Fort Rucker, AL
and comment sheets allowed members to submit
written input to other work groups or to visit the
groupS.
Echoing the emphasis on combined arms
training, experts of the combined arms and aviation
carrier branches attended the work group ses
sions. Representatives of the Combined Arms
Center, as well as the Air Defense, Armor, Infantry,
Intelligence and Transportation Schools provided
valuable input.
After 2 days, the symposium groups had com
pleted their tasks and final discussions, alterna
tives and recommendations for each issue; and
results were printed for use during the Policy
Committee meeting. COL Frank Estes, Director
of Training Developments, noted that the thorough
and frank discussions by each group contributed
to the operational success and greatly reduced
the research requirements and workload to the
Policy Committee.
POLICY COMMITTEE
BG Ellis D. Parker, committee executive chair
man, opened the meeting at midweek. In his
remarks he stressed the need for aviation Com
manders to “sell" their assets and capabilities to
combined arms members to fully integrate their
units with the ground maneuver forces and to
train the ground commanders to use aviation in a
doctrinally and technically sound manner. MG
Harold I. Small, CG, United States Army Trans
portation School, joined the meeting to discuss
maintenance related issues.
Every issue from the field was presented to
the committee by the representative responsible
for its submission. After review and discussion,
each issue was then voted and finalized by the
members. While some recommendations to issues
APRIL 1982
Mr. Robert L. Ledbetter
Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
will require more study, many issues were decided
immediately. In order to make it possible for field
commanders to implement those without having
to wait for printed changes to the ATM and AR
95-1, a message authorizing such implementation
was sent to all active and reserve Component
aviation units (Message, HQDA (DAMO-FQ) DTG
2815282 December 1981, subject: Army Aviation
Policy Changes). This is the first time the com
mittee has taken such action, and its timeliness
made the policy changes much more meaningful.
Some highlights of changes listed in the mes
sage are:
• Crediting ATM task iterations flown in a
more demanding mode of flight for iterations
required in a less demanding mode.
• Eliminating ATM tasks 451 1,4512 and 4513
as mandatory flight evaluation tasks.
• Authorizing MACOMs to waive, by unit, ATM
requirements.
• Revising procedures for evaluation of the
vertical helicopter IFR recovery procedure.
• Allowing the logging of copilot time when
performing CP duties from the “jump seat"
if the aviator is receiving training or evalua
tion from UT, IP/SIP or IFE.
• Deleting accelerate/stop distance computa
tions for Army airplanes as the sole basis
for a go/no-go decision.
• Allowing reserve component aviators to per
form VFR pilot duties prior to completing
instrument qualification (qualifiers are out
lined in the message).
• Authorizing qualified flight surgeons to fly
aircraft from the CP position of a single
pilot aircraft while accompanied by an IP/SIP
in order to evaluate aeromedical factors.
• Refining ATM requirements for aviators
23
 required to fly more than one aircraft.
• Outlining mandatory ATM tasks for mainte
nance officers.
Many other issues resulted in recommendations
which will require additional study and considera
tion and which involve outside agencies. Some
issues and/or recommendations are:
• Simultaneous printing of operator's manual
and checklist changes.
• Evaluation of planning for and employment
of Army Aviation assets during ARTEP.
Institutionalized training for SEMA aircrews.
Refining of the concept/doctrine of tactical
instrument flight.
• Review of weight and balance requirements
for flight and, if necessary, training of
technicians.
• Standardization of emergency locator trans
mitter procurement for MACOM-optional
installation in aircraft.
• Continued study of Individual Ready Re
CGºizºs)N
º A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
HITMORE vs. GACP
ISSUE: Unit commanders and aviators felt that
the Helicopter Installed Television Monitor and
Recorder (HITMORE) system does not provide
sufficient real time feedback to the gunner while
he is engaging a target. The IP monitor is not an
adequate device because the IP's attention is diverted
to flying the aircraft. Every aviator interviewed
preferred the Gunner's Accuracy Control Panel
(GACP).
COMMENT: HITMORE was evaluated at the U.S.
24
serve aviator training and guidance.
• Continued progress to the goal of institu
tionalized training for all test pilots.
• Defining standards and depth of knowledge
required for pilots, UT, IP and SIP during
oral evaluations.
• Emphasis on integration of Army Aviation
into the combined arms team through mili
tary education systems, ARTEP, confer
ences and training.
COL George Newton, DES director and execu
tive secretary of the Policy Committee, noted
that issues requiring additional action would be
aggressively pursued to ensure action and imple
mentation.
The work of the attendees, according to BG
Parker, met the challenge of the many difficult
and complex issues. He charged the members
to return to their units and disseminate the fine
detail of the issues and to move ahead with realis
tic training and combined arms operations.
Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, in 1976
and 1977. In 1978, user evaluations were conducted
at Ft. Campbell, KY and in USAREUR (U.S. Army,
Europe). Following the evaluations, a decision was
made not to procure more Gunner's Accuracy
Control Panels (GACP) and to pursue fielding of
the HITMORE system. Serious problems with
GACP include erroneous scoring and the require
ment to have an infrared source on each training
target. HITMORE can be used any place and any
time, with or without firing actual ammunition.
HITMORE now can provide real time feedback as
well as pre and post launch constraint indications.
(Directorate of Training Developments)
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 - -

|
|
.
|--
-
.
º
º -
-
-
ºt finitz.
º
-

- -
-

From Jeffery L. Stout

• Well Santa, I knew we should have filed that flight plan before take-off.

From MAJ Joe D. Coyner Jr.

• I tried to tell Santa to recompute the weight and balance after he decided to
include batteries with the electronic games.

From SP5 Noelkenya Atkins

• What in the . . . . . . . . . .

From SSG Lewis K. Phillips

• Guess which red-nosed 94%.”?X& was responsible for figuring weight and balance?
• You see what can happen when just one individual doesn't pull his share of the
load. Think safety!
• Okay Rudolph, you were flight lead so you haul the bag out of here.
• For my next trick I'll stand on my head and . . . (old army joke).
• Honest, the BF-TR2E pulled up right in front of me.

From SGT Joseph Kielbasa Jr.

• Wire strikes again!
From LTC William H. Schwend
• Don't spoil your day, keep a tight line on the flight line.

From SP4 Michael J. Anthony Jr.

• Dancer, I thought you said tree top level was at 4 to 5 feet. No Santa, I said 45 feet.

From Marvin P. Fitzgerald

• We told him before we left, he was in violation of AR 95-1 paragraph 2-8 (4).
From CPT William P. Wilson
• Well, so much for TAC instruments!

From MAJ Bill Carroll

• I warned you that flying night NOE without night vision goggles is tricky business.

APRIL 1982 25
 6"AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL BATTALION
| N TH E F| E LD
An interview conducted for Aviation Digest by Richard P. Fulton,
III Corps and Ft. Hood Public Affairs Office

AN UNExPECTED blanket of headquarters and two platoons sta

snow, reinforced with icy blasts of tioned at Ft. Hood. Both platoons,
frigid arctic air, was overrun with a however, are assets of one of the
muddy thaw late in the week-long two companies making up the 16th
GOLDEN SABER V, corps-level ATC. One of these companies is
training exercise conducted late in stationed at Ft. Sill, OK, and the
January over 240 square miles of other is at Ft. Lewis, WA.
maneuver area at Ft. Hood, TX. Each company has 5 air traffic
Even though environmental con control platoons, and the 10 platoons
ditions were harsh, soldiers of the are spread out over the western
post's 16th Air Traffic Control part of the United States, including
(ATC) Battalion warmed to the tasks Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, Kansas,
the exercise demanded and provided Colorado, Texas and other loca
required air traffic control and flight tions. The two platoons at Ft. Hood
following services to the many air are in support of activities taking
craft being used in the exercise. place at the largest military instal
Moving out into the cedar brush lation in the free world. Units sup
north, west and south from the main ported under the III Corps umbrella
cantonment area, convoys of 16th include the 1st Cavalry Division,
ATC troopers crawled their vehicles 2d Armored Division and the 6th
through ice and snow to prede Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat).
termined locations, set up heavily According to Lieutenant Colonel
camouflaged airfields and flight Carlton Roberson, battalion com
support facilities, and were soon in mander, units manning the numer
business managing the airspace over ous field sites set up by 16th ATC
the huge exercise area. soldiers included 1/68th and 2/68th
Even though individual platoons ATC Platoons from Ft. Hood,5/68th
of the battalion frequently go to ATC Platoon from Ft. Sill, the 68th
the field in support of division-level AirTraffic Control Company Head
(and below) unit training, GOLDEN quarters and the 16th ATC Bat
SABER V was the first time the talion Headquarters. In addition to
battalion headquarters had moved the soldiers from Ft. Sill, the bat
out as well. talion also brought in soldiers from
The 16th Air Traffic Control Ft. Riley, KS, and Ft. Polk, LA, to
Battalion consists of the battalion take part in GOLDEN SABER V.
SSG Frank Felix, a Ft. Sill, OK, noncommissioned officer, stands perimeter
guard near a portable radar unit at a north Ft. Hood temporary airfield. Members
of the 16th ATC from numerous posts came to Ft. Hood to participate in GOLDEN
SABER V training. SSG Felix is visual proof of a statement attributed to a retired
Army general officer that regardless of assignment, all training must stress that
the primary duty of a soldier is the obligation to fight to protect the nation when
called upon to do so

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 Aviation Digest: What is the 16th ATC Battalion
doing in the field?
LTC Roberson: The battalion has come out for the
GOLDEN SABER exercise which is happening now
(18 to 22 January 1982). GOLDEN SABER is a III
Corps exercise with the corps headquarters and key
personnel from two divisions participating. It is primarily
a command post exercise; but, we will be controlling
the airspace over the Ft. Hood training area during
the exercise.

Aviation Digest:When you say controlling the airspace,

do you mean everything that flies over Ft. Hood?
LTC Roberson: Essentially that means that we will
provide flight-following to all aircraft in the exercise
area. By flight-following, I mean that we will advise
|-
aircraft of the range hot areas; we will flight-follow
with them or track them from takeoff to landing, and
º for safety purposes assist in rescue actions if anyone
|
should go down. Finally, we will provide them all
types of advisories such as weather in and around Ft.
Hood except for the main cantonment area of the
| --
\ i post. We will control all of the airspace over Ft. Hood
reservation, and all of the training area. We will be
putting in a corps-level airfield for the III Corps
command post. We also will be putting in a division
airfield for the 1st Cavalry Division and a division
airfield for the 2d Armored Division. In addition, we
will have the flight-following facilities which will talk
to the aircraft while they are en route from one
airfield to the other.

Aviation Digest:Is this what you would do in a combat

situation?
LTC Roberson: Yes, this is essentially what we would
do in a combat situation, though it is somewhat modified
because of the training aspects of the exercise. And of
course we are restricted by real-world considerations
here around Ft Hood. We have other traffic besides
exercise traffic of which we have to be aware.
Essentially, what we would do in a combat situation is
the same thing except all of the division and corps
troops would be out instead of just the command
posts. We would work in the corps rear areas and the
division rear areas providing airfields and flight
following services to the aircraft who fly in the division
and the corps rear areas.

Aviation Digest: What kind of interface would you

have with Air Force operations?
LTC Roberson: The only interface that we would
have with the Air Force would be in terms of airspace
itself. In other words, the Air Force aircraft would
probably be working at higher altitudes. There is
such a thing called the coordinating altitude which
runs in the neighborhood of 300 to 500 feet above the

APRIL 1982 27
ground. We are primarily concerned with Army aircraft
and helicopters that are working below that coordi
nating altitude at NOE (nap-of-the-earth). The Air
Force is concerned with aircraft above this coordinating
altitude. We work with the Air Force to coordinate
any aircraft that would penetrate that altitude. In
other words, Air Force fast-mover aircraft that would
come down low or Army aircraft that would go higher
than the coordinating altitude would mean that we
would need to work that interface.
As far as any airfield operations, no, we would not
get directly involved with the Air Force in that respect.
In fact, our airfields are primarily for Army elements.
Of course, certain Air Force aircraft may land at
Army airfields depending on the operation or situation.
There possibly would be, in a combat zone, many
airfields that were operated by the Air Force. We
-
would establish communication and coordinate with
them, but we would not be part of their operation.
Aviation Digest: What about the air defense situation?
Are you all somewhat interfaced in that respect in
terms of watching for bogies?
LTC Roberson: We are directly involved with the air
defense personnel in that we have a great deal of
coordination to effect because Army aircraft have to
move around in the battle area. In the division rear
area and, of course, in the corps rear area, we would
advise the Army aircraft concerning the location of
hot areas—what things they should avoid and not
overfly. We would also pass along warnings from the
air defense folks as to any bogie aircraft traffic or
some other air defense threat in being in the A/O
(area of operations).
We have a direct interconnect with the air defense
personnel through an element we call the CAME
which stands for corps airspace management element.
We also have the DAME which, of course, stands for
division airspace management element. In either the
CAME or the DAME we have air traffic control
personnel, air defense personnel as well as aviation or
airspace management personnel or aviator personnel.
These elements work as part of the CAME or DAME
to coordinate all of the airspace with respect to air
traffic control and air defense. It is, as you can see, a
coordinated and integrated effort.

º º- º A viation Digest: Is this the first time the 16th ATC

Dºº- º **º-
U.S. Army helicopters (below)
flying into 16th Air Traffic
Control Battalion-operated
airfields during GOLDEN
SABER V, a III Corps training
exercise held earlier this year,
received expert instruction
from soldier controllers man
ning flight-following, radar and
Control tower facilities. The
soldiers did an expert job of
camouflaging various pieces
of equipment and conducting
themselves in a tactical man
ner during the exercise
-
* -
16th ATC Battalion soldiers
(left and center, above), confer
with LTC Carlton Roberson,
their battalion commander, at
a field site high atop Anderson
Mountain on the Southwest
portion of the Ft. Hood military
reservation. The Soldiers heavi
ly camouflaged their facility,
and also put out concertina wire
tangles as part of their overall
physical Security plan
has been in the field at Ft. Hood?
LTC Roberson: In one respect yes, in another, no.
Our ATC platoons here at Ft. Hood go to the field
quite often in support of the III Corps divisions (1st
Cavalry Division and 2d Armored Division) here.
This is, however, the first time the entire battalion
headquarters has gone to the field in total support of a
III Corps level exercise. It is an experiment, so to
speak, with the weather and the elements and getting
everything coordinated. It has been quite an experience
so far, moving out into the teeth of a heavy snowstorm
and getting set up.

.. I - - -
Aviation Digest: When did you come out to the field?
LTC Roberson: We came to the field on Thursday,
the 14th of January, and were finally able to get out of
the Ft. Hood cantonment area in spite of the snow. It
was quite an experience. We did deploy our aircraft,
which was no problem, but the convoys had problems
getting up and down the hills on the icy roads. It took
quite some time.
Aviation Digest: How many miles are we talking about?
LTC Roberson: In the neighborhood of about 20
miles from main post out to the various field sites. For
example, here at the battalion headquarters, we moved
into the site and began immediately getting the messhall
tent Squared away, communications established and
the sleeping tents up. It was supposed to drop to
about 15 degrees F. that night, and we wanted to be
ready for it. We got established the first night before
dark, and moved in and have been working ever
Since.
Aviation Digest: Yesterday there were significantly
low temperatures in this area. Did you have a reading
out here?
LTC Roberson: We did not have a local onsite reading,
but we estimate it was about 16 to 18 degrees F., and
that was in the afternoon. Later it became even colder
with the windchill factor making it generally pretty
miserable. As you know, this type of cold is not the
kind of thing we are used to in the central Texas area
during the winter.
Aviation Digest: When you say you moved the battalion
headquarters out here, does that mean you moved
everything that a regular Army battalion has?
LTC Roberson: We have a headquarters and a head
quarters detachment, not a complete headquarters
and headquarters company. We have most everything
that the company would have with the exception of a
wrecker and a few other odds and ends. We moved
the entire battalion headquarters out here for this
exercise. We have the motor pool set up, operations,
distribution—we are making our chow runs and so
forth. We are conducting both exercise business and
real-world business. We have to stay in touch with
Alaska and Hawaii as well as the elements in the field
for GOLDEN SABER V.
Aviation Digest: How is air traffic control being imple
mented in this particular exercise?
LTC Roberson: Basically the airspace at Ft. Hood
has been broken into four distinct areas with one
area, of course, being over Ft. Hood proper or the
main cantonment area. Outside of that, within the
military operational area, the 16th ATC controls all
aircraft and three distinct flight-following zones have
APRIL 1982
been set up. In the northern portion of the Ft. Hood
military reservation our 2/68th ATC Platoon has
responsibility. In the middle zone the battalion
headquarters and the 5/68th controls the aircraft in
that zone. The 1/68th ATC Platoon controls the
aircraft in the southern portion of the post.
Essentially what has been worked out is that any
aircraft departing Robert Gray Army Airfield or Hood
Army Airfield will initially be controlled from airfield
facilities. As they move into the GOLDEN SABER
exercise area, control or advisory will be passed to
16th ATC elements. Letters of agreement have been
established for these procedures and an aviators'
procedures guide has been provided to the aviators.
Aviation Digest: Air traffic controllers are not normally
thought of as people who wear helmets and carry
rifles, yet everyone I see, yourself included, is so
equipped. Why is this?
LTC Roberson: We are in an actual training exercise
and we have a lot of things to do. The tendency is to
want to put the weapon down on the ground and take
off the field gear because it is, of course, easier to
work without it. In a real combat situation, however,
the helmet would be necessary and so would the
weapon in case of incoming, or possible perimeter
attack or something of that nature.
I require, as most commanders do, that all personnel
work completely, totally, in their field gear to not
only get used to wearing it but also to be prepared for
any contingency that might arise.
The bottom line is that if we don't train with weapons
and field gear, and if we don't run our generators, and
if we don't put up our tents, then we don't know how
to do those things when or if we have to. We need to
train with what we have and know how to use it.
Aviation Digest: I notice some aircraft parked here at
your field battalion headquarters. Why are they here?
LTC Roberson: We have three UH-1 Hueys assigned
to the battalion. In addition, we have two OH-58
Kiowas brought from Ft. Sill on loan to us from
another battalion. These aircraft are used primarily
for flight checks on our radar systems and on the
precision approaches installed at each airfield set up.
We also flight check the airspace system. So each
facility, each airfield, will be flight checked by battalion
aircraft flown by an officer who is certified to check
the actual approaches. That is how we can be sure
that they are safe.
In addition to interviewing the 16th ATC Battalion
commander, several of his soldiers were also inter
viewed. Here are their comments.
Aviation Digest: Sergeant, what is your job?
29
Sergeant First Class Terry L. Howard: I am the battalion
motor sergeant.
Aviation Digest: What kind of challenges have you
had on this training problem?
SFC Howard: Most of the problems we have are with
the cold weather. Right now we are kind of low on
fuel as far as the fuel trucks getting way out here to us
and giving us fuel. About our generators, we had one
generator go down back to the rear, and we have had
some problems on the vehicles, getting them started
in the morning because it is so cold. But let me add
this, that we always do get them started. Our M880s
are starting real good but the deuce and a halfs and
the jeeps are the ones we have to work with. When
the cold hits the batteries, you can hang it up as far as
trying to get one started, so we pull-start them or
jump them. When we get them started we let them
run awhile in order to get a good charge.
Aviation Digest: How long have you been with the
16th?
SFC Howard: Going on 2 years now. Other assignments
have included infantry, mechanized infantry, aviation,
medics and signal.
Aviation Digest: And, what is your job, lieutenant?
Lieutenant Howell: Roy Howell, the 16th ATC
Battalion's headquarters detachment commander.
Aviation Digest: Where are we, and what is your job?
LT Howell: We are on top of a hill in the northern
part of Ft. Hood, and I am working with some soldiers
from the 68th ATC Company's Ft. Sill platoon. We're
setting up and running a corps level airfield. These
soldiers convoyed 300 miles by truck and jeep to get
here for this exercise.
Aviation Digest: Tell us about the weather.
LT Howell: When we came out here, we had about 4
inches of snow on the ground. Then, within the past 2
or 3 days, the snow melted and created quite a mud
problem for us. The past 2 days it has dried out pretty
well. We are doing pretty good right now, having
scraped a lot of the mud out of the mess tents and
sleeping tents.
Aviation Digest: Lieutenant, if this airfield were in a
combat situation, would the corps folks be using it?
LT Howell: Yes, sir. What we have Over here is the
radar set that you would see normally at any airfield–
civilian or military. It is ground controlled approach
radar. They have the radar sets inside those vans.
What they can do is find out what aircraft are out
there, who they belong to via the IFF (identification
friend or foe), and then guide those aircraft in, in case
30
1LT Randy L. Moseng, platoon leader of 5th Platoon, 68th Air
Traffic Control Company, uses the desk inside a flight coordi
nation center to record locations of 16th ATC Battalion units
scattered around the more than 200 square miles of maneuver
area being used in the GOLDEN SABER V training exercise.
LT Moseng is from Ft. Sill, OK. The battalion brought in soldiers
from its many western United States military posts to observe
and take part in the exercise
of adverse weather. This airfield is capable of C-130
drops and also is C-130 landable.
Aviation Digest: A lot of people are wearing field
gear—in fact everyone we have encountered. Every
thing is heavily camouflaged too. Why is that?
LT Howell: We are in a simulated tactical situation
and in a tactical situation all equipment and vehicles
must be camouflaged so that they cannot be seen
from the ground or from the air. Our people are
carrying weapons because they are soldiers as well as
controllers. They would have the mission of defending
this airfield as well as operating it.
Aviation Digest: Sergeant, what is your job?
Staff Sergeant Armando Leos: I am the administration
NCO in the NCO Section.
Aviation Digest: What has it been like for you out
here?
SSG Leos: The first part of our time was spent putting
up tents and getting our vehicles deployed.
Aviation Digest: Did the weather create any problems?
SSG Leos: Yesterday was a really super cold day for
central Texas–snow and ice on the ground—we heard
it was minus 2 degrees F. out here, but nobody has
had frostbite or other cold weather injuries.
Aviation Digest: What about the sleeping situation?
Did you put blankets in your sleeping bag?
SSG Leos: Yes, right now I am using two sleeping
bags, one inside the other, and I have to say this—it's
still cold in there!
The corps-level exercise proved to be a valuable
learning experience. ATC personnel working in field
gear and confronted with extremely cold weather (for
the area) nevertheless succeeded in this mission and
demonstrated that they are capable of meeting the
challenges of the future. qº-" —-
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Cold air replacing warm air at the surface is character
istic of what type front?
A. Cold C. Stationary
B. Warm D. Occluded

Warm air replacing cold air at the surface is character

istic of what type of front?
A. Cold C. Stationary
iſolſ|Gſº B. Warm D. Occluded

iſſºlſ; Which type of icing is the most serious form of structural

ice?

% A.
B.
Rime
Frost
C.
D.
Clear
Carburetor
43
“Tower Talk” is a quiz containing questions based on 6
How often are National Weather Service terminal
publications applicable to Army Aviation.The answers are at forecasts issued?
the bottom of the page. If you did not do well, perhaps you
should get out the publication and look it over. A. Every hour C. 4 times daily
B. 3 times daily D. Every 12 hours

AVIATION WEATHER 7. A terminal forecast is valid for how many hours.

A 4 C. 12
FM 1-30 B. 6 D. 24

Mr. Ron B. Jackson 8. When may the terminal forecast visibility be omitted
Directorate of Training Developments from the forecast?
U.S. Army Aviation Center
A. Exceeds 8 statute miles C. 2 miles
Fort Rucker, AL
B. 3 miles or more (VFR) D. 5 miles

An area forecast describes which of the following

1. If the lowest barometric pressure at sea level is 29.92 anticipated conditions? - -

inches of mercury, the pressure (in inches of mercury)

A. Clouds C. Weather
at 2,000 feet would be approximately?
B. l.cing D. All the above
A. 27.92 C. 30.92
B. 28.92 D. 31.92
10. Area forecasts are good for how many hours?
2. Which defines a decrease in temperature with an 8 hours with an 8 hour outlook
increase in height? 12 hours with a 12 hour outlook
A.
B.
Inversion
Lapse rate
C.
D.
Relative humidity
Isothermal layer : 18 hours with a 12 hour outlook
Period specified for each report

eg-91 eled II uogoas I-9L 6d O ‘OI p-91 eled 'I-91 5d ‘G ‘Z t-4 eled ‘9-Z 6d a 't' qLZ-Z eled 61-Z 5d V 'i
q8-91 eled II uoupa's ‘I-9L 5d ‘G ‘6 tº-91 eled I-91 5d a 9 qI-4 eled Z-4 5d v 'g
qt-91 eled ‘9-9L 6d V '8 9-6 eled 'I-6 6d O ‘g G-Z eled 9-2 5d a 'z SXHGHAWSNV

APRIL 1982 31
 REPORTING FINAL
Late NewsFromArmy Aviation Activities
FROM FT. EUSTIS
Warrant Officer Occupational Survey. The
Warrant Officer MOS 160A (Aviation Maintenance
Technician) occupational survey is currently being
fielded by the Army Transportation School. Its
results will be used to design, develop and
implement improved aviation maintenance in
struction. Transportation School officials believe
information from individuals who are performing
and supervising the maintenance tasks in field
units will enable the school to ensure needed
courses are being offered.
All 160A warrant officers and their supervisors
are to be surveyed. Individuals who have not
received their copy of the form by this time should
contact LTC Dilg, CW2 Moriarty or Mr. Cahill at
AUTOVON 927–217 1/3367, or write to Comman
dant, Army Transportation School, ATTN: ATSP
TD-PDD, Ft. Eustis, VA 23604. Nonduty-hour calls,
with specific reference to the 160A survey, can
be made to AUTOVON 927-3571.
FROM. F.T. RUCKER
Safety Contributions Recognized. SFC Gerald
L. Johnson, Army Aeromedical Research Lab
oratory, has been presented the General Spruance
Award by the SAFE (Survival and Flight Equip
ment) Association, recognizing his outstanding
contribution to safety through education pertaining
to aviation life support equipment. As NCOIC of
the laboratory's Aviation Life Support Equipment
Retrieval Program, he has conducted detailed
inquiries that resulted in the identification of
inadequate equipment which contributed to
injuries.
The award was established and first given in
1969 to General William W. Spruance and has
32
been presented each year to individuals or groups
for outstanding contributions to safety through
education. After General Spruance survived a
near-fatal crash in a T-33 (jet trainer), he spent
much of his time teaching others how to survive
and extolling the use of protective equipment.
SFC Johnson's is the second Spruance Award
that has been received by Army personnel; the
first resulted from a group effort.
(June Greer, USAARL)
Museum Fund Report. Progress continues to
be made in the drive to raise $2 million for a new
Army Aviation Museum. The present total is
$522,000.
At the recent annual board meeting of the
Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc., which
is directing the fund drive, it was reported that
the foundation is now self-sufficient. Its expenses
are covered by interest on investments and profits
from the museum's gift shop, meaning that all
contributions go directly to the building fund.
Other business transacted at the board meeting
included the reelection of two retired general
officers, LTG Robert R. Williams and LTG John J.
Tolson III, as chairman of the board and president
of the foundation, respectively. All foundation
board members serve without pay.
Parallel building committees have been named
by the foundation and by the Army Aviation Center
to assist with the specifications and final plans.
Selection of an architect is expected to be made
in the near future.
Individuals, units, industries, etc., Can have a
part in the challenging task of procuring a new
home for Army Aviation's history. Tax-deductible
contributions can be mailed to the Army Aviation
Museum Foundation, Inc., P.O. Box H, Ft. Rucker,
AL 36362.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

º ºs
STAR OVER BERLIN . . . BG Jimmy Stewart, USAFR (Ret.), looks toward Brandenburg
Gate through the window of an Army helicopter while being given an aerial tour of Berlin by the
Berlin Brigade's Army Aviation Section. The actor was in the city as an honoree at the Berlin
Filmfest.
AASPR-82. The Presidential nominee to be
the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
GEN John W. Vessey Jr., chaired the Army
Aviation Systems Program Review (AASPR) which
was conducted at Ft. Rucker, AL, 24 and 25
March 1982.
In addition to GEN Vessey, representatives
from all four armed services attended the AASPR
which will provide guidance on the future of Army
Aviation.
During discussions and displays the attendees
were updated on present and future arms, tactics
and technology dealing with Army Aviation.
At the conclusion, GEN Vessey, as Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army and Chairman of the AASPR,
gave guidance on where he feels emphasis should
be given during the next 4 years of Army Aviation
development.
Within 6 months of the AASPR, a formal devel
opment plan will be forwarded to the Office of
the Vice Chief of Staff for final approval.
APRIL 1982
º,
Zºº /
º
-. -
The purpose of the AASPR is to gather repre
sentatives of the senior leadership of the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force and show
them where Army Aviation has come from, where
it is now and where it should go in the future.
The AASPR is one of only 10 such program
reviews held by the Army, according to officials.
Attendees of the AASPR were also guests at
the Bogardus S. Cairns Chapter of the Association
of the U.S. Army general membership meeting
on the night of 24 March 1982.
They were also afforded the opportunity to
view flight demonstrations of Sikorsky's Advancing
Blade Concept (ABC) helicopter and Bell Heli
copter's XV-15 Tilt Rotor System.
The static displays available included the new
advanced attack helicopter, the CH-47D Chinook,
the UH-60 Black Hawk with the External Stores
Support System, and a full-sized model of the
OH-58 Army Helicopter Improvement Program
(AHIP) Aeroscout.
33

REPORTING
FINAL
Late NewsFromArmy Aviation Activities
FROM VIRGINA
Test Pilots Selected. Five aviators have been
selected by a Department of the Army board to
participate in the Army Aviation Engineering Test
Pilot Program.
Those chosen from 60 candidates were Captains
Gary A. Sharon, Frederick W. Stellar and Richard
L. Vincent; CW3 Reginald C. Murrell; and Major
James M. Correai. These officers will attend a
60-day orientation course at the Army Aviation
Engineering Flight Activity, Edwards Air Force
Base, CA, before going to the 11-month Naval
Test Pilot School at Patuxent River Naval Air
Station, MD. Graduates of that course incur a 4
year service obligation, 3 years of which will be
spent as developmental test pilots at Edwards
AFB, Ft. Rucker, AL, or Ft. Eustis, VA.
Members of the selection board were Colonels
Lewis J. McConnell and William B. Woodson;
Majors Thomas E. Burch, Kenneth P. Roland,
Gary T. Steimle and Michael K. Jennings; and
CW4 Velter H. King. (MILPERCEN PAO)
FROM PENINSYLVANIA
Repairing Saves Money. A study at the New
Cumberland Army Depot has determined that
many previously discarded CH-47 Chinook heli
copter vertical shaft assemblies can be repaired.
Maintenance personnel modified an existing
shot peening machine in order to remove the
pitting and corrosion of a worn assembly's spline
without exceeding the required tolerances.
The repair cost for an assembly is $5,552; the
cost of a new one is $70,000. (NCAD PAO)
FROM CALIFORNIA
Aviators are Straight Shooters. The FORSCOM
Commander's Company-Level Markmanship Cup
has been won by D Company, 7th Combat Aviation
34
Battalion, Ft. Ord. Members of that attack heli
copter company outshot 104 other teams, includ
ing many from infantry units. (FT. ORD PAO)
FROM ST. LOUIS
AAAA Awards. Further plaudits came to the
United States' World Champion Helicopter Team
and Pilot at the Army Aviation Association of
America's 25th convention this month in St. Louis.
The Outstanding Aviation Unit Award was ac
cepted by Major Roy E. Mann, coach of the team
which took the world honors in Poland last August.
Recognized as Army Aviator of the Year by
AAAA was CW2 George Chrest, who also won
his world title in Poland.
Other contributors to Army Aviation and the
awards they received were SSG William G. Pat
terson, 44th Medical Detachment, Ft. Lewis, WA,
Aviation Soldier of the Year; SFC Gerald L.
Johnson, Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory,
Ft. Rucker, AL, James H. McClellan Safety Award;
717th Medical Detachment, New Mexico Army
National Guard, Sante Fe, NM, Outstanding
Reserve Component Aviation Unit Award; Mr.
Michael J. Hoffman, aerospace engineer, Army
Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness
Command, St. Louis, Army Civilian of the Year,
and the Applied Technology Laboratory, Ft. Eustis,
VA, a special unit award for 25 years' service to
Army Aviation. (Lindberg Chapter, AAAA)
FROM FT. HUACHUCA
ACC Stabilized Tours. Under the new AR 614
5, which became effective in March, several
position stabilized tours for communicators and
air traffic controllers are reduced from 36 to 24
months.
Since the revised regulation has no "grandfather
Clause," personnel assigned to Army radar ap
proach control facilities and to an alternate national
military Command center will become available
for worldwide reassignment as soon as they have
served 2 years at their present assignment.
The changes will not affect personnel on
Stabilized tours at headquarters, Army Communi
cations Command or at major subordinate USACC
elements. (Sokalski, USACC PAO)
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 VIEWS FROM READERS
Editor:
I would like to get copies of your
Recognition Quiz sections from past
issues of Aviation Digest. I find material
such as that useful in teaching vehicle
and aircraft identification which I have
found is a weak area in my unit.
I would like to commend you on
your article on the “Threat—More Than
Vehicle ID.” This brought out an im
portant point which is often overlooked.
Keep up the good work.
1LT James L. DiSimoni
S2, 1/41 Inf
Ft. Hood, TX
Editor:
I have read the December 1981 issue
and was dismayed to read of the deval
uation of the Master Army Aviator Badge.
(Views From Readers, page 30.)
I suppose if I had entered the program
in recent years I would be more sympa
thetic with the proposed change which
will apparently eliminate the requirement
to have 3,000 flight hours. It appears
improbable that many new aviators will
be able to amass 3,000 hours during
their career with the current cutbacks
in flying hours. However, I, along with
dozens of others, paid my dues based on
the original ground rules of 15 years,
3,000 hours, special ticket and 50 hours
AI. Whoever established the original
criteria must have had something “spe
APRIL 1982
cial” in mind when he attempted to
distinguish the MASTER ARMY AVI
ATOR.
You who are so dead-set on changing
things ought to change the design of
the badge to accommodate the new
criteria rather than devalue the badge
for those who met the original intent
and standard. I agree with CW3 Dennis
E. Dura wholeheartedly in his quest to
retain the original criteria. (I know the
50 hours AI was eliminated by D.A.)
A Master Army Aviator of the “old
School,” LTC Bob Burris, USA-Ret.,
once described the Master wings in
jest. “The wing means I fly airplanes,
the star means I fly generals, and the
wreath means I killed one.” Everyone
knows how Bob Burris got his Master
Aviator Badge, and what the badge
means to us.
LTC S.D. Hoyem
2111 Valencia Ave
Monroe, LA
Editor:
Request you send one copy of each
reprint of all three articles on NBC
subjects. The articles were originally
published in the August, October and
December (1981) issues of U.S. Army
Aviation Digest.
CPT F.L. Germano Jr.
Headquarters, 3d Ordnance Battalion
APO New York
Editor:
I read your NBC article in the
December '81 issue of the Aviation
Digest, which referred to two previous
NBC articles. I would appreciate your
sending me copies of the NBC articles
that appeared in the August '81 and
October '81 issues.
CW2 William Wightman
New York Army National Guard
Editor:
Please send a copy of “Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical—Training and
Development” and a copy of “Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical Decontamination
Problems.”
LTC Joseph F. Kasper
U.S. Army Air Defense School
Ft. Bliss, TX
Editor:
Could you please send me MAJW.P.
Patterson's 1980 (November) OPFOR
training program article. Apparently
copies of other threat articles can be
obtained from you folks and I'd appreci
ate them as well.
I've just been named Threat Officer
in a separate National Guard ATK HEL
Company.
1LT Timothy A. Tealey
WIARNG
Madison, WI
35
VIEWS FROM READERS
Editor:
As the commander of the 275th
Chemical Detachment (JA), I recently
read the excellent article in the Decem
ber 1981 Aviation Digest titled, “Chem
ical Agents, First Aid and Long-Term
Effects.” However, there was a gross
error made by Captain Savage concern
ing the first aid for nerve agents.
The following is the correct treatment
concept for a nerve agent casualty:
a. Reference, TRADOC Message
ATTG-OCS, DTG 222000Z June 81,
subject: Treatment Concept for Nerve
Agent Casualty. Reference, FORSCOM
Message, 301635Z September 81, sub
ject: Treatment Concept for Nerve Agent
Casualty.
b. Approved first aid doctrine:
(1) Self Aid—Upon onset of one
or more nerve agent symptoms, im
mediately inject yourself with one
atropine autoinjector in the fleshy
portion of the thigh. After 10 to 15
minutes, if symptoms persist or get worse,
inject yourself with a second atropine
injector. If still no improvement after
10 to 15 more minutes, inject yourself
with a third injector. After use, stick
needle of the expended autoinjector
through the flap in your overgarment
or shirt. Seek medical attention. If,
after the first or second injection,
your heart beats very rapidly and your
mouth becomes very dry (symptoms of
stropinization), you have injected enough
atropine and should not use the remain
ing injectors.
(2) Buddy Aid—Upon finding an
individual exhibiting nerve agent symp
toms and unable to help himself/her
self, immediately mask and inject the
soldier with all three atropine auto
injectors at once. (Use the casualty’s,
not yours.) Stick needle of expended
autoinjectors in the soldier's pocket flap
Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
36
and seek immediate medical help. If
soldier stops breathing, apply artificial
respiration.
(3) The need for more than three
injections of atropine is determined only
by medical support personnel.
c. Remaining instructions for medical
treatment vice self aid/buddy aid will
continue to be IAW paragraph 2-11(a)(6)
of TM 8-285/NAVMED P-5()41/AFM
160-12(J).
In addition to correcting the first aid
for nerve agents, please send the previous
two articles, “Nuclear, Biological, Chem
ical—Training and Development.” Au
gust 1981, and “Nuclear, Biological,
Chemical Decontamination Problems,”
October 1981.
CPT C.A. Gillette
275th Chemical Detachment (JA)
Fort Polk, LA
• Captain Gillette is correct. Anyone
using the article, “Chemical Agents,
First Aid and Long-Term Effects," that
appeared in the December 1981 issue
should place the information contained
in Captain Gillette's letter with that
article.
Editor:
I have just finished reading the Decem
ber 81 issue of Aviation Digest and
noticed in the “Views From Readers”
section a matter of interest to me.
Please send me parts 1 through 4 of
the article “From Balloon to Black Hawk,
The Army Forward Aeromedical Evac
uation Story,” by Lieutenant Colonel
David M. Lam, M.D.
V. Sterlene Hapner
63d Med. Det. (RA)
APO New York
Editor:
I am writing to request reprints of the
series of (four) articles printed in the
Aviation Digest concerning the issue
of attrition (aviation warrant officer
retention). Thank you for your assistance.
Kathryn Brooks
Research Associate
HQ, USAREUR & 7th Army
ODCSPER (ARI)
APO New York
Editor:
I just finished reading a recent issue
of Aviation Digest. The articles were
excellent but there were a couple of
pictures that upset me. One of these
shows an NCO getting ready to hook
up a sling load. No problem there, but
he has on a wristwatch and a wedding
band. The other picture shows an EM
working on a UH-1 engine, but he has
on a ring and bracelet. Both of these
are definite no-nos. The way that safety
is stressed in the Army Reserve (at least
in my unit), you would show safety
minded photographs. Personnel who
wear jewelry while working around
aircraft are just asking for big trouble.
Thank you and please continue such
good articles.
Sergeant Michael Torsiello
315th Engr Gp (USAR)
UH-1 Crewchief
Hagerstown, MD
• We agree with you fully and regret
that they slipped through and were
printed. But the fact of the matter is
this is real—these practices are going
on. We hope the poster on the next
page will be taken seriously in an effort
to prevent accidents, injuries and the
loss of lives or aircraft.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 who's in Error? .
We are, for having let the photos on this page slip
through into print in a previous issue. But, stop and
think about the real danger here. These photos
reflect what's going on in at least one unit. And,
judging by the number of photos wereject for safety
reasons, the problem is pretty widespread. We
recommend that you use this page as a safety poster.

APRIL 1982
Heliborne
Electronic
Worfore
System
(HEWS)
Colonel Robert S. Fairweather Jr.
TRADOC System Manager, Scout Helicopter
Fort Rucker, AL
O THER MILITARY services use many tactical
techniques which can effectively be employed
by Army Aviation. In this article, I will discuss
an adaptation of the U.S. Air Force's “Wild Weasel"
concept to greatly enhance the survivability of attack
helicopter teams and to generally degrade enemy
capabilities.
I am sure that many readers have at least a general
idea of how the “Wild Weasel" is employed in combat,
so I will not spend much time dwelling on that. In
simple terms, the “Wild Weasel" is a high performance
fighter type aircraft loaded with sophisticated passive
and active electronic warfare equipment. It can be
used to suppress or destroy enemy air defense missile
and tracking systems so that they are ineffective against
our airplanes. In most cases, the “Wild Weasel" would
be employed to support air operations, especially
those directed toward offensive counterair targets.
The idea of an Army Aviation “Wild Weasel" that
has different but related missions has been toyed with
over the years, but not really ever followed up. None
theless, it is an idea that has a lot of merit and bears
serious consideration. In the first portion of this article,
I posit a conceptual Army “Wild Weasel" that, for the
lack of a better name, I will call the Heliborne Electronic
Warfare System (HEWS). I then propose how we
should use such a system.
A quick review of helicopters available in the
Army inventory shows that the UH-1 Huey airframe
is the most likely platform for HEWS. Scout airframes
are too small, attack helicopters are too valuable as
firepower platforms, and of the remaining helicopters,
only UH-1s are available in sufficient quantities to
divert a number of them away from their normal
38
roles. It should be noted at this point that the UH-1
was the original platform for the Quick Fix Communica
tions Jammer/DF system. However, the Quick Fix
system was moved to the UH-60 Black Hawk because
of its weight and power demands. The suitability of
the UH-1 for HEWS will depend on the successful
reduction of weight and power demands through new
technology and may require some modification to the
helicopter power train.
The real heart of HEWS would be the mission
equipment package placed on the helicopter. This
mission equipment package would consist of warning/
acquisition, jamming/deception, directed energy, com
munications and aircraft/aircrew protection subpack
ages. The primary items in the warning/acquisition
subpackage would be an interferometer to provide
radar warning and to locate radar emitters, directed
energy warning receivers, an optical detector, possibly
an acoustical detector/locator and any other appropri
ate warning/acquisition devices.
Sufficient jamming/deception devices would be
placed on the UH-1 to jam radars, infrared detectors/
seekers, and a wide range of communications while
also providing the capability to spoof or decoy enemy
acquisition systems. High energy jammers would be
particularly desirable. The directed energy subpackage
would further extend capabilities by enabling the
operator to degrade the enemy's visual acquisition of
targets. What I have in mind here are directed energy
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

systems that cover a relatively broad area with
reasonably low power demands. The main objectives
would be to blind enemy troops, to deny the use of
optical systems and to degrade visibility by “fogging”
viewing ports, windows and canopies.
The communications subpackage would include
radios/secure devices that are protected from electro
magnetic pulse (EMP) and jamming and an automatic
target handoff system that would link with similar
systems on other helicopters. An accurate onboard
navigation system would enhance the effectiveness of
the target handoff system, of course.
The aircraft/aircrew protection subpackage is
essential to assure survival and mission effectiveness
of HEWS. Nuclear and nonnuclear EMP protection
is a must. Further, “stealth” technology should be
applied where possible to reduce the aircraft'ssignature
to the minimum. Obviously, the HEWS should be
protected against any of the systems that it carries
since these also could be developed by the enemy.
Given the above operational capabilities for the
HEWS, how would it be best employed? Stealing
from the Artillery, I would visualize it providing both
general and direct support to attack helicopter and
air cavalry units. Assuming the Division 86 force
structure, a HEWS company of 4 to 6 helicopters
would be assigned to the combat support aviation
battalion. The HEWS helicopters would then be placed
in general support of the aviation brigade, located to
APRIL 1982
-
provide balanced coverage of the forward line of own
troops (FLOT) or would be placed in direct support
of specific attack helicopter battalions and/or the air
cavalry squadron.
When in the general support role, the HEWS
helicopters would respond to threats as determined
by the brigade battle tactical operations center. This
role would be particularly appropriate when the brigade
attempts an over-the-FLOT operation, operates as a
covering force or moves to contact. If employed in
direct support of an attack helicopter or air cavalry
unit, the HEWS helicopters would work directly with
aeroscout team leaders and direct their efforts toward
augmenting the team's combat capabilities. Specifically,
the HEWS helicopter would use its systems to suppress
the enemy's ability to acquire and attack targets,
disrupt enemy command and control, and inflict
damage on enemy personnel and equipment with
directed energy. To assure its own survivability, the
HEWS helicopter would operate at maximum standoff
(well behind the team it is supporting) and would use
nap-of-the-earth flight techniques.
Since HEWS is only a concept at this time, I will
not attempt to go into further detail. However, I am
convinced that the basic idea is sound and is techno
logically feasible. The advantages, from a tactical
standpoint, are obvious and could result in a significant
increase in the overall effectiveness of our attack
helicopter and air cavalry units. -º-'
39
 -

This article reflects the views of the authºr and not necessarily
those of the Department of the Army or any of its agencies

Mr Wilburn A. James
Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 T HE DAY STARTED Out to be One of those
beautiful days that we can all recall. The
weather was cool and crisp; the humidity
was low, and the visibility was excellent under a
clear blue sky. It was a great day to be alive! But,
shortly after arriving at the office, my dream world
turned into a real nightmare; I was informed of
another fatal Army aircraft accident.
It was a real-life tragedy that ruined a beautiful
day. The accident involved an OV-1 Mohawk.
Although at this time I knew nothing of the
details except that the weather in the area of the
crash site was just as it was here—I couldn't help
but ask myself, “Why." Why did this accident
occur? Why didn't the crew eject?
True, the accident investigation board would
be composed of the most qualified and experi
enced personnel available. They would do a
thorough job. They would determine the most
probable cause of the accident.
The question remains: Just what can be done
to prevent tragedies such as this? Do we waste
time teaching maneuvers that have little realistic
value when more time could be spent on maneuvers
that are meaningful? Do we teach our pilots proper
flight planning? Does the training enhance their
ability to use good judgment, or do we just check
to see that they do everything by the book? The
“book” is important, but there has never been a
book that covered all aspects of flying.
Why didn't the crew eject? Have we been
glossing over ejection decisions and procedures?
Are we training pilots in such a way that their
confidence exceeds their competence?
Confidence is a necessary trait that all pilots
must possess but overconfidence can sometimes
detract from exercising good judgment more than
lack of confidence. Overconfidence in one's ability
or the capability of the aircraft can lead to improper
decisions and ultimately to an accident.
Some Mohawk pilots have been overheard to
say, “I’ll never eject—I'll stay with it," etc. Unfortu
nately, the OV-1 does not provide the best
protection for the crew during a crash landing.
Hence, the reason for equipping the Mohawk
with the best available egress system. As exam
ples: During fiscal year (FY) 1979, half of the
fixed wing accidents and the two fixed wing
fatalities were caused by the OV-1 type aircraft.
The statistics could have been worse; one of the
APRIL 1982
accidents was a midair collision involving two
Mohawks. The four occupants involved in this
accident ejected successfully from both damaged
and uncontrollable aircraft. Two other crew
members of another OV-1 type aircraft ejected
successfully when their craft developed engine
trouble. There were six successful ejections Out
of six attempts—a creditable record for the OV-1
ejection system.
During FY 1980, the OV-1 type aircraft was re
sponsible for all three fixed wing Class A mishaps
and three fatalities. Ejection was not attempted in
the two mishaps resulting in fatalities. Ejection in
the other mishap was successful.
During FY 1981, there was one Class A mishap
involving the OV-1 and when no attempt to eject
was made, it resulted in two fatalities. No matter
how good the system is, it is worthless if it is not
used!
Were the previously mentioned decisions to
delay or to refuse ejection the result of overconfi
dence? We are not certain, but we do know that
overconfident pilots will tend to expect more
from themselves and their equipment than either
can produce. All too often, the pilots competence,
skill and judgment falls below their level of confi
dence, and the capability of their equipment
cannot make up for the deficiencies inherent in
such a situation.
I could not have written this article if it hadn't
happened to me. I have brought aircraft home
when the safest course of action called for me to
eject. True, I basked in that moment of glory. I
enjoyed having my fellow aviators talk about me
and state that I “was a really great pilot." Now
that I look back on all those years of flying, I
realize that while I was classed as a good pilot, I
also had some luck. None of us know how much
luck we have, so the intelligent thing to do is to
play it safe. Thorough knowledge of our emergency
procedures, aircraft limitations as outlined in the
Operator's Manual, confidence in our egress
system, based upon a realistic appraisal of its
capabilities and application of sound judgment,
will enhance our chances of survival when faced
with the ultimate decision—to “PUNCH OUT –
NOW!"
Your competence in the use of the ejection
system will then increase your confidence in
that system. *—º
41

ANY INGREDIENTS are brought to
gether to make up that intangible called
safety. Training safely to produce unit
combat proficiency is the ultimate goal of the Army
Aviation Program in Maine. Changes in operational
aircraft and doctrine have caused revisions in training
programs. Through changes from CH-34s and OH
23s to UH-1Hs and OH-58s and initial aircraft quali
fication to terrain flight, the most important elements
of Maine's accident prevention program have been
people, supervision and training.
A National Guard unit has the personnel problems
of an active component unit. In addition, there are
disruptions to unit operations caused by civilian jobs,
distance from home to unit training sites and many
other factors. Maine is fortunate that the majority of
its unit members are true “Maineiacs.” A Maineiac is
traditionally a cautious, conservative, reliable person.
This Maineiac tradition has played an integral part in
10 years of accident-free flying. Cautious, conservative,
reliable individuals will perform preſlights or mainte
nance tasks by the book; they will complete a perfor
42
Major Michael T. McCourt
State Aviation Safety ºfficer ---
Maine Army National Guard º
mance planning card; and they will make in-flight
decisions ensuring the odds are in their favor. In short,
the accident prevention effort in Maine has been people
oriented. Train guardsmen safely, and they will perform
safely.
In the course of routine operations, the command
structure has many avenues available to influence
accident prevention. From the Deputy Adjutant
General, who is president of the State Aviation Safety
Council, to the instructor pilots who administer the
standardization flights, each supervisor in the chain
has accepted a responsibility to make safety the primary
consideration.
Each supervisor in the chain of command can
influence the sequence of events leading to an accident.
Maine has had Class E mishaps that would have been
Class B or A mishaps if someone in the chain had not
interrupted the sequence of events leading to the
mishap. True, some may attribute this to divine
intervention, or luck, but in most cases it takes a
supervisor who knows the signs of an impending mishap
and takes effective corrective action.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Maintaining proficiency in all flight tasks is a constant
problem for aviators. This is especially difficult for
National Guard aviators who only fly once or twice
per month. To help eliminate this problem, a training
program has been developed that incorporates many
unit tasks. It implements a schedule that requires
instrument, terrain and medical evacuation flight
training. The 112th Medical Company (Air Ambulance)
is divided into four flight platoons consisting of six
UH-1s with a crew of pilot, copilot, medic and crewchief.
One flight platoon is designated to conduct instrument
training, another provides administrative support and
two others conduct tactical mission training. The
administrative support required consists of individuals
to serve as patients, personnel to apply moulage and
an aircraft crew to position patients in the pickup
sites. A typical training day might be as follows:
20 nautical miles east of Bangor, ME. The MOA is
1,025 square kilometers of sparsely populated woodland
and is a designated terrain flight area. It has been
used by aviators of U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Marine
Corps, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Active Army and
National Guard of other states.
Command supervision of dedicated people coupled
with an effective training program are the ingredients
of Maine's accident prevention program. A program
that has been effective for the past 10 years and will,
with continued dedication, provide many more
accident-free flying hours. *—’

0700 Morning Formation

0715 Safety Meeting/Tactical Situation—Safety
meetings include appropriate topics for mis
sions to be flown such as: flight planning,
weight and balance, terrain flight, confined
area operations, medevac operations and
hoist operations. Tactical situation briefings
include friendly situation, enemy situation,
enemy air defense artillery positions, weather,
logistics, tactical air/artillery, communica
tions, command and control and downed
aircraft procedures. (After the initial briefing,
aviators post maps and partially complete
flight planning and weight and balance.)
- *-
0900 The first tactical mission is given to the
platoon leader, who then assigns a crew. "Medevac" in progress;
The crew completes its flight plan and - - from the FLOT (forward
line of own troops) by
computes weight and balance. Tactical Medevac UH-1 (above)
missions are conducted until 1330 hours.
to triage (assigning a
1400 Debriefing—Problems and corrective mea priority to each casualty)
sures are discussed to formulate lessons while the “birds" stand
by
learned to pass on to other unit members.
1500 Dismissal

Throughout the training period, unit instructor pilots

are available to answer questions and assist in the
preflight phases. Along with safety officers, they
participate in flight missions as crewmembers and as
evaluators. At each stage of the day's training, there
are many opportunities to influence and ensure that
the training conducted is in accordance with aircrew
training manual and ARTEP (Army Training and
Evaluation Program) requirements. Maine operates
its own tactical training area. Tactical mission training
and/or terrain flight training is conducted in Deepwoods
Military Operation Area (MOA). Deepwoods is located

APRIL 1982 43
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
The Third Ingredient
Mr. Ken Arnold
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
U NFORTUNATELY Oral radio communications are the
weakest link in the air traffic control (ATC) system. The mis
understanding of ATC clearance messages leads to more
midair conflicts than any other system operational factor
reported to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The
“Whaddesay?" syndrome is probably the most frequently
noted cause for clearance message and automatic terminal
information service (ATIS) monitoring errors. Why is it the
message always comes just as you were busy doing something
else?
That's another story. Let's assume there is no communication
problem. You heard the message. The situation now depends
on what you do with the information.
Your eyes may be 20-20 or better and your ears may be 15
15 or better. But, we need to add one more component (the
third ingredient) at the 100 percent level to make the people,
part of the interface between people and machines, work
successfully in aviation. That component is the brain! It
takes total concentration on the ear, eye, hand coordination
effort to overcome the complacency and carelessness which
have a way of creeping into the cockpit and air traffic
control facility.
Reading the altimeter is one area where pilots sometimes
do not use that one vital component we mentioned earlier.
Altimeter setting/reading errors happen often enough to
cause NASA to devote half of a quarterly report to the
problem. The following examples were excerpted from the
ASRS Quarterly Report No. 12 and are statements of profes
sional pilots with years of experience.
1. “While climbing to cleared altitude FL240, ABC Center
called and requested the altitude. I responded 12,000 climbing.
Center asked altitude confirmation. I again responded 12,800
climbing. Center said altitude readout was 22,800 feet. Upon
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
44
| `
\ \\
SNP,
*H
rechecking I found I had misread the altimeter by 10,000
feet. This was a first time for me, but I have seen it done
before on four occasions in 23 years. Obviously, once is
enough under the right circumstances.”
2. “We had been cleared to 27,000 feet direct to ABC.
We then received another clearance to 13,000 feet. The
copilot was flying the aircraft and I was working the radio.
We leveled off at 23,000 feet thinking we were at 13,000 feet.
Scattered clouds and haze obscured ground visibility. Center
then cleared us to cross ABC VORTAC at 6,000 feet. At
20,000 feet I reported passing through 10,000. The copilot
completed the descent to 16,000 feet and I reported 6,000
feet. Center changed us over to Approach Control and I
contacted Approach when level at 6,000. The Approach
controller then said that Center had had a problem with our
altitude transponder readout and that he showed us at 16,000
feet on his altitude readout. We checked our altitude,
immediately realized we had been misreading our altimeter
and descended immediately to 6,000 VFR."
3. “I was assigned 9,000 feet. My copilot was flying the
aircraft. At 8,000 I called out one thousand to go and he
acknowledged. Approximately 15 minutes later, Center asked
for altitude verification which turned out to be 8,000, not
9,000 feet as assigned. Why did we level off at 8,000 considering
the above conditions? Why did we both miss the error?"
4. “This incident involved climbing to and leveling off at
an altitude 1,000 feet high due to both pilot and copilot
setting the wrong barometric pressure prior to departure.
Apparently the altimeters had previously been set near 28.80
because only a small adjustment was required to set 28.84.
Upon starting the engines the ATIS was used to obtain the
altimeter setting of 29.84. Both of us stated 29.84 and set
them at 28.84. ATC questioned us when we reached level-off
and said our Mode-C was inoperative. A cross-check on the
radar altimeter quickly revealed our error.”
Each of the above incidents attests to the potential gravity
of misreading/missetting altimeters. Incident number two
also reflects a certain laxity on the part of the Center in that
it assumed an inoperative altitude transponder and failed to
question the pilot. It wasn't until the approach controller
questioned the altitude that the extremely dangerous situation
was discovered. This shows that controllers, too, sometimes
fail to engage the brain in the coordination effort.
fºr U.S. GovePNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1982–546-037/1
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Wºr

ENT
Atwº RucKER, ALA

40th Birthday of ARMY AVIATION

and FORT RUCKER

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
THURSDAY 3 JUNE 82 O900-1700 Museum Open House
O900-1800 Information Center (9am-5pm) Building 6007
(9am-6pm) Building 9204
O930-1 100 Army Aviation Air Display—Yesterday
O900-1700 Museum Open House (9:30-11am) and Today
(9am-5pm) Building 6007 Cairns Army Airfield
1000-1700 Golf Tournament 1 OOO-2100 Carnival/Bazaar
(10am-5pm) Golf Course (10am-9pm) Old Division Parade Field

1400–2100 Carnival/Bazaar 1200-1700 Synthetic Flight Trainer Open House

(2-9pm) Old Division Parade Field (Noon-5pm) Building 4905

FRIDAY 4 JUNE 82 1200-1700 Safety Center Open House

O800-1800 Information Center (Noon-5pm) Building 4905
(8am-6pm) Building 9204 1200-1700 Aeromedical Research Laboratory
O8OO-1 OOO Golden Hawk 10K Run (Noon-5pm) Display
(8-10am) Building 6901
Physical Fitness Center, Building 4605
1330-1430 New Army Aviation Museum Site
O900-1700 Museum Open House
(9am-5pm) Building 6007 (1:30-2:30pm).Dedication
Corner of Headquarters Road and
O900-1700 Synthetic Flight Trainer Open House Andrews Avenue (Near Building 6022)
(9am-5pm) Building 4901
1500-1600 Memorialization of Warrant Officer
O900-1700 Safety Center Open House (3-4pm) Career College
(9am-5pm) Building 4905 Building 5301
O900-1700 Aeromedical Research 1830–2400 Army Aviation Ball
(9am-5pm) Laboratory Display (6:30-Midnight) Officers' Club, Building 113
Building 6901
SUNDAY 6 JUNE 82
1000-2100 Carnival/Bazaar O800-1300 No-Host Brunch
(10am-9pm) Old Division Parade Field
(8am-1pm) Officers' Club, Building 113
1530-1600 JRROTC — Drill Team O900-1000 Memorial Service
(3:30-4pm) Post Parade Field (9-10am) Post Parade Field (Inclement Weather
1615-1700 Post Theater)
Brigade Review With Retreat
(4:15-5pm) Post Parade Field (Inclement Weather 1000-1700 Carnival/Bazaar
Physical Fitness Center, Building 4605) (10am-5pm) Old Division Parade Field

SATURDAY 5 JUNE 82 For more information contact:

0800-1800 Information Center Commander
(8am-6pm) Building 9204
1st Aviation Brigade
O800-1200 Static Display ATTN: Planning Committee
(8am-Noon) Cairns Army Airfield Fort Rucker, AL 36362

O900-0930 Band Concert Telephone: AV 558-214.1/3413

(9-9:30am) Cairns Army Airfield COMM 205-255-214 1/34 13
Editor: -

notice in your Dece:ber 1981

issue of Aviation Digest that your
back cover is given over to
aviators leaving the service with a
point of contact for U.S. Army
Reserve aviation units.
My division, not unlike other
Army National Guard divisions
and nondivisional units, also has
aviation units; and we under the
Total Army Concept could benefit
from the same service you
provided the USAR.

Units in the 42d Infantry

(Rainbow) Division are located in:

NEW YORK
Freeport (516) 378-0187.
• 42d Avn Bn (Cmbt) (Div)
Latham (518) 457-70.98
• Co D, 42d Avn Bn (Atk Hel)
Niagara Falls (716). 297-0180
• Co B, 42d Avn Bn (Cmbt Spt) (Div)
KENTUCKY
Frankfort (502) 564-8434
• CoC, 42d Avn Bn (Cmbt Spt)(Div)
SOUTH CAROLINA
Eastover (803) 748-4328
• Co D, 1-101st Cav (Air Cav) (Div)

MG Joseph A. Healey
Commander, 42d Inf Div
NYARNG
125 West 14th St.
New York, NY 10011

The Aviation Digest is happy to publish

the listing of aviation units in the 42d
Infantry (Rainbow) Division. Others
(National Guard or Reserve) are invited
to send us listings of their units which
contain Army Aviation. Please give
mailing addresses to include zipcodes
and telephone numbers, both AUTO
VON and Commercial. If we have not
used them, we will be happy to do so in
future issues.
AIRASSAULT
 MAY 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 5 ſ
§3 º
º:

Yºr Yº Yºr S. Yºr

Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Richard D. Kenyon
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 Aviation Update, BG Ellis D. Parker

9 Aviation Personnel Notes: Key Personnel Changes;

10
Special Duty And The Aviator
Putting The Air Assault In The Air Assault Division,
C. :
LTC Barry J. Sottak and MAJ Charles B. Cook
16 Super Safety Training Weekend, Captain John W. page 37
Simmons
18 DES Report To The Field: Observation Performance
Planning Card
19 ACTAAT: Landing Update
2O PEARL'S IS BETTER
24 Reporting Final page 38
26 Views From Readers
27 Hangar Talk:TC 1-62 And TM 10-8415-206-13,
MSG Jackson R. Ooten
28 Regional Accident Prevention Survey Program,
Mr. Timothy Flynn
30 Threat: Soviet Air Defenses Against Attack Helicopters—
Part 1: The Philosophy, LTC Brian P. Mullady
36 The Aviation NCO, CSM David L. Spears
37 RSI Report, Mr. Rush Wicker
38 Yellow Is Better, CW3 Gary E. Rossomme
40 From Routine To Near Disaster, CW3 Robert A.
Stolworthy
44 ATC Action Line: IFR Takeoff Minimums And Departure &stoff:
Procedures, Mr. F. H. Helfenberger 3°
5&º
º

Cover: The Air Assault School of the 101st º |

Airborne Division (Air Assault) teaches doctrine, º ºis º
builds stamina and instills the “air assault Spirit” ºffsoº
*ºtºoo
into each of its graduates. See page 10
Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.
Secretary of the Army w

Richard K. Tierney
Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data.
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center.
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the US Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise speci
fied Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise indicated.
Articles, nhſ tos and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981, in accordance with Army Regulation
310-1.
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1. Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR, AG
Publications Center. 2800 Eastern Boulevard. Baltimore, MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Dese
*** - - - - - - - - - - - – -– – º "-- * * ––----
E CANNOT RECALL a Digest recently that has
*. any better reading on a diversity of topics
than this issue. As Disraeli is reputed to have
claimed, "variety is the mother of enjoyment," so
there should be no question about your reading
enjoyment of this issue.
It begins with an indepth report from the
Pentagon—"Department of the Army Aviation
Update" by Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker in
which he provides us with an excellent synopsis
of the latest information on a number of key
Army Aviation matters from his perspective at
DA. The subjects are so pertinent that a collection
of his once-a-quarter articles (the first appeared
in our January issue) would be an excellent
reference on how matters stand on top level
decisions regarding our area of service.
Lieutenant Colonel Barry J. Sottak and Major
Charles B. Cook collaborated on “Putting the Air
Assault into the Air Assault Division." They
describe concepts which will provide the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) an even greater
ability to “slug it out on any foreseeable battle
field," the kind of air assault force needed by our
combined arms team.
On those future battlefields we will be faced by
a formidable threat as described in "Soviet Air
Defenses Against Attack Helicopters." According
ly, it behooves each of us to become more conver
Sant with that threat. "Know your enemy" is exem
plified in the first of three articles by Lieutenant
Colonel Brian P. Mullady in which he explains
the vulnerabilities of our opponent and how they
can be exploited to our advantage. His is a
refreshingly unique approach to describing the
threat—but while vulnerability does not necessar
ily equate to impregnability neither is it synony
mous with weakness. As LTC Mullady stresses,
#e must guard against complacency when weigh
ing the power of our adversaries.
That very factor, complacency, is woven
throughout the article by Chief Warrant Officer,
CW3, Robert A. Stolworthy, “From Routine to
Near Disaster." He has the courage to describe,
in telling detail, a flight that was not accomplished
in the most professional manner. Thanks, Mr.
Stolworthy, for giving us the chance to learn
from your mistakes; perhaps you will save a life
with this writing!
Command Sergeant Major David L. Spears,
our top NCO here at the Home of Army Aviation,
writes authoritatively of a key leadership element,
the essential contribution to mission accomplish
ment made by “The Aviation NCO." He has written
about "a very special group of people." And we
all know that "people are the Army."
These are exciting days indeed in our Army
and especially in Army Aviation, days filled with
challenge and reward, days of new equipment
ºn re-l irr rena rarl roar inacc arrl c 1 Irarrºr! frar rai i r Arrºnvº
and Our mission. We have all seen a tremendous
increase in our reenlistment rates, increased
numbers of volunteers for Our critical aviation
specialties and a greater dedication to service—
and these indicators are heartening indeed.
But there is one area in which we have slipped
recently and that is aviation safety. Our accident
rate and fatality rate for FY 1982 have been
running far ahead of earlier years Armywide and,
disappointingly so, also right here at the Aviation
Center. We have launched an all-out effort to
turn that trend around, and I am confident you
will join us in this endeavor. We are all vulnerable
to accidents at one time or another—regardless
of unit, station, mission or proficiency level. Flight
safety is simply everyone's job, from the com
mander through the flight platoons and the main
tenance secton and finally to the crew in the
aircraft itself. The responsibility belongs to us all;
so please look at yourself, yoursection, your job,
your aircraft; for your accident may be the next
one. Don't let it happen. Our Army cannot afford
to lose you and your aircraft because of care
lessness, bravado or neglect.
Finally, before you begin to absorb the excellent
articles which follow in this issue, let me give you
a final reminder of the 40th birthday celebration
of Army Aviation and Ft. Rucker, Friday, 4 June,
through Sunday, 6 June. If you are in or near our
“AO," drop in and share some history and nostalgia
with the Aviation Center team.
Army Aviation, 40 years young–6 June 1982–
and still growing. The June Digest will feature
some super articles describing these 40 years,
leading off with a splendid historical perspective
by BG William W. Ford, the first director of Air
Training at Fort Sill, 2 January 1942–5 months
before the historic War Department directive
authorizing "organic air observation for field artil
lery" that led to today's modern aviation force—
"Above The Best."
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 Department of the Army
AVIATION UPDATE
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker
Army Aviation Officer, ODCSOPS
Headquarters, Department of the Army
THIS PAST QUARTER has been an extremely
busy one for all involved with aviation at Department
of the Army. As you know, aviation must compete
each year for a portion of the Army budget. In days of
constrained resources, competition demands the best
effort, teamwork and coordination in building the
aviation program. Part of my broad responsibility is
to provide necessary oversight in program and budget
development, and to defend before Congress the validity
of our requirements and the soundness of our program
management. LTG James H. Merryman, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, myself and many others, have spent a
significant amount of time in this arena the last few
months. As this is being written, we are expecting
some major Congressional decisions in the very near
future.
*
Aviation Systems
• AH-64. We have a production go ahead from the
Secretary of Defense. On 26 March 1982, after cost
differences between the contractor and the Army
were resolved, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council approved the production of 446 aircraft over
the next 5 years. This is a major milestone in the
history of Army Aviation. In the very near future we
will begin adding to our inventory an attack helicopter
capable of finding, engaging and destroying enemy
armor and other forces during day, night and adverse
weather conditions. For those who have worked so
hard over the last 9 years to make the AH-64 a reality,
you can be proud of what you have accomplished for
the Army and the fighting capability of our Armed
Forces.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 GLOSSARY
AHIP Army Helicopter Improvement Program
aviation intensive management items
AR Army Regulation
Army National Guard
ATC air traffic control
AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance
Corpus Christi Army Depot
CMF career management field
continental United States
CY calendar year
DARR Department of the Army Regional Representatives
DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
ECAS Enhanced Cobra Armament System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FM fully modernized

fiscal year
GPS Global Positioning System
HODA Headquarters, Department of the Army
IFR instrument flight rules
LAPES Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System
LTG lieutenant general
MAJ major
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MG major general
MLMS Multi-Purpose Light Weight Missile System
MOD modernized
MOS military occupational specialty
MTOE Modification Table of Organization and Equipment
NOE nap-of-the-earth
PATCO Professional Air Traffic Controller's Organization
PIP Product Improvement Program
POMCUS prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets
PROD production
RAM reliability, availability, maintainability
RAPID rapid Army priority item delivery
RPM revolutions per minute
SEMA-X special electronic mission aircraft
SGM sergeant major
SIMOS space imbalance MOS
TDY temporary duty
TOE table of organization and equipment
TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSARCOM U.S. Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel
Readiness Command
Twy teletypewriter exchange
USAREUR U.S. Army, Europe
WSPS Wire Strike Protection System

e UH-60A. The first UH-60A Black hawk medevac
configured helicopter was introduced into the Army at
a formal acceptance ceremony on 14 January 1982, at
Ft. Campbell, KY. It was a big day for the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault), and certainly for the 326th
Medical Battalion. LTG Bernhard T. Mittemeyer,
Surgeon General of the Army, and MG Charles W.
Bagnal, commander of the 101st Airborne Division
(AA) both participated in the ceremony. Unquestion
ably, the Black Hawk medevac helicopter is a major
improvement over the 22-year-old faithful and reliable
workhorse of the Army, the UH-1 Huey. It carries
four litters in the combat configuration, provides full
patient accessibility and is easy to load. Its speed is a
major advantage, as time is critical and rapid evacuation
a must if we are to ensure rapid treatment. Further,
the speed and range of the Black Hawk allow the
medical commander flexibility in the strategic place
ment of hospitals and clearing stations in any combat
operation.
The U.S. Army/Sikorsky Aircraft Black Hawk Team
was the Army nominee for the 1981 Robert J. Collier
Trophy. This award is presented annually by the
National Aeronautic Association for the greatest
achievement in aeronautics or astronautics in America,
with respect to improving the performance, efficiency
or safety of air or space vehicles—the value of which
has been thoroughly demonstrated by actual use during
the preceding year. Unfortunately, we lost out to the
space shuttle this year.

MAY 1982
AVIATION UPDATE continued
• Army Helicopter Improvement Program. On 8
March, the Army System Acquisition Review Council
approved the AHIP to
proceed to a Depart
ment of Defense Pro
gram Go-Ahead Re
view, to continue full
scale engineering de
velopment and to pur
Sue an acquisition strat
egy which requires the
procurement of long
lead items starting in
fiscal year 1983 to pro
tect early production schedules. This is the first major
step in seeing a new scout helicopter in the field. The
AHIP program managers are attempting to speed the
acquisition process by getting OSD permission for
the Army to make the final production decision.
e AH-1S. The AH-1S FM Cobra distribution is in
its second year and remains on schedule. Following
closely behind the fully modernized program is a
decision on Cobra 2000–a block improvement program
that would upgrade 488 older generation (MOD, PROD,
ECAS) aircraft by adding night/adverse weather
capability, improved TOW, reducing weight and
increasing performance, and upgrading certain compo
nents to current state-of-the-art technology to improve
standardization, maintainability and
effectiveness.
In January, the Army placed
two platoons (14) of AH-1S aircraft
in humidity controlled POMCUS
storage in USAREUR.
N |
Q
After 6 months, one attack platoon will be removed,
flown and test fired to establish the impact of storage,
time, manhours and resources needed to make them
fully operational. The second platoon will be retained
in storage for 1 year, then removed and the same
assessment will be made to establish the impact of
long-term storage. Comparison data will hopefully
provide optimum storage times and other information.
All aircraft will then be issued to a USAREUR unit
and 6 months of RAM data collected to further evaluate
the total effect of this year-long storage.
e Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft
Development Program (JVX). In December 1981, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to take
the lead, as Executive Service, in the joint development
of a multimission, common airframe to be procured
in the early 1990s. The goal of the program is to
develop an aircraft that is best suited for the Army
SEMA-X Program, Air Force/Navy search and rescue,
Air Force special operations and Marine Corps assault
(HXM) requirements. This is a long-range program
designed to increase defense capability in multiple
mission areas by providing a common aircraft at low
risk. All services are actively engaged in the program
now in a sense of mutual cooperation, and progress
reports will follow in the months ahead.
• C-17. Although not our program, the Army, as
the primary user of Air Force transport, has a definite
interest in strategic airlift capabilities. In the January
issue, it was announced that the Air Force had awarded
a contract to McDonnell-Douglas to produce the C-17
(C-X). However, on 26 January 1982, the decision was
changed to procure instead 50 C-5N and 44 KC-10
- **
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
*:
aircraft. Apparently, the overriding factor was the
need for a near-term solution to meet current defi
ciencies in airlift capability. Unfortunately, Army re
quirements for air drop, LAPES, rapid combat on/off
load, increased reliability and lower life cycle cost
remain unsatisfied. The C-17 met all Army needs, to
include those for intratheater outsized cargo airlift.
We are working to keep consideration for the C-17
alive, if only in research and development for the
immediate future.
• Multi-Purpose Light Weight Missile System. The
proposed MLMS consists of an air-to-air missile,
launcher and associated avionics/fire control designed
for helicopter mounting. The system is conceived as a
self-defense weapon that would provide fire and forget
protection against hostile air weapons systems that
may threaten mission accomplishment. This will provide
a potential capability to configure aircraft within the
air cavalry or attack helicopter team with the MLMS
based on the commander's analysis of the tactical
situation. The MLMS will improve the capabilities of
scout and attack helicopter teams to counter enemy
air while pursuing their primary missions, thus en
hancing survivability and contributing to overall mission
accomplishment.
• Wire Strike Protection System. OH-58A: Kit
fielding began last summer and will continue through
June with a total of 1,339 kits provided to the Army.
OH-58C: A contract was awarded on 1 July 1981. A
delivery date of December 1982 is expected.
• OH-6A: Still in concept development stage.
UH-1: A contract award was made 30 September
1981, and the swing test was completed in December
1981, at Langely AFB. Beginning in October 1982, the
kit delivery schedule calls for 19 the first month and
75 each month thereafter, for a total of 619 kits.
UH-60: An Equipment Change Proposal was pro
vided to Sikorsky on 15 July 1981. Anticipated contract
award for production cut-in is June 1982. The PIP for
fielded aircraft is not yet funded.
AH-64: The Project Manager has included the WSPS
in the Block I improvement program scheduled to
begin in FY 1985, if approved.
AH-1S: The Phase III testing and qualification
contract was signed on 28 September 1981. Swing
tests and flight tests are scheduled for completion this
month. If successful, kit deliveries are projected to
begin December 1982.
MAY 1982
* - - -
Aviation Personnel
• The Army Avia
tion Engineering/
Flight Testing Selec
tion Board convened
on 20 to 22 January
1982 to select appli
cants for attendance
into the program for
FY 1982-1983. A to
tal of 65 applicants
went before the
board; 4 primary and
4 alternates were se
lected. Program of instruction begins with 60 days of
instruction at Edwards Air Force Base, CA, followed
by 11 months at Patuxent River, MD. Selectees incur
a 4-year obligation.
• Aviation Warrant Officers. Aviation Maintenance
Technician (Non-Rated), MOS 160AO is open for
appointment from the enlisted ranks for the remainder
of FY 1982, and probably will continue into early FY
1983. Thirty-five warrant officers are to be appointed,
and applications are encouraged.
Air Traffic Control Technician, MOS 150AO, has
been approved effective 1 September 1982. Thirty
seven are to be appointed in FY 1983.
MOS 100EO, Attack Helicopter Pilot, has 1,508
trained personnel as of 1 December 1981. MOS 100KO,
Multiengine Attack Helicopter Pilot (AH-64), has been
approved and future training will be provided to selected
100E aviators. Future increases of airframes in the
active inventory, AH-1 plus AH-64, will increase the
requirement for attack helicopter pilots. Ongoing stud
ies for around-the-clock crews are expected to further
increase requirements. Training rates may have to be
increased to meet future requirements.
MOS 100CO, Cargo Helicopter Pilot, has the
potential to become a space imbalance MOS. SIMOS
is defined as 55 percent or more authorizations over
seas. Deployment of additional CH-47 units overseas
will aggravate the SIMOS condition. In addition, of
the 673 in the MOS, 164 (24 percent) have 18 or more
years of service. Training rates and assignment policies
are being reviewed.
Aircraft Armament Repair Course started 19 Feb
ruary 1982 at Ft. Eustis, VA. This course meets a criti
cal field requirement for MOS 100EE, 100BE and 160AE.
Commanders may request quotas, using local funds
for TDY, by calling MAJ Michael Jennings or SGM
Donald Merritt at AUTOVON 221-8158. Warrant
AVIATION UPDATE continued
Officer Division will also be sending officers to the
course en route to their next assignment.
MOS 100R, Combat Surveillance Fixed Wing Pilot,
will also be a SIMOS in future years. This is a relatively
small field with 52 authorizations of which 30 are
overseas. Ten pilots must be trained per year (1983
rate) to sustain this MOS. Careful management of
these personnel will preclude a problem provided
training quotas are not reduced and loss rates do not
increase due to the SIMOS condition.
• Enlisted Aviation Management. The Army Avia
tion Maintenance Career Management Field 67 Study
was completed some time ago. Many of you may not
be aware of the key decisions that resulted from that
study. They are:
D AIT students will be trained as “doers” (vice
assistant repairers) and will arrive at their first units as
trained mechanics.
[] Control will be exercised over the influx of people
from other specialties to allow CMF 67 to “grow its
own” supervisors, complete with technical skills.
DEach soldier will remain with a family of aircraft
up to and including grade E7 to provide technically
proficient supervisors.
[]A member of CMF 67 can become a crewchief at
grade E3 and remain with the same aircraft through
E6.
[]There will be separate technical inspector MOSs
by type aircraft to provide better quality assurance
programs.
[]Still being evaluated are: reenlistments, migration,
and monetary and nonmonetary incentives. All pro
visions of the restructure are to be completed by
October 1983.
• Commissioned Aviators. The Task Selection
Board, established by TRADOC to determine the
tasks that SC 15 company grade aviators should be
able to perform, met in March to review the analysis
conducted by each TRADOC school involved. Their
recommendations as to which tasks should be taught,
Ç
how they should be taught and where they should be
taught are expected by mid-summer.
• Aircrew Ratio Study. In August 1978, TRADOC
began an intensive study to determine the number of
aviators, nonrated aircrew personnel and aviation
maintenance personnel necessary to man and maintain
Army aircraft to sustain operations in a high threat
(wartime) environment. The study was completed in
December 1979, and the aviator ratios were sub
sequently approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, HQDA. The approved aviator to aircraft
seat ratios are as follows:
ATK HEL CO MED HEL CO
AH-64 – 1.25:1 CH-47C – 1.14:1
AH-1S — 1.20:1 CH-47D — 1.13:1
OH-58 – 1.42:1
AIR CAV TRP DIV AVN CO
AH-64 – 1.29:1 OH-58 – 1.31:1
AH-1S – 1.33:1 UH-1 — 1.29:1
OH-58 — 1.80:1
CBT SPT AVN CO MEDEVAC CO
UH-1 — 1.42:1 UH-1 — 1.45:1
UH-60 – 1.36:1 UH-60 – 1.49:1
TRADOC is now developing the first phase of an
implementation plan to document the additional aviator
requirements in Army 86 aviation unit TOE/MTOE.
During Phase II, they will determine how the new
requirements will be manned in wartime and if we
can afford some peacetime fill for key units. The
nonrated aircrew and maintenance personnel imple
mentation plan will be developed later, following
completion of the Combat Service Support Mission
Area Analysis and enlisted Manpower Authorization
Criteria (MACRIT) Studies.
The pilot requirements for the AHIP (two versus
one) are under close scrutiny. More to come on this.
Aviation Logistics
• Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility. Mr. Joe
Cribbins' aviation logistics office plays an active role
in ensuring top level support for our maintenance
programs. They have been working on several things
recently, to include the Floating Aircraft Maintenance
Facility. Many recall the Navy seaplane tender, the
Corpus Christi Bay, which the Army modified into an
aircraft maintenance facility. It was outfitted to maintain
aircraft engines and components with supporting
fabrication shops, metallurgical and chemical labora
tories and other support of Army Aviation. The FAMF
was highly successful, operating offshore in Vietnam
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

from early 1966 to December 1972 when it was returned
to CONUS. Subsequently, the mission support equip
ment was removed and returned to the Navy, because
of the age of the ship and lack of immediate require
ments. As a result of greatly renewed interest, however,
and the requirement for a quick deployment capability,
the FAMF concept is being revisited. The project
involves looking at a ship that can transport helicopters,
maintain high-value, critical components (black boxes,
line replaceable units and printed circuit boards);
provide clean rooms, humidity controlled environ
ment, and stockage or war reserve parts. The FAMF
Revisited Study is well underway, but the greatest
problem will be affordability.
• Rapid Army Priority Item Delivery. An AIMI
(aviation intensive management items) initiative
kicked off by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logis
tics, RAPID is now under test in Europe. The
RAPID concept allows Corps AVIM battalions to
TWX for an item grounding an aircraft (or even by
telephone) directly to the operations center at the
Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Com
mand. TSARCOM, in turn, directs that the item be
issued and airlifted on the first available flight. The
goal of RAPID is to cut down “order and ship times”
rom more than 20 days to fewer than 5 days. If
APID works well in Europe, it may be extended to
other theaters and commands.
• Twenty-Four Hour Hotline.
ºulºu"
º' = ºn
Corpus Christi Army Depot has
T LITT
in tº tº established a 24-hour hotline,
ſº a a
º 4 1a AUTOVON 861-2651, which en
ables users in the field to make a
service call to CCAD engineers
who can help diagnose aircraft en
gine problems and relay what is needed to fix the
engine. About 25 percent of these calls in FY 1981
resulted in the engines being fixed in the field. When
the hotline doesn't work, and the number of engines to
be repaired warrant field services from CCAD,
engineers are sent TDY. These teams repaired 360
engines in FY 1981. Cost avoidance/savings for the
hotline and TDY teams in FY 1981 were $15.5M.
MAY 1982
• Improvement of Fuel Consumption. Early in 1981,
a program was initiated between Aviation Research
and Development Command and DA to reduce aircraft
fuel consumption at the Aviation Engineering Flight
Activity, Edwards AFB, CA. Revised AH-1S, UH-1H
and OH-58C checklists have been drafted and approved
and currently are going through an aircraft evaluation.
Modified performance charts have been prepared
and testing is ongoing. Calculators to allow pilots to
quickly calculate the most fuel efficient flight profile
for a given mission are being procured. OH-58C and
UH-1 cold and hot weather performance testing is
completed. AH-1S testing is ongoing and is expected
to be completed this July. The objective is to provide
flight crews data to enable them to fly at an altitude
and RPM to achieve the most economical fuel con
sumption rates. There is no intent, however, to dictate
flight profiles that would conflict with missions.
- -
- Aviation Safety
Safety statistics for 1981 reflect that it was not as
good a year as we had in 1980. However, the efforts of
all of you are evident in the progress we have made
over the last several years.
• Aircraft Accidents. There has been a steady
reduction of major aircraft accidents since the formal
aviation accident prevention program began in 1958.
There were 54.3 major accidents per 100,000 flying
hours in 1958 compared to 2.28 in 1980—a record
year.
During the 4-year period 1977 to 1980, the Army
had an average of 43 Class A aviation mishaps and 34
aircraft destroyed at a cost of 31 fatalities and $35.7M
per year. However, these Class A mishaps represent
only 17 percent of the DOD aviation accidents.
CY 1981 statistics reflect an increase when compared
to the two previous years.
CY 79 CY 80 CY 81
Class A Mishaps 44 38 46
Destroyed Aircraft 35 31 40
Fatalities 19 26 28
Class A Mishap Rate 3.05 2.28 2.79
Utility helicopters are the single greatest source of
Class A, B and C mishaps and dollar losses. Utility
helicopters also have the greatest exposure in terms
of number of aircraft in the field environment. While
exposure may explain the high numbers, the greatest
potential gains for reduction of mishaps and dollar
losses can be made in the utility helicopter area.
AVIATION UPDATE continued
The U.S. Army Safety Center conducted a special
analysis of CY 1981 utility helicopter mishaps and
found no new cause factor patterns or any factors
that were appreciably different from previous years.
The failure of pilots, instructor pilots, flight leaders
and commanders to adhere to regulations and other
directives in the performance of their mission accounted
for most of these mishaps.
The Army's plan to reduce aviation losses in the
near term (12 to 18 months) includes both proactive
initiatives and after-the-fact analysis and feedback to
users on a timely basis.
Other Areas
• NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. The Army
is looking at several position locating systems that
have possibilities for military use. One of these is the
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. Under joint
service development, NAVSTAR GPS provides a
locating system using a worldwide common grid for
both ground and aviation use. Terminals can be
deployed with pathfinders, forward observers, recon
naissance and surveillance units, signal units, ranger
units, as well as many others. Its application to aviation
is particularly significant. It will give aviators the
capability to navigate at NOE to selected points with
total precision; pinpoint target positions for attack
teams; make instrument approaches to specific spots;
and communicate the position of downed crewmen
quickly and accurately. Its uses are truly unlimited.
• Use of the National ATC System. The continuance
of an operational national ATC system during the
PATCO strike caused some major policy changes in
the use of the ATC system. One of these changes was
the initiation of flow control on civil air traffic. This
means a civilian aircraft must get a “reservation” for
an IFR flight prior to takeoff, and the routing will be
as designated by ATC. To date, most military flights
have been exempted from the reservation require
ments. In order to continue this desirable situation,
aviation personnel should try to minimize the number
of flights into high density areas or try to use off-peak
periods if possible. If the civil craft operators perceive
they are being denied flight reservations by military
use of critical airspace for less than serious purposes,
they may cause pressure to have the military included
in the reservation system.
• Aerial Demonstrations. Several incidents have
come to my attention in the past few months of Army
Aviation and parachute jumping demonstrations which
C.
have attracted adverse publicity or incurred alleged
violations of Federal Air Regulations. One of the
principal causes of these undesirable incidents seems
to be misunderstanding of ARs and FARs governing
aerial demonstrations by both the Army and FAA
officials involved. The Army has Department of the
Army Regional Representatives to each of the FAA
Regional Headquarters. Their primary mission is to
coordinate Army requirements for the use of the
national airspace. Direct coordination between the
aviators flying the demonstrations and the DARRs
could clarify the situation while it is still in the planning
stage, and consequently, reduce the adverse publicity
and allegations of FAR violations. The DARR's phone
numbers are listed in AR 95-50 and the Flight Infor
mation Bulletin, which is supplied to all Army flight
operations offices. Aviators should be cautious when
accepting demonstration clearances obtained by non
aviation oriented personnel. The relay of clearances
and limitations for flight demonstrations by personnel
not familiar with flight rules seems to be a major
source of the misunderstanding.
• The Army National Guard Aviation Program
has experienced tremendous growth over the past 10
years in both the number of aircraft operated and
maintained and in aviator personnel. In 1971, more
than 221,000 hours were flown by 2,500 ARNG aviators
in 1,027 aircraft with an aircraft accident rate experi
ence of 11.3 accidents per 100,000 hours. At the end
of FY 1981, more than 312,000 hours were flown by
4,538 ARNG aviators in 2,583 aircraft with an accident
rate of only 2.88. The contribution of ARNG aviation
to the overall Army Aviation program is illustrated by
the fact that 30 percent of the Total Army Aviation
force structure is within the Army National Guardº
The success of the ARNG aviation program can be
attributed to resourceful leadership at the state and
local level, innovative management at the national
level and an unyielding committment to aviation safety
at all levels.
• Aviation Awards. Last January, we sent a message
(DTG 131546ZJan 82) to all aviation units announcing
the 12 nonfederally sponsored awards in which Army
Aviation may participate during 1982. These are very
prestigious award programs designed to recognize
the outstanding civilian or military contributions in
various aspects of aviation. Many of our aviators and
aviation units are qualified to compete, but their ac
complishments need to be brought to our attention.
Please review the award criteria contained in the
message. -º-f
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

* AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES
Key Personnel Changes
ILITARY Personnel Center has announced
major personnel changes which should be of
interest to all Officer Personnel Management Direc
torate managed officers. Colonel J Thomas H. Denney
has been assigned as chief, Plans, Programs and
Analysis Division. A Master Army Aviator with
extensive aviation experience, COL Denney has served
in numerous artillery and aviation positions in the
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and commanded
the 477th ARA BN at Ft. Campbell, KY.
LTC Turner E. Grimsley has come from being the
squadron commander of the 4/17th Cav in Korea. He
is now SC 15 colonel (06) assignment officer.
Major David Hicks has arrived after a tour in Europe
to become the SC 15 lieutenant colonel assignment
officer; he will replace Major George Sweat who will
be reassigned to Korea in May. Major Steve DeVault
will be working in major assignments along with Major
Gary Steimle; Steve also arrived from Europe in early
January.
Special Duty and the Aviator
PECIAL DUTY or SD has become a well-known
term in today's Army—a term that often strikes
fear in the hearts of our boldest aviators. It's doubtful
that there is an Army installation in the world that
does not have officer special duty positions, and experi
ence tells us that Army aviators share the burden of
filling these positions.
Special duty positions comprise those requirements
on an installation for which there is no authorized
position; yet the job requires an officer on a full-time
basis for mission accomplishment. These positions,
while normally valid and usually career enhancing,
are seldom operational flying positions. Herein lies
the problem. Regardless of the mechanism used, an
aviator “attached” or “SD d” from an operational
MAY 1982
º
2."
Over in Warrant Officer Division COL Paul J.
Wenzel has moved from the chief assignments of
Combat Arms Division to the chief of Warrant Officer
Division, replacing COL George A. Morgan who has
gone to the Pentagon to work as the liaison to the
High Technology Test Bed at Ft. Lewis, WA. LTC
Doug Thorp, Deputy Division Chief, has been reassign
ed to HQ, DARCOM, with no replacement named at
this time. CW4 David Helton is in from Ft. Campbell
and has replaced CW4 Lee Komich as Aviation As
signment Branch chief. CW4Komich has been reassign
ed to Alaska. CW4 Jim Newhouse will depart in early
May for an operational flying position, while CW3(P)
Larry Morgan is in from the 11th Group in Germany to
handle 100C, 1000, 100R and 160A assignments. Over
in the Professional Development Branch, CW4 Lloyd
Washer is now branch chief, coming in from 1st
Personnel Command in Germany. CW4 Washer took
over from CW4 Dick Sauer, who retired after 25
years of service.
flying slot to an installation, division or corp staff
position to function where flying is not required as a
part of the primary duties will not receive operational
flying duty credit.
Due to an abundance of commissioned aviators,
particularly at the field grade level (coupled with a
shortage of field grade aviation positions), the move
ment of aviators into SD positions at the installation
level has become commonplace. While this practice
is often the only solution to meeting command
established priorities for personnel managers in the
field, it is imperative that aviators and personnel
managers remain cognizant of the impact on aviator
"gate qualification. hºmº

º Dº
Vision
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of any Department of Defense agency
Lieutenant Colonel Barry J. Sottak
Commander, 101st Avn Bn (AH)
Fort Campbell, KY
Major Charles B. Cook
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Major Cook was assigned as commander, Co. D. 101st Avn Bn (AH),
Fort Campbell, KY, when he coauthored this article
Eves SEE THE cigarette ad of the past to the modern, powerful
vertisement with the foxy looking state-of-the-art machines of today—
young lady saying, “You’ve come a have had a dramatic impact on Army
long way, baby” So has Army doctrine, organization and training.
Aviation through some 40 years of Today, the potential contributions
both evolutionary and revolution of helicopters to modern battlefield
ary developments. Indeed the capa success are widely recognized and
bilities of the helicopter—from the reflected in a plethora of new train
ungainly, underpowered rotorcraft ing literature, organizational docu
10
ments and equipment. With its
recent combat arms designatio
Army Aviation proudly accepts its
place as a full-fledged coequal mem
ber of the combined arms team. In
the dynamic areas of equipment,
tactics, doctrine and training, Army
Aviation continues to seek better
and more efficient ways to integrate
and employ its resources. The pur
pose of this paper is to describe
new concepts within the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault)
aimed toward that end.
The fundamental advantage of
an air assault force lies in its ability
to use organic helicopters to provide
a significant tactical mobility and/or
firepower differential over the en
emy. We know from doctrine al
ready developed that heliborne
forces can attack from any direction,
strike otherwise inaccessible areas,
bypass obstacles, rapidly place forces
in the concentrations desired at de
cisive locations and they can react
rapidly to tactical opportunities.
Also, they allow more of the com
mander's force to be committed
thereby requiring smaller reserves.
Air assault forces, like all other
combat arms elements, are affected
or limited by certain unique factors,
of which the following are the most
significant: weather extremes, allow
able cargo/passenger capacities,
aircraft availability, the need to
maintain airlines of communications
beyond friendly lines, vulnerability;
to enemy action during pickup
zone/landing zone (PZ/LZ) oper
ations and the air defense threat.
Air assault force commanders,
like their colleagues in armor, mech,
airborne or straight “leg” units,
employ the basic principles of FM
100-5 to enhance survival on the
modern, lethal battlefield of today.
If we allowed the enemy to maximize
his strengths against our own weak
nesses, we would deserve the defeat
that will almost surely follow. How
ever, with the aid of modern tech
nology, realistic training and proper
integration of Army Aviation into
the combined arms team, the weak
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 nesses of the air assault force can
e minimized while simultaneously
maximizing its strengths.
The Army has had aviation units
supporting its forces for more than
30 years–normally an organic,
composite battalion supporting a
division. As such, the division com
mander has been able to take advan
tage of the helicopter at least on a
small scale—usually battalion-size
operations or less. Though small in
scope, these operations still afford
ed the commander a great deal of
flexibility in his ground tactical
planning. By combining the best
features of the forces available to
him into one combined arms team,
the commander normally enhanced
the employment of his total force.
The Soviet airmobile threat is a
ABOVE: The AH-1 Cobra attack
formidable one. The large numbers helicopter provides the division
of sophisticated helicopters avail with a knockout punch
able in the Frontal Tactical Air RIGHT: The CH-47 Chinook's
Armies could easily be used to capability to move artillery about
the battlefield enhances the
conduct airmobile operations using already significant firepower of
troops drawn from motorized or the division
airborne units. It would be naive to
believe that the Soviets do not con
\_
sider this capability an important
feature of their high speed offense. Photographs by Ft. Campbell Public Affairs Office and by Major Charles B. Cook
On the other hand, the U.S. Army
that developed the airmobile con
cedpt has elected to retain a mix of
divisional units to include the world's
only air assault division. Arguments were committed simultaneously. ern weapons systems, the division
as to which concept is the most When the UH-1 Huey was the main can assess the threat with equipment
effective could probably rage on stay of the lift fleet, the criticism that has already been fielded— not
*orever. In these days of scarce could not be taken lightly. future systems that are on the draw
dollars and resources, it often be Due to significant limitations ing boards or in various stages of
comes necessary to defend the cost involving survivability, lift capacity development (which seems to be
of one of the Army's largest, most and staying power, the division was strictly an American technique).
expensive divisions, particularly in probably best described as a “leg" Such future systems war game well
light of the increasing threat. Many unit with a significant airmobile on paper but are useless against a
have asked if the 101st Airborne capability rather than being a true well equipped opponent until they
Division (Air Assault) is not just a air assault division. Indeed, air have been fielded and are in the
scaled up version of the battalion assault operations were limited by hands of the users.
sized force available to most division aviation state-of-the-art and one With its 90-UH-60 Black Hawks
commanders using the one or two lift could seriously challenge the utility and large number of modernized
companies available to them. Since of the air assault concept in light of AH-1S Cobras, the 101st has a new
there are only two lift battalions in the increased threat of the 1980s. family of aircraft designed to cope
a division with three maneuver The air assault division of today, with rigors of today's battlefields. It
brigades, a criticism was often heard however, has a dramatically different does not have to face the 1980s
that there would be insufficient lift appearance than the division of the with aircraft technology dating back
to adequately support the air as 1960s or 1970s. With the recent to the 1960s. To ensure that our
sault division if all three brigades acquisition of a new family of mod tactical doctrine keeps pace with

MAY 1982 11

and maximizes the increased capa
bilities afforded by these new heli
copters, many new experiments are
being conducted. The 101st is a
unique division, not just because of
its large number of helicopters but,
more importantly, because of its
ability to closely integrate infantry,
aviation, fire support and close air
support into one combined arms
team. The division's combat power
has been dramatically improved by
the increased mobility, survivabil
ity and firepower afforded by its
new aircraft and a new fleet of TOW
mounted jeeps. With proper use of
all other combat multipliers, the
101st Airborne Division (AA) has
the capability to slug it out on any
forseeable battlefield of the next
decade with less regard for its limi
tations and with more flexibility due
to its newly acquired strengths.
One of the new concepts being
experimented with has to do with
the manner in which aviation units
provide support to the infantry task
force. Until recently, if three brigade
task forces were employed simul
taneously, their tactical mobility
would be seriously impaired because
of the inadequate lift capacity of
the two UH-1 equipped lift battalions
to support three maneuver brigades.
The solution was readily apparent,
though cost prohibitive: a third lift
battalion was required! The advan
tages of a third lift battalion are
manifold. First, a direct support (DS)
aviation battalion could be habitually
associated with a maneuver brigade
in a manner paralleling field artil
lery doctrine. In the peacetime train
ing environment, supporting aviation
units would be in sync with the sup
ported brigades training cycle. This
arrangement would provide aviation
units with the opportunity to plan
and conduct maintenance and train
ing based on carefully developed,
realistic, short and long range train
ing plans. Under a two-lift-battalion
concept, aviation units are rarely
able to execute planned training
due to being preempted by, and
12
(AR ASSAUT)
reactionary to, the plans of sup
ported units and a myriad of other
unprogramed, short-fused taskings
from higher headquarters (HQ).
Second, each brigade would have a
dedicated aviation command and
control HQ as part of its task organi
zation. The brigade commander
would have an aviation battalion
commander and staff at his disposal
to facilitate aviation planning and
integration, and more importantly,
he would have for the first time a
dedicated, highly qualified and prop
erly equipped agency to control all
combat aviation assets allocated to
him. By having a parallel control
structure in all three brigades, com
bat aviation assets could be massed
and shifted about the battlefield
rapidly to meet tactical require
ments; and combat aviation would
be controlled by the people best
qualified to do it, i.e., combat avia
tors! Third, the habitual support
relationship would foster tremen
dous teamwork, confidence, esprit
and efficiency as the task force
trained together, refined unit stand
ing operating procedures (SOPs),
Ct C.
It is unlikely, however, that the
air assault division will be autho
rized the needed third lift battalion
in the near term. Given this reality
and recognizing the need for ime
proved aviation responsiveness to
meet the tempo and dynamics of
modern battle, the air assault divi
sion has developed a new system for
providing aviation support. The new
system uses in-house resources,
features a dedicated aviation bat
talion in direct support of each
maneuver brigade and provides each
brigade with a base line aviation
slice with which to conduct training.
The third command and control
headquarters comes from the attack
helicopter battalion. Each brigade
slice consists of two assault heli
copter companies (UH-60) and one
attack helicopter company (AH-1S).
In the peacetime environment,
this arrangement will greatly facil
itate training for all units—especially
the two lift battalions which here
tofore were spread too thin in their
efforts to support all three brigades
and concurrently to respond to other
short-fused taskings. The greatest
value of the system, however, will
be realized in wartime:
• It provides unprecedented flexi
bility and responsiveness in that a
mechanism exists in all three bri
gades to facilitate the rapid massing
and shifting of aviation assets to
meet tactical requirements through
out the division sector.
• It assures that combat aviation
command, control and planning
functions are performed by the bestº
qualified personnel, that is, combat
aviators.
• It maximizes the use of avail
able command and control head
quarters, thereby ensuring that the
span of control of ground elements
is not exceeded.
• It relieves ground commanders
and staffs of aviation-related bur
dens, thereby permitting their total
focus on fighting the battle on the
ground.
As can be seen, the system de
scribed is modeled after field artil
lery doctrine: Each maneuver brig
ade has a DS aviation battalion
capable of planning support and
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
commanding and controlling what
ever aviation resources are allocated
to the brigade. The medium lift
battalion (CH-47) is normally re
tained in general support of the
division, though portions of it may
reinforce DS battalions as required.
The field artillery has a well estab
lished responsive “Long Red Line”
of agencies and communications
Troops from the 101st Division rappel from the UH-60 Black Hawk
^ N
channels to translate the request
for fire support to “shrapnel on the
target.” In a matter of seconds or
minutes, rounds are on the way. So
too must combat aviation have a
responsive “Dark Blue Line” of
agencies and communications chan
nels to translate the request for
aviation support to “aircraft on
station.” As with the field artillery,
aviation support is extremely time
sensitive. Aviation must be capable
of reacting within seconds and min
utes. The Dark Blue Line starts at
infantry company level and goes
through each succeeding level
through division.
One or two specially trained,
radio-equipped pathfinders are as
signed to each line company to
respond to the company command
er's requirements for aviation sup
port. They can call for and control
combat aviation, assist in PZ/LZ
and slingload operations, and per
form other aviation-related services
as directed by the company com
mander. In the heat of battle, the
company commander will be the
busiest officer in the division; he
simply will not have the time to get
bogged down with time consuming
radio transmissions, etc. This combat
aviation team (CAT) will alleviate
many of his burdens, thereby freeing
him to focus on fighting the battle
and leading his troops. In a simplistic
way, the CAT is the aviation sequel
to the artillery FIST (fire support
team). At infantry battalion level,
an aviator (ideally a captain) from
the supporting aviation battalion,
an RTO/driver with vehicle and
radios, and pathfinders form the
combat aviation party (CAP). The
CAP provides the capability of
calling for and controlling combat
aviation in the battalion sector and
assists the battalion in planning
aviation employment. In addition,
this aviator with line pilot experience
as a flight leader, will assist in pull
ing together the efforts of the S-3,
S-3 air, fire support officer and U.S.
Air Force liaison officer to ensure
as enhanced an air assault operation
as possible. An important side bene
fit generated here is that as line
pilots are rotated through this critical
function, they experience firsthand,
and from ground level, the problems
that result from sloppy integration
of aviation support. In the future, as
they return to their normal duties
in their own units, this added ex
13
perience makes them more effective
operations officers, platoon leaders
and flight leads. Also, since the CAP
officer will normally come from the
aviation company that has air mis
sion command responsibility for the
battalion that the CAP is supporting,
close and continuous liaison exists
between him and his parent aviation
unit. Missions can be anticipated,
reaction times decreased, briefings
conducted quicker (en route if neces
sary), and missions accomplished
with more efficiency. At brigade
level, the aviation headquarters
colocates with the brigade head
quarters and forms the Combat
Aviation Control Center (CACC)—
the single point of contact to the
brigade commander for all aviation
matters in support of the brigade's
mission. Exchange of information
is facilitated with emphasis on up
to-date intelligence summaries, and
reaction times are dramatically im
proved. At division level, the aviation
group headquarters provides a simi
lar function to the division com
mander. CATs, CAPs and CACCs
are tied together by means of combat
aviation nets (CAN)— nets separate
from the task force's command
channels and which can be moni
tored by all members of the com
bined arms team from company to
division.
The system described is new, is
by no means perfected in terms of
efficiency and is undergoing con
tinuous refinement. While in garri
son, each aviation battalion head
quarters establishes one-on-one re
lationships with its respective in
fantry brigade. Aviation person
nel at all levels become intimately
acquainted with supported brigade/
battalion personnel and unit SOPs,
and vice versa. This facilitates tre
mendous opportunities to truly inte
grate aviation and infantry units into
one combined arms team, the result
being a cohesive, true air assault
force, rather than just an “airmobile”
force, wherein any one of the in
fantry battalions may be supported
by any one of the aviation units as
14
AE ASSAI)
missions are tasked out on a random
basis. Aviation units are currently
organizing “mobile training teams”
to pitch standardized briefings to
supported elements. The briefings
will be informal and informative in
nature and may be given to either
an entire battalion of troops or
geared for presentation to company
officers and battalion staffs. They
will explain how aviation units are
organized and equipped and what
their true capabilities and limitations
really are, e.g., expected sustained
availability rates, surge rate capa
bility, reaction times, allowable
cargo loads, fuel requirements,
aviation training requirements, etc.
Infantry units in turn will recip
roCate.
When engaged in field activities,
aviation battalions will habitually
support the same brigades. Lift
companies will habitually support
the same battalions of a brigade
and will continue to assume air
mission command responsibilities
for all missions conducted in the
battalion's sector. Whenever an
aviation unit moves into an area of
operations, it does not take long
for the commander, his operations
personnel and flight leads to become
intimately familiar with the support
ed battalion's sector due to constan's
overflights and the ability to monitor
numerous frequencies on aircraft
radios. As priorities are switched
along the division's front and aviation
companies are shifted to reinforce
each other, the commanders and
flight leaders are ideally postured
to assume operational control of
reinforcing units, whether lift, attack
or medium lift, and to quickly meet
mission requirements due to their
familiarity with the terrain, enemy
situation, and status and disposition
of friendly units being supported.
Aviation units' responsiveness and
flexibility allow the commanding
general a wide range of options on
the use of his aviation resources.
Whether it is AH-1s from the attack
battalion or cavalry squadron rein
forcing each other, or lift companies
“ganging up” for one big lift, aircraft
can be shifted rapidly across the
division's front to meet any tactical
requirement. This feature, perhaps
above all others, is the division's
most outstanding and unique capa
bility.
As with all Army divisions, the
101st continues to train hard with
combat readiness as its first priority.
Due to turnover rates and real world
missions, recurrent training, strategic
deployment, readiness and field
training exercises are a way of life
at Ft. Campbell. During the past
year, some extremely challenging,
tough, realistic training was con
ducted which maximized the full
potential of the division's aircraft.
Unfortunately, knowledge gained
from exercises is highly perishable;
and as personnel depart the division,
so too does much of the experience
base. Flight leaders and senior pilots
in-command do not just grow on
trees, nor do good experienced
infantry company commanders or
squad leaders. Good training breeds
them. When the opportunity to get
the new guy's feet wet presents itself.
it sometimes becomes necessary to
remind ourselves not to get too
excited if a pilot being groomed for
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 flight lead didn't juggle all the balls will have a task force with unpre to enemy strengths. The 101st Air
*he first time and circled his LZ be cedented combat power—a capabil borne Division (AA) strategically and
fore landing, or if the new infantry ity which probably has not escaped tactically mobile, firepower heavy
company commander just coming the Soviets either, considering their and highly trained, stands ready to
off a night raid had a confused PZ. capability to merge frontal helicop assume any mission, anytime, any
We must expect, profit by and under ters with a tank army's assault. This where, against any enemy. One day,
write mistakes as we train our junior reality highlights a critical equip we will stand on our objective, wipe
leaders. Another reminder, and an ment deficiency in the U.S. Army. our bayonets clean, tie down our
important one: Whether in training We are not prepared to meet and rotor blades and shake hands with
or in war, many aviators see and defeat the enemy helicopter threat. our fellow team members on a job
understand what is happening as A pressing need exists now for well done. Air Assault! agº-4
events unfold on the ground as well helicopters to have the capability
or better than many ground com to fight helicopters, thereby freeing
manders and staff officers. Rarely, air assault or attack helicopter forces
however, is input solicited from the to accomplish their mission (and NOTES:
aviation community, especially at let's not hear any of that “well,
ARTEP (Army Training and Eval it's on the drawing boards”). The 1. Briefing as presented by MG
uation Program) after-action reviews. need is now, and it is urgent. Jack V. Mackmull, CG of the 101st
If aviation observations and insights As the air assault division faces Airborne Division (AA), to a 101st
are not integrated into formal de the challenging decade ahead, it Aviation Group Commanders Call,
briefings, the loop is not closed on continues innovative training with Ft. Campbell, KY, July 1980.
any air assault operation. Com its state-of-the-art aircraft and its 2. After-Action Review of JRX
manders and staff officers imbued three air assault brigades. It will Brave Shield '80 as conducted by
with an “I call, you haul” mentality remain a powerful force dedicated COL Peter M. Dawkins, then 3d
really do not understand combined to developing tactics and techniques Brigade Commander, to the Com
arms integration and true air assault. to maximize its strengths against its mand Group of the 101st Airborne
One last point deserves mention. adversary's weaknesses and con Division (Air Assault), September
During the recent joint readiness versely to minimize its vulnerabilities 1980.
exercise, Brave Shield '80, which
pitted air assault forces against a
larger mech-armor force, numerous
and varied scenarios were arranged
and conducted. The system for
controlling combat aviation describ
ed in this paper was played exclusive
ly and with great success. The
vaunted A-10 and AH-1S combi The UH-60 Black Hawks of the 101st have the speed and maneuverability
needed to move troops and survive on the extended battlefield
nation with its synergistic effect
*worked to perfection as the divi r -N
sion's knockout punch. In one sce
nario, a tank battalion was placed
under operational control of the
air assault brigade, and an extremely
potent force resulted—a force that
was capable of generating awesome
combat power, could operate day
and night in all conditions of visibil
ity or weather, and one which could
operate without regard to terrain
obstacles. This combination created
a multiplier effect perhaps even
greater than that of the A-10/AH
1S combination. In some future
conflict, the corps commander who
has an opportunity to cross-attach
his armored and air assault divisions

MAY 1982
Super Safety Training
Weekend. s = or why ruin
wasting a good weekend of flying with classes
I T IS NEVER enjoyable to
hear, “Your unit has a
problem, ASO. What are you
going to do about it?” Particularly
when the unit has 12 years of
flying without a damage-costing
mishap, an average age of 34, and
an average of 1,800 flight hours.
Although the unit passed the
ARMS inspection, a question like
that tends to unnerve a newly
assigned ASO.
This is a story with a happy
ending, if it can be said that safety
stories have an ending. This is a
story of how attitudes are critical
if a true safety philosophy is to
permeate every aspect of the
unit's operations. This is a story
that illustrates one unit's
approach to solving a safety
management problem.
The management problem,
quite simply, is four small USAR
aviation units, each drilling on a
different weekend, with
completely different missions, all
using the same aircraft, each unit
individually striving to conduct a
comprehensive safety program. If
only those efforts could be
consolidated, then we could . . .
Effective management
technique involves three steps:
problem recognition, solution
identification, and imple
mentation. Managing a meaning
ful and comprehensive safety
program is no different from
managing any other program.
Since the ARMS team had
identified the problem and
possible solutions, two-thirds of
the work was done. WRONG!
16
Captain John W. Simmons
The fun was to begin.
The recommended solutions
included a proposal for a consoli
dated safety meeting on an
annual basis. The first hurdle then
was how to consolidate drill
weekends. If all units drilled on
the same weekend, then limited
aircraft would reduce training
accomplished. The final solution
was a no-flying drill weekend.
That's right, one weekend drill
with all units in attendance,
devoted solely to conducting as
many nonflying training and
safety classes, inspections, and
exercises as possible and done on
an annual basis (each unit could
then accomplish the quarterly
requirements).
To devote a weekend to safety,
a timely theme was needed. Since
two of the units were going to go
through NOE qualification during
annual training, with one unit
responsible for an airfield and the
other conducting aviation
ARTEPS, the NOE theme was
selected. The involvement of as
many people as possible with an
interest in aviation safety was
strived for. An ambitious under
taking such as this has to be sold
to the units as well as the chain of
command. The participation of
the division commander was
critical.
Since the main theme was
NOE, the main attraction would
be a guest lecturer from the U.S.
Army Safety Center. LTC James
Kenton, chief of the Aviation
Technology Division at the Safety
Center, was the centerpiece
ning
around which the weekend was
planned. In two days, the
following was accomplished:
• A comprehensive presenta
tion by LTC Kenton on safety in
general and NOE in particular.
• Quarterly aviation safety
meeting.
• Quarterly standardization
council.
• Quarterly aviation safety
council.
• Weather briefing by MSG
Gaudreau, SWO, USAF.
• CBR practical exercise (Fort
Eustis gas chamber).
• Aeromedical class by the
flight surgeon, CPT Paschal, MD.
• Demonstration of crash
rescue (preaccident plan) by CW4
Pete Smith, FAAF ASO.
• Quarterly safety meeting
(EM) conducted by CPT
Ambrose, safety officer, 80th
Division.
• Threat briefing by MAJ Jack
Stacy, assistant G-2, 80th ($
Division.
• Egress practical exercise
(simulated shutdown of the
aircraft and egress) conducted by
CW4 Terence Abbott.
• Three-station ALSE practical
exercise. CW2 Steve Gibson con
ducted a survival radio practical
exercise, SGT Mike Stubbs in
spected the individuals aviation
life support equipment, and MSG
Tom Graves inspected the
survival vest and gave instruction
on its use.
• Briefings on selected subjects
too numerous to mention (e.g.,
OHR, SOF, PRAM, FOD, etc.).
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Tables 1 and 2 show the scope
20f a comprehensive safety
program (tailored for our unit).
Participation was excellent. It
would be nice to know that a
quest for knowledge about
aviation safety was the motivator.
However, it appears that the
oyster roast planned after training
on Saturday did as much to
promote safety as the classes.
During the social hour all the
attendees had a chance to discuss
safety with the experts such as
LTC Kenton, Dr. Paschal, LTC
James, and CW4 Smith. It is
interesting to note that much of
the dialogue with the division
commander at the social was
safety related.
Out of a demanding schedule,
several hours of the division
commander's time was devoted to
insuring that the weekend was a
success. Late Saturday afternoon,
the commander spoke to the
attendees, telling them of his
interest in aviation safety, his
concern for the men and women
in the units, and his philosophy
on mission accomplishment in a
safe manner.
Two observations, which are
perhaps the reason for this article,
can be made. Safety is an
attitude. The two observations
relate to attitude, first the
commander's attitude, and
second the aviators' attitude.
A division commander's
attitude can be expressed in a
policy letter, but when he takes
time to travel to attend a safety
meeting, to address the units on
safety, and to participate in a
social hour, then his attitude is
personally conveyed to each
attendee.
An aviator's attitude is
influenced by his commander's
attitude. The safety program may
exist, but it is only operational
U.S. ARMY SAHIW CHNIHR
through the aviator if he
incorporates the attitude of his
commander. In our unit, all
aviators, crewmembers, and
related personnel personally
know the attitude of their
commander, and the coming
year's safety program will be
devoted to reminding everyone of
that attitude.
Even though a Reserve unit is
made up of people with diverse
backgrounds and civilian occupa
tions, we can accomplish the
mission with the right attitude.
Captain Simmons is the aviation
safety officer of the 80th Division
(Training), USAR. After serving on
active duty for 5 years, he spent 1
year with D Company, 26th Aviation
Battalion, Florida National Guard, as
a Scout pilot and has been with the
80th Division Aviation Section for 2
years. He is employed as a civilian
attorney with the Applied
Technology Laboratory, USARTL,
AVRADCOM.

TABLE 1.-Required Safety Classes

Egress training ALSE/survival/first aid Mapreading Quality Deficiency Report

Fire prevention Aviation safety meeting OHR/AIRMISS Teardown Analysis Program
Weather briefing EM safety meeting SOF Army Oil Analysis Program
Hearing conservation Aeromedical training PRAM Weight and balance
FOD prevention Range briefing CBR gas mask Forms and publications

TABLE 2. — Required Safety Instructions/Reviews

Review and telephonic check of preaccident plan Review unit training with training
FOD inspection
officer, operations officer, and
commander to insure that training
Aviation resource survey is directed towards known
Review of unit SOP deficiencies

Review of applicable safety regs Fly with crews to determine

Review reading file, compare to TCFE file standardization/operational
readiness
Review safety bulletin board
Monitor POL/refueling operation
Review safety award program
Observe ground and flight operations to Review unit orders appointing
detect unsafe practices safety personnel
ALSE periodic inspection
Inspect physical condition of airfield for (scheduled and unannounced)
measures, check current publications in
flight planning, and inspect any other Inspect safety kit and review
airfield activity which might impact on CMI checklist
unit safety Other inspection/review

MAY 1982 17

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
OBSERVATION
PERFORMANCE PLANNING
CARD (PPC)
REPARATION OF the Performance Planning
P Card (PPC) is an integral part of all missions
flown by Army aviators. When proper perfor
mance planning is accomplished, the aviator can depart
with a wide variety of information that is relative to
the mission. Due to the modern battlefield tactical
employment of observation helicopters, it is essential
that all aviators have a good understanding of the
computation of the PPC.
The equipment needed to complete the PPC is
relatively simple. First, a TM 55-1520-228,235, or 214
-10 has to be procured. These publications will provide
the necessary charts located in Chapter 7 for completion
of the form. Second, a DA Form 4887-R (PPC) with
appropriate asterisk items imprinted in the left margin
should also be located. (A number of field units only
provide PPCs for one type of aircraft. The asterisk
items are different between UH-1 and OH aircraft.)
AR 95-16 states that copies of the original 365F have
to be maintained in Flight Operations, aircraft log
books and also in the aircraft historical records. This
form may be located in these locations to obtain
operating weight of the aircraft at takeoff and landing.
Temperature and pressure altitude may be obtained
from a weather forecaster or, while operating in the
field, from the aircraft's altimeter and free air tem
perature gauge.
The first item to be computed is the maximum
torque available. To compute this value, proceed to
figure 7-3, pages 7-11 through 7-14, OH-58 series aircraft,
and figure 7-3, page 7-9, OH-6A aircraft. Ensure proper
chart selection by comparing your aircraft's con
figuration with the configuration as printed on the
chart (i.e., engine deice and heater off). Use of this
chart is explained in detail in the left margin of the
18
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
STANDARDIIATION
chart. Once the maximum torque value is computed,
enter this value in the “single eng” column under
calibrated.
The second computation required is the torque
available continuous value. To obtain this information,
use figure 7-4, pages 7-15 through 7-19, in the OH-58
manuals and figure 7-4, page 7-11, in the OH-6A
manual. Once again, before attempting your computa
tion, ensure the proper configuration chart is used. If
computing this value for an OH-58 aircraft, the
maximum continuous torque should be reduced to 79
psi (OH-58A) (85 percent OH-58C) if the value is
computed above these values due to the 5-minute
torque operation limit restriction imposed by the
Operator's Manual. The OH-6A aircraft will be a
maximum continuous torque of 70 psi. After computing
this value, enter the number on the PPC under the
“single engine” calibrated column.
Predicted hover torque is computed by referring to
figure 7-5, page 7-23, OH-58 Operator's Manuals, and
figure 7-5, page 7-3, OH-6A Operator's Manual. To
determine hover power which is required by the
Operator's Manuals, enter the chart at the top right
labeled “pressure altitude.” The entry point is deter
mined by the pressure altitude received from the
weather forecaster by obtaining the value from the
aircraft altimeter. Move right to the temperature line
and down vertically to your aircraft weight configur
ation for the mission at the time of takeoff. Move left
to the desired hover height, where the hover height
line intersects the gross weight computed value; move
down to read the predicted hover torque. Enter these
values on the PPC under “single eng” “calibrated"
adjacent to predicted hover (TQ percent) and hover,
OGE (TQ percent).
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 If passengers are expected to be transported in the
Faircraft during the mission, their actual weights should
be obtained and added to the operating weight of the
aircraft. If the actual weights are unavailable to the
pilot during the premission planning phase, use the
standard configuration 365Fs located in the logbook
of the aircraft for these computations. The Aircrew
Training Manual (ATM) requires that, when environ
mental/loading conditions change significantly, the
aviator is required to recompute a new PPC. Since a
significant change is not defined in the ATM or
Operator's Manual, it is the pilot's responsibility to
determine his personal significant change values. TC
1-10, “Mountain Flying Sense,” defines a significant
change as 5 degrees and 500 feet pressure altitude.
These figures may be used as a guideline in determin
ing your personal significant change values.
Safe pedal margin is determined by referencing
figure 5-5, page 5-11, and figure 5-2, page 5-12, in the
OH-58C Operator's Manual (figure 5-6, page 5-13,
and figure 5-6, page 5-14, OH-58A Operator's Manual).
The Operator's Manual explains the procedure for
computing the Directional Control Margin Chart. If
it is determined that your aircraft does not fall into
the yellow area of the chart, you may assume that you
do have at least a 10 percent pedal control margin and
check “yes” on the PPC. However, if your aircraft's
gross weight falls within the yellow area of figure 5-5,
you must proceed to figure 5-2, page 5-12, OH-58C
(figure 5-6, page 5-14, OH-58A). Enter the chart in the
appropriate area (i.e., Area C). The left limit line of
Area C is the 10 percent pedal control margin line.
Read to the right Area C limit line and identify the
worst possible winds conditions by tracing this line
from 150 degrees at 20 knots to 087 degrees at 20
knots. The most critical wind velocity is 20 knots and
greater from 150 degrees to 087 degrees. If you operate
the aircraft at a high gross weight, marginal power
* conditions, and a slow rate of airspeed and exceed 20
knots of relative wind from these azimuths, the aircraft
may turn uncontrollably to the right. If you determine
that these wind conditions do exist, you may reduce
the aircraft gross weight or alter the mission to ensure
safe operation within aircraft limits.
Arrival data is required to be computed if the
arrival configuration differs significantly from the
takeoff combinations. This information is computed
the same as the departure data except the adjusted
environmental or loading conditions are used for
your computations.
TC 1-137 requires that an in-flight fuel check be
initiated upon entering your mission profile. The
airborne fuel check must be completed 15 to 30 minutes
after the initial check was recorded. For PPC purposes,
the start/stop time, rate of consumption, burnout
time and 20-minute (VFR) fuel reserve time must be
MAY 1982
recorded on the PPC in the appropriate blanks.
The optional and cruise data is not required to be
completed during your premission planning. If this
information is computed, a large amount of information
is made readily available to the aviator which may be
useful in performing his mission.
The Performance Planning Card was devised to aid
you, the aviator, to determine the operational limits
of the aircraft under specified conditions. Completing
and using the card will enhance your unit's mission
capabilities and provide essential information to the
pilot. Plan your missions thoroughly and fly them
safely. 4 ºr --
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL
36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message
CGºśs)N
A viction Center I on ng Analysis ond Assistance I egm
LANDING UPDATE
ISSUE: In accordance with Aircrew Training Manual
1-137, aviators are required to verify the Performance
Planning Card (PPC) predicted power during 4 feet
and out of ground effect (OGE) hover checks. If both
checks are not in agreement with predicted require
ments, but actual indications remain within aircraft
limits, can flight be legally continued? Instructor
pilots report that 95 percent of the 4 feet hover
checks and 40 percent of the OGE hover checks do
not agree with predicted requirements in the OH-58A.
Are the charts incorrect?
COMMENT: TC 1-137, Task #2002 states that the
pilot is responsible for ensuring that the flight can be
safely conducted by: (1) reducing the load, (2) reverify
ing the performance planning card, and (3) performing
an OGE hover check. If aircraft limitations are not
exceeded, the flight may be made. The charts in the
operator's manual are correct. However, there are
numerous conditions that affect hover power; i.e.,
wind, dirty engine, pilot technique, etc. (Directorate
of Evaluation and Standardization)
19
 ºw

Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

New SPH-4 Earphone

We have been receiving calls and letters from per
sonnel in the field regarding a new style earphone
which is now being installed in the SPH-4 flight helmet.
The new earphone is the Electro-voice Model 986,
H-143A/AIC, and is easily identified by the 19 holes
in the speaker cover. According to the manufacturer,
this new earphone is waterproof and has a much
better frequency response than the older H-143/AIC.
This allows the crewmember to wear earplugs with
the helmet and still be able to hear the radios and
intercom without difficulty.
Although the old earphone (NSN 5965-00-615-0104)
is still acceptable for use, the new H-143A/AIC
earphone obviously has certain advantages which
may make it preferable for use by Army aircrew
personnel. It is available from S9E under NSN 5965
0.1-094-6602 at a cost of $10.27 each.
Point of contact at this office is Mr. Tommy Vaughn,
AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial (314) 263-3307.

Camouflage For Helmet

Air Force Technical Order (TO) 14P3-4-112 (Service
Instructions for Flying Helmet Assemblies, Types
HGU-2A/P and HGU-26/P) lists a camouflage film
which may be applied to protective helmets used by
aircrew personnel in jungle or tropical combat areas.
According to the TO, this film (decal) consists of
about 2.5 square feet of camouflage printed elastomeric
film with a pressure-sensitive adhesive backing. The
decal is cut into irregular shaped pieces and applied
to the outer surface of the helmet shell and visor
housing.
Many Army aircrew personnel have expressed an
interest in using the camouflage film on the SPH-4
helmet in certain combat situations. This film is already
used by both the Air Force and the Navy and is cur
rently being evaluated for adoption by the Army.
Personnel wishing to obtain the camouflage film now
Debbie Bacle photograph by Tom Greene may order it “off-line” from FPZ under NSN 8475-00

20 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 173-9054. It comes in a package of three sheets and
costs $1.14 for each package.
Point of contact at this office is Mr. Tommy Vaughn,
AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial (314) 263-3307.
For the edification of everyone concerned, we furnish
the following list of current ALSE supply catalogs.
SC 1680-97-CL-A02
Individual Hot Climate Survival Kit
NSN 1680-00-973-1861

Supply Catalog Problems SC 1680-97-CL-A03

Two problems have arisen regarding Supply Catalog Individual Cold Climate Survival Kit
(SC) 1680-97-CL-A08 (Sets, Kits, and Outfits Compo NSN 1680-00-973-1862
nents List for Survival Kit Seat, Aircraft: Cold Climate,
Hot Climate, and Overwater), dated 21 August 1981. SC 1680-97-CL-A07
The first problem involves which publications are Individual Vest Survival Kit
superseded by this SC. The document cover indicates
NSN 1680-00-205-0474 (Large)
that it supersedes SCs 1680-99-CL-A08 and -A10 for NSN 1680-00-187-5716 (Small)
the cold climate seat survival kit and overwater seat
survival kit, respectively; it does not indicate that it SC 1680-97-CL-A08
supersedes SC 1680-99-CL-AO9 for the hot climate Aircraft, Cold Climate Survival Kit Seat
seat survival kit. It would thus appear that there are NSN 1680-00-148-9233
two SCs in effect for the same survival kit. This is not
the case. According to personnel in the Data Manage SC 1680-97-CL-A08
ment Branch of the Directorate for Materiel Manage Aircraft, Hot Climate Survival Kit Seat
ment, TSARCOM, SC 1680-97-CL-AO8 does supersede NSN 1680-00-148-9234
SC 1680-99-CL-A09 as well as the -A08 and -A10, even
though that fact is not indicated on the cover. SC 1680-97-CL-A08
The second problem involves one component of Aircraft, Overwater Survival Kit Seat
* the survival kits which is not listed in the SC, namely, NSN 1680-00-140-3540
the first aid kit. According to personnel in the Sets,
Kits and Outfits Branch of the Directorate for Materiel SC 1680-99-CL-A()4
Management, TSARCOM, the first aid kit (NSN6545 Individual Overwater Survival Kit
00-823-8165) was deleted from the SC because the NSN 1680-00-973-1863
supply point was unable to obtain it for survival kit
assembly due to the controlled substances which it SC 4220-90-CL-NO1
contains. However, personnel in the field should still Inflatable, 7 Person Capacity Mark VII Life Raft
order the first aid kit through their local medical NSN 4220-00-245-7751
facility and include it as a component of their seat
survival kits. SC 846.5-90-CL-P02
Point of contact at this office is Mr. John Chubway, Individual Vest Type Survival Kit
AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial (314) 263-3307. NSN 8465-00-177-48.19

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN DRCPO-ALSE.
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63 120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 3 14-263-3307

MAY 1982 21
 [..ife Support Squipment Insurante Borporation
This policy is issued to Your Name. It is payable whenever the need arises.
The face value of this policy is Your Life. The provisions under which the policy
is issued are as follows:
SECTION I: This policy guarantees, in the event of an aircraft accident, which
places the insured in a survival situation, to do the following:
A. Separate the insured from his aircraft by means of ejection or bailout.
Note: In the event of ditching or crash landing, it will be the responsibility
of the insured to get out of the aircraft using the best available means.
B. Return the insured to Terra Firma, in the event of ejection or bailout, by
means of a nylon conveyance commonly known as a parachute.
C. Provide the insured with sufficient equipment to enable him to survive
wherever he lands (water, desert, tropics, or mountains).
Note: It is the responsibility of the insured to use this equipment to—
1. Build adequate shelter from the elements;
2. Provide himself with additional food and water;
3. Use the signaling devices to best advantage for attracting rescue
personnel.
SECTION II: This policy may not be redeemable:
A. If the insured fails to take advantage of all life support continuation training
made available to him. Such failure includes, but is not limited to:
1. Annual training.
2. Training in excess of annual requirements.
Note: This also includes but is not limited to commanders, wing
personnel, life support officers, crew chiefs, and flight mechanics.
B. If the insured fails to take advantage of all equipment and assistance offered
him by life support specialists prior to each flight. This includes but is not
limited to:

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 . Failure to preflight all equipment as outlined in current tech orders and
regulations and as taught or published by the life support equipment
section. Equipment is interpreted to mean:
a) Life preservers d) Parachutes
b) Survival kits e) Helmets
c) Emergency signaling devices f) Oxygen masks
g) Any and all additional equip
ment provided the crew
member prior to flight
2. Failure to notify the life support specialist of any equipment problems.
C. If the insured fails to wear proper clothing for each mission. This includes
but is not limited to:
1. Wearing summer flight suit during winter operations, or failure to wear
winter underwear when winter flight suits are not available;
2. Leaving flight jacket in the life support equipment section while
insured is engaged in flight;
3. Failing to wear flying gloves;
4. Wearing low-quarters, wellingtons, Probst boots, or other unautho
rized footwear while engaged in flight.
D. If the insured misuses or abuses life support equipment. This includes but is
not limited to:
Throwing or mishandling of helmets and masks;
Laying equipment on wet or oil-covered ramps,

i Using equipment improperly for seats or pillows;

Leaving equipment exposed to weather, children, or other types of
pestilence;
5. Using auto as a wall locker.
SECTION III:
A. This policy may become null and void if the insured, through his own
º negligence, invokes any of the items in Section II.
B. The company will do all within its power to help the insured meet the
requirements of this policy. The company further assures that it will in no
way willfully cause this policy to be canceled. However, the insured may
cancel at any time.
Signed:
Life Support Specialist
Company Representative
Sound like a good policy? You bet your life it is! If you are interested in further
details, see our company representative today. You can find him in any life
support equipment section. Aviation Digest thanks Airscoop for permission to reprint this article

MAY 1982 23
 REPORTING FINAL
Late NewsFromArmyAviation Activities
FROM WASHINGTON
Vice Chief of Staff Nominee. General John A.
Wickham Jr. has been nominated by President
Reagan to serve as the Army's next Vice Chief of
Staff. He is now Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command/Commander in Chief, Com
bined Forces Command/Commander, U.S. Forces,
Korea, and Commander, 8th U.S. Army.
General Wickham, who has more than 31 years
of active commissioned service, is slated to
succeed General John W. Vessey Jr., who has
been nominated as the next chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (ARNEWS 262)
Smithsonian Display. A new exhibit commem
orating the 1981 World Helicopter Championships
is now on display in the Smithsonian Institution's
National Air and Space Museum. Included are
the individual and team trophies won by the U.S.
helicopter team in the world competition last
August in Poland.
The exhibit is open 7 days a week from 10
a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and is located at the entrance of
the Vertical Flight Gallery on the first floor.
(ARNEWS 230)
FROM TRADOC
Term Clarification. Recently there has been a
proliferation of terms that conceptually describe
battlefields on which modern forces may be
required to fight. A brief description of those
terms follows:
• Integrated Battlefield is a generic description
of a battlefield where either combatant has
employed or could employ nuclear, chemical
and conventional munitions, singly or in combi
nation. This definition has now been expanded
to include electronic and directed energy weapons.
• Extended Battlefield deals primarily with war
in areas of the world where there are large numbers
of relatively modern, well equipped forces that
use Soviet-style doctrine and tactics. Extended
Battlefield describes the need to bring to bear
the full range of friendly capabilities, to include
deep-ranging sensors and weapons, with the goal
of collapsing the enemy's will to fight. Enemy
units not yet in contact are brought under deep
attack in order to destroy, disrupt and delay their
24
Scheduled commitment to battle. The concept
recognizes that the deep and the close-in battles
are inseparable and must both be prosecuted
within the commander's overall objectives.
• AirLandBattle ties together ideas from con
cepts for the Integrated and Extended Battle
fields and applies them conceptually to the battle
field visualized for the 1980s. The main theme is
to win through early initiative of offensive action
by joint air and land forces. The key to moderni
zation as set forth in this concept is based on
Division 86 materiel and force structure require
ments. While full implementation of the AirLand
Battle concept is scheduled by 1986, many of its
ideas can be implemented today with current
aSSetS.
• AirLand Battle 2000 is an evolutionary matur
ing of the precepts of the AirLand Battle, describ
ing trends and environment for the Army for the
year 1995 and beyond. The essence of this
concept is agility whereby the enemy's will to
continue the conflict is collapsed by presenting
him with new tactical situations faster than he
can react. This concept brings to fruition the
guidelines of the Concept Based Requirements
System whereby conceptual notions dictate the
development of Systems and forces necessary
for implementation. The overall (umbrella) concept
for AirLand Battle 2000 will be supported by
eight subconcepts which will describe the battle
field in terms of functional areas. (ODCSDOC)
Safety Winner. Sergeant First
Class Gerald L. Johnson is the first
enlisted person to receive the James
H. McClellan Aviation Safety Award
that is presented annually by the
Army Aviation Association of America.
He is NCOIC of the Tri-Service Avia
tion Life Support Equipment Re
trieval Program at the Army Aero
medical Research Laboratory, Ft.
Rucker, AL. Throughout the Army
SFC Johnson is known as “Mr. Helmet" because of his dedicated
efforts to improve helmet safety for aviation personnel. He is
also the recipient of the 1981 Survival and Flight Equipment
Association General Spruance Award for his contributions to
safety through education
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Historic first delivery of the initial production CH-47D
Chinook was made 20 May at Boeing Vertol Company, Ridley
Township, PA.
Current Army plans are to modernize 436 earlier model
Chinooks to CH-47D status during the next 10 years. The
remodeled aircraft provides needed versatility for a variety
of rugged combat and combat-support missions, including
troop movement, artillery emplacement and battlefield resupply.
The 50,000 pound gross weight CH-47D has double the
payload capability of the earliest model Chinooks
FROM FORT EUSTIS
ALSE Course. The Army now has its own
Aviation Life Support Equipment (ALSE) Course.
It opened in January at the Army Transportation
School.
The course is designed to train selected person
nel in inspection, repair and resupply of ALSE
equipment. Since many items of that equipment
are controlled by other services, supply proce
dures are stressed along with hands-on training.
Upon completion of the 5-week School, students
will be awarded a special skill identifier of Q2
and will be familiar with maintenance of all current
items of ALSE equipment.
Twelve quotas are available for each class and
should be requested through normal channels.
(ATSP-DT-AS)
FROM FORT RUCKER
New Correspondence Course. Enrollment for
a new correspondence course, Army Air Traffic
Control Duty Positions, being offered by the Army
Aviation Center will be accepted after 1 July
1982. The course consists of six Subcourses
totaling 26 credit hours: Control Tower Operator
(CTO) Orientation, Flight Data, Ground Control,
Local Control, Nonradar Approach Control and
Radar Approach Control. Separate enrollment in
any of the subcourses is not authorized.
Course objective is to provide students with a
working knowledge of rules, regulations and
procedures required in the performance of ATC
MAY 1982
-
-------
The Honorable James R. Ambrose, Under Secretary of
the Army, right, learns about the AH-1S (Fully Modernized)
Cobra from Captain (P) William H. Bryan during a 2-day orien
tation visit (29-30 April) to the Army Aviation Center, Ft.
Rucker, AL. Another of the Under Secretary's activities was
to present certificates from Governor Fob James of Alabama
to six pilots of the World Helicopter Championship Team who
are stationed at Rucker, naming them Goodwill Ambassadors
for Alabama. Those recipients were Chief Warrant Officers,
CW3, Roger A. Bodwell, John J. Durkin, Robert L. Miller,
Irvin B. Starrak, Robert A. Stolworthy and Norman Thompson
duties. It can also be used as preparation for the
Federal Aviation Administration CTO written
examination.
Enrollment is open to civilian personnel and to
military personnel (whose aptitude area Scores
meet the prerequisites for Advanced Individual
Training for MOS 93H or 93J) who require
refresher or preparatory training, are considering
MOS reclassification to 93H or 93J, or who are
anticipating assignment to the ATC field.
To enroll, send completed DA Form 145 to the
Army Institute for Professional Development, Army
Training SupportCenter, Newport News, VA 23628.
(ATZQ-TD-CD)
Warrant Officer, WO1,
Diana M. Hensley is the
only woman in the Missouri
National Guard who is rotary
wing rated, is the MNG's
youngest pilot and is the first
female warrant officer in the
state. She received her
Army aviator rating in Feb
ruary and is assigned
to the 135th Engineer Group,
MNG, Cape Girardeau, MO,
with duty as a UH-1 Huey
pilot for the 868th Medical
Detachment of Jefferson
City, MO
 VIEws FROM READERs ſº
Editor:
In recent months, the term “forward
line of own troops” (FLOT) has appeared
in a number of your articles. Is this
valid U.S. Army terminology or did
someone with nothing else to do believe
that “forward edge of the battle area”
(FEBA) was obsolete and did they have
to dream up a new term? What are the
differences between FLOT and FEBA
and how do they affect us as tactical
planners? Thank you.
CPT Michael J. Morrison
Montana Army National Guard
• The battlefield is divided into three
areas: The main battle area (MBA),
the covering force area (CFA) and the
division rear area. The leading edge of
the MBA is known as the forward edge
of the battlefield or “FEBA.” This line
separates the MBA from the CFA. The
leading edge of the CFA is known as
forward line of own troops or “FLOT.”
Friendly troops may operate beyond
this line, but there would normally be
no prepared positions beyond the FLOT.
Editor:
As an aviator in a forward deployed
combat aviation battalion in Europe, I
read the article “The Leak in the Soviet
Air Defense Umbrella” in November's
Aviation Digest with great interest. I
tend to agree with the author, Major
Frank E. Babiasz, that the threat is
overstated and in all reality the threat
will react to tactical innovations which
we develop for use in combat. Due to
this, I have concluded that the threat
will try to counter any tactical innovation
by massing larger numbers against friend
ly forces, as they usually do. I believe
that this analysis of ADA threat is on
Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
26
the right track and that it should be the
major thrust of a unit's threat training
program.
Personally, after spending more than
4 years flying in Europe, I find one
element of the enemy antiair threat
grossly overlooked, that of the individual
soldier. Flying in the NOE environment
in thin-skinned aircraft, I fear the in
dividual soldier dismounted more than
those mounted. I can train to obtain a
better knowledge of the ADA threat
and tactics, but flying in and around
ground forces in close proximity will
bring ground fire to bear on us and I do
not train with enough emphasis on this.
I am looking forward to vast improve
ments with the APR-39 and thus in our
ability to identify the threat. Those with
whom I have been associated have
intensified our training in regards to
the APR-39 by using the GRETA now
deployed in Europe. Yet there is no
way to train against the ground threat
except for increased emphasis on pre
mission planning and NOEtactical flying.
I have one thing to point out specifi
cally about the article, other than threat
training and analysis, and that is the
article typifies Army Aviation thought
in this day and age. Your article stresses
the role of the scout and attack helicopter
on today's battlefield. Let us not forget
the importance of the totality of Army
Aviation in moving troops, supplies,
ammo, fuel and even TOW teams about
the battlefield. That scout and attack
helicopter is only one element of Army
Aviation, “the combat multiplier.” I’m
writing this reply because I enjoyed
your article, yet I think it's time that all
aviators express and think about the
totality of Army Aviation and not be
come narrow minded.
As a commander of an aviation com
pany, I believe it is extremely important
that when an aviator walks into a ground
TOC that he represents Army Aviation
and not just another gun pilot, scout
pilot or Huey driver. In all aspects of
Army Aviation, tactical concepts,
etc., we must plan and talk and think
about the totality of Army Aviation.
MAJ Stephen K. Cook
E Company
3d Aviation Battalion (Combat)
APO New York
Editor:
LTC (P) James Lloyd's excellent article
“Who's Going To Teach Aviators How
To Fight” in the February issue of the
Army Aviation Digest almost described
the guts of our AirLand Battle training
problem.
Yes, Army Aviation is a combat arm
like Infantry, Armor, Artillery and Air
Defense. But Army Aviation is more
than a combat arm. It is a combat maneu
ver arm like Infantry and Armor. By
fire and maneuver, Army Aviation
directly engages the enemy.
LTC Lloyd stated the case quite well
for training Infantry and Armor officers
to properly employ aviation assets. One
more step is needed. Army aviators
must be taught how to employ all
elements of the AirLand Battle. As the
Infantry, Armor and Aviation officer
matures, the very cream of the crop
should progress to command of brigades
and divisions.
The purpose of this combined arms
training is not to give equal opportunity
in the personnel system. It is to ensure
that the most capable maneuver arms
commanders lead on the battlefield!
MG Ben L. Harrison, USA (Ret)
Belton, TX
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 |H|ſ|NGſilſº . BA-156/U batteries are used in the AN/PRC 90
survival radio. These batteries must be recharged:
A. After each use
B. Never
C. Every 90 days
D. When they are weak

. Every Army survival kit contains a search and

rescue survival manual. What is the number of
this manual?
“Hangar Talk” is a quiz containing questions based on A. TC 1-62
publications applicable to Army Aviation. The answers are at B. TM 9-1300-206
the bottom of the page. If you did not do well, perhaps you C. AFM 64-5
should get out the publication and look it over.
D. TO 145-102

TC 1-62 - º: armor currently in use is capable of defeating

AVIATION LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (ALSE) small arms fire and armor piercing projectiles up
to:

TIM TO-8415-2O6-13 A. 223 caliber

B. 50 caliber
OPERATOR, ORGANIZATION, DIRECT SUPPORT
C. 30 caliber
MAINTENANCE MANUAL–SPH-4 FLIGHT HELMET
D. 45 caliber

MSG Jackson J. R. Ooten

. The SPH-4 helmet is available in three sizes:
Directorate Of Training And Doctrine small, medium and large.
U.S. Army Transportation School
Fort Eustis, VA A. True B. False

1. Equipment improvement recommendations (EIR) . The AN/PRC-90 radio, when operated in AM

concerning ALSE will be submitted in accordance voice mode, has a maximum range between ground
with: units of:

A. TC 1-62 A. 60 miles
B. TM 38-750 B. 1 mile
C. 80 miles
C. ALSE Special Instructions Booklet

* 2. AllArmy ALSE specialistsare trained in Air Force . First aid kits will be inspected in accordance with:
and Navy schools. A. Enclosed packing lists, supplied w/kits
A. True B. False B. TB 740-10/DLAM 41555, Appendix M
C. Unit SOP
3. The SRU-21/P survival vest should contain all of D. By medical personnel only
the following except:
A. Compass, magnetic, unmounted 10. Storage of individual survivalvest, containing signal
B. Fishing gill net flares, is up to the individual who is signed for the
veSt.
C. Compass, magnetic, lensatic
D. Whistle, cork ball w/lanyard A. True B. False

Spiepuels &ajes saaisodka pue uoglunuuv. CIOCI gºt GIG GOG
pue tº 25ueuo/m 90Z-009I-6 WL WVI paiols aq Isny,
W xipuaddw 'spuepue, S ^!!!qe
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6|uo Jubis go aull-aſſu I
abuel enxa pue Lenbau AuC)
Jaqeo 09, Q
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alqeabieupal jou are sauaned a 't'
3 0I onesual/m padeſdal aqpnous sseduoo paiunoutſ) v 'g
uado mous susna 1- 19 Ooups 3STV a "Z
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SHEIWSNV
 &E
".
Regional Ac
Mr. Timothy Flynn
When this article was written,
the author was an Aviation
Safety Team Leader at the
National Guard Bureau
28
APS".
HE ARMY National Guard
(ARNG) Regional Accident Pre
vention Survey (RAPS) Program,
NGR 385-5, dated 31 July 1980, was
implemented in February 1980. This
“self-help” type program was pri
marily established to assist the vari
ous ARNG aviation facilities in
meeting their requirement to con
duct an annual safety survey. This
annual safety survey requirement
was imposed by National Guard
Regulations (NGR) 95-1 and 385-10
as a concerted effort to prevent
ARNG aircraft and ground acci
dents. It involves all levels of com
mand in the accident prevention
effort:
– The Chief, National Guard
Bureau (NGB) is responsible for the
overall supervision of the ARNG
RAPS Program and for coordina
tion with other DA staff agencies
and State Adjutants General on
matters pertaining to the prevention
of accidents. This responsibility is
vested in the Director, ARNG.
– The Chief, ARNG Aviation
Division has staff responsibilities for
supervision of the program. The
ARNG Safety Branch, in turn, is
the coordinating center on all mat
ters pertaining to the RAPS. It
provides control for the funding and
personnel requirements to ensure
an integrated, comprehensive and
continuous RAPS program is accom
plished throughout the ARNG.
– The State Adjutants General
are responsible for establishing,
supervising and directing the RAPS
Program through their State Avia- ºr
tion Officers. They ensure adequate
provisions for safe practices and
physical standards are incorporated
into all the State aviation facilities.
– The Army Aviation Flight Ac
tivity/Army Aviation Support Facil
ity/Aviation Classification and Re
pair Activity Depot commanders
are responsible for conducting a
continuing vigorous effort toward
the prevention of accidents in all
operations and activities at their
facilities. To this end, they advise
and coordinate with the State Avia
tion Officer (if they are not one and
the same) on implementing the
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
13. Facility to
Conduct Survey
Team #62
(Stationed at Aurora, CO)
Team #63
(Stationed at Bismarck, ND)
Team #64
(Stationed at Rapid City, SD)
Team #65
(Stationed at Lincoln, NE)
Team #66
(Stationed at Topeka, KS)
Team #67
(Stationed at Cheyenne, WY)
Schedule of surveying in the VIII Region
RAPS Program. They arrange for
the scheduled survey to be con
ducted by coordinating with their
appropriate contemporary as out
º lined in Appendix B, NGR 385-5. A
sample matrix is shown in the ac
companying figure.
RAPS teams consist of sufficient
members to accomplish the stand
ardized checklist contained in NGR
385-5, as it would apply to the
aviation facility being surveyed. A
model team would consist of a team
chief and the following specialists:
one operations/training; one main
tenance; two safety (air and general).
This is not to imply that three
individuals during 3 days or seven
individuals during 1 day might not
be a more appropriate team. The
team's composition is the preroga
MAY 1982
FY 32 l FY 83 FY 84
Lincoln, NE Topeka, KS Cheyenne, WY
Topeka, KS | Cheyenne, WY Aurora, CO
Cheyenne, WY Aurora, CO Bismarck, ND
Aurora, CO Bismarck, ND | Rapid City, SD
Bismarck, ND Rapid City, SD Lincoln, NE
Rapid City, SD Lincoln, NE Topeka, KS
tive of the surveying facility com of minimizing travel and per diem
mander, based on input from the costs to accomplish aviation safety
facility being surveyed, and travel surveys; and, RAPS provides the
and time considerations. catalyst for keeping aviation acci
ARNG aviation facilities prior to dent prevention high on the priority
implementing the RAPS Program list! *—”
were primarily surveyed by the U.S.
Army Safety Center, appropriate
Army Headquarters, or inhouse.
Feedback from the RAPS reports
received at NGB and conversations
with the participants of this program
indicates positive support for the
RAPS Program. It has provided
meaningful inspections of ARNG
aviation facilities by using ARNG
developed checklists; a means for
the mutual exchange of ideas and
managerial concepts through associ
ation and discussion with personnel
from other member states: a means
29
 The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of any Department of Defense agency
£

30 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 REAT

Soviet AIR 1)BFENSEs

Against Attack Helicopters
In this three-part series, the author reviews current
Soviet military literature in an effort to determine
vulnerabilities in their air defense against low level attack
helicopters. He examines air defense philosophy, Soviet
small arms, the SA-7 and the ZSU-23-4 at the Soviet
battalion level. Although there are several vulnerabilities
which can be exploited, the author concludes that the
primary threat to helicopters is the Soviet ZSU-23-4.
Changes to current U.S. antitank helicopter training and
tactics are recommended in order to enhance the
helicopter vs. tank kill ratio

PART 1: the Philosophy

Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Mullady
59th Air Traffic Control Battalion
APO New York
N JUNE 1972, Phase IV of the “Joint United
States-German-Canadian Attack Helicopter Evalua
tion” was conducted near the town of Ansbach, West
Germany, and came to be known as the “Ansbach
Trials.” The test was designed to determine how well
attack helicopters would fare in a European environ
ment against attacking enemy armor, including the
pilots was 41.7 aggressors killed per helicopter lost.
Since the U.S. pilots were at least as proficient in
the AH-1G Cobra as their North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) counterparts, and as a group
had far more flight hours recorded in the aircraft,
what caused this startling difference? The report of
the evaluation explains it this way: “The German and
Canadian pilots . . . appeared to have a better
appreciation of the European terrain and of the
application of nap-of-the-earth flight techniques,
generally selected better firing positions, and had a
better grasp of the tactical situation and likely aggressor
actions.” -

type of antiaircraft weapons typically employed by
the Soviet forces. The results of the test were as
follows: 18 enemy tracked vehicles destroyed for
each attack helicopter lost, or 13:1 if the scout helicopter
casualties are recorded. What many tend to forget (it
is not widely publicized) is that U.S. pilots killed only
8.6 aggressors per antiarmor helicopter lost, whereas
the combined record of the German and Canadian
This and the two following articles are intended to
aid in closing the statistical gap between U.S. pilots
and their NATO counterparts. They will be different
from most accounts concerning Soviet air defense.
Instead of reporting and emphasizing the strengths of
Soviet air defenses, an attempt will be made to deter
mine their vulnerabilities. Further, ways to exploit
these vulnerabilities in their air defense philosophy,

MAY 1982 31

zsu-23-4 º
*-
º:
their weapons systems or their techniques will be
suggested. Information will be provided which will
assist the attack helicopter pilot and ground commander
in solving the last three problem areas mentioned in
the Ansbach test report, namely: selecting better firing
positions, understanding the tactical situation and
predicting likely aggressor actions.
The primary reference sources used are Soviet,
especially the monthly publication, Voyennyy Vestnik
(Military Herald). Although much fresh literature has
been published by the Soviets during the last several
years concerning the employment of such weapons as
the SA-7 Strella (called Grail by NATO) and ZSU-23-4
antiaircraft gun (hereafter referred to as the “ZSU”),
precious little regarding the capabilities of these
weapons has been published by the Soviet press. The
real value of Soviet literature is to be found in the
descriptions and explanations to their own forces of
the antiaircraft tactics to be used and methods of
weapon employment. This information, together with
Western data concerning weapons capabilities, provides
the clearest possible picture of the low level antiaircraft
system presently employed by Soviet forces and is of
the greatest value to pilots and to both air and ground
commanders. Finally, drawing strictly on Soviet sources
concerning their tactical exercises is one of the best
ways to achieve any degree of predictability regarding
likely aggressor actions in combat.
I,nearly every scenario of a Warsaw Pact attack
on Western Europe, the antitank capability of NATO
attack helicopters is one of the critical factors in
32
-- -
* Attack aircrafts' first
ºpriority should be to
>< destroy or suppress air de
Treases, then to provide the
* necessary fire support
- required by the ground
commander -
determining the outcome of the first few hours and
days of the battle. There will be no time to pass on the
“lessons learned” which so increased the effectiveness
of our aircraft in Vietnam. U.S. Army aviators must
lift off on their first mission knowing what to do— in
short, how to fight, survive and win. Based on the
Ansbach test results, an assumption can be made that
everyone associated with Army Aviation needs to
know far more about the Soviet threat.
It has been necessary to impose certain limitations
to keep these articles to a manageable size and pertinent
to attack helicopter employment. First, the air defenses
of a typically deployed Soviet battalion are examined.
It is this unit (with normal augmentation) which is
considered in Soviet military literature as the basic
combat unit. There is also much more open source
material available here than at higher levels. And the
weapons which pose the greatest threat to attack
helicopters (small arms, SA-7 and ZSU-23-4) are most
plentiful here.
Second, only low level Soviet air defenses are
discussed. Once attack helicopter pilots begin to climb
on the European battlefield, they become vulnerable
to an increasingly greater arsenal of air defense
weapons. The airspace from 100 feet to several miles
above ground level requires far more sophisticated
means of antiaircraft defense. A recurring theme
throughout will be that current U.S. attack helicopter
employment fails to emphasize strongly enough the
importance of destroying Soviet air defense weapons
in the first engagements.
The oft-repeated phrase, “attack helicopters have
one mission-kill tanks!" is wrong. The attack helicopter
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 battalion commander who believes he is paid to kill
a tanks, not ZSUs is, in essence, wrong. Attack aircrafts
first priority should be to destroy or suppress air
defenses, then to provide the necessary fire support
required by the ground commander. That does not
mean that attack helicopters should waste time
searching for air defense weapons, which is the job of
scout helicopters, ground forces, etc. It simply means
that attack helicopters should destroy, wherever
possible, Soviet ZSU-23-4s. This is not now our clearly
stated tactic; it is not emphasized or even tested in
current evaluations and may result in pilots attempting
to avoid ZSUs while seeking out tanks in the initial
engagements. The following sections will support the
validity of this conclusion.
M ost Western authors depict the Soviets as
possessing the best air defenses of any army in exis
tence. There is always the graphic representation
before the readers' eyes of a series of overlapping air
defense “umbrellas” provided by various weapons
which begin with small arms fire against the lowest,
closest air targets and go to weapons systems which
can destroy a U-2 at maxmium altitudes. Some writers
have even suggested that the lethality of Soviet air
defenses has had the effect of neutralizing aviation as
a weapon on the European battlefield. However, the
“total” coverage attributed to Soviet air defenses is
accurate only when Soviet units are stationary or in
the defense. As soon as they begin to move, the air
defense system—and especially the low level system–
will be degraded. Further, Soviet units will most likely
be encountered while moving.
Soviet air defense concepts are in accord with their
experiences in World War II. The Soviets vividly
remember 22 June 1941, when the German army
launched Operation Barbarossa with an unmerciful
*attack of 5,000 aircraft which was spectacularly success
ful. However, the Soviet military does not plan to
fight the next war as it did in 1941. They have witnessed
the use of our helicopter and close air support aircraft
in Vietnam. They have examined the experience of
air defense forces in the Middle East wars. Their view
of today's battlefield is quite different. Due to the
availability of tactical nuclear weapons on the modern
battlefield, the Soviets conclude that large concen
trations of forces will become immediate targets.
Therefore, Soviet units in the attack will be brought
from relatively secure positions well behind the line
of immediate contact. The result is that Soviet columns
on the move will be the typical encounter. The Soviet
textbook, “The Offensive,” describes armored assaults
across a broad front, spearheaded by independently
maneuvering columns advancing 100 kilometers per
day, maintaining wide gaps between columns to avoid
MAY 1982
destruction by NATO's nuclear weapons, rapidly cross
ing radioactive zones, bypassing the great floods,
fires and destruction caused by nuclear detonations.
The battlefield will be gigantic in comparison with
past wars; and the Soviet advance will be characterized,
above all else, by a rapid tempo of attack. Speed of
the Soviet column is expected to lie in the range of 12
to 20 miles per hour and vehicle intervals will be
about 100 meters. During the approach march, tanks
are expected to continue to move while under fire
from attack helicopters, even increasing their speed,
and will not return fire against them.
The fact that armor is the heart of the Soviet-led
Warsaw Pact doctrine and tactics is clearly reflected
in the writings of Soviet military leaders. Colonel A. A.
Sidorenko, Doctor of Military Science and a member
of the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy, has
written:
. . . (all) offensive actions will be conducted pri
marily in tanks . . . . Battles in dismounted combat
formations are only where the enemy offers strong
resistance and where the terrain hinders the actions
of the maneuver battalion on vehicles.
That concept goes back well before the 1970s. In the
1962 publication, “Military Strategy.” Marshall Vasiliy
Sokolovskiy declared:
"An offensive should be mounted using primarily
tanks and armored troop carriers. Dismounted
attack will be a rare phenomenon. Mechanized
firepower and maneuvers of troops in vehicles will
now reign on the battlefield."
Given this Soviet view of the modern battlefield—the
emphasis on speed, dispersion and armor—how are
air defenses employed to support this type of warfare?
What is the air defense philosophy? What are the
basic principles?
A review of Soviet military publications concerning
the roles and missions of their air defense forces
indicates that the operative principles which are
constantly repeated are deployment in mass, mobility.
dedication to mission and continuity.
Deployment in mass, in the simplest definition of
the concept, means that the discovery of one antiair
craft weapon by U.S. forces will indicate that another
is nearby. For example, it would violate basic Soviet
air defense philosophy to assign one ZSU-23-4 mount
to independently defend a unit, particularly one on
the move. However, this principle of “massing” air
defense weapons is often misunderstood in Western
literature. It does not mean great numbers of air
defense weapons per se, rather that air defense systems
are employed in pairs. One American author has
stated that the ZSU-23-4 will comprise the tank
company's self-screening AAA cover. They may be
33

allotted on the basis of perhaps two air defense units
per tank company (10 tanks), a 1:5 ratio. This is true
for the leading two companies of a tank regiment, but
what of the other seven tank companies and assorted
support units? A Soviet tank regiment has 118 armored
vehicles and only 4 organic ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft
gun mounts assigned. There are also 36 SA-7s assigned
to this regiment, but the effectiveness of this weapon
against attack helicopters is not clearly established
and will be discussed later.
Mobility means that air defenses are designed to
maintain the same speed as the units they are covering.
This principle implies several things to the attack
helicopter pilot. Fresh attacking Soviet units, regard
less of how far and rapidly they have traveled, will
have antiaircraft mounts organic to the leading
elements. It also should imply that once the anti
aircraft guns have been detected, they should be
engaged immediately since they will not be there
again. Finally, the attack helicopter pilot should be
aware that the effectiveness of a moving antiaircraft
gun is severely degraded. That is due somewhat to the
smoke and terrain-induced movement of the mount,
but primarily to the difficulties in visually detecting
the attacking helicopter while keeping up speed in a
rapidly moving column. When under an attack, the
ZSUs in column may either fire on the move (with
less accuracy) or perform a “leap-frog” tactic (firing
from a short halt while the other ZSU rushes toward
the front of the column, and then reversing roles).
Leap-frogging provides for more effective fire; but it
also allows the ZSU to become a better target, and it
can only be used when there are at least two ZSU
mounts in column. Obviously, if the first target struck
in column were a ZSU-23-4, the “leap-frog" tactic
could not be employed. It if were the lead ZSU, the
fire of the second would be severely degraded as it
rushed to a more forward position in the attacked
column. Although SA-7s can be fired by a gunner
standing in the rear hatch of a Soviet BMP (armored
personnel carrier), it is hard to see how this fire would
be effective against a helicopter hovering low, head
on (lowest infrared profile) and at maximum range.
Dedication to mission is a constantly repeated basic
principle of the air defense assets of the battalion. In
his textbook, “Antiaircraft Subunit in Combat,”
Lieutenant General V. A. Gatsolayev expressed this
philosophy when he wrote:
The essence of an antiaircraft podrazdeleniye's
(note: any size unit below regiment) combat mission
can be expressed with two words, “to cover, "The
34
term “to cover" could equally be replaced with the
phrase "to defend against danger from the air" or
even more precisely, "to prevent strikes and re
connaissance of the target from the air." In other
words, the antiaircraft podrazdeleniye engages in
battle against an air enemy not generally, but in the
interests of certain forces or rear services facilities.
This, it is stressed in Soviet sources, includes not
firing upon a clearly hostile aircraft when doing so
might endanger its supported unit or compromise the
supported unit's position. This information is important
to the attack helicopter pilot. In fact, a lack of immediate
fire from a detected Soviet unit on the march may be
the rule rather than the exception.
In a 1975 article in Voyennyy Vestnik, it was
emphasized that a single aircraft normally will not be
engaged, to avoid giving away the location of a battalion,
unless it attacks the battalion directly. The article
praises air defense troops who allowed a “scout
helicopter” to fly directly over the supported unit.
Another Soviet article praises an antiaircraft unit for
holding its fire in order to draw two aircraft, instead
of one, into a space from which they could not escape
unpunished.
I n addition to Soviet air defenders' dedication to
mission, there are several other examples of antiair
craft gunners holding their fire and being praised for
doing so. Due to the self-perceived effectiveness of
their air defense weapons, the Soviets have stressed
that air defense weapons themselves may become
lucrative targets for attack. There is much to indicate
that air defense weapons may be counting on surprise,
not opening fire until there is a clear certainty of
destruction before giving away their positions.
Identification of enemy aircraft will be a problem
in a European mid-intensity environment. The Soviets
must always consider the possibility of shooting down
one of their own. The result of this possibility, coupled
with the Soviet emphasis on a highly centralized com
mand, leads to an extremely strict firing discipline.
The Soviet soldier and ZSU-23-4 gunner alike simply
do not open fire until they are told to do so, and even
then not until they are told which target and where. In
a 1977 article in Voyennyy Vestnik, the following
excerpt is typical of the emphasis in this area:
During the exercise . . . the “evening's "first recon
naissance helicopter was detected by squad com
mander Guards Junior Sgt. A. Komushin. By the
agreed-upon signal, he immediately reported that
fact to the commander of the 3rd company, Guards
Senior Lieutenant V. Stolyarov. And it was then
that a substantial error was made. Instead of con
cealing the location of the battalion on the pass
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 and allowing the helicopter to get through, the
officer gave the order to open fire, thus revealing
the company's strong point.
From the standpoint of looking for vulnerabilities,
this tendency to delay fire for any number of reasons
certainly stands out as an advantage to the attack
helicopter pilot. Indications are quite clear that the
air-ground engagement may not be of the “quick
draw" variety that NATO exercises, our tactics and
tests seem to stress. If the Soviets choose to delay fire
until the unit is clearly detected and attacked by
enemy air, the obvious first target should be a ZSU
mount, the weapon that is most lethal to the attacking
helicopter.
The principle of continuity is closely related to
mobility but stresses the idea that air defense coverage
must be provided for the supported unit in all tactical
situations. Under no circumstances will the air defense
assets allow themselves to be separated from their
supported unit. The message is constantly repeated
in Soviet publications that the most serious mistake
an antiaircraft battery commander can make is to
allow his ZSU mounts to fall behind the column for
any reason. In some cases this philosophy has been
carried to the extreme of not allowing ZSUs to fire
from a short halt for fear that they would fall behind
the unit. Soviet writers stress this while at the same
time stating that a moving column is most vulnerable
to air attack. An air defense philosophy which stresses
continuity of air defenses to the detriment of air
defense effectiveness increases the psychological impact
on a Soviet unit deprived of its air defense mounts,
which is another argument for destroying the air
defenses at every opportunity.
In addition to the four basic principles of Soviet air
defense philosophy discussed above, there is another
recurring theme which, while considered a strength,
* also reveals a potential vulnerability. The Soviets
conduct most of their exercises in an environment
which emphasizes either radio silence or a loss of
communications due to enemy “jamming.” Soviet
aircraft and helicopters are constantly depicted in the
open press as providing a visual signal to the Soviet
ground forces which indicates “I am one of yours.”
During maneuvers, Soviet aircraft execute a predeter
mined maneuver, launch colored rockets (or flares),
or turn on navigation lights to allow ground observers
to confirm their identity. The system is vulnerable
and can be exploited by discovering the Soviet signal
for “I am one of yours” and using it just before the
attack. Naturally, such a ploy is not without risk; but
it would confuse an antiaircraft gunner for a few
critical seconds, and it could allow an aircraft under
ground attack the possibility of a cease fire. If used
several times, there is also the possibility that ground
MAY 1982
observers would begin to distrust the compromised
visual signal and fire on their own aircraft. The first
Soviet prisoner should be questioned concerning the
visual signal, and any discovery of such a signal by
friendly ground or aviation personnel should im
mediately be reported and exploited.
Soviet literature nearly always describes the use of
colored flares fired in the direction of an aircraft as
the signal to notify the unit of a hostile sighting and
also to command the unit to open fire. The Soviet
practice of strict fire discipline could lull the crew
members of the attacking aircraft into thinking that
they have not yet been detected. However, an exposed
pilot, observing a visual signal from a Soviet troop
unit, should immediately expect to receive fire.
Additionally, the launch point of the flare should be
noted; a unit commander, and a lucrative target, has
just given his location in the column.
Although the vulnerabilities of a Soviet low-level
air defense philosophy have been discussed, it must
be stressed that many of these vulnerabilities exist
only when the unit is moving. When a Soviet battalion
is stationary or in a defensive role, these philosophical
principles act as strengths.
S.J., doctrine clearly indicates that the
“defense" is always a forced and temporary condition.
During all defensive operations, the emphasis will be
on inflicting maximum damage on an attacking enemy.
This aggressive attitude is certainly reflected in the
role of the air defense. Unlike the fluid and dynamic
character of the offensive, Soviet air defenses will be
characterized by ambushes, roving guns which are
actively seeking targets of opportunity, and all-around
unit coverage by overlapping fields of fire and obser
vation. Camouflaged antiaircraft positions will be
shifting to deceive aircraft and hide the unit's true
location. Antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air weapons
of higher command echelons will be integrated with
those of the battalion. Finally, fighters and interceptors
of Soviet Frontal Aviation can be expected. As one
Soviet author writes, helicopters will not be able to
attack from the flank or the rear. They may try, but to
do this they will have to cross an air defense zone
which has both reconnaissance facilities and weapons
for destruction of air targets; they will have to fly over
various locations screened by air defense troops, and
consequently they can be detected and destroyed.
A review of Soviet air defense literature indicates
that attacking a prepared Soviet defensive position is
not a mission for aircraft unless the attack is part of
ground attack, well supported by artillery. Even then,
losses of attacking aircraft will be high. *-*
Next month – Part II: Individual Weapons
35
THE AVIATION NCO
Command Sergeant Major David L. Spears
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
THINK THE entire neighborhood was still
asleep when I left home for work this morning. It
is several miles to the unit where I'm assigned as
an aviation platoon sergeant, and I used that
driving time to mentally go over plans for the
busy day ahead. When I arrived at the company,
I checked with the first sergeant to see what had
occurred since the previous afternoon. The only
thing of note he had to tell me was that SP4
Johnson, one of my crewchiefs, had not returned
from leave as he was supposed to. Since he is
scheduled to fly today, I have to find a replacement
for him, pronto. That's a further complication to
my job of ensuring that 8 of the 10 UH-1 heli
copters I'm responsible for are ready to lift off at
O630, about two hours from now. We have to
move an infantry company to the field.
My responsibility as a platoon sergeant also
includes seeing that the maintenance equipment
required to keep the Hueys flying is available,
and supervising 12 crewchiefs.
After I left the first sergeant I stopped by the
barracks and found the cleaning which had to be
done by the platoon before breakfast was well
underway. I asked one of the men, a specialist
five, how many hours his aircraft had before it
would be down for inspection. He told me eight.
From there I went to the dining facility where I
met the platoon leader. We had some coffee as
we went over the day's mission. The captain
wanted to know who would replace Johnson. I
said that since there are three people on leave
and one in the hospital, I will fly the mission and
then work with the maintenance crew tonight
after our return.
On my way to the hangar I had some more
36
*
thinking time: Are the parts in for the two aircraft
in maintenance? Did I get the statements the
first sergeant wanted for the Chapter 13 action?
Did SP Johnson turn in his tool box before going
on leave? Did maintenance get the servo changed
during the night shift? Is SP Brown still having
marriage problems, and will he be on time this
morning? |
It is now 0510 and I can see several people
moving around on the flight line. In the platoon
headquarters room I find that keys, survival
equipment and APUs are being issued by the |
clerk. I remind a crewchief that this is an all-day
mission so C rations will be needed for the entire
platoon.
Everything is now ready. The Hueys take off
on time and arrive at the pickup point for the
infantry company. The soldiers board the aircraft.
and are then flown to their destination—right on * *
Schedule. .
If the rest of the day goes as well, I'll be pleased!
The foregoing could be taken from any day of
any Army Aviation platoon sergeant. Some days
will go as planned and some won't. In either !
case, the sergeant will handle it. I'm thoroughly |
convinced of that because our aviation noncom
missioned officers are a special group of people.
When they stand in front of their troops, march
in a parade, qualify at the rifle range or prepare
for an in-ranks inspection, they are combat leaders.
They must also be highly skilled technicians on |
the sophisticated aircraft in the Army inventory.
We don't promote them any faster or pay them
any more money than any other NCOs, but we
expect—and receive—a lot more from them.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
RSI Report /1 \
º \\
The SIXTH MEETING Of m. Helicopter Interservice Working Party
(HISWP) met at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) head
quarters in Brussels, Belgium, during the period 22 to 26 February.

|| || Delegates from 10 nations and 2 major NATO commands attended.

A summary of the most important actions of the working party follows:
1. Draft ATP-49—The Use of Helicopter in Land Operations.
The draft outline of this publication was approved by the Army
Board. It will incorporate the contents of each of the helicopter
related operational Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and
will be presented in a small compact handbook. Although the publication
is intended for aviation units, a section will be written to provide
ground commanders with basic information on helicopter operations.
The writing of the publication will be a joint effort among France, the
United Kingdom and the United States. The working party has assigned
this publication its highest priority. A first draft for review is programed
for this summer. The final draft will be issued to nations after the
Seventh HISWP in March of 1983.

H 2. A new draft edition for ratification which incorporates changes

to existing agreements will be circulated for each of the following
STANAGs:
STANAG 2.351, Procedures for Marshalling Helicopters in Air Mobile
Operations
STANAG 2355, Procedures for Employment of Helicopters in Anti-Armor
Role in Support of Ground Forces
STANAG 2861, Procedures in the Event of Downed Helicopters

| STANAG 3597, Helicopter Tactical or Non-Permanent Landing Sites

3. A review of draft STANAGs was conducted. A new draft for
ratification which incorporates the proposed changes will be circulated
for each of the following STANAGs:
STANAG 2946, Forward Area Refueling Equipment
STANAG 2947, Technical Criteria for a Closed Circuit Refueling System
STANAG 2949, Technical Criteria for External Cargo Carrying Slings
STANAG 2950, Technical Criteria for External Cargo Carrying Nets
NOTE: A color code was proposed for identification of the load re
straint capability of tie-down fittings for helicopter and external
lifting devices. The United States will evaluate this proposal and
report their recommendation at the seventh meeting of HISWP.
4. The following draft STANAG/studies were reviewed, but nations
recommended further study before circulating for ratification:
STANAG 2951, Non-Electronic Communications
STANAG 2956, Helicopter Mission Tasking Messages
STUDY 2958, instrument Flight in the Battlefield Area
STUDY - Joint Close Air Support/Attack Helicopter Operations
5. Attack helicopter and scout aircrews should be aware that
when conducting joint operations with NATO forces that the term
hand-off has a different meaning to some forces. In an effort to
standardize NATO language the term handover may become the
common phraseology for passing a target from the scout to the
attack helicopter.

H The seventh meeting of HISWP will be held in March 1983. During

the interim, new drafts of agreements will be written, drafts for ratifi
cation will be circulated and many other required actions will be
completed by each nation. The objective of all these actions is to
promote standardization and interoperability among NATO forces
both in operational procedures and equipment.
If this article has generated any questions or requirements please
contact Mr. Rush Wicker by writing: Commander, U.S. Army Aviation
Center, ATTN: ATZG-D-CC, Fort Rucker, AL 36362.
Eºsº
TICOT,

ES-G
 UCH RESEARCH and tech
Mº advancement has
been made in recent years
in the understanding of light and
the human eye. Night vision gog
gles have enabled aviators to operate
closer to the terrain at night than
we have in the past; however, a
substantial portion of night flying is
dependent upon vision with the un
aided eye. Because of this fact the
technological understanding of light
has been of utmost importance.
White light generally contains all
the wavelengths or light colors.
These can be separated into blues
(short wavelengths) and/or yellow
(medium-long wavelengths) by filters
or other means. The blues are re
flected and refracted (scattered)
much more by dust and water parti
cles than the yellows. The yellows
tend to continue straight until re
flected by a larger solid object or
viewed by the eye. Yellow light will
illuminate large objects with much
less glare or interference than blue
or white light when dust, water
particles or ice particles are present
in the air or on the windshield.
38
We can use this technological
knowledge of light to improve landing
lights and searchlights. Landing and
searchlights are used to safely ma
neuver an aircraft during taxiing,
takeoff and landing.
Suggestion number R81-131M,
modification of landing lights, has
been evaluated by appropriate engi
neering elements of Troop Support
and Aviation Materiel Readiness
Command (TSARCOM) and Avia
tion Research and Development
Command (AVRADCOM). The
conclusion is that it is a valid sug
gestion and should be adopted. The
modification is now authorized for
all Army aircraft operating in Alaska.
The modification consists of plac
ing a 3/16 inch yellow plexiglass
lens, 7 inches in diameter, 'A inch in
front of the landing light. By length
ening the two screws—using spacers
between the landing light and the
plexiglass—heat is able to dissipate
and as a result does not damage the
lens.
This modification has been used
on 22 UH-1H Huey helicopters
assigned to the 120th Aviation Com
pany (CS), Ft. Richardson, AK. With
this modification more than 10,000
hours have been flown: The majority
of these hours have been flown during
nighttime.
The pilots who tested the modifi
cation agree that the yellow lenses
are an improvement over the white
landing light currently in Army use.
The pilot has gained major advan
tages by using this modification. The
pilot has the option of a bright white
searchlight or a yellow soft landing &
light of less intensity. Yellow light
reduces glare—following the same
theory of using fog lights on an auto
mobile. By using the yellow lens,
the aviator cuts to a minimum the
scattering of light off dust, snow
and water vapor.
Most aviation units are constantly
involved in night-to-night operations
– night assault, resupply, sling loads,
medical evacuations and countless
hours in poorly prepared landing
zones. During these night opera
tions, if marginal weather and re
duced visibility are prevalent, pilots
continue to operate with only the
knowledge obtained through their
experiences. However, experience
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 in many cases is not enough. Pi
lots need to have every technologi
*cal advantage to aid them in night
flight.
By using the earlier mentioned
modification or, even better, re
placing the current white landing
bulb with a lesser intensity yellow
bulb, the pilot is given the choice of
a searchlight or—an improvement
in technology—a yellow light. If the
night conditions warrant the use of
a searchlight, use it. However, if
the mission is conducted in marginal
weather with reduced visibility, it is
sometimes more hazardous to use
the white landing light or search
light. In some cases, using the white
light in reduced visibility has a
tendency to induce disorientation.
The yellow light technology has
been used on automobile fog lights
for many years. The yellow light
has less glare and allows the driver
to distinguish objects better than
does a white light. The glare caused
from white light affects not only the
driver but also drivers of oncoming
CarS.
The same basic principle applies
in night flying. Once we look at
another bright white light, much (if
not all) of our night vision is lost. If
our white landing or searchlight is
turned on, the same philosophy
applies. If the yellow light is used,
or another yellow light is looked at
in use, the effect the white light
would have had on our eyes is
lessened. With yellow our total dark
adaptation or night vision is regained
at a faster rate than with white light.
Two factors concerning the modi
fication to use yellow light need
elaboration. Yellow light does re
duce total light; this fact is an advan
tage, not a disadvantage. We have
believed the more candlepower
the better. This concept is not
necessarily so. It is not the quantity
of light or distance which is impor
tant but rather the quality of vision
available under varying conditions.
Moreover, yellow light changes the
colors and perception of the illumi
nated area in much the same way
MAY 1982
that the red map light tends to filter
out red lines on a map.
I visited Major Frank F. Holly of
the U.S. Army Aeromedical Re
search Laboratory, Ft. Rucker, AL.
Major Holly conducts research with
the Sensory Research Division. He
agreed with the yellow light philo
sophy. While with Major Holly I
took the color vision plate exami
nation administered to all aviators
during their annual flight physical.
Using the yellow lens, I was able to
read each colored number. The
numbers with yellow and tan were
difficult but readable. I don't feel
that this color disadvantage is more
of a problem than the high intensity
white light we have used for many
years. It is possible that the white
light has contributed to many of
our night accidents.
The benefits and savings of this
modification are numerous. With
the use of the yellow lens in marginal
weather, fog, dust or any precipi
tation, visibility is increased. Night
dust and night blowing snow landings
are greatly improved because of
less light scattered from snow, dust
and the ground. With the yellow
lens in use, the pilot maintains most
of his night vision.
If one aircraft can execute a safe
landing in marginal conditions by
the advantages of this modification,
the tangible savings are evident.
Yellow landing lights are needed
because technological data confirms
what practical testing in the field
has proved. By modifying all Army
aircraft, we have taken away nothing
and have given the pilot an option.
By using the yellow light in marginal
weather, aviators increase their
ability to identify objects.
Currently the yellow landing light
modification is being used only in
Alaska. According to TSARCOM
and AVRADCOM, “the probabil
ities of establishing a product im
provement program is near zero
because there is no user require
ment for the change.”
There is a user requirement for
yellow lights. We as pilots work over,
through and around many mission
related problems and we feel that
problems go with the job. However,
the yellow light is a solution to one
of the problems. We need yellow
lights to help successfully complete
night missions safely and to assist
in the training of our newly rated
aviators. There is no need for ex
perience gained from white-knuckle
night flying the way many aviators
learned to fly in the past.
Let's use every technological tool
that is available to conduct night
operations safely. Let's establish
“user needs.” To improve all types
of aviation operations, let's use
expertise in the field. Just because
“It’s been like that for years” or
“We've always done it that way”
doesn't make these operations right.
Yellow is better!
Let's hear your feedback to Avia
tion Digest. Let's cause improve
ments to be made.
1. Is reduced visibility at night a
problem which needs further study?
2. What tools do we have readily
available, besides knowledge, to aid
pilots in night marginal weather?
3. How long are you willing to wait
for improvements in the field?
CW3 Gary E. Rossomme
CW3 Rossomme was attending Warrant
Officer Senior Course 81-2 when he wrote
this article. He developed and tested
the yellow light while assigned as an
instructor pilot with the 120th Aviation
Company, Ft. Richardson, AK. CW3
Rossomme has 3,700 hours of helicop
ter time and holds FAA ratings of CFI,
CFIT and ATP for helicopters and CFl
and MEI for fixed wing aircraft.
39
 -

Fºº [Gº][: *

'G) Cººſ Mº DESIAGT'ſ. E3 ,

CW3 Robert A. Stolworthy

In order to graphically portray the day's events, I felt compelled to discuss not only
the equipment failures which occurred but also those human elements which played a
significant role. There were some crew errors made. I have spoken freely of my own
and have taken the liberty of writing about those errors made by the other two crew
members. I would like to point out that as we discussed the day's events afterward,
each of the three crewmembers recalled different details and in some cases they con
flicted. Under the conditions which developed there arose some serious questions
concerning the appropriate course of action. The intent of this article is to stimulate
thinking and “hangar talk." It should not be construed as encouragement to deviate
from published procedures. Here are the events as I recall them.

40 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 including the heading indicator. (I wondered how the
examiner felt about my choice to proceed in the DG
GLOSSARY mode. Well, never mind, it was in accordance with

AAF Army airfield

ADF automatic direction finder
Al actual instruments
AR Army Regulation
DG directional gyro
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FM frequency modulated
|FR instrument flight rules
ILS instrument landing system
|MC instrument meteorological conditions
NAVAIDS navigational aids
NDB nondirectional beacon
PAR precision approach radar
RIA| radio magnetic indicator
UHF ultra high frequency
VHF very high frequency
VOR very high frequency omnidirectional range
|r WAS ANOVERCAST day in December 1976.
Another aviator and I prepared for takeoff on an
annual instrument renewal checkride which was to
be conducted under actual instrument conditions.
I was to occupy the left seat, the other pilot the right
seat and the examiner would ride in the jump seat of
our UH-1 Huey. We planned to depart Robert Gray
Army Airfield and fly to Temple, TX, perform some
approaches, then return to Gray and execute the
* remaining approaches necessary to complete the
renewal. Our planning weather looked good. Visibility
was not a factor, and the ceiling at Temple was 1,300
feet broken, while the ceiling at Gray was 500 feet
overcast. These conditions were forecast to improve.
We were pleased since it's not often that you find
excellent instrument conditions with a suitable alter
nate within the fuel range of the UH-1.
With the oral exam completed, we filed the flight
plan and proceeded to the aircraft. While checking
the logbook, we noticed that the RMI was inoperative
in the magnetic mode. I suggested that we continue in
the DG mode since, at that time, the regulations
called only for a gyroscopic heading indicator.
After the radios warmed up, we put our clearance
on request and completed the run-up. We were then
cleared to taxi, hold short of the active. The hover
checks showed all instruments functioning normally
the FARs and AR 95-1.) Moments later I copied our
clearance.
Army 15008 is cleared to Sparks intersection via
direct the Hood VOR (a right turn) then, as filed.
Climb and maintain 4,000 feet, squawk (appropriate
transponder code) and etc. After takeoff, turn left
heading 270° for traffic separation. We were to take
off from runway 33.
Prior to takeoff, the right seat pilot and I became
involved in conversation which I felt was necessary
crew coordination. On two or three occasions, I felt
the examiner pull on my shoulder harness. I got the
message—this was a checkride. Again it became
necessary to discuss some mission-related matters,
and I felt another tug on the shoulder harness. Then
the examiner placed my selector switch to private
and told me that we were not to lead each other
through this checkride. Pointing to the overcast, I
said, “OK, but checkride or not, this is the real thing.”
We continued.
The pilot made a visual takeoff, then transitioned
to the instruments and climbed into the solid cloud
layer. After climbing above circling minimums, he
began a standard rate turn—to the right. (My poor
shoulders.) When I asked why he was turning to the
right, I felt the now familiar tug on my harness, as the
pilot repeated that portion of his en route clearance
which told us to proceed direct to the Hood VOR.
When reminded of the takeoff clearance, he turned
left to 270°, then told me to take the controls.
I assumed control of the aircraft, with all the
confidence of a seasoned instrument pilot. After all, I
was now a CW2 (the senior front seat occupant) and
had about 12 hours of AI helicopter time, most of
which was in the left seat. I even had some recent
fixed wing AI time, as much as 7 hours in 1 day. Sure,
I could fly instruments—as I promptly let the aircraft
roll into an inadvertent 30° bank to the right. A sharp
comment from the examiner about the rate of turn
brought me back to reality. I became very serious
about maintaining control of what seemed to be an
extremely unstable aircraft, then recalled the discussion
which had taken place when I scheduled my renewal
ride.
I had been asked if I had 10 hours in the “blue
canoe.” I said no, and was told to get it, then come
back to schedule the ride. I argued that the unit
mission may require me to fly instruments on any
given day, so why not take a renewal ride without
practicing up for it. Good logic indeed. The ride was
scheduled, and now we're back in the clouds just
leveling off at 4,000 feet. The right seat pilot had
finished whatever he was doing and again took the

MAY 1982 41

| this double transmission at periodic intervals during
º ºf
NEAR DISASTER continued
controls. I wondered if he knew how happy that made
me. As we received further clearance, we were told to
report passing the Hood VOR. Fine, all we have to do
is fly our route as cleared, make a few approaches
each and be done with it. But the Hood VOR came
and went without a word from the right seat. I knew at
that point the examiner did not want me to say anything,
but I also knew approach control was expecting to
hear from us, particularly since there were numerous
instrument aircraft in the area. What about that vital
element of any operation called cockpit teamwork?
When I couldn't stand it anymore, I told the pilot he
was supposed to report passing the Hood VOR. I felt
the tug on the shoulder harness as a somewhat irritated
pilot announced that he had been trying to. The UHF
radio had gone out so we switched to VHF. I heard
the pilot transmit about three words, then the sound
of electrical arcing, then nothing.
We informed the examiner that we were experiencing
lost commo, and he immediately told us to turn up
our NAVAIDS. As I rotated the volume control on the
VOR, we heart the following: “Army 15 double
08, this is Gray approach control transmitting on the
Hood VOR. If you hear this transmission, squawk
ident.” Darned if this stuff doesn't work just the way
it's supposed to. I pressed the ident button and we
heard the following response: “Roger, Army 15 double
08, this is Gray approach control, we acknowledge
your ident feature, turn left heading 330, maintain
4,000. This will be a radar vector to the ILS final
approach course runway 15 at Temple, TX.” I chuckled
under my breath when I realized that all we had to do
was listen and comply. What better way to take a
checkride?
The turn was made, then came the terminal weather:
400 overcast, 3 miles visibility in light rain and fog. I
looked at the examiner, smiled and commented that
the weather was considerably different than forecast.
We all agreed that this was no problem just as the
terminal weather was amended to 300 overcast, 2
miles visibility and deteriorating rapidly. The change
42
in weather caused some concern, but I remember
thinking that if the ceiling were ragged we may still be
able to break out at or slightly above minimums.
Approach control had done a very good job up to
that point and, for the most part, continued to do so.
However, I became quite upset with them shortly
thereafter because the only message that was repeated
twice was the telephone number by which we should
contact them when on the ground. Even though we
had copied it correctly the first time, they kept sending
what was soon to develop into a full scale emergency.
I can appreciate them wanting to know when we were
on the ground, but I also wished they'd consider our
desire to first get there and respond by sending twice
the information which was vital toward that end. This
became a significant factor shortly thereafter.
I was on the controls again and doing a much better
job since I had counseled myself about my previous
performance. Approach control told us to descend to
2,000 feet. The right seat pilot pressed the ident
button, and I began the descent. Somewhere just
prior to leveling at 2,000 the examiner asked in a
startled voice what altitude we'd been cleared to. I
told him 2,000. The examiner instructed me to initiate
an immediate climb since 2,000 feet was below minimum
sector altitude and approach control would not give
us such a clearance. I had distinctly heard 2,000 feet,
but the examiner's conviction on the issue created
just enough doubt to make me wonder if I’d heard
correctly. Still trying to make sense of it all, I told him
that it was a hard altitude to which we had been
cleared. He agreed, and deduced that it must have
been 3,000, the altitude to which I reluctantly climbed.
We were beginning to get intermittent reception
on one of the communication radios. We heard ap
proach control clear (ironically) Army 15 double 07
direct to the Temple VOR at 3,000 feet. The examiner
told me to climb to 3,500 feet. I responded with an ºr
immediate increase in power, thinking that there
probably would not be anyone else at that VFR altitude.
We were due to hear from approach control and
hoped that our next clearance would include an altitude,
but what we heard instead was the familiar crackling
in the headsets as the VOR receiver burned up. It had
been our only means by which to execute the approach
for which we were expecting clearance. Things were
really starting to pile up on us. We could not talk to
approach control, and they couldn't talk to us. We
knew approximately where we were, but didn't know
where to go, plus we were at an altitude that we knew
was wrong and we were without mode C capability.
We still had a good ADF receiver, but the Gray NDB
was out of service and, at last report, the Hood NDB
had numerous practice approaches in progress. If the
weather had remained good to the west the practice
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 approaches would still be in progress; and, if not, to
3 opt for the Hood NDB approach would mean executing
the most basic of all nonprecision approaches in weather
much too far below minimums to hope for a happy
ending.
With the equipment failures and confusion in the
cockpit, all occupants of the aircraft began to realize
the urgency of the situation. We started reviewing
our options. I wanted to proceed to the Hood NDB.
Considering the regularity with which our radios had
been failing, we could not be sure our transponder
was still working, and since approach control did not
know our intentions (we didn't even know our inten
tions), we could not be sure they would clear the
airspace. So, we would approach the NDB below low
station altitude, being sure to steer clear of the 2,049
foot tower at Stillhouse Lake, then turn direct to
final. I still kind of like that idea.
The examiner wanted to reverse course while we
still knew about where we were and descend to visual
conditions over Belton Lake. I didn't like that idea
due to the cliffs at the north end of the lake, not to
mention the fact that in the vicinity of the lake there
simply had to be zero-zero conditions.
I experienced many emotions in the short period of
time during which we felt that we had no reasonable
options. Not the least of those emotions was an element
of fear. But the fear soon turned to anger as I recalled
a recent fatal accident in our unit involving inadvertent
IMC. As my anger mounted, I made a commitment to
myself. Come hell or high water, this flight was not
going to end up in total disaster like the other which
had just flashed across my mind. I remembered
someone once saying that there was no such thing as
complete lost commo, a philosophy which I still do
not totally endorse. As I toyed with this thought, it
dawned on me that we had not yet tried the FM radio.
I knew that approach control didn't have FM capability,
* but the tower at Gray did—if only we're not out of
range. I remember frantically grabbing the IFR supple
ment and easily turning to the right page since the one
next to it was folded in half. FM frequency 32.10 will
remain engraved in my mind as long as I live—that's
the only one that brought us home.
The tower got approach control on the phone, and
told them our altitude and approximate location. We
were vectored to final for a PAR approach runway 33
at Robert Gray AAF by information relayed to the
tower via land line, then transmitted to us over the
FM radio.
On final, our UHF receiver became operable, though
weak, so we continued the approach on UHF, keeping
the FM in standby.
One more significant factor. On final with the right
seat pilot on the controls, we kept steering to the right
of the headings which we had been given. Remember
MAY 1982
the inoperative RMI? Well, the DG was working just
fine, but the pilot didn't think so since he had seen it
precess slightly in a turn. The headings flown were on
the mag compass, as we were to learn later in a de
briefing. I don't remember at what altitude we broke
out . . . it was pretty low. I do know that if we had
talked to each other about the precessing directional
gyro we could have prevented the comment “too far
right of course to continue safe approach" just as we
descended out of the overcast.
As I indicated earlier, my intent is only to bring to
light those things which had a significant impact on
this flight. I made some mistakes, and the other two
crewmembers did also. Unforecast weather and
equipment failures stepped in to teach us some lessons
that I will not soon forget.
Some of the items which surfaced in the discussions
following the flight were:
1. Even though the regulations called for a DG,
the checklist called for “IN or MAG.”
2. My instrument proficiency was severely lacking.
I had been lulled into the trap of complacency by
previous successful flights. I believe that my recent
fixed wing experience also contributed to my lack of
concern. Since fixed wing aircraft are inherently more
stable than rotary wing aircraft, I had allowed my
instrument cross-check to deteriorate considerably
without realizing it.
3. Had we been truly observant during the mission
planning, we would have known that the overcast
topped out at about 4,500 feet. We could have climbed
on top when the question of altitude came up, then
avoided traffic visually. We could have collected our
thoughts and calmly selected an appropriate course
of action.
4. Had someone copied the clearance to descend
Out of 4,000 feet to an altitude that I remember to be
2,000 feet, it would have eliminated that element of
confusion completely.
After most of the discussion had subsided, an older
fellow, seems like he was a CW4, came up to me and
said, “Bob, you guys did a pretty fair job under the
circumstances.” Then, with the trace of a smile, he
said, “But I have a question for you.” I felt as though I
was about to learn yet another important lesson. He
asked me if we'd had a survival radio onboard. Indeed
we had. I wonder sometimes, even today, just how
many other options were available to us that we did
not consider. *—”
About the Author
CW3 Robert A. Stolworthy is a Senior Army Aviator and a
UH-1 standardization instructor pilot with Methods of Instruc
tion Branch, Lowe Division, Department of Flight Training,
Fort Rucker, Alabama. He was a member of the 1981 World
Helicopter Championship Team.
43
 U.S. Army Communications Command

ATC ACTIONLINE
Mr. F. H. Helfenberger
IFR Takeoff Minimums U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
and Departure Procedures Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA

WHAT WOULD YOU DO7 published. Is it better for legality's sake to take
Situation: off in poor weather conditions on a 3,000 foot
• Departure scheduled from Stockton Metropolitan, runway or use an 8,651 foot runway that requires
CA, airport at 0400Z. % mile visibility when the tower is in operation?
• Type aircraft—C-12. A paradox exists.
• Pilot LT I. M. Good has logged more than 50 • He can ask for clearance to take off runway 11 L
hours of military weather instrument time as a since there are no weather requirements associ
pilot or instructor pilot and has no standard ated. .
takeoff minimums. (AR 95-1, paragraph 4-25c). FAR 91.116f establishes takeoff minimums for civil
• Weather at departure time— 100 feet ceiling, airports as follows:
% mile visibility. “Civil airport takeoff minimums. Unless otherwise
• AR 95-1, paragraph 4-25d states, “All aviators authorized by the Administrator, no pilot operating
will comply with IFR an aircraft under Part 121, 123, 125, 129, or 135 of this
(instrument flight chapter may take off from a civil airport under IFR
rules) takeoff mini unless weather conditions are at or above the weather
ELEV 30 |
mums and departure minimums for IFR takeoff prescribed for that airport
procedures in flight under Part 97 of this chapter. If takeoff minimums are
information publica not prescribed under Part 97 of this chapter for a
tions.” particular airport, the following minimums apply to
* Published technical takeoff under IFR for aircraft operating under those
order (TO) mini Parts:
mums (DOD FLIP). (1) For aircraft having two engines or less— 1 statute
STOCKTON mile visibility.
METRO . . . . . . . . . (2) For aircraft having more than two engines—%
Rwy 29R, WA mile statute mile visibility.”
(When control tow (NOTE: Part 91 operators are not included in the
er in operation) above.)
291 ° 5.4 NM
from LOM
• Tower operates 1500 In this situation a credit for civil aircraft having two
Hilla-likº i
to 0600Z and Rwy 29R engines or less is being provided when the tower is in
is being used . . . operation; however, it is penalizing I. M. Good for no
apparent reason.
NOTE: No takeoff minimums are published for run WHAT CAN WE DO7
ways other than 29R.
Well, let's be patient, help is on the way. First of all,
the takeoff minimums in DOD FLIP were not com
Discussion: pletely correct. They should read as follows:
With the information available, I. M. Good has STOCKTON METRO . . . . . . . . . Rwy 29R, V, mile
several courses of action: (FAR 135)
• He can wait until the tower closes and take off As we have advised previously, FAR 135 does not
with 100-% weather or wait until the visibility apply to Army operations and therefore the takeoff
increases to V, mile. minimums would not affect I. M. Good's departure.
• He can ask for clearance to depart on runways Also, AR 95-1 is being changed to reflect that FAR
11 R or 29L since there are no TO minimums 135 is not applicable. -º-º/

Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
Yr Us Gover NMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1982–846-037.2
 coming next month in the Digest:

by BG William W. Ford, USA, Retired

PART I in a history series commemorating the 40th Anniversary

of the birth of Army Aviation

also:
• A Detailed History of the U-21
• Flight to Arizpe
• Aviator Selection Research, Then and Now
• Army Aviation-Age Forty
 U.S.ArmyAviations
40th Birthday § º
JUNE 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 6 !,
Yºr Yº Yºr S. Y
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Richard D. Kenyon
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

Forty Years Of Army Aviation, Part I: Grasshoppers,

BG William W. Ford, U.S. Army (Retired)
Flight To Arizpe, COL Richard E. Mackin
A Detailed History Of The U-21, LT James R. Dobson
Reporting Final
Aviation Personnel Notes: Upcoming Board Dates;
Maintaining Aviation Force Structure Documents
Army Aviation—Age Forty, COL Emmett F. Knight
Aviator Selection Research, Then And Now,
John A. Dohme, Ph.D.; William R. Brown, M.S.;
Michael G. Sanders, Ph.D.
DES Report To The Field: Employment Of Army Aviation:
Filling The Void
ACTAAT: IMC For Cobra
Threat: Soviet Air Defenses Against Attack Helicopters,
Part 2: Individual Weapons, LTC Brian P. Mullady.
PEARL'S
Army Aviation Systems Program Review'82, MG Carl
H. McNair Jr. and CPT(P) Josef Reinsprecht
Back Cover: ATC Action Line: The National Airspace
System Plan (NASP), Mr. John McKeeman
Cover: The L-4 Grasshopper symbolizes the
beginning of Forty Years of Army Aviation. “Part
1: Grasshoppers" written by BG William W. Ford :
begins on page 2. Illustration by Fredric M. Martin É
‘ºo sº. 1773
**:Arts º

Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.

Secretary of the Army
Richard K. Tierney
Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the US Army Aviation Center Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise speci
fied Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise indicated.
Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct
communication is authorized to Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest PO. Drawer P.
Fort Rucker, AL 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981. in accordance with Army Regulation
31O-1
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1 Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR, AG
Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription rates
are $26.00 domestic and $32.50 overseas
 - HIS IS ARMY Aviation's 40th birthmonth. It
Yºgāº auspiciously and in great style with the
"Čelebration earlier this month at Ft. Rucker and
now ends in the same fashion with this history
oriented issue of the Aviation Digest.
Our anniversary festivities (4 to 6 June) were a
tremendous success, thanks to all who attended
and those who worked diligently to prepare a
calendar of events that truly did offer something
for everyone from yesteryear through today. One
of the very key events was a formal dedication of
the site for the new Army Aviation Museum. With
the site now approved and the fund raising effort
nearing the halfway mark, we are nearing the
reality that it is going to be a home for Army
Aviation history, memorabilia and vintage air
craft through the years.
Another most significant event was the me
morialization of an academic building in the War
rant Officer Career College complex in honor of
CWO Manford L. Kleiv who lost his life during an
aerial mission in the Vietnam conflict. It is most
fitting that we recognize Mr. Kleiv's contribution
and Sacrifice by such a structure, but the memorial
ization of the building is also representative of
the great contribution to all of Army Aviation,
both in peace and in war, by our aviation warrant
Officers.
One of the most distinguished guests who "came
home" for the celebration was retired Brigadier
General William W. Ford, the “Daddy Grasshop
per" of Army aviators. General Ford and all “Grass
hoppers" were reunited at Ft. Rucker during the
birthday celebration and reviewed the troops
during an impressive retreat ceremony conducted
by the First Aviation Brigade. Thus, it is entirely
fitting that this month's lead article should be
entitled "Grasshoppers" and provide an account
*om General Ford's personal experiences as
one who was so instrumental in the birth of Army
Aviation.
Another viewpoint of our past and our present
is presented by Colonel Emmett F. Knight, com
mander of the AVRADCOM Advanced Technology
Laboratory at Ft. Eustis. He has written "Army
Aviation—Age Forty," a pungent poetic descrip
tion of the growth, snags and progress that have
marked these four decades.
And even the history of how people have been
chosen to be Army aviators, past and present, is
included to add depth to your knowledge of our
business. "Army Aviator Selection Research: Then
and Now" by Dr. John A. Dohme, William R.
Brown and Dr. Michael G. Sanders identifies
testing procedures that have been and are being
used and Ones that are forecast for the future—all
JUNE 1982
intended to reduce the attrition in the flight training
program and enhance the quality of our product.
Much of the luster of Army Aviation's history
has been derived from our people's willingness
to be good neighbors to civilian communities,
providing service and support where needed.
Colonel Richard E. Mackin describes such an
act in “Flight to Arizpe"—a mission of international
neighborliness.
Such good relationships also exist with members
of other Services; witness the article from Navy
Lieutenant James R. Dobson entitled "A Detailed
History of the U-21." It is a very revealing bit of
nostalgia for our fixed wing fanciers.
As we concluded the 40th Birthday celebration,
not only had hundreds of oldtimers visited their
“Center of Training Excellence" to share a tale or
two, but also letters of congratulation and recog
nition poured in from around the world. Space
simply does not permit us to print them all, but
would like to at least share a few excerpts with
you. From these you will gain a further appreciation
not only of esteem in which Army Aviation is now
held but more importantly the measure of per
formance expected of aviators today to meet our
Army commitments worldwide.
• The achievements and contributions Army
Aviation and Fort Rucker have made to the United
States Army are recognized throughout the world
... You can be proud of the exemplary manner in
which you have continuously accomplished your
mission “Above the Best."—John O. Marsh Jr.,
Secretary of the Army
• Army Aviation has won its spurs many times
over, on many battlefields, since its birth, and
Continued on Inside Back Cover
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 Once “redlegs"sought in vain a tree
Up which to shinny and to see º
The shells that came riproaring out
Their field artillery cannon spout.

But then, “O-hoſ" the wise ones said.

“This ground observer stuff is deacº
Give us a chariot with wings;
We'll leap aloft as though on springs
From hedgerow, beach or tennis court
And undertake the gentle sport

F O R T Y Y E A R S O F

ARMY AVIATIO
tº.

T. is the first of a five-part series that will tell Army

Aviation's story from its beginning to the present. It is
authored by Brigadier General William W. Ford
(U.S. Army, Retired), and he gives an account of the
actions that led to the birth of Army Aviation. The
succeeding four sections will be by Richard K. Tierney !
and will be titled “Building a Training Program,”
“Combat,” “Armed Helicopters” and “Policies and
Organizations.” This history of Army Aviation will be a
valuable addition to the library of every interested member
of the Army Aviation community

2 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Of heaping quantities of lead
Upon the Kraut's defenseless head.”
Twas done! A million so-called pilots
(Never considered shrinking violets)
Forthwith began to strut their stuff.
Biºeve me, boy, it was enough!
They filled the air with Cubs, and though
They flew the damned thingslow and slow
They ſponder this with greatest awe:)
With some assistance won the war.
By Brigadier General William W. Ford,
U.S. Army (Retired)
This article is adapted from Wagon Soldier, a private
publication, 1980 by William Wallace Ford.
JUNE 1982
º i he poem or whatever-it-is at left above
º º (spoken with a Deep South accent), written
º:
- EZ
l § for a celebration dinner at the end of World
A&Mºsſº
man's (Redleg's) need for air observation, the solution
devised, and—perhaps with some exaggeration—the
results achieved.
People who visited Ft. Rucker, AL, on 6 June 1982
to celebrate Army Aviation's 40th birthday anniver
sary were apt to notice a score or more middle-aged
characters wandering about the place, gawking at the
newfangled machines and poking into things. On their
coats, especially their blazers, some wore a large,
gaudy emblem which looked like a grasshopper. Well,
by gosh, it was a grasshopper! The wearers called
themselves Grasshoppers. They belong to the first
generation of Army aviators. This is the story of how
they came to be.
The end of World War I found military air obser
vation at a crossroads. The device upon which the
U.S. Army had depended since Civil War days, the
hydrogen-filled, captive balloon, was due to be phased
out. Its vulnerability to attack by hostile fighters and
to the growing range and accuracy of antiaircraft fire
rendered it completely obsolete. Some 265 balloons
had been sent to France; of these, 77 had participated
in action and 48 had been lost.' It was too fragile a
device for frontline observation purposes.
Fortunately, the same instrument that had brought
about the demise of the balloon now provided a
replacement: the fixed wing aircraft. Although the
Wright brothers had first flown in 1903 and the U.S.
Army had bought its first airplane as recently as 1909,
by the end of World War I it had had 39 aerosquadrons
in action against the enemy.” These had performed
“pursuit” (fighter), bombardment and observation
missions, all of primitive type, using mostly open
cockpit biplanes.
 GRASSHOPPERS
But enough had been learned to make it clear that
the fixed wing aircraft (helicopters were way in the
future) was the device to develop, for observation as
well as other missions. When the Army Air Corps was
created by Act of Congress in 1926 it began to develop
specialized types of aircraft to perform its several
functions; for observation a tandem two-seater, open
cockpit biplane was generally used. Rather heavy, it
required a hard surface runway or its near equivalent.
The Air Corps furnished the plane and pilot for
observation of artillery fire while the field artillery
furnished the observer. Doctrine specified that such
observation planes should be attached to corps and
from there allotted to subordinate units on a mission
by-mission basis as the situation indicated.
The two branches quickly worked out a suitable
technique. During 1930 to 1932, at Ft. Bliss, TX, I was
reconnaissance officer of the 82d Field Artillery
Battalion (Horse) of the 1st Cavalry Division. My
duties included those of battalion air observer. On
numerous occasions I went aloft as observer in an Air
Corps plane and adjusted artillery fire during target
practice at the Dona Ana Firing Range in New Mexico.
Adjustments were routinely rapid and accurate, though
slowed somewhat by the use of Morse code instead of
radio telephone; a suitable set was not then available.
(During this experience I became interested in flying
and learned to fly at a nearby civilian school. Over the
next few years I advanced through several pilot ratings—
solo, amateur, private, limited commercial with instru
ment rating—and I owned two airplanes. I flew often
from small fields and strips, gaining experience which
was to bear fruit later.)
But, however adequate the technique, there were
serious and I think fatal flaws in the arrangement just
described:
• The plane furnished was always a fairly heavy
type requiring a hard surface runway or near equivalent;
it therefore had to be based at an airport or temporary
field some distance to the rear, “on call.”
• When the call was made (if indeed it was heard)
the pilot had first to find the guns he was to serve,
since the artillery often had moved since the last
mission.
• The observer, whether Field Artilleryman or Air
Corps observer, was likewise in the dark as to gun
position and target location; this had to be worked
out by radio after the plane was airborne. It wasn't
easy. Of course the observer could be stationed between
missions at the guns, and thus have all the information
he needed, but the delay due to his travel overland
from guns to airfield to begin the mission was unaccept
able.
• The overriding deficiency in this system was the
limited amount of observation time available. There
was need for air observation, not merely to fire of
some target previously located (located how, please?)
but to sit up there and find targets. Time spent by the
airplanes on the ground or flying back and forth
between landing area and gun position was a complete
loss.
All this was well-known to every artilleryman, and
much complaining was done, but little else. The
stringencies of peacetime funding plus the natural
preoccupation of the Air Corps with what it considered
its more pressing responsibilities, strategic bombing
and tactical air support, left scant opportunity for
improvement in air observation for Field Artillery.
In 1939 war broke out in Europe, and by 1940
military activity in the United States was increasing
by leaps and bounds, for it seemed likely that we
would eventually be drawn in. (My class at Leavenworth
was turned out in January 1940, ahead of the scheduled
June, to go to units in field training.) Agitation for
better air observation grew in intensity, led by the
chief of Field Artillery, Major General Robert M.
Danford. This attracted the attention of the three
leading light aircraft manufacturers: Aeronca, Piper
and Taylorcraft. Aggressive businessmen, they got
into the act and placed one or more civilian aircraft
with company pilots, at the disposal of every senior
commander in every large scale Army maneuver
conducted during 1940 to 1941 in Louisiana, Tennessee
and elsewhere. Toward the end a veritable squadron
of planes was in action during the Desert Maneuvers
at Ft. Bliss: eight from Piper and two each from
Aeronca and Taylorcraft. The missions performed
were mostly courier and command reconnaissance,
though there apparently was some adjustment (simu
lated) of artillery fire.
An amusing incident occurred in the course of the
Desert Maneuvers. Henry Wann, one of the Piper
pilots, was told to fly to the field headquarters of thr
First Cavalry Brigade and report to the commander,
Major General Innis P. Swift. Wann located the head
quarters, landed and reported. General Swift seemed
quite impressed. He said, “You looked just like a
damn grasshopper when you landed that thing out
there in the boondocks and bounced around.” Thus
“Grasshopper” became the proud title of the early
Army aviators.
At this point my 20 years' service as an artilleryman,
my modest experience as an air observer, and my 7
years of private flying came into conjunctive focus:
Why not make air observation organic to the artillery
itself? Each battalion would have its own light plane
operating from a nearby field or road, with its own
artilleryman pilot and artillery observer, constantly in
touch with the battalion fire direction center, constantly
and instantly available to the battalion commander.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 GRASSHOPPER SQUADRON

Piper Aircraft Corporation Aeronca Alrtraft Corporation

w. T. Piper Sr. Maurice C. Frye
T. 1. Case James Rosing
Thomas Piper James Kukla
Howard Piper John Gall”
T. H. Miller
Norman Hockenberry Taylorcraft Aviation
Henry Kubick James Ludwig
W. D. Strohmeier Paul Yates -

T. V. Weld Philip Gow"

Forrest I. Nearing" Adair Miller
Robert Bowes Ray Carlson"
David Cogswell Frank Parmelee"
Gordon Curtis
James-Diegel Continental Engine Company
Robert Heath - - - - - Percy Hubbel"
- J. M. Helbert. " - - - Chauncey Chantree"
C. R. Holladay - -

J. W. Miller - :Ground engineers, the others were flying

Henry S. wann 2 salesmen John E. P. Morgan was also a mem
David Kress" befor this joup-From Washington he acted
- Jules Parmentier --" **In the capacity of a director or observeſ.
. H. sheldon chadwick - *
-
: º --- -*: ---
-
-

- - - " * - Lº

In the fall of 1940 I wrote an article along these
lines, published in the Field Artillery Journal of April
1941, recommending organic air observation for Field
Artillery. As to the need, I said, in part:
“During the Third Army maneuvers in the early
part of 1940 this writer was a battery commander in
the light artillery of a “streamlined” division. During
uccessive division, corps and army exercises he
participated in a number of field problems. Not once,
during this period of 4 months, did he find a decent
OP! Not once did he have a map or map substitute
from which fire could have been computed! Not once
was an actual air observer available to adjust the fire
of his battalion!”
As to the feasibility and type of plane:
“The plane for our Field Artillery battalion should
go with that battalion at all times. The "flivver'
plane, with its light wing loading and its 75 HP
engine, cruises at about 80 mph and lands at about
45 mph. It does not require a prepared landing
field, but can land in almost any cow pasture or
similar place. Hundreds of landings and take-offs
have been made on highways. Even plowed fields
are practicable provided the furrows are not deep.”
As to vulnerability:
“Objection will be heard that such a craft will be
quite vulnerable to hostile aviation. Well, what
aircraft isn't? Only the best of the fighters themselves.
Does anyone think, for example, that our present
service type observation ship, the O-47, would bear
a charmed life in an atmosphere infested with enemy
pursuit? Of what use are one or two flexible machine
guns, firing to the rear, against the eight fixed
forward guns of the modern fighter?
“Our little flivver plane will have no armament at
all; its protection will consist in:
• General superiority of the air secured by our
pursuit aviation. Let no one say we may not have
this. We may not win the war, but we should try.
We should try, likewise, to gain air superiority. No
modern war has been won without it. Of course not
even a definite air superiority on our part will
render us immune from enemy air attack. But such
superiority, or merely an equality, should make it
possible for us to employ observation aviation without

JUNE 1982
 Some of the members of the test group (above) who helped
bring about the birth of Army Aviation and the establishment
of the Department of Air Training at Ft. Sill, OK:
Žs
GRASSHOPPERs
prohibitive losses, especially if other protective
measures are adopted.
• Observing from low-altitudes over own territory.
Low-flying airplanes, particularly if painted camou
flage, are hard to see from above. If enemy fighters
cruise at low altitudes our ground weapons should
be able to make it hot for them.
• Maneuverability. Upon the approach of hostile
aircraft our pilot will put the little ship into a series
of tight turns, barely off the ground; high-speed
enemy fighters, much less maneuverable, will have
difficulty in bringing their guns to bear.”
Well, what happened? The article in the Journal
excited much favorable comment; the light aircraft
manufacturers placed a dozen or so planes and pilots
at the disposal of the senior commanders in the
maneuvers of 1941, but not much else took place.
Opponents of the idea claimed, first, that Field
Artillerymen couldn't fly these little planes from roads
and small fields, they'd break their necks; second, that
if they did manage to fly them as proposed, the necessary
maintenance could not be performed under primitive
field conditions; third, that if it happened by some
miracle that the planes could be so flown and maintained,
they'd be shot down the first day in battle.
So the “experts” were opposed. The Air Corps was
opposed for an additional reason. It had been too long
under the tutelage of the Army not to know the uses of
bureaucracy and it wasn't about to let air observation
slip from its hands any more than the Army, some
years earlier, in the days of Billy Mitchell, had been
willing to let the Air Corps slip from its hands to
become an independent arm.
Despite this strong opposition, the idea would not
die. The commanders who in the 1940 and 1941
Richard H. Alley
Frank C. Baumstark
Lloyd M. Bornstein
Delbert L. Bristol
Joseph R. Caldwell
Felix H. COune
ROland J. Coutura
maneuvers had been served by the light planes lent by
the aircraft manufacturers were enthusiastic in their
support. General Danford visited the artillery school
in England during the summer, and came away
impressed by the efforts being made there to use light
aircraft for artillery observation. I talked to him later
that fall when he came to Ft. Sill, OK, and was delighted
to realize his strong support of the proposal that a test
of my theory be made. His staff was plugging for it
with G-3 of the War Department, and finally, on 5
December 1941, a formal proposal to this effect was
made to the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall.
It is doubtful whether the proposition would have
gone any further in the absence of a strong push from
a new direction. But 2 days later, on 7 December 1941,
the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor with devastating
effect. The event caught some of the big brass, military
and civilian, with their pants down, and scared the
pants off nearly everyone else. People had nightmares
of Japanese scaling the cliffs of California. On 1(t ,
December the Chief of Staff directed the chief of
Field Artillery to proceed with the proposed tests.
I was called to Washington a few days later and
worked with General Danford's staff on the details of
a directive which he would issue to the commanding
general, Ft. Sill, covering the training phase of the
program. This directive was issued on 23 December
1941, and on 2 January 1942, I was appointed director
of Air Training.
On my way to Washington I had been visited on the
train during the brief stop in Cincinnati by Major
Gordon J. Wolf, a Field Artillery Reservist, who had
heard of the program and wanted to join. He was an
enthusiastic private flyer with several years experience,
of great energy, intelligence and imagination. I gladly
accepted his offer, and he became my second incom
mand. He contributed outstandingly to the operation.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Lloyd M. Damron Ralph P. Hage Robert M. Leich
Robert W. DOnOVan Chester Hammond William R. Matthews
Edward Drapela Steve E. Hatch Joseph E. McDonald
Robert M. Ford James W. Hill Jr. J06 L. MeSSima
William W. F0Id Edwin F. HOUSeſ Forrest I. Nearing
Mari0m J. FOſtner James I. Keſſ Thomas F. Piper
Alwin R. Hackbarth Charles W. Leſewer AlansOn RawdOn
Incredibly, on 15 January 1942, actual training for
the tests began. That so much had been accomplished
in a scant month is explained only by the heroic efforts
of all concerned under the impetus of war.
Arrangements had been made as follows:
• The chief of Army Air Corps had turned over
Post Field, Ft. Sill, for use in the project; had furnished
24 Piper Cub airplanes (commercial J-3s painted olive
drab) and associated equipment; and would supply
80-octane aviation fuel.
• The chief of Field Artillery had sent circulars to
all field artillery units in the United States, inviting
applications for participation in the test from officers
and enlisted men having civilian pilot licenses with
private pilot or higher grade. Fourteen officers and 19
enlisted men were thus selected and they reported to
Ft. Sill for training.”
• The Civilian Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
lent Mr. Richard Alley to serve as chief flight instruc
*or, and Mr. Stanford J. Stelle to serve as maintenance
supervisor. It also recommended seven flight instructors
of extensive experience in the type of flying contem
plated. These instructors were hired by the Field
Artillery School and served throughout the training
period prior to the field tests. Included in their number
were two, Tony Piper and Henry Wann, who had been
active as pilots for the light aircraft manufacturers in
the maneuvers of 1940 and 1941. Both of them, and
Ted Shirmacher, another of the civilian flight in
structors, obtained commissions and continued as
military pilots throughout the war.
• The aircraft and engine manufacturers sent
experienced people to assist: Mr. Forrest I. Nearing
from Piper, and Mr. Chester Hammond from Con
tinental.
It was a piece of cake. Probably no military group
ever began a war mission with greaterjoy and enthusiasm.
JUNE 1982
Lawrence E. Rhodes Paget W. Thornton
William T. Roulston Jr. Henry S. Wann
John S. Saſka RObert R. Williams
Theodore F. Shiſmacheſ Bryce Wilson
Thomas M. Skelly Gordon J. Wolf
Stanford J. Stelle Walter J. Zimmerman
Dawid SweetSer
For here was an opportunity not only to serve their
country in a highly promising war effort, but to do so
while getting their fill of what they liked best to do—
flying. Whereas flying hours had previously been limited
due to their costliness, they were not bountiful and free.
The course laid out by Mr. Alley and Mr. Stelle
under my direction was to last from January 15 to
February 28. After that would come the field tests.
One-half of each day would be spent in flying; the
other half in maintenance, for we were training pilot
mechanics. The pilot had to be prepared to do all the
usual day-to-day maintenance in the field. As far as
practicable each pilot was assigned a specific airplane,
which was exclusively his to fly and maintain. The
CAA skilled flight and maintenance instructors were
all over the operation, giving dual instruction, check
rides and examinations in both subjects.
It was the flying, of course, which was the most
unorthodox. In their previous civilian training these
pilots had been taught to fly only from fields large
enough to provide a generous margin of safety against
misjudgment in landing and takeoff. They had been
taught to maintain, except at the final moment of
landing, a speed well above stalling. And they had
been required to fly at an altitude high enough to
provide reasonable safety in case of engine failure.
Now all this was changed. They were to fly “low and
slow,” formerly a prescription for trouble. Flying low
was to provide some protection against hostile aircraft.
Flying slow, during the approach for landing, was to
- permit them to get into the smallest possible field or
strip, since any excess speed would risk overshooting
and cracking up. The fields to be used were to include,
ultimately, those of smallest negotiable size and barest
acceptability as to surface; the roads with smallest
tolerable clearance as to wires, trees, telephone poles,
fences and similar obstructions.
 GRASSHOPPERS
What fun it was! Like defying the law of gravity.
Daring to do what you had been told, up to now,
never, never to do.
But this was no foolhardy enterprise, no exercise in
recklessness. We began by practicing this new style of
flying under conditions where the dangers were only
simulated. We began on practice fields and strips as
large and as smooth as many small airports. We put
up, at the approach end of the landing strip, two
bamboo poles about 20 feet high, with a string bearing
short streamers stretched between their tips. The
pilot's job was to come in over this simulated obstruc
tion in a delicately controlled power-stall approach
and land as short as possible, braking hard if necessary.
If he overshot, being too high or too fast, there was
still plenty of field left on which to make a landing. If
he came in too low the only damage was to the string
and streamers; if too slow, he might “stall out” and
have a hard landing, possibly washing out the landing
gear but nothing more. Actually, not a landing gear
was lost.
After several hours of this, when the pilots had
acquired a feeling of confidence in the power-stall
approach and a fairly good feeling for what size field
was acceptable, the scene shifted to smaller fields and
roads. Nothing was simulated here; the obstructions
were real. Landings on roads presented no problem
except in crosswinds or where obstructions such as
trees or telephone poles were too close to the road. In
that case a less hazardous stretch of road was sought.
After more experience a pilot skilled in this technique
could even land on a curving road with confidence.
The trick was simply to fly around the curve, banking
just enough under part throttle to stay over the center
line of the road, then settling gently to a one-wheel,
tail-high landing. As soon as the landing roll was
stabilized on one wheel, following the curve, the outside
wing was lowered until the outside wheel touched the
Flight A at Camp Blanding, Florida, April 1942 Flight B at Pershing Field, Ft. Sam Houston, TX, April 1942
ground. Rudder control was then sufficient to keet
the desired direction until, with throttle closed, the
tail dropped gently, the steerable tail wheel touched,
and the aircraft was braked to a stop.
During the latter part of this short-field work our
“evasive maneuver” was introduced. Upon observing
the approach of hostile aircraft the pilot was to roll
into a dive, aiming for the ground. The hostile pilot
could not follow this maneuver because of his much
greater speed, and would thus be thwarted. Our pilot,
having rolled into the dive, would immediately begin
a gentle pullout, lest a dangerously high airspeed be
built up, which might take him into the ground or
cause him to lose a wing in pullout. Little training was
required for this maneuver. In the production aircraft
for field use the observer would be seated facing to
the rear, with large plexiglass window areas giving
him a good field of view for detecting the approach of
hostile aircraft.
In the beginning the pilots had been given a review
of basic flying maneuvers, lasting about 10 hours.
Several were dropped from training during this period,
due to lack of aptitude or unsatisfactory rate of progress.
Then, after some 20 hours or so of practice on small
fields and roads, came the third and final phase: the
actual conduct of fire. The splendid Ft. Sill firing
ranges were made available, along with well-trained
firing batteries and skilled fire direction centers (FDCs).
The observer, having conferred with the FDC as to the
mission to be flown, would go to his plane nearby, the
plane would take off at once, and as soon as the target
area was in sight the command to fire was given.
Adjustment would be rapidly concluded and the plane
would land. The average time achieved, from takeoff
to landing, was about 9 minutes. This was for personnel
in training; skilled pilot-observer teams sometimes
did it in as little as 6 minutes. During this part of the
training the observer was usually a second pilot in thº,
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
*ircraft but in the field the observer would be a junior
officer in the Field Artillery unit served, he having been
already well-trained, at Ft. Sill, in the conduct of fire.
The War Department had directed that the training
phase at Ft. Sill be completed by 28 February 1942,
after which the real tests, in the field, would be
conducted. So it was. In less than 3 months since Pearl
Harbor there had been assembled, trained and made
ready a unit prepared to demonstrate the capability of
an entirely new kind of military aviation.
Of the 14 officers and 19 enlisted men who reported
for this training, 3 officers and 10 enlisted men failed
to complete the course. Probably there would have
been fewer failures had the course been not so
condensed. The average flying time at the beginning
of the course was, for officers, 187 hours; for enlisted
men, 70. This explains the disparity of results between
the two groups. The average number of hours flown
during the course by students completing same was
39. Enlisted pilots completing the course were im
mediately promoted to staff sergeant.
There were no accidents! Well, no serious accidents.
On 28 February 1942, the training detachment, later
to become known as the Class Before One, was divided
into two groups: Flight “A,” consisting of 11 airplanes
and 14 officers and men, to go to Ft. Bragg, NC, for
service test with the 13th Field Artillery Brigade;
Flight “B,” consisting of 10 airplanes and 14 officers
and men, to go to the 2d Infantry Division, Ft. Sam
Houston, TX, for the same purpose.' I was not a mem
ber of either group, although I led Flight A on the
flight to Ft. Bragg and remained there as observer
and consultant for most of the test period, then moving
to Ft. Sam Houston for the same purpose.
The field tests were to be made with troops actually
on maneuvers, where the utility and practicability of
*Organic air observation for field artillery could be
assessed. A new element was now introduced for eval
uation: the vulnerability of these small planes to hostile
aircraft. Actually this was the only element in doubt.
If the little planes could live in battle, there was no
doubt that they could operate from landing areas or
roads somewhere near the guns they served; there
was no doubt that they could maintain the planes in
operational condition; there was no doubt that they
could bring fire, unerringly, upon any target within
range of the guns, and this by staying over our own
lines, out of reach of enemy ground fire. But what
about hostile aircraft? We hoped that the evasive
maneuver previously described would neutralize this
danger.
Shortly after Flight A arrived at Ft. Bragg, the 13th
Field Artillery Brigade moved to Camp Blanding, FL,
where the actual tests were to be run. Flight A went
JUNE 1982
along, finding an acceptable landing strip on a sandy
lane in the pines near brigade headquarters. An Air
Corps fighter squadron, based nearby, was designated
to furnish the air opposition. Flying P-39s equipped
with gun cameras, they were to take pictures of our
Cubs in the air, thus proving the Cubs would be shot
down while flying their observation missions, and on
the ground, proving that our attempts to hide planes
under trees while not on missions were ineffective.
We were worried about this. Not only at the prospect
of having some high-speed fighter whiz by you a few
feet away (suppose he miscalculated?), but more so at
the thought that he had just taken a picture of you as
he shot you down. These pictures might convince
higher authority that our whole scheme was impractical
A bright idea occurred to us. If he wanted to play at
shooting us down, why shouldn't we play at shooting
him down? Not from our plane, of course, which had
no guns, but from the ground? All the artillery units
underneath us were generously equipped with machine
guns for defense against low-flying aircraft as well as
against ground attack. Why not equip each machine
gunner with a camera to “shoot down” (that is, take
the picture of) any hostile plane that pursued a Cub so
low as to present a good target? This would render the
picture war a stalemate. This was done, and the game
was entered into with enthusiasm by all concerned:
the fighters, the Cubs, the men on the ground. The
ultimate in evasive maneuver by a Cub pilot was
reached one day when Lieutenant Couné came in
from a mission with a section of pine tree about 3
inches in diameter and 3 feet long stuck in the lead
ing edge of his right wing. Attacked by a fighter,
he had barely pulled out of his evasive dive when he
flew through the top of a pine tree, clipping off a
piece. The plane was repaired in the field and remained
in service.
Brigadier General Mark Clark came by to have a
look at all this, and I took him for a ride from a
secondary road with pine trees close to our wing tips
on both sides. We landed on the same strip. He seemed
favorably impressed.*
After a few weeks at Camp Blanding I went to Ft.
Sam Houston, where Gordon Wolf was leading Flight
B through a highly successful test with the 2d Divi
sion. The field tests at both places were soon over,
and enthusiastic reports from both generals con
cerned went on their way upward through channels
to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. A curious
thing happened here. Lieutenant General Lesley J.
McNair, who commanded the Ground Forces all over
the United States and did a magnificent job of training
them, was away on an inspection trip at the time and
his Chief of Staff, General Clark, who had flown with
me, was in charge. Ever willing to take responsibility,
General Clark promptly approved the reports and
sent them up to the War Department Chief of Staff,
General Marshall, recommending that organic air
observation for Field Artillery be adopted as standard.
The War Department approved. It was rumored that
General McNair, upon his return, was somewhat
displeased at this precipitate action. I asked him later
about this, believing that having served under him at
Purdue ROTC I had his confidence. I asked him
didn't he believe we could do what we claimed we
could do. He said oh, yes, he believed the concept was
sound but that the Air Corps, being the traditional
operator in the flying domain, should have been allowed
to handle it if it wished. However, he made no effort
to undo what had been done. He and General (Hap)
Arnold, chief of Army Air Forces, were very respectful
of one another's prerogatives.
So it came about that on 6 June 1942, a War Depart
ment directive established “Organic Air Observation
for Field Artillery,” allotting two planes, two pilots and
one mechanic to each field artillery battalion, and the
same to each group, division artillery and corps artillery
headquarters. It was wealth beyond our wildest hopes.
A Department of Air Training was instituted at the
Field Artillery School. I was appointed director, and
most of the personnel who had been in the test group
remained as members of the initial staff. The course
of pilot training was refined and somewhat extended,
and training of mechanics was begun on a corresponding
scale. When the supply of persons already holding
civilian pilot licenses gave out, the Air Corps contracted
with civilian flying schools to fill this need. Volunteers
from all over the Army were first given primary training
at the civilian schools, coming later to Ft. Sill for
Pilots of the Grasshopper Squadron at a reunion in October 1978 at Ft. Sill are left to right: John Sarko,
Robert Williams, Gordon Wolf, Randy Matthews, James Kerr, Charles Lefever, Tony Piper, Robert Cassidy,
William Ford, Bryce Wilson, Padget Thornton, Henry Wann, Delbert Bristol and James Hill
º
…
º
10
advanced and special training. It was a great satisfactiot
to those of us who had been the pioneers in this
activity that, although starting from scratch after the
war began, it developed fast enough to supply each
Field Artillery headquarters entering combat in any
theater of operations its organic air section.
That, then, is how Army Aviation got its start,
though under another name. How it went on in World
War II to fulfill richly the predictions which had been
made for it; how it came to serve many needs beyond
those of the Field Artillery; how it came to employ a
new type of aircraft, the helicopter; how it proved
itself over and over in two more wars; how it stands
today in robust maturity and is still developing—these
are chapters in a remarkable story for which there
isn't the beginning of enough space here. Some other
time; some other reporter.
Anyone who makes bold to write for the information
or entertainment of other people ought to be able to
scrape up as a parting shot some bright thought,
some gem of wisdom. I give you the words of Tom
Jenkins, who was wrestling coach at West Point a long
time ago. His maxim was: “There ain't no holt what
can't be broke.” It is as true in military science as in
wrestling, whether you are making the holt, or breaking
it. Tºº-e
References
The Army Aviation Story, by Richard Tierney,
Colonial Press, 1963, p. 24.
*ibid., p. 38.
"ibid., pp. 54-56.
"ibid., pp. 57-58.
*ibid., Introduction, General Mark Clark's postwar
comments on the little planes.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Colonel Richard E. Mackin
Assistant Chief of Staff/Deputy
Installation Commander
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
Airfield, 26 May 1963
º
JUNE 1982
Army Aviation's reputation as a good
neighbor to civilian communities
is well established. An international
mission 19 years ago helped
build that character
ZIPE
1. MAY 1963, I was assigned to the 17th Aviation
Company at Ft. Ord, CA. The company was equipped
with the U-1A Otter, a fixed wing aircraft which was
produced by de Havilland of Canada. It was a strange
looking beast even then, with its strut-supported main
landing gear and its seemingly outsized verticle stabilizer.
It could carry, depending on the fuel load, 11 people, at
least one of which had to be a pilot. The empty weight
was about 5,000 pounds, and it had a maximum gross
weight of 8,000 pounds which was frequently exceeded.
With a full load of fuel, 212 gallons as I recall, the Otter
could fly at a speed of 105 knots for more than 6 hours.
In any event, the Otter could carry 3,000 pounds of a
suitable combination of fuel, crew, cargo and passengers.
I might add that the whole affair was propelled by a
single Pratt and Whitney R-1340 engine and its forte
was operating into and out of very short, unimproved
areas.
At this point in time I was relatively free of responsibil
ities, having just been replaced as the company operations
officer due to my impending reassignment to the Infantry
Officer's Advanced Course at Ft. Benning, GA. Thus,
when a strange mission was received from the Sixth
Army Headquarters, Presidio of San Francisco, I was a
likely candidate, as a captain, to be the mission com
mander.
The initial order received at the 17th Aviation Company
was to send two Otters to Crissy Army Airfield, Presidio
11
of San Francisco, Sunday, 26 May 1963, for a mission
which would involve a flight into Mexico. Further
instructions would be provided later. If possible, we
were to bring two Spanish speaking crewchiefs. We
did as instructed, arriving at Crissy shortly after noon
Sunday. Later that day, we were briefed by the Sixth
Army public affairs officer who told us the background
of the mission and exactly what must be accomplished.
The crews of the aircraft were myself, then Captain
Richard E. Mackin, Captain Robert B. Galusha, First
Lieutenants Clifford Fremstad and Ted L. Rogers
and crewchiefs Specialists Five Jamie Restrepo and
Fernando Vargas.
According to the PAO, the priest in Arizpe had
accumulated sufficient funds to have a new floor
constructed in his church. In the process of removing
the old wooden floors that had been installed, one on
the other, over the years, he exposed the graves of the
various dignitaries who had been buried under the
floor of the church. One of the graves the priest knew
to be that of Juan Bautista de Anza (1735-1788), a
Spanish explorer and governor in North America
who founded Monterey and San Francisco. Apparently
feeling that the final resting place of such a famous
man should be recognized in some way, the priest
wrote the Mexican Government. On receiving no
response to the letter, the priest wrote the governor
of California, Governor Pat Brown. Governor Brown
sent the letter to the University of California and
thereby started a chain of events which led to the city
of San Francisco getting involved. There was an ex
change of delegations between San Francisco and
Arizpe, resulting in the commissioning by San Francisco
of the fabrication of a marble sarcophagus. Further,
the city requested assistance from the Sixth Army
commander to get the coffin delivered.
Initially, it was expected to use UH-1 helicopters to
do the job, but aviation staff officers pointed out that
the distance involved, along with the lack of JP-4
fuel—or any other aviation fuel—at Arizpe, made the
use of the Hueys impracticable. Obtaining Marine
Corps CH-34 Sikorsky helicopters or de Havilland
CV-2 Caribous from other commands was also con
sidered. Desiring to accomplish the mission with its
own assets, however, Sixth Army's attention turned
to the 17th Aviation Company with its slow, but
sturdy Otters.
Our mission was to depart Crissy Army Airfield at
the Presidio on Monday, 27 May 1963, with 2,700
pounds of sarcophagus split between the two aircraft.
We also were to carry an Army photographer. The
aircraft were to land at Arizpe, Mexico, at 0900 hours
Wednesday, 29 May, and be out of Mexico by 1500
hours that same day. How we did it was up to us.
Allegedly, customs in both Nogales, Mexico, and
Nogales, AZ, were aware of our coming.
12
We started early Monday morning with the loading
of the disassembled sarcophagus, using forklifts º
bring the heavy pieces to the height of the aircraft
doors, then man-handling them forward to keep the
center of gravity of the aircraft within acceptable
limits. After that was completed, each aircraft com
mander did his weight and balance computations,
considering the weight and location of the marble
slabs (some weighing 700 pounds), the same for
passengers and crew, and sufficient fuel with reserve
to take us to Bakersfield, our first stop. While the
results of our figuring were marginally acceptable, we
were faced with a takeoff from Crissy to the west with
a quartering headwind. I must point out that im
mediately west of that airfield sits the Golden Gate
Bridge. At 1115 hours, after some cargo adjustments
between aircraft and with TV cameras rolling, the
ungainly birds lumbered down the runway with all
resting on the skill of the aircraft and engine makers.
Clearing the southern approach of the Golden Gate
with at least 50 feet to spare, we slowly turned south.
We refueled in Bakersfield and went on to spend the
night in Phoenix.
Tuesday we flew to Ft. Huachuca, AZ, where we
planned our next day's flight so as to, first, find Arizpe,
and second, to arrive there at 0900 hours. Our maps
showed Arizpe to be around 100 statute miles generally
southeast of Nogales, Mexico. There was an airfield
indicated on the map but there was no tower nor any
services listed. Other than a commercial radio station
in Nogales, there were no navigational aids; however,
there were some good terrain features and the weather
was forecast to be excellent, so we didn't anticipate
any problems. We again computed our fuel require
ments so as to carry only what was needed. Not
knowing what the strip at Arizpe consisted of, we
wanted to be as light as possible.
Wednesday the two aircraft left Ft. Huachuca at
0645 hours and landed at Nogales, Mexico, at 07156,
hours. Of course, the Mexican Customs had no idea
what the two funny looking U.S. Army aircraft were
doing inside Mexico. Fortunately, a Cessna, chartered
by the Sixth Army public affairs officer, showed up
shortly after we did and that officer, who spoke Spanish,
explained the mission and cleared our way. At roughly
0850 the two Otters arrived over the Arizpe Airfield.
It turned out to be a flat clearing in the sparse bush
that made up the countryside. For some reason, best
known to others, the Arizpe airstrip is the only one I
have ever seen with a dogleg in the runway. We easily
had 700 to 800 feet of usable dirt strip, however, so
there was no great challenge offered for the Otters.
At approximately 0856, I started my approach. I
instructed the other aircraft commander to stay airborne
until I was safe on the ground and clear of the runway.
At 0900 hours, or close thereto, the first Otter touched
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
At the airfield in Arizpe, Mexico (above), a school teacher and her class
waited to inspect the aircraft. The church in Arizpe (right) showing the
future resting place of Juan Bautista de Anza, with standing, left to right:
LT Rogers, the charter pilot; SP5 Restrepo; CPT Mackin; LT Fremstad, CPT
Galusha; SP5 Vargas; unknown citizens of Arizpe. In the hole, the Padre
and the mason

down at Arizpe, followed shortly thereafter by the
second. We parked the aircraft side by side, put on
our ties and jackets, and dismounted. Off in the distance,
toward the city, we saw pickup trucks, sedans and
people on horses all in a convoy, heading for the
airfield. The Cessna landed just ahead of the convoy's
arrival.
Many of the people from Arizpe spoke English;
and when that wasn't the case, either another citizen
translated or one of our crewchiefs stepped in to help.
Among the people we met were the priest, the mayor
of the town, and a representative of the governor of
the state of Sonora. In addition to the aircraft crews
the only other people on the scene from the United
States were the Cessna pilot, the Army photographer,
and a mason from the company that fabricated the
sarcophagus who had also arrived via the Cessna.
Having seen the effort that went into loading the
marble slabs in San Francisco, it was with awe that I
watched the Mexican men, under the supervision of
the priest, unloading them. They backed their trucks
up to the cargo doors and as many strong arms as
could get to the heavy pieces would gently and carefully
carry them out. The whole operation took only minutes
and was executed without a scratch to the aircraft or
damage to the marble.
At approximately 1100 hours, after the mayor had
established a guard on the aircraft, the crews were
assigned to sedans for the trip to town and church.
Frankly, I don't remember much about the church
other than it was fairly large and had a number of side
altars with numerous statues. The new floor project
was almost complete with only the finishing yet to be
accomplished. The coffin containing the remains of
Juan Bautista de Anza was placed on the floor, off to
the side of the main altar. I presumed that the other
bodies of distinguished people who had been buried
under the floor of the church had been left in place.
The new, and hopefully permanent site for de Anza
was a bricked-in hole in the floor, awaiting the marble
from San Francisco and, of course, awaiting de Anza.
After lunch, along with a sizeable entourage, we
returned to the airstrip where we performed the normal
preflight inspection of the aircraft and then took off
from Arizpe. The two aircraft joined in what for
Otters approximated a formation and made a low
pass over the airfield with much waving of hands both
on the ground and in the planes. Following a short
stop in Nogales the flight cleared Mexican airspace at
approximately 1455 hours.
Equipped by nature with one of the world's worst
memories, I have attempted to recount the events of
that mission to Arizpe some 19 years ago. While
much of the detail has faded, I clearly remember the
feeling that we had done something that was worthwhile
and that on 29 May 1963, in Arizpe, Mexico, the United
States looked good in the eyes of the folks of that little
town—and I was proud to have been part of it.

JUNE 1982 13
A Detailed History of the
LJ-213
Lieutenant James R. Dobson, U.S. Navy
- Beech Aircraft Corporation's King Air and Queen
º production model U-21A at the Beech
- -
- twin Bonanza. The L-23 led to the development of
NU-8F (YU-21) prototype for U-21
14
N|
A. U-21, IS THAT a King Air or a Queen Air? A
question frequently asked by civilian pilots, as well as
military pilots from the other services. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) air traffic controllers are usually
puzzled by the identifier U-21. They call it anything
from an Army King Air, to a Queen Air, to an Army
Twin, and in lieu of anything else, simply call it an
Army aircraft. The U-21 has turbine engines like a
King Air, but civilian pilots are baffled by the square
Queen Air windows which indicate the U-21 is not
pressurized.
So, is the U-21 a King Air or a Queen Air? Actually,
it is a combination of both. The U-21 is a cross between
Air.
lage It has King
similar Air of
to that wings
the and engines
Queen and aBeech
Air. The fuse
model number 65-A90 further indicates the combination
of both King Air and Queen Air. Civilian King Air
pilots call the U-21, “A cheap imitation King Air.”
The U-21 evolved out of the Beech stables from ane,
already well developed line of twin engine utility
aircraft. In 1952, the Army acquired its first twin
engine airplane, the Beech L-23 (later designated U
8D), the military version of the Beechcraft model 50
the L-23F (later designated U-8F) the military version
of the Beechcraft model 65 Queen Air.
The most radical change in the F model was the
seating arrangement. It had a wider, deeper and
longer fuselage with four deluxe seats that fit behind
the pilot's compartment. The first U-8F was flown on
28 August 1958. One of the most outstanding features
realized of this aircraft was its growth potential. With
its existing fuselage, wings and tail, it could be fitted
with turboprop engines and pressurized. Beech already
had visions of developing a pressurized twin engine
turboprop which would be called a King Air 90.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
º * N
wwwºw Swwes W.
In 1963, Beech converted for the Army an unpres
surized Queen Air model 80. Beech added Pratt and
Whitney PT6A-6 turbine engines rated at 550 shaft
horsepower each. The Army designated the aircraft
as an NU-8F, thus becoming the Army's first turbine
powered airplane. Little did the Army know that it
had opened up a door for Beech that would result in a
multibillion dollar growth explosion.
In early 1964, the U.S. Army Aviation Test Board,
Ft. Rucker, AL, received the NU-8F for a 3-month
comprehensive evaluation before placing the aircraft
into regular Army service. The NU-8F (later designated
a YU-21), serial number 63-12902 is still flying in 1982.
The aircraft, almost 20 years old now, is assigned to
the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command
(TECOM).
On January 1964, Beech first flew its new pressurized
King Air model 90, thus beginning a new revolution
for Beech that would spread like wildfire in developing
* the King Air series.
After successful testing and evaluating the NU-8F,
the Army decided on a production design for its new
utility transport aircraft. The production model aircraft
were designated as U-21As. The U-21A engines are
PT6A-20 also rated at 550 shaft horsepower. Beech
also switched to the -20 engines on their King Air
model A90.
The U-21A was produced by combining the Beech
King Air and Queen Air. The purpose in combining
the two aircraft was to get the features most needed
by the Army from each aircraft. The turboprop engines
give the U-21A power and reliability. The King Air
wings provided the lift needed to match the engines,
and the Queen Air fuselage provided the roominess
needed to carry troops and cargo. The U-21A looks
very much like the NU-8F. The major difference in
the looks of the two aircraft is that the U-21A has only
JUNE 1982
U.S. Army U-21F
two cabin windows on the left side because of the
addition of a cargo door forward of the regular airstair
cabin door. This gave the U-21A an overall cargo
entrance space of 53% inches by 51% inches.
The interior arrangement of the U-21A allows for a
variety of uses. The pilot and copilot sit side by side
and are separated from the main cabin by a removable
half-curtain. The cabin will accommodate 10 combat
equipped troops on center facing bench seats, 6 on
the right side and 4 on the left. An alternate ambulance
arrangement will accommodate three litter patients
plus three ambulatory patients or medical attendants.
As a staff transport, it will carry six passengers in
standard forward-facing chairs.
With all passenger seats removed, the cabin can
hold 3,000 pounds of cargo. Cargo tiedown fittings
are installed in the floor and are capable of restraining
2,000 pounds. Usable cabin space is 55 inches wide by
57 inches high and 12% feet long. The floor is designed
to withstand cargo loads of 200 pounds per square
foot. Bulk cargo is easily loaded through the cargo
door 53% inches wide by 51% inches high.
The Army awarded the Beech Aircraft Corporation
an initial contract of $17,631,081 for 88 U-21As. The
Army took delivery of the first production model
U-21A on 16 May 1967 at the Beech factory in Wichita,
KS. Additional contracts were later awarded for several
different models of special electronics mission aircraft
(SEMA).
When the U-21 production ended in 1971, 7 different
models had been built totaling 162 aircraft. An
additional five King Air model A 100s were procured
in 1971 and designated U-21 Fs, and three Super King
Air model.200s were purchased in 1974 and designated
as RU-21Js. This brought the total to 170 U-21 aircraft
procured.
continued on page 18
15
The following is a list of the total number of U-21 aircraft built for the Army:
102 built U-21A

J U-21A
These three aircraft (serial numbers 67-18063, 67–18065,
67-18069) were built as U-21As. They were specially
modified and redesignated JU-21As for the electronic
warfare LEFT JAB Program.

RU-21A
4 built (67-18112 through 67-18115)

FU-21B

3 built (67-18077, 67-18087, 67-18093)

RU-21C

2 built (67-18085, 67-18089)

RU-21B and RU-21C models are five specially built
electronic warfare aircraft for the CEFIRM LEADER
Program. (For additional information on the JU-21A, RU
21A, RU-21B, RU-21 C, see April 1981 Aviation Digest and
January–February 1981 Army Aviation Association of
America magazines.)

RU-21 D

RU-21D
18 built (67-18104 through 67-18111, 67-18119 through
67-18128)

12 FT 3.15/32 in

U-21A, RU-21A,U-21G, HU-21D, RU-21E RU-21E

16 built (70-15875 through 70-15890)

16 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 U-21G

U-21G
17 built (70-15891 through 70-15907)
22 ft 46 in —-

- º “. . . to sº.--

Beech built a total of 162 U-21 aircraft (excluding the Fand J

models). The U-21 F and the RU-21J were specially
procured aircraft and were designed as U-21s.

39 fºr 11 36 in

Fru-21J.
P is ºr 425 in

3 built (71-21058 through 71-21060)

In 1972, Beech produced two prototype T-tail Super King
Airs. FAA certification was obtained on 14 December 1973.
In 1974, the Army took delivery of the first three production
model Super King Air 200s off the assembly line. The Army
designated these aircraft as RU-21J models. These Super
King Airs are fitted with standard PT6A-41 engines rated at
850 shaft horsepower. The RU-21J looks identical to the
Army's C-12. The three aircraft were configured with
various types of electronic warfare equipment and an array
of antennas. After several years of serving as a test
platform, the RU-21Js were stripped of their electronic gear
and configured for the VIP transport role.
3H-1
**is
Tº
---
U-21F
5 built (70-15908 through 70–15912)
The last U-21 contract awarded to Beech was for 22 U-21G
models. However, in 1971, the Army changed the contract
to 17 U-21Gs in order to purchase 5 of Beech's new King
Air model A 100s. These were off the shelf civilian version
aircraft and the Army's first pressurized aircraft. The Army
designated these aircraft as U-21 F models. However, the
only thing military about these aircraft is the OD and white
paint job. These aircraft have PT6A-28 engines rated at 680
shaft horsepower, and four-bladed props. The U-21F looks
somewhat like the Army's new C-12, but with a straight tail
similar to the standard U-21 models.

170 total U-21s built for the Army

RU-21J.

JUNE 1982 17
 W W hen the Army originally contracted for the U-21,
it was with the anticipation of acquiring a versatiles.
and reliable utility transport aircraft that would give *
many years of service. The U-21 has far exceeded all
of its expectations. It has proven itself well and will
surely continue to be a work horse for many years to
COme.

Since the U-21 was first acquired in 1967, it has had

very few modifications performed, unlike many other
military aircraft. Even though most U-21s in the utility
fleet today have been configured with VIP interiors
to provide more comfort to the passengers, the aircraft
itself is still the same basic airplane as it was the day it
rolled off the assembly line. One of the most reliable
aspects of the U-21 and probably the dominant one is
the engines. The Pratt and Whitney PT6A turbine
engines have certainly exceeded their expectations
and have become the standard turbine engine used
on a dozen or more different military and civilian
aircraft today.
- FU-21H
In state-of-the-art
latest keeping up with today'sthe
in avionics, technology and the
Army has approved
... .." ºº::::::::P are RU- a U-21 Avionics Update/Retrofit Program. This new
mission aircraft (SEMA). Currently the Army has 21 RU-21H update was approved for the King Radio Corporation's
models in the SEMA fleet. installation of a complete new avionics package. The
installation includes a relocation of existing engine
instruments and gages into a vertical arrangement
similar to the U-21G model and civilian model King
Airs. Some of the features of the King avionics package
include digital dual COMMS, dual NAVS with RNAV,
flight director and autopilot.
In addition to the new avionics package, a new
Bendix ANP 215 color weather radar has been
purchased by the Army for installation in all U-21
aircraft. More than 50 percent of the U-21 fleet already
- has the new radar installed. One advantage of the new
As of March 1982, these are the U-21 aircraft avionics package is a weight reduction of about 268
that have been lost or destroyed: pounds, thus giving the U-21 a greater payload.
The U-21 is 15 years old now. It has served its
purpose well and still has many more years of service
U-21A J U-21A left. So as the U-21 continues to soldier on, civilian
66-18OO2 67-18065 pilots and air traffic control personnel will still ask
66-18003 that question, is that a King Air or a Queen Air?
66-18007
66-18O12
66-18022 -

66-18026 U-21D
66-18028 67-18106
66-18035 67-18125
66-18039
66-18041
66–18045
67-18081 RU-21E
67-18O86 70–15890 About the Author
67-18095 (Destroyed in hangar fire At thetime this article was written, CPT James R. Dobson
67-18101 at Ft. Bliss, TX, 1975) was the fixed wing platoon leader, 18th Aviation Company
(Corps), Ft. Bragg, NC. He has since left the Army and is now
a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy. LT Dobson may be contacted
through Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest.

18 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 Original U-21 panel (left)
and redesigned panel
(below)

Redesigned
U-21 panel

Avionics Retrofit at the

THE AVIONIC'S UPDATE/ King Radio Factory, Olathe, KS
RETROFIT program for the Army's
U-21 has resulted in a panel which
is 268 pounds lighter in weight but
“heavier" in ease of operation.
It offers the flight crew dual comms - - -

with displayed active and standby frequencies for easy access to - * --> - * –
four frequencies; and dual navs with 9-waypoint, TACAN-based \ -

RNAV and displayed active/standby nav frequencies. The fully ------

integrated flight control system features pilot's 4 inch flight director - -
- -
- -
and horizontal situation indicator with separate and independent -
artificial horizon and HSI for the copilot. In addition to standard
operating modes, the KFC 250 flight director and autopilot includes 37*. -

yaw damper and altitude preselect and alerting, along with a servoed,
encoding altimeter. ºf
The manufacturer uses the latest in state-of-the-art in micro -

processors and LSI technology to assure the avionics have increased

reliability. That results in a higher mission completion rate, more
flexible mission capability, less time for crew qualification, higher -

payload and greater dispatch ability. (King Radio Corporation) . - sº

The following is a list of all U-21 aircraft in service today:

Active Army, Utility Aircraft U.S. Army National Guard Aircraft

U-21A 75 U-21A 8
U-21 D 8 U-21 D 2
U-21G 8
U-21H 6
U-21 F 5
U-21J 3 -

U.S. Army Reserve, Utility Aircraft

U-21 D 3

Active Army, Special Electronics

Mission Aircraft (SEMA)
RU-21H 21 U.S. Army Reserve, SEMA Aircraft
JU-21A 2
RU-21A 4
The Army has three electronic warfare companies with RU-21B 3
Seven RU-21H aircraft each RU-21C 2

JUNE 1982 19
 REPORTING
FINAL
Late NewsFrom Army Aviation Activities
FROM FORT RUCKER
Reassignment. On 2 July, Brigadier General
Richard D. Kenyon will assume the position of
director of weapons systems, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Research, Development and
Acquisition, Washington, DC. He has been deputy
commanding general of the Army Aviation Center
since July 1981.
A 1957 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy,
West Point, NY, who received his aviator wings
in August 1958, General Kenyon came to Ft.
Rucker from Washington where he was deputy
director of requirements and Army Aviation officer,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans, DA.
His successor in the deputy commanding
general position is slated to be Brigadier General
Charles E. Teeter, assistant commander, 2d
Infantry Division, Korea. (USAAVNC PAO)
FROM FORT HOOD
New Commander. Major General John W.
Woodmansee Jr. assumed command of the 2d
Armored Division on 22 June. He came to his
new position from Europe where he was com
manding general, V-Corps, USAREUR, and was
the ranking Army aviator.
He succeeded Major General Richard L.
Prillaman who is now with J3 (Operations), Joint
Chiefs ºf Staff, Washington, DC.
The Army's new external stores sup
port system (ESSS) for the UH-60A
Black Hawk helicopter is now being
tested. The ESSS consists of wings
mounted on each side of the aircraft
that can carry four auxilary fuel
tanks or a variety of other exter
nally mounted tactical equipment.
Under the current development pro
gram, the Army will qualify the ESSS
and the external fuel system of two
450-gallon tanks on the inboard wing
stations and two 230-gallon tanks out
board. Using the four tanks results in a
significant extension in range capability,
making the aircraft with a crew of three
self-deployable. (TSARCOM PAO)
20
A southeast view of a conceptual design of the proposed
Army Aviation Museum at Ft. Rucker, AL, shows the inter
section of Andrews Avenue and Headquarters Road in the
center background, with Andrews being at the top of the
picture. This model was part of the promotional presentation
by the architectural firm, H. J. (Jack) Mizell Architects of
Ozark, AL, which was selected by the Army Aviation Museum
Foundation, Inc., to design the new museum building.
FROM FORT HUACHUCA
Controllers To Stay Awhile Longer. Permission
has been granted for 53 Army air traffic control
lers now working at various Federal Aviation
Administration facilities around the United States
to remain in those FAA jobs beyond the expected
ending date of 31 August.
Some of the Army controllers held over will be
released by 30 September. Others will return to
their military duty between then and the latest
expected release date of 30 June 1983.
The airfield sites and number of controllers to
stay include: Atlanta, 3; Buffalo, NY, 5; Dallas/
Fort Worth, 2; Houston, 3; Memphis, TN, 1; Reno,
NV, 3, Syracuse, NY, 2; Augusta, GA, 2; Alton, IL,
1; Burbank, CA, 1; Cleveland, 2; Kansas City,
MO, 5; Pittsburgh, 3; St. Louis, 5; Washington
(National Airport), 8; Midland, TX, 1; East St.
Louis, IL, 3; and Indianapolis, 3.
As of 30 April there were 93 Army controllers
at 29 FAA locations, with 160 already having
been released to return to their duty stations.
(USACC PAO)
FROM WASHINGTON
Desert Aviation. An Army Aviation company is
part of the United States' main military contingent
to the Multinational Force and Observers which
has been in the Sinai since March. It is Company
C of the 82d Airborne Combat Aviation Battalion,
and it is serving in the Sinai with the 1st Battalion
(Airborne), 505th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 82d Air
borne Division. There are over 800 members of
the Ft. Bragg, NC, division who are part of the
approximate 2,500-member MFO international
organization set up as a result of the Egypt-Israel
treaty of peace dated 26 March 1979.
(ARNEWS 234)
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES º
Upcoming Board Dates
HERE ARE SOME very important upcoming
board dates that will be of interest to the aviation
community.
The LTC AUS Promotion Board will convene 2
June to 16 July to consider all majors with a date of
rank of 9 February 1977 and earlier for above the
zone consideration, 10 February 1977 through 3
September 1978 for promotion zone consideration
and 4 September 1978 to 14 August 1979 for below
the zone consideration.
The Warrant Officer RA Integration Board will
convene 7 July to 16 July to consider all warrant
officers who have applied or who have 14 years of
active federal service and a minimum of 3 years of
warrant officer service.
A Warrant Officer RA Promotion Board will convene
27 July to 6 August to considereligible warrant officers
for RA CW2, CW3 and CW4.
Officers should ensure that their Officer Record
Briefs, DA Form 4037 and Official Military Personnel
File are verified and correct. ORBs may be verified at
the servicemember's local military personnel office.
A copy of the OMPF may be requested by writing to:
HQDA (DAPC-POR-RS), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria,
VA 22332. Provide full name, grade, SSN and military
or civilian address. MILPERCEN will send the micro
fiche at no cost; turnaround time is about 3 weeks.
Maintaining Aviation
Force Structure Documents
N 1979, an Aviation Task Force Steering Commit
tee provided implementing guidance and policy
changes associated with the CSA Aviation Career
Pattern Decision. The mechanism given to aviation
personnel managers to implement this policy is through
the validation of aviation requirements in the force
structure documents. The current personnel manage
ment regulations for identifying aviation force structure
requirements and authorizations are AR 570-1, "Com
missioned Officer Aviation Position Criteria.” AR
611-1, “Military Occupational Classification Structure
Development and Implementation,” and AR 611-101,
“Commissioned Officer Specialty Classification Sys
tem." These regulations provide policy, procedures
and positions in TOE, MTOE and TDA units. These
criteria were developed for application to authorization
JUNE 1982
documents from Public Law 93-294 (Aviation Career
Incentive Act of 1974) and AR 600-105.
The aviation commander should ensure that the
authorization documents reflect the correct and desired
data so that officers are identified and trained in the
right numbers with the right skills to satisfy Army
requirements. Incorrect data will affect accessions,
requisitioning, training and assignments of aviators
Armywide. Listed below are some basic guidelines
that may help. If a position requires the skills of an
aviator, the position should be reviewed for appropriate
coding in accordance with the following criteria:
• Positions will be identified with SC and SSI 15A,
15B, 15C, 15M, 15S, 67J or 71A and appropriate
additional skill identifiers. SCs 15 and 71 will not be
combined with SC 11, 12, 13, 14 or with each other.
See AR 611-101 for specific coding instructions.
• Requirements for aviators with military intelli
gence skills will be identified with SSI 15M.
• Requirements for aviators with signal skills will
be identified with SSI 15S. Additionally, if the require
ment is for air traffic control skills, the ASI of 3J will
be used.
• Operational flying positions will be identified
with an SSI of 15A, 15B, 15C, 15M, 15S, 67J or 71A as
the primary position requirement followed by the
primary aircraft designation ASI. Additional aircraft
qualifications or language requirements will be reflected
in the LIC position.
• Aviation positions which require aviation expertise
but not the performance of flying duties will be identified
with appropriate aviation SSI as the primary position
requirement with an ASI of 1X.
• Nonoperational aviation positions coded 1X which
require previous qualifications in a specific aircraft
will have appropriate aircraft ASI indicated in LIC
column of authorization documents.
• No lieutenant aviation positions will be coded
1X. Only limited captain positions may be coded 1X;
however, if a requirement does exist for a non
operational company grade position, it must reflect a
captain requirement vice lieutenant.
• Duty titles should be career enhancing and provide
professional development for the commissioned aviator.
These basic rules will help planners at all levels
identify and train the right officer for the job desired.
It is incumbent upon the aviation community to police
our documents in order to reflect the most current
and correct data. -*
21
 *śry
by Colonel Emmett F. Knight

Conceived to fill a need not fully recognized, to form an overflying crest

Soldiers: organic, extended eyes and ears and voice flying above the best.
Weaving an overlapping seam along the edge of air and ground
Commanders carried aloft, ranging with the guns and flying to the sound.

Born forty years ago to a fractious Army family of ground and Air Corps
Weaned in North Africa, Italy and France to a diet of worldwide wars.
In Asia and in Germany, all together in Army combat shoes
Concerned with how best to fight the enemy; there were divergent views.

Army Aviation, formed with hidden strengths of Ingenuity and drive

With pilots performing air liaison a new capability comes allve.
Light and fragile in the beginning, but with clear-eyed vision at the hub
Flying fabric covered “Grasshoppers,” Stinson and Piper Cub.

In three years the war is over; the one to end them all of course
So the victorious nation reorients resources and begins to starve the force.
The Air Corps still flew, off into the blue, by high performance seduced
For the Army troops, an old idea comes true; the helicopter is introduced.

Soon, Jo and behold, this nine year old is once again thrust over the fray
New concepts of vertical lift and troop Insertion keep the enemy at bay. º
Rotary wing for medevac, a Godsend proven on that rugged Korean ground
| Metal airplanes replace flimsy fabrics; improved combat support is found.

| Those lessons learned, this youth comes home with experience that shows
He fills a void the Air Force can’t, his early promise grows.
Planning, expanded training, procurement and logistics
Helicopter R&D takes off, Rucker explodes, growth defies statistics.

Real surveillance, and cargo fixed wing craft above the best are found
An integral part of Army combat strength; aviation units the world around.
| Improved helicopters are developed for increased support of the troops
| In CONUS and Korea and Europe this lad is beginning to run in groups.

"I
 Growing fast, but those old cantankerous recips comprise the power of the fleet
With brains and slnew and bone structure in place, he’s rapidly adding meat.
Then a major change-turbine power for muscle begins to appearatage fourteen
Opening new horizons of sky cavalry; airmobility is no longer just a dream.
At age twenty with aircraft turning obsolete, another war... “Play it again, Sam”
Our willing crews will be sorely tested in the Jungle of Vietnam.
Soon Shawnees and Mojaves give way to Iroquois and Chinooks... then damn
The Caribous are lost to the Air Force in that old roles and missions scam.

Helicopters armed for combat soon help to dull the pain and by age twenty-five
A milestone passed, a final phase achieved, an airmobile division is alive.
A hardened veteran then, with choppers rampant on the Vietnam combat scene
Army Aviation becomes highly visible on the home front TV screen.

Still fighting at age thirty, youthful vigor and power now fully mature
A proud warrior standing tall and straight, his massive strength secure.
Mauled by the ever Increasing intensity of that unpopular far-off war,
He faces about to quit the field with a chagrin never suffered before.

So home again, battle scarred, proud, and in need of rest and recuperation
Yet anxious to refit and rearm before the next crisis to face the nation.
But history repeats anew after all our wars, the struggles will be again
To compete for suddenly restricted resources amid the ennui that follows pain.

Army Aviation, combat proven today, but with the anxiety that middle age brings
Many aircraft are older than the flyers, and them drawing boards don't have wings.
The Russians have watched and listened; witnessed our successinairmobility
Their Hips and Hinds in quantity show their respect for helicopter capability.

Thirty-nine and holding? No, that's a thing one can't achieve-Time moves on
And now we face a scenario of radars and smart weapons in organic echelon.
The future unfolds as usual with predictable events but at an accelerating pace
And we in Army Aviation are part of a frenzied technology race.

“The light at the end of the tunnel,” remember when that bromide first flew?
There is a new generation of flying machines and we’ve actually bought a few.
The Black Hawks are really superior and there will be a rejuvenated medium too
Apaches are at the Junction, without the Scoutsperse but with AHIP in lieu.

But then take a look at the numbers and compare the production rate
Think a minute about helicopter alr-to-air and now let’s calculate.
Army Aviation at age forty, resolutely marches toward its fate
Press on, old warrior, forward, let's ensure that we’re not too late.

JUNE 1982 23
 AVIAIOR*.
SELECTION--
RESEARCH
T. armed services have tradi
tionally used tests to screen flight
school applicants for the purpose
of reducing attrition in the flight
training program. Selection testing
in Army Aviation goes back to the
days of the Army Air Forces. A
problem was identified in the attrition
of aviators during World War II. In
order to graduate 100 Army aviators,
it was necessary to accept 397 train
ees (5). To reduce this unacceptable
rate of attrition, a team of psycholo
gists was established under the
direction of Colonel J. C. Flanagan.
That team implemented the first
edition of the Army Air Forces
Qualifying Examination (AAFOE)
in 1942(9). The AAFQE was a pencil
and paper test designed specifically
for the quick selection of aviation
trainees (10). At the same time, the
Aircrew Classification Battery
(ACB) was developed using seven
24
John A. Dohme, Ph.D.
William R. Brown, M.S.
Michael G. Sanders, Ph.D.
U.S. Army Research Institute Field Unit
Fort Rucker, AL
processor-based portable testing de
vices which could be installed at
performance-based tests. The ACB
used apparatus adapted from psy
chological research to measure:
complex coordination, rotary pur
suit, finger dexterity, discrimination
reaction time, rudder control (foot
coordination), two-hand pursuit and
two-hand coordination (13). The
combined usage of AAFQE and
ACB as selection tests reduced
the number of individuals required
to graduate 100 aviators from 397
to 155 (5). This corresponds to a
reduction in the attrition rate from
75 percent to 35 percent.
Performance-based testing was
discontinued after World War II,
not because it was ineffective, but
because it was time-consuming to
administer and equipment of that
era was unreliable and difficult to
calibrate (1). Researchers of that
era (10) and the present era (4) agree
that performance-based tests would
add significantly to the prediction
of flight training performance. His
torically, because of the cost of
obtaining testing apparatus and
setting up regional centers for per- tº
formance based testing, the services
are currently using only paper and
pencil tests. However, the tech
nology of microprocessors has large
ly solved the problems of reliability
and calibration. The Army Research
Institute (ARI) and the Air Force
Human Resources Laboratory are
currently experimenting with micro
processor-based portable testing de
vices which could be installed at
Military Entrance Processing Sta
tions (MEPS) regional test centers
(formerly called Armed Forces En
trance and Examination Stations).
If scores on these test devices prove
to be reliable and valid indices of
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 the aptitudes and abilities required
to succeed in Army flight training,
then the Army could share the cost
., of operating and maintaining them
* with the Air Force. Coordination
between Army and Air Force re
search laboratories is continuing in
this area of emerging technology.
Postwar Flight Selection Testing
After World War II, the Army
formed its own aviation organization
primarily with personnel who re
mained with the Army after the
formation of the Air Force. How
ever, as these experienced aviators
left the Army, the problem of high
attrition in pilot training reoccurred
(12). The problem was especially
acute with enlisted personnel in
training to become helicopter
qualified warrant officers. Initially,
existing Air Force and Navy selec
tion tests were examined but they
were ineffective predictors of rotary
wing training performance (12).
Research began in 1955 which
led to the fielding of the Flight
Aptitude Selection Test (FAST) in
1966. The FAST consisted of two
batteries: one for officer applicants
and one for warrant officer candi
date (WOC) applicants. Each battery
provided both a rotary wing aptitude
score and a fixed wing aptitude
score, but a combination of the two,
called the composite score, was used
for selection. Both FAST batteries
were validated against flight school
performance and were found to be
effective predictors of overall per
formance in flight training and also
effective predictors of elimination
due to “flying deficiency” (12). These
batteries were used for aviator
selection with only minor changes
in scoring format until the spring of
1980 when the Revised FAST
(RFAST) was implemented.
The Revised Flight Aptitude Se
lection Test (RFAST)
The RFAST was developed by
ARI in 1978 to meet several ob
jectives: (1) Reduce test adminis
tration time by shortening the
"Complete results of this study are presented in Dohme. J. A., Brown, W. R. and Sanders. M. G. Comparison of minority, majority attrition in the
Army initial entry rotary wing aviator course Predicting graduation elimination from FY 80 and 81 entry scores. Research Report, Army
Research Institute. Fort Rucker, AL, 1982
JUNE 1982
Test
Biographical Information
Mechanical Principles
Flight Orientation
Aviation Information
Helicopter Information
Mechanical Information
Mechanical Functions
Wisualization Of Maneuver S
Instrument Comprehension
Complex Movements
Stick and Rudder Orientation
Self-description
FIGURE 1: Composition of FAST and RFAST batteries
test, (2) provide for machine scoring
of the answer sheets to reduce
errors which occur when the test
is hand-scored in the field and
(3) combine the two batteries
to create a single test valid for the
selection of officer and WOC train
ees. Figure 1 compares the compo
sition of the RFAST with the Old
FAST batteries. The number of test
items has been reduced from more
than 500 to 200 and the adminis
tration time reduced from 4 hours
to 2 hours. To date, about 15,000
applicants have been tested using
the RFAST but, because of the time
required for applicant selection and
Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW)
training, only about 200 RFAST
applicants have graduated from the
IERW program. Overall, the mean
score for all applicants is 99.4 and
the standard deviation is 21.1.
A pilot study was performed to
estimate the validity of the RFAST
(2). A sample of 178 WOC trainees
who had been selected with the
FAST WOC battery was given the
FAST
FAST | Warrant
0fficer | 0fficer
Battery | Battery | RFAST
i V
V
V
RFAST shortly after entering IERW
training. In this small sample, the
RFAST was found to predict IERW
overall grade moderately well, which
serves to validate the test in a
preselected sample. A large-scope
validation study is currently under
way pending the graduation/elimi
nation of a large number of trainees.
Current Developments and Appli
cations
Recently, ARI was tasked by the
deputy commanding general, U.S.
Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker,
AL, to review attrition in the IERW
program. This study traced all Army
IERW flight students entering train
ing in fiscal year (FY) 1980 and the
first 20 classes of FY 1981 (later
classes had not reached the point
of graduation).” Students were fol
lowed, through turnbacks and other
administrative procedures, until they
had either graduated or were elimi
nated. Altogether, 1,108 officer and
2, 185 WOC students were studied.
25
 100
65th percentile) on the GT is used
to screen applicants for flight train-,
ing. In other words, only 35 percent *
co
-:

F
90- . . ~~ of all enlisted personnel score at,
or above, 110 and thus become
º
-> eligible to apply for the WOC Flight
c

2:
are 80s
*-
2 :
-
cº->
c
*
tº
70
60 =
50 H T
110 120
119 129
FIGURE 2: Percent of WOC students graduating as a function of GT score
The research project examined a
number of correlates of attrition:
training phase in which attrition
occurred, stated reason for elimi
nation, and trends over time in elimi
nation rates by comparing FY 1980
to FY 1981 data with FY 1974 to
FY 1979 data (3).
As the correlates of attrition were
identified, it became clear that the
FAST and certain other variables
were good predictors of IERW
performance. In other words, this
research effort set out to under
stand what causes IERW attrition
and reaffirmed the value of selection
testing. The ARI Research Report
provides a complete review of the
attrition study. Selected highlights
of that study are presented below
to describe the role of research in
aviator selection procedures. The
four predictors of attrition are: Gen
eral Technical (GT), education, age
Training Program.
Figure 2 presents the relation
ship between GT scores and the
percent of WOCs graduating from
IERW. The vertical axis can also
be interpreted as the probability of
graduation for an individual with a
given GT score. The data plotted
show a slight positive relationship
which is not statistically significant.
Other research (11) revealed that
I T T the GT score is correlated with other
130 140 150
measures of success in the IERW
139 149 & A60WE
Program, especially academic
grades. The data suggest that the
GT is effective in screening out
individuals that would not be suc
cessful in the IERW program. How
employs in the classification of en ever, the severe restriction in range
listed personnel. The current GT caused by the screening of all in
test contains three components: dividuals below 110 prevents the
Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Know direct evaluation of flight training
ledge and Paragraph Comprehen performance of individuals with low
sion. A cut score of 110 (about the GT scores.
FIGURE 3: Percent of students graduating as a function of years of education
º
.*-----e.---- •,
90- ^,
•
**
O
#
É 80
•ºr
5
=
# 70
ch

and FAST.
GT. The GT score on the Armed 60- - - - - OFFICER
Services Vocational Aptitude Bat — WOC
tery (ASVAB) is used to screen
applicants for the Aviation Warrant
Officer Flight Training Program. 50 I T i I I i

The GT is one of several aptitude 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Or more

area composites which the Army YEARS OF EDUCATION

26 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 Education. It was hypothesized
*
that the trainee's number of years
of education would predict perfor
mance in the IERW course. Figure
3 presents the relationship between
education and the probability of
graduation for officers and WOCs.
While both curves show a slight
positive overall relationship, educa
tion is not a good predictor because
the functions are not linear. In other
words, the two functions deviate
greatly from straight lines and the
interaction between the two func
tions, represented on the graph by
the lines crossing at two points,
suggests that the relationship be
tween education and IERW perfor
mance is considerably different for
officers and WOCs. However, draw
ing conclusions from the graph about
the relationship between education
and probability of graduation
should be tempered by the fact that
several of the data points represent
very few people. For example, 7
WOCs have 17 years of education
and only 4 have 18 or more.
While education has been shown
to positively correlate with IERW
academic grades, it was a significant
predictor in only one phase of the
current attrition study. When the
four predictor variables were used
to forecast elimination for reasons
of flight deficiency or failure to
progress (that is, flight related elim
inations only, not those for medical
or administrative reasons), then
education became a significant
predictor for the WOCs. However,
even in that phase, it was not as
effective a predictor as age and
FAST. Additional investigation of
the relationship between education
level and IERW performance is
required to understand this complex
area.
Age. This study is one of the first
to consider age as a predictor of
IERW training performance. Prior
to the 1980 to 1981 timeframe, the
number of older trainees in the
IERW Program was small. Until
August 1976, the age limit for train
ees was established at 28. About 15
JUNE 1982
percent of the trainees in the FY
1974 to FY 1979 attrition study (3)
were older than 28. In the current
study, about 26 percent of the FY
1980 and FY 1981 trainees were
older than 28. Thus, until recently,
it hasn't been possible to look at a
large enough number of older train
ees to adequately evaluate their per
formance in IERW training. There
fore, the trends presented in figure
4 represent new information for use
in selecting the best qualified
applicants.
The study found that overall,
eliminees (officers and WOCs) were
considerably older than graduates.
The graph presents the probability
of graduation as a function of age.
While there are some perturbations
in the curves, the overall relationship
is significantly negative. Each curve
shows a point of inflection, at about
age 30 for WOCs and 31 for officers,
above which the probability of
graduation drops sharply. The rea
sons for this age effect are unknown;
more research is needed to identify
the causes and correlations of age
related attrition.
Warrant Officer Candidate FAST
Scores. The study revealed that there
was a sizeable decline in the average
FAST score over time for WOC
FIGURE 4: Percent of students graduating as a function of age
100
90
80*.
- - - - , 0FFICER
— W00
60 -
is in
graduates and eliminees. In the FY
1974 to 1979 time period, the average
FAST score for graduates was 341.4,
while in FY 1981, it dropped to
3.28.4 The decline in FAST scores
was a result of a DA policy decision
to lower the FAST cut score for
WOCs from 300 to 270 for about 9
months in FY 1980 to 1981 to meet
surge training requirements.
A primary finding of the study
was the strong positive relationship
Observed between the FAST and
probability of success in IERW
(reference figure 5). When the FAST
cut score was 270, more than 200
WOCs were admitted to the flight
training program with scores be
tween 270 and 299. As figure 5
indicates, their rate of success in
the program was considerably lower
than that of higher FAST scorers.
About 37 percent of the 270 to 299
group were eliminated in IERW as
compared with the 14 percent of the
300 and above group. The point of
inflection at about 300 suggests that
the FAST is a particularly effective
screening test and a moderately good
overall predictor. In other words,
the test is better at identifying
individuals who are poor risks in
flight training than it is at identifying
potential outstanding students. This
I-II
2: ;
I
27 28 29 30 31 32
m
33
r
34 35
AGE AT ENTRY
 finding reinforces the use of the
FAST as a screening test. {

Commissioned Officer FAST

FIGURE 5: Percent of WOC students graduating as a function of FAST scores
Scores. As can be seen in figure 6,
the FAST is also a significant
100 m predictor of IERW performance
for commissioned officers. How
ever, it is not nearly as effective
a screen as is the WOC battery.
90° Officers are prescreened by the
attainment of a baccalaureate degree
and/or the military development
training received in Officer Candi

. 80-

70
date School (OCS), Reserve Officer
Training Corp (ROTC) and the
Military Academy. Thus, it is not
surprising that officers with low
FAST scores are more successful
in IERW training than low scoring
60 - WOCs. MILPERCEN policy has
reflected this difference in the past
by setting the WOC cut score at
50 r—u—u—u—u—u—u—u—u—I—I-—i. 300 (corresponding to the 50th
210
219
280
289
280
299
300
309
310
318
320
329
330
339
340
349
350
359
350
W
percentile) while the commissioned
officer cut score was 155 (corres
FAST SCORE ponding to the 8th percentile). In
other words, the WOC cut score
excluded the lowest 50 percent of
the applicants from selection where
as the commissioned officer cut
FIGURE 6: Percent of officer students graduating as a function of FAST scores score excluded only the lowest 8
percent.
At the present time, nearly all
100 m students entering IERW training
have taken the RFAST which con
sists of only one test form with the
same cut score for commissioned
90
officer and WOC applicants. Current º
MILPERCEN policy sets the cut
score at 90 out of 200 possible points.
80s WOCs who score between 90 (34th
percentile) and 99 (the median or
50th percentile) on the RFAST are
70- expected to have about the same
success rate as WOCs scoring be
tween 270 and 300 on the FAST.

60 -
Prediction of IERW Graduation/
Elimination

50 T T I-I-II I-II The selection/screening variables

155 175 185 215 235 755 215 25 ºs ºs ºs. " discussed above (GT, education,
lis 134 2 is 234 254 214 2.84 314 334 354 W age and FAST) were statistically
FAST SCORE combined to evaluate their intercor
relations and combined predictive
capability. The statistical technique

28 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 discriminant analysis was used to
combine all four variables. The
* results showed that the discriminant
analysis correctly predicted IERW
graduation/elimination for 72 per
cent of the WOCs and 79 percent
of the commissioned officers. When
discriminant analysis was used to
predict elimination due to flight de
ficiency (not considering medical
or administrative eliminations) ver
sus graduation, the correct pre
diction improves to about 82 percent
for WOCs and 86 percent for com
missioned officers. In these discrim
inant analyses, nearly all the predic
tive power was in the two variables,
FAST and age. The contribution
of the other two variables (GT and
education) was minimal.
Practically speaking. MILPERCEN
and U.S. Army Recruiting Com
mand (USAREC) personnel could
use an individual's age and FAST
score to predict graduation/elimi
nation and be correct about three
times out of four by using this dis
criminant analysis technique.
Enlisted vs. Civilian Entry
About 24 percent of the WOCs
entering IERW in FY 1982 are classi
fied as civilian entry (CE). In other
words, they enter the Army specifi
cally for the purpose of attending
the flight training program. The
remaining 76 percent are selected
from Army enlisted applicants (EA).
Some CE students have had prior
enlisted service in the Army or in
the other services. The 76 percent
to 24 percent ratio of enlisted to
civilian entry WOCs selected has
not been constant over the years.
In FY 1976, the ratio was 30 percent
EA to 70 percent CE and in FY
1979 it was 85 percent EA to 15
percent CE.
An evaluation of IERW appli
cant data indicated that the mean
RFAST score is higher for CE than
for enlisted entry applicants (105
vs. 96 respectively). While fewer
individuals enter as civilians, they
have a higher expected success rate
because of their higher FAST scores.
JUNE 1982
Additionally, because of the large
civilian applicant pool, USAREC
can selectively choose only high
scoring applicants. Changing the
ratio to a more balanced percentage
would increase the mean FAST
score of entering students but it
would also impact the “end strength"
of the Army, i.e., the number of
acquisitions USAREC is permitted
without exceeding limitations of
overall Army personnel strength.
Summary
In summary, while no selection
technique will ever correctly identify
all eliminees, the use of selection
tests and related measures has con
tinued to reduce attrition in Army
Aviation training. The Aviation
Center is working with MILPER
CEN and USAREC to minimize
attrition by selecting those applicants
who have the highest probability of
success. Currently, plans are being
formulated to determine optimal
test score weighting techniques for
use by MILPERCEN and USAREC
selection boards. The weights given
to test scores by selection boards
should be revised periodically to
assure that selection techniques are
responsive to changes in the appli
cant pool and changes in the IERW
Program.
Research to Improve Aviator Selec
tion and Assignment
In cooperation with the Aviation
Center, ARI is continuing to develop
and evaluate aviator selection and
flight school attrition in order to
improve the efficiency of the process
and reduce training costs. ARI
projects currently underway address:
• The development of a new FAST
which will select individuals who
can meet WOC Military Devel
opment Course requirements
as well as evaluate individuals
on cognitive and perceptual
abilities required in new and
existing aircraft.
• Ensuring fairness in the selec
tion of all applicant groups.
• The development of a battery
of tests to be used for IERW
track assignment (aeroscout,
attack, utility and later cargo).
REFERENCES
. Adams, J. A. An evaluation of test items measur
ing motor abilities. USAF Personnel and
Training Research Center, Research Report
No. AFPTRC-TN-56-55, Lackland AFB,
Texas, 1956.
. Brown, W. R., Dohme, J. A., and Sanders, M. G.
Changes in the U.S. Army selection and
training program. Presented at the 1981
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio
State University, Columbus, Ohio, April 1981.
. Brown, W. R., Dohme, J. A., and Wick,
D. C. An evaluation of minority and female
performance in Army rotary wing aviation
training. ARI Research Report submitted for
publication, July 1981.
4. Cronbach, L. J. Essentials of Psychological
Testing, 3rd Edition, Harper and Row, Inc.,
New York, 1970, p. 97.
5. Davis, F. B. (Editor) The AAF Qualifying
Examination, Army Air Forces–Report #6,
washington, D.C., 1947 (AD 651 782).
Dohme, J. A. An evaluation of the fairness
of the flight aptitude selection test (FAST).
Proceedings, 23rd Annual Conference of
the Military Testing Association, 1981, pp.
345-354.
Dohme, J. A. and Sanders, M. G.
Validation of the aeroscout selection process.
Research Report, Army Research Institute
Field Unit, Fort Rucker, Alabama, 1979.
Eastman, R. F. and McMullen, R. L.
Item analysis and revision of the flight aptitude
selection tests. Research Memorandum, Army
Research Institute Field Unit, Fort Rucker,
Alabama, 1978.
Flanagan, J. C. (Ed.) The Aviation Psychology
Program in the Army Air Forces, Army Air
Forces, Aviation Psychology Program, Research
Report 1, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1948.
10. Guilford, J. P., and Lacey, J. E. (Ed.) Printer
Classification Tests, Parts I and II. Army Air
Forces, Aviation Psychology Program, Research
Report 5, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1947.
11. Hertli, P., Brown, W. R., Sanders, M. G. and
Dohme, J. A. The prediction of success in
Army Aviation training: A study of the warrant
officer candidate selection process. Working
Paper 82-1, Army Research Institute Field
Unit, Fort Rucker, Alabama, 1981.
12. Kaplan, H. Prediction of success in Army Aviation
training. Technical Research Report 1142, US
Army Personnel Research Office, OCRD, 1965.
13. Melton, A. W. (Ed.) Apparatus Tests. Army Air
Forces, Aviation Psychology Program,
Research Report 4, Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 1947.
North, R. A. and Griffin, G. R. Aviator
selection 1919-1977. Special Report 77-2,
Naval Aerospace Medical Research Labora
tory, Pensacola, Florida, 1977.
15. Oosterhof, A. C., Atash, M. N., and Lassiter,
K. L. Evaluation of the Revised Flight Aptitude
Selection Test for possible bias and develop
ment of experimental unbiased items. First
Interim Progress Report to Contract
MDA903-81-C-0085, Fort Rucker, Alabama, 1981.
29

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
Employment Of Army
Aviation: Filling The Void
HE U.S. ARMY Aviation Center's Training and
Assistance Team (ACTAAT) has recently reported
two issues that continue to plague the improvement
of Army ground and air combined combat effective
ness. The issues are well known to all members of the
combined arms team, yet there is no indication that a
resolution is near at hand.
The first of these issues is the noticeable void of
training for ground commanders, and their staff, in
the tactical employment of Army Aviation assets.
This issue was addressed by the Chief of Staff of the
Army on 9 November 1981 at the Aviation Center.
The Chief of Staff addressed a requirement to educate
and sensitize commanders in the tactical employment
of Army Aviation at all levels. This could be accom
plished, he indicated, by instruction being added to
the command courses and through increased command
influence in the conduct of unit training and training
exercises. The Aviation Center is making some progress
in the education of ground commanders by providing
a series of aviation related instructional materials that
are designed to be taught in the combat arms branch
schools. Although the problem is being addressed at
the service school level, it will take time to raise the
comprehension of combat arms officers through the
institutional system alone.
The second recurring issue is in much the same
status as the first. This issue is: Newly assigned
commissioned aviators need more training in the tactical
employment of Army Aviation. Steps to improve our
commissioned aviators' ability to lead and correctly
employ their assets through training at the Aviation
Center must await the resource approval of new training
programs.
The only “quick-fix” to either of these issues is on
the-job training in the field environment. The best
person to teach the ground commander and his staff
how to use his fellow aviation combat team member
is the aviation team commander himself. We must be
good salesmen for our product, and we must go out
and sell it to the ground commander. While making
our sales pitch we take the time to brief the ground
30
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
STANDARDIIATION
commander on what our unit can and cannot do to
Support our end of the combined arms team. To do
this, we must first be knowledgeable of the ground
commander's mission, area of operation and support
requirements. We must now plan how our unit mission
and capabilities fit with that of the ground commander
and how we can best provide mutual support for each
other.
Once we have done our planning and we know that
we have the right answers to all the ground commanders'
questions, then what? Now comes the time to advertise
our product. Perhaps the best way to do this is to
prepare a slide briefing that will best show our unit
capabilities and limitations. Yes, we include our
limitations because this is the area that is often misun
derstood by the ground commander. The ground
commander must understand fully why we can't always
support him as he has requested, why we will sometimes
be late, why we cannot always stay onstation as long
as he would like and why sometimes we may not show
up at all. We make our briefing short, to the point, but
we cover the areas that are critical to mutual under
standing of our mission and support requirements.
Now we get ourselves invited to the ground com
mander's staff meeting or officers training class, show &
our slides and sell our unit's product. Whenever possible,
we should loan out one of our experienced aviators to
work as liaison between the ground commander and
our unit. This liaison officer can do much to sell our
product, especially during field training exercises.
Both these methods worked well in Europe in the
mid-1970s to sell the TOW Cobra to the ground com
manders, and it still works well today. One thing to
remember—as unit commanders and their staff are
reassigned, it is a must for us to go back and bring the
new people up to date with our briefing.
Now for the newly assigned aviator just out of Ft.
Rucker. We get these new people involved with the
planning for our pitch to the ground commanders by
leading them through the briefing and telling them
how and why it was developed. Then, we take them to
the briefings for the ground commanders so they can
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 get a feel for the viewpoints of other combat arms
members. This is a quick way for the new guy to get
* his feet on the ground, get involved with the unit
mission and see how his unit fits into the combat arms
team. This will not make him an instant success at
employing his unit assets, but it will speed up his
learning process and give him a sense of direction for
learning future employment tasks.
The burden of educating the aviator and ground
commander in tactical employment of aviation assets
will remain, for the near future, that of the aviation
units in the field. The methods described above are
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL
A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
IMC FOR COBRA
ISSUE: Tactical instrument guidance requires aircraft
not certified for instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) flight to be flown in IMC. Aviators express
concern about being expected to fly in the more
hazardous tactical instrument environment in aircraft
not authorized to fly under standard instruments
conditions. Are there any ongoing efforts designed to
eliminate this problem?
COMMENT: There have been attempts to certify
the fully modernized Cobra. At this time, there are
four basic issues which came out of a recent test.
These issues are being researched by U.S. Army
Aviation Research and Development Command. The
user community acknowledges a need for attack
helicopters to be capable of flying IMC in those areas
where the air defense threat is not present, e.g., port
of debarkation to corps or division rear. A requirement
to fly the attack helicopter IMC in the main battle
JUNE 1982
only a few of the many ways that we in Army Aviation
can affect and improve the coordination and use of
aviation within the combined arms team. If your unit
has conducted unique coordination or education efforts
with ground units let us know about them. These
ideas will be used to expand upon this same topic in a
future issue. As always your ideas, suggestions and
comments are welcomed. Please submit your ideas
for consideration to the Director of Evaluation and
Standardization, ATTN: ATZQ-ES-E, Ft. Rucker,
AL 36.362. -
Amº
36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message
area (MBA) does not exist because current doctrine
stresses nap-of-the-earth flight techniques for all
helicopters forward of the rear boundary. The major "
issue which surfaced from the above mentioned test
is the variance of airspeed during ascents and descents.
Errors of up to 18 knots have been recorded. Costs,
in terms of time, dollars and testing to correct the
alleged deficient areas is considered excessive by the
user. The user consensus is that IMC flight is desirable
in the AH-1S, however, it is also contended that the
AH-1S presently provides emergency IMC recovery
capability without application of extensive fixes. The
U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness
Command has been tasked to evaluate its certification
criteria. Certification to fly in instrument conditions
and capability to fly in instrument conditions are two
different requirements. The scout helicopter has the
capability to fly in tactical instrument conditions
when required in special situations. Normally, the
scout helicopter will be flown only in VFR conditions.
(Directorate of Combat Developments)
31
 Soviet AIR 1)BFENSEs
Against Attack Helicopters
In this three-part series, the author reviews current
Soviet military literature in an effort to determine º
vulnerabilities in their air defense against low level attack
helicopters. He examines air defense philosophy, Soviet
small arms, the SA-7 and the ZSU-23-4 at the Soviet
battalion level. Although there are several vulnerabilities
which can be exploited, the author concludes that the
primary threat to helicopters is the Soviet ZSU-23-4.
Changes to current U.S. antitank helicopter training and
tactics are recommended in order to enhance the
helicopter vs. tank kill ratio

PART 2: Individual Weapons

32 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

º Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Mullady
59th Air Traffic Control Battalion
APO New York
| T. LITTLE HAS been written concerning
the importance of individual weapons and small arms
against attack helicopters. In the numerous articles
discussing the more sophisticated Soviet air defense
weapons, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that a lone
AK-47 gunner, within the proper range, can have the
same effect on an attack helicopter as the most
sophisticated defenses: He can destroy it.
The small arms weapons of the tank and motorized
rifle battalions are indeed a serious threat, if only
because they are so numerous. For example, a
motorized rifle battalion will have about 201 AKMs
(assault rifles) available and the 31 BMP/BTRs (armored
personnel carriers) of the battalion will add 31 additional
7.62 mm machineguns and, in the case of BTRs. 31
additional 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm antiaircraft machine
guns. Each of the 31 tanks in a tank battalion mounts
a 7.62 mm machinegun, and tanks are often seen with
a 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm antiaircraft gun.
Soviet troops are trained to use their individual and
vehicle-mounted weapons in an air defense role. The
philosophy of small arms weapons against air targets
is that these weapons will be massed against individual
targets. One Soviet author stresses the psychological
factor of massing fires when he writes, “Under
conditions of intense fire opposition, pilots are forced
to maneuver, climb and shorten aiming times. All this
lowers the effectiveness of onboard systems.” The
Soviet training and exercise literature make it quite
clear that, in a stationary or defensive role, the optically
sighted small arms weapons will probably form the
bulk of the threat against air assault operations. And,
* it is stressed, “firing as a unit is the most effective
means of engaging aerial targets.”
However, in looking for vulnerabilities, the most
obvious is that the individual weapons are generally
unusable when the unit is moving. The AKMs will be
with the soldiers in the tanks or APCs. They will not
normally be available during the attack either, if we
are to accept the Soviet concept that dismounted
attacks will be the exception on the modern battle
field. Also, when the unit is moving, the accuracy of
the vehicle-mounted weapons drops correspondingly.
These weapons are all optically sighted. The gunner
must first visually acquire the target, then relay the
information to his commander who must acquire the
target, relay the location to the firing unit, and give
the fire command for massed fire. All this takes time.
And in low-light conditions, bad weather or brief
unmaskings by the helicopter, the pilot has the advantage.
JUNE 1982
Additionally, the attack helicopter has a great range
advantage; and this is the best defense against small
arms fire. The AKM is credited with a maximum
effective range of between 300 to 400 meters. The
7.62 mm machinegun is effective to 800 meters and
the 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm can reach about 1,000
meters. An attack helicopter pilot, having discovered
a unit without ZSUs attached, or after the ZSUs have
been destroyed, might press the attack to within 1
kilometer—but should go no closer.
Attack helicopter pilots should know that all of
these weapons are designed for both air defense and
ground roles. The 12.7mm and 14.7 mm guns especially
have a direct fire role in actual combat. In other
words, a Soviet unit in the Offense would have far
fewer of these weapons available for air defense. In
fact, several Soviet authors stress the point that fire of
rifle weapons must not be at aerial targets if it detracts
from the main mission of the destruction of the enemy's
ground forces.
There are also indications in the Soviet military
press that they do not completely understand our
attack helicopter tactics. They may be expecting attack
helicopters to be much higher and moving more rapidly
than will be the actual case. One article describes
infantrymen firing at enemy helicopters “while lying
on their backs.” Another article written in 1979 boldly
states that “scout helicopters are expected to be at
altitudes up to 800 meters.” The clearest picture of
their small arms techniques against helicopters appeared
in Starshina Serzhant in an article entitled “Low Altitude
Target.” The author writes that targets normally will
be engaged at ranges of 700 to 900 meters. There are
two types of fire: “defensive fire” and “accompanying
fire.” Defensive fire is used against air targets moving
at speeds greater than 270 knots (nautical miles/hour)
and consists of placing concentrated fire in front
along the course of the target's flight path “in order to
ensure the meeting of the target with the bullets' cone
of fire.” Accompanying fire is conducted by following
the target's movement during firing. This type of fire
will be used against attack helicopters. He then explains
how to lead the helicopter: “It is useful to remember
that during firing at the range of 100, 300 and 500
meters, the helicopter is led by 1, 3 and 6 body lengths
respectively.” This would seem to indicate that Soviet
gunners are taught to lead slow-moving attack heli
copters by too great a figure. Helicopter pilots should
be aware that when receiving massed fire while moving
at the nap-of-the-earth (NOE) airspeeds (less than 50
knots), most rounds will be passing in front of the
aircraft.
The author mentions that tracer rounds should be
at least a ratio of 1:4 and that "firing will only be at the
Order of the commander.” Unit-delivered small arms
fire is even more directly controlled than that of dedi
33

antiaircraft machinegun
cated air defense weapons in order to provide effective
massed fires and to avoid shooting at friendly aircraft.
A typical firing command is quite lengthy: “From the
front—three helicopters. Squad, at the helicopter above
the grove, lead one aircraft length. Fire!" Obviously
the more helicopters visible to the unit, the more
complicated becomes the command. This all takes
time.
Although small arms antiaircraft fire represents a
serious threat to the attack helicopter pilot, it can
generally be avoided by knowing the exact location
of the enemy unit, using maximum firing ranges and
minimum exposure times. Particularly dangerous would
be an air attack against a Soviet unit in a defensive
role. The Soviet's emphasis on camouflage and assign
ment of horizontal and vertical fields of fire could
trap a low-flying aircraft within small arms range. The
effectiveness of small arms against helicopters during
Soviet movement or attack is severely degraded. In
fact, the first actual test of attack helicopters against
tanks proved this dramatically. During Lamson 719,
the cross-border operation into Laos, conducted from
8 February to 9 April 1971, U.S. attack helicopters
were employed against a North Vietnamese tank assault
on Fire Base 31. The commander of the attack heli
copters in the mission wrote the following account:
The majority of the enemy tanks seen were T-34s
mounting either an 85 mm or 100 mm main gun, a
12.7 and 7.62 mm turret machinegun. The remainder
were PT 76s mounting what was believed to be a 76
mm main gun and a 12.7 mm AA gun and a 7.62 mm
turret machinegun.
We reported a total of47 tank engagements. In all
cases the tank used its 12.7 mm gun in defense. In
some cases the tank used its 76 mm or 85 mm gun in
defense. Most tanks were protected by troops and
other weapons. We did not lose an aircraft or crew
memberfrom a helicopter-tank encounter (emphasis
added) . . . we reported . . . 6 tanks destroyed, 19
immobilized and 8 damaged by helicopters.
In short, Soviet ground fire can be avoided by precisely
locating enemy units and maintaining greater than a
1-kilometer range. The air defense role of Soviet
small arms would, of course, increase as other means
are destroyed.
As is the case with Soviet small arms fire, the
United States has had experience flying against the
34
T-54 medium tank with 12.7 mm
SA-7. It is a shoulder-fired air defense missile system
which has been produced by the Soviet Union
specifically for employment against low, slow-flying
aircraft. It uses a passive infrared homing system, and
its characteristics are reported as being quite similar
to the U.S.-produced “Redeye.” And, as the Redeye,
it is used for company level air defense. First observed
during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, it is reportedly
produced in two versions. The SA-7A missile reaches
a speed of approximately 1,000 mph and has an effective
range and altitude of about 2 miles. The SA-7B travels
at approximately 1,300 mph with a maximum effective
range and altitude of about 3 miles. If it misses the
target, the missile is reported to self-destruct 15 seconds
after launch (about 4 miles downrange). Each SA-7
team is composed of a gunner and assistant gunner,
each carrying one missile.
The SA-7 is the only organic, dedicated air defense
weapon available to motorized rifle and airborne
battalions. It is not issued to tank battalions. Normally,
it is regarded as the SAM system which complements
the ZSU-23-4 gun system usually found at these levels
of organization. Each company is assigned a section
of three SA-7 gunners, making a total of nine SA-7
gunners in each battalion. Since each BMP has a
storage rack capable of transporting one SA-7 missile,
there is a potential for a battalion to carry a basic load
of up to 30 SA-7 missiles. In airborne units the SA-7
would be complemented by the six regimental level
ZU-23-2s. This weapon, unlike the ZSU-23-4, has no
radar control, is not self-propelled and offers only
half the fire power of the four-barreled ZSU-23-4.
A review of Soviet literature concerning the SA-7
indicates the Soviets have faith in its ability to bring
down low-flying helicopters. No doubt their optimism
stems from its reported effectiveness when first
employed in 1972 in the Vietnam conflict. One Western
source reports that one helicopter was downed for
every three SA-7s fired in Vietnam.
Soviet military literature indicates how” the Soviets
plan to employ this weapon in modern war. In the
assembly area, SA-7 gunners will be assigned sectors
of responsibility but will stay with their companies.
They will be primarily oriented on the most probable
low-altitude approaches into the area. They are usually
deployed on line facing the most dangerous avenue of
approach or in a triangle with the apex facing the
most probable direction of attack.
During the approach march and during the attack,
the SA-7 gunners will proceed with their companies
and one, as a rule, will be located in the same vehicle
as the company commander. The attack helicopter
pilot should note that the BMP/BTR will usually
make a short halt to allow the SA-7 gunner to fire
while standing in the rear hatch. It will probably be
the only APC which suddenly halts during an air
attack.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 SA-7 Grail
In the defense, SA-7 deployment is similar to that
in the assembly area. Sectors are assigned and primary
target lines established for each probable low-level
approach. The gunners will normally be positioned in
a triangle formation within their company strong points
and oriented on an assigned primary target line. The
SA-7 gunners may also be positioned to fill in the gaps
in radar coverage by the ZSU-23-4s. Finally, SA-7
gunners may be used, in strength of a section (three
gunners) or more, to establish an antiaircraft ambush.
This should be expected when there is only one low
level approach into the defensive area. Throughout
discussions of air defenses in the defense, it is
continuously stressed that at a minimum, primary,
alternate and reserve firing positions will be used by
SA-7 gunners. After firing, the SA-7 gunner immediately
relocates to a different preselected position. Concerning
the actual positioning of these weapons, one recent
Soviet article described a rear area raid by airmobile
forces establishing SA-7 ambush positions on the hilltops
* surrounding the objective, and another 1979 article,
describing a defensive position in heavily wooded
terrain, stated that SA-7 positions should be established
on platforms located in the trees themselves.
The Soviet tactic is to launch several of these missiles
at one target. U.S. pilots in Vietnam reported that
helicopters were often fired on by multiple SA-7 rockets,
occasionally as many as five at one time. The United
States does not hold the same high opinion of the
effectiveness of the SA-7 as do the Soviets. One report
says the SA-7's low speed and altitude, short range
and limited maneuverability reduce its effectiveness.
This, coupled with the requirement for the operator
to do the ranging for the system and a delay from
firing initiation to missile launch, results in many
missed targets.
According to another report, the SA-7 can acquire
and attack only helicopters presenting an aft view,
JUNE 1982
since the acquisition and attack angle is limited to a
maximum of about 50 degrees off the tail of the target
aircraft. Also, the missile can engage only aircraft
flying above a minimum intercept altitude of 50 to
100 feet.
It also appears from Western sources that the new
AH-64 advanced attack helicopter may be invulnerable
to the SA-7 threat. One article states that U.S. Army
tests have shown that the AH-64, as a whole, is below
the lock-on threshold of any present or postulated
infrared threat through the mid-1980s. Another states
that the AH-64 “black hole" passively cooled infrared
suppressive exhaust ducts “would appear to eliminate
the SA-7 as a threat.”
As stated above, reaction time is the most important
factor in considering the effectiveness of Soviet air
defense weapons against low-flying helicopters. It has
been stressed as a vulnerability of the Soviet air defense
philosophy and in their delivery of small arms fire. In
this light, it is clear that the SA-7 has a severe
disadvantage for use against suddenly appearing, rapidly
fleeting air targets. How much time the SA-7 gunner
actually needs to acquire and attack a target depends
upon the curcumstances; but he must aim the weapon
at the aircraft until he is locked-on, warm up his gyro,
initiate fire and wait for missile launch. All this would
have to be preceded by visual acquisition, identifica
tion and the command to fire. Additionally, nearly all
recent pictures of SA-7 gunners preparing to launch
show them wearing large goggles. Do they put these
on after detecting the target, thus losing more valuable
seconds, or do they scan the sector with them on, thus
reducing the field of vision, especially in rain and fog?
It would appear that attack helicopters can prevent
an SA-7 “lock-on" by staying as close to the ground as
possible, staying near heavily wooded areas and
presenting only a head-on target for the SA-7 gunner.
Finally, although ammunition for the ZSU is
specifically mentioned as being carried by vehicles
organic to the regimental antiaircraft battery, there is
no mention of how SA-7 resupply is accomplished.
Since the SA-7 is a company air defense asset, logically
the additional rounds would be carried in the company's
BMPs, meaning the company would be forced to halt
to transfer missiles from the BMPs to the gunners. In
other words, in active combat and on the march, the
SA-7 gunners would be unable to reload. There may
also be a drop in SA-7 activity as front line units
expend their missiles with no resupply.
In summary, a review of Soviet and U.S. sources
indicates that the SA-7 is slow to employ and generally
ineffective against attack helicopters, yet the Soviets
appear to be counting on it. sº-"
In the August issue – Part 3: The ZSU-23-4 Shilka
35
 º E. A tº

PEARLS
Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

Compass Problems?
Conflicting reports are being received from the
field regarding the quality and durability of the MC-1
compass, national stock number (NSN) 6605-00-515
5637, a component of the SRU-21/P survival vest, hot
climate, cold climate and overwater survival kits. If
you are having any problems whatsoever with the
compass, please submit a quality deficiency report to
the Commander, TSARCOM, ATTN: DRSTS
MCAPL, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120
and furnish an information copy of your QDR to the
DRCPO-ALSE, ATTN: Mr. Ed Daughety, same
address. We will review and expedite actions to resolve
the problems being encountered.

New ALSE Training Films

The following aviation training films are now available
from your local Audiovisual Support Center:
• TF 46-6203, “Inspecting the Overwater Survival
Kit”
• TF 46-6204, “Inspecting the Cold Climate Survival
Kit”
• TF 46-6205, “Inspecting the Survival Vest"
• TF 46-6206, “Inspecting the Hot Climate Survival Pam McLemore photo by Tom Greene
Kit”
NOTE: More training films on ALSE are being
developed and we will announce them as they become Operational Hazard Report (OHR)
available.
The OHR is a viable tool in the hands of the aviation
community and has been around for some 14 years.
Water Purification Tablet, Iodine, 8 MG, 50S The OHR has brought about many changes in aviation
The Food and Drug Administration has issued operations, maintenance and systems during its lifetime
disposition instructions on these tablets. Test results and the trend toward aviation life support equipment
revealed that the following materiel is unsuitable for (ALSE) is on the upswing, increasing the margin of
issue and use: Note: Credit/replacement not applicable. safety for aircrew personnel.
Activities will destroy this medical materiel in accor The OHR is designed so that an individual in a unit
dance with Para 3-48, AR 40-61, UP Para 2-10, AR can report a safety problem to the aviation safety
735-11: officer and commander and, more recently, the ALSE
officer. It also provides a means for the commander
Manufacturer Lot No./Project No.
to tell the individual what was done about the reported
0.416-600 D8102145SL problem. Currently, the Army Aviation community
0.416-604 D810.150SL uses more than 13,000 OHRs per year. This is good
2007-650 D810352SL because it means the OHR is doing its mishap prevention
2007-652 D800468SL job.
2007-662 D810.154SL The OHR can do a better job only if individuals will
2007-673 D810543SL take the time to fill out the form and pass it along to

36 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 the aviation safety officer, ALSE officer or the
operations officer. If there is a signature and address
on the form, the commander must return a copy to
the originator when corrective actions have been
taken. If the originator does not choose to put his
name and address on the form, that's all right too.
The anonymous feature was established so the
originator could avoid any problems that might arise
from the report. Paragraph 5-5 of AR 95-5 will provide
you with general information on the OHR. Use it to
the benefit of the user and command for your increased
safety and protection.
Correction
Reference is made to the PEARL article, “That
Other First Aid Kit,” in the March 1982 issue of the
Aviation Digest. The information is correct but PEARL
| erred in the last sentence. POC for further information
is COL L. Hugh Olander, Defense Medical Materiel
Board, Ft. Detrick, Frederick, MD 21701. We apologize
to COL Olander for this misprint.
ALSE Training Tidbits
Four ALSE training courses have been conducted
at Ft. Eustis, VA. The fifth course is currently in
session. The Fifth Army has concluded another ALSE
training school; altogether, these schools and the
Army National Guard ALSE schools being conducted
at Little Rock, AR, make up some 400-plus personnel
trained in ALSE. We also have continued support
from the 25th Infantry Division, Eighth Army and
Europe. We discussed the possibility of starting a
supervisory type ALSE course at Ft. Eustis, VA. As
we view it, we are probably talking about 2 weeks of
intensive ALSE training for supervisors. We already
cover an 8-hour segment in the aviation maintenance
course at Ft. Eustis, VA, and a 4-hour segment at Ft.
Rucker, AL, for all aircrew personnel.
Helmet, Flyers SPH-4
A loose grommet condition of the SPH-4 helmet
was reported on a QDR from an Army activity. The
loose grommet is on the earcup retainer assembly
where the chin strap is attached by a screw and post.
If the grommet pulls out of the material the chin strap
will fail to function and the helmet may separate from
the user. Recent design changes to the SPH-4 helmet
will provide greater security in this area. Until the
newly designed chin strap becomes standard issue, a
one-time inspection of all earcup retaining assemblies
now in use is recommended, and particularly items
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN. DRCPO-ALSE.
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commorcial 3 14-263-3307
JUNE 1982
procured from Kings Point Manufacturing Company
on Contract Number DLA100-80-C-2420. There is
one grommet on each assembly. It should be inspected
for security by grasping the grommet between the
thumb and index finger and pulling downward. If the
grommet can be rotated in the cloth, or shows signs of
separating, a 3/4-inch flat washer should be added to
the underside of the retainer assembly to ensure the
screw and post do not pull away from the retainer
assembly if the grommet becomes loose. This inspection
and fix are offered in the interest of safety because of
the critical function of the SPH-4 helmet to protect
life and limb.
SPH-4 Helmet, Repair Of Components
When repairing certain components of the SPH-4
flyer's helmet, it is imperative to use the proper adhesive.
Failure to do so will result in damage to the helmet as
well as cause a potential safety hazard. Repair of the
following components should be accomplished only
with the proper corresponding adhesive. This infor
mation will be included in TM 10-8415-206-13 at a
later date.
Components Adhesive Used In Repair
Helmet Liner Synthetic Adhesive, NSN 8040-00-833-9563
Rubber Beading Synthetic Rubber Adhesive, NSN 8040-00-832
6173
Adhesive, NSN 8040-01-021-4173 and NSN 8040
Earcup Cushion
Inserts 01-021-4172
Requests for additional information may be addressed
to: Commander, TSARCOM, ATTN: DRSTS-MCFT,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63.120. Point of
contact is Ms. Mary Krsul, AUTOVON 693-2614.
Flyer's Helmet, SPH-4
The locking screw which is currently issued as part
of the visor lock assembly, NSN 8415-00-933-9280, is
neither stocked nor issued through normal supply
channels; NSNs for the screw do not exist. Local
purchase of the locking screw is authorized pending
accumulation of demand data necessary to warrant
assignment of a stock number. Descriptive data and
source of supply are:
Screw Locking Assembly, Left Hand Threaded, Part Number
74A2860-1. FSCM 97427, Natick Dw8 No. 8-2-523, Item 4-20,
Color Black per CL4. MIL-C-13924, Unit Cost is $1.18 each.
Minimum orders $25.00 FOB. Source: Gentex Corporation. PO
Box 315, Carbondale, PA 18407. POC: Mr. Dennis J. Nealon,
Commercial (717) 282-3550. -as
37
 Army
Aviation
Systems
ram
Review32
MG Carl H. McNair Jr.
YESERDAY. Commanding General
U.S. Army Aviation Center
|ODAY - For Rºcker A.
MISSION AREA ANALYSS - CPTCP) Josef Reinsprecht
Chief of Program, AASPR-82
|OMORROW - U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL

ARMY AVIATION to the year 2000; that is where

our mission area analysis is coming from and
pointing to, the how, why and what of Army
Aviation from the ground up. This article
is the first of an AASPR-82 series of five that
will focus on specific details of aviation issues.
Succeeding issues will encompass aviation
concepts, doctrine and tactics; organization/force
38
cºactiºns tenºsing; and materiel
 T. entire aviation center
* team is pleased to share with you
some background from the Ft.
Rucker perspective on the increas
ingly critical role that Army Aviation
must play if our Army is to be able
to fight outnumbered on a battle
field and win. Most of our uniformed
colleagues should be conversant with
our AirLand Battle concepts and
doctrine, while to some of our
civilian counterparts and retired
military family they may be some
what new; but it is indeed important
that we fully understand them and
how they differ from our concepts
and doctrine of the seventies. The
focus for the aviation community
today should be on where we have
been, where we are and how we
are using the Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Mission
Area Analysis (MAA) and our recent
Systems Program Review (SPR) to
get where we want to be, and indeed
need to be, tomorrow.
YESTERDAY
You all know our history. Forty
years ago, Army Aviation was of
ficially born on 6 June 1942—when
a team of two light observation
aircraft were assigned to each Field
Artillery headquarters. The invasion
of North Africa was the inauguration
of Army Aviation in combat when
three Piper L-4 Grasshoppers launch
tº ed from the deck of the carrier USS
Ranger and adjusted artillery on
the continent. History tells us that
one of the three was shot down on
the way to the beach.
But, even after 20 years and two
major wars, World War II and Korea,
it was not until development of the
air assault division by the Howze
Board that Army Aviation became
the key innovation in which heli
copters and fixed wing aircraft
became principal tactical elements
of the Army–providing support in
every element of land combat.
Finally, the war in Vietnam con
clusively established the worth of
Army Aviation—in less than four
JUNE 1982
decades, in three major conflicts,
on every continent. Army Aviation
has now evolved from a small auxil
iary force of the Field Artillery to
become a full-fledged member of
the combined arms team.
TODAY
As part of the Total Army, our
active forces have more than 5,800
aircraft in the field with 7,000 com
missioned officers, 5,800 warrant
officer aviators, and 23,000 non
commissioned officers and enlisted
service members deployed world
wide. However, the status of our
total aviation force is critically de
pendent on our Reserve Components:
The National Guard, with about
2,550 aircraft at 85 installations,
represents some 50 percent of all
CONUS aviation forces while the
Army Reserve has about 510 aircraft
located in 38 Army Reserve flight
facilities across the nation. Together
they contain a wealth of tactical
experience. The Guard aviation fleet
has come a long way in the past 10
years, and while the majority of its
aircraft are the same as our active
fleet, an area of continuing concern
is their attack aircraft which are
--~ x x
—?
RECON−)
*-
ATTACK
T- x -
PLAN & CONDUCTL)
~ x x
FIGURE 1: Cavalry Brigade Air Attack (CBAA)—a maneuver brigade
mainly UH-1 B, C and M model
Hueys. The bright spot is that AH-1
Cobras are now being assigned and
the National Guard is doing a fine
job of training with them. The
principal utility helicopter in the
Reserve Components will continue
to be the UH-1; however, UH-60
Black Hawks are now being issued
for cross-training. Furthermore, CH
47A Chinooks will be replaced with
CH-47C models during the coming
decade, and under current plans
they will receive the “D” model
Chinook in the 1990s.
Cavalry Brigade
Air Attack (CBAA)
With respect to force organiza
tion, the generic Air Cavalry At
tack Brigade (ACAB) is on the
ground for testing in the 9th Infantry
Division at Ft. Lewis, WA– where
it is designated the 9th Cavalry Bri
gade (Air Attack) or CBAA. The
CBAA is a highly mobile and flex
ible maneuver brigade tailored to
fight (figure 1). It optimizes employ
ment of all the new aviation equip
ment and provides the division com
mander additional tactical flexibility
tº
—
§
.
39

: divisions requires that aviation de
FIGURE 2: Cavalry Brigade Air Attack (CBAA)—aviation maneuver force
as all aviation assets of the division
are located in this single brigade.
~& OUINUMBERED IN TANKS
The CBAA is an aviation maneuver
force which has a full staff comple
ment capable of planning and con
2
a lº Tº ducting combat operations to the
rear and the flanks of the division,
* --> as well as the capacity to assume
control of ground assets as necessary
for mission accomplishment.
The modularity of the brigade
was designed to provide for im
proved command and control of
aviation resources and to exploit
ARMY ATTACK HELICOPTERS the ability of the division to mass
INCREASE OUR ODDS antiarmor forces (figure 2).
6B We know so well that the threat
Tºhº we face on the AirLand Battlefield
wº outnumbers us significantly in main
battle tanks. For this reason we try
Tºp
- to organize and optimize our attack
helicopter force to kill enemy tanks
and threat systems. This would even
the odds for the combined arms
€P team. But now we face the real and
imminent possibility that the threat
SOWIET ARMED
will outnumber us not only in tanks
HELICOPTERS = CHECKMATE 2 but also in attack helicopters; thus,
we could be checkmated (figure 3).
In other words, to protect both
Tºp
our offensive and defensive capa
viºſ Tºhº bility on the ground and in the air,
Tº a we must carefully guard our aviation
forces—and yet go after theirs!!
*—º-
~ ; To combat this threat, Army
Aviation forces, through the applica
\- j tion of the inherent characteristics
of speed and economy of force
FIGURE 3: AirLand Battle coupled with great firepower (figure
40
4) must make even more signifi
cant contributions to the integra
ted conduct of the close-in “Land $
Air” Battle and deep-attack in the
extended “AirLand” Battle. These
capabilities exist in our aviation
organizations and equipment now,
but we are going to be called upon
to do even more. Engagement of
the first echelon by our forward
stroy, delay and disrupt the threat.
There simply is no other way—and
our Chief of Staff has given us that
mission, get more out of Army Avia
tion—in the high technology divi
sion—it is the wave of the future!
Just a brief look at the methods
of tactical employment for aviation
systems and forces reveals they differ
little from classical ground fighting
techniques. First, combined arms
team employment optimizes our ef
fectiveness, nap-of-the-earth terrain
flying is essential, engaging from
maximum standoff distance is a
must, minimizing exposure time to
threat air defense artillery is an
absolute requirement, and we must
neutralize forward air defenses, both
ground and air!!
In applying the fundamentals of
tactical employment Army Aviation
must:
• See the battlefield
Fight as a combined arms team
Concentrate firepower
Destroy enemy air defense
Shock and destroy the enemy
Attack deep
Provide continuous airmobile
support.
Our aviation force must contribute
at all operational levels; it can bring
about the winning concentration of
forces either by mass or firepower
at the critical time and place; it
contributes to the control and direc
tion of the battle; and, finally, by
improving our ability to maneuver
at the operational level, it helps us
to fight the battle with firepower
instead of manpower. Just as in
physics, where F=MA, Mass and
Momentum equal force on the bat
tlefield. Consequently, in modern
mounted warfare, the tank continues
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
to be the primary offensive weapon
and considering the mobility advan
tage our new M-1 Abrams tank has
demonstrated, the possibility cannot
be discounted that the new M-1
equipped units may outdrive their
combat support and combat service
support elements.
In such a contingency, aviation
forces may be the only means of
providing armor units with the secur
ity, fire support and even logistical
resupply demanded by a thrust for
deep objectives. As armored units
move forward, aviation units will
support and assist them by perform
ing the following critical combined
arms missions:
• Guarding open flanks
• Reinforcing in event of enemy
counterattacks
• Deepening penetrations
• Sweeping around flanks to hit
enemy reserves
• Providing fires
– overwatching
—direct
—indirect.
The point is: Army Aviation forces
are the catalyst to improve our ability
through mobility, firepower and C*I
FIGURE 5: Mission Area Analysis
AVIATION
MISSION
AREA
ANALYSIS
: DOCTRINE
*Program Objective Memorandum
JUNE 1982
capabilities: aviation is essential if
we are to execute the doctrine of
the AirLand Battle and exploit the
full capabilities of all our weapons
systems to support that doctrine.
Mission Area Analysis
Which brings us to the Army
Aviation Mission Area Analysis
(AAMAA) and Army Aviation Sys
tems Program Review (AASPR)
process—what they are and how
they will help us to develop and
exploit our full potential. Our
r
\ MANEUVERING
SUPERIOR Aº
___ºp X
JFIREpower
ECONOMY OF FORCE
FIGURE 4: Army Aviation Characteristics
DEFICIENCIES
FORCE STRUCTURE
TRAINING
MATERIEL
AAMAA completed in March of
this year used a front-to-rear con
ceptual approach, incorporated the
materiel and nonmateriel aspects
of Army Aviation, and produced a
comprehensive chapter report for
every arrowhead depicted in figure 5.
Our objective was to take a 1987
force and pit it against a 1992 threat,
examine the tasks required to defeat
that threat, then determine our abil
ity to perform those tasks. The result
was a list of key deficiencies which
were in turn scrutinized for oppor
wº
ſ
wº
1992
THREAT
FORCE
;
41
 Opportunities
!!!!
doctrine
Diſcº
structure
training
materiel -> need driven - developer
by user
FIGURE 6: Concept Based Requirement System
tunities for resolution first in doc
trine, then organization and train
ing and, finally, in materiel.
These opportunities are now
evolving into new concepts which
will drive our long-term develop
ments—better focusing the user's
requirements to meet the challenge
of the 1990s (figure6). This method
ology should then permit us to lead
the threat, not merely react to it as
we have in the past.
Ultimately then, we have identi
fied the real and manageable de
ficiencies upon which to base Army
Aviation requirements through the
end of this century and into the
next (figure 7). In this way, the Army
Aviation-specific MAA will deter
mine how Army Aviation forces can
best serve the doctrine of the Air
Land Battle and amplify the ef
fectiveness of the combat arms. It
is this analysis that served as the
keystone for our AASPR.
FIGURE 8: Army Aviation Progress
42
ë
F-—
Army
Aviation 1982
requirements
; 20th Century
A J
FIGURE 7: Forecast Future Requirements
Army Aviation
Systems Program Review—1982
That brings us to the very purpose
of the AASPR conducted on 24
and 25 March at Ft. Rucker— to
review Army Aviation—in a forum
where the Army's senior leadership,
which included 51 general officers
to include half of our serving four
stars and some 70 field grade officers
tº
\ \ . . ..
. . .
.
I
º,
ºº
--.
0
- A -
y r r
A
I
I
I
21st Century
S
P
R
representing the Army, Navy,
Marines and Air Force and the
senior executive service, could dis
cuss aviation's deficiencies and
opportunities. With the guidance
we then received from the Vice
Chief, the review chairman, the
Aviation Center, is producing a
development plan scheduled for
publication in October 1982, to guide
our aviation forces during the com
ing years.
The progress of Army Aviation
will be:
• Guided by periodic systems
program reviews, and its
• Payoff heightened by mission
area analysis.
These and past efforts are all in the
pursuit of greater progress with a
realistic roadmap toward our ob
jective (figure8). Our combat power
will most certainly be enhanced as (r
a result of those efforts.
The resultant of the entire study
analysis and review is to assist us in
enhancing the effectiveness of the
Army and to leap-frog the enemy
threat.
Major Issues
While we are moving forward on
broad fronts in all areas, the recently
completed mission area analysis
identified 77 major deficiencies
which has led us to further focus on
these specific areas of challenge to
aviation (figure 9): in concepts,
doctrine, and tactics, in organization
and force structure, in training, and
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 last, but not least, in materiel. Quite
ü). a list in all areas, but a list that has
been prioritized, sanitized and
recognized by our community as
representing the key deficiencies
where our energies must be focused
Concepts, Doctrine and Tactics Panel now if we are to get the most from
Survivability of SEMA Aircraft Army Aviation.
Combined Arms Operations The foregoing issues and the
discussions that followed were sum
JAAT Operations
Helicopter Air-To-Air marized by the TRADOC com
mander to include these highlights
NBC Operations
(figure 10). General Otis is convinced
Airspace Management that these issues are best addressed
Reduced Visibility Operations within the Total Army effort because
Self-Deployment Procedures of aviation's impact on all TRADOC
mission areas.
Across FLOT Operations
Search and Rescue, Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion
Taking all of this into consider
ation, General Vessey summed up
the conference and issued guidance
in a number of the most critical
areas (figure 11). Specifically, com
bined arms training must be a joint
Organization and Force Structure Panel service effort; aviation should be
CONUS Versus OCONUS—Aircraft Distribution integrated into the national training
Supporting the Force—Airframes centers and aviation training ranges
War Reserve Stock and POMCUS
developed; our air-to-air combat
capability as part of our overall air
Sustained Operations—Manning defense must be improved; and our
Wartime Flying Hours flying hours and crew ratios in
creased to support wartime pro
jections; our aircraft fleet must be
modernized, keeping in mind the
fact that we can't buy everything.
Training Panel
We must therefore develop an opti
Commissioned Officer Aviator Training mum fleet mix of existing and new
Integration of Army Aviation Into Combined Arms Training aircraft and equipment and we must
Training Device Development further develop equipment and
Range Adequacy for Training procedures to capitalize on aircraft
self-deployability, survivability of
Special Electronic Mission Aircraft Training
aircraft and aircrew life support
systems and finally our logistics
support system must be enhanced.
The Vice Chiefs concluding counsel
Materiel Panel was that we must structure, equip
and train our aviation forces to meet
Aircraft Survivability Equipment
mission needs, recognizing that there
Aviation Life Support Equipment are real world constraints such as
Fleet Obsolescence men, money and time.
Class IIIA and VA Sustainability
Desert Operations
Air-to-Air and Air Defense Suppression Weapons
; Mission
Army Aviation's summary situa
tion report today is that our doctrine
is the AirLand Battle – our organiza
tion, the cavalry brigade air attack
FIGURE 9: Systems Program Review—Panel Issues our materiel will incorporate advan

JUNE 1982 43

General Otis
FIGURE 10: TRADOC Commander's Summary
General Vessey
FIGURE 11: Guidance from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
The Mission of the Total Army Is...
• To Deter Attack Upon National Interests
And If Deterrence Fails. . .
• To Engage and Defeat Any Enemy
• In Any Environment
FIGURE 12: Total Army Goals
ced technology—and our training
programs must fully integrate com
bined arms.
Furthermore, the mission of Army
Aviation has now been redefined
by the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Our mission now is to "conduct
prompt and sustained combat oper
ations. "Gone is the nuance of Army
Aviation being simply a supporter,
44
- tº
Branch Proponency
Air-To-Air/Air Defense
Airspace Management
Sustained Operations
Guard/Reserve Roundout
Reinforce Europe
Combined Arms Training
-
Desert Operations
Fleet Obsolescence
Logistics Support
; matically since its beginning and has
ë contingency. For Army Aviation is
Combined Arms Training
National Training Center
Training Ranges
Air-To-Air Capability
Flying Hours
Aircraft Modernization
Self-Deployability
Survivability/Life Support
Logistics Support
Force Structure ;
wº
E. C. Meyer and
John O. Marsh Jr.
December 1981
; can provide to the combined arms
a transporter or an observer. The
aviation community will meet its
commitment to the Total Army goals
as prescribed by the Chief of Staff
and the Secretary of the Army
(figure 12). Our AAMAA findings
culminate our most extensive study
ever, and the AASPR will serve as
a roadmap to guide us through the
bold, new concepts we need to reach
our goals. We cannot overemphasize
that the Aviation Center and the
entire Army Aviation team recog- º
nize full well that the effectiveness
of our Army depends on combined
arms operations. For all of these
reasons our Army and our aviation
forces are meeting the challenge of
the threat and are “Fit to Fight.”
Army Aviation has evolved dra
come of age, almost 9,000 aircraft
strong, with nearly 25,000 Army
aviators and thousands more crew
men—throughout our Army, Active
and Reserve Components.
Army Aviation is a vital combat
system—a solid team, trained, equip
ped and prepared today for any
--
INFANTRY
truly the most modern and promising
of the combat arms, proudly joining
with the Infantry, Armor, Field
Artillery and Air Defense forces as
the combat multiplier of the eighties
. . which is destined to be our
decade of full maturity. Aviation
team the flexibility, maneuverability,
shock action and firepower which
will permit our forces to fight out
numbered and win on the AirLand
Battlefield today—and tomorrow.
Keeping all of this in mind, let us
in Army Aviation “be all we can
be” in the next 40 years, as we have
been in the first 40.
Next month: The Second article in this
Series looks at tactics and doctrine.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 ARMY

40th
BIRTH DAY
Continued from page 1

ABOVE: Major General Carl H. McNair Jr., Aviation

Center commander and Brigadier General William W.
they can be worn with pride and a confidence
Ford, Retired, review the troops at Ft. Rucker during
that Army Aviation will meet challenges in its
40th anniversary observances on 4 June. General Ford
future with the same spirit of professional dedi
cation that has marked its four decades of self played the key role in bringing about the birth of Army
Aviation (see page 2). BELOW: General McNair partici
less service.—General E. C. Meyer, Chief of Staff,
USA pates in ceremonies dedicating the future site of the
Army Aviation Museum at Ft. Rucker. At left is Lieutenant
• Happy birthday to the Home of Army Avia General John J. Tolson III, Retired, former Aviation
tion and best wishes for continued success
Center commander and the Honorable William L.
in the next forty years.-General John W. Vessey Dickinson, U.S. Representative for the 2d Congressional
Jr., Vice Chief of Staff
District which includes Ft. Rucker
• Congratulations... accomplishments of your
Officers, soldiers and units, over four decades
and during three wars, have served as a constant
and living testimony to the vital place you occupy
in the defense mosaic of our great country.—
General Glenn K. Otis, CDR, USATRADOC.
• Salutes Fort Rucker and Army Aviation . . . .
As we celebrate the anniversary of your founding,
we can look back with pride at the professionalism
* and dedicated service Army Aviation has con
sistently provided in peace and war to this great
nation we love so well.–General Donald R. Keith,
CDR, DARCOM.
• The future looks even brighter with Army
Aviation playing a challenging and demanding
role in the combined arms team.–General Donn
A. Starry, CINC, USREDCOM.
This issue reflects the annals of our history
ranging from the aviation entity itself to an
individual aircraft, thus delineating truth we all
recognize: Each of us today is engaged in writing
some portion of tomorrow's history. The contri
butions will not all be the same but they will all be
important. Aviation has made its mark on our
Army and the mark it makes tomorrow is in your
hands. So read on into history. It will make you
proud to be a member of the aviation team.
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
THE NATIONAL
AIRSPACE SYSTEM
PLAN (NASP)
Mr. John McKeeman
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
Aº. A 10-MONTH review of the national airspace
system, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
has charted a comprehensive plan (the NASP dated
December 1981) for modernizing and improving air traffic
control and airway facilities service from now to the year
2000.
It specifies improvements to facilities and equipment and
supporting research and development associated with the
national airspace system. Particular emphasis focuses on
terminal and en route air traffic control, flight service
stations and weather services, ground-to-air services, inter
facility communications and auxiliary services such as airway
facilities maintenance and flight inspection of navigational
aids.
The plan theme is that safety, capacity, productivity and
economy will be realized through higher levels of automation,
consolidations of major facilities and the application of
rapidly changing and lower cost technologies in telecommuni
cations. FAA recognizes that implementing the plan will be
expensive and will proceed more slowly than many would
wish. However, the agency is certain that the measures
contained in the plan are essential to flight safety, efficiency
and economy and must begin immediately to meet the
projected needs and demands of U.S. aviation.
The NASP makes the following assumptions:
• Aviation demand will grow significantly during the
next 20 years.
• Air carrier routes and service will reflect a better
balance between trip frequency and cost than would be the
case under a closely regulated system. The industry will be
affected by deregulation for several more years before
routes and schedules stabilize.
• The commuter industry will be affected by deregulation
for several more years. Anticipated growth will require
many years of adjustmet before routes and schedules stabilize.
The number of commuter operators is expected to decrease
over the period.
• The rapid growth in business use of general aviation
will continue. Significant growth in turbopowered aircraft
will result in increased operations above 12,500 feet. This
growth is expected though both fixed and variable aircraft
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
operating costs are expected to rise.
• General aviation aircraft and hours flown will nearly
double in the next two decades.
• The number of helicopters and helicopter operations
will continue at a high growth rate. City-center to city
center operations are expected to be commonplace by the
turn of the century.
• System limitations on any class of users' right-of-access
to the system should be imposed only when no other resource
is availble to ensure the common good. Any such restrictions
should be removed as soon as possible and not be considered
a final solution. However, to gain access to the system,
individual users must comply with conditions applicable to
all classes of users and essential to the safety and efficiency
of the system.
• Specific equipment may be required to operate in
designated airspace.
• Individual user's preferences for routes, runways,
approaches, altitudes, etc., cannot be honored if they will
cause delays to other users.
• No change to the system will be permitted to reduce
safety or increase risk. A very high level of midair collision
protection, including a backup ground-independent airborne
separation device called TCAS, will be available. “See-and
be-seen" operations, which will continue, may be supple
mented by new systems. Self-separation may be feasible in
some airspace.
• Airport capacity limitations at busy airports will be the
constraining element in the national airspace system. The
national airport system is essentially in place. Few new air
carrier airports are anticipated and most major airports
have limited expansion capability due to physical, environ
mental, airspace, runway and/or landside limitations. These
factors will continue to impose capacity constraints at ,
many large and medium hub airports.
The first two chapters of the plan provide an overview
and a projected demand upon the national airspace system.
The remaining six chapters provide the descriptions and
planning for: en route systems, terminal systems, flight
service systems, ground-to-air systems, interfacility communi
cations and auxiliary systems.
The NASP en route and terminal chapters have the
following aims:
• The major facilities will be consolidated from more
than 200 today to about 60 by the year 2000.
• That common modular computers, software and
controller work stations (i.e., sector suites) will increase
capacity, availability and satisfy a wide range of needs.
• That higher levels of automation will improve safety,
fuel efficiency and productivity.
In summary, this is an energetic plan to improve the
national airspace system for all users, to include Army
Aviation, into the next century.
 JULY 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 7
§
=/
Yºr Yº Y º Y
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Colonel Benard S. Pergerson Jr.
Army Aviation Officer Commander Acting Assistant Commandant
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 Victory in Air-To-Air Combat, The Marine Corps Way,

22 Sº Betty J. Goodson
22:33%;S 8
Army Aviation Systems Program Review '82,
LTG Jack V. Mackmull and CPT (P) Josef Reinsprecht
13 ACTAAT: Drill Distance
14 PEARL'S
16 When Will We Learn About Mountain Flying?
Raymond P. Johnson
20 DES Report To The Field: Aviation Center's Branch
Training Team: ACTAAT
21 ACTAAT: NVG Qualification
22 Forty Years Of Army Aviation, Part 2: Building A Training
Program, Richard K. Tierney
37 Tower Talk, Mr. Ronald B. Jackson
38 Views From Readers
40 Aviation Personnel Notes
42 Reporting Final
44 CBAA Testing Period Finished
Inside Back Cover: ATC Action Line: The Go-Around— *ść
Lifesaver Or Killer? Mr. Kenneth S. Arnold 341Bs 9:
Back Cover: Annual Writing Awards
Cover: Each of the Marine Corps aircraft makes C;
a contribution to the air-to-air training Marine Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.
aviators receive. See page 2. Secretary of the Army
Richard K. Tierney
Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data.
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center.
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U S Army unless otherwise speci
fied Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise Indicated
Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct
communication is authorized to Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest PO Drawer P.
Fort Rucker, AL 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request.
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981, in accordance with Army Regulation
310-1.
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1. Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR, AG
Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general.
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription rates
are $26.00 domestic and $32.50 overseas.
 his month marks the 206th year of our Nation's
independence and our memory of that struggle
should be just as vivid today as it was for American
£2atriots two centuries ago. The preservation of
that independence and our heritage of freedom
are in our hands today and Army Aviation plays a
critical role in the preservation.
Training and readiness are the responsibilities
of each of us in the force as we maintain our
preparedness to meet contingencies and national
commitments world-wide. Likewise, we must
identify our shortcomings and seek improvements
in those areas wherein we find ourselves deficient,
be they in materiel, training, tactics or operations.
One of those of increasing importance is our
preparation for air-to-air helicopterself-defense.
“Victory in Air-to-Air Combat, the Marine Corps
Way" by Betty J. Goodson, Digest writer, highlights
the fact that our sister service has acknowledged
that aerial engagements between rotary wing
aircraft appear to be inevitable. Further, it details
for us how the Marines are preparing for that
inevitability. We appreciate the willingness of
Colonel B. G. Butcher and his staff at the Marine
Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One to
share this information with the Army Aviation
community.
Likewise, the topic of air-to-air operations is
one of several addressed in "Army Aviation
Systems Program Review-1982, Concepts, Doc
trine and Tactics Panel" by Lieutenant General
Jack V. Mackmull, panel chairman, and Captain
Josef Reinsprecht. The authors very ably discuss
the many concepts, doctrine and tactics issues
considered by the panel members and the ensuing
recommendations they presented during the 1982
AASPR. You will note that the issues are quite
substantive and represent a myriad of areas
wherein the Overall effectiveness of Army Aviation
can be greatly enhanced.
And concern for training to meet all contin
gencies was equally well recognized as a funda
mental necessity by our early Army Aviation
pioneers. Digest Editor, Richard K. Tierney, makes
that clear in his “Forty Years of Army Aviation,
Part 2: Building a Training Program," which details
the growth of that curriculum from 1942 to 1954.
I think you will find it quite enlightening. Mr.
Tierney's entire five part series, written for the
Fortieth Birthday, has been compiled into a
training text used by the students in the Aviation
School as a part of their military history program.
Continuing on the theme of training, there is a
fact that we in aviation learn and relearn the hard
way, that no matter how outstanding the course
of instruction an aviator receives, or how proficient
he or she becomes, the training cannot be truly
effective unless the gained knowledge is used!
Safe flying depends on knowing what to do and
then doing it in the proper way. Raymond P.
Johnson in "When Will We Learn About Mountain
Flying?" recounts several accidents that occurred
because some people did not use the knowledge
they had.
The accidents, their causes and their effects,
described by Mr. Johnson are an absolute must
for this month's reading. Do not put the magazine
down until you have completed that article. In
fact, turn to page 16 right now and begin reading
in the middle of the magazine. Some of you may
say, “there but for the grace of God, go l," and
many of you can immediately recount similar
tight spots in which you, your aircraft, your crew,
your mission, were all placed in jeopardy by your
actions. Our accident rate for FY 82 is living
testimony to such actions. Already with only three
fourths of the year behind us, we have exceeded
the number of FY 81 accidents, fatalities, aircraft
lost and cost. And the sad part is that over 60
percent of those accidents were attributed to
human error, be it the pilot, another crew member
or the supervisor. Only 16 percent were attributed
to mechanical or maintenance failure with environ
mental factors accounting for the balance. Thus,
our aircraft are not letting us down, we are letting
our aircraft down. Aviation safety is everyone's
job. Read and heed. Accidents can be prevented
and the next one which you prevent may well be
yOurS.
We all live and learn by experience, the great
teacher. But experience is not the teacher it can
be unless it is shared with others. We provide
you a forum to do just that, either through an
article in this magazine or a letter to the editor.
Let us hear from you on those things that concern
you, on how we can improve Army Aviation or
how you have met a particular challenge in your
unit. But we especially want to share your thoughts
and initiatives to improve our safety record. Only
through all of us working together can we become
independent of needless accidents. The Aviation
School, with the best IP's and the best training in
the business—and the Safety Center with the
finest safety specialists in the Army, can't do it
alone. It takes YOU!
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center Fort Rucker, AL
 S. MARINES run from the enemy?
ICTORY Taught to do so? That's heresy.
EXCEPT- -:
There is nothing heretical about
|N the instruction given at the Marine Aviation
Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One (MAWTS-1),
Yuma, AZ, with reference to air-to-air combat
A R4 between helicopters. There, Marine rotary wing
aviators are taught that evasive (read that “run
COM B AT: ning") maneuvers are the best way for a helicopter

Betty J. Goodson
Staff Writer

- -

-- -- Fromtop?obottom:CH-53, CH-46, -
--- -- uh-1N, Ah-it º -
- - - -

- --- º -
*
ºr
photographs by Harry Gunn.
courtesy of McDonnell Douglas º
--
, -

- -
*
2 U.S. ARMY AVAſion plafst

and its crew to survive in a threat
environment. Of course, the prime
$ step is to avoid detection and engage
ment. If those do occur, however,
then the task is to evade the threat
by whatever means are available.
Such action has a simple rationale:
A live Marine can do more for his
country than a dead one can!
Every aviator in the Corps' four
aircraft wings cannot come to
MAWTS-1. So Colonel B. G.
Butcher, squadron commander, and
his people do the next best thing as
one of their major tasks: Twice a
year they conduct a 7-week Wea
pons and Tactics Instructors (WTI)
Course. Its goal is to provide one
WTI and, in the case of crew
concept airplanes, one WTI crew
per squadron per year. Course grad
uates then conduct the required
professional individual and unit
training programs for their squadrons.
The course curriculum covers the
six functions of Marine aviation—
aerial reconnaissance, antiair war
fare, assault support, offensive air
support, electronic warfare, and con
trol of aircraft and missiles—for the
12 kinds of aircraft the Marines use.
These include two conventional and
seven jet fixed wings and four kinds
of helicopters. The latter are the
CH-53 Sea Stallion, CH-46 Sea
* Knight, UH-1 Huey and AH-1
Cobra; and the air-to-air segment
of the WTI course for those aircraft
is taught as a part of assault support.
STANDARDIZED EVASION
Majors Jim Pruden and Bob
Garner of the Assault Support
Branch are two who instruct the
instructors to conduct training
in a standardized manner throughout
the Marine Corps.
“We teach evasive maneuvers
(EVM) against the ground threat,”
JULY 1982
Major Garner said, “and then we
progress into EVM for one aircraft
vs. one aircraft—helo vs. helo and
helo vs. fixed wing. The next step is
two vs. two, then two vs. many.
“These are specific maneuvers
designed to put the helicopter in a
position that prevents its being shot
down. We run the students through
these flights in a very controlled
atmosphere; then we give them a
couple of free engagements so they
can practice what they've learned.”
He noted that the maneuvers have
to be amplified by other instructions.
Major Pruden explained: “The
students have to learn how they
should support each other and how
to drive the fight the way they want
it to go. That is the key to two vs.
two or two vs. many—to drive the
fight so the aircraft being attacked
can possibly be supported by the
other. Mutual support, in other words.
“In past air-to-air wars, aircraft
that were shot down were usually
attacked by an unseen adversary.
This then teaches us that an ex
tremely good lookout doctrine must
be maintained by all aircrews to
prevent that unforeseen shot. Estab
lishing a good lookout doctrine
requires crew coordination—getting
Alſº
WAIR.
everybody to work together. To
keep it simple, all aircrews must
use standard terminology in calling
the threat so the pilot can understand
explicitly what he is being told.
Aircraft recognition is also vital,
since at a distance it is not always
easy to tell a friendly from a non
friendly. Further, our aircrews have
to recognize what maneuvers the
enemy is making to determine if he
is really a threat to us at that particu
lar time.
“All of this knowledge is essential
to survival, but the key element is
standardization—everybody under
standing what the other person does,
just the way he does. We believe in
this because we know there will not
be a lot of time in combat to ask
questions and look for answers about
procedures.”
HOW TO USE EVM
Captain Hal Reeves, formerly of
MAWTS-1 and now a helicopter
projects officer with Air Test and
Evaluation Squadron Five, Naval
Weapons Center, China Lake, CA,
gave more specific details on the
Marine Corps use of rotary wing
aircraft and its preparation for air
to-air combat.
“We have a great asset in our
transport helicopters, the CH-46 and
CH-53, because we can carry 15 to
30 troops at a time and that means
we have fewer assets committed for
troops as well as supply movements,
when compared to the Army. We
primarily use our Cobras and
OV-10 Broncos as escorts for those
transports, with the Cobras pro
viding the crucial part of that pro
tection. So I want to talk primarily
about the AH-1 role.
“When the Cobra is flying as the
escort, we must keep our airspeed
up at a good maneuvering speed
the majority of the time, where the
terrain will allow. Now, assume I
am flying a Cobra and am acquired
by an attacking Hind helicopter at
a range where I cannot turn around
(without being an easy mark) or
hide effectively. I cannot then dis
engage (outrun him) because of his
superior airspeed and weapons
range. In other words, if there is an
attacker back here at 180 knots,
and I am running away from him at
140 knots, and he is 1,000 meters
out of his envelope to fire, my best
option is to run straight away. If I
am turning, etc., he is closing on
me; and it is 140 knots against 180.
At 40 knots of closure, it is going to
take him only about 60 seconds to
make up that 1,000 meters and be
in his weapons range.
“That differential closing velocity
problem is the big one, and it means
the way to run is going to be depen
dent on where the acquisition occurs
relative to my speed. That also trans
lates into the fact that the theory of
crossing our lines back into friendly
territory is not as easy as it sounds;
so we must have some alternate
contingencies.
“The premise we work with is
that the Cobras are trying to protect
the transport helicopters as well as
themselves. Our ratio of transports
to Cobras is about 5 to 1, so it would
be ludicrous for us to say that every
transport is going to have Cobras
as escort. Thus, we have to teach
defensive evasive maneuvers to our
transport pilots as well. At the same
time, and this is my opinion, we
need to look at some type of defen
sive armament for our transports
because there're going to be many
times they are not going to have
Cobras around them. And even if
they do, the Cobra is by no means
the perfect match for the Russian
Hind. So we need some type of
superior combination of tactics,
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 OPPOSITE PAGE: OV. 10D aircraft in formation over the Arizona desert, TOP
ABOVE. AH-1T firing a TOW missile, LEFT ABOVE CH-53, CENTER ABOVE
AV-8 Harrier; RIGHT ABOVE UH 1 N

weaponry and aircraft maneuvers.
* That is how it needs to be and should
be. What we are teaching, however,
is how to fight if we had to go to war
tomorrow. We can't readily alter
the weapon situation, but we can
help ensure that every Marine air
crewmember knows the kind of
tactics and maneuvers that will
increase his chances of surviving.
“In the 7-week WTI course, EVM
occupies roughly 1/6 of the flight
phase. A student is exposed to at
least six sorties, allowing him to
build on his learning experiences
when engaging both helicopters and
fixed wing. We start out 1 vs. 1
against fixed wing (jets) to see the
fixed wing attack characteristics and
types of attacks. The same thing
with the helicopter follows; and all
of this is demonstrated in flights.
The syllabus is essentially identical
for the attack and the transport
helicopters, except that the Cobras
put more emphasis on offensive and
the transports on defensive postures.
“We teach maneuvers in the 1 vs.
1 segment and then how to imple
ment those in 2 vs. 2.
“Those evasive maneuvers have
one primary purpose—to buy time
until help arrives. To buy this time
we have to try and position our
helicopters relative to any threat
aircraft so they cannot bring their
weapons to bear on us.
“I want to back up and say that
the whole thing is predicated on
not engaging. We will not engage
unless absolutely forced to do so
because we start out in a deficient
status, and helicopter vs. helicopter
engagements are so lethal! Studies
have shown that helicopter pilots
and crews who are not trained in
evasive tactics will probably be killed
100 percent of the time if they are
engaged by armed enemy helicopters.
“Tactically, we teach avoidance
first of all and then how to force the

JULY 1982

threat aircraft into some type of
predictability. For instance, we have
just finished a period here with jets.
At the beginning, there was total
disdain for the helicopter—not on
the part of the jet pilots, but tac
tically. Those tactics said, if you
see a helicopter, go for it—but it
was soon revealed that the jets stood
a good chance of getting shot in the
face if they had a head-on meeting
with a helicopter. As the trials went
on, we found the jet attacks were
initiated more from the aft and were
intentionally avoided in the forward
hemisphere. That kind of predict
ability in tactics is what we want,
since such foreknowledge will give
us more time to disengage or will
make us more effective as we turn
to defend.
“In order to defend, or to attack
if forced to do so, the helicopter
must have armament equal to the
task. One of those would be the
Sidewinder (AIM-9L); and we are
in the process of putting those short
range, infrared, air-to-air missiles
ABOVE CH-53D pre positioning
prior to troop assault; RIGHT
CH-46 near Picacho Peak, AZ
on the Cobra as a test. That is my
job. I have been doing some of the
firing and have been developing
tactics for the missile's use. We've
“killed jets and helicopters with it.
Having that missile will give us a
great improvement, but it is not a
panacea. We will still try to avoid
the encounter; but if one occurs,
we have a better chance to survive
or defend ourselves. Another thing,
if we can just instill respect for our
weapon system on the part of the
enemy, we have gained an advan
tage. He will know that we are not
an easy target every time he engages
uS.
“Of course, there is no way to
measure preparation for survivabil
ity. There's no way to tell, unless
we actually strap on the guns and
go to war. Knowing all the avoidance
tactics and evasive maneuvers, hav
ing the Sidewinder or any other
weapon—these are no guarantees.
It is just that we know if you don't
do something you are going to be
killed in an air-to-air engagement;
and we want to be certain that every
Marine knows what to do and how
to do it in the most professional
manner possible.”
EVM AGAINST JETS
Do the evasive maneuvers taught
in the WTI course accomplish their
purpose? Yes, according to Major
George G. Goodwin, an AV-8 Har
rier pilot who often serves as an
aggressor against the helicopters º
during the training sorties.
He said: “Previous aviation train
ing did not provide the skills needed
to do the maneuvering that a heli
copter has to do if it is going to
survive in combat. Those skills are
taught in the WTI course. There is
a great difference between the pilots
ability to maneuver on the first sortie
and that displayed on the last one.”
Major Goodwin has definite opin
ions about helicopters vs. jets:
“The best way to get a helicopter
is from an unobserved quadrant.
So if I see a helicopter coming, I
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 may have to take some evasive
action and break my tracking run;
then I have to set up again. I'll run
out about 8 to 10 miles, turn around
and come back in. That takes about
a minute out and a minute back. I
know the helicopters move some
where between 120 to 150 miles per
hour, roughly 2 to 2.3 miles per
minute. If I’m gone 2 minutes, the
most the helicopter can move is
about 5 miles; so I know what area
* I have to search to find him.
“Once our Marine helicopter
pilots are trained, they become more
and more difficult to track. In fact,
a helicopter is a difficult target for
us to hit if the helo pilot knows he is
being attacked. Because of his air
craft's rapid turn performance, he
can quite easily defeat a gunrun."
Major Jim Wojtasek, an F-4 pilot
and head of the MAWTS-1 Fixed
Wing Branch, also respects the
rotary wing aircraft as an adversary:
“Fighting a helicopter, at least in
an F-4, is no fun; it is very difficult
if the helicopter pilot is maneuvering.
JULY 1982
However, if he is not maneuvering,
then he becomes easy; or if he
doesn't see you, he becomes a sitting
duck. Evasive maneuvers are es
sential, and they're fine up to a point;
then there has to be something for
the helicopter to fight back with.”
With relation to helicopter arma
ment, Major Goodwin observed:
“My personal belief is that they need
to be able to fight. The problem is
that the first reaction has to be to
run, and currently their best course
of action is to hide. I don't see a
helicopter being able to duke it out
with a fixed wing— not intentionally.
“When you give somebody a fight
er capability, you have to be careful
that he doesn't then think he is a
fighter and go looking for trouble.
That is one of the main concerns in
the Marine Corps about arming all
of our helicopters—that they won't
forget their first and best recourse
is to run and hide. And helicopters
can hide pretty well. Finding them
is difficult, even here in the desert
terrain.”
PURPOSE OF EVASION
Colonel Butcher does not refute
his staff members' opinions on heli
copter armament, but he explains
the MAWTS-1 course emphasis on
evasive maneuvers very realistically:
“What we are teaching are de
fensive tactics only. We have no
helicopter that is armed with missiles
right now which would allow us to
take an offensive role. If you don't
have a weapon that will allow you
to shoot down a Hind with any
degree of success, why train to that
end? So we feel what we should do
is avoid him if we can; if we can't,
then we must know evasive maneu
ver tactics that will keep him from
shooting us down.”
Colonel Butcher added that the
sole mission of all Marine Corps
aviation assets is to support the
Marine on the ground. It follows
that a basic tenet on which that
mission's accomplishment rests is
that the Marine in the air must stay
alive – even if he does have to run
and hide! *—r

Lieutenant General
Jack V. Mackmull
Commanding General
XVIII ABN Corps and Ft. Bragg
conduct their examination within the context
Fort Bragg, NC
Panel Chairman
Captain (P) Josef Reinsprecht
Chief of Program AASPR-82
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
Army
Aviation
Systems
ram
Review32
The scope of the Concepts, Doctrine
and Tactics Panel members' effort was to
of Army Aviation's role as a member of the
combined arms team in the AirLand Battle.
Furthermore, they focused their analysis
on the findings of the Army Aviation
Mission Area Analysis (AAMAA) and
tempered the deficiencies referred to
them by the AAMAA with their own
experience and expertise. The objective
of their analysis was to provide the Army's
senior leadership with recommendations
to resolve those deficiencies.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 T. PURPOSE OF this panel
was to look at the concepts, doctrine
and tactics of Army Aviation and
report its findings to the Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army during the
course of the review on 24 to 25
March 1982 at Ft. Rucker, AL.
Force and total force were well
represented.
Before getting into the concepts
of aviation-peculiar doctrine and
tactics, it was the consensus of the
panel to first establish and define,
in a broad sense, the concept of
performing as part of the combined
arms team add a third dimension to
the battlefield and reinforce the
effectiveness of the ground gaining
arms. Put another way, Army Avia
tion forces can:
• maneuVer

Its expertise and broad frame
of reference is evidenced in figure
1. The panel was composed of
representatives from Forces Com
mand (FORSCOM), Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
and the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air
Command (TAC). Worthy of note
is the fact that close combat light,
close combat heavy, logistics, Air
• LTG MACKMULL
• MG SMALL
• MG WAGNER
• MG WALKER
• MG WETZEL
Army Aviation. Specifically, what
is Army Aviation? How does it relate
to the total Army? As aviation, and
indeed the entire Army, continues
to make advances in capabilities,
its mission, like those of the other
branches, is becoming more precise
and definable. Force contribution
analysis of Army Aviation indicates
in a positive way that Army aircraft
– tº
CG, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS
CG, TRANSPORTATION CENTER
CG, ARMOR CENTER
DIRECTOR, ARNG
CG, INFANTRY CENTER
• Strike
• link-up
• recycle
all with decisive violence and neces
sary agility.
The commissioned officers neces
sary to give us this capability are
managed as specialty code (SC) 15,
Aviation. But, they fundamentally
receive their career training with
one of six carrier branches (figure
2). Significantly, Field Artillery and
Air Defense Artillery are receiving
the very minimum allocation of
aviators for carrier branch training.
While this may not impair the Artil
lery or Air Defense, it impacts
unfavorably on Army Aviation.
Aviation units certainly need an
appreciation of and expertise in
these skills. The carrier branch

• BG(P) GORTON DCS, PLANS HQTAC concept is a compromise solution

• BG MORELL
• COL RUTKOWSKI
DCSDOC, HQ TRADOC
DOTD, USAAVNC ; between the old concept of branch
qualified aviators and an aviation
branch. Military Personnel Center
indicates that aviators will not nor
mally ever serve in their carrier
FIGURE 1: Concepts, Doctrine and Tactics Panel
branch except for school attendance.
But in answering the question
“what is Army Aviation, and how
does it relate to the total force?”
– 2 let's look at the close combat branch
content by commissioned officer
specialty code of active Army divi
AN ACCESSION SPECIALTY
sional units in figure 3.
INA CARRIER BRANCH The programed accessions for
—ARMOR —AIR DEFENSE fiscal year 1982, the total inventory
—INFANTRY —INTELLIGENCE of commissioned officers by spe
—ARTILLERY —SIGNAL
cialty code, and how many of each
of the combat arms specialty codes
TRAINED BY MISSION PROPONENT SCHOOLS
are in table of organization and
—ARMOR —TRANSPORTATION Å equipment (TOE) positions (and thus
—INFANTRY —INTELLIGENCE S in units capable of performing close
—ARTILLERY —SIGNAL P combat) are displayed.
—AIR DEFENSE —AVIATION R Looking at the remaining TDA
(table of distribution and allowance)
and TOE numbers, one can see that
commissioned officer Army aviators,
FIGURE 2: Specialty Code 15–Commissioned Officers in relation to the total combined

JULY 1982
arms team, are significant players.
With the utilization rate of SC 15
being the same, and given that SC
15 commissioned officers are much
more expensive to train, we need to
maximize our investment in terms
of combat power. This is the tone
in which the Concepts, Doctrine and
Tactics Panel was conducted.
With that as a prelude we can
turn to the issues considered by
this panel. The Army Aviation Mis
sion Area Analysis (AAMAA) re
ferred only one major issue con
cerning concepts, doctrine and
tactics to the panel; however, that
issue was, in fact, 27 subissues which
were grouped under one major
deficiency and it was “that Army
Aviation concepts of employment,
doctrine and tactics are not ade
quately written into appropriate
manuals to show aviation's con
tribution to the AirLand Battle.”
With regard to the 77 major AAMAA
deficiencies, this umbrella issue was
ranked fifth in overall priority. The
27 subissues ranged from concepts
of helicopter air-to-air combat to
airspace management and joint
service or multinational operations.
Of course, considering the ongoing
revision of many of our principal
doctrinal publications such as FM
100-5, it is obvious that we are º
making progress. The issue of “ade
quacy” is one of how much progress,
is it timely and are there blindspots
in our concepts, doctrine and tac
tics? Keeping that in mind, the panel
further refined the 27 AAMAA
issues into what it felt were the most
pressing issues as listed in figure 4.
First, survivability of
special electronic mis
sion aircraft (SEMA)
has always plagued avia
tion to some degree, but
has become more acute in the last 3

SC11 SC 12 SC 13
tº
SC 14 SC 15
or 4 years as we rapidly progress
through the concepts of the central
battle with the ensuing requirement
ACCESSIONS 945 512 816 355 483
for division and corps commanders
to have a dedicated capability to
(FY 82) see and then strike deep. The em
INVENTORY 12,144 5,684 8,491 3,952 5,485 phasis on fighting the second echelon
TOE POSITIONS 4,539 2,429 3,938 1,704 1,999 reinforces this need. The panel felt
that the opportunity to solve this
TDA POSITIONS
(37.4%) (42.7%) (46.4%) (43.1%) (37.2%)
2,849 1,204 1,730 670 1,180
ÅS issue lies in actively integrating
concepts, doctrine and materiel for
(23.5%) (21.1%) (20.4%) (17.0%) (21.5%) P an adequate air defense protection
OTHER (39.1%) (36.2%) (33.2%) (39.9%) (41.3%) R suite and tactics for SEMA. The
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Intelligence School, in conjunction
with the Aviation Center, should
produce a discrete training manual
FIGURE 3: Close Combat Potential Combat Arms Commissioned Officer Data on doctrine, tactics and employment
(SSC-NCR as of 1 Mar 81) of SEMA aircraft operating in the
environment of the integrated Air
Land Battlefield, in NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) as well &
as Mideast scenarios, and, once
• SURVIVABILITY OF SEMA AIRCRAFT
• COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
tº completed, that manual should be
classified because of SEMA's impor
tance to the AirLand Battle.
• JAAT OPERATIONS
• HELICOPTER AIR-TO-AIR
The issue of com
• NBC OPERATIONS >IS - -

bined arms operations

• AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT in the main battle area
• REDUCED VISIBILITY OPERATIONS involves the doctrine
cousine” “s and tactics of integrat
• SELF-DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES
• ACROSS FLOT OPERATIONS
• SEARCH AND RESCUE
. SURVIVAL, ESCAPE, RESISTANCE AND EVASION
; ing the separate factions of Army
Aviation into a smoothly functioning
team, and then integrating these
into the scheme of maneuver of the
combined arms team. Problems here
FIGURE 4: Concepts, Doctrine and Tactics Panel Issues have arisen because there is no

10 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 manual as yet for our new units. doctrine was first published in a both offensive and defensive. Refer
Additionally, these units have not joint TAC/TRADOC training text, ring back to the threat, indica
* been tested, and many field com and its tactics are presently widely tions are that the threat has an air
manders are not fully aware nor practiced. However, the newness to-air capability, more so than do
convinced of the tactical advantages of the concept and the multiple we. The panel felt that there is
and methods of employment of proponency concept have contrib definitely a requirement for a heli
aviation's new brigade organizations. uted to undue variation in JAAT copter air-to-air capability to allow
A doctrinal void also exists in avia procedures, tactics and techniques Army Aviation to accomplish its
tion literature describing how to in academic and field training. assigned missions as part of the
integrate cavalry, attack, utility and To resolve this, the coordinating combined arms team. If for no other
transport aviation units, operating draft of the proposed TAC/ reason than to force the threat forces
together as a team, to accomplish TRADOC joint field manual on to change their tactics, an air-to-air
missions requiring multiproponent JAAT, after revision, should be capability for Army Aviation should
units or aircraft. The requirement published as a Department of the be vigorously pursued. Considering
for multiproponent publications Army and Department of the Air this problem, it would appear ob
adds complexity to an already com Force manual so that it will be vious that the Aviation Center
plex aviation doctrinal system. applicable worldwide. Additionally, should be assigned responsibility as
Opportunities to correct this are the Aviation Center, as the inte the proponent for helicopter air-to
to reinforce the role of the Aviation grator, should be charged in close air combat concepts, doctrine and
Center as the integrating centerfor coordination with the Air Force and tactics, that the air-to-air concept
aviation doctrine. Furthermore, a the combined arms to further statement presently being staffed
how-to-fight manual should be writ streamline JAAT procedures, stan should be approved for development
ten by and at the Combined Arms dardize communications procedures into doctrine, and that Aviation
Center (CAC), in direct coordination and jam-resistant compatible radios, Center training should be expanded
with the Army Aviation community, centralize coordination under the to include air-to-air combat. Air-to
that details Army Aviation doctrine air battle captain operating in con air combat is a reality. Army Avia
and tactics in combined arms oper junction with the ground maneuver tion must be prepared to counter
ations. This manual should tell commander and, finally, add em and exploit this aspect of the Air
aviators and their ground-gaining phasis to strengthen participation Land Battle. Threat helicopter pilots
counterparts how to employ Army by the Field Artillery, particularly are being trained and threat heli
Aviation. Based on the status quo, in battlefield illumination, so that copters are being equipped for air
one would think it sufficient just to JAAT operations can be effectively to-air combat.
include Army Aviation tactics and conducted at night.
doctrine in existing how-to-fight
manuals. The next AAMAA
HELICOPTER Next the panel ad deficiency put before
dressed helicopter air the panel was that of
Ja/A A ! drº,
The third issueCon
by the ad Sº to-air combat opera nuclear, biological chem
tions; specifically, Ar ical (NBC) operations
cepts, DoctrineandTac my Aviation concepts and mission-oriented protective
tics Panel was that of of employment, doctrine and tactics posture. Simply put, doctrine, tactics
Joint Air Attack Team are not written into appropriate man and techniques for aviation unit
(JAAT) operations. While close air uals for air defense by aviation ele operations in an NBC environment
support and combined arms oper ments, either while airborne or do not exist. Concepts do exist and
ation are not recent innovations, during ground operations such as they are important forerunners to
the deliberate, concurrent combi refueling and rearming and laager doctrine, but there is not adequate
nation of attack helicopters, close operations. doctrine. The doctrine we do have
air support aircraft and fire support, Manuals that briefly address heli is oriented to the individual and
as opposed to a sequencing of those copter air-to-air combat are FMs does not address unit tactics in a
elements, is a fairly recent develop 17-50 and 1-101. However, on this contaminated environment, espe
ment. Several associated “how-to subject, these manuals are not com cially with regard to offensive oper
fight” manuals, FMs 71-1, 71-2, 90 patible with AirLand Battle doctrine ations. There are three generic areas
4 and 100-5, stress Army attack air in that they address helicopter air in which aviation unit doctrine,
craft and close air support utiliza to-air combat only in terms of in tactics and techniques need to be
tion but do not mention Joint Air dividual aircraft self-protection and improved: contamination avoid
Attack Team operations. JAAT neglect aviation unit operations, ance, individual and collective pro

JULY 1982 11
 tection, and decontamination. Once
this is accomplished, unit training
in earnest could begin. Of the op
portunities available for solution,
the most obvious calls for the Avia
tion Center, acting as the integrating
center and in coordination with the
Chemical School and other combat
arms, to produce the necessary
doctrine, tactics and techniques for
Army Aviation NBC operations.
º: The sixth issue ad
==IA dressed by this panel
was the deficiency re
aſ lative to airspace man
ManageMENT agement and Army air. operations in reduced visibility con
space control doctrine. Current
Army efforts at airspace manage
ment are wrought with problems
and frustration. Although the avia
tion community has diligently work
ed this problem, it still exists. Air
space above a combat zone belongs
to the joint force commander, and
this overall responsibility for man
agement, control and defense of
this airspace normally rests with the
Air Force component commander.
This position, however, does not
reduce the Army's requirement to
habitually employ aviation, air de
fense and artillery into this airspace, * . . .
nor does it diminish our responsi
bility for the coordination and inte -------------- was strategic, interthea
gration of the use of airspace. We PEPLOYMENT ter/intratheater self.
must have this capability if we intend deployment procedures, a concept
to maximize individual and collec
tive combat effectiveness and pre ware development in progress.
clude mutual interference.
The subissues listed here must
be resolved in both Army and joint
service doctrine to facilitate the
tactical ground commander's ability
to prosecute the AirLand Battle.
Based on the magnitude and com
plexity of this issue, it seems that
the Combined Arms Center should,
as the combat arms integrator and
proponent for command and control
and joint airspace management,
assume responsibility for and take
the lead in solving the airspace
control and airspace management
issue.
12
The next issue was
“reduced visibility op
RE 5Perations." Our AirLand
Battle concept states
that we will conduct
combat operations around the clock.
While doctrinal publications are a
little thin on aviation unit operations
in these conditions, we are exten
sively developing aviation materiel
to fly and shoot at night. It won't do
us any good if we don't know how
to employ it! Again, it seems that
the Aviation Center, as proponent
for instrument flight, should develop
and integrate aviation concepts,
doctrine and tactics for combat
ditions, to include nonaviation
specific manuals such as FM 100-5.
Currently in the field, there is con
siderable confusion as to what kind
of instrument qualifications, rules
and equipment will be required in
combat—Federal Aviation Adminis
tration rules, tactical instrument
rules or international civil aviation
organization rules. Low visibility
operations must address instrument
meteorological conditions, night and
battlefield obscurants.
SELF
The eighth issue con
-
ºf sidered by the panel
presently in being and with hard
Based on recent international de
velopments, one can only perceive
self-deployment of selected Army
aircraft as being vital to ensuring
that Army Aviation can first get
into the battle and then strike deep
when called for. Therefore, ap
propriate doctrine, tactics and tech
niques should be developed by the
Aviation Center and incorporated
into appropriate manuals. This issue
was also addressed by the 1978
Aviation Program Review and since
then we have made tremendous
progress. We have conducted Oper
ation Northern Leap to prove the
feasibility of self-deployability; and,
we are making rapid progress with
the external stores capabilities for
our new aircraft. But we need to
continue; self-deployability will add
flexibility to our current short-legged
fleet by giving the commander an
ability to mission configure his air
craft by trading fuel and payload.
The next issue con
sidered by the panel
Tº or was that of cross for
~~
s-s-s- ward line of own troops
(FLOT) operations. This
issue directly involves all the other
issues we have already discussed—
SEMA aircraft and seeing deep,
combined arms and JAAT oper
ations attacking deep, air-to-air
combat operations to get across the
FLOT to attack deep, NBC oper
ations, airspace management, re
duced visibility operations, and in
tratheater self-deployment oper
ations. Vulnerability continues to
be the biggest problem, although in
many ways Army aircraft are less
vulnerable today than they were in
Vietnam. This can be attributed to
better air defense protection and
less vulnerable aircraft, but tactics
need further development.
The inherent ability of aviation
forces to perform the types of mis
sions we envisage is not succintly
defined in existing how-to-fight man
uals; and while the AirLand concept
calls for the use of aviation forces
to extend the range of the ground
commander, the following questions
are unanswered doctrinally:
• Just how deep can we reason
ably employ aviation?
• Which aircraft will go?
• Will the forward arming and
refueling points operate beyond the
FLOT2
The answers to these and many other
salient questions can be best provid
ed by the Aviation Center acting as
an integrator. In direct coordina
tion with the entire aviation com
munity and in close concert with
CAC, the Aviation Center team can
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
produce a discrete “how-to-fight”
manual on the conduct of aviation
across FLOT operations which
should be, when completed, clas
sified to at least the CONFIDEN
TIAL level.
This leads us to the
SEARCH, tenth and final issue:
ſº and rescue op
REscue" erations and escape and
evasion. If we are going
to do all these things with aviation,
especially in the offense, that we
say that we are going to do, then we
must expect to have aircrews go
down in contested, and denied as
well as uncontested areas, and we
must offer those aircrews a reason
able hope of recovery; we don't do
that now. This problem goes well
beyond ongoing personnel locator
system materiel developments.
Army Search and rescue and survival,
escape, resistance and evasion proce
dures must be compatible with those
of other services and national civil
when, in fact, it is not organized,
trained, managed and recognized
as a full member?”
Based on these questions put
before the AASPR-82, the TRA
DOC directive that outlines propo
nent responsibilities for aviation
systems (the 21 August 1978 letter
entitled “Aviation Proponency and
Integration Functions”) is under
going review.
Throughout the deliberations of
this panel, because of the desire for
consensus, it was obvious that the
principal area of conceptual con
troversy was not directly addressed;
however, it was pervasive and pres
CGºśā)N
Aviation Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
ent in all panel discussions; we are
referring to the concept of aviation
proponency. Since many members
of this panel are also aviation pro
ponents who, by the way, were all
against changing the proponency
concept, it was not directly dis
cussed; however, that issue was
addressed by the Training Panel
and will be discussed in the Septem
ber issue. After
NOTE: Our sincere appreciation to COL
Joseph Rutkowski, DOTD, USAAVNC;
LTC George Coutoumanos (Retired);
CPT(P) Paul Hinote, DOTD, USAAVNC;
and, of course, the panel members for
their contributions.

agencies. The panel feels strongly

that our progress, or the lack of it,
in developing an organic ability to
recover aircrews impacts on our
ability to effectively commit our
aviation forces during self-deploy
ment, at the FLOT and across it.
That concludes the second article
in this series; but we would like to
close with several questions which
are prompted by looking at the
variety of issues in the concepts,
doctrine and tactics area: “Is the
overall concept of Army Aviation,
that is, how our aviation relates to
the rest of the Army, is it what it
should be? Could we fight, organize,
equip, train and manage it better
under a realignment of responsi
bilities? We have already compro
mised on the aviator issue, we no
longer adhere to the principle of
branch qualified aviators, why not
an aviation branch? Why not an
Aviation School with the same
responsibilities and authorities as
the other TRADOC Schools? How
can aviation be declared a full
member of the combined arms team
DRILL DISTANCE
ISSUE: AR 95-1 states that the distance from the unit
is the determining factor for setting the synthetic
flight training system (SFTS) training requirement.
In many cases it is difficult for Reserve Component
aviators to meet these requirements since the aviator
is not colocated with the unit and must travel in some
cases 150 to 175 miles to the unit. It would be better
to set the SFTS requirement from the aviator's current
residence to nearest available training facility rather
than unit location.
COMMENT: Coordination with the National Guard
Bureau (NGB) was made. The NGB recommends the
unit request individual approval for training for those
aviators who are located nearer an SFTS training
facility other than that specified by FORSCOM
Regulation 350-3. The amount of training time will
remain the same and will be determined as it is
currently. (Directorate of Evaluation and Standard
ization)

JULY 1982 13
 PEARLS º
º
-

Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

-- - - -

of the Army Aviation community. This we will continue

º
Zºº - º
to do. By the same token, we would appreciate a “team"
effort to put forth the best information available so we
ſº -
º. º
can all profit by it. We also use PEARL to pass along
information which is certainly a benefit to you in this
fast growing area. Tell us what you're doing out there
for the benefit of ALSE and Army Aviation. Thanks
for your continued support and inquiries.

Headbands for Spectacles

Headbands for spectacles of individuals working in
and around Army aircraft are listed under national
stock number (NSN) 8465-01-102-9129. These headbands
may be ordered from SARGENT SOWELL INC.,
11185 108th Street, Grand Prairie, TX 75050. Part
number is 61W185, manufacturing code is 22027, the
cost is $1.00 each. We do not plan to stock them
because of the minimal cost.

AR 95-XXXX
AR 95-XXXX is currently being staffed/coordina
ted throughout the Army Aviation community. This
regulation when finally published will establish/identify
the Army Aviation life support system program. Should
you have any comments pertaining to this draft regula
º -

tion we would appreciate getting the information

- i.
* . through your major command to DCSLOG-AV,
HQDA, Washington, DC 20310; and should you have
any questions on this regulation please do not hesitate
to give us a call. Point of contact is the DARCOM
Benny Duhaime photo by Tom Greene
Project Officer, AUTOVON 693-3307/2492.

AN/PRC-90 Survival Radio

PEARL Articles
The purpose of each PEARL article is to keep the
Army Aviation community informed of changes or
new developments in the areas of aviation life support
equipment (ALSE), survival techniques, rescue pro
cedures and training, and to make suggestions, answer
questions or clarify policy pertaining to those areas,
and to help correct problems or irregularities in the
field. Everything we say or do is said or done only with
the best interests of Army aircrew personnel in mind.
Should we become aware of someone doing something
that they shouldn't be doing, or using equipment that
they shouldn't be using, or violating regulations they
should be adhering to, then it is our obligation and re
sponsibility to bring that situation to light for the benefit
There isn't a day that goes by that we do not get
inquiries on the AN/PRC-90 survival radio. Seems
that the biggest problem we are faced with is the
replacement of the radio that is turned in for repair to
Sacramento Army Depot. Because these radios are
“Free Issue” it appears that units may be requisitioning
the replacement radios as “Initial Issue.” We have
discussed this problem with the item manager (Jim
Lewis), AUTOVON 992-3919, and believe that the
turnaround process could be speeded up by the units
if they would indicate on their requisition form that it
is an “EXCEPTION REQUISITION" for a serviceable
radio citing the turn-in document number of the un
serviceable radio plus a 26 in column code 55 and 56.
This action should preclude activities' requisition with

14 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 a low Department of Army Management Priority List
(DAMPL) from being placed on backorder. NOTE: It
$ has also come to our attention that some units are
turning AN/PRC-90 survival radios in to Defense
Property Disposal Services. This problem was surfaced
recently during a review of property disposal assets
wherein 60 of the AN/PRC-90 survival radios had
been turned in. All defective/unserviceable AN/PRC
90 survival radios should be turned in to Sacramento
Army Depot because of their criticality and short
supply.
Survival Radio Test Equipment
We in the Army have been using the AN/PRM-32
and AN/PRM-32A test sets and the U.S. Air Force has
been using the AN/PRM-95A tester to test survival
radios and their personnel locator beacons. We also
use the 2530/UR and 2530A test sets to test survival
radio batteries. Unfortunately, these testers do not
test the survival radios as a system and it is possible
that a survival radio may not be fully operational
when it is issued to aircrew personnel. A recent F-4
aircraft accident highlights this possibility wherein
the pilot and navigator ejected from the aircraft. One
individual was rescued when he used his survival
radio and transmitted a beacon signal, the other
individual was rescued a week later by a visual sighting.
Inspection of the survival radios revealed that they
both tested operational, but when they were put into
the new U.S. Air Force survival avionics tester TS
24B, only the survival radio of the individual who
transmitted a beacon signal was operational. This
new tester tests survival radios as a system whereas
the old testers test as a go/no-go but the antenna may
not be putting out a signal. The new tester will test all
survival radios and personnel locator beacons as a
system. An accessories kit containing associated
TS-24B
survival radio tester
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL DARCOM ATTN DRCPO-ALSE,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commorca 31.1.263-3307
JULY 1982
hardware and cables for accommodating all survival
radios and personnel locator beacons for input and
output electrical parameters as a system is provided.
We are currently taking action to gain support for this
tester (see figure) and will keep you aware of its status.
Report Of Discrepancy (ROD)
The ROD is submitted on Standard Form 364 in
accordance with AR735-11-2. Transmittal letters and
indorsements are not authorized. The design of the
SF 364 is sufficient to report discrepant conditions
and direct disposition instructions. So, if someone
finds they are getting equipment which is not up to
standard, i.e., something is missing or found to be
lacking, fire up an SF 364. We would appreciate an
information copy be sent to this office (DRCPO
ALSE); point of contact is Mr. Tommy Vaughn. We
will monitor the action and give you full support to
resolve the issue early.
Aircrew Personnel Body Armor, Small Arms Protective
Assets of the assembled item, front and back plate
w/carrier, in size regular, NSN: 8470-00-935-3193, have
been exhausted; only minimal assets are available in
size short, NSN: 8470-00-935-3192. No additional pro
curement will be made. Army activities authorized
body armor should requisition out-of-stock sizes by
available components and assemble the items locally.
Size Vest Front Plate Back Plate
Short 8470-00-999-1473 8470-00-935-3177 8470-00-935-3174
Regular 8470-00-999-1474 8470-00-935-3178 8470-00-935-3175
Survival Vest, Radio Pocket
Stocks of radio pocket, NSN 8415-00-442-3616, are
exhausted. The effective date of supply for the pocket
which is used to accommodate the AN/PRC-90 survival
radio was July 1982.
Survival Vest, SRU-21/P
The survival kit, NSN 8415-00-177-4819, has among
its components a tropical personnel aid kit, NSN
6545-00-782-6412, which contains ingredients classified
as controlled substances by the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Public
Law 95-513. Authorized Army activities, designated
to receive controlled substances by The Surgeon
General, may submit requisitions for the tropical air
kit direct to RIC S9M: Defense Personnel Support
Center, ATTN: Director of Medical Materiel, 2800
South 20th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101. All other
Army elements, including National Guard installations,
must contact their base hospital or nearest medical
support unit. Subject survival vest is now being shipped
with the butane lighter and signal flares. This is autho
rized by the Department of Transportation Exemption
DOT E6232 (extension) scheduled to expire 1 August
1983.
15
When will we learn about .
mountain flying? &=
Raymond P. Johnson
Directorate for Investigation, Analysis, and Research
U.S. Army Safety Center
-
RECENT REVIEW Of 43
Aº flying accidents
showed that in only eight of
the cases the investigation board
did not fault the flight crew. Six
of the cases involved materiel
failure/malfunction, which brings
a quick conclusion that when an
aircraft component fails, Army
crews are capable of handling the
emergency quite well. The
opposite may also be true. When
crew error OCCurS, CrewS
sometime compound the
problem by trying to recover
from the bad situation they
created. Sometimes they even try
to hide an embarrassing situation
they created.
It is generally believed that in
structor pilots are a cut above
other pilots. They should know
more about how the aircraft
operates, why it does what it
does, what its limitations are, and,
equally as important, what the
limitations of the operator are
and what errors he is most apt to
commit.
IPs must keep their cool in
stressful situations and use good
judgment. Neither of these
attributes is taught in school; they
are usually acquired through
experience. Therefore, our IPs
should be our most talented and
experienced aviators. However,
16
-
- -
- - -
IPs were on board the aircraft in
11 of the 35 mountain flying acci
dents involving crew errors. In all
11 accidents, the IPs were at fault.
This article was not written to
criticize IPs, pilots, copilots, crew
chiefs, commanders, or anyone
else. It should, however, point out
the fact that no one is immune
and that everyone should know
beforehand when approaching
either aircraft or operator limits.
If we always operated at sea level
on a standard day with a
proficient IP at the controls of a
lightly loaded aircraft, we would
have few occasions to test those
limits. If, however, we must
operate in rough terrain and/or
high altitudes with heavy loads,
then we had better become inti
mately knowledgeable of some
VIPs (Very Important Publica
tions). The operators manual and
TC 1-10, Mountain Flying Sense,
are two prime ones.
Let's look at some of the cases
to see if we have progressed over
the years.
A long time ago
A U-8 pilot and passenger were
cruising at 17,000 feet msl, VFR
on top, when a pilot in another
aircraft asked for their location.
The U-8 pilot answered, “I must
be near my destination because
the ADF is getting nervous. I'll
-
drop down through this cloud
deck to see where I am and will
call you back.” That call was
never made. The aircraft and the
dead pilot and passenger were
found at the base of a sheer rock
face near the top of a 15,000-foot
mountain. This particular
mountain would cause the ADF
needle to swing (indicate station
passage) if flight was conducted
near it. This condition was known
by all the aviators in the area, and
it was approximately 85 miles
from the nearest
nondirectional beacon (NDB).
A few years later a U-1A with
five people and some cargo
aboard tried to cross this same
mountain range during inclement
weather. How inclement was it? It
was so inclement that they could
not file an IFR flight plan, so they
filed VFR instead. The planned
route was to cross the southeast
quadrant of an occlusion. A cold
front was moving east
approaching the north/south
mountain range. Their
destination was west of the
mountain range and forecast to
be VFR at ETA.
The flight did not go well. All
the passes through the mountains
were filled with low clouds. The
crew decided to climb on top and
finally, at 15,000 feet msl, were
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
clear of most of the tops. No
oxygen was aboard (although it
was available before takeoff), and
the flight was continued above
14,000 feet for more than an
hour. The ADF was tuned to
destination NDB and when the
needle started swinging, the crew
decided they were at or near their
destination. Radio
communication with their desti
nation established that
destination weather was VFR, so
the crew decided to descend into
heavy buildups ahead and below
them. They encountered severe
turbulence and radioed ahead for
any reported thunderstorm
activity. Destination observers
said, “No, we did have about an
hour ago but they have all moved
to the east into the mountains
now.” At 12,500 feet msl, the
plane flew into a snow-covered
mountain slope and flipped on its
back, 96 nautical miles east of
destination and less than 20 miles
from where the U-8 mentioned
earlier had crashed. Several days
later, the crew chief and one
passenger were rescued in very
poor condition. The bodies of the
other three people were
recovered several months later.
We are not the only ones who
manage to find a cloud full of
rocks on occasion. A commercial
airliner “in the soup” in a squall
line, at night on a VFR flight
plan, flew into a 2,600-foot
mountain about 600 feet below
the peak. Scratch one airliner and
eleven people.
Here are some of the findings:
• The crew was properly
trained and qualified.
• The aircraft was properly
equipped and maintained.
• There was no materiel
failure or malfunction.
• Postmortem found no physio
logical problems.
• The crew had current and
forecasted weather before
takeoff.
• The flight deviated from the
planned route.
JULY 1982
• The flight was operated in
instrument meteorological condi
tions on a VFR flight plan.
• The captain, without
adequate knowledge of the
terrain, directed the flight to
descend to an altitude which was
below terrain elevation.
• There was no evidence that
the captain was concerned about
his position or track over the
ground.
• The accident occurred while
the aircraft was flying straight and
level, under cruise power. The
crew was not aware of the
impending impact with the
terrain.
What has an airliner crash to
do with Army aviation? Most of
the identified faults have also
been committed by Army
aviators. And the Army was
directly involved in this case. Two
UH-1s were sent into this same gray
and murky weather later in the
night in an attempt to retrieve the
bodies. Again, the UH-1s filed
VFR and ran into low scud,
rain, and rising terrain. After
getting caught in a blocked
canyon, they tried to make a 180
degree turn to get out. One made
it. Scratch one UH-1 and three
more people in the same weather
and mountains on the same night.
Another UH-1 was sent to
retrieve the body of a civilian who
had died in a privately owned
aircraft several months earlier.
The UH-1 made a successful
landing at about 13,000 feet msl.
The crew decided to reposition
the aircraft, lost control, and
rolled it over. Another UH-1
successfully rescued the crew.
Not so long ago
A CH-47 with a load of troops
failed to clear a 10,000-foot saddle
and was destroyed during an
attempted landing on a steep
slope.
A few years later, another CH
47 with troops and cargo aboard,
trying to cross a 10,000-foot
saddle, encountered low clouds
in the saddle. The pilot tried a
slow downwind turn and lost
control of the aircraft. It crashed
and burned after bouncing off the
side of the mountain and after the
crew thought they had regained
control during the bounce.
An AH-1G was climbing
around a mountain. About 12,500
feet msl, the crew decided to take
some photos of an observatory.
To get into a better position for
the photos, the crew decided to
overfly a ridgeline. Airspeed dissi
pated to 10 knots, rate of climb
stopped, and rpm dropped to
6,350. Then things started to de
teriorate—altitude, rpm, control,
etc. The crew tried to “plant” the
aircraft on the mountain slope.
The crew survived, but the
aircraft didn't. An OH-58 picked
up the two pilots, who were not
seriously injured, and flew them
Out.
With the aircraft located and
the crew en route to medical
facilities, surely everything was
under control. Not so. The crew
of another OH-58 decided they
needed to go to the crash site to
pinpoint its location. In doing so,
they managed to get into a
situation where they tried to
make a slow, right, downwind
turn. Anyone familiar with the
limitations of the OH-58 can tell
you that slow, right, downwind
turns at high power settings are
not addictive. Usually they are
disastrous but not habit-forming.
This crew survived—the aircraft
didn't.
A UH-1 with nine aboard con
tinued flight into mountainous
terrain and deteriorating weather.
It hit trees and was demolished.
Two people survived, and the
next day they tried to walk out.
One survivor had to give up
after a short distance because of
his injuries, but the other got to a
farmhouse and called a sheriff,
who initiated rescue procedures.
Later, another UH-1 on a
similar mission in the same
mountains had an engine failure
and had to make a landing into
17
the trees on a slope. Maintaining
control of the aircraft saved all
aboard. Six had major injuries,
but had the aircraft hit
uncontrolled, as in the preceding
case, the results would probably
have been as disastrous. These
two mishaps illustrate that when
crews make the errors that create
an emergency they don't fair well.
On the other hand, if the aircraft
creates the emergency, our crews
usually perform very well.
A U-1A pilot was flying across
a mountain range, returning to his
home station. He had flown
nearly 8 hours since initial takeoff
and had been on continuous duty
more than 12 hours. The VFR
flight plan began to get out of
hand since he was in and out of
clouds at 5,500 feet msl. The
destination forecast had been
given as 900 feet scattered, 1,500
feet overcast with a chance of 600
overcast, and 2 miles in light rain
and fog. The pilot elected to get
below the cloud layer and
proceed VFR to destination. He
soon realized he wasn't going to
get below the clouds and started a
180-degree climbing left turn to
get back on top. The aircraft hit
the side of a mountain and was
destroyed. Fourteen hours later
rescue crews found the pilot and
his passenger injured but alive.
A T-42 pilot began a cross
country training mission,
intending to overfly some
mountainous terrain. An hour
and a quarter later, an eyewitness
at 11,170 feet msl watched the
aircraft fly up a canyon and crash
at 12,450 feet on a snow field
below a pass. Three fatalities
resulted from the crash.
A CH-47 was No. 2 in a flight of
three proceeding up a
mountainous valley. No. 1 got
into IMC, climbed, contacted a
nearby approach control, and
returned to home base. No. 2
attempted to cross a ridge VFR in
low clouds and struck powerlines,
destroying the aircraft and killing
the three people aboard.
18
A U-21 flew into a
mountainside in a remote area
after the IFR flight plan was
cancelled. The postcrash fire
consumed the aircraft. There
were five fatalities. Cancellation
of IFR clearances while still IMC
was not uncommon with this
remotely based flight detachment.
A UH-1 was sent to the east of
home base on an instrument
instructional training mission.
The crew, without telling anyone
of any change, proceeded
northwest instead to an 11,500
foot mountain peak. During an
attempt to overfly the peak at less
than 50 feet agl, the IP lost
control of the aircraft and had to
put it down among large rocks
and small trees. Another UH-1
with a qualified mountain flight
crew recovered the downed crew
about 2 hours later.
A UH-1 IP and crew diligently
determined what power was
required and available to make a
takeoff from an Air Force Base at
4,000 feet msl. They then flew to
a ridgetop at 8,500 feet msl and
tried to hover without considering
what power was now available or
required. Needless to say, more
power was needed than was
available. The aircraft turned to
the right until the IP “planted” it
on the side of the ridge. There
was no suitable landing area on
the ridge. The aircraft was totaled
but the crew and passengers were
uninjured. Other less experienced
aviators successfully flew UH-1s
in and out of the crash site for the
next several days. These pilots
used the performance charts in
the operators manual to
determine what performance
would be at the higher elevations.
Later, over a beer, the IP of the
mishap aircraft was asked, “When
did you lose the aircraft?” His
answer, “I lost it on the ground
before takeoff when I failed to
properly plan my flight.” Amen.
An OH-58 was scheduled for a
night ATM training mission. En
route time, with intermediate
stops, was to be 7 hours and 35
minutes. The flight began at 1912
hours. Toward the end of the
mission, the crew decided to
deviate from their plan and do
some approaches at a tank
gunnery range. The pilot started
an approach to a ridgeline covered
with sagebrush and pinon trees.
He decided not to use the landing
light and attempted a go-around
at translational lift. He lost
control during the go-around and
finally chopped power. The
aircraft crashed at 0125 hours
from about 20 feet with impact
forces of 20 g’s. The crew
sustained major injuries and the
aircraft was destroyed.
Unplanned, unscheduled,
unskillful, unprofessional,
unnecessary.
More recently
How about an IP who was not
aboard?
Five UH-1 crews managed to
find themselves on top with low
fuel. One made an instrument
approach to their departure
point. Two found holes,
descended below the Overcast,
and landed in the mountains
where they were refueled and
returned VFR to the departure
point. Two landed on adjacent
ridgelines on a logging road
above the cloud deck. There was
an IP in one of the aircraft.
Before the refueling truck could
service these aircraft, the cloud
deck rose and engulfed them
both. The crews met and planned
their departures. The IP's recom
mendation was that they make
instrument takeoffs (ITO) from
their present location after they
were refueled. He told the PIC of
the other aircraft that it was a
“piece of cake.”
After the refueling was
completed, the IP had his pilot
radio a VFR flight plan for two
UH-1s from the mountain top to
their departure point. The No. 1
crew then made an ITO from a
hover on a VFR flight plan in
zero-zero conditions. They made
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
it on top and radioed back to No.
2 to “come on up.”
The second ITO was slightly
different. The PIC was flying
from the left seat, from a hover,
but never established a climb and
crashed 300 feet below and less
than one-half mile from his
takeoff point. Where does it say
you should make an ITO from a
pinnacle, from a hover, from the
left seat on a VFR flight plan?
This accident will surely tell you
that you shouldn't. Scratch one
UH-1H and crew of three.
How about another IP who
wasn't aboard?
Two W1s were scheduled to lift
a recon patrol to some high
ground in a UH-1H. While
planning the flight the night
before the mission, it appeared to
them that they would be
overgross. They took their
problem to the unit IP who
checked their computations and
came up with a quick fix. “Your
figures are wrong. You are
computing your passengers at 240
pounds when those guys won't
weigh 160 pounds soaking wet
the day after Thanksgiving. Get
them down around 200 pounds
and you'll be all right.” Sure
enough, when they recomputed at
200 pounds per passenger, the “all
up” weight of the aircraft was
below 9,500 pounds—not much,
but below. They took the load to
a ridgeline. The landing was
okay, but while trying to lift off,
rpm bled off. The crew made
a hovering right turn uphill
and downwind to avoid an impact
area. Control was lost and so was
the aircraft. The passengers with
their gear were individually
weighed after the accident. They
averaged 267 pounds each.
How about an IP who was
aboard? The IP was not
functioning as an IP on this flight.
However, he was qualified as an
SIP, an NVG SIP, and an IFE,
and he was flying the aircraft at
the time of the mishap.
Approaching a ridgeline above
JULY 1982
12,000 feet msl, he suddenly
realized he had full left pedal and
only 6300 rpm. The situation
quickly deteriorated to a shallow
right turn that got progressively
worse, shuffling very badly with
no pedal control and losing
altitude. The aircraft hit and
rolled to the left, ending up on its
back. The IP said it was like a
topping check. If you pull
collective until the rpm bleeds
off, it really is something like a
topping check, isn't it?
None of the crew knew what
torque was being used nor what
was available. They did know that
when they took off they had 40.5
pounds available at 6,000 feet.
They had never computed it for
12,000 feet, nor did they look to
see what it was reading in the last
10 to 15 minutes of flight. They
did not know they had exceeded
VNE during cruise flight before
the mishap. The IP had beeped
rpm to 6500 because it sometimes
crept to 6625 to 6650 in flight.
The lowest rpm anyone saw was
5700 and descending. The crew
thought they were at 10,500 to
11,000 feet msl when in fact they
were at 12,000 feet. The highest
anyone remembers on the
altimeter was 11,200 feet. The
PIC/IP was confident he could
handle any situation in a UH-1
and was not particularly
concerned when he found himself
with full left pedal and 6300 rpm.
He expected to fly out of it. The
PIC/IP had deviated from the
planned route to take a closer
look at this particular ridge.
A flight of four AH-1s en route
to a training site approached a
mountain pass. The lead pilot
reported they would not be able to
get through. The No. 4 pilot, the
platoon leader, said they should
go a little bit further. Soon after
ward, lead entered IMC and lost
control of the aircraft. Control
was partially established before
they broke out of the clouds, but
there was not enough room to
fully recover before the aircraft
crashed. Both pilots survived.
One pilot was able to walk to a
road, stop a vehicle, and get help.
IMC breakup procedures had
been briefed before the flight.
However, no one in the flight
followed them. There was a short
period of intense confusion
(panic). The three remaining
aircraft made a 180-degree turn to
return to the departure point and
were immediately confronted
with another flight of four AH-1s
inbound to the same pass. The
original three passed about 50
feet below the second flight.
Neither flight had any idea the
other was in the area. Somehow,
everyone missed everyone else.
Not all of the mistakes made by
the crews in these cases nor the
solutions have been listed in this
article. For those who are
interested in improving their
ability to operate in rough terrain
and high altitude, don't read the
operators manual and TC 1-10;
study them! The limits of the
aircraft are pretty well outlined in
the operators manual, and
TC 1-10 points out lessons
learned in dealing with mountain
operations. Compute; don't check
off the 365F. Unless you really
know the weight of your aircraft,
how can you determine the capa
bilities of it? Study the weather
and learn to cope with it. Who
expected to operate a helicopter
at a density altitude of 15,000 feet
when he was learning to fly one?
But if you are asked to perform at
high altitudes over rough terrain,
don't wait until you get there to
find out you are asking for more
than your aircraft can produce.
How do you go inadvertent
IMC in the daytime? Webster
defines inadvertent as
unintentional, but it also defines it
as heedless and negligent. Check
the publications that pertain to
your operations, local SOPs, etc.
And be sure you correctly
prepare a performance planning
card before pulling pitch. Please.
---
•º-”
19

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
Aviation Center’s
Branch Training Team:
ACTAAT
l, THE LATE 1970s, Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) headquarters recognized a serious shortcoming
in the Army's training system. The shortcoming was that no
formal mechanism existed to provide a link between units
in the field and the service schools and training centers. A
process was envisioned to serve as the foundation for the
development of a closed loop feedback system through
which information would flow from the field to the schools,
integrating centers and TRADOC headquarters. The
information then would be analyzed, acted upon and returned
to the field as new or improved training policies or procedures.
On 21 August 1979, General Donn Starry, then TRADOC
commanding general, directed that each TRADOC institution
establish a “branch training team" for the purpose of
conducting visits to proponent units in the field. The objective
of these visits would be to “establish and maintain a meaningful,
productive dialogue between the TRADOC schools and
field units, battalion size and smaller, and to collect data
pertaining to the effectiveness of training at the TRADOC
institutions.”
The establishment of the branch training team at the
U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, required coordi
nation with each of the other TRADOC institutions which
was the proponent agency for the various aviation related
areas, i.e., Ft. Benning, GA, for utility helicopters, Ft.
Knox, KY, for attack helicopters, etc. Once the coordination
was accomplished, the path was clear for the formation of
the Aviation Center's branch training team, known as the
Aviation Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team,
or ACTAAT.
ACTAAT visits provide an opportunity for field units to
provide data and input into the training programs of the
Aviation Center, thus increasing training effectiveness and
producing a final product which readily meets the needs of
the tactical mission. The ACTAAT visits further provide
the field units a direct connection to other similar programs
within TRADOC institutions and thus a voice in the
formulation of doctrine. In the area of assistance, the team
provides training support materials and briefings on
20
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
SIANDARDIIATION
USAAVNC training plans and programs. The ACTAAT
further serves as a point of contact at the Aviation Center
for information exchange and field feedback.
The data and comments collected during a visit are
collated into a final report and purged of any unit or
personal identification. The data and comments are staffed
to the appropriate agencies and directorates for response.
The responses on all issues developed on a visit are then
submitted to the commanding general of the Aviation Center
for approval. The final report is then forwarded through
the commander of the Aviation Center to the commander
of TRADOC for information and/or any further action.
Copies of the final report are supplied to the commanders
of the visited units. Information pertaining to other TRADOC
institutions is sent to the proponent agency for the proper
disposition.
Since its inception, the ACTAAT has conducted visits to
active duty and Reserve Component Army Aviation and
air traffic control units throughout the world. Time and
funding, however, affect the frequency with which the
visits may be conducted. The current projection is for
annual visits with units in Korea and Europe with the
remaining units being visited every 30 to 36 months.
Methods to provide more timely information sharing and
to increase the contact between the Aviation Center and
aviation related field units are constantly being developed
and evaluated. The monthly feature in the Aviation Digest,
“The ACTAAT Connection,” has been established to highlight
major issues from ACTAAT visits.
The first 18 months of ACTAAT visit reports have been
consolidated and resubmitted to the appropriate agencies
for their comments. The purpose of this consolidated report
is twofold. First, it provides an opportunity for the various
agencies responding to ACTAAT findings to update their
responses. Second, upon completion the report will be
distributed to each aviation and air traffic control battalion
or separate company-sized unit throughout the Army. The
consolidated report will enable the ACTAAT to reach all
units on a yearly basis and will provide the very latest
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
information on those subjects. The consolidated report will
be distributed in the early summer and will become an
annual report.
Although determination of data for improvement of
USAAVNC courses of instruction is paramount to the
ACTAAT mission, it has been found that the rapport
established with the unit because of the visit is of equal
importance. The visit provides the unit an opportunity to
tell USAAVNC what is needed to make aviation a full
partner in the combined arms team, what type of training to
emphasize, and what training products are needed to ac
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL
C(DºDN
A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
NVG QUALIFICATION
ISSUE: There is a strong feeling in the field that night
vision goggles (NVG) qualification training covers
more tasks than are needed. It is perceived that there
is little need for traffic pattern maneuvers other than
normal and shallow takeoffs and landings. It is also
perceived that proficiency in simulated emergency
procedures is required only for low level and hovering
autorotations. Traffic pattern work is largely unreal
istic because of the lack of visual feedback at altitude
under NVG. Simulated emergency maneuvers, other
than those cited, will be flyable and the aviator will
be able to fly the aircraft to a suitable area for a
normal NVG landing, or to a prepared field where
NVG will not be required. Instructor pilots stated
that more time should be devoted to teaching aviators
the visual cues applicable to tactical NVG contour,
low level, and nap-of-the-earth flight.
COMMENT: NH/NVG flight training courses are
designed to develop proficiency in all the aircrew
training manual (ATM) maneuvers which may be
JULY 1982
complish efficient unit training. In turn, this data is con
sidered for use throughout the aviation community, saving
resources and increasing training effectiveness and tactical
awareness.
The ACTAAT stands ready to provide assistance or
information in Army Aviation or air traffic control matters.
Any questions or requests may be made by calling AUTOVON
558-4691 or 6571 or by writing the Directorate of Evaluation
and Standardization, ATTN: ATZQ-ES-E, Ft. Rucker, AL
36,362. Aºmº
36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message
performed in the NH/NVG mode. This ensures aviator
proficiency in all aircraft operations within the
NH/NVG flight environment. This also applies to
emergency procedures since it is impossible to
anticipate the varied flight conditions an aviator will
encounter while in the NH/NVG flight environment.
The ATM delineates the minimum iterations necessary
to achieve maneuver qualification. The commander
may increase the number of iterations as necessary to
attain or maintain maneuver proficiency. When fielded,
the AN/PVS-6 Aviator Night Vision Imaging System
(ANVIS) will provide sufficient visual cues to allow
night flight at traffic pattern altitudes. Additionally,
although unlikely, it is conceivable that a running
landing may have to be conducted while wearing
NVG at a tactical site due to constraints of fuel, time
or tactical situation. Therefore, aviators should be
trained to perform all required maneuvers to proficiency
in case of such a contingency. As stated in an earlier
comment, the NH/NVG task list is being reviewed, in
an attempt to align requirements with the flight envelope
of the AirLand Battle. These, and similar issues will
be considered during that review. (Directorate of
Training Developments)
21
-

--- º º
This is the second of a five-part series by Richard K. Tierney
- ---
º ---
-

º º º º
-

º º-lº - - - º º
- -

* ATION L.
 ºn 2.
B(IILDING
- º -

-
- A TRAINING
The first pilot class. This class was graduated in -

September 1942 at Fort Sill, OK. Reading from left to

right they are: front row,LTS. A. Williamson, CPT J.E. º.
*
PROGRAM
º Swenson, LT. H. R. Phillips and SGT J. S. Rengers; -
-
-

middle rºw, set his wiſkinson, setw.c.

Schoonower, LT.J. W. Byrd, LT. W. D. Stephens and SGT
C.B. Allen Jr.; top row, LT B.A. Davol Jr., LTG.M. Department of Air Training
Albert, LT-R. P. Stallings II, CPT J. M. Watson Jr. and
LTT. L. Hendrix. Absent when this picture was taken
were CPTE.S.Gordon and LTJ.U. Overall (Inset).
---
mechanics. It got underway on 27
July 1942 and lasted 5 weeks—
making it Army Aviation's first class. Mean
while, preparations to begin the first flight
class were completed by the end of July. The
instructors, consisting mostly of members of
the Class Before One, did not have long to
wait. The 19 students who started out in Pilot
Class One reported in on 1 August and began
training two days later, flying the L-4B Piper,
the L-2B Taylorcraft and the L-3C Aeronca.
Sixteen of them were graduated on 18
September.
Post Field at Fort Sill was turned over to the
Army Ground Forces by the Army Air Corps.
Thus Army Aviation had its first airfield with
23 aircrafton hand and 100L-4s plus 50 L.2s on
order. Several small auxiliary fields were built
either on the reservation or on nearby leased
land. Some tactical training strips also were
built.
For the first five flightclasses the Department
of Air Training was able to accept both officer
and enlisted soldiers from the Army Ground
and Army Service Forces. However, each stu
dent had to have at least 60 hours of flight time
and hold (or have recently held) a pilot's license.
That prompted growing pains. By November
1942, the sources for obtaining experienced
pilots from within Army Ground and Service
Forces had dried up. A plan under which the
Army Air Forces would supply 100 basic trained
pilots a month also failed. Consequently, an

JULY 1982
 Colonel William W. Ford, left, first director of the Department of Air Training chats
with Lieutenant Colonel Gordan J. Wolf, first deputy director, at Fort Sill, OK, in 1942.
agreement was made with the Air Corps that
effective 26 November it would provide primary
flight training at Denton, TX, to Army Ground
Forces' pilots. In March 1943 that training
began alternating between Denton and Pitts
burg, KA; and by November it was completely
phased out at Denton.
Upon completion of Air Corps primary train
ing the students were given silver wings, and
then they reported to Fort Sill for tactical flight
training that would make them Army aviators.
They showed up at Fort Sill a little cocky, with
50-mission crushed hats, and without any re
spect whatsoever for Colonel Ford's desire that
everyone stay off the grass. Only a few of their
number experienced the wrath of the veteran
from the Field Artillery before they quickly
gained a little humility—and stayed off the
grass!
Originally the Field Artillery planned for 80
percent of its aviators to be enlisted, with the 20
percent officers providing supervision. But
things didn't work out that way, primarily
because people who were able to be aviators
also were officer candidate school (OCS) mate
rial. The enlisted pilots usually left troop units
for OCS shortly after reporting for duty. The
War Department reasoned that it would be
better for enlisted soldiers to attend OCS before
going to flight school, and on 20 April 1943 they
24
ceased to be eligible for liaison pilot training.
In late 1944, the Army Air Forces elected to
terminate training at Pittsburg and Class Num
ber 88 was the last to be trained there. Class
Number 89 was shifted to Sheppard Field, TX.
AGF Air Training School
Army Aviation was an instant success in
combat and soon branches other than Field
Artillery were clamoring for light organic avi
ation to support their operations. In fact, it
became a common practice among the combat
arms to borrow the Cubs whenever possible.
This situation did not go unnoticed at the War
Department. As a result, in August 1945 it
extended organic aviation to five more users:
Cavalry, Infantry, Engineers, Armor and Tank
Destroyer. The War Department also approved
additional light aircraft to accommodate the
expansion.
This growth of Army Aviation resulted in a
need to increase the flight training program
and, effective 7 December 1945, the Department
of Air Training at the Field Artillery School
was redesignated the Army Ground Forces Air
Training School. It was organized to provide
tactical training to support the combat arms
that were incorporating organic aviation. Brig
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 adier General Ford (promoted and back from
troop duty after departing Fort Sill in January
1944) was made commander.
After World War II the Army reorganized its
schools, and the Army Ground Forces Air
Training School was redesignated again as the
Department of AirTraining. However, it contin
ued to train Army aviators for all of the combat
armS.
The Korean War broughton another increase
in student input; and by 1953 Army Aviation
was on the verge of having a full-fledged Army
school.
Credit for the success and continued growth
of Army Aviation from the 1940s to 1953 can be
attributed to many people, including General
Ford and Colonel Wolf, who had become the
Department of Air Training commander in
1944. Other key people were Captains Robert R.
Williams and T.S. Baker, each of whom served
tours as chief of the Flight Division; Captain
E.F. Houser, chief of the Tactics Division; also
Captain Robert M. Leich and Lieutenants
Marion J. “Jake” Fortner and Lloyd M.
Bornstein. Lieutenant Fortner, a member of the
Class Before One, was an aeronautical engineer
and experienced in light aircraft maintenance.
He was primarily responsible for developing
maintenance courses for both pilots and
mechanics.
Army Aviation School
The success and growth of Army Aviation
resulted in the establishment of the Army
Aviation School at Fort Sill on 1 January 1953.
It was made a Class I activity under the
commanding general of the Fourth Army by
authority of Department of Army General Or
ders No. 9, dated 16 January 1953. In reality
the school did not come into existence until 1
July 1953 when the Department of AirTrain
ing was deactivated. Also the birthday of the
Army Aviation School was officially changed
to 6 June to coincide with the birthday of
Army Aviation. Secretary of the Army, Wilber
JULY 1982
M. Brucker, approved the change 23 February
1960 and ordered that the 6 June birthday be
made a matter of record.
By 1953, primary fixed wing flight training
was being conducted for the Army by the Air
Force at Gary Air Force Base, San Marcos, TX,
in L-19 (O-1) Bird Dogs and L-21 Super Cubs.
Also, the Army established its own instrument
flight training at Fort Sill in January 1953. The
LC-126, a Cessna, was used in the instrument
flying course which was under the Department
of Flight at the Aviation School. In August, the
first instrument flight examiner's course was
initiated.
When the Korean War broke outin June 1950,
Army Aviation's training assets consisted of 50
members on the staff and faculty, about 100
students and about 125 aircraft. By August
1954, the Aviation School had grown to about
300 members, 800 students and about 500
aircraft. Fort Sill could no longer accommodate
the growing Army Aviation School. Also, peri
odic storms of great intensity took their toll on
the aircraft, causing millions of dollars in
damage and resulting in thousands of flight
training hours lost. It was time to look for a
home of its own for Army Aviation.
The Move To Rucker
After considering eight possible sites, Camp
Rucker, AL, was selected primarily because it
had four major advantages over the others. It
included Ozark Army Airfield (now Cairns)
with three 5,000-foot runways; its buildings had
just been renovated at a cost of$8 million; huge
truck stands would serve as good heliports for
an emerging rotary wing training program;
and it had large buildings that had been used
for truck repair and would serve as good helicop
ter maintenance hangars.
Brigadier General Carl I. Hutton, who had
reassumed command of the Army Aviation
School at Fort Sillin July 1954, was alerted by a
Department of the Army letter dated 23 July
1954 to move the Aviation School and Aviation
25

ABOVE: An L-19 (O-1) Bird Dog
BELOW: Ozark Army Airfield,
Camp Rucker, AL, when the
Army Aviation School moved
from Fort Sill, OK.
EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL ORDERS
PERTAINING TO ARMY AVIATION
DA General Orders No. 9 dated 16 January 1953.
| ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL, FORTSILL, OKLAHOMA. Effective 1 January 1953, the Army Aviation
School is established at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as a class|activity under the jurisdiction of the Commanding
General. Fourth Army
DA General Orders No. 85 dated 15 December 1954
| ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL. CAMP RUCKER ALABAMA. Effective 1 November 1954 the Army
Aviation School is discontinued at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and concurrently established as a class|activity at
Camp Rucker, Alabama, a class installation under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General. Third
Army
DA General Orders No. 17 dated 2 March 1955.
|| ARMY AWIATIONCENTER. Effective 1 February 1955, the Army Aviation Center is established as a
class|activity, under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General. Third Army, at Camp Rucker. Alabama
a class I installation under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General. Third Army. The Army Aviation
Center will consist of the Army Aviation School and such other activities as may be assigned.
DA General Orders No. 63 dated 27 October 1955.
III. CAMP RUCKER ALABAMA. Effective 13 October 1955. Camp Rucker, Alabama is redesignated
Fort Rucker. Alabama and announced as a permanent Department of the Army installation
DA General Orders No. 26 dated 29 June 1956
|| TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT TEST AND SUPPORT ACTIVITY FORT RUCKER. ALABAMA
Effective 1 July 1956, the Transportation Aircraft Test and Support Activity is established as a Class ||
activity under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Transportation, at Fort Rucker, Alabama, a classlinstallation
under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General. Third Army, and is assigned to the Transportation
Supply and Maintenance Command
DA General Orders No. 29 dated 11 July 1956.
IV. WOLTERSAIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS. Effective 1 July 1956, Wolters Air Force Base, Texas,
is transferred from the control of the Department of the Air Force to the Department of the Army, and
designated Camp Wolters, Texas, a class I installation under the jurisdiction of the Commanding
General, Fourth Army
DA General Orders No. 41 dated 12 September 1956
| SIGNAL CORPSAVIATION TEST AND SUPPORT ACTIVITY FORTRUCKER ALABAMA. Effective 15
September 1956, the Signal Corps Aviation Test and Support Activity is established as a Class ||activity
under the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer, at Fort Rucker. Alabama a class I installation under the
jurisdiction of the Commanding General. Third Army. W
DA General Orders No. 22 dated 25 April 1957
| UNITED STATES ARMY AVIATION SAFETY BOARD FORT RUCKER ALABAMA. Effective 1 May
1957, the United States Army Aviation Safety Board is established as a class || activity under the
jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, at Fort Rucker, Alabama, a class
installation under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General. Third Army.
CONARC General Orders No. 14 dated 15 July 1955:
SECTION | ORGANIZATION OF BOARD Pursuant to authority contained in paragraph 60a (6). Change
7. SR 10-5-1 and under the provisions of AR 220-5, the 8576th DU, Board Number 6, Headquarters
Continental Army Command, is organized with station at Camp Rucker, Alabama. (Board No. 6 was
redesignated U.S. Army Aviation Board by authority of CONARC General Orders No. 1 dated 1 Jan 1957)
Department of the Army General Order No.5, dated 4 Feb 1963changed the name to U.S. Army Aviation Test
Board
- --
**** -
- ". * * *

- 2- - - - - -
Last class to start at Camp Gary, April 1959
STANDING (left to right) - Unknown,
Unknown, 2LT Warren E. Griffith II, 1 LT
Eduard A. Colburn, LTC James D. Kidder
(Class Leader), 2LT James D. Bradin IV,
2LT Robert L. Burns, 2LT Terry L. Gordy,
Unknown, 2LT Paul D. Vanture, 2LT
James R. Hubbard, 2LT Allan R. Fetters,
1LT George F. Newton, 2LT Roy E.
Lindstedt, CPT John W. Lauterbach, 2LT
Stephen McIntyre.
SITTING (left to right) - 1 LT Robert A.
Herbold, Unknown, 1 LT James W. Napier
III, Unknown, 2LT Bestor W. Coleman III,
Unknown, 2LT Charles L. Haskell Jr., 2LT
James Thomas, Ms Brown (Flight Records),
I LT Richard W. Buckland, Dr. Prophet
(HUMRO), 1 LT John C. Lobias, 2LT
William D. Gardner, 2LT Ronald C. David,
Unknown, 1LT Jack D. Kincaid, 2LT
James D. Bates, 2LT Henry L. Harvey Jr.
Test Section of (Army Field Forces) Board No. 1
to Camp Rucker. The general's chief of staff,
Lieutenant Colonel Carlyle W. Arey, departed
Fort Sill for Camp Rucker on about 20 August
: with a party of 50.
On 1 September 1954 General Hutton as
sumed command at Camp Rucker. Colonel
Jules E. Gonseth Jr., assistant commandant of
the Aviation School, remained behind to phase
out operations at Fort Sill.
The first course to get underway was a
combined Army Aviation tactics course. Class
AATC-54-K and Class AATC-54-L, both of
which had completed primary flight training at
Gary, became AATC-54-K-L. That class of 120
officers started training 18 October 1954 to
become the first Aviation School flight class at
Rucker. It was graduated 29 January.
By December 1954, there were several classes
in session at Camp Rucker and all necessary
JULY 1982
-
- -
- - -
C- º - - * - -
... – º –– º
*- " - - - * *
KNEELING (left to right) - All instructors,
all unknown except fourth from left, Mr.
Don Lofton.
NOT PICTURED - I LT John J. Berner,
1LT Alexander S. Budd Jr., 1LT William L.
Effler, 1 LT Ronald Kennedy, 1 LT James M.
Langston, 1 LT Max K. McHaney, 1LT
Raleigh R. Meyer Jr., 1 LT Marvin E.
Morris, 1LT Robert P. St. Louis, 1LT Bob T.
Watson, 2LT Charles F. Densford Jr., 2LT
Robert K. Dillon Jr., 2LT Holman Edmond
Jr., 2LT Philip R. Fidler, 2LT James P.
Mellin, 2LT Paul J. O'Donohue, 2LT Eduin
P. Ofgant Jr., 2LT Ronald D. Renfro, 2LT
Stephen M. Solomon IV, 2LT Leigh R.
Sprouts, 2LT William Tantau, 2LT Charles
Teeter, 2LT Hasten B. Walker, 2LT
Langston W.T. Weinberg.
facilities were operating. The Army Aviation
School celebrated its first Christmas in its new
home.
The development of the Army Aviation train
ing base received a couple of shots in the arm in
1955. The Army Aviation Center was estab
lished 1 February 1954 and on 13 October Camp
Rucker was redesignated Fort Rucker, making
it a permanent Army installation.
A Department of Defense memorandum dated
on 19 April 1956 directed the Army to assume
responsibility for all of its Army Aviation
training. The Army took over Camp Gary 14
December and awarded a primary flight train
ing contract to W.J. Graham and Sons, Inc. The
first class, 57-9, was made up of 115 Army
students.
In a move to improve its program, the Army
moved primary fixed wing training to Fort
Rucker on 1 July 1959. The Department of
27
 First Primary Fixed Wing Class at Fort Rucker
OFWAC 60-1
11 September 1959–27 January 1960
Green I on Left–Green II on Right
1st Row (L to R) Capt W.E. Crouch, Jr Capt W.T. Fitts, III 1st Lt F.W. Russell
Maj R.M. Shoemaker Capt W.A. Lusk, Jr Capt J.B. Hatch 1st Lt T.R. Chapman
Capt J.F. VanSant Capt J.M. Blair 1st Lt H.E. Malone, Jr. 1st Lt C.F. Morgan
Maj C.B. Sinclair Capt J.A. Lynch 1st Lt L.E. Scoggins 2nd Lt R.M. RuSch
Maj R.S. Kellar 2nd Lt R.L. Hazlewood 1St Lt J.A. Matos, Jr.
Maj K.E. Davidson 2nd Row (L to R) 2nd Lt R.W. Nelson 2nd Lt J.L. Christie
Maj R.L. Gabardy 1st Lt D.J. Kim 2nd Lt K.0. Hulse 1st Lt F.D. Scott
Lt Col W.C. Boehm 1st Lt A.L. Powell 1st Lt C.E. Sauer 2nd Lt D.M. Whitehead
Lt Col M.H. Pats0ns 1st Lt C. Chin 2nd Lt R.L. Chancellor 2nd Lt D.H. Halsey
Lt Col G.S. Beatty, Jr Capt C. Chang 2nd Lt G.W. Nelson
Col A.M. Burdett, Jr. Capt K. Yoon 3rd Row (L to R) 2nd Lt J.P. Vaughn
Lt Col J.W. Hemingway 1st Lt P.L.J. Klempnow 1st Lt C.G. Robertson 2nd Lt C.F. Shearer
Lt Col G.A. Peyer 1st Lt J.B. Morgan 1st Lt R.L. Filson
Maj M.M. Mahmud 1st Lt D.T. Moentmann 1st Lt J.M. Henderson, Jr. Absent—
Maj R.J. Dillard 1st Lt W.D. Gess, Jr 1st Lt R.D. Millspaugh Capt H.L. Wheeler
Maj T.A. Crozier Capt J.H. Mapp 1st Lt Z.K. Rector 1st Lt W.F. Boyle

º
- Sº \

–= - -
T-42 Cochise The first five Mohawks are lined up at Bethpage, NY, In
July 1960 with three YAO-1 (OV-1) models flanked by
two AO-1AFs.

28 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


Primary Fixed Wing Training was established
at Lowe Army Airfield. Lieutenant Colonel
G.W. Jaubert was the first director.
The first class at Fort Rucker, 60-1, began
training 11 September 1959 and was composed
of 57 officers ranging in rank from second
lieutenant to full colonel. Many of this group
were destined to play key roles in the develop
ment of Army Aviation, and in fact the U.S.
Army as a whole.
Fort Stewart
As the mid-1960s approached, the war in
Vietnam intensified and placed heavier and
heavier demands on the Army for aviators. The
skies became overcrowded at Fort Rucker, and
in February 1966 the Department of the Army
approved the establishment of a U.S. Army
Aviation School Element at Fort Stewart, GA,
to train initial entry fixed wing students. The
flight training program was conducted at Fort
Stewart's Hunter Army Airfield. It consisted of
phases A and B (primary and advanced) in the
single engine T-41 Mescalero. The students
then went to Rucker for 16 more weeks of
training, 8 in the twin engine T-42 Cochise and
the remainder in the single engine O-1 Bird Dog
(the airplane the students would most likely be
flying in Vietnam).
When hostilities ceased in Vietnam, the input
of flight students was greatly reduced. In a
move to consolidate flight training at Fort
Rucker, the Department of the Army directed
that the Army Aviation School Element be
phased out. The last class at Fort Stewart was
Aviator Qualification Course 74-2 which began
training 19 July 1973 and was graduated 21
August 1973.
During the 1960s, the emphasis in Army
Aviation was shifting from fixed wing aircraft
to rotary wing. Late in that decade, the require
ment for fixed wing operations decreased by
about 45 percent. Thus, plans called for elimina
tion of the initial entry fixed wing program.
This by no means meant that the Army's fixed
JULY 1982
Vºs. *. >
wing operations were being phased out com
pletely. The OV-1s, U-8s, U-21s, T-41s, T-42s
and C-12s would continue to play vital roles in
support of the Army Aviation mission. The
Army's fixed wing needs were met by transition
ing rotary wing aviators into fixed wing aircraft
through qualification courses. The first “Q”
Course input for fixed wing aviators for fiscal
year 1972 was scheduled to include 446 students.
A 29-year era in Army Aviation history
ended at Fort Rucker on 29 June 1971 with the
combined graduation of 35 Army aviators of
initial entry fixed wing classes 71-17 and 71-18.
Part of the graduation ceremonies included an
impressive—and highly nostalgic—flyby. It
was a final salute back through the years to all
of the fixed wing classes, to and including the
Class Before One. In fitting tribute to this “End
of an Era Flyby” Colonel J Y Hammack, then
the senior Army aviator at Fort Rucker, led the
pass-in-review in an L-5. Then came the 18 O-1
Bird Dogs—in formation, impressive and
proudly passing the reviewing stand in front of
the Aviation Center headquarters building for
the last time. As they passed, one could see
approaching in the distance UH-1s flown by
graduates of an initial entry rotary wing class—
also in formation, also proud and impressive,
and also Army aviators, as were those who
preceded them.
Army Rotary Wing History
The helicopter began attracting attention in
Army circles in early 1945. It was felt that the
flight capabilities of rotary wing aircraft made
them uniquely qualified to “live” in the field
and provide airmobile support to the ground
forces. Subsequently, plans were made to obtain
helicopters, and an informal agreement was
made with the Army Air Corps to train the first
Army helicopter pilots. They were to be selected
on an individual basis and trained in R-4, R-5
and R-6 helicopters at Scott Field, IL; Sheppard
Field, TX; and San Marcos, TX.
continued on page 32
29
 FORTY: YEARS OF ARMY AVIATI ON + -

U.S Aºnly * * * TON DIGEST

º
 OPPOSITE: O-1 Bird Dogs in the “End of an Era Flyby.”
pass the reviewing stand on 29 June 1971 in front of the
headquarters building at Fort Rucker, AL. This combined
graduation of Classes 71-17 and 71-18 marked the end of
Army Aviation initial entry fixed wing training.

OPPOSITE INSET: Colonel J Y Hammack led the pass in

review in an L-5.

LEFT:Captain Robert J. Ely, The Army's first helicopter pilot.

BELOW INSET: Bell’s YH-13 was the first helicopter

procured by Army Aviation in 1946.

BOTTOM: The Continental Army Command’s Board

Number 6 tested the YH-13.H. Some of the Army aviators
who test flew the Sioux were (left to right, kneeling)
CWO Alva Anderson, Captain Charles C. Watts and CWO
George W. Cox; (standing) CWO Bert E. Ratcliff, CWO
Walter S. Catlow and CWO Joseph H. Pfluger.

- - -
º º, --
Z_Vº - -

JULY 1982 31
 FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
Captain Robert J. Ely completed the course
at Scott Field in 1945 to become the Army's first
helicopter pilot. Others who received their train
ing from the Air Corps included Captains
Kenworthy Doak, Thomas J. Rankin, and JY
Hammack, and Lieutenants Robert R. Yeats,
Daniel Wilson and Norman Goodwin.
The first helicopters were procured for Army
Aviation in 1946 with the purchase of 13 Bell
YR-13s (in 1948 the letter designation was
changed from R to H). The next year Bell
conducted the first formal Army helicopter pilot
training course, using the YR-13. Those attend
ing were Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marinelli,
Major Jack Blohm, and Captains Hubert D.
Gaddis and Darwin P. Gerard.
Interest mounted in the helicopter and in
1947 the Army contracted with the Air Corps to
provide primary rotary wing training for Army
students at San Marcos. The first class got
underway on 1 September 1947 and lasted 6
weeks. Major Harry Bush, Captains Jack
Tinnen and Troy B. Hammonds and Lieutenant
L.C. Boyd were trained in the YR-13.
During the 6-week course the Army students
received 25 hours of instruction, which the
Army considered to be inadequate. In fact, the
Army felt that its students who were trained at
San Marcos knew little or nothing about the
techniques or finer points of helicopter flying.
Consequently, the Army established the Heli
copter Advanced Tactical Training Course
(HATTC) on 1 November 1948 in the Depart
ment of Air Training at Fort Sill, OK.
Captain Gaddis set up the flight training
course and flight standardized the first Army
rotary wing instructor pilots. Those IPs, who
had received primary rotary wing training
either from the Air Force or Bell, included
Lieutenants Rodney J. Collins, Norman
Goodwin and Marcus Sullivan, and civilians
Charles L. Martin and James K. Knox. They
taught the Army's first tactical helicopter
training course.
The value of using helicopters to transport
cargo (and troops) was brought into full focus
during the Korean War. The emergence of
32
Transportation Corps helicopter companies
resulted in the need for the Aviation School to
train pilots to fly transport helicopters. The
result was a course which did not require
applicants to have prior aviation training. It
was hoped the Air Force would teach the
course; but it refused, stating that helicopter
flying could not be taught to anyone who was
not already a pilot. Bell Helicopter also re
fused to teach the class for basically the same
reason. Consequently, the Army took a bold,
unprecedented step and established the
course itself. The enlisted portion, which
graduated warrant officer aviators, consisted
of intensive OCS-type training, to include
hazing. There were rigid inspections, and it
was not, for example, uncommon to see a
candidate standing at brisk attention and
continuously saluting a telephone pole while
addressing it in the proper military manner.
The course was an immediate success, and
when the Aviation School was moved to
Camp Rucker it was changed from a section
of the Flight Department to a department of
its own. Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hill
was made director of the Department of
Rotary Wing Training at Fort Rucker, and
Major Gaddis was his deputy.
Rucker’s first helicopter class
(ACHPC 55-5)
W/0 Jack M. Hendrickson Sgt Bobby G. Bruce
1st Lt Donald F. Lusk M/Sgt Robert W. Beechter
1st Lt Willie M. Dixson SFC Rex C. Flohr
1st Lt Curtis 0. Greer Pvt Charles R. Hall
CW0 William L. Ruf SFC Donald R. Joyce
Capt Glen W. Jones M/Sgt M.I. Keys
2d Lt Raymond E. Smith SFC Raymond T. Kline
1st Lt Jack C. Snipes Sgt Michael J. Madden
M/Sgt Donald C. Beachnew SFC Eugene E. Price
M/Sgt Henry R. Beau SFC Lucis L. Share
M/Sgt John F. Williams M/Sgt Joseph M. Truitt
Sgt Stanton C. Beedy SFC Jay L. Dugger
SFC L.T. Brown
Listed above are members of ACHPC 55-5
which on 30 April 1955 became the first
to have started training and to be
graduated at Camp Rucker.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 -
licopter School, ſº Tx.

- -

- --

FIRST CLASS TO GRADUATE FROM USAPHS -

WARRANT OFFICERS

1. Clayton L. Anderson 19. Lloyd K. Kaul

2. Alvin D. Arrington
3. John A. Banks
20. §.) G. Kusilka
21. Paschaſ Lentini-Bottey
4. James E. Beeman 22. Robert W. Meade
5. Wirl A. Black 23. John E. Moodt
6. Donald D. Bright 24. Henry C. Norton
7. Basil B. Cataſano 25. James M. Parker
8. James B. Childers 26. James P. Pickel
9. Benson M. Collett 27. Joseph L.R. Pinard
10. Gerald H. Dirks 28. Leslie G. Purdon
11. Roger L. Eichelberger 29 Royce D. Raley
12. James A. Godfrey 30 Hu B. Rhodes
13. Lawrence C. Hammond 31. John W. Schwegler
14. Raymond L. Henr 32. William T. Slye, Jr.
15. Joseph P. Hollan 33. Alfred E. Smith
16. Charles R. Honeycutt 34 Dale L. Stockwell
17. Carl H. Hunter 35 CWO Robert E. Helterbran
Martin A. Jetton

º - º
- -

As a result of the move from Fort Sill, Army
Cargo Helicopter Pilot Course 55-E was can
celled and ACHPC55-F reported to Rucker on
18 October 1954. It was the first rotary wing
class to begin instruction at Rucker and on 30
April 1955 the first to be graduated.
Fort Wolters
The Department of Defense memorandum
of 19 April 1956 directing the Army to assume
all Army Aviation training, also resulted in
the transfer to the Army of Wolters AFB,
Mineral Wells, TX, for use as the Army
Primary Helicopter School.
The Army terminated its operations at
Gary AFB, and 1 July 1956 Wolters was
transferred to the Army. Colonel John
Inskeep, who had been sent from Rucker
earlier to help effect the transfer, assumed
command. On 13 July, Secretary of the Army,
Wilber M. Brucker, redesignted the post
Camp Wolters; on 26 September it became an
official Army school (it was made Fort
Wolters June 1963).
The first class at Wolters was Army Avi
ation Transport Pilot Course (Rotary Wing)
57-6, with training conducted in the H-23
Raven. After graduation on 27 April 1957, a
portion of this class reported to Fort Rucker
for transition training into transporthelicop
ters. The rest was sent to various Army units
to fly utility and observation helicopters.
At first Wolters and Rucker each handled
half of the primary helicopter training input.
But in 1958, it was all turned over to Wolters.
Training at Fort Wolters grew steadily,
with 2,120 students in residence by 1966, and
it was still increasing. But in 1973, under the
plan to consolidate flight training at Fort
Rucker, the phase-out was started at Fort

JULY 1982 33
 FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
Wolters. The last class there was Initial
Entry Rotary Wing Class 74-7/8 which had
started training 15 July 1973 and was gradu
ated 15 November 1973. The next classes
reported to the Aviation Center.
Helicopter Instrument Program
It was inevitable that a rotary wing instru
ment program would emerge. By 1954 the
Army was experiencing a rising number of
helicopter accidents caused by loss of visual
reference to the ground. This resulted in an
Army policy statement that prohibited heli
copters from being flown “unless visual ref.
erence to the ground can be maintained.”
This was a matter of immediate concern
because the new policy was in direct contra
diction to the growing hope that the helicopter
was the answer to balancing the firepower
mobility scales. To be effective, helicopters
had to be able to operate around-the-clock in
any part of the world at near zero visibility.
A group at the Aviation School was deter
mined to solve the problem. Major Gaddis,
the director of the Department of Rotary
Wing Training, appointed Captains Ellis G.
(Sam) Langford and Emil E. Kluever to con
duct a test and evaluation program to deter
mine the feasibility of helicopter instrument
flight. The two really started from scratch,
although they had earlier accomplished the
Army's first simulated (hooded) helicopter
instrument flights. Some instrument work
also had been done on a small scale in Korea
with H-19 Chickasaws.
After an evaluation, the single rotor H-19
was chosen to be used as the instrument
trainer over the tandem rotor H-25 Army
Mule, which was not as stable and had too
much vibration, making it difficult to read
the instrument panel. The first instrument
class, consisting of Chief Warrant Officers
Clifford Turvey and A.R. Tucker began
3 May 1955. Several others followed and on
34
16 April 1956, Brigadier General Carl I.
Hutton, commandant of the Aviation School,
was granted authority to issue helicopter
instrument tickets. On 1 May, he presented
the first standard helicopter instrument
tickets.
A few months earlier, on 19 January 1956,
the first actual instrument flight was made
by CWO Tucker and Mr. Don G. Clark. It
lasted 1 hour and was conducted at various
altitudes up to 4,000 feet. Each flew the H-19
(No. 55190) a half an hour and did not
experience any serious problems.
As the program evolved, Army regulations
were revised in 1958 to allow the operation of
helicopters under instrument conditions. Gener
ally, the regulations were reworded to include
helicopters. But they specifically made heli
copter takeoff minimums lower than those
applying to fixed wing aircraft and also
lowered minimums at destination and alter
nate airports.
Meanwhile the first formal Army Helicop
ter Instrument Flying Course (59-1) started
14 July 1958 and ended 20 September 1958.
Its graduates were First Lieutenant Kenneth
L. Wenn, Chief Warrant Officers Harold E.
Marks, Richard L. Piety, Douglas E. Story
and Henry Coleman; and U.S. Marine Corps
First Lieutenants Bruce W. Driscoll and
David T. Forbes Jr.
Instrument training was conducted with
the H-19 Chickasaw until late 1958 when it
was replaced by the H-34 Choctaw and H-21
Shawnee. In 1962 those aircraft were phased
out and replaced by the UH-1A Huey that
was procured in 1959.
Aviation Maintenance Training
At Fort Sill, OK, flight students in 1942
were given 27 half-days of instruction on
maintenance and repair of airplanes and
engines. All pilots were issued a kit of hand
tools and did the maintenance on the aircraft
they flew.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 LEFT: The CH-34 Choctaw transport helicopter

BELOW: The CH-21 Shawnee transport helicopter

BOTTOM: Corporal Beahan (first name

unknown), the first WAC (Women's
Auxiliary Corps) instructor in the
Department of Air Training’s Maintenance
Division at Fort Sill, OK, explains
carburetors to a class of students.

-
-
º
-

3 ** - "- º: -

- º- - sº
- | PL – **

Swedecº Cºxº~~~~<s
-

JULY 1982 35
 FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
Student mechanics were selected from
Army Ground Forces members who had con
siderable mechanical experience. After exten
sive training they were capable of performing
all first and second echelon maintenance in
the field. The Department of Air Training did
not have any trouble filling its mechanics'
classes. By August 1942, more than 3,000
applications had been received.
The first Air Force program for providing
organizational fixed and rotary wing me
chanics' training for the Army was estab
lished on 17 March 1948 at Keesler Air Force
Base, Biloxi, MS. Among those responsible
for setting up this fixed wing course were Mr.
Donald McShee (the senior instructor) and
Mr. Joseph M. Robinson. The first class
began about mid-May with eight students
and lasted 13 weeks.
On 12 March 1949, the mechanics’ school
was terminated at Keesler and resumed on
16 September 1949 at Sheppard Air Force
Base. It was at Sheppard in August 1950 that
a rotary wing course was developed which
closely paralleled the fixed wing program.
The Air Force maintenance training pro
gram was shifted from Sheppard to Gary Air
Force Base in February 1951, and after a brief
interruption classes got underway again
2 March 1951 on an accelerated basis due to
the demands of the Korean War. Training
continued at Gary until April 1956 when the
36
Army was directed to assume responsibility
for all of its aviation training to include
maintenance. The phase-out at Gary began
that August. Mr. Robinson, along with Mr.
P.L. Gary and Mr. W.W. Ford moved to the
Aviation School at Fort Rucker which ab
sorbed the program into its Department of
Academics.
The Department of Academics, organized
at Camp Rucker in September 1955, was an
outgrowth of the Department of Aviation
Maintenance which was established when
the Aviation School moved to Camp Rucker
from Fort Sill in 1954. (Note: Although the
Air Force had been tasked with teaching
Army organizational fixed wing and
rotary wing maintenance in 1948, it
could provide it only in the H-13 Sioux
and L-19 Bird Dog. That made it neces
sary for the Army Aviation School at
Fort Sill to maintain separate organiza
tional maintenance courses on other air
craft such as the H-23 Raven and L-23
Seminole. These were the maintenance
training functions that were moved from
Fort Sill to Camp Rucker.)
Third, fourth and higher echelon mainte
nance was conducted by the Transportation
School at Fort Eustis, VA. The first course of
instruction was started within the Transpor
tation School's Aviation Department on 21
June 1954 with the opening of six classes.
&
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 . What does the word STOL mean?

A. Short-field takeoff and landing

B. Short takeoff and landing
C. Specific type of operational landing
D. Simultaneous takeoff or landing

. A point located on the runway other than the

designated beginning of the runwaywould be referred
to as:

A. Threshold
B. Touchdown zone
C. Displaced threshold
Mr. Ronald B. Jackson D. Overrun of stopway area
Directorate of Training Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center . When providing airport traffic control service,
Fort Rucker, AL decisions and actions are based on:
A. Observed traffic
1. The calm-wind runway maybe used when the wind
decreases to: B. Local policy
C. Known traffic
A. 170 degrees at 2 knots
D. Both A and C
B. 170 degrees at 3 knots
C. 170 degrees at 4 knots
. The responsibility to avoid collision in terminal
D. 170 degrees at 5 knots areas, according to Federal Aviation Regulations,
rests with:
. You are using runway 27 with the wind 270 degrees A. Pilot
at 10 knots. Runway 19 may be assigned when: B. Controller
A. Wind decreases to 2 knots C. Both A and B
B. Pilot requests it D. Aircraft owner/operator
C. Is operationally advantageous
D. All the above . The statement, “differs from other airport traffic
control in that repetitious, routine approval of pilot
3. A line perpendicular to the runway centerline des action is eliminated,” best describes:
ignating the beginning of that portion of a runway A. Control associated with radar control
usable for landing is called the:
B. Airport without control tower source
A. Threshold C. Tactical air traffic control services
B. Threshold marker
D. Airport preventive control service
C. Perpendicular threshold
D. Runway end 10. The minimum information to be exchanged by
local and ground controller shall be:
. What does an X painted on the runway indicate? A. Aircraft identification
A. A displaced threshold B. Runway and taxiway
B. Runway closed to air traffic C. Aircraft type
C. New runway/without markings D. None of the above
D. Caution should be used E. Both A and B

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 VIEWS FROM READERS
Editor:
While reading in the December issue
of Aviation Digest I came across your
article on NBC. I found it to be very
informative. So would you please send
me the two previous articles on NBC.
a. “NBC Decontamination Problems,”
October 81 issue.
b. “NBC Training and Development,”
August 81 issue.
Your assistance in the matter is greatly
appreciated as we can use this infor
mation in the NBC school at Schofield
Barracks, HI.
SSG Bobby J. Clark
Schofield Barracks, HI
Editor:
Please send us two copies of the article
concerning developing a unit program
on “Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures
and Survivabilities" (from the April 1981)
Aviation Digest.
CPT William R. Wieserman
CDR, Det 1,308th ENG GP
Penn Run, PA
Editor:
The attached poem is submitted for
publication. It was written as a personal
message to the many young aviators
who deserve to know that most of us
have been there. I observe young aviators
doing things that I have done and
survived. I have known a few who are
no longer with us.
The old adage, “There is no such
thing as an old bold pilot,” is true. Survival
in aviation should not and does not
have to be a matter of luck.
I am the aviation safety officer for
Aviation Division, Directorate of Plans
and Training, United States Army
Infantry Center, Ft. Benning, GA 31905.
C. N. (Whit) Whittle
38
Editor: B. R. Maca and 1LT M. Grablin
I really liked the series of articles on Apr 1981—"Special Electronic Mis
NBC in your Aviation Digest and I am sion Aircraft” by CW3 Ed Jones
interested in receiving four copies of Thank you for your cooperation.
the articles to disseminate within the CPT Kevin C. Peterson
unit bulletin boards and key personnel. Sierra Vista, AZ
If possible more copies would be greatly
appreciated.
SGT H. Simon Editor:
NBC NCO In reading the January 1982 issue of
E Co., 3d Avn Bn (CBT) Aviation Digest, it indicated the De
APO New York cember 1981 issue of the Aviation Digest
had a list of the USAR aviation units in
Editor: 27 states. The article indicated a copy
Please send the following articles could be obtained by writing to the
which have appeared in previous issues editor. If a copy is still available, would
of Aviation Digest: you please send me that December 1981
issue?
Nov 1980–"OPFOR Training" by
MAJ R. W. P. Patterson Mr. William Clark
Apr 1981—"Threat Training" by CPT Raytown, MO
| AM AN AVIATOR
I am an aviatoſ.
I am approaching the most hazaſdous phaS6 Of my flying Caſe0ſ, SimC0 most
human-factor injury accidents OCCUr near the 500-hour level. I am not Stupid.
I am an aviatoſ.
I have had close calls and near-misses in the past. lamintelligent enoughtorealize
thOS6 were accidents that did not happen. I am not Stupid.
I have taken ShOſtCuts in the past, but I am not Stupid.
I have dOne maneuVerS in a helicopter that I was not trained to do, but I am not
Stupid.
I am an aviatoſ.
| realize that I reduce my margin for error everytime I fly Outside the aircraft's design
envelope, but I am in top physical shape and am always 100 percent mentally
alert. I am not Stupid.
In the event SOmething does happen to me, I have prepared my wife and family
to make it withOut me!
I am not Stupid!
C. N. (Whit) Whittle
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Editor:
Regarding LTC Hoyem's letter in the
April 1982 issue of Aviation Digest, a
few observations are offered:
(1) 50 hours of AI time is nigh well
impossible for a Cav pilot or even the
average UH-1 pilot. A few “old guys"
still feel 50 hours AI should be a pre
requisite for Master Army Aviator
Wings, mainly because they already have
their 50 hours and then some; but when
ever I try to argue the point they
straighten their ties, tuck in their shirt
tails, brush off their Wellingtons and
taxi for takeoff. Would they entertain a
proposal to substitute 500 hours of NOE
or NVG for 50 hours AI? Master Army
Aviator Wings should not be limited to
one segment of the Army Aviation force.
(2) I have over 3,000 flight hours so
perhaps I can look at the new criteria
for Master Wings from a passive stance.
The Army is unique in its aviator force
in that it consists of those who aviate
and those who aviate and administrate.
One side cannot function without the
other, and the administrating side would
probably, as a group, prefer to aviate
instead of administrate, given the op
portunity to do so. I really doubt that
there are many recipients of Senior/
Master Wings who aren't extremely close
to the elusive 1,500/3,000 hour level in
any event.
As a past commander of USAREUR's
Safety and Standardization Board, LTC
Hoyem should remember that the ability
to fly missions never made or broke a
unit undergoing an AORSE. That some
how always was subordinate to the ad
ministrative side of the house. The
criteria for Army Aviator Wings, be
they Aviator, Senior Aviator or Master
Aviator, has always been tough and I,
for one, do not feel they have been
cheapened in any way.
CPT Jeffrey R. Murray
Dep Cdr. Contact/Night
Qualification Branch
Lowe Division
Ft. Rucker, AL
Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
JULY 1982
Editor:
Request one copy each of the follow
ing Aviation Digest articles:
“Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Train
ing and Development,” August 1981;
“Nuclear, Biological, Chemical De
contamination Problems,” October 1981;
and
“Chemical Agents, First Aid and Long
Term Effects,” December 1981.
MAJ John M. Moerls
Division Chemical Officer
7th Infantry Division
Ft. Ord, CA
Editor:
LTC James Lloyd's article (February
82) on teaching aviators how to fight
puts into perspective one of the major
problems facing Army Aviation today.
Nevertheless, I firmly believe the solu
tions he suggested will remain only sug
gestions until the Army faces up to the
real issue at hand, which is acknowledg
ing the fact that aviation has grown to
the point where it needs to be a branch,
equal to the other combat arms.
The Army must establish a sense of
belonging, promote esprit de corps and
develop the professionalism inherent
within the branch concept. Make the
Aviation Center the proponent and
resource aviation basic and advanced
courses. This will fix responsibility for
providing the AirLand Battle tactical
training.
Well-rounded courses of instruction
for SC15 aviators (including SC71,
medical and intelligence fields) would
better prepare the aviator for his combat
mission. At the other combat arms
schools, establish aviation teams to teach
future ground commanders how to
integrate aviation into their scheme of
maneuver and fire support plans.
I submit that the requirement for a
branch and a single proponent of aviation
as a combat arm in the same sense as
we now address the other combat arms
can no longer be hidden behind the
“smoke screen of emotion and passion.”
We must follow through with the Chief
of Staff's decision and concepts of OPMS
and Division 86/Army 90 aviation force
structure to permit Army Aviation with
its expanded technology and inherent
flexibility to reach its full potential. It
will not be accomplished as long as
Army Aviation is fragmented by carrier
branches and split proponency.
As MG Galvin succinctly stated during
the Army Aviation System Program
Review in March 82, “Army Aviation's
ability to keep pace today with the
realities dictated by an extremely chal
lenging wartime environment falters
under management by a system of
diffused responsibility.”
COL E. Kirby Lawson III
USAREUR Aviation Officer
Editor:
I am presently assigned as the “ALSE
NCO" in my unit. I have read “PEARL's"
monthly and have found the article to
be extremely informative and helpful. I
have attended the ALSE school at
Chanute AFB and am setting up an
ALSE shop.
The reason I am writing is that I'm
wondering if it is possible to receive
copies of back issues of either Aviation
Digest or PEARL's articles for reference.
I feel that access to this information
is very valuable in placing me up-to
date on the Army ALSE program.
I would appreciate any assistance or
information you can supply me.
SSG Chris Reichert
E Co., 1st Avn Bn
Ft. Riley, KS
Correction to May 1982 ATC Action
Line:
Under the heading “What would you
do?” the sixth bulleted item should have
read Published takeoff I (9 rather than
Published technical ºrder 101.
*º-
-º-º:
39
 AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES

Chemical Corps Moves To Strengthen must obtain concurrence from their basic branch
Officer Inventory before any further consideration can be given to
Because of a severe shortage of officers in the accepting SC 74 as an additional specialty.
Chemical Corps Specialty Corps (SC 74), Military Questions concerning the program can be addressed
Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) is inviting some to Chemical Branch, Combat Support Arms Division,
officers with an academic background compatible MILPERCEN, DAPC-OPF-CM, 200 Stovall St., Alex
with the Chemical Corps to consider SC 74 as an andria, VA 22332, or by calling AUTOVON 221
additional specialty. Individuals so identified will be 7314/7432.
sent letters of invitation within the next several months.
In the early 1970s, the Chemical Corps was almost Officer Assignment Preference Statement
disbanded. Many Chemical Corps officers transferred Assignment officers routinely review officer pref
to other officer specialties, and there was a drastic erence statements when making assignment de
reduction in new officers entering the Chemical Corps. cisions. It is important that you keep your preference
That situation has caused severe shortages of captains, statement current. Many of the officer preference
majors and lieutenant colonels. statements, particularly at the grade of lieutenant
Increased emphasis on survival and fighting to win colonel, are not up to date. Please update your prefer
on the integrated battlefield has placed a heavy demand ence statement at least 12 months prior to reassignment
upon the small inventory of Chemical Corps officers. or any time you desire to change your preferences.
Personnel managers say it will take many years to
rebuild the Chemical Corps population to the point 1982 Schedule of Selection Boards
where the specialty will be aligned at all grades. Ac The 1982 selection boards schedule is listed below.
cordingly, there is a tremendous opportunity for qual Listed board dates are subject to change.
ified officers of other specialties to participate and COLONEL
excel in the chemical field.
SSC 17 Aug— 1 Oct
Challenging assignments range from battalion, COL, CA CMD 5 Oct—29 Oct
brigades, division or corps to major command level COL, CSA CMD 13 Oct—29 Oct
chemical staff officer positions. There are also require COL, CSSD CMD 13 Oct—29 Oct
ments for platoon leaders and commanders of NBC
(nuclear, biological, chemical) defense companies, LIEUTENANT COLONEL
smoke companies and battalions. About 20 percent LTC, CA CMD 2 Nov — 3 Dec
of the chemical requirements are research and develop LTC, CSA CMD 2 Nov–24 Nov
ment, and logistics assignments which encompass the LTC, CSSD CMD 9 Nov–24 Nov
field of chemical engineering, munitions development CAPTAIN
and production, or materiel acquisition. CPT, AUS (To be announced)
MILPERCEN is now in the process of screening
officers' academic records in an effort to identify MISCELLANEOUS
qualified and experienced personnel with a good DAADB 2d 6 Jul— 7 Jul
background to serve in the Army Chemical Corps. RA Board (commissioned officers) 12 Apr-23 Apr
Officers who are so identified will receive a letter but RA Board (ROTC) (To be announced in November)

40 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

4:
Your DA Photo Is Important!
The photograph in your official military person
nel file is extremely important! The first item that
shows up on the microfiche reader screen during the
selection board deliberation is the full-length photo.
If you look bad in your photo, you are off to a poor
start. If you are overweight or fat, the photo will show
it. It might put a negative image on the rest of your
file. Your photograph represents you before the board.
The board members carefully screen each file.
This goes for the photo as well. Some items you
should consider when submitting a photo are:
• Does the uniform fit properly?
• Are all authorized ribbons, awards and decorations
properly displayed?
• Is the name tag straight?
• Try to have the photo taken in the morning. This
is especially important if you have a heavy beard.
You don't need a 5 o'clock shadow when you go
before the board. If you do have a beard, the board
might not necessarily assume it's because of a temporary
medical profile. That information isn't in the docu
ments going before the board. That's why many profiled
soldiers shave for their official photo.
• Don't wear your uniform to the shooting session.
Take it with you on a hanger. This way, you'll appear
before the board in a crisply pressed, fresh uniform.
• Winter greens are best for the photo. They hold a
crease and hang well.
• Make sure you have appropriate paperwork in
your file to support every award and decoration on
your uniform. Temporary awards and decorations
like shoulder loops and green tabs may not be worn.
All ribbons, brass and name tag should look like new.
Wear your primary branch brass.
• Do not wear bloused jump boots.
• Have a regulation haircut. Make sure that your
hair is neatly trimmed and combed. Trim your
mustache, too. Women should not have hair that
extends below the bottom of the collar.
As you prepare for your photo, try to place yourself
on that Department of the Army panel. Remember,
you are not going to be able to personally go before
that board. The only way they can see how you look is
by using your photo. Officers are required by AR 640
30 to have photographs taken:
• Upon promotion to 1LT or CW2
• Every fourth year—LTC–CW2*
• Every third year—COL and General Officers”
*Periodic photos are taken during officer's birth month.
(Information taken from Soldiers magazine, March
1982)
JULY 1982
Retirement In Lieu of PCS
On 5 March 1982, the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel approved a recommendation reducing the
retirement application period from 13 months to 6
months for those officers retiring in lieu of (ILO)
permanent change of station (PCS). The decision period,
time provided for submission of a retirement request,
was also reduced from 30 days to 10 days. This change
is applicable to officers and enlisted personnel.
Under the new policy a servicemember must have
19 years and 6 months AFS (active federal service) at
the time he is placed on orders to qualify for retirement
ILO PCS. Servicemember must request retirement
not later than 6 months from the date of notification.
The decision period, 10 days, is included in the 6
month retirement window.
The implementation date for this change was desig
nated as 1 June 1982. AR 635-100, “Officer Retire
ments, Resignations and REFRADS,” has been revised
to include this change. A FOCUS article is being
prepared which discusses this change. Point of contact
is MAJ Hodge, AUTOVON 221-0686/9421.
Specialty Code 28
On 22 December 1981, the director of the Army
Staff approved the proposal that Training Development
be eliminated as a separate specialty code (SC28) and
converted to additional skill identifier (ASI) 7Q. Some
of the training functions of SC 28 will become a portion
of SC54, Operations, Plans, Training and Force
Development. Records of officers holding SC 28 are
being reviewed by the professional development branch
to determine a new specialty. Only those officers with
training experience will be considered for SC 54; all
others will be given an additional specialty (ADSPEC)
based upon their experience, their desires and the
needs of the Army. CSSD officers possessing SC28 as
an ADSPECshould contact their respective professional
development officer at AUTOVON 221-96.97.
Sequencing of Specialties on Your ORB
You will note that your specialities are listed in
numerical order on your Officer Record Brief. This
change was made to indicate that there is no primacy
among specialties. Does this mean that the branch
that manages your file has changed? NO! Your control
branch is listed at the top center of your ORB and that
is the branch that does indeed control your file. In
other words, “Business as usual.”
41
 REPORTING FINAL &

Late NewsFromArmy Aviation Activities

FROM WASHINGTON Parachute Team, ATTN: Tryout NCOIC, P.O. Box

Teaming Agreement. Bell Helicopter Textron
and Boeing Vertol Company have announced a
teaming agreement to participate in the U.S.
Government's Joint Services Advanced Vertical
Lift Aircraft Program (JVX) competition.
The JVX is being formulated to provide a signifi
cant improvement in the vertical lift capabilities
of all the military services. It is anticipated that a
Request for Proposal will be released to industry
in September for a detail design definition phase.
Full-scale engineering development would be
authorized in late 1983 with first flight scheduled
in mid-1986. Production deliveries would begin
in the early 1990s.
(Bell Helicopter Textron PAO)
126, Ft. Bragg, NC 28307, AUTOVON 236-4800/
4828 or commercial (919) 396-4800/4828.
(ARNEWS 288)
Perfect Student. Chief Warrant Officer, CW4,
Michael L. Talton, left, Distinguished Graduate of the
Warrant Officer Senior Course which graduated 3 June
at Ft. Rucker, AL, finished with a 100 percent class
average. Only three previous students have maxed
the 22-week course. With him are his fiancee Lydia
Araujo and the guest speaker for the ceremony, LTG
Richard H. Thompson, the Army's deputy chief of staff
for logistics

Attention Parachutists. Tryout selections for

the Golden Knights' 1983 demonstration season
will be held 27 September to 5 November at Ft.
Bragg, NC. Applications may be obtained by
writing or calling the commander, U.S. Army

Reading his story.coL David L. Funk reads his *

article in the April issue of Army Aviation Digest,
published at Ft. Rucker, AL, where he is the Army
Training and Doctrine Command systems manager
for attack helicopters. For
writing “The Attack Helicop
-
ter School and Center of the
A record. Five members of Cairns Division, Depart
Future,” he was presented
ment of Flight Training, Ft. Rucker, AL, have received
the Digest monthly writing
Master Army Aviator Wings. Recipients and their flight
hours are Chief Warrant Officer, CW2, Gregory A. award for April, consisting
Eastman, 4,800; MAJ Warren W. Spencer, 4,560; LTC of an Aviation Digest Cer
Robert R. Parks, 2,200 and 108 total operational fly tificate of Achievement and
ing duty credit months; MAJ Larry Hester, 3,980; and an engraved pen from the
Chief Warrant Officer, CW2, Ronald C. Gibes, 4,500. Bogardus S. Cairns
They form the largest group of aviators to be awarded Chapter, Association of the
Master Wings at one time, while in the same unit. U.S. Army

42 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 New Warrant Officer MOS. A new Warrant
Officer Occupational Specialty (MOS) for air traffic
control (ATC) technicians has been approved by
Headquarters, DA, and will become effective 1
September.
The 150A Specialty will require Supervising
and managing ATC personnel as well as all cate
gories of Army ATC facilities, including training
and certification programs.
Applicants must have graduated from a military
ATC School and must possess an ATC Specialist
certificate (FAA Form 7220-1) with a facility rating
in either tower or radar ATC operations.
More details on this MOS will be published in
Change 7, AR 611-112. (ARNEWS 314)
FROM FORT BRAGG
Safety Winner. The FORSCOM Commander's
Award for Aviation Accident Prevention for fiscal
year 1981 has been won by the 1st Squadron
(AIR), 17th Cavalry; and this is the second con
secutive year it has received the trophy for a
battalion-size unit.
There were no injuries, fatalities or accidents
sustained in the 13,083 hours flown by 1/17th
aviators in Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters in
FY 1981. (82d Airborne Div PAO)

LISTING OF ARMY AVIATION NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

ILLINOIS AV: 794-4733 Saint Paul, MN 55107

Chicago Comm: (612) 296–0114
Det *. C, 47th Avn Bn Waterloo AV: 825–0114
National Guard Armory Trp D, 1/194th Cav Sq
5400 West 63d Street 22.45 West Big Rock Road
Chicago, IL 60638 Waterloo, IA 50701 PENINSYLVANIA
Comm; (312) 767-9265
AV: 459–2200
§§glºssovo
- -
Harrisburg
Det 2, 136th Trans Co
Decatur MININESOTA (Med Hel)Herr Streets
21st and
Co C (–), 47th Avn Bn Saint Paul Harrisburg, PA 17103
National Guard Armory HQ, 47th Avn Bn Comm:(717)787-1072(Unit)
402 East Eldorado Street Downtown Airport (717) 787-8694 (Flight
Decatur, IL 62523 National Guard Hangar Facility)
Comm: (217) 423-2084 Saint Paul, MN 55107 AV: 235-271.4
AV: 555-3618 Comm: (612) 296–6489 (Operations)
Det 1, Co D, 47th Avn Bn AV: 825-6489
402 East Eldorado Street
National Guard Armory HQ and HQ Co, 47th Avn Bn TEXAS
Decatur, IL 62523 Downtown Airport Dallas
Comm: (217) 423-2084 National Guard Hangar 136th Trans Co (–)
AV: 555-3618 Saint Paul, MN 55107 Dallas NAS, TX
Comm: (612) 296–0114 Comm: (214) 263-8741
AV: 825–0114
IOWA (214) 266–6565
AV: 874-6565
Boone CoA (–), 47th Avn Bn
(Member of Minnesota ANG) Downtown Airport Houston
HQ, 248th Avn Bn National Guard Hangar Det 1, 136th Trans Co
1064th Trans Co (AVIM) Saint Paul, MN 55107
Houston-Ellington AFB, TX
Det 2, Co A, 47th Avn Bn Comm: (612) 296–01 12 Comm. (713) 481-1400 Ext
CPL Snedden Drive AV: 825-O112
2355
Boone, IA 50036
Comm. (515) 432-6351 Co E, 47th Avn Bn
AV: 946-2388 Downtown Airport WISCONSIN
National Guard Hangar
Davenport Saint Paul, MN 55107 Madison
(Member of Minnesota ANG) Comm: (612) 296-8129 Co D (–), 47th Avn Bn
Co B, 47th Avn Bn AV: 825–8129 National Guard Armory
National Guard Armory 1952 Pearson Street
RR #3 Municipal Airport 47th ATC Platoon Madison, WI 53704
Davenport, IA 52804 Downtown Airport Commi (603) 24.1-6353
Comm: (319) 391-3635 National Guard Hangar AV: 273-9386

Other units are invited to submit their lists for publication

JULY 1982 43
 -*. - -º-º:
- -

CBAA TESTING
PERIOD FINISHED
Operational tests of the 9th Cavalry
Brigade (Air Attack) (CBAA) have been
completed at Ft. Lewis, WA.
The most significant aviation project
since the air assault tests in the 1960s,
the CBAA concentrates all division
aviation assets under one brigade head
quarters, making them more responsive
to the division commander and the overall
mission accomplishment. See the
December 1981 Aviation Digest for an
indepth report by Colonel Thomas H.
Harvey Jr., 9th CBAA Commander, on the
unit's evolution, structure and mission
("Mission First," pp. 41-45).
Testing was conducted intermittently
from February through May 1982 and
Photographs by Barry Dowell,
Bob Nessom and Dave Schad
record some activities during the
operational tests of the 9th
CBAA, clockwise from below:
Two OH-58 Kiowas and three
AH-1S Cobras rise from their
staging area and depart to
engage the enemy at Yakima
Firing Center; In the final test
exercise for CBAA, 222,363
gallons of helicopter fuel were
pumped at several FARPs which
were relocated every 3 to 6 hours
to reduce enemy target -

escalated from sub-unit evaluations opportunities; An Air Force A-10

through division field training exercises in and an Army AH-1S work
together on a Joint Air Attack
a European and a Mideast scenario. Team: Soldiers wait to board a -

Objectives of the tests were to ascertain UH-60 Black Hawk; A CH-47 l

the command and control capabilities of airlifts a UH-1H to simulate
the CBAA, to validate its ability to act as a major repair work done in the
fourth maneuver brigade, and to check rear battle area.

the organization's logistics and adminis

trative structure. According to test
officials, only a few problems were found /.
that will require changes to the CBAA to
make it more fully operational. Oe
Colonel Harvey said he was "delighted
but not surprised" at the success of the
tests.

He added: "It has been evident to all of

us who have been involved with the
CBAA that it is the most efficient means—
looking at people, money, time and
materiel-to provide a force multiplier for
the Army's divisions. Additionally, the
brigade will give the division COmmander
the needed capability to execute the
AirLand Battle concepts, such as deep
Strike."
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
The Go-Around
Lifesaver Or Killer?
ALL AVIATORS will remember their primary flight
training instructors' words which always came early in the
game, “When it doesn't look right, GO AROUND!"
In some cases, the student pilot became acquainted with
the go-around on his first training flight. In all cases, he was
familiar with it and thoroughly convinced it was a lifesaver
before he soloed. In those early days of the training phase
most go-around situations were generated by the student
pilot himself, i.e., improper approach procedure or aircraft
preparation. As the student accumulated more experience,
this particular type of go-around became less frequent, and
soon, to make a go-around was damaging to one's ego.
Additionally, although a go-around is a “no sweat" maneuver
which is neither difficult nor demanding, the normal flight
crew reaction is annoyance at the waste of time, fuel and
effort in pulling out of the approach with the expectation of
a long resequencing procedure—especially at busy airports.
A little later in the aviator's career he graduated into the
world of IFR, TCAS, TRSAs, etc. At the same time he
became aware of near-misses, OHRs and the required
evasive actions. The go-around also graduated from the
self-induced to the conflict generated type. Since go-around
maneuvers happen fast, at low altitude, and within the
confines of the terminal area, the cause and effect relation
ships that trigger the conflict situations remind one of the
so-called domino effect. Here's where the old reliable go
*around becomes a potential killer! º
Reports received by National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's aviation safety reporting system frequently
portray go-arounds as avoidance or evasive actions to break
away from traffic conflicts. Sometimes these go-arounds
channel aircraft immediately and precipitously into conflicts
with other aircraft in the airport traffic area. In this respect,
the go-around becomes a transition phase—from the flying
pan into the fire! As a matter of fact, review of the NASA
reports discloses that one-third of the conflict generated
go-arounds developed innmediately into additional midair
conflicts, of which one-third could be classified as near
midair collisions.
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
Kenneth S. Arnold
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
The number of conflicts occurring in the go-around
phase suggests the possibility that in VMC conditions air
traffic controllers were conditioned by habit to expect the
continuation of aircraft approaches into completed landings.
Unexpected go-around sometimes resulted in hasty, unplanned
or incompleted coordination reactions. Three examples
given by NASA's latest quarterly report follow:
“I watched on radar as an air carrier on a go-around
merged with another aircraft that was departing off runway
04. Apparently no separation was being exercised. Then
they dumped them both on to my frequency; both pilots
were somewhat mad, to say the least.”
“We were advised we were overtaking traffic and told to
climb out to 3,000 feet. At 1,800 feet, we broke out of some
rain showers, found ourselves head-on with another aircraft
at our 12 o'clock position. I feel no provision was made for a
go-around in the controller traffic picture.”
“At approximately 600 feet the captain spotted the aircraft
on the go-around. He was about 500 to 600 feet away and
converging on us. We leveled off and then noted the other
aircraft make an abrupt upward pitch change indicating
they had seen us. They then passed over us.”
As indicated in these examples, a normal lifesaving go
around can become a killer when the two broad major
conflict causing factors are involved simultaneously. These
broad classifications are human behavior factors, such as
distraction, worry, anger, pressure, complacency, or even
the pressing requirement for restroom facilities, and, the
coincidental presence of operational situations or flight
activities involving adjoining parallel runways, aircraft per
formance mix, training aircraft on opposite-direction practice
instrument approches, pilot use of back course ILS localizer
approach, and nearby peripheral airports.
Throughout all conflict reports, at all types of airports,
and in all types of airspace, were threaded the limitations
and fallibilities of both flight crew and controllers. The
human factors identifiable in the go-around incidents are
varied, diverse and further verify the cliche that we are our
own worst enemies!
Yºr US Gove RNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1982–546-037/4
 July January !
*-
Hangar Talk: The FLIP and
Aeronautical Charts
Helicopters—The Soviet View
CW2 Gary R. Weiland CW4 Richard H. Davis

August
Aviation Warrant Officer
Retention: A Matter of Concern
February
CW3 Carl D. Everhart and Who's Going To Teach
Michael G. Sanders, Ph.D. Aviators How To Fight
LTC(P) James W. Lloyd
-
*
&
* . .

"-

September
AWO Retention,
The Factors Which Influence
º March
The Decision To Leave Give Us Our Guns And Optics
MAJ Gordon L. Rogers and 1LT Rónald M. Buffkin
CW2 Orion T. King ------

October April
Smart Guys Win:
The Attack Helicopter School
The Thinking Man's Guide And Center Of The Future
To Helicopter Aerial Combat COL David L. Funk
MAJ Michael L. Brittingham

NOWember ſº LTC (P) James W. Lloyd

Army National Guard Aviation

May
John J. Stanko Jr.

2. CW4 Richard H. Davis

From Routine To Near Disaster
CW3 Robert A. Stolworthy

DeCember 3. nºt eswºman wººl,

AWO Retention,
A Matter Of Action
June
COL George A. Morgan and Grasshoppers
CW4 Kenneth M. Johnson
BG William W. Ford (Ret.)

-
-
ºw T-Pepository
REce:VES |
PEC6 952 |
EE-Asies
O.s, J. -
 <>

AUGUST 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER8

§
=/
Y Yº Yºr º Y
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Colonel Benard S. Pergerson Jr.
Army Aviation Officer Commander Acting Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 Helicopter Aerial Combat Week, CPT Greg R.

Hampton and 1LT Mario H. Acevedo
12 DES Report To The Field: Dynamic Rollover
Accidents

13 ACTAAT: Equipment Requirements

14 Reporting Final
16 PEARL'S

19 Forty Years Of Army Aviation, Part 3: Combat,

Richard K. Tierney
33 Views From Readers
34 Threat: Soviet Air Defenses Against Attack
Helicopters—Part III: ZSU-23-4 Shilka,
LTC Brian P. Mullady
38 Changes, 2.75 Inch Rocket System Upgrade,
page 38
CPT David R. Reger
ºf
&N 6;
Inside Back Cover: ATC Action Line: Noise §
w"

Abatement

Cover: The “kills” on the AH-1 on the cover *

emphasize that the primary role of the attack
helicopter is to kill tanks. They also reflect the
air-to-air threat recently studied during Helicopter
Aerial Combat Week at Ft. Hood, TX. See page 2 Honorable John O. Marsh Jr.
Secretary of the Army
Richard K. Tierney
Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data.
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center:
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise speci
fied. Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise indicated.
Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct
communication is authorized to Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P.
Fort Rucker, AL 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request.
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981, in accordance with Army Regulation
310-1.
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310–1. Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR, AG
Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general.
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription rates {
are $26.00 domestic and $32.50 overseas.
,This MONTH YOU will find that we continue
our focus on one of the most important issues
Army Aviation faces today, that of engagements
between helicopters. In the lead article, “Heli
copter Aerial Combat Week,” Captain Greg R.
Hampton and First Lieutenant Mario H. Acevedo
describe the antihelicopter training program
conducted last December at Ft. Hood, TX, by the
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat). The objectives
were “to familiarize the 6th Brigade's aviators
with threat helicopter Systems and tactics, recent
air-to-air weapons Systems developments and
helicopter vs. helicopter aerial tactics." There is
an increasingly strong consensus that such training
is not nice-to-have—it is essential-to-have! And a
tip of our visor to the 6th Cav members for their
local initiatives in air-to-air training. With the results
of our Mission Area Analysis and Systems Program
Review now reflected in the Aviation Development
Plan at Department of the Army, we should soon
see clear doctrine emerge and the training itself
can become institutionalized across the Army.
Preparing for combat is, of course, the name of
the game for our Army, and our future preparations
have a proud heritage upon which to build. Richard
K. Tierney talks about “Combat" in Part 3 of the.
Army Aviation history series, looking at contri
butions made in World War II, the Korean War
and in Vietnam. Dick's work on this history series
has drawn favorable comment from all—those
who lived it as well as those who follow.
While we have focused much in recent issues
on the air-to-air threat, we also must not lose
sight of the fact that all of our enemies are not
going to be up in the air with us in tomorrow's
battles. Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Mullady has
very ably described “Soviet Air Defenses Against
*Attack Helicopters" in a three-part series, the
last of which is offered to you this month. In it, he
writes about ZSU-23-4, perhaps the most for
midable ground-based gun threat we face. The
article deserves close attention—to learn how
the Soviets will employ this gun and how we can
overcome that employment. Threat systems can
be defeated if you know your enemy.
Our key safety thrust for August is contained
in “DES Report to the Field: Dynamic Rollover
Accidents" by Chief Warrant Officer, CW4, Michael
J. Novosel. Mike is a legend in his own time and
as one of our most senior and most respected
Army aviators, he has some very Sage advice.
Heed his counsel as he describes for you a number
of accidents that, according to all evidence, should
AUGUST 1982
not have happened. These are truly disturbing
and we need to hitch up our professionalism a
notch or two and put an end to such occurrences.
As I stressed last month, it takes much more than
the best instructor pilots and safety specialists in
the business; it takes you, each and every crew
member, to prevent needless accidents.
Finally, I want to share a brief comment with
you on a tremendous experience I had in late
July when I attended the Silver Jubilee Cele
bration of the British Army Air Corps. Events at
Middle Wallop, England, home of the British Army
Aviation Center, included an International Heli
meet in which helicopter crews, both civilian and
military from many of the NATO nations, competed
in precision helicopter maneuvers and navigation;
a symposium on the expanding role of the heli
copter in this decade; a great Army-Air 82 air
display with literally hundreds of helicopters and
airplanes on display; and in-flight demonstrations
to include many participating aircraft and crews
from U.S. Army Europe and our very latest U.S.
system, the AH-64 Apache—truly an impressive
array of Army Aviation capabilities. The tactics
and doctrine symposium was particularly timely
in that the commanders of the British helicopter
units in the Falkland Island campaign reviewed
many of their lessons learned. As is now so well
known, helicopters played key roles in every
operation—and did their job well. Thus, we salute
our long-time ally on this, the 25th Anniversary,
Silver Jubilee of their Army Air Corps, as they
continue to live up to their motto; “PREPARE."
-
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 The opinions expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of any Department of Defense agency. <>

*ºr

ELICOPTER l

ERIAL COMBAT
WEEK ºr...
Necember 14–18,1981
2 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 ITHIN THE PAST few
years the Army Aviation community
$has been faced with the growing
threat of Soviet rotary wing aircraft.
These formidable aerial weapon
platforms pose a serious threat to
Army Aviation units because an
air-to-air mission now seems to be
accepted as viable by Soviet rotary
wing aviation units. As Soviet
Colonel M. Belov has noted in a
recently published article on how
to fight helicopters, the best way to
destroy the armed antitank heli
copter is to use another helicopter,
a fighter helicopter, armed with
cannon and air-to-air missiles, com
pletely dedicated to an antiheli
copter mission.
In future conflicts it will not be
unreasonable to expect Mi-24E and
subsequent variant aircraft to fly
forward of their armor columns
specifically to engage and destroy
our attack helicopters in their hold
ing areas and firing positions. Real
izing this potential threat to Army
attack helicopter units, the 6th
Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) pro
lead
l High Yo-Yo
The figures in this article are for information purposes only and are not
to be used as a basis to try the maneuvers as described. More specific
information about these maneuvers should be obtained from the 6th Brigade.
AUGUST 1982
ceeded with an antihelicopter train
ing program entitled “Helicopter
Aerial Combat Week,” which took
place at Ft. Hood, TX, last De
cember.
The objectives of Helicopter Aeri
al Combat Week were to familiarize
the 6th Brigade's aviators with threat
helicopter systems and tactics, re
cent air-to-air weapon systems devel
opments and helicopters vs. helicop
ter aerial tactics. Additionally, eight
selected AH-1S Cobra instructor
pilots were given air-to-air live fire
gunnery and actual aerial maneuvers
training. These instructor pilots
would subsequently pass on this
training to the attack helicopter
pilots within the 6th Brigade during
future training. The training was
centered around the participation
of two instructor pilots from the
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tac
tics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1), based
at Yuma, AZ, who provided class
room and flight instruction in aerial
evasive maneuvers. The Marine
Aviation Group 42 (MAG-42) based
at Dallas, TX, provided two CH-53
aircraft and crews which simulated
threat helicopters during the week's
flight training phase. Additional
classroom instruction was provided
by representatives of the General
Electric Company and the General
Dynamics Corporation addressing
their work in the development of
new air-to-air weapon systems.
After a brief introduction by COL
Charles E. Ivey, the 6th Cavalry
Brigade commander, to the industry
representatives, Marine instructor
pilots and the aviators in attendance,
training began with a briefing on
one of the most serious aerial threats
to tactical Army Aviation—the
Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter and
its subsequent variants. Here, the
capabilities and the tactical employ
ment of the Hind were discussed
with particular emphasis placed
upon its antihelicopter abilities.
The majority of the day was
devoted to reviewing the two pri
mary antihelicopter weapon systems
now under development: air-to-air
missiles and rapid fire cannon. Mr.
Richard Hein of the General Dy
 roll level
\Defense against the High'Yo-Yo
at close range (500 feet) break into turn
threat
threut o-yoin
yo-yoing

upplying lead
und
accelerating

sº ~j
tight turn
_*

|
3 |atDefense against the Long Yo-Yo
long range (7,500 feet) rolling climb
threat begins -

nose low

accelerate … Tºs
(4) Low Yo-Yo

Defense against the Low Yo-Yo at long range rupid

threat leads and fight turn
uses superior air speed
to close in
-- minimize
2. broadside

*—ſº- -

tight
turn
--
/*
(6) \
Horizontal Scissors
- 7 Defense against the Horizontal Scissors
over shooting
furn
threaf in fight turn
namics Corporation discussed the
development and capabilities of the
Airborne Stinger system. This missile
system, with its high speed and long
standoff range, is capable of dealing
with both fixed and rotary wing
aircraft in a nap-of-the-earth (NOE)
environment, and thus does not
undermine the primary antiarmor
mission of the Army attack heli
copter.
However, a missile system has
some shortcomings. For example,
it has a minimum engagement range,
an obvious launch signature and
AUGUST 1982
threat overshoots
*
—-
-
§ \ºv-,
N V
º NM4
ºs
C
- relux
º turn
the launch platform must be pointed
at the target prior to launch. If a
threat aircraft appears within the
minimum missile engagement range
or if a situation occurs where the
threat attacks from the rear or flank
quadrants, then a gun system would
be the primary weapon. Mr. Thurow
Mayhood and Mr. James Wagner
of General Electric discussed their
various gun systems in use or under
development and the problems en
countered in engineering a heli
copter air-to-air gun system. Mr.
Wagner explained that the lethality
re Wer $6
-
\
\ stuy in phase
º 2TN
\ $
threut
re Wer $6.5
of an air-to-air cannon is primarily
influenced by its rate of fire. As the
firing rate increases, so does the
probability of hits during a given
time period. Projectile size also has
a profound influence—the bigger
the round, the more kinetic energy
with greater catastrophic target
damage. Also, a larger round pro
vides a longer engagement range
due to greater projectile inertia.
However, the rate of fire and gun
size must be optimized for the user
aircraft, otherwise excessive vibra
tion, weight, recoil and ammunition
 begin side flure
(out of trim condition) ments the other. A fire-and-forget
guided missile such as the Airborne
Stinger would be the primary air- **
to-air weapon, allowing the attack
-
helicopter team to engage threat
threat sees wings down aircraft at long ranges and yet
attitude und leads
continue their primary mission of
unticiputed turn destroying armored targets. In those

(8) Side Flare

Quick Stop
threat
overshoots
instances where helicopters are
decisively engaged at close ranges,
then a gun system would be necessary.
In order to provide the 6th Bri
gade's instructor pilots with some
experience in the difficulties in
musk ubove threut engaging aerial targets, a firing
excercise against MRCAT (minia
follow turized radio controlled aerial target)
threut trainers was planned for the second
maintain airspeed day of training. The MRCAT is a
climb ubove styrofoam model airplane with a
6-foot wing span originally designed
threat ºn as an air defense aerial target. Its
threat begins nimbleness makes it a worthy adver
quick stop sary for a high speed ground gun
accelerates
system, and it was hoped that it
9 Defense against the would be an adequate aerial gunnery
target.
Side Flare Quick Stop
or
wingover for Eight AH-1S helicopters (four
2 -
Modified S models with the M-28
turret system and four ECAS (En
". six º'lock TY hanced Cobra Armament System)
climb -

wingover º position
~~
/
models with the M-19720 mm) were

__*.(O.
uccelerate
slush uttuck

Attack T
-

consumption vs. storage capacity
would offset the advantages of any
particular gun.
The current M-19720 mm cannon
is considered adequate in dealing
with the Hind, and a proposal is
being considered to double its rate
of fire from 750 to 1,500 shots per
minute. The use of the M-134 7.62
mm minigun and the M-128.40 mm
grenade launcher was briefly discus
sed. The M-28 turret weapon sys
tem should not be overestimated as
a viable air-to-air weapon. Hosing
an aerial target with minigun tracers
will not produce a great deal of
ºs-ºs
catastrophic damage despite the
illusion of a sheet of fire blanketing
the target. The long time of flight
and high angle of fire of the 40 mm
grenade precludes its use as anything
but a last-chance, close-in weapon.
In engagements which are close
enough to use guns, both aircraft
would be maneuvering violently,
making deflection and lead esti
mation very difficult (particularly
for the 40 mm).
A general consensus, therefore,
is that a combination of a missile
and gun system would be the best
arrangement since each comple
used during the firing exercise. All
of the AH-1s were to fire on the
MRCAT individually with the Modi
fied Cobras engaging initially from
a hover followed by the ECAS air
craft using running fire in a tail
chase. These scenarios were selected
due to range restrictions, yet they *
offered each instructor pilot the
opportunity to engage targets in at
least two different types of firing
situations. Each instructor pilot
would occupy both the gunner's and
pilot's station once during the day
and would have the option of using
any sight system: the TSU, helmet
sight or the M-73 sight in the stowed
gun mode. It was hoped that a
consensus could be arrived at as to
the preferred firing techniques fol
lowing the day's training. Six
MRCATs were used and they proved
to be a great disappointment. Only
two flew long enough to be shot at

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 -

threat initiates
wingover for such training to the current
required air-to-air training for all
Marine helicopter pilots. He then
addressed the series of EVM (evasive
maneuvers) training that would be
practiced on the final 2 days of the
week. Initially one vs. one maneu
vers with similar aircraft (AH-1 vs.
AH-1) would be flown, followed by
climb more complicated scenarios, refer
toward red to as “set-ups" by the Marines,
involving two vs. one and two vs.
two using dissimilar aircraft (in this
case AH-1S vs. CH-53). The primary
training points were to turn the
situation to one's advantage by
unpredictable maneuvering and the
use of teamwork. Major Perry stres
sed that airspeed is paramount in
maintaining a “high energy state"
for abrupt maneuvering. However,
Defense against the air-to-air combat between helicop
Wingover Attack ters is not an aerobatic contest
involving loops, rolls and Immel
mann turns. It is violent and short
lived with each engagement lasting
less than 30 seconds before someone
is shot down or contact is broken.
-

*
º wingman
free musked by lead
uircraft
Threat
in
echelon
and due to uncontrollability all six
trainers eventually crashed out of
control, with FM radio interference
suspected as the culprit. As a result,
training was curtailed for the day.
The MRCAT's usefulness as an anti
helicopter gunnery trainer is prob
ably negligible because of its control
problems and the fact that it cannot
exceed 80knots of forward air speed.
A more plausible solution would
be the use of a QH-50 helicopter
drone towing a 4 foot by 8 foot
cylindrical sleeve. One of these
drones could be issued to each instal
lation range control agency with a
permanently assigned operator and
used as necessary by the aviation
units stationed there.
Wednesday morning was devoted
to classroom instruction on aerial
tactics and maneuvers that have
been developed by the Marine
Corps. Major Henry C. Perry and
Captain Lou F. Russo from
MAWTS-1 were the primary instruc
tors and provided cockpit instruction
later in the week. Major Perry and
Captain Russo are Marine instruct
or pilots who are qualified in the
AH-1J, S and T model Cobras and
are the Marine Corps primary air
to-air helicopter instructors.
Major Perry began by outlining
the development and growth of
helicopter air-to-air training from
the initial studies showing a need
Each of the individual one vs. one
maneuvers was discussed in depth
with the 6th Cavalry Brigade's in
structor pilots, in preparation for
Thursday's flight training.
After preflighting the aircraft that
would be used on Thursday's flight
training, the involved aviators,
cover ship crews, instructor pilots
and Marine CH-53 pilots met for a
safety briefing. Here the rules
of engagement, aircraft separation,
airspace management and the all
important “knock it off" call were
briefed. The “knock it off" call was
perhaps the most critical safety
control measure used while con
ducting aerial evasive maneuvers
training. If at anytime anyone who
was involved with the training saw
an unsafe situation or felt that the
degree of maneuvering was exceed
ing his own limitations, the “knock
it off" call would be given. Upon
the call, all maneuvering aircraft
would immediately resume straight
and level flight and would clear the
maneuvering area. One point to be

AUGUST 1982

THREAT 1 &
a
ºx
(3) º
THREAT 1
stressed is the importance of having
all friendly and aggressor pilots
coordinate face to face whenever
evasive maneuvers training is con
ducted. Altitude restrictions that
were imposed were from a minimum
100 feet above ground level (AGL)
to a maximum of 1,000 feet AGL.
Major Perry and Captain Russo
occupied the AH-1's gunner's seats
while the 6th Brigade instructor
pilots flew in the pilot's station during
both one vs. one and two vs. two
set-ups. The Marine instructor pilots climbs, trading airspeed for altitutde,
would first demonstrate each maneu
ver emphasizing certain key points
or techniques, then allow the Army
pilots to practice, with each period
lasting about 1 hour.
The flight period began with flat
tail chases which allowed the pilots
to judge closure rates at different
airspeeds. Turns, climbs and des
cents were then added as the period
progressed. The actual set-ups fol
lowed, beginning with both AH-1Ss
approaching head on, each then
breaking to the left and “cork
screwing" upward in an attempt to
get on the other's tail or 6 o'clock
position. A point to be stressed here
is that continuing to do so would
eventually have both helicopters at
altitude, out of airspeed and execut
ing pedal turns. Equally important
was that after about 20 seconds the
learning value of each set-up would
diminish and, as discussed pre
N THREAT 2 x^
•*
WHITE I
\-
viously, that the time period roughly
corresponds to the approximate
duration of most actual engagements.
The first of the evasive maneuvers
taught was the High Yo-Yo (figure
1). This technique is used to prevent
the overshooting of a threat aircraft
while in pursuit. Here, the pursuing
aircraft uses speed and lead angle
deflection to close in as the target
initiates a defensive break. Once
the threat aircraft reveals the direc
tion of its break, the pursuing aircraft
avoids an overshoot and then rolls
into the threat's rear.
To defend against the High Yo
Yo at close range (500 feet or less),
break toward the threat and force
him to overshoot. Before turning
so far as to lose visual contact, roll
wings leveland use a wingover attack
to force the threat low (figure 2).
If a greater separation exists (500
feet or longer) initiate a nose low
attitude and then begin a defensive
pull-up with a rolling climb which
will cause the threat to overshoot
at a lower altitude (figure 3, Long
Yo-Yo).
The Low Yo-Yo was the next
maneuver taught. It is an offensive
maneuver that exploits the 6 o'clock
position by decreasing range and
increasing closure rates. To initiate
this maneuver, lower the nose to
increase airspeed and lead into the
threat's defensive turn. As the range
~
º
* HREAT
closes, trade off excess airspeed with
a cyclic climb to reestablish the tail
chase position (figure 4).
Countering the Low Yo-Yo is
accomplished by turning and diving
toward the threat at the first indica
tion of its turning and force a head
on pass. Beware! The Hind has
bullet-resistant forward windscreens
and we don't. Another technique
that can be used as a defense against
the Low Yo-Yo, provided you have
sufficient airspeed, is to pull up and
roll into the threat using the wing
over attack (figure 5).
The Horizontal Scissors came
next. This is a defensive maneuver
used if airspeed and nose to tail
separation do not permit another
course of action. Here, the lead
element increases its rate of tur
until the threat either overshoots”
or moves outside its turn radius. As
the threat passes, reverse the pre
vious direction of turn and slide
toward the threat. Once behind and
below, attempt to remain in phase
with the threat's maneuvers (fig
ure 6).
To counter the Horizontal Scis
sors, do not attempt to turn harder
inside the threat's turn radius or
reduce power. Relax the turn to
maintain airspeed, climb and wait
for the threat to reverse and cross
in front (figure 7). This will establish
you in a position to initiate a tail
chase and employ weapon systems
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 in a more stable plane. If by some
chance the threat fails to reverse
back toward you, initiate a High
Yo-Yo and break contact.
The side flare quick stop was
perhaps the closest relating maneu
ver to NOE flight techniques that
the Marines taught to the brigade's
pilots. This is a defensive maneuver
designed to cause the threat to
overshoot when within 500 feet.
Rapidly apply opposite pedal and
cyclic input to place the aircraft in
an out-of-trim condition while simul
taneously reducing power. Once the
threat is committed to an overshoot,
accelerate, maneuver to a tail chase
position and close to within weapons'
parameters. If you become the
victim of the threat's use of the side
flare, maximize your higher energy
state and initiate a rapid climb to
mask your aircraft from the threat's
weapon systems. In doing so, you
place the threat's rotor disk between
his turret weapons and your aircraft
and this in turn leaves you in a
position to initiate a look down
attack (figures 8 and 9).
The wingover attack was then
demonstrated. This is an offensive
maneuver that is used primarily in
head-to-head engagements or slight
ly angled off the front of the threat
(figures 10 and 11). To initiate this
maneuver accelerate toward the
target at high speed. As the distance
closes initiate a rapid cyclic climb
º (25 to 30 degrees) to attain an altitude
advantage over the threat and mask
his weapon systems. As you reach
the desired altitude roll in toward
the threat by letting the nose of the
aircraft fall below the horizon while
maintaining positive G loading. Dive
for a point about one-half the dis
tance between your position and
the threat's position over the ground
and close to weapons' parameters.
If this slashing attack is not desired
simply dive into the tail chase posi
tion to engage.
To defend against the wingover
attack, climb and turn toward the
threat after its commitment to a
nose low attitude. This generally
AUGUST 1982
results in the two aircraft cork
screwing in an effort to gain the 6
o'clock position.
Following these basic aerial ma
neuvers, each of the instructor pilots
was given a free style set-up in which
to practice the maneuvers he had
been taught, with the Marine in
structor pilots still occupying the
gunner's seat controlling the action.
From these maneuvers several
conclusions became apparent. Cock
pit coordination is an absolute neces
sity. Common terminology and the
prior division of cockpit duties
(clearing for turns, weapons utili
zation, monitoring instruments, vis
ual acquisition, etc.) have to be
addressed prior to each flight. Air
craft control is paramount to avoid
exceeding crew and aircraft limita
tions. Transient torque and pitch
cone coupling were very prominent
considerations but can be adequately
dealt with provided that a sufficient
amount of practice is made avail
able. During these violent engage
ments the participating aircraft will
be flying very close together thus
making the gun the primary weapon.
The AH-1S with its helmet sight
system and turret mounted guns
has the advantage over threat air
craft with fixed weapons or those
systems that require the gunner to
bury his head in a sighting device.
This weapon sight advantage is
offset, however, by the AH-1S's poor
rearward visibility. An MWO (modi
fication work order) is needed to
install two rearview mirrors on either
side of the pilot's station, perhaps
incorporating a combination of
convex and flat mirrors in an aerody
namic fairing. This will greatly
increase the field of view of the
pilot and aid in overall tactical aware
neSS.
Once each instructor pilot had
the opportunity to fly one vs. one
and felt comfortable with the basic
maneuvers, two vs. one and two vs.
two set-ups against CH-53s com
menced. The MAG-42 pilots have
been trained in evasive maneuvers
and have had previous experience
simulating threat tactics against
Army and Marine aircraft.
Flying against dissimilar aircraft
added a great deal of realism to the
flight training. The CH-53's agility
belies its great size, and its superior
airspeed and acceleration make it
an excellent threat trainer. When
operating without cargo, the CH
53's performance and power reserves
closely resemble those of many
threat helicopters.
The set-ups began with the aircraft
approaching head-on. The CH-53s
would maneuver in a tight echelon
or “welded wing" formation that is
normally employed by Soviet attack
helicopters. After the initial head
on pass and right break, each team
would maneuver in an attempt to
force a two on one engagement.
Here the main emphasis was to
determine which AH-1S was “en
gaged" and which was “free.” Major
Perry had stressed in his classroom
instruction that this determination
was crucial to successful team en
gagements. The engaged and free
aircraft had specific role respon
sibilities:
Engaged Role Responsibilities
• Keep the threat in sight
• Remain unpredictable
Deny weapons employment
Force the threat to lose sight
Clear own 6 o'clock position
Free Role Responsibilities
• Track the engaged aircraft and
the threat
• Clear the engaged aircraft and
own 6 o'clock position
• Maintain a high energy state
• Break phase (contact) with the
fight
As the aerial engagement progres
sed the free and engaged aircraft
had to be prepared to change roles.
As maneuvering intentions and
threat positions were called out, the
free aircraft maneuvered to prevent
the engaged aircraft from reaching
a low energy state or allowing the
threat to get at his own 6 o'clock
position. As a result, in the two
AH-1Ss vs. one CH-53 set-up, the
threat was unable to press an attack
on the engaged aircraft without
becoming vulnerable to the free
AH-1.
In the two vs. two set-up with the
threat aircraft in echelon, the
AH-1s would maneuver so that the
engaged element would be always
on the threat's weak side, thus
causing the lead threat to mask his
wingman (figure 12).
Meanwhile the free element
would maneuver to direct the en
gagement, either forcing a disen
gagement or driving the fight. A
disengagement could be accom
plished by forcing the threat aircraft
to lose sight through terrain masking
or through the use of shadow. If the
free element must drive the fight
he should then maneuver to cause
an engagement by supporting ele
ments (friendly air defense, A-10s)
or force the threat aircraft into a
disadvantageous position. Beware
however, because in a matter of
seconds the situation can reverse
itself which emphasizes the need
for teamwork and the need to keep
a close eye on all threat aircraft.
Finally, both crews must avoid “pad
locking” or target fixation on the
same threat. The one you don't see
is the one that kills you both!
The week's training culminated
with two iterations of attack team
battle-drill on Friday afternoon. A
3 × 5 mix was briefed on a battle
field situation where an enemy
armored regiment had forced a
breakthrough of friendly lines and
was threatening the ground units'
rear areas. The crews were also
briefed to be aware of threat air
elements that could be operating in
the area. Since the attack team knew
an aerial threat existed they were
briefed to attempt to avoid an aerial
engagement unless actually fired
upon by other aircraft. If the team
was forced into an aerial engage
ment, then the fewest possible attack
helicopters were to engage in order
to minimize the disruption of the
10
primary mission. The scout heli
copters were briefed to provide
security in the battle position and
to alert the attack helicopters to
the presence of any threat aircraft.
Immediately following the flight
briefing, the aircraft were launched
and proceeded to their respective
holding areas and subsequently into
their firing positions.
As the team began to engage the
simulated armor column, two CH
53s which were orbiting north of
the battle area were called in by the
cover/control aircraft to attempt
to locate and engage any attack
helicopters in the area. As the
CH-53s came within visual range (4
km) they were spotted by the white
(light section) scout who called out
to the battle captain the heading
and number of aircraft inbound.
The flight techniques employed by
the CH-53s made it possible to
quickly determine which section of
the attack team would be engaged.
The white team was then released
by the battle captain to engage the
CH-53s to protect the red team
elements. As the map in figure 13
shows, the white 2 element immedi
ately exited his firing position to
gain airspeed and attack to engage
while white 1 remained in his hover
hole to attempt a concealed passing
shot on the lead threat. White 1
fired on the lead CH-53 at about
200 meters, pivoting with the target
as it passed through the firing posi
tion and then exited to the rear to
gain airspeed and support white 2.
Finally white 2 was spotted by the
second CH-53 pilot who immediately
executed a Low Yo-Yo to force a
head-on engagement. As the two
aircraft passed each other at 100
feet above the trees, both aircraft
executed high banked turns with
the Cobra coming out to the CH
53's rear. This iteration lasted less
than a minute from the first visual
contact to the “knock it Off” call.
After the engagement the 3 × 5
mix withdrew to a holding area to
reorganize, then proceeded forward
to reengage the advancing armor
force. As the attack helicopters
began to fire on the tank column,
the scouts again sounded the alarm.
Two CH-53s approached from the
northwest in an attempt to disrupt
the team's flank. This time the red
or heavy team was engaged and as
in the first iteration, the fight lasted
less than a minute.
As the map in figure 14 illustrates,
the red team took a more aggressive
course of action. Red 1 (the overall
Cobra leader) moved out directly
toward the threat in order to estab
lish airspeed and provide the CH
53 with the smallest visual profile.
This proved to be very hazardous
and resulted in red 1's simulated
destruction by the lead CH-53 who
had visual contact with him early in
the battle. Meanwhile red 2 and 3
exited their hover holes using terrain
masking and low level flight to gain
maneuvering airspeed. This allowed
red 2 and 3 to pick their fights and
saved the situation for the red team
following red lead's unfortunate
demise.
Both iterations showed the value
of the OH-58 Scouts in an air-to-air
engagement even though still un
armed. In both instances their early
visual acquisition (often in excess
of 5 km) gave the attack helicopters
a distinct advantage. This allowed
the attack team to initiate maneuver
in order to engage the aerial threat
and thus prevented the complete
disruption of the antitank mission. e.
Although not allowed to maneuver
against the CH-53s, the scout's pres
ence in the battle area was a visual
distraction to the CH-53 pilots who
initially have a difficult time trying
to locate any helicopter down in
the trees.
Helicopter Aerial Combat Week
introduced many new concepts to
the aviators of the 6th Brigade. It
was discovered that energy (air
speed) or the lack of it is one of the
most critical keys to survival. Since
the primary mission of the Army
attack helicopter is to disrupt and
destroy enemy forces as a member
of the combined arms team, and
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 since we do not as yet have an air
to-air missile system in operation,
remaining undetected is the prefer
red method of air defense. However
once committed, cannon fire and
maneuver must be used to ensure
survival. Keeping your eyes open
and making the first visual contact
with an approaching aerial threat
provide the opportunity to initiate
* this maneuvering and gain the tacti.
cal advantage.
For any air-to-air training, quali
fied instructor pilots and trained
and proficient aggressor crews flying
dissimilar aircraft are a must. Equally
important is a well organized and
carefully thought out training se
quence. Safety considerations were
an initial concern but if adequately
briefed and controlled, air-to-air
training can be conducted well
within existing safety parameters.
A training team organized along
the same lines as the MAWTS-1
group should be formed to train all
of the Army's instructor pilots in
the techniques of air-to-air combat.
AUGUST 1982
By training the trainers at one central
location, the U.S. Army Aviation
Center could simply and inexpen
sively provide standardized instruc
tion and spread a wealth of experi
ence throughout every aviation unit
in the Army. Coupled with effective
tactical doctrine, which is now under
development, Army Aviation can
meet and destroy the aerial threat
on any battlefield.
During the 1973 Mideast War
those helicopters that did nothing
when engaged by an aerial threat
were annihilated; those that maneu
vered agressively, including heavily
laden transports, survived. All Army
aviators should be proficient in air
to-air combat if we are to not only
survive but also drive the battle to a
successful conclusion.
Helicopter Aerial Combat Week
gave the aviators of the 6th Cavalry
Brigade a valuable insight to the
complexities of air-to-air combat—a
new skill in the myriad of tasks we
must master to defeat the threat.
*—”
ABOUT THE
AUTHORS
Captain Greg R. Hampton was commis
sioned in Armor upon graduation from
ROTC at Colorado State University in
1977. His service has included duty as a
mechanized infantry platoon leader,
weapons platoon leader and tank platoon
leader while assigned to the 1st Cavalry
Division. Following his completion of the
rotary wing aviation course as an honor
graduate, he was assigned to the 6th
Cavalry Brigade and has served as a
Scout and attack helicopter platoon leader.
He is now the operations officer for A
Troop, 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 6th
Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat).
First Lieutenant Mario H. Acevedo was
graduated from New Mexico State Univer
sity in 1978 with a B.S. in mechanical
engineering. He was commissioned
through ROTC into the Infantry and served
as a rifle platoon leader and heavy
motor platoon leader with 7th infantry
Division at Ft. Ord, CA. 1 LT Acevedo is
currently serving as an attack helicopter
platoon leader with the 6th Cavalry
Brigade (Air Combat), Ft. Hood, TX, and
worked as the assistant project officer
for Helicopter Aerial Combat Week.
11

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
DYNAMIC ROLLOVER
ACCIDENTS
FROM JANUARY 1972 to January 1982, Army Aviation
recorded 25 dynamic rollover accidents. The average aviator
would most likely identify the cause of these accidents as
improperly performed slope operations. However, such is
not the case—only eight occurred on slopes and the remainder
occurred on level ground. Equally disturbing is the fact
that since June 1977 we have experienced a significant
increase in this type accident. During this 4%-year period,
there have been 17 rollover accidents but only 3 occurred
as a result of slope operations. The significant increase in
rollover-type accidents is dramatically illustrated by the
fact that eight occurred in the past 13 months of the study
period and all but one occurred on level ground.
These are accidents that should never have occurred.
They involve the most basic of all helicopter maneuvers—the
pickup to a hover. This maneuver must be mastered by the
fledgling aviator before he can be taught to hover and
maneuver for his first solo flight. Furthermore, these accidents
have not necessarily been caused by inexperienced personnel.
Pilots in command (PICs) with considerable experience, to
include maintenance test pilots (MTPs) and instructor pilots
(IPs) have been involved in too many instances. We have to
be doing something wrong. Here are a few examples to
illustrate the problem:
• UH-1H. Pilot was performing a hydraulics check in a
high wind condition, without the assistance of the copilot,
when the aircraft became light on the skids, began sliding to
the right and rolled about the longitudinal axis of the right
skid. Corrective action was initiated, but the aircraft continued
to roll onto its right side. Both crewmembers were transported
to a local medical facility where they were treated for
minimal injuries and released.
• OH-58A. Pilot was practicing for the flyoff of the world
helicopter competition. He placed the heel of the right skid
on the ground, held it there with right aft cyclic, and
pivoted around the heel to the right. He attempted to pivot
to the left by applying left pedal. The aircraft rolled over on
its right side. The crewchief suffered a broken bone in the
left hand. Both crewmembers were evacuated to the hospital.
• UH-1H. Aircraft had just completed a limited test
flight (once around the pattern) to verify correct antitorque
pedal positions and was sitting in the grassy area next to the
12
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
STANDARDIIATION
runway. As the maintenance test pilot began to lift off to
hover back to the parking ramp, the aircraft rolled over on
its right side and the main rotor struck the ground and
separated. The aircraft came to rest inverted and the three
crewmembers exited unassisted through the copilot's door.
• UH-1H. This was the student pilot's (SP's) first attempt
to takeoff to a hover in the UH-1H aircraft. As the aircraft
became light on the skids, it began a slow left pivoting turn.
IP was about to correct with right pedal when SP applied
abrupt up collective. Aircraft pitched nose high with a
severe left yaw and roll. IP corrected with forward cyclic
causing 30 to 40-degree nose-low attitude. Subsequent attempt
to correct for the nose-low attitude resulted in another nose
high condition causing impact of main rotor blades with the
ground. Main rotor blade strikes caused the rotor mast to
separate and the aircraft impacted in a left roll nose-low
attitude. As the aircraft came to rest on its left side, the IP
reached up and broke out the cabin roof window to facilitate
egress. All crewmembers exited the aircraft through the
same cabin roof window.
• UH-1H. SP was attempting an instrument takeoff from
a level surface. The SP applied collective pitch abruptly,
causing the aircraft to roll to the right. The main rotor
blades struck the ground and the aircraft came to rest on its
right side. The crew egressed without difficulty and was
transported to the hospital, examined and released by a
flight surgeon.
• UH-1H. The SP attempted a takeoff to a hover with
excessive right cyclic. The aircraft pivoted about the heel of
the right skid. A dynamic rollover situation developed with
a rapid right roll. Both main rotor blades contacted the
ground which caused the aircraft to pitch up to about a 20
degree nose-high attitude. The right synchronized elevator,
the tail skid and the tail rotor blades contacted the ground,
resulting in loss of tail-rotor thrust and separation of the
vertical fin. The IP applied left forward cyclic and lowered
the collective pitch full down. The fuselage bounced several
times as it yawed 260 degrees to the left, resulting in collapse
of the landing gear. The aircraft came to rest upright. The
crewmembers exited the aircraft unassisted and were evacu
ated to the medical facility.
The foregoing illustrations have much in common—all
occurred on level ground. The PICs, IPs and maintenance
test pilots were experienced aviators. The use of improper
procedures was evident in all instances, as was inattention
to duties and complacency. Let's put a stop to these silly
maneuverings. PICs must not permit themselves the luxury
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 of day-dreaming while flying and IPs must not cease
* instructing—not even for an instant. Sufficient information
on the dynamic rollover phenomenon is available. Applying
-
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL
CGººſſ)
A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance I eam
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENT
ISSUE: The following equipment items are
considered priority needs by air traffic control
(ATC) personnel to provide the capability
required for their mission:
a. Very Light Air Traffic Management Equip
ment (VLATME) is needed as an interim theater
and corps device. A lightweight, low signature,
surveillance radar is required as a follow-on,
with short fielding times.
b. An automated system is needed with the
º capability to monitor and positively control all
aircraft positions and destinations.
c. A directional beacon system that is simple
to operate and maintain, is nonjammable, has a
low signature and will interface with the new
aircraft navigation and positioning equipment
(i.e., Doppler).
d. A means for ATC interface with the Position
Location Reporting System (PLRS)/Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS). What
actions are ongoing or anticipated to provide
ATC with these capabilities? What is the current
doctrinal needs assessment for ATC capabilities
in these areas?
AUGUST 1982
this information to a well-organized prevention and training
program can produce excellent dividends and eliminate a
needless type of aviation accident. º-r
36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message
COMMENT: Many of the requirements outlined
here are discussed in the United States Army
Communication Command (USACC) draft Letter
of Agreement (LOA) for the Combat Support
Air Traffic System (CATMANS), dated 20 July
1981. A Joint Working Group (JWG) was con
vened 24 and 25 August 1981 to discuss this
LOA. The LOA addressed many of the priority
needs identified in this issue. However, VLATME
is not being considered as anything more than a
training device in Europe. There are no plans to
develop a new directional beacon. In fact, the
TRN-30, Nondirectional Beacon and Associated
ADF Airborne Receivers, will be phased out in
the 1990 to 1995 timeframe. Though the other
equipment needs were addressed in JWG, further
staffing will be necessary to determine the best
system to install in Army aircraft. As of this date
no decision has been made. POCs for ATC related
questions are: Mr. Joe Swartz, AUTOVON 879
6793 or CPT Charles Kennedy, AUTOVON
879-6920 (USACC, USA Air Traffic Control
Activity, CCQ-SYS-CD, Ft. Huachuca, AZ85613).
13
 REPORTING FINAL
Late/NewsFromArmyAviation Activities
_ ---
Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, Robert A. Stol
worthy checks out the instruments and communica
tions in a UH-1 Huey helicopter at Ft. Rucker, AL,
before a flight, trusting this one will not in anyway be
similar to one he made in December 1976 at Ft. Hood,
TX. That earlier flight was the basis for an article,
“From Routine to Near Disaster,” which was the May
winner of the Army Aviation Digest Monthly Writing
Award. He wrote that many things went wrong during
the annual instrument renewal checkride, including
rapid deterioration of weather conditions, “... but the
biggest problem we had was the malfunction of our
communication gear.” CW3 Stolworthy received a
Certificate of Achievement from the Digest and an
engraved pen from the Bogardus S. Cairns Chapter,
Association of the U.S. Army. He is now a standardization
flight instructor pilot at Lowe Division, Ft. Rucker, and
was a member of the 1981 World Helicopter Cham
pionship Team.
FROM FORT RUCKER
Guest Speakers:
• Major Sherwood C. Spring, an Army aviator
who is now a qualified space-shuttle pilot with
the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis
tration, told 80 graduating helicopter pilots they
will have “a tremendous opportunity to work with
Some of the finest technological equipment going."
Those opportunities can exist in the space program
for his listeners because the professional abilities
14
Army pilots have is a good qualification for
selection as shuttle “mission specialists."
• Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker, Army
Aviation officer and deputy chief of staff for
operations, Department of the Army, Washington,
DC, challenged 29 graduates of the Aviation
Officer Safety Course to be leaders in the safety
field and to place high safety standards on their
units. He said they will have a very important
position in their units because "establishing safety
guidelines and adhering to them will prevent
accidents."
• Lieutenant General Jack V. Mackmull, com
mander of XVIII Airborne Corps, Ft. Bragg, NC,
spoke at a recent general membership meeting
of the Bogardus S. Cairns Chapter, Association
of the U.S. Army. The corps he commands is the
Army portion of the Rapid Deployment Force
and makes heavy use of aviation to carry out its
mission. “I am probably the Army's largest user
of aviation in a single command," he said. “We
have 750 to 800 aircraft to do our basic mission.”
(USAAVNC PAO)
FROM FORT HUACHUCA
Gives Flight Assistance. SP5 Tami L. Cockerton,
an Army air traffic controller on duty with the
Federal Aviation Administration facility at Niagaraº
Falls International Airport, NY, has been credited
by the FAA with a flight assist:
A student pilot unfamiliar with the area around
the airport asked for landing directions. He was
told to contact Buffalo Approach Control but that
facility could not identify the airplane because of
limits in the airplane's instruments.
An FAA controller relieved SP Cockerton at
her local control position while she looked for
the airplane. She also helped the pilot locate
familiar geographic features. After about 15
minutes, she was able to see the airplane and
assist the pilot to make a safe landing.
SP Cockerton's normal Army duty station is
Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. She is an Army
communications command controller on loan to
the FAA. (USACC PAO)
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 º
º º
º
Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, Michael B. Farmer tests the aviator's night vision imaging system (ANVIS)
before a night-firing exercise in the AH-1S (Modernized) Cobra at the Army Aviation Development Test Activity
(AVNDTA), Ft. Rucker, AL. The ANVIS is the third generation of night vision goggles and is designed specifically
for aviation as a replacement for the AN/PVS-5 goggles. AVNDTA is one of nine installations and activities under
the Army Test and Evaluation Command which checks the developmental quality of proposed Army materiel
throughout the United States and in the Republic of Panama.

Major George Magrath (right) and William H.

- -

A British Auster MK-9 aircraft (left) has been re

Grady of the Army Aviation Development Test Activity
(AVNDTA), Ft. Rucker, AL, inspect an upper wire cutter
on the AH-1S Cobra helicopter. Using a modified
OH-58 lower wire cutter as the prototype, controlled
testing will determine if the proposed location and
configuration will interfere with navigation and VHF/FM
homing.
FROM PORTUGAL
Safety Course Scheduled. An international
course on Aviation Safety Management will be
taught 18 to 29 October 1982 in Lisbon. It is to be
presented by the Institute Superior Engineering,
Lisbon, in cooperation with the Institute of Aviation
Safety, Stockholm, Sweden, and will be sponsored
by TAP Air Portugal. For reservations contact
Flight Safety Department, TAP Air Portugal,
Annexo F Hangar 6 Room 22 Floor 3, Post Office
Box 5124, P 1704 Lisbon CODEX, Portugal.
|
assembled and is now on display at the Army Aviation
Museum, Ft. Rucker, AL. The Auster arrived aboard a
British C-130 Hercules from the Museum of Army
Flying at the Army Air Corps Centre, Middle Wallop,
Hampshire, England, in exchange for a U.S. Army
L-19 (0-1) (right), with each of the aircraft having a 99
year lease on its new home. The Auster MK-9 was
used by the British Army in Korea. In its original version,
designated as the MK-1, it served in 1941 as an artillery
observation aircraft.
Correction
Major General John W. Woodmansee was er
roneously carried in the June issue of the Aviation
Digest as having served as commanding general,
V Corps, USAREUR. He was deputy commanding
general, V Corps, USAREUR, before assuming
Command of the 2d Armored Division on 22 June
at Ft. Hood, TX.

AUGUST 1982 15
 PEARLS
Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown
-
-
Elaine Chiboucas
Kudos are in order
1LT Max Mitchell and SSG Michael Bulkley of the
Aviation Company, 5th Aviation Battalion (P), Ft.
Polk, LA 71459, were recently visited by the Health
Services Command Aviation Resource Management
Survey (ARMS) Team and the following report was
rendered by the Inspector: “The Aviation Life Support
Equipment (ALSE) Shop of the Aviation Company,
5th Aviation Battalion, clearly indicated that the ALSE
officer and NCOIC had truly done a most outstanding
job. Undoubtedly their ALSE program is a prime
example of how a program should be developed and
implemented.” PEARL was elated to receive this report
and appreciates their outstanding effort as do others
in the ALSE community.
Exception Requisition—AN/PRC-90 Survival Radio
The turn-in of subject radio to Sacramento Army
Depot for repair has heretofore resulted in long
turnaround of the item. We have discussed this problem
with Mr. Jim Lewis, the Communications-Electronics
Command (CECOM) item manager, AUTOVON992
3919. He has assured us that the repair/replacement
of the radio can be speeded up by simply identifying
on the requisition that it is an “EXCEPTION REQUISI
TION" for a serviceable radio. The turn-in document
number should be cited and a code “26” should be
16
photograph by Tom Greene
inserted in columns “55" and “56” of the requisition
document. Accompishing these actions will preclude
requisitions being placed on back order from activities
with a low Department of Army management priority.
TC 1-62 And FM 1-302
We are still getting questions pertaining to items
erroneously listed with wrong national stock numbers
in TC 1-62. “Correct” NSNs for items listed are as
shown herein: AN/PRC-90 survival radio 5820-00-782–
5308; AN/PRC-90 antenna 5820-00-371-6806LS; test
set TS2530A/UR-6625-00-238-0223; test set AN/PRM
32A 6625-01-013-9900.
FM 1-302 is currently out for coordination, and
eventually will replace TC 1-62. Another FM for mainte
nance, repair and inspection of ALSE is being prepared
by the ALSE Training School at Ft. Eustis, VA. FM 1
302 covers aviation life support equipment for Army
aircrews primarily in the operations area and was
prepared by the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker,
AL. These documents are but another step in providing
to the Army Aviation community information and in
structions pertaining to this critical equipment.
ALSE Activities
The Fifth U.S. Army recently completed another
“hands-on” ALSE school at San Antonio, TX. About
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
93 Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Active
Army personnel were given instruction in such subject
areas as establishment of a unit life support shop;
ALSE publications; inspection and maintenance of
the life preserver, first aid kits, individual survival kits,
flight clothing, flight helmet, survival vest, survival
radio and ALSE maintenance forms and records; also
covered was the ALSE retrieval program. A highlight
of this training was an overnight training exercise
where the “students” got a taste of survival under
“survival” conditions. Mr. Al Cargen of the Fifth
Army Safety Office and his instructors should be
given an accolade of thanks for their fine performance
of duty. Unfortunately for the Army Reserve, Mr.
Cargen is leaving for an assignment with the Army
National Guard at Aberdeen, MD. Thanks for a fine
job Al, and we know you will continue the fine ALSE
support wherever you go. We will certainly miss you.
ALSE School Update
Ft. Eustis, VA, continues to train Army personnel
at their newly organized ALSE school. Recently, the
ALSE Management Steering Council convened at Ft.
Eustis, and had an opportunity to see the “hands-on”
training that was being conducted. We also participated
in the students' ALSE graduation ceremonies. Quotas
for this training are available through your local training
officers and major commands. We are still working
toward a career management field for ALSE and we
will keep you posted via these PEARL articles.
Helmet, Flyers, SPH-4
Army activities have reported receiving subject
helmets manufactured by AQUA-AIRE under Contract
No. DLA 100-80-C-2226 which are unusable due to
various deficiencies. Defense Personnel Support Center
has agreed to give recipients of these defective helmets
manufactured under contract DLA-100-80-C-2226 only
full credit. Procedure for return and credit follows:
Submit SF364, Report of Item Discrepancy (ROD) to
CDR, DPSC ATTN: DPSC-ITEF, 2800 S. 20th St.,
Philadelphia, PA 19101. Return helmets with a copy
of SF 364 to: Defense Depot, Mechanicsburg, PA,
ATTN: DDMP-JQ (MARK FOR CONDITION CODE
“L,” MECHANICSBURG, PA 17055). Defective
helmets received from other contracts should be
reported by Quality Deficiency Report, in accordance
with Chapter 12, TM38-750. Above data is also being
disseminated via DPSC Supply Information Letter.
Oxygen Throw-Away Masks Maintenance/Inspection
Dear PEARL, can you tell me what we should be
looking for when we inspect the throw-away type
oxygen masks? We know what to look for when we
inspect the regular type oxygen masks, but these
other masks have us in a dilemma.
AUGUST 1982
Glad you asked that question because we have
been getting a number of inquiries pertaining to this
area. We consulted the Air Force and Navy and
basically the following would prevail on throw-away
type oxygen masks:
Check the facepiece for holes, cuts or tears; examine
valve(s) housing for cracks, breaks and damage to
valve seats; check oxygen reservoir bag and tube
assembly for holes, cuts, tears or imperfect seams;
check tubing for security of installation and distortion;
check tubing for cracks, kinks and evidence of crimp
tubing marks; check head strap for distortion, elasticity,
cleanliness and security of installation; visual “daylight"
inspection of all accessible surfaces which will be in
contact with oxygen shall disclose no evidence of
rust scale, dirt, paints, preservatives and organic
materials such as grease, oil, ink and dye; wipe dust
from facepiece, using a clean lint free cloth dampened
with isopropyl alcohol. WARNING—the presence of
oil and other petroleum base contaminants on oxygen
equipment will create a dangerous fire hazard. If
there is evidence of contamination due to air sickness,
dispose of the complete mask assembly; after de
ployment or use, clean and disinfect mask with dis
infectant approved by the Surgeon's Office.
Lensatic Compass
Reference is made to message R221530Z APR 82,
from 97 BMW Blytheville AFB, AR//LGSMS2//to
this office; subject is requisition of health hazard
radioactive item NSN 6605-00-151-5337YS. Item has
been identified as radioactive and users are herewith
alerted to this fact. This item is required and is
mandatory and must be installed in individual survival
kits used aboard applicable Army aircraft. Exercise
caution when using.
Nomex Thread
Dear PEARL, I have been looking for an NSN for
Nomex thread (gray), and was hoping that you could
provide it. The OD thread is available at most units
but the gray Nomex thread needed for repair of the
one-piece flight suit seems to be scarce.
PEARL is always happy to oblige so here goes:
Nomex thread sage green can be ordered as a unit
tube NSN 8310-00-405-2252 at a cost of $8.96 per tube.
As you are probably aware the Army is using USAF
TO 14P3-1-112 (Maintenance Instructions for Nomex
single piece flight suit sage green). The thread specified
is MIL-T-83.193, and can be ordered from DPSC (S9 T)
using the aforementioned NSN.
Seat Belts
Reference is made to the April 1982 issue of the
Aviation Digest PEARL article “OBSOLETE SEAT
BELTS.” That portion of the article, national stock
number (NSN) 1680-00-787-4299, should be disregarded
17

PEARLS
as it is in error. Only the seat belt NSN 1680-00-787
6531 should have been included. In order to set the
record straight, we researched the whole seat belt
area and coordinated the following data with TSAR
COM Directorates for Maintenance and Materiel
Management: NSN 1680-00-787-4299, this belt must
still be requisitioned as the prime belt for UH-1 V
aircraft only due to configuration required for litter
application. NSN 1680-00-447-9504, this belt and all
substitutes are being replaced by NSN 1680-01-128
4488”. Existing stock of NSN 1680-01-128.4488* will be
the replacement belt for the above NSNs with the
exception of the UH-1W litter application noted above.
NOTE: *DO NOT requisition the replacement belt
NSN 1680-01-128-4488 until officially notified to do so.
For further information/clarification, points of contact
are: Mr. D. Boone Hopkins (AUTOVON 693-3112)
and Mr. James E. Alexander (AUTOVON 693-3308).
New Office
DARCOM HQ has established a Commodity Man
agement Office for Clothing and Individual Equipment
as a branch of the Command Control and Surveil
lance and Support Division of the Directorate for
Supply, Maintenance and Transportation. Their mission
is to monitor all clothing developmental/fielding actions,
and introduction of new items. Ms. Vivian McKenzie,
GS-14, and LTC Bob Surratt, formerly of Defense
Personnel Support Center, are a part of the staff. The
telephone number is AUTOVON 284-8231/9531. This
new office will not be fully operational until 31 October
1982.
U.S. Army Logistic Assistance Office, TRADOC
We in the ALSE area appreciate the support the
U.S. Army Logistic Assistance Office, TRADOC, has
been providing through their TRADOC Executive
Digest Reports. Colonel William E. Gregerson, Military
Police Corps (MPC) is the chief of this office and can
be reached on AUTOVON 680-3637 or by mail, USA
Logistic Assistance Office, TRADOC, ATTN: DRXLA
TR, PO Box 97, Ft. Monroe, VA 23651.
Thanks
We would be remiss if we did not pay an accolade
of thanks to Major Jim Foster, HQ TRADOC, Ft.
Monroe, VA, and Mr. Ray Birringer, TRADOCALSE
representative, Ft. Rucker, AL. Major Foster and Mr.
Birringer have and hopefully will continue to provide
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE.
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63.120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 3 14-263-3307
18
outstanding expedited support to the critical area of
ALSE. Many of the immediate actions have been
achieved through their “get the job done” attitude.
We understand, through the “grapevine,” that Major
Foster will be leaving soon to attend the Command
and General Staff College. His replacement has not
yet been announced, but LTC “Chuck" Lesko will
keep the ball rolling. We also owe thanks to other
ALSE Management Council members—FORSCOM's
CW3 Jeff Alley for his effort on prepositioned ALSE,
and The Surgeon General's Office COL Bruce Chase
for his support on resolving medical problems the
aircrew personnel are confronted with. We also thank
all ALSE council members for their efforts and
continued support. Always remember, PEARL cares.
Carbon Dioxide Cylinders For Liferafts
Dear PEARL, I have several questions and your
timely expert answers have always been of help to us
field users of aviation life support equipment. What is
the importance of having a spring adapter installed in
the carbon dioxide cylinder inflation valve? I have
been having trouble getting replacement carbon dioxide
cylinders for the one-person-type liferaft and I have
ordered them under NSN 1680-00-097-0104, but my
requisitions are returned without action. Can you tell
me what, if anything, I am doing wrong? Someone told
me that I should be ordering the valve and cylinder/
assembly under NSN4220-00-565-3276; is that correct?
Why can't I have the cylinders refilled locally?
You have asked some very important questions
and we will answer them in the order you asked them. A
spring adapter must be installed in the carbon dioxide
cylinder inflation valve to allow the packed raft to
“breathe" while being carried aboard an aircraft flying
at high altitudes. In the past, carbon dioxide cylinders
for one-person liferafts were ordered under NSN
1680-00-097-0104 from B-17. Because it was difficult
to have them locally recharged due to lack of carbon
dioxide high pressure recharging equipment, they are
now ordered under NSN 4220-00-565-3276 as a valve
and cylinder/assembly from S9C. We are taking another
look at this to determine if it would be cost effective to
stock the0104 cylinder and have them locally recharged.
Your local Fire Department formerly had the recharging
capability but, because of the new type of fire
extinguishers, most of them might not still have this
capability. We hope this information will be helpful
and will resolve some of the problems you have been
encountering. TM 55-1680-317-23 & P provides detailed
inspection and maintenance information. -
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

º
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º '''
--
tº
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º
ºn
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º |- ºf
World War II
rmy Aviation's initial entry into
combat was far from glamorous.
It began on 10 October 1942 at
Fort Sill, OK, when Captain Ford
E. (Ace) Allcorn received orders to report to
Camp Pickett, VA. There he was directed to
select three people from a group of Army
aviators that had been assembled there and
then report to the divarty (division artillery)
commander of the 3d Infantry Division at
Hampton Roads, VA. He selected Captain
Brenton A. Devol Jr., and Lieutenants John
R. Shell and William H. Butler. At Hampton
they were told that three L-4s were aboard the
aircraft carrier USS Ranger and that they
were to fly them ashore to direct artillery fire
during the invasion of North Africa.
The four joined the Ranger at Bermuda
where they quickly discovered that the L-4s
AUGUST 1982
FORTY YEARS
OF ARMY
AVIATION
Richard K. Tierney
Editor, Aviation Digest
ºn3.
º
combat
were in bad condition. But by the time they
were off the North African coast, the group
had their Cubs ready for combat.
On 8 November the invasion started and
the four Army aviators were placed on alert.
As they waited, word from the shore was dis
couraging. Inexperienced American troops
on the beach had shot down several of the
Ranger's planes.
The next day the Army aviators were or
dered to take off. A request to notify American
units on shore that the L-4s would be ap
proaching from the sea was refused by the
skipper of the Ranger who declined to break
radio silence. The Ranger had been under
torpedo attack and was running in moderate
seas at full speed of about 25 knots. That
meant the L-4s had to take off into a 35 knot
headwind about 60 miles at sea. “Taking off
was no chore,” Captain Allcorn recalled later.
“Some of the crew held the plane back while I
19

gunned it. I was in the air almost as soon as
they let go.”
Captain Allcorn took off first (in L-4 No.
204) and made a 360-degree turn before join
ing up with the other two aircraft. The plan
was to fly to Fedala where a racetrack was to
be used as a landing strip.
The Cubs flew at about 2,000 feet to a point
3 miles from the shore where they were fired
upon, and narrowly missed, by the USS
Brooklyn. The Army aviators immediately
dived for the surface and flew what might be
called “nap-of-the-sea” toward the shore.
Meanwhile, almost all the 200 ships in the
invasion convoy opened fire with 20 mm
guns on the three L-4s, despite the fact that
they were painted with invasion markings.
Lieutenant Butler, flying one Cub with
Captain Devol riding as observer, and Lieu
tenant Shell, piloting the other L-4, headed
north away from the invasion site. Later they
landed near a French fort and were taken
prisoner for a brief period.
Meanwhile Captain Allcorn, flying
between the swells and taking fire from shore
batteries, flew along the coast. When he was
off Fedala he pulled up and headed inland.
Immediately units of the 2d Armored Division
peppered his L-4 with 30 caliber machinegun
bullets, disintegrating its windshield and
blowing away portions of the cockpit. He
recalled, “I stayed as low as possible and as I
got farther inland I realized I was not going
to get to the racetrack and that I was getting
ahead of the Allied advance.”
20
LEFT: Captain Ford Allcorn flies his L-4
Cub from the USS Ranger during the
invasion of North Africa in 1942.
BELOW: Lieutenant William Butler (front
seat) and Captain Brent Devol prepare to
takeoff from the USS Ranger during the
invasion of North Africa in 1942. Their
L-4 Cub was named Elizabeth.
Suddenly a burst of fire from a Vichy
French machinegun hit Captain Allcorn in
the leg. At the same time the L-4 burst into
flames and Captain Allcorn had to slip the
airplane into the ground in a controlled crash.
He crawled from the cockpit and dragged
himself about 50 feet across the ground to a
point where he watched the L-4 explode and
burn.
Captain Allcorn, aided by friendly civil
ians, was taken to an American aid station.
Later X-rays revealed he had been hit five
times in the leg by 25 caliber slugs. In addition
to being the first Army aviator in combat,
Captain Allcorn was the first to fly a Cub
from an aircraft carrier, the first Army avi
ator to be wounded in combat and the first to
be shot down—not a dubious honor under the
circumstances.
Besides the four who flew from the Ranger,
there were other Army aviators from the first
three pilot classes who participated in the
invasion of North Africa. These included
Lieutenants John W. Oswalt, Bob Ely,
Eugene Gillespie and Robert Johnson.
In late November and early December a
number of Army aviators were attached to
British units which were heavily engaged
with the German Africa Corps in Tunisia. It
was during this period that Lieutenant Paul
A. Dewitt became the first Army aviator to
fly an artillery mission in a Grasshopper in
World War II.
In January 1943, the first air observation
post sections were organized within Ameri
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
can tactical units in North Africa. Lieutenant and success. An example was Captain Devol
Oswalt organized the 1st Armored Division who had flown from the deck of the USS
Air Section while the 1st Infantry Division's Ranger. He constructed a flight deck on an
was initiated by Lieutenant Jesse Overall III. LST (Landing Ship Tank) taking only 36
Meanwhile, Captain Delbert Bristol orga hours of work. The runway was 12 feet wide
nized a senior tactical headquarters in II
Corps to control employment of the division
air sections. He also handled aviator assign
ments and flight records, and established the
first Army Aviation parts supply system in a
combat zone.
As the Army aviators became more pro
ficient they developed more and more mis
sions in support of the ground forces. Their
ability to gather intelligence, coupled with
the fact that they could trigger instant and
devastating firepower (from artillery), was of
great importance, as illustrated by an inci
dent that occurred in March 1943.
After Army aviators had
uncovered a major thrust
being launched by the Ger
man 10th Panzer Divi
sion, they were able to di
rect a withering artillery
barrage that helped stop
the assault. A penetration
of the Allied lines was
averted.
The ingenuity of people
associated with Army
Aviation was directly re
sponsible for its growth

An L-4 Cub flies from the deck of an LST during

Mediterranean invasion rehearsals.

21
FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
and 70 yards long. It was constructed of
timbers covered with metal landing strip
mesh. Four Cubs took off from an LST in the
Sicilian landings. The operation was success
ful and the LST “aircraft carriers” were
effectively used at Anzio and in Southern
France. Captain Devol was awarded the
Legion of Merit for his work.
Field expediency also was demonstrated in
Italy by Army aviators as related in the story
of the Futa Pass “Ski Jump” airstrip. Due to
rugged mountain country it was extremely
difficult for Fifth Army Commander General
Lucius K. Truscott to visit units under his
command. Traveling by jeep was not practi
cal, so General Truscott made frequent use of
the Cub to get about in the Futa Pass area.
General Truscott's headquarters was a 30
minute jeep ride (and an often-times impass
able river) away from the nearest airstrip.
Disturbed over this, General Truscott told his
air officer, Captain Jack Marinelli, to get an
airstrip built near the command post—
“and the sooner the better.” After much
study, the airstrip was built on a mountain
side. It was 735 feet long and 30 feet wide. The
upper end was 98 feet higher than the other
end, and the whole airstrip had the appear
The fifth Army’s “Ski Jump”: airstrip was built at Futa Pass, Italy, in 1944.
ance of a ski jump. The lower part ended
abruptly with a sheer 2,000 foot drop-off to
the valley below.
“The interesting feature,” according to
Captain Marinelli, “was that we had to use
full throttle to taxi to the top of the strip after
landing. But you could also take off down the
strip without power.”
Many general officers made frequent use of
the Cubs, especially General Mark Clark,
who on one occasion had his pilot, Captain
Eugene P. Gillespie, land his L-4 on the
Boulevard Carrageola in the heart of the city
of Naples. Many Neopolitans were astounded,
but the general made it in time for an urgent
meeting that he could not get to by other
means of transportation. A short while later,
in the assault on Rome, General Clark and
his pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Walker,
made the famous L-4 landing near Rome
inside a school courtyard formed by buildings
and an 8-footbrick fence. When it was time to
depart, Colonel Walker assured the general
that he had enough room to take off. “He
did,” General Clark recalled, “by a margin of
3 inches.”
During the assault on Rome, Captain John
Oswalt landed his L-4 on a racetrack on the
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 INSET; The L-5 Sentinel joined the fighting at about the time Rome fell to the Allied forces.
ABOVE: Lieutenant Dave Condon and his L-5 at Utah Beach on D Day + 1.
outskirts of the city to contact lead tanks and
armored cars. Within minutes Captains Bill
Holden and Bill McKaylanded to help coordi
nate the attack. After Rome fell, Army avi
ators flying L-4s pressed the surveillance of
the German Army as it retreated north. Dur
ing the pursuit, the first L-5 Sentinels, heavier
type liaison planes, were employed in increas
ing numbers by the Fifth Army.
The addition of the L-5 brought many
comments at the front. Some felt the L-5 was
too heavy and should not be used, while
others thought the L-4 was underpowered
and preferred the L-5. But both airplanes had
their good points. The L-4 was extremely ma
neuverable and able to get in and out of many
more confined areas than the L-5. On the
other hand, the L-5 carried more of a payload,
and it had a few instruments and a lighted
instrument panel which made it more effec
tive in night operations.
º During the invasion of France in June
1944, most of the Army's liaison planes were
dismantled and loaded on trucks that were
moved across the English Channel on ships.
However, a few were flown across.
Captain James Gregorie, 4th Infantry Di
vision Artillery Aviation Officer, landed at
AUGUST 1982
Utah Beach with the 4th Infantry on D Day.
The next day he found a suitable area for an
airstrip and sent a message to Lieutenant
Dave Condon to have the division's L-4s and
L-5s flown from England.
The L-5s carried enough fuel to make the
trip, but it was necessary to equip the L-4s
with oxygen tanks filled with fuel and at
tached to the back seats. A fuel line running
from the oxygen tank to the main tank gave
the L-4s 20 additional gallons of gas. By the
time the aircraft arrived in France the divi
sion's artillery was set up, but the guns were
not registered because hedgerows limited visi
bility. Since the primary concern was to get
the guns registered and firing, Captain
Gregory and Lieutenant Condon immediately
took off in an L-5 and registered the first
artillery fire on Utah Beach.
Meanwhile Major J. Elmore Swenson and
his “29th Air Force,” as he called his 29th
Infantry Division Artillery Aviation Section,
arrived at Omaha Beach. In minutes Major
Swenson was directing the first artillery fire
in that area.
As the Allies began penetrating the
Brittany Peninsula, the liaison airplanes of
ten were the only source of contact with the
23

TOP: An L-4 is du'arfed by an LST in New
Guinea. L-4s saw action throughout the
Pacific in World War II.
ABOVE: Wrecked Japanese Zeros line an
airfield in Tokyo used by L-48 at the
conclusion of the war.
24
rapidly advancing armored columns. The
planes also flew out in front of the Allied
advance, keeping track of the enemy's posi
tions. In addition, the cubs directed supply
columns and flew food, ammunition, and
medical supplies to patrols and/or troop units.
As in Europe, the role of the Cubs became
increasingly more important to the ground
commanders in the Pacific. The liaison pilots
fighting the Japanese demonstrated just as
much ingenuity and initiative as their coun
terparts did in Africa and Europe.
During the invasion of Okinawa the light
planes effectively operated from the Brodie
Device mounted on an LST. Named for its
developer, Lieutenant James Brodie, it consis
ted of four masts which supported a strong
horizontal steel cable that provided a straight,
smooth, clear runway for landing and taking
off. A trolley with an attached sling under
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 The Brodie Device was used on LSTs to land and launch L-4s.
neath caught a hook mounted above the
center of gravity of the airplane. The trolley
ran along the cable and allowed landing and
takeoff runs. The airplane was raised from or
lowered to the deck by tightening or slacken
ing the cable.
In the Pacific the device was mounted on
LST No. 776 which also became known as the
“USS Brodie.” It was at Okinawa that the
device paid off. There was an urgent require
ment to set up artillery units in the Kerama
Retto Islands to bombard the Japanese on
nearby Okinawa. Photography and aerial
observation were needed by the artillery bat
teries, but there was no place to set up a
landing strip. That's when the “USS
Brodie”“steamed” to the rescue. It launched
and retrieved numerous airplanes throughout
the invasion, and not an Army aviator or
plane was lost.
In the Pacific the liaison pilots also directed
transport planes and ground troops, dropped
food and ammunition to surrounded troops,
and guided tactical air strikes.
The Korean War
While World War II proved the value of
Army Aviation in support of the ground
AUGUST 1982
forces, the Korean War proved that its poten
tial was unlimited. With the introduction of
newer airplanes and helicopters, the Korean
battlefield spawned new ideas on airmobility
and aerial medical evacuation.
In the early stages of the war L-4s, L-5s,
and some L-16s were used. But they were soon
replaced with the newer L-17 Navion, L-19
Bird Dog, L-20 Beaver and the L-23 Seminole.
The single engine L-17 did a good job in
courier work, but was not designed for use in
combat. In late 1952, it was replaced by the
twin engine L-23 which was used primarily
for the transportation of commanders and
staff officers. The L-20 was used for transport
ing equipment, supplies and troops; while the
L-19, which arrived in Korea on 16 February
1951, became the favored airplane for recon
naissance and VIP transportation. It pro
vided much better visibility, and everyone
appreciated the heater which made it more
comfortable to fly.
When the H-13 and H-19 helicopters arrived
in Korea in 1950 and 1951, ground com
manders quickly became aware that they
could perform any diversified jobs in the
combat zone. They offered airmobility and
excelled in aerial medical evacuation.
The 6th Transportation Company (Heli
copter) with its H-19 Chickasaws was the
25
 ABOVE: An H-19 (UH-19)
Chickasaw of the 6th
Transportation
Company lands in 1953
in Korea with supplies
for the 5th Regimental
Combat Team.
RIGHT: H-13 medical evacuation
helicopter in Korea in 1952.
first Army helicopter transportation com
pany to support units in combat. H-19s were
flown from Japan to Korea in groups of five
between 11 February and 24 March 1953. By
20 March, the 6th Transportation Company
had enough H-19s in country to fly its first
combat mission in which it supplied forward
elements of the 3d Infantry Division. The
13th Transportation Company (Helicopter)
arrived in Korea on 1 May 1953 and was the
only other Army transportation helicopter
company in Korea during the war.
The airmobile value (and potential) of the
H-19 cargo helicopters was probably best
stated by General Maxwell D. Taylor, the
Eighth Army commander. During the war's
campaign, he stated that he could not have
maintained the right flank of the front of the
MLR (main line of resistance) in its position
without the assistance of the cargo helicop
ters. Some units had been forced back behind
the main supply route and supply would not
have been possible without the helicopters.
Helicopter evacuation of the wounded in
Korea was not the result of a preconceived
plan. It was more the result of expediency.
The Eighth Army noted the effectiveness of
many heroic medical evacuation missions
that were flown in June 1950 in H-5s by the
Air Force's Helicopter Detachment F, Third
Air Rescue Squadron.
At the the request of Eighth Army, the
Second Helicopter Detachment arrived from
26
Japan in November 1950 at Tague, Korea,
with its H-13 Sioux helicopters. The first
Army helicopter evacuations took place 3
January 1951 when First Lieutenants Willis
G. Strawn and Joseph L. Bowler each picked
up wounded American soldiers 60 miles east
of Seoul and returned to an American hospital
at Seoul.
But the Second Helicopter Detachment,
commanded by Captain Albert C. Sebourn,
did not receive its baptism of fire until 14
January 1951 when its four pilots and four
H-13s evacuated 23 critically wounded sol
diers from a surrounded battalion. Despite
intense enemy small arms fire over a 2% hour
period, all of the wounded were evacuated 25
miles to safety.
When active hostilities ceased on 27 July
1953, helicopter detachments under the con
trol of the Army Medical Service had evacu
ated 21,212 casualties. In addition, division
aviation elements had evacuated many more;
and the 6th and 13th Transportation Com
panies (Helicopter) had achieved an enviable
record in mass aeromedical evacuation.
Because of forward helicopter medical evac.
uation, the wounded reached medical assist
ance quicker and fewer of them died than in
any previous war. And the H-13, “living”
with and aiding the wounded throughout the
war, was richly and deservedly honored by
the nickname “Angel of Mercy” affection
ately bestowed upon it by the troops.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

The first CH-21 Shawnee, flown by Major
Robert J. Dillard, commander of the 57th
Transportation Company, arrives in
Vietnam as it takes off from the deck of the
USNS Core.
Vietnam
During the administration of President
Dwight D. Eisenhower the United States be
came more and more concerned about Com
munist activities in Southeast Asia. President
Eisenhower sent military advisors to Vietnam,
but the situation continued to worsen.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy, con
cerned over the United States' responsibilities
as a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO), sent General
Maxwell D. Taylor to Vietnam to survey the
situation. He reported a critical lack of mobil
ity in the jungle-covered area; and on his
recommendation, Army helicopters were sent
to Vietnam.
On 21 November 1961, the USNS Core
departed for Vietnam with the 57th Transpor.
tation Company (Light Helicopter) from Fort
Lewis, WA, and the 8th Transportation Com
pany (Light Helicopter) from Fort Bragg,
NC. The small flight deck was loaded to
capacity with CH-21s sealed in cocoons as
protection from salt water spray.
The voyage ended on 11 December 1961 at a
dock in Saigon. As quickly as possible the
cocoons were removed and one by one the
H-21s flew from the deck, down the Mekong
River to Saigon International Airport. Major
Robert J. Dillard, the 57th commander, flew
the first H-21.
Both the 57th and 8th Transportation Com
panies began training exercises with South
AUGUST 1982
Vietnamese troops on 22 December. Major
Milton P. Cherne of the 57th Transportation
Company reported on the first airmobile
combat action in which his company partici
jointly with the 8th. On 2 January 1962, they
flew 1,036 Vietnamese soldiers into a “hole in
the jungle,” about 300 by 150 yards. The
mission was a success, routing the surprised
Viet Cong and enabling the capture of a
considerable amount of equipment vital to
the Viet Cong operations around Saigon.
The mission was performed with great
speed and success, helping to convince the
Vietnamese staff and commanders, of the
great potential offered by the helicopter in
airmobile operations. They had already been
impressed by operations of the Army's U-1A
Otter and CV-2 Caribou fixed wing transport
airplanes that had preceded the helicopters
arrival in Vietnam.
The first CV-2s arrived in Saigon in August
1961. Two years later there were two Caribou
companies, totaling 32 airplanes, in Vietnam.
They filled the gap between the helicopters
and the larger Air Force C-123s by landing on
short, unimproved airstrips. By 1964, the CV
2s were fully involved in the daily operations
of the South Vietnamese Army.
Army Aviation operations grew rapidly,
and by the end of 1964 it had 400 aircraft and
3,700 soldiers in Vietnam. The OV-1 Mohawk
arrived in 1962 and conducted reconnais
sance and surveillance missions. In 1964, the
UH-1 Hueys arrived, and by the end of the
year there were 250 in country. The Huey
phased out the H-21 and H-34 and became the
workhorse of the Vietnam War, moving
troops and cargo, developing into an armed
“attack” helicopter, and picking up the role of
the “Angel of Mercy” OH-13 helicopter of
Korean War fame.
Before mid-1965, organic Army Aviation
did not exist in Vietnam. Its operations were
primarily in specific geographical areas and
it was under the control of the Military Assist
ance Command, Vietnam. But things began
to change in the second half of the year. The
27

An armed UH-1 Huey in Vietnam.
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) began arriv
ing at An Khe in the Central Highlands of
Vietnam in August 1965. By 3 October the
full division with its 15,787 officers and en
listed, 434 aircraft, and 1,600 vehicles was at
An Khe. By November it was heavily engaged
in combat near the Cambodian border at the
Ia Drang Valley.
The bitter fighting raged for 35 days before
the Viet Cong withdrew. But military plan
ners had a peek at the seemingly unlimited
potential of the concept of Army Aviation. In
a little more than 1 month, an Army di
vision—with its aircraft engaged in heavy
and devastating combat operations—itself
transported 5,048 tons of supplies to troops in
the field; moved 8,216 tons from seacoast
depots to its tactical resupply points; whole
infantry and artillery battalions were moved
into, around, and out of combat areas; and
about 2,700 refugees were evacuated. Only 59
aircraft were hit by ground fire and only 4
were shot down, 3 of which the division
recovered.
28
Army Aviation operations not
organic to a division were organized
under the 1st Aviation Brigade, the
Golden Hawks. Brigadier General
George P. Seneff Jr., became the
first commander when it was
organized as the U.S. Army Bri
gade (Provisional) on 11 March
1966. He was still in command
when it became the 1st
Aviation Brigade on 25 May
1966. The 1st Brigade grew to
23,000 officers and enlisted by
1970. When the last American
troops departed Vietnam 29
March 1973, the brigade's colors
were brought to Fort Rucker, AL,
where they were received on 6 April
1973 by the Aviation Center Com
mander, Major General Alan M. Burdett
Jr., himself a former commander of the
Golden Hawks.
At its peak the 1st Aviation Brigade was
the largest single Army Aviation command
in the world. Although the commanding gene
ral of the brigade commanded the nonorganic
Army Aviation elements in Vietnam, oper
ational control of given units remained with
the supported commander. The brigade com
bined the best features of centralized and
decentralized control, which is in fact the
heart of the concept of Army Aviation. The
164th Combat Aviation Group, operating as
part of the 1st Aviation Brigade, was sup
porting three Vietnamese divisions of the
Vietnamese IV Corps in the Mekong Delta
with three aviation battalions. Each day the
battalion commanders checked in with the
divisional headquarters to ensure that their
Army Aviation thrust was geared to support
of the ground effort—primarily the Infantry
which relied on the helicopter for support.
They maintained a continuous command
control link between the supported elements
and the brigade headquarters. This philo
sophy permeated the 1st Aviation Brigade,
whether its support was being rendered to
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 On 6 April 1973 MG Allen M. Burdett Jr.,
commanding general of Ft. Rucker, AL, and
former commander of the “Golden
Hawks,” received the 1st Aviation Brigade
colors from LTC James T. McQueen,
commander of the colors detachment. CSM
American, Vietnamese or other Allied troops.
Similar relationships existed for the 12th and
17th Groups supporting other Vietnamese
Corps.
For religiously sticking to its Army Avi
ation concepts of support of the ground battle,
General Creighton Abrams, commander of
U.S. Forces in Vietnam, paid the highest of
tributes to the 1st Aviation Brigade by saying:
“It has always been interesting to
me to note that the aviators and
men of this Brigade have been taken
into the brotherhood of the combat
arms. Not by regulation, not by
politics, but they have been voted in
by the Infantry...the charter
members of that secluded club, the
combat arms.”
Early in the war the Army's transport
helicopters were being protected by Air Force
B-26 and T-28 aircraft which flew escort.
Meanwhile, the Army was experimenting
with attempts to provide protection by mount
ing light machineguns in the doors of its CH
21 transports. This proved ineffective, but the
emergence of the UH-1 Hueys armed with 30
caliber machineguns and 2.75-inch rockets
AUGUST 1982
Francis Aquinaldo (center) and 1SG Allen
Brewer, the top enlisted men of the brigade
headquarters, accompanied colors to Ft.
Rucker. CSM Clifton Wagner (left center) of
Ft Rucker awaits reception of the colors.
brought about the formation of the Utility
Tactical Transport (UTT) Helicopter Com
pany (see PART IV, ARMED HELICOP.
TERS, Armywide Growth).
The UTT fielded some 20 armed Hueys in
Vietnam in 1962 to fly escort and provide
protective fires for the CH-21 transports. As
soon as they replaced the Air Force escorts,
the number of light helicopters hit by ground
fire dropped significantly. Most of the tactical
doctrine used later during helicopter assault
missions was developed by the UTT.
Since this was such a success, it was not
long before each separate lift company had 7
to 10 armed Hueys, thus providing organic
Army Aviation
Medal of Honor Awardees
Major William E. Adams
Major Patrick H. Brady
Warrant Officer Fred Ferguson
Chief Warrant Officer Michael J. Novosel
Warrant Officer Louis R. Rocco
Specialist 4 Gary G. Wetzel
Sergeant First Class Rodney J.T. Yano
29
FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
escort and suppressive fire. As a consequence,
the UTT was redesignated the 68th Aviation
Company and later the 197th Airmobile
Company.
The role of the armed helicopter grew in
Vietnam after the introduction of the armed
UH-1. But the Huey was slow and its ammuni
tion capacity limited. The situation improved,
however, when the first six AH-1 Cobras
(then called Huey Cobras) appeared on the
scene in September 1967 at the 1st Aviation
Brigade. Designed as attack helicopters, the
Cobras were much faster, more maneuverable
gun platforms than the UH-1s. The AH-1s
would prove their worth time and again until
the end of the U.S. presence in Vietnam.
Airmobility became more and more impor
tant, and by the late 1960s no major battle
was fought without helicopters providing
transport, reconnaissance, surveillance, com
An AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter in Vietnam
munications and firepower. In fact, the
concept of Army Aviation had proven so
successful that the Army formed a second
airmobile division in Vietnam.
On 1 July 1968 the 101st Airborne Division
was converted to the 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile). It played key roles in the 1968,
Tet Offensive and a series of combat oper
ations in I Corps' tactical zone, to include
Operation Delaware near the A Shau Valley.
(Following the war in Vietnam, the 1st Cav
alry Division was discontinued as an airmobile
division. However, an airmobile/air assault
capability was retained when on 4 October
1974 the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
was reorganized into the 101st Airborne Di
vision (Air Assault).
In the early hours of 31 January 1968, the
Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese
Army launched the Tet Offensive aimed at
 seizing power in South Vietnam and causing
the defection of major elements of the Army
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). One of
the enemy's chief objectives was to seize
Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base. More than
3,000 enemy soldiers had slipped into Saigon
and launched an attack at about 3:25 AM.
Bloody hand-to-hand fighting broke out.
Within 3 minutes after the alert at Tan Son
Nhut, four armed helicopters were airborne
and attacking the enemy. Meanwhile, Major
General Robert R. Williams, 1st Aviation
Brigade commander, was airborne in a com
mand and control Huey checking into the
12th Combat Aviation Group control net. He
soon learned that the enemy, some in Viet
Cong “pajamas” and others in standard
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) uniforms,
were attacking at 100 points along a 500-mile
front.
The armed UH-1s, plus the few AH-1s
in country at that time, were widely ac
claimed as having played a key role in stop
ping the Tet Offensive. Later that year the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) broke the NVA
siege of Khe Sanh. By the end of 1968, the
NVA and VC had been so badly hurt that
they were unable to launch a major campaign
over the next 2 years. This setback would not
have been possible without the firepower and
mobility provided by Army Aviation. In fact,
without Army helicopters the war might
have been lost in early 1968.
After the impressive victories in 1968, the
American policy quietly shifted to turning
the war over to the ARVN and withdrawing
American forces. To protect the American
withdrawal, President Richard Nixon di
rected that the enemy's sanctuaries in Cam
bodia be destroyed. The resulting attacks in
1970 by American and ARVN airmobile
forces in conjunction with ground thrusts
were most successful. The effectiveness of the
airmobile assaults in the enemy's backyard
brought high praise from many high ranking
general officers. Lieutenant General John J.
Tolson III, who had once commanded the 1st
AUGUST 1982
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), said that “the
1st Cav airmobile operation far exceeded all
expectations....” But as U.S. forces were being
withdrawn, the LAMSON 719 engagement
awaited Army Aviation.
In 1971, as American forces were well on
their way out of the Vietnam War, a large
scale attack, dubbed LAMSON 719, was
launched at the Ho Chi Minh Trail by ARVN
ground forces supported by U.S. Army
helicopters in the transport and air cavalry
roles.
The air assaults were met with intense and
highly sophisticated NVA antiaircraft weap
ons systems. Losses of helicopters were heav
ier than normally had been experienced in
the South Vietnamese environment. For
many years critics of the Army's airmobile
concepts had been claiming that helicopters
were too vulnerable in combat. The LAMSON
719 events triggered a renewal of their
criticism.
While the Army was concerned about the
losses, it was reasoned they were not exces
sive in light of the highly sophisticated battle
field environment of LAMSON 719. In fact,
one of the most encouraging points to come
out of the LAMSON 719 experience concerned
the attack helicopters' successful encounters
with enemy tanks, which occurred on numer
ous occasions while the helicopters were fly
ing reconnaissance. The standard procedure
was to engage the tanks until the Air Force
would take over. When the fighter-bombers
were not available, the AH-1 Cobras would
engage the tanks—and at least 10 tanks were
destroyed. Had antitank weapons been avail
able to all of the AH-1s and UH-1s, many
more enemy tanks would have been killed.
The Army has not forgotten the lessons of
LAMSON 719. Today it has fielded newer,
more modern, more survivable helicopters
such as the UH-60 Black Hawk that carries
an infantry squad of 11 fully-equipped combat
troops, and the improved CH-47D Chinook
which can support more of the logistical
mission; also the greatly improved AH-1S
31
 FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
fully modernized Cobra and the emerging
AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, both of
which can destroy enemy armor; plus the
new scout, the AHIP, which stands for Army
Helicopter Improvement Program and trans
lates into a greatly improved OH-58 that
meets the Army's immediate scout helicopter
needs. To those developments add constantly
improving air assault tactics and flight tech
An AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter
32
niques, ever improving training and stand
ardization programs, plus other hardware
improvements such as mast-mounted gun
sights. All of this gives Army Aviation the
capability to fly and fight in adverse weather
conditions, to engage and defeat armor, and
to survive against the sophisticated weapons
of the modern battlefield. *-*
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

VIEWS FROM READERS lº
Editor:
I am very impressed with the articles
on NBC that have appeared in Aviation
Digest and would like to obtain a copy
of each article in the series.
(1) NBC—Training and Development
– Aug 1981.
(2) NBC–Decontamination Prob
lems—Oct 1981.
(3) Chemical Agents, First Aid and
Long-Term Effects—Dec 1981.
(4) Also, any other articles that may
have been published in Feb 1982.
SGT Kenneth W. Ellis
B Co, 1/23 Inf
APO San Francisco
Editor:
Please forward to me the following:
The First Army Aviator/June 1962,
inside back cover
The First Army Aviation Pilot Class/
July 1962, page 11
The First Army Aviators in Combat/
November 1962, page 36
B. B. Blevins, D.D.S.
Oak Ridge, TN
Editor:
We are writing to request, if available,
the issues of Aviation Digest for June
and July 1980, containing the excellent
articles by General Harry W. O. Kinnard.
Additionally, our company is under
contract to TRADOC in which receipt
of the information of the type contained
in the Digest would be most helpful, and
we would sincerely appreciate it if our
name could be placed on your distribu
tion list.
Finally, with regard to your interest
in the documentation of Army Aviation
history, the writer may be able to provide
copies of photographs relating to the
Army's World War II experiments with
Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft Rucker, AL 36362
AUGUST 1982
the Brodie device (fixed wing launch
from guide wires). These pictures were
copied years ago from originals made
available by a pioneer of Army Aviation
—the late Bill Gardner, who participated
in this work and later played a key role
in the creation of Project Flatop (USS
Corpus Christi Bay).
Please let me know if they would be
of interest.
George Chernowitz
Director, American PowerJet Company
Arlington, VA
• ‘To obtain an annual subscription to
the Aviation Digest it will be necessary
for you to send a remittance of $26.00
to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Wash
ington, DC 20402. Your offer of Brodie
device pictures is appreciated.
Editor:
Yellow Is Better
Yes.
Knowledge, with very little help from
aircraft instrumentation.
Hopefully we won't have to wait a
long period of time before they realize
that aircraft operators come up with
some damn good ideas concerning
modifications that actually aid the
individual aviators in aircraft control
and performance!
Our thanks to CW3Gary E. Rossomme,
Aviation Digest, May 1982, page 38.
CW2 Billy L. Johnson
Ft. Polk, LA
Editor:
In response to CW3 Rossomme,
Yellow is Better; I would like to be his
yellow light in the dark. His point of
yellow light exhibiting more desirable
characteristics is not new and from a
2....
2.
technological standpoint only begins
to scratch the surface in the area of
lighting (external, cockpit, signature,
etc.). The “user requirement" CW3
Rossomme refers to in his article unfor
tunately is not the pilot, this refers to
TRADOC. TRADOC is the proponent
for user requirements, more specifically
they are referred to within the DARCOM
community as the combat developer.
Each of the major aircraft systems has
a proponent TRADOC System Manager
to act as the point of contact (the user)
and address the user requirement. The
System Manager works with respective
proponent schools/centers to provide
input required for system changes. For
example, the Armor Center has propo
nency for attack and scout airframes,
the Transportation Center for cargo,
and so forth.
Once a requirement has been identi
fied, i.e., yellow landing lights, it comes
to the Materiel Developer (AVRAD
COM) in the form of a required oper
ational capability (ROC). AVRADCOM
prepares a Product Improvement Pro
gram (PIP) and the next event in this
process is funding, IF the user supports
the project at a fundable level. Bear in
mind that many PIPs are approved by
the user but never are supported at a
level to achieve funding. Funding for
development comes from Project Mana
ger, Program Management Office or
Readiness Project Office (TSARCOM)
in the form of reimbursable funds.
Then, and only then can AVRADCOM
and TSARCOM produce a “better
mousetrap."
Granted this is a very simplified/con
densed answer but it should shed some
light on the problem.
CPT David Downey
Aero Engineer
HQ, AVRADCOM
33
 Soviet AIR 1)BFENSEs
Against Attack Helicopters
NITED STATES aircraft have never flown
against the Soviet ZSU-23-4, as they have
against Soviet small arms fire and the SA-7.
The ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled, four-barrel
23 millimeter (mm) automatic antiaircraft system
mounted on a slightly modified PT-76 chassis. First
seen in 1966, it was specifically developed to provide
low-level air defense for the motorized rifle and tank
regiments. It has a four-man crew, carries between
1,300 to 2,500 rounds of 23 mm ammunition in internally
stored cannisters and is credited with a rate of fire of
34
TART III:
zSu-23-4
Sbill;a
Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Mullady
59th Air Traffic Control Battalion
APO New York
1,000 rounds per barrel per minute. The ZSU is capable
of firing on the move due to the integrated radar/gun
stabilization system. It is generally reported as having
three modes of firing; however, the Soviets have
described a fourth mode. The modes are: (1) radar
control; (2) electro-optical (radar gives range only);
and (3) optical. The Soviets describe the fourth mode
as “unique,” and say: “Work proceeds briefly accord
ing to “remembered coordinates of the target and
their rates of change. Here, it is assumed that the
target is moving evenly and in a straight line in any
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
plane. The mode is put into effect if there is danger of
losing the target by radar during its automatic tracking
because of interference or inaccuracy.” Western sources
claim the guns are capable of effective fire in the
optical mode to 2,500 meters and, with radar, out to
3,000 meters, although the Soviets claim an effective
range of only 2,500 meters.
The GUN DISH radar has a very narrow beam
which not only provides excellent aircraft tracking
but is also difficult to detect and evade. It may also
have an IFF (identification friend or foe) capability.
The ZSU is organic to the motorized rifle regiment
and tank regiment with one battery of four ZSUs
assigned. It is not organic to airborne units.
At regimental level the complementary SAM
(surface-to-air missile) is the SA-9, about which almost
nothing appears in the Soviet press. It is not organic
to battalion leveland, therefore, will not be discussed
here except to say that it is generally described as a
vehicular-mounted, improved SA-7. Many of the
previously mentioned limitations of the SA-7 would
apply to this weapon as well. The Soviets hold the
ZSU in high regard. The record of the ZSU in the
1973 Arab/Israeli Mideast War, when it was credited
with about one-third of all Israeli aircraft losses, would
indicate that it presents a formidable threat.
Soviet military literature describes how they plan
to use this weapon in combat. In the assembly area,
regimental ZSUs will normally join the battalion which
will be acting as the advanced guard for the march.
This battalion will normally be assigned sectors to
defend, paying particular attention to probable low
level approaches. During this period, detection of
aircraft in the area will be accomplished primarily by
visual observation and, perhaps, one of the ZSU's
radars. The Soviets are aware of our ability to detect
their radars. A 1979 Soviet military publication stated
that in the assembly area “... it is easy for the enemy,
who has appropriate equipment available, to determine
the number of operating sets, their characteristics
and the combat formation, operating frequencies,
and finally the probable composition of the forces
being concentrated.” Since our attack helicopter pilots
have been trained to use their onboard AN/APR-39
radar warning receiver to detect ZSUs, they should
know that this system will not be reliable in approaching
a Soviet battalion assembly area. It may detect one
radar, but there will be four ZSUs.
On the march, the ZSUs may be anywhere within
the column. It is the battalion commander's decision
and much depends upon the level of air activity he
expects to encounter. There are, however, two
recommended methods of ZSU distribution within
the column. If the column is moving without expecting
a meeting engagement at a predetermined location,
the ZSUs should be found in the column of the company
AUGUST 1982
with which the battalion command and observation
post is moving. If the air situation is particularly
hostile, one ZSU will be positioned near the head of
the column and another near the rear. The ZSUs will
probably respond to air attack by firing from short
halts and employing a leap-frog technique of fire and
maneuVer.
When a column is moving to a meeting engagement
at a predetermined location, the ZSUs are normally
spaced at 500 to 700 meter intervals. This column will
probably not halt for an air attack and the ZSUs are
reported to fire from the move while keeping their
place in the column.
There are two other nonstandard variations concern
ing placement of ZSUs on the march. One Soviet
source recommends deploying ZSUs along the most
susceptible flank in the case where there is only one
avenue of low altitude approach or the possibility of a
tank “killing zone" being created. Another Soviet
author recommends the variant of sending some of the
ZSUs forward of the column to be ready to conduct
fire before the approach of the screened companies
and battalions.
During the assault, the ZSUs will form a line of
platoons with each platoon (two ZSUs) supporting a
first echelon motorized rifle company. In the case of
a regiment advancing with two battalions in the first
echelon, each will normally be assigned a ZSU platoon.
In any event, the ZSUs will invariably be located 300
to 400 meters behind the attacking tanks or BMPs
(Russian infantry combat vehicles) and, depending
upon the width of the battalion sector, with a linear
separation of 150 to 200 meters.
The ZSUs will display less strict fire control in the
assault than during any other maneuver. Normally,
they will fire based upon previously issued instructions
and will fire at any aircraft which appears to threaten
the supported unit. Interestingly enough, in two recent
Soviet articles ZSU gunners were forced to decide
between firing at fixed wing attackers or helicopters
which were simultaneously attacking the Soviet unit.
The solution in both problems was to concentrate the
fire on the helicopters first because they present the
greatest danger for the tanks.
It is interesting to note that ZSUs will very rarely be
used in a direct fire, ground combat role. During one
reported exercise a ZSU opened fire on an enemy
APC (armored personnel carrier). The author of the
article criticized this action. “It is a very dangerous
tactic,” he writes, “which is allowed when necessitated
by self-defense measures.”
In the defense, the ZSU is a particularly dangerous
air defense weapon. The ZSUs will be camouflaged,
vehicle tracks will be covered, and most will turn the
radars off in order to achieve surprise in the attack. In
this case target data will be provided by higher
35

headquarters. Only in the case of a battalion in the
defense, separated from the regiment, are the radars
left on. Each ZSU will have predetermined alternate
positions. After engaging an aircraft, the ZSU will
move for its own protection and to deceive the air
enemy as to the actual location of the air defenses and
the unit supported.
Roving guns are particularly dangerous. Generally,
the battalion is responsible for the destruction of
helicopters within a linear sector to the maximum
range of the ZSU (3,000 meters), but roving guns
usually maneuver outside the main defensive position
and actively seek out encounters with enemy aircraft.
They will aggressively engage any aircraft within range
and then quickly proceed to a new location.
There is one tactical maneuver which must be
discussed due to the Soviet's special vulnerability to
attack helicopters. The river-crossing operation presents
a unique opportunity to the attack helicopter since
the ZSU is not amphibious and, as a result, will not be
able to continuously provide air cover throughout the
operation. As a result, speed of crossing is emphasized
continuously. Initially, the ZSUs will assume firing
positions about 300 to 500 meters before the water's
edge to protect the tanks being prepared to snorkel
across the river. In the case of a motorized rifle
battalion, the SA-7 gunners will usually cross amphibi
ously with their companies. That is the extent of
dedicated air defenses across the river until the ferries
are put into operation. The first vehicle to cross on
the ferry will be a ZSU.
Obviously, the battalion is most vulnerable to air
attack after the companies have crossed the river but
the ZSUs have not. If the air attack could be coordi
nated with artillery fire delivered approximately 400
meters deep on the Soviet side of the river, there
would be increased opportunities for killing tanks.
Under no circumstances should attack helicopters
cross over to the enemy's side of the river where the
concentration of ZSUs will be waiting, several in
ambush positions.
What are the vulnerabilities of the ZSU and how
can they be exploited? The first, and most often
neglected vulnerability of the system is that while it is
the best, if not the only, truly effective air defense
36
weapon against attack helicopters, it is limited in
number. Therefore, if it could be deliberately attacked
as the first priority target, the Soviet air defenses
would be severely weakened. For example, a tank
regiment has 118 armored vehicles. The only truly
effective air defense against attack helicopters is the
organic ZSU-23-4 battery which consists of only four
ZSUs. Simply stated, killing one ZSU mount leaves
nearly 30 armored vehicles of this unit without effective
air defense against attack helicopters.
The silhouette of the ZSU is certainly another
vulnerability. The vehicle is difficult to mistake in a
column of BMPs or tanks. The prominent GUN DISH
radar and the four-barrel assembly allow it to be
distinguished quickly in a column.
Curiously, the ZSU's greatest strength, its radar,
can be used to the attack helicopter pilot's advantage.
The Soviets write very little concerning the effective
ness of this radar. One article describing the ZSU
reports the following data: “Planes or helicopters
flying over open country at an altitude of 100 meters
can usually be detected at a distance of not more than
10 to 15 kilometers (km), whereas over a closed
countryside they can appear in the area of a target
completely undetected.” Electronic warfare devices
can be used to jam the ZSU radar. The potential is
always there with any system of this type. As a radar
tracker, the ZSU emits a unique signal, an electronic
“signature.” This can be used to identify and locate
the unit. The onboard AN/APR-39 can be used to
signal the ZSU's existence, proximity and general
direction. The GUN DISH antenna of the radar can
be destroyed by artillery fragments, mortars, rock
etS, etc.
How effective is a ZSU without radar? In recent
articles the Soviets have provided some information
on an answer to that. One article describes the sequence
involved in firing a ZSU in the optical mode—relating
how the operator must lay the tubes in the direction
of the target by turning the handle of the control
panel, shift the sight lever to the “doubler position,”
align the open sight with the axis of the bore, set the
distance grid with the indicated range, bring it up
under the target and press the button on the control
lever to fire a short burst. In this case, he missed. The
senior sergeant made a correction for wind and range
and ordered long bursts until the target was destroyed.
Obviously, the ZSU without radar is far slower. In this
case a stationary target at 2,000 meters was missed
the first time. The short burst would certainly have
alerted the attack helicopter pilot.
Although the above sequence would appear to
take quite some length of time to perform, the question
“how long?" was not answered until the following
article appeared in 1979: “In a timed test without
radar the majority of the crews were slow, much time
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
was wasted finding the targets, refining and using the
fire data. The result of this is that they opened fire, as
a rule, 2 minutes after the helicopters appeared. At
this point the commander took his best-trained crew
and ordered them to fire as soon as possible. The
crew was lauded for opening fire in 32 seconds . . .
without making a single mistake.”
How do those times compare with the launch of a
TOW missile? The flight time of a TOW missile from
3,000 meters is about 14 seconds; from 3,750 meters it
is 21 seconds. Therefore, a total exposure time for the
aircraft is in the order of perhaps 15 to 25 seconds, if
the pilot immediately remasks. It is during this time
period that the “average” ZSU crew must detect,
acquire, fire at and hit the attack helicopter.
To continue with vulnerabilities of the ZSU radar,
it is clear from Soviet descriptions of the ZSU during
exercises that it cannot prepare to engage one target
while scanning for others. Therefore, the concept of
a decoy aircraft, say a "scout, "to unmask and remask
at approximately 3,500 to 4,000 meters range from a
ZSU would allow an attack helicopter to strike
undetected from a flank position.
If it can be hit, a ZSU can be destroyed. It is a
comparatively “soft” target. The ZSU armor has a
maximum thickness of 6.3 millimeters in the front of
the crew compartment and 9.2 millimeters on the
hull. The T-54/55/64 tanks, by comparison, have
armor varying from 3 to 6 inches in thickness. Not only
can heavy machinegun fire penetrate the turret and
hull of the ZSU, but its tread and road wheels are
subject to damage by artillery; and high-explosive
fragments can penetrate its armor, destroy the radar
dish and rupture the liquid coolant sleeves of the 23
mm CannonS.
Another vulnerability in a mid-intensity conflict
could turn out to be the ZSU's high rate of fire. The
amount of ammunition carried (1,300 to 2,500 rounds)
and rate of fire (3,400 to 4,000 rounds/minute) have
been confirmed in the Soviet press. Simple mathematics
will reveal that the onboard ammunition supply will
be exhausted in 45 seconds of continuous fire.
Current U.S. tactics do not separate the destruction
or suppression of Soviet air defenses from degrading
enemy combat power per se (i.e., killing tanks). In
initial engagements, killing tanks in column with a
ZSU is equivalent to drawing on a gunslinger's horse.
The first target is the “gunslinger" (ZSU), then all the
"horses" are vulnerable. Presently, U.S. attack heli
copter tests and evaluations tend to teach the wrong
lessons. Each pilot and his commander is concerned
with the final tank vs. helicopter ratio. That is the
number that will be carved in granite at the close of
the exercise. Will it be 12:1 or better? What is missing
is a credit factor for ZSU kills. One ZSU should be
worth at least 10 tanks in exercise play; it will be
AUGUST 1982
worth far more on the battlefield. Also, nearly all tests
are computed on repetitions of "first" exchanges of
fire or simulations in which the ZSUs cannot be
destroyed. If kill ratios are to be meaningful and
predictive, second and third engagements should be
considered after the ZSUs have been destroyed. The
resulting kill ratios would be spectacular.
Larger helicopter units should be used in antiarmor
attacks. The standard “one scout/two gunships" tactic
allows the enemy forces to concentrate their attention
and fire on a few targets. Tests should be conducted
with attack helicopter companies supporting brigades
and destroying the ZSUs as first priority. Again the
results would be startling.
In cases when the ZSUs of a unit have been destroyed,
whether by air or ground forces, those units must be
considered high priority targets for future air activity,
both by TACAIR and helicopters. They must be
tracked and destroyed.
Clearly, the air defense battle is a battle of attrition.
The winner and loser will be determined by who runs
out first. The employment of attack helicopters should
be viewed in this light. If attack helicopters achieve a
12:1 kill ratio against tanks but all are destroyed in the
process, there will still be tanks—and stopping them
will be far more difficult.
Perhaps the U.S. Army should review the lessons of
the last great air defense battle of the Vietnam war. In
December 1972, B-52 attacks on military targets
surrounding Hanoi involved about 1,000 sorties in 11
days. The North Vietnamese countered with SA-2
missiles, firing as many as 100 at a time. U.S. electronic
countermeasures were saturated by these massed
attacks, and B-52 losses peaked at six on the third and
fourth days. At this point, the Air Force changed
tactics and struck the SAM and radar sites with fighter
bombers and air defense suppression F-4s. By the
fifth day, no B-52s were lost. The battle of attrition
was won; North Vietnamese Army radars could no
longer track targets, and the B-52s “flew at will.”
Soviet sources clearly indicate that the ZSU-23-4 is
the attack helicopter’s “SA-2." If these can be suppressed
and destroyed, perhaps the attack helicopters can
“fly at will" without suffering 4 days of losses.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Mullady
is a Master Army Aviator and Soviet
Foreign Area Officer. He is the first
Army aviator to graduate from the
U.S. Army Russian Institute in Garmisch,
Germany. A Russian and German lin
quist, his last assignment was in Pots
dam, East Germany, as a liaison officer
to the CINC, Group of Soviet Forces. --
Germany. He assumed command of ºº
the 59th Air Traffic Control Battalion -
in November 1981.
37
 Captain David R. Reger
Test and Evaluation Coordinator
Aircraft Armament Engineering Branch
Yuma Proving Ground, AZ
HANG
I HE SUN IS JUST beginning
to spread its rays over the green
rolling German countryside in the
3d Armored Division sector. It has
been a busy night for the soldiers of
the division, but the years of thought,
planning and practice that went into
preparing and implementing the divi
sion's general defense plan are
paying dividends. The covering force
has nearly finished its rearward
passage of lines through the 1st
Brigade sector, and although it has
suffered casualties, it has given a
good account of itself in disrupting
the first and second echelons of the
enemy attack. A few hours to con
duct consolidation and resupply
operations will allow the covering
force to maintain its status as a
combat effective force.
One armor company remains in
the covering force area, decisively
engaged with the enemy. The 1st
Brigade commander, who has been
in control of the covering force to
his front for several hours, turns to
38
2.75 Inch
the 503d CAB for a little added
leverage to allow the beleaguered
armor company the opportunity
to conduct its rearward passage.
LTC Dashing, the 503d CAB com
mander, notes from the spot reports
generated by the armor company
in contact that he will be expected
to engage an enemy motorized rifle
battalion cross reinforced with a
tank company. He decides to keep
six modernized AH-1 Cobras in the
air continuously, engaging the
enemy force until the passage is
complete. He will launch four
Cobras in a heavy TOW (eight
each) configuration and the remain
ing two Cobras configured with a
maximum load of 2.75 inch rockets.
Wait a minute—LTC Dashing
obviously has his wars confused.
Anyone who would shoot 2.75 inch
rockets at BRDMs, BMPs and T-72
tanks has to be an optimist at the
very least, and most probably is
missing a few screws in his head.
We all know that the 2.75 inch rocket
is an area fire weapon, and that if
one elected to fire a complement at
an armored column, all he would
probably do is irritate the recipients
of those rockets.
Before we pass judgment on the
competency of LTC Dashing, we
need to take a look at some of the
latest aircraft armament research
and development products being
fielded.
First, the new M260 and M261
lightweight launchers that, when
installed on the Modernized Cobra,
give the pilot of the aircraft the
capability to independently set the
mode of operation and/or the func
tion range for the new electronic
rocket fuzes from the cockpit.
Then consider that the new MK66
rocket motor, when fired from the
AH-1S(MC), has the capability of
delivering a variety of warheads out
in excess of 6,000 meters accurately.
Couple these capabilities with the
new Multipurpose Submunition
(MPSM) warhead and the thought
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 727
…”

Rocket System Clpgrade

of taking on armored vehicles with personnel and materiel. The body
GLOSSARY
the 2.75 inch rocket system at ex is then filled with composition B
BMP Russian infantry combat
tended ranges begins to enter the high explosive; a truncated copper vehicle
realm of distinct possibilities. The cone and a wave shaper provide a
MPSM warhead increases the lethal BRDM Russian reconnaissance
shaped charge sufficient to damage vehicle
effectiveness and utility of the 2.75 or destroy most armored vehicles CAB Aviation Battalion (CBT)
inch rocket system to include: upon impact with the top of the
CBT Combat
• The ability to engage a variety vehicle (figure 1). Each submunition
FCC fire control computer
of battlefield area targets comprised is fuzed with an M230 stored energy
of materiel, personnel or light armor. “all ways” fuze. “All ways” means FCS Fire Control System
• The ability to engage targets that the fuze will function regardless HE high explosive
by director indirect fire out to 6,000 of impact angle. HUD heads up display
meters, with the additional capability To give you an idea of exactly LRF laser range finder
to select any range from 1,000 to how potent the MPSM warhead is, LTC lieutenant colonel
6,000 meters through the use of a consider the fact that just one of MC Modernized Cobra
cockpit remote settable fuze. the nine shaped charge M73 sub MPSM multipurpose sub
In order to do all of the above, munitions possesses about 75 per munition
the development of the warhead cent of the lethality against a prone NOE nap-of-the-earth
required a departure from traditional target of one current 10 pound M151 RAD Ram Air Deceierator
2.75 inch rocket warhead designs. HE warhead.
RMS Rocket Management
In looking for a single warhead to M73 submunition will also pene System
replace many of those previously trate armor, whereas an M151 HE
SM submunition
used, the developer settled on nine warhead will not. After taking into TOW
consideration a certain amount of tube-launched, optically
individually fuzed M73 HE shaped tracked, wire-guided
charge submunitions. Each sub desirable overlap in coverage be TSU telescopic sight unit
munition body is scored internally tween the MPSM's nine shaped
to optimize fragment size against charges, a single warhead possesses

AUGUST 1982 39
 Rum Air Decelerator

M230 “all ways” fuze

* wave shuper
*— composition B high explosive
copper come

sufe position armed position

M73 shuped churge submunition

M439 buse fuze

with expulsion churge

FIGURE 1:2.75 inch rocket Multipurpose Submunition Warhead-M261

Lumbilical cable

a lethality area against a prone target

FIGURE 2: Production AH-1S (MC) at least six times greater than the
M151 HE warhead.
Think about that for a minute.
The MPSM warhead represents a
quantum jump in available battle
field firepower.
º Fire Control Now that we have increased the ºf
System
-
potency of the warhead over pre
--- --------- vious garden variety 2.75 inch war
º heads, our next trick is to be able to
get those nine submunitions onto
the desired target out to 6,000 meters.
The MPSM warhead is an air
burst (payload ejected above the
target area) delivered muniton, one
fuze umbilical of several airburst warheads sched
tº
uled for addition to the 2.75 inch
Mikº motor rocket system inventory.
Our nine shaped charges are each
-- ºr ºn tº ºr equipped with a Ram Air Decelera
tor and loaded into the warhead
case (figure 1). The RAD inflates
when the SMs are ejected from the

40 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


FIGURE 3: Range Error
FIGURE 4: Multipurpose
Submunition “Wall. In Space"
warhead case, initiates arming of
the “all ways” fuze, acts to arm the
submunition, controls vertical de
scent into the target areas, and serves
to disperse and scatter the submu
nitions after ejection, thereby re
ducing overlap and increasing muni
tion coverage.
The warhead case is capped with
a nose cone (ogive) equipped with
an umbilical connector which plugs
into the launcher so that the warhead
can receive fuze charge information
from the aircraft. The umbilical is
connected by internally routed wir
ing to the M439 fuze with its expulsion
charge at the base of the warhead.
The M439 fuze is a remotely
settable time fuze that has a resis
tance-capacitor circuit which trans
lates an electronic charge to range
by discharge time that corresponds
to the selected range based on
rocket time of flight. Its primary
function is to initiate the expulsion
charge in the base of the warhead,
which in turn expels the submu
nitions into the airstream at the ap
propriate preselected range. The
time (range) can be set manually
from the cockpit by dialing in range
on the Rocket Management System
cockpit control panel, or auto
AUGUST 1982
Gº->
-- –IARGET ~~
Dramatic effect minor pitch changes have on
impact points when firing conventional HE rockets
MPSM functioning at computed range allowing
SMs to descend almost vertically on target area
matically with the aircraft Fire
Control System which integrates the
laser range finder, the fire control
computer and the RMS. System
interfaces are shown in figure 2.
Attack helicopter pilots are well
aware of the difficulties encountered
to date when attempting to engage
targets with the 2.75 inch rocket
from terrain flight and nap-of-the
earth altitudes. The shallow angle
of attack produced when firing from
reduced altitudes invariably creates
elongated elliptical patterns in the
target area. Very small deviations
in aircraft pitch attitude have a
profound effect on the range of
something moving as fast as the
2.75 inch rocket. Figure 3 depicts
range error introduced from minor
increases in pitch attitude. The
MPSM fired from the Modernized
Cobra virtually eliminates range
error. The MPSM relies on the “wall
in space” concept to negate longi
tudinal aircraft pitch deviations and
to increase range accuracy. This
concept is depicted in figure 4, and
described below.
The pilot dials in the MPSM
rocket and quantity to be fired on
the RMS. The RMS designates this
data to the FCC, and the FCC selects
the MPSM/MK66 trajectory data
from memory. The electronic fuze
setter in the RMS will set the fuze
when the pilot depresses the firing
trigger.
The gunner in the front seat of
the Cobra sights in on the target
through the telescopic sight unit
(figure 5) and lases to obtain con
stantly updated range data. The
aircraft FCC processes this data
along with aircraft speed, relative
wind, temperature and flight char
acteristics of the rocket, and com
putes the point in space at which
the MPSM must function in order
to hit the intended target. The
computer then presents a solution
reticle through the heads up display
(figure 6) to the pilot in the back
seat. All he must do is match the
solution reticle to the boresight
reticle on the HUD by maneuvering
the aircraft and firing the weapon
system. The computer continues to
constantly update the solutions as
the aircraft moves along. The pilot
pitches the aircraft up, aligns the
boresight reticle with the solution
reticle and depresses the firing
trigger. The fuze receives the latest
ranging data about 50 milliseconds
prior to the rocket motor being fired.
Fire! The sequence illustrated in
figure 7 occurs upon firing of the
rocket—initial forward motion of
the rocket causes set back weights
in the M439 fuze to seat, and the
fuze time is initiated.
• At the computed determined
time (at a point slightly before and
above the target area), the M439
fuze initiates the expulsion charge.
• Expulsion charged gas pressure
forces the SMs forward, the ogive
41
 FIGURE 5: Gunner's Sight Picture
ºſſ' . . v \- -

% ºf .
*% ---

• Each SM descends, at an ap Consequently, the traditional ele

proximate rate of 80 to 90 feet per
second, with less than 6 degrees of
coning.
• Upon impact with any object,
or the ground in the target area, the
M230 fuze initiates the HE, shooting
a shaped charge jet downward and
spraying lethal fragments nearly
horizontally in a 360-degree pattern
around the impact point of each
SM.
Because the fuze receives very
sophisticated range information, and
É
E
because the MPSM functions nor
H
mally at 300 to 400 meters above
target elevation, causing the shaped
vation ranging error is no longer
traditional.
One of the real advantages of
firing the MPSM from the Modern
ized Cobra, especially in light of
the trade-offs encountered when
considering the choices of more
firepower or more fuel and conse
quently more station time, is that
the pilot can fire a substantially
reduced number of rockets in an
engagement with reasonable confi
dence that he can hit the target,
even at extended ranges.
During recent tests conducted at
Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ, MPSM

ſº
| FIGURE 6: Pilot's view through HUD
shear pins shear and the payload
ejects into the airstream.
• On airstream entry, each RAD
inflates, spreading the SMs and initi
ates the arming sequence of each
M230 fuze, while also stabilizing
each SM into a near vertical fall
into the target area.
charges to descend nearly vertically
onto the target area, we now have a
very accurate 2.75 inch rocket
weapons system. Pitch errors may
cause the MPSM to function above
or below the computed point; but
because it does function at a com
puted range (wall in space), shaped
charges have either more or less
time to descend vertically, rather
than more or less time to change
range because of rocket flight.
warheads with MK66 motors were
fired from a Modernized Cobra. All
shots were from reduced altitudes
at ranges in 1,000-meter increments
from 1,000 meters to 6,000 meters,
with airspeeds covering hover, 40
and 90 knots. Rockets were fired
one at a time for 10 to 14 iterations
at each range and airspeed combi
nation. The MPSMs consistently
impacted within a 40-meter radius
of each other for each range air

42 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


BFP
4. HIGH DRAG
speed combination, despite the
variables induced by firing only one
rocket for each firing pass. The data
presented could lead one to believe
that the 2.75 inch rocket system
equipped with an MPSM rocket is
approaching point target accuracy.
While that may be an overzealous
statement, the fact is that the MPSM
does provide target coverage con
sistently and is a very potent weapon.
º The integration of the MK66
motor with the MPSM warhead into
the Army arsenal presents some
interesting tactical considerations.
How will we employ this combi
nation to take maximum advantage
of its capabilities? Current doctrine
indicates that flank engagement of
armored columns with TOWs at
ranges from 3,000 to 3,750 meters
will offer Army aviators the best
chance of achieving satisfactory kill
ratios. Armor columns moving to
ward known or suspected enemy
locations logically orient the pre
ponderance of their observation
capabilities and firepower in the
direction of the enemy, with a lesser
AUGUST 1982
_*** FIGURE 7:2.75 inch rocket M261 Multipurpose
Submunition Deployment Sequence
2. RANGE SET FUZING
3. PAYLOAD EJECTION
SUBMUNITION
DEPLOYMENT
5. VERTICAL
FALL IN A
COMPACT
PATTERN
amount devoted to the flanks and
rear. An armor column has reduced
observation capabilities when it is
forced to button up. If enough of
an incentive can be created to cause
that column to deploy out of their
formation, button up and orient
toward the apparent threat, then
Cobras maneuvering into TOW
range from the flanks are going to
be presented an excellent oppor
tunity to inflict heavy enemy ca
sualties.
A logical technique for causing
all of this to happen would be to
have one or two Cobras equipped
with 2.75 inch MPSM rockets engage
the column or formation head on
from 5,000 to 6,000 meters. The
flash of firing rockets and the virtual
“rain" of armor-penetrating shaped
charges on the enemy formation
will cause them to do something,
and that something will be oriented
upon the helicopters firing the sub
munitions. Because the MPSM does
not require the helicopter firing it
to remain exposed for long periods
of time, NOEfiring techniques could
be used effectively, especially at
extended ranges, to avoid becoming
the recipient of all of that antiaircraft
capability Warsaw Pact forces
possess.
Consideration of a few facts con
cerning the Cobra fire controlsystem
would help the crew to maximize
the effect of its attack. Time of
flight of the MK66 rocket with the
MPSM warhead at various ranges
is shown in figure 8.
If the aircraft crew engaged a
column 2,000 meters long head on
with the rear of the column 6,000
meters from the aircraft, the gunner
could start sighting somewhere short
of the rear of the column and move
his TSU reticle slowly to a point in
front of the column. The pilot in
the rear seat could fire a pair of
MPSM equipped rockets every sec
ond for 8 seconds as the gunner
moved his sights in from 6,000 to
4,000 meters along the column. By
using this technique, all 16 rockets
would impact nearly simultaneously,
spread out evenly along the column.
Meanwhile, the aircraft will have
43
remasked or can engage again while capability and the confusion that is
the target is being suppressed. sure to follow, TOW equipped
These rounds have a very good Cobras operating from the flanks
probability of hitting the column, are going to be presented with “an
and they will defeat light armor. offer they can't refuse.” Figure 9
They may or may not defeat a tank, portrays the scenario described.
but they will defeat any crewmem The possibilities based on dif
bers' heads sticking out of the tank. ferent scenarios are endless; how
Everyone still alive after this barrage ever, it should be apparent that the
will definitely consider closing his 503d CAB commander made a
hatch. With the reduced visibility, sound choice in electing to devote
loss of considerable observation a portion of his fighting force to the
M439 Fuze Function Nominal SM Time To
KM Seconds Descent Seconds Impact Seconds
6 17.5 12 29.5
5 12.5 12 24.5
4 9.5 12 21.5
3 5.2 12 17.2
2 3.3 12 15.3
1 1.5 12 13.5
FIGURE 8: Cobra Fire Control System
FIGURE 9: Employment possibility. Cobras A and B engage enemy at 4 to 6 km
head-on with MPSM, while Cobras C and D engage from the flanks with TOWs
44
employment of MPSM warhead 2.75
inch rockets.
Coincidentally, the M267 MPSM
training warhead is also ready for
introduction into the improved 2.75
inch rocket system. It is physically
and ballistically matched to the
M261 warhead but contains nine
flash smoke M75 SMs. With the
existence of the M267 training war
head, commanders will be able to
practice and develop unit MPSM
deployment techniques suitable to
their own particular missions.
The systems and components
discussed represent a vast improve
ment in the accuracy and flexibility
of the Cobra as a battlefield force
in the medium and high intensity
environment. This, along with the
almost continuous flow of tech
nological advances associated with
aircraft armament systems, should
cause us to devote some thought to
effective training and employment
techniques. -idº-f
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
NOISE ABATEMENT
THE FOLLOWING information is extracted from
Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular
91-36B. All aviators are encouraged to follow the
suggested practices and demonstrate to the public
the Army's concern for a better environment:
1. PURPOSE: This advisory circular encouraged pilots
making VFR flights near noise-sensitive areas to fly at
altitudes higher than the minimum permitted by
regulation and on flight paths which will reduce aircraft
noise in such areas.
2. BACKGROUND:
a. The Federal Aviation Administration contin
ually receives complaints concerning low flying aircraft
over noise-sensitive areas. These complaints have
prompted requests for regulatory action prohibiting
low altitude flight over identified noise-sensitive
locations. We believe that a satisfactory solution can
be realized by means of a pilot/industry cooperative
endeavor rather than through the regulatory process.
b. Increased emphasis on improving the quality
of the environment requires continued effort to provide
relief and protection from aircraft noise.
c. Excessive aircraft noise can result in discomfort,
inconvenience, or interference with the use and
enjoyment of property, and can adversely affect wildlife.
It is particularly undesirable near outdoor assemblies
of persons, churches, hospitals, schools, nursing homes,
noise-sensitive residential areas and National Park
Areas which should be preserved as important historic,
cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage.
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
Yºu.S. GovePNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1982–546-037/5
d. Adherence to the practices described below
would be a practical indication of pilot concern for
environmental improvement, would build support for
aviation, and forestall possible regulatory action.
3. VOLUNTARY PRACTICES;
a. Avoidance of noise-sensitive areas, if practical,
is preferable to overflight at relatively low altitudes.
b. Pilots operating fixed and rotary wing aircraft
under VFR over noise-sensitive areas should make
every effort to fly not less than 2,000 feet above the
surface, weather permitting, even though flight at a
lower level may be consistent with the provisions of
FAR 91.79, Minimum Safe Altitudes. Typical of noise
sensitive areas are: outdoor assemblies of persons,
churches, hospitals, schools, nursing homes, residential
areas designated as noise sensitive by airports or by
an airport noise compatibility plan or program, and
National Park Areas (including Parks, Forest, Primitive
Areas, Wilderness Areas, Recreation Areas, National
Seashores, National Monuments, National Lakeshores,
and National Wildlife Refuge and Range Areas).
c. During departure or arrival from/to an airport,
climb after takeoff and descent for landing should be
made so as to avoid prolonged flight at low altitudes
near noise-sensitive areas.
d. This procedure does not apply where it would
conflict with ATC clearances or instructions or where
an altitude of less than 2,000 feet is considered necessary
by a pilot in order to adequately exercise his or her
primary responsibility for safe flight.
4. COOPERATIVE ACTIONS: Aircraft operators,
aviation associations, airport managers, and others
are asked to assist in implementing the procedures
contained herein by publicizing them and distributing
information regarding known noise-sensitive areas.
 Fort Eustis, Virginia.
The ALSE School is in full swing and is
conducting courses of training in ALSE
on inspection, maintenance and repair
of this critical equipment. Recent visits
by staff personnel and the Aviation Life
Support Equipment Management Steering
Council revealed the determination and de
dication of the instructors and the over
whelming enthusiasm of the students. Even
with this zeal, we feel we can help to make the
training better through making available
adequate training aids. We are therefore asking
others in the ALSE community to look around
and see if you have any items of ALSE which
could be sent to the school for their use. Please
call one of the following instructors on
AUTOVON 927-3001/5510: MSG Jack Ooten;
SFC Bruce Amos; SGT Barney Baker; SGT
Frederico Western; and if all else fails you can
call Mr. Ed Daughety, AUTOVON 693-3307.
PEARL will certainly appreciate any support you
can give.

Aviation Life Support System

 Depository
RECEIV-D
Novº º 1982

Awiºrio
-
|
Vº
-

****** .
-

- --- - º-

-º-º-º-
--
 §
SEPTEMBER 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 9
=/
Y ºr F. Y
Y
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Charles E. Teeter
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 Army Aviation in Latin America, LTGWallace H. Nutting

3 Knights Train For The Night, MAJ Frank L. Carson
and CW3 Owen D. Scruggs
6 Battle Line The Sky, MAJ Mark A. Ison
9 CH-47 Operations in Central And South America,
CPT Dennis Patrick, CW4 John Robinson and
CW3 Tom Susi
12 Maintenance, Latin American Style, CPT G. D. Muse
14 Rotor-Induced Whiteout
16 PEARL'S
19 Reporting Final
22 RSI Report, Mr. Rush Wicker
24 Hangar Talk: Aeronautical Equipment Maintenance
Management Policies And Procedures, CW4Kurt J.
Porter and CW3 Robert W. Lunau
25 Aviation Personnel Notes
26 DES Report To The Field: U.S. Army Aviation
Standardization Program
28 A Lieutenant's Guide To The Aviation Warrant Officer,
1 LT Ronald M. Buffkin
31 Forty Years Of Army Aviation, Part 4: Armed Helicopters, ooºººººººº.oo
Richard K. Tierney 3&#95& fº. -

36 Army Aviation Systems Program Review '82, MG John

W. Woodmansee Jr.
40 Pilot Error, Human Error, SSG (P)William C. Hawkins
44 Views From Readers
Inside Back Cover: ATC Action Line: Lost Commu
nications: Filing Fact Or Fiction, CW4 Peter C.
McHugh
Cover: A Chinook overflies the Panama Canal. Honorable John O. Marsh J.
Read the series about the diverse mission of the Secretary of the Army
210th CAB in Latin America beginning on page 2. Richard K. Tierney
Illustration by Paul Fretts Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center:
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise speci
fied. Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise indicated.
Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct
communication is authorized to Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P.
Fort Rucker, AL 36362 Manuscripts returned upon request.
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army 14 October 1981, in accordance with Army Regulation
31O-1
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310–1. Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR. AG
Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general.
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S
Government Printing Office. Washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription rates
are $26.00 domestic and $32.50 overseas
 ARMY AVIATION in Latin America is our featured
topic of this issue; and Lieutenant General Wallace H.
*Nutting, commander in chief, U.S. Southern Command,
leads off with his perspective of our mission there. The
principal aviation element of the command is the 210th
Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) of the 193d Infantry
Brigade (Panama), long recognized as a super Outfit
with a multifaceted operational as well as training mission.
Major Mark A. Ison provides an overall look at the
unique jungle and coastal environment in which the
battalion operates and the varied missions it performs
with his “Battle Line the Sky." He highlights the daily
challenges which dictate stringent training requirements
to ensure mission accomplishment. For instance, in
“Knights Train for the Night" we learn about a dedicated
program to teach the proper use of night vision goggles
so that night operations will not be “an exercise in
terror.” The authors of this very informative article are
Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, Owen D. Scruggs and
Major Frank L. Carson.
Likewise, the battalion's Chinook Crews are "Constantly
learning and searching for new and different ways" to
satisfy the wide ranging task of providing"CH-47 Oper
ations in Central and South America." Captain Dennis
Patrick, CW4 John Robinson and CW3 Tom Susi have
written with pride of their unit's efforts. While flight
operations across national boundaries are an everyday
occurrence, so must maintenance be accomplished
under similarly unique conditions. Captain G. D. Muse
has put pen to paper to tell us about “Maintenance,
Latin American Style."
And for Army Aviation operations in the Southern
Command—and everywhere else—the admonitions
offered by Staff Sergeant Bill Hawkins in “Pilot Error–
Human Error" apply across the board. His theme is
one we have heard before, and it deserves articulation
again: A great responsibility rests on us in the aviation
field—a responsibility for safe, prudent operations.
ergeant Hawkins then warns of the disasters that
: result when that responsibility is not fully accepted.
Unfortunately, it is also timely and almost prophetic
that an article dealing with SSG Hawkins' topic of
flight safety should appear in this, our final Digest
issue of fiscal year (FY) 1982. Through the end of
August there have been 49 Class A aircraft accidents,
with 35 involving crew or supervisory—or “human"—
error. Further, the cited mishaps have resulted in 33
fatalities and an accident rate of 3.33 per 100,000
flying hours. This is our poorest year since we began
using the current classification system of Class A-E
accidents in 1977, with yet another month to be added
to those statistics! As this issue goes to press in early
September, we have experienced ELEVEN more—
bringing the FY 82 total to 60.
For the third month in a row, I have directed the
closing remarks of this column to safety, or perhaps
SEPTEMBER 1982
should say the lack of it. While you may think it tedious
or repetitious to hear it time and again, it is obvious
that the safety message and the concern it conveys
still has not gotten across. It is even more tedious and
even more distressful for me to read recurring reports
of needless accidents. Stop for a moment and realize
that if every individual involved had accepted the
responsibility of doing his or her job as professionally
as possible, at least 75 percent of our accidents would
not have occurred in these past 11 months! Professional
ism equates lives saved and equipment saved in our
critical business of flying. Our duties as aviators may
be challenging and even on occasion risky, but our
training and our skills are commensurate with the tasks—
if properly applied and judiciously executed.
Even this very day, a comprehensive aviation accident
prevention plan is being prepared at Department of
the Army and will be disseminated to the field before
the end of the month. I ask each and every member of
the Army Aviation team to give it your total support—on
the ground and in the air. Make FY 1983 a banner year
for safety. It can be so only with your support.
Let me conclude by telling you of two very recent
and welcome additions to the Aviation Center command
group: Colonel J. Kitterman, formerly commander, 11th
Aviation Group, U.S. Army Europe, is now the chief of
staff, replacing Colonel Ben Pergerson who departs
this month to become the chief, Colonels Division,
Military Personnel Center; Brigadier General Chuck
Teeter who served last as the assistant division
commander of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea is also
now aboard as the deputy commanding general of the
Center.
My final word to you in FY 1982—let our theme be
“Accident Free in '83."
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL

Cºrmy Czáviation in
-Catin Człmerica
HESERIES OF articles beginning this month,
authored by members of the 210th Combat
Aviation Battalion, 193d Infantry Brigade
(Panama), the Army component of the U.S.
Southern Command, focuses on the diversity of the Army
Aviation mission in Latin America. Although the number
of assigned aircraft in the unit is small, the Army Aviation
mission here remains a big one. The dense jungle, tropical
climate, varied terrain, tactical training, civic action missions
and threat in the region present unique challenges.
Tactical aviation in Latin America often presents a
significantly different picture than the one painted for the
trainer, tactician and operator of Western Europe. In the
U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility the tropical
environment underscores the dynamics of battle in proportions
often inappropriate elsewhere. For the Army component,
it is an environment where limited aerial and ground obser
vation also limits fields of fire; where the commander faces
serious obstacles to rapid ground movement; where light
infantry and small arms predominate; and where tactical
maneuver, rapid movement and logistical efficiency elevate
the helicopter and airmobility to the forefront.
Doctrine. With respect to tactical, logistical and operational
doctrine in Army Aviation, it is apparent that some thinking
and doing is necessary. Our doctrine and way of training
tactically and technically proficient aircrews, and integrating
aviation into the plan of the ground forces, must be continually
assessed as it applies to concentrating those forces at the
correct time, and then controlling those forces while
maneuvering them in the right combination to destroy the
enemy. One good method of gaining insight into the dynamics
of the jungle battlefield is by practicing and training with
proven methods while obtaining practical, and often new,
experiences from the soldiers living and operating in the
jungle. Articles are one way to capture some ideas from the
latter.
While the Army doctrine for jungle operations is being
refined, we must always be careful to avoid rigidity of
thought by referring to tactical doctrine in terms of “never"
or “always,” but rather to encourage innovative ideas and
thought. This rule is very apparent in the night training
activities of aviation based in Panama, where training has
enhanced our night aviation capability.
Airmobility. If helicopters are important anywhere—in
providing essential mobility for light infantry; for achieving
shock effect through surprise, deception and maneuver;
for extending the ground commander's area of influence;
for positioning indirect fires in support of the ground forces;
for augmenting the ground commander's capability to move,
--- *-
Lieutenant General
Wallace H. Nutting
Commander in Chief
United States Southern
Command
shoot and communicate—then it is in a jungle environment.
This becomes very obvious throughout the articles.
In the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) aviation is tactically
integrated with the ground commander in airmobile
operations, in artillery raids and in his scheme of maneuver
wherever it can better support. From the onset, the brigade's
aviators gain appreciation of the “ground perspective” by
undergoing a jungle training program with the infantry.
Training. Training is paramount to success in battle, and
combined arms training is also in full swing in the aviation
battalion. Particularly noteworthy are the unique training
accomplishments toward a 24-hour airmobile capability,
even in marginal weather conditions, and the ability to
operate and maintain at extended distances. Good training
is conducted very much like good battle execution—both
have centralized planning and control, and decentralized
execution. Continual refinement and training of the combined
arms concept as it applies to jungle operations, along with
the development of standard operating procedures to enable
crisp execution, is visible in both their tactical and logistical
execution.
From the training standpoint, realistic and effective training
often involves some risks. The good aviation trainer can
still accomplish realistic training—safely—through good
planning and by using available training tools to enhance
training readiness, thus minimizing risks. In the U.S. Southern
Command area of operations, good training achieves good
results despite a most demanding flying hour program which
requires aviation support over extended distances and at
the end of a very long logistics tail.
There are some interesting things happening from the
Army Aviation and Army component standpoint in Latin
America. Aggressive training by competent and confident
leaders on the ground and in the air is helping to define and
develop the airmobile doctrine in the jungle environment.
Some of their efforts and some of their statements may
have meaning for all of Army Aviation. The applicability of
jungle operations techniques as they pertain to helicopter
operations have encouraged imaginative thought. Innovative
ideas have been put into action. It is apparent to me that a
collective pride and cohesion are being fostered by the
Army component units. I encourage Army service school
thinkers to contact the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama),
where specific tactics and techniques can be examined
further for their applicability in developing a jungle doctrine
for the Army. º->
- - = -- --- -- - -- - -
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Cºnſ
Crºſſ for
ſevºight
º º
O DOUBT ABOUT it, the
aircrews of the 114th Combat Sup
port Aviation Company (CSAC),
“Knights of the Air," have a challeng
ing flying environment. In the Re
public of Panama, they operate over
a carpet of triple canopy jungle,
º rapidly changing terrain elevations,
º and into precipitous “hover-hole”
ſº landing zones (LZs). Nights in Cen
tral America are blacker than the
º proverbial “black hole.” Add the
º
SEPTEMBER 1982
º:
weather component, which is char
acterized by an 8 to 9 month mon
soon or rainy season and a shorter
dry season during which the skies
are clear but extremely turbulent.
Year-round, almost every flight at
terrain altitudes is a thrill.
The normal mission of the Knights
consists of airmobile operations in
support of the 193d Infantry Brigade,
the Jungle Operations Training
Center (JOTC) and the U.S. Army
ºx=
2
Z;%"
ABOVE: Airmobile opera
tions are the word of the
day when operating in the
jungle, particularly against
guerilla forces
BELOW: Providing cover
fire for airmobile
operations in Panama
means returning ground
fire in a general direction,
as seeing a target through
triple canopy jungle is
absolutely impossible
Major Frank L. Carson
Commander
CW3 Owen D. Scruggs
Standardization Officer
114th Combat Support Aviation
Company
210th Combat Aviation Battalion
193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)
Howard AFB, Panama
School of the Americas. The unit
must also be prepared to conduct
disaster relief or civic action missions
throughout Central and South
America. Perhaps the best way to
convey a feel for our mission is a
war story.
There I was -200 feet over
some of the most unforgiving
terrain in the world, with so
 Cºrmy cxviation in 24atin
much darkness around me I organized program for their inte
supore I had been suyallouped gration into our unit mission. Thus,
by a coup; and a ground com there was no confidence in them.
mander in back of my heli The turning point in the 114th
copter wanting to land in an CSAC came in December 1980 when
LZ that I wasn't too crazy the Forces Command commander
about in the daytime! All I said that the mission of aviation on
needed nouv was for the rain the modern battlefield depended
to start again! on total proficiency at night, the
The opportunity to excel skilled use of night vision devices
started when we tried to find and absolute coordination between
our little “hower-hole.” The air and ground elements. More
trees around the LZ rose specific guidance followed from
about 60 to 80 feet on all brigade and battalion, the crux of
sides, making it impossible which is that we must train the way
to see the landing area until we will fight and focus on what will
the aircraft was directly over lead to success in battle. Realism
it. I was lucky and found it! and the ability to integrate safety
The next problem was to es into mission accomplishment were
tablish an approach that stressed as the keys to a well trained
would allow the landing to unit in night operations.
º be made without having my The first step in developing our
| entire life flash before my NVG program was to determine
eyes! We weren't so lucky where, or at what level the unit
| here, although nothing was needed to be trained. The com
| broken. The takeoff was prob mander, together with subordinate
ably the easiest part of the leaders and standardization per
| entire ordeal. Maximum pouy sonnel, determined that if 50 percent
er was applied until we felt of the unit's aviators were NVG
we were above the barriers, qualified, we could commit one
then blackness forward, air third of our aircraft 24 hours a day.
speed, return to the pickup Achievement of that goal would
zone and start the uphole gory increase the combat power of the
mess over again. 193d Infantry Brigade dramatically.
Resources available to be used
As the above example depicts, for the training were an experienced
night operations used to be an exer NVG standardization instructor pilot
cise in terror. No matter how long (SIP) and 87 sets of AN/PVS-5A
and hard we trained, the night-terror night vision goggles. Higher head
syndrome persisted. In retrospect, quarters provided the necessary
the basic problem was in applying flight hours. However, only 3 of the
the Wright brothers' tactics and tech 23 assigned UH-1H Huey aircraft
nologies (fly by feel and sight) to had been modified for NVG flight,
accomplish space-age missions. We so organic maintenance would have
had all been exposed to night vision to begin the required modifications.
goggles (NVG) at the Aviation Cen Obviously the first step was to
ter at Ft. Rucker, AL, and we even train the trainers. With Our One NVG
had some on hand in the unit, but SIP the process began in October
by late 1980 they were still toys. Oh 1980 and was completed in July 1981
sure, we used them on a haphazard when the last IP, yours truly, was
basis but had no systematic or dragged kicking and Screaming to
Człmerica
the aircraft to get NVG qualified.”
Then we were ready to build a
complete night training program.
Using the Army Aviation Center's
exportable NVG training package
as a guide, the unit began developing
an effective “Night Flight Training”
standing operating procedure (SOP)
which would go beyond the NVG
qualification phase and would fur
ther define training objectives for
NVG, tactics and continuation train
ing. Finally, this training would be
integrated with brigade tactical field
exercises and airmobile operations
for the JOTC. Aviators selected for
the instruction would be carefully
screened for their flying ability and
experience, motivation, medical
fitness and aptitude to perform under
goggles. The end product was to be
a unit with increased night capability
and one that could eventually prac
tice night missions similar to those
they would actually fly in combat.
In the continuation phase of training,
the unit would train to support night
airmobile operations by actually
conducting night airmobile oper
ations with the NVG devices, i.e.,
“train to do by doing.”
Once all IPs and several platoon
aviators were qualified, we attempt
ed to initiate night vision devices
into mission support, using AN/PVS
5A NVG. Our first attempts were
less than desirable in planning and
execution.
The first and most significant
problem was ignorance. We had
logged countless hours in the traffic
pattern and very few, if any, in the
tactical flying area. Subscribing to
the theory that altitude is life when
flying at night, we would fly to the
landing zone at altitudes from 300
to 500 feet AGL (above ground
level), don the goggles and then
attempt an approach and landing.
This method was frightening in
execution and tactically unsound
-------- sº a 2 tº a
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

due to the increased possibility of
detection in the objective area.
Lights in the landing zones pre
sented another problem. It was not
always possible to have light avail
able if the LZ was in one of the
many remote areas. When they were
available, they were poorly aligned
and positioned. At other times the
“Y” would be set up properly but
would run away (soldiers holding
lights) when the aircraft was on short
final. Without a doubt, our most
serious problem came from well
meaning soldiers aiming flashlights
directly into the face of the pilot
.
just before touchdown. This is a
serious safety hazard anywhere; it
is especially uncomfortable—and
dangerous—when landing in a single
ship “hover-hole” with an NVG
affixed to your eyeball.
Every unit's mission is a little
different, particularly as concerns
NVG usage, so any unit embarking
on an NVG training program must
be prepared to use the “scare and
error” technique to develop the
appropriate tactics. The key to
survival during this phase is total
involvement by the commander,
standardization and safety person
nel. After a series of “scare and
error" exercises the standardization
officer began to meet regularly with
the NVG pilots in an attempt to
*document ideas and experiences
which formed the basis of NVG
º tactics. From those meetings and
many hours of NVG training our
present Night Training Program was
developed and continues to evolve.
The 114th CSAC program consists
of night, Night Hawk and night vision
goggles training. All personnel assign
ed to the company are qualified in
night operations. Using TC 1-135,
“Aircrew Training Manual, UH-1,”
all aviators are continually trained
and evaluated on night maneuvers.
In Night Hawk training, the aver
= ºº: º ºs º ºs
SEPTEMBER 1982
ſ
age pilot receives about 10 flight
hours and 10 academic hours regard
less of previous training. After quali
fication, aviators are continually
monitored and evaluated to ensure
these skills do not deteriorate.
The last, and most demanding
phase of the program, is qualifica
tion in AN/PVS-5A night vision
goggles. Aviators complete required
academic instruction and normally
receive about 15 hours of flight.
The first 10hours of flight is normally
conducted in the traffic pattern
which perfects individual skills; the
remaining flight hours are used to
perform terrain flight operations in
the tactical training area.
In order to maintain currency,
pilots are required to fly a minimum
8 hours quarterly, of which only 4
may be flown using daylight filters.
This increased currency require
ment is necessary to ensure safe
NVG operations in our environment.
Our primary mission is tactical
aviation support of the 193d Infantry
Brigade; and since we are the only
UH-1 unit in Panama, we work very
closely with the ground units. The
114th's night training program qual
ifies aviators but it also opens new
vistas for the supported units.
All missions are conducted at
terrain flight altitudes, under black
out conditions and complete radio
listening silence. A normal operation
usually involves routes between 20
and 40 kilometers with landings
made at one or more single-ship
landing zones. Control is maintained
by a series of aircraft checkpoints
along the assigned route. Remaining
on the assigned route and crossing
checkpoints at specified times is
imperative for both safety and mis
sion accomplishment. Converging
routes are avoided and there is
normally a minimum 3-kilometer
separation between routes. All pilots
and crewmembers attend a debrief
e º ºr * *º is a -s ºn
--~~ El
º
&:
º
ing at the completion of every
mission which allows any problem
areas to be discussed and dealt with
while the information is current and
provides input necessary to contin
ually update SOPs and checklists
used during NVG operations.
We constantly seek methods to
extend the NVG capabilities of the
unit. A recent operation, conducted º
with a training battalion at the JOTC,
required the unit to insert troops to
a defended rooftop about 15 meters
square. The ground unit was to
|
perform a rescue operation and
prepare for vertical extraction. A
second aircraft was used to vertically
extract personnel off the same posi
tion. The entire operation was con
ducted in less than 5 minutes, during
the hours of darkness, using night
i
vision devices. It was considered a
complete success and proved that,
with sufficient training, very compli
cated special operations can be
conducted using night vision goggles.
The question was recently raised
as to what effect nuclear, biological,
chemical (NBC) operations would
have on NVG equipped aviators. In
order to find an answer, the standard
ization officer and another brave
soul conducted a training flight with
AN/PVS-5As while wearing the M
24 protective mask. After 1 hour we
determined that it was not as totally
outrageous as many first believed.
NBC operations are now part of the
qualification and continuation training
phases of the NVG program.
The unit is gaining proficiency
monthly but has a long way to go.
It is significant, however, that the
114th CSAC now routinely accom
|
plishes night tactical troop insertions
and extractions into and out of jungle
confined areas and pinnacles using
NVG devices, meaning it has en
hanced its survivability and effect
iveness to the ground commander
during the hours of darkness.
-º-,
 photo by MSG Dave Goldie
The new JOES (Jungle
Operations Extraction
System) extraction
method developed by the
JOTC cadre now makes it
easier to rescue downed
| aviators from dense
jungles. The system
incorporates a standard
“Swiss" rappelling seat
and a regular troop
rappelling rope, items that
are readily available
around any infantry unit
today
Major Mark A. Ison
Operations
210th Combat Aviation Battalion
193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)
Howard AFB, Panama
_S OME OF THE MOST challenging
training conditions and demanding flight standards
in the Army—these are what pilots of the 210th
Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) routinely face
accomplishing their missions in Panama.
Located only 600 miles north of the equator,
Panama encompasses varied types of terrain.º
including sweeping hill country and peaks formed
by extinct volcanoes that tower up to 7,000 feet.
Much of the country is covered with thick, triple
canopy jungle that mostly offers only widely scat
tered, one ship landing/pickup zones (LZ/PZ). It
is flanked by the Pacific and Atlantic oceans that
are connected by the Panama Canal. The canal
includes a series of large lakes and the Chagres
River, which draws much of its water from tropical
rain forests.
Temperatures vary from the high 70s to the
mid-90s, year round.
Besides flying in relatively hot weather, the
aircrews must also operate in two distinct seasons:
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Cºrmy cxviation in 24 atín
rainy season, from April through
December, and dry season, called
“summer,” from January through
March,
The rainy season is characterized
by ground fog, low ceilings, showers
and heavy cloudbursts. Aircrews are
often required to fly hood or actual
instrument meteorological condi
tions (IMC) during single aircraft
administrative flights and during
tactical training missions going from
one ocean to the other. Multiship
flights may either separate and fly
IMC, or transit the canal area as a
flight by combining nap-of-the-earth,
contour and low-level flight.
During the dry season, the trade
winds blow steadily and extremely
dry, dusty conditions prevail, often
causing light to moderate turbulence
by mid-day throughout the operating
area. Wind, smoke (most Pana
manians use the dry season to burn
away the 8- to 12-foot high grass
that grows during the wet season),
haze and bright sunlight are the
major climatic conditions that affect
aviation operations.
A common hazard during both
seasons is birds. It is not unusual
for a flightcrew to see a sky filled
with beautiful red, yellow or blue
headed parrots in formation flight.
Not so beautiful are unorganized
flights of black buzzards in groups
*of hundreds.
These operational conditions set
the stage for a dynamic training
program unique to the 210th CAB.
First, however, the battalion mission
must be discussed.
The primary mission is to support
U.S. Army forces that are in Panama
to defend the Panama Canal. Those
are the 3d Battalion, 5th Infantry
(including one airborne rifle com
pany), the 4th Battalion, 10th In
fantry, and the 4th Battalion (Mech),
20th Infantry, the 3d Special Forces
Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group
SEPTEMBER 1982
Człmerica
(Abn), and the Jungle Operations
Training Center (JOTC)—all or
ganic to the 193d Infantry Brigade
(Panama).
The 210th CAB also provides
aviation support to:
• about 14 CONUS (continental
United States)-based infantry battal
ions that undergo 3 weeks of jungle
training annually at JOTC
• Latin American officers and
soliders who attend courses at the
U.S. Army School of the Americas
• the Panama Canal Commission
• other U.S. agencies in Panama.
Real-world mission support is
always up-front and often comes
during maximum support periods.
An example of this diversification
was during joint training exercise
(JTX) Black Hawk IV, 1981, when
the battalion was supporting two
Organization of American States
missions, one in El Salvador and
Honduras some 700 nautical miles
to the north with two UH-1 Huey While Panama is largely low, dense
aircraft, and another in Ecuador/ jungle, other areas of operation for
Peru some 2,000 nautical miles Isthmus-based aviators can include
the Andes mountains in Peru, where
to the south, also with two Hueys.
oxygen is required just to sneak
In addition, three UH-1s and
through the valleys
one OH-58 Kiowa were deployed
to Costa Rica for annual high altitude
qualification training. As one can in the accompanying chart, a special
see, this organization provides a organization that is tailored for the
great variety of aviation support in many OH-58, UH-1H, CH-47 Chi
an operational area the size of the nook and U-21/C-12 flights. The
contiguous United States. annual flying hour program is bud
The battalion's secondary mission geted for 12,130 hours.
is to furnish aviation support for I stated earlier that flying in
disaster relief operations throughout Panama is unique and that op
Central and South America. An erational conditions set the stage
example would be the movement for a dynamic training program. This
of personnel and critical supplies program applies to all crewmembers
to remote locations after a major who operate in and over the jungles
storm or earthquake. of Panama.
Training of newly assigned pilots
210th [T]cas and crewmembers is planned in a
ºcsac Bººmc
series of phases. Water training, a
must because of the two oceans, a
To accomplish its missions, the large canal and several larger lakes,
210th CAB is organized as shown is conducted within the first 30 days
 ==

CLOCKWISE FROM LEFTABOVE: When a map in Panama

says "one bird LZ" it means it
Survival and evasion training given at Panama's Jungle
Operations Training Center for pilots and aircrews finds
aviators mastering the art of propelling a 7-man lifeboat-in a
semistraight line
The JOTC aviator survival and evasion training is often the
first time many young fliers have ever deployed their water
wings, let alone tried to swim with them on
Something simple, like opening a coconut, isn't so simple if
you've never done it before. Aviators are exposed to this and
numerous other survival skills during their 3-day survival and
evasion training at JOTC photographs by MSG Dave Goldie

after arrival. Unit training schedulestors gain a healthy respect for the lated training integrated into the
are followed for this instruction as jungle and for the difficulties an daily work schedule, supervised by
dictated by appropriate aircrew untrained or physically unfit soldier the noncommissioned officer lead
training manuals. might encounterin a rugged tropical ership, is a must. The soldiers of
Specialized pilot and crew skills environment. More than that, they this battalion represent 43 different
are developed during mission train learn that achieving established military occupational specialties and
ing at JOTC. Examples are stabo, training standards will enable them have achieved an 88 percent SQT
rappel, Night Hawk/night vision to survive so they can fly again. Up (skill qualification test) rate in fiscal *
goggles approaches and take to this point, training activities year 1982.
offs from single-ship LZ/PZs, para discussed have covered only a small Flying and training in Panama
drop operations and helocast/water part of the battalion's training pro are extremely demanding, but they
borne operations for CH-47 flight gram. Collective/individual training are also fun. The 210th CAB has a
crews. defined mission—defend the Panama
programs are an unending process.
The need for downed aircraft The soldiers are taught the impor Canal–which keeps us well-trained,
survival skills is met with a two tance of tactical/technical task pro ready and able. It also gives sub
phase jungle survival training course ficiency on a continuing basis, i.e., stance to the battalion's motto,
developed by the 210th CAB and training is everything and everything “Battle Line The Sky,” and accounts
JOTC. It is the only course of its is training. Time being our most for the 210th Combat Aviation Bat
kind available today in the Army. precious resource, the principles of talion's well deserved reputation
(See “Prepared to Survive,” Aviation the Battalion Training Management throughout the Army Aviation com
Digest, February 1982, pp. 42-44.) System are the key to a dynamic munity, as well as Central and South
As a result of their training, avia training program. Hands-on, job re America. -º-º:

-lºs
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 §
3.
3

t º : ~ -

- º ºgº..." 24/2%
- * 3 º
--n Jº Jº

Qe7!!-47 perations 111

Ce tral & S t!, Cºd eric
There are 75 people assigned to the platoon, and it
- - - has 8 Chinook helicopters. Each aviator and crew
Captain Dennis Patrick member has to maintain a high level of proficiency in
Platoon Leader - - - - -

CW4 John Robinson all realms of flight to accomplish missions ranging

Operations Officer from tactical troop moves, resupply flights and artillery
CW3 Tom Susi raids to helocasting, aircraft recovery, mountain oper
Instructor Pilot/Instrument Flight Examiner ations, sea rescue and civic action—the majority of

) (1)
- 3d Platoon, 242d Aviation Company
210th Combat Aviation Battalion
. will
V1Sibilities an
º .
ow ce.
temperatures, with poor
1ngs. - -

193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)
Howard AFB, Panama
HE PANAMA CANAL, a man-made feature
through which ships transition between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans, highlights the
primary area of operation for the 3d Platoon, 242d
Aviation Company. This independent CH-47 Chinook
platoon provides medium-lift helicopter support to
the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama) and to the various
countries of Central and South America.
Many of the tactical support missions are performed
at night during periods of marginal weather conditions
using minimum lighting. In addition, most of them
are into small, single-ship landing zones. To ensure
the safe, professional accomplishment of these flights,
night flying and training have become a way of life for
the CH-47 pilot in Panama.
Due to the tactical mission of the 193d Infantry
Brigade (Panama), the nature of the Panama Canal
area of operations and the political situation in and
around the Republic of Panama, it is not reasonable
to envision armed conflict in Panama taking a conven

F------------~~~~~~~~~
SEPTEMBER 1982
 -
- - ------------------
cºrmy cºviation in -Catin Człmerica
photo by MSG Dave Goldie
-**
Helicast resupply missions featuring supply
laden RB-15s being pushed from low flying
Chinooks at fixed water locations are a much
opted-for support technique used by deployed
infantry elements
tional form as in Europe. That is to say, there will in
all likelihood be no main battle area and certainly no
forward line of own troops. Therefore, the CH-47
pilot in Panama can expect to work throughout the
operational area while the CH-47 pilot in Europe
would operate primarily in the rear area. As a result,
the 3d Platoon routinely trains with the artillery and
special forces working on artillery raids, paradrops
and helocasting.
Helocasting is a unique mission the platoon conducts
in conjunction with the Jungle Operations Training
Center and the Special Forces. It allows a unit
commander the flexibility to air deliver 12 combat
equipped troops and loaded 15-man rubber boat
(RB-15) into a water landing zone in an area where
conventional landing zones are not available. To
successfully accomplish this, the pilot must maintain
a constant 10-knot, 10-foot profile over the water
while the troops and boat exit the aircraft. Imagine
the excitement involved and the skill required to fly
-T-
10
--- -- *-* *- -----------------
photo by MSG Dave Goldie
ability. Holding the CH-47 10 to 15 feet off the water
at 15 knots long enough to launch a loaded RB-15
followed on the same pass by squad members is not
an art perfected on the first try
nap-of-the-earth down a winding river, identify the
drop zone, put the cargo in the river and depart
undetected in a CH-47. Helocasting is extremely
valuable in the jungle environment of Central and
South America.
While tactical training is most important, the unit
participates in other exercises and in various real
world missions. High altitude training, ranging from º
6,000 to 14,000 feet, is conducted annually in nearby
Latin American countries. Pilots and crewmembers
become proficient in performing mountain approaches
and landings at high gross weights under adverse
wind and turbulent conditions. This training enables
the platoon to transport ground forces and equipment
to any location in Central or South America and has
proven essential to the successful completion of various
civic action missions.
As the 3d Platoon, 242d Aviation Company, is the
only medium-lift unit in the theater, its CH-47 heli
copters are in high demand throughout Central and
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 photo by SFC Charlie Lopez
CH-47 lifts the minidozer to another LZ in the jungle around Ft.
Sherman, Panama
South America for such civic action missions. Those
are often in remote areas which may require extended
flights over unpopulated areas with no fuel sources.
Because of this requirement, the unit is authorized to
use internally mounted auxiliary fuel tanks which
allow up to 7 hours of flight without refueling.
One mission to an area lacking the proper aviation
ºsupport facilities was the recent support of the
construction of a microwave transmitter in Pasto,
Colombia. The unit delivered more than 80 external
loads to the summit of a 14,000-foot mountain, proving
the benefit of the auxiliary fuel tanks as well as the
professionalism and talents of the crewmembers.
In the recent past the Chinook pilots and crews
have been called upon to assistin disaster relief, carry
food and medical supplies to people in need and to
carry supplies and equipment to the Cuna Indians.
The unit has also helped recover foreign aircraft and
aided in the rescue of people and ships at sea.
The most recent civic action mission came as a
SEPTEMBER 1982
result of the collapse of a bridge in David, Republic of
Panama. The 3d Platoon, 242d Aviation Company,
was notified on Friday to ready an aircraft to support
the reconstruction of the bridge, and Saturday morning
the aircraft departed. Completion of the mission
entailed the moving of construction material over a
distance of 50 miles and required the crew to spend 3
days in David. That time and effort clearly demonstrated
the dedication of the United States to the promotion
of goodwill throughout Central and South America.
Pilots and crews of this unit are constantly learning
and are searching for new and different challenges.
Their professionalism, pride and “can do” attitude
ensure success on any battlefield as well as the success
of any future goodwill mission in Central and South
America. Let it be said that the 3d Platoon, 242d
Aviation Company, stands prepared and willing to
provide CH-47 support to anyone, anywhere—and
that it typifies the statement, “ALL THINGS DONE
WELL.” º
11
-- ~~~ - - sº º prº-ºr-º-º-º-º-º-º:

* Cºrmy cºviation in 24 atín Człmerica

cAMaintenance,
24.atin
cámerican
-Style
Captain G. D. Muse
Executive Officer
590th Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company
210th Combat Aviation Battalion
193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)
Howard AFB, Panama

ROVIDING MAINTENANCE support for the
210th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB), the aviation
element of the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama), can
be a unique and sometimes very frustrating experience.
Principally, that is because many of the battalion's
support missions take aircraft out of the Panama
Canal area, often well beyond the reach of normal
maintenance facilities. The 590th Transportation
Aircraft Maintenance Company (AVIM) found that
unusual problems call for unusual solutions.
Unlike their European, Korean or CONUS (conti
nental United States)-based counterparts, the 210th
CAB aircrews routinely cross international borders
to provide training, maintenance and logistic support
to countries throughout Central and South America.
The 590th TAMC's maintenance responsibilities,
however, do not disappear when aircraft cross beyond
the invisible borders. In fact, if aircraft go down for
maintenance, the unit's problems are just beginning.
The first major obstacle is communications. The
590th TAMC attempts to trouble shoot maintenance
problems based upon whatever information is avail
able. Although a small maintenance crew accompanies
units when they leave Panama, it cannot carry enough
spare parts and equipment to cover every contingency.
If a situation arises that is beyond the capabilities of
the small maintenance crew, 590th TAMC specialty
teams go into action.
These specialty teams were organized specifically
to handle out-of-country difficulties, and most have
at least one member who is a Spanish linguist. All
team members are experts in their respective specialties
and have sufficient experience to assist in other areas,
adding up to an expert grouping of maintenance
personnel that can react immediately whenever a
questionable maintenance problem arises. The main
tenance officer gathers spare parts and equipment
deemed necessary to ensure repairs are made expe
ditiously. Surprisingly, most repairs are completed
without major delays or logistical requirements.

- -

º - – - - -

----- ** * * - - - - - -- - - - - - - -------------

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

- * * ** * - - - - - - ----- - - - - - - -
ºl.
Depending on the circumstances and the avail
ability of transportation, maintenance specialty teams
will normally arrive onsite within 24 hours of their
initial notification. The 210th CAB has two fixed wing
aircraft—a U-21 and a C-12—that are normally used
in these situations. On occasion, the U.S. Air Force
has transported heavy equipment if a C-130 is scheduled
* to fly to that particular country. In the event a helicopter
is not repairable at the field site, a sling-load operation
is initiated. If feasible, a CH-47 from the 210th CAB's
Chinook platoon is tasked to sling the downed aircraft
to a usable airfield. There the aircraft is repaired or
disassembled and returned to Panama aboard Air
Force transport airplanes. Although that situation
has never occurred, the potential for it remains high
because of the 210th CAB's out-of-country support
mission requirements.
The 590th TAMC is often required to provide
mobile training team (MTT) support to Latin American
countries that possess aircraft similar to those operated
* -- *-*-*- -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
º
SEPTEMBER 1982
:
--------------------ºf -*
**
* ** *
*
Mechanics pull a UH-1 out
for a tailrotor alignment
check at the 590th's hangar
at Howard AFB, Panama
by the U.S. Army. These teams train the country's
maintenance crews and assist them in updating their
maintenance procedures.
MTTs can vary from 1 day “hit and run” classes to
extended training which can last for several months.
The latter requires lengthy preparation as reference
material, training aids and lesson plans must be
translated and bilingual instructors have to be used.
The interesting thing about MTT's is that the trainers
learn so much from their counterparts. Of equal
importance is the rapport established and the enduring
friendships that result.
Aviation maintenance support in Latin America is
more than having the right wrench. Soldiers in the
590th TAMC have to be mechanics as well as diplomats,
trainers, travelers and troubleshooters. That is what
makes being part of a maintenance effort professionally
º
rewarding. It may not always be fun—although most
of the time it is—but it surely is exciting and interesting. |
-** º
 IS ARMW SAHIW CHNIHºl
ROTOR. F.
INDUCED
WHITEOUT
inter presents many
hazards to helicopter
operations. One of these
winter hazards which causes
aircraft accidents each year is
rotor-induced whiteout. The
following two cases are typical.
Four UH-1Hs were on a troop
insertion mission. The formation
prescribed was a diamond
formation from liftoff until the
mission was completed. The flight
platoon leader received the
mission from the infantry platoon
14
-
-
-
--
-
-
-
- -
leader with a request for an
immediate departure. This
permitted only a sketchy briefing
and no time for flight planning.
The troops were loaded and
the aircraft took off. After 25
minutes in flight, the pilot of the
lead aircraft decelerated and
began an approach toward the
wood line of a large, open, snow
covered field. Both the pilot and
copilot (PIC) of the No. 3 aircraft
were surprised—the copilot
because he did not recognize the
field ahead of them as the coordi
nates of the first LZ that had been
briefed, and the pilot because he
had begun to overtake the lead
aircraft before he realized lead
was decelerating in an approach
without advance warning. The
No. 3 pilot was able to regain his
relative position in the flight and
maintained that position almost
until he landed.
During termination of the
landing, rotor-induced blowing
snow developed, and the pilot lost
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
outside visual reference with
everything except the top of the
tree line to his front. The copilot,
looking down through the chin
bubble on the left side, told the
pilot he thought they were
moving backwards. The pilot did
not sense any backward
movement but, almost
simultaneously, he saw the trees
on the horizon tumble as the
aircraft rolled right and came to
rest inverted.
The copilot jettisoned the door
on the left side of the cockpit and
exited, followed by the pilot. One
of the passengers seated on the
left side of the aircraft removed
the emergency window in the
cargo door and exited, followed
by the crew chief and the other
seven passengers. Two of the
passengers sustained minor
injuries.
Adequate time to plan the
mission was not given to the air
crewmembers. Although the
mission was received before the
start of the training exercise, final
details were not available until
the morning of the mishap. The
flight leader, in his haste to meet
the requested departure time, did
not provide route of flight data or
adequate time for the other pilots
to plot the coordinates before
takeoff. When the flight leader
began a deceleration and
approach without warning to an
area that did not coincide with
any of the map coordinates he
had given the flight, the rest of
the flight was somewhat
surprised. Although the flight
leader evaluated weather and
performance planning, time was
not available for the others to do
the same. Radio silence was
imposed on the flight and an
alternate means of controlling the
flight was not provided.
Contrary to instructions in TC
1-12, the flight leader led the four
aircraft in a close diamond
formation to a landing in a snow
covered field, instead of spacing
SEPTEMBER 1982
them out at 15- to 30-second inter
vals. This resulted in enough
rotor-induced blowing snow for
the No. 3 pilot to become dis
oriented. The flight leader was
not aware of the instructions in
TC 1-12.
When the approach was
initiated, the No. 3 pilot used a
greater than normal decelerative
attitude to regain and maintain
position in the formation
throughout the approach. When
the aircraft entered the rotor
induced blowing snow, it drifted
to the rear once outside visual
reference was lost by the crew.
The copilot (PIC), concerned
with landing at the wrong LZ, was
engrossed in his map during
termination of the landing and
did not initiate a go-around. The
pilots of the No. 2 and 4 aircraft
did not land in the LZ after seeing
the blowing snow induced by the
first aircraft.
As an OH-58 and two Cobras
were taking off from a field site,
visibility began to decrease
because of light snow. Snow
showers and one-half mile visibility
had been forecast. Fresh, loose snow
about 6 to 8 inches deep covered
the ground. The IP in one of the
AH-1s momentarily lost sight of
the lead OH-58 during takeoff
because of blowing snow and
closed his interval to 200 to 300
meters. The two Cobras followed
the OH-58, with the weather
rapidly deteriorating.
Crossing a ridge line and seeing
heavy snow moving toward them,
the OH-58 pilot said he was going
to make a right turn and return to
the takeoff point.
As the IP of the No. 2 aircraft
completed his turn, he saw the
OH-58 cross a powerline and
disappear from sight in the snow
shower. The AH-1 IP had just
decided to land when the platoon
leader, flying in the OH-58, called
to the pilots to pick a spot and
land. The AH-1 IP picked what
appeared to be a level spot and
began his approach. On final at
about a 5-foot skid height, the
aircraft was completely engulfed
in rotor-induced blowing snow.
The IP became disoriented but
couldn't go around because of the
powerlines ahead of him. He
applied aft cyclic to continue his
landing.
The AH-1 hit the ground with
the right skid and then the left
skid and rolled over. The IP and
pilot exited uninjured.
The IP was not new to winter
operations. He was well qualified,
highly experienced, current and
proficient in the type of flying he
was performing when the
accident occurred. The problem
arose when the IP had to shoot a
downwind approach to a snow
covered field. The rotor-induced
blowing snow cloud stayed with
the aircraft as it continued
forward. An upwind approach
will allow a pilot to stay ahead of
the blowing snow cloud.
The flight waited too late to
land. The AH-1 IP was the most
experienced pilot in the flight and
should have advised the flight
leader to land earlier when he
realized the weather conditions
were deteriorating. A lack of
weather information concerning
cloud tops and icing conditions
also contributed to the accident.
Without this information, the IP
had to rule out vertical helicopter
instrument recovery procedures.
The best way to prevent these
types of accidents is through a
well organized unit training
program. Pilots lose some of their
winter flying proficiency during
the summer months and should
be given refresher training on
blowing snow conditions just
before the first snowfall. Pilots
should also be familiar with
appropriate ATMs, FM 1-51, and
DA Training Circular 1-12.
Advance planning is still the
key to successful winter
operations.
p <dº-"
–-
15
 PEARLS
Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown
A New Look To AR 40-61 Is Coming
A serious recurring problem exists with security
and inspection of aviation survival kits containing
diphenoxylate hydrochloride (Lomotil), a Schedule
V controlled substance. The provisions of paragraph
3-5, AR 40-61, are usually applied by field activities,
resulting in unnecessarily frequent and cumbersome
inspections; storage security requirements that are
unrealistic; or, in some cases, removal of the substance
from the kits in order to eliminate the problem. The
latter action improperly denies downed aircrews
adequate protection from disabling diarrheal condi
tions; it also increases the aircrew's risk of potentially
fatal dehydration, especially under conditions where
water supplies are limited, such as desert environments.
The following DA Form 2028 changes to AR 40-61
have been recommended:
Page 3-22, 23, paragraph 3-55a, line 1, change to
read: a. An inventory of controlled substances will be
conducted monthly except, however, that controlled
substances which are components of aviation survival
kits will be inventoried at the same time as the periodic
inspection of such kits is conducted. RATIONALE:
Survival kits are inspected every 90 days; inspection
every 30 days for controlled substances is an unneces
sary additional workload, particularly since the only
controlled substance is diphenoxylate hydrochloride
(Lomotil).
Page 3-23, paragraph 3-55a, add a new paragraph
(3) as follows: The inventory
officer for Schedule V con
trolled substances in avia
tion survival kits will be
the aviation life support
equipment technician
who conducts the per
iodic inspection of that
kit. RATIONALE:
Since aviation survival
kits contain no con
trolled substance other
than Lomotil, which
has no history of abuse,
it is not necessary to
have a separate
inventory officer.
Carol Stein
photo by Reid Rogers
Page 3-23, paragraph 3-58, add a new paragraph as
follows: Para 3-58. Controlled medical items as
components of aviation survival kits. When controlled
medical items, Schedule V, are components of aviation
survival kits, the kits will be issued and stored in the
manner as if the kits did not contain a Schedule V
item. At unit level, such kits will normally be in the
possession of personnel authorized or issued those
kits or will be secured in the same manner as prescribed
for other aviation life support equipment, such as a
locked room, cage or individual locker. RATIONALE:
Existing storage practices for survival kits have been
unnecessarily rigid and have interfered with proper
availability of kits and of Lomotil to aircrew members.
Requisitioning Of Medical Materiel
Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) advised
the Commander, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency,
Ft. Detrick, MD, that there have been increasing
incidents of requisitions for medical materiel being
sent to DPSC by nonmedical, unauthorized requisi
tioners. Message, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency,
SGMMA-SDR-B, 181601Z May 82, advised this office,
DRCPO-ALSE, and other addresses of AIG 7485,
that AR 40-61, Chapter 3, requires requisitions for
medical materiel be made by installation Medical
Supply Activities (IMSA). We are advising all ALSE
users to follow the procedures established in AR 40
61 as pertains to medical materiel. The SGMMA
SDR-B message states “requisitions submitted from
inappropriate sources will be rejected without action.”
Your assistance in this matter is appreciated. Point of
contact is CPT Daley, AUTOVON 343-7161, or assis
tance can be requested by letter addressed to the U.S.
Army Medical Materiel Agency, ATTN; SGMMA
SDR-B, Ft. Detrick, MD 20783.
Could This Be You?
Recently a few graduates of the 5th Army ALSE
School did not provide complete addresses where
forwarding mail could reach them. We are looking for
addresses of: Dominick J. Rela, Army Armament
Research and Development Command (ARRADCOM)
Dover, NJ; Willie L. Tanner, 14th Co 1st BDE, Ft.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Rucker, AL36362; and Walter L. Eagle, PO Box 623,
Marathan, KS 66502. Please send a complete mailing
address so we can send you your Associate Membership
in the ALSE system. Write to PEARL and your
certificate will be sent post haste.
Update on First Aid Kit Inspection
Message DASG-HCL 2718207 Oct 81, reiterates
local interpretation of paragraph 10-7, TM 55-1500
328-25, erroneously limiting inspection responsibility
to post medical facility personnel. Inspection, marking,
replacement of components, sealing, etc., may be
accomplished by unit aviation life support, medical
supply or medical personnel provided local procedures
have been established and the necessary publications,
quality control information, etc., are available. The
installation or other supporting medical supply person
nel will provide assistance as required and ensure
appropriate quality control information is disseminated
to supported units.
Pistol Holster For SRU-21/P Vest
Dear PEARL, recently I ordered an SRU-21/Psur
vival vest and it was delivered but it came without the
holster. Can you tell me what happened, as previously
we have been getting the holsters with the survival
vest?
Glad you asked that, as we have been having a
number of inquiries from the field on this same subject.
It seems as though someone submitted a suggestion
to issue the vest without the holster as they thought it
would result in a cost avoidance. The OV-1 Pistol
Holder can be used and actually is easier to install as
it is made of a cloth base. The national stock number
(NSN) is 1095-00-208-7598 and it is authorized to be
sewn onto the SRU-21/P vest. The hip-type pistol hold
er (NSN) 1095-00-716-0488) and the shoulder pistol
holder (NSN 1095-00-716-0934) are also authorized
and can be used providing they do not interfere with
flying duties. Sorry for any inconvenience this may
have caused you. Unfortunately, some configuration
changes are made that we are sometimes unaware of
and we are continually working toward closing the gap.
AN/MQ-1A Oxygen Tester
We have received a number of inquiries pertaining
to the availability of subject tester and how to order
it. First, the tester is authorized. Table 2-2 of TM 55
1660-243-12/TO 15X5-4-4-12 (Maintenance Instructions
for the Oxygen Mask, Type MBU-5/P) lists the MQ-1
oxygen mask tester as a required item of test equipment
for the MBU-5/P oxygen mask. This is your basis of
authorization. Since the item is not in the AMDF, it
must be ordered “off-line” from FPZ under NSN 6695
00-564-9500. If you are in the Army National Guard,
SEPTEMBER 1982
you should consult your state USPFO (United States
Property and Fiscal Officer) concerning the funding,
since a transfer of monies to the Air Force is involved.
The contractor of the tester is Winding Specialist Inc.
Mr. George Wells is the president and it is possible it
could be ordered direct but clearance would have to
be obtained from the Air Force through this office.
Water Purification Tablets
I know you have been hearing a lot about these
tablets, but we want to be sure you are kept apprised
on where we are in this area. You may never need to
use them but should the occasion arise, you should
have the correct information. The Defense Personnel
Support Center advised the following medical
materiel was tested and found to be suitable for issue
and use provided the unit has a good wax closure and
shows no signs of physical deterioration. A retest of 2
years has been established for the following lot: NSN
6850-00-985-7166, water purification tablet, iodine,
8MG, 50S, Van Brode Milling Company, 1311-727
Oct 82 D800757SL. NOTE: Cite DPSC project number
as authority for extension of expiration date. SAILS
ABX8100555. USAMMA will confirm this information
in DA. SB 8-75 Series.
Water Purification Tablet Serviceability Testing
In order to reduce the large number of individual
potency requests and tests performed by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), the Department of
the Army will conduct an annual inventory of subject
materiel. Activities are to report all lots which will
expire during the following year (reports will be sent
to USAMMA, ATTN: SGMMA-LDT, Ft. Detrick,
MD). Negative reports are not required. The report
will contain the lot number (in sequence), quantity,
manufacturer and expiration/retest date. Activities
will be notified via SGMMA-LDT-Q message series
and the DA SB 8-75 series of all lots undergoing
testing. Upon completion of the FDA tests, disposition
instructions will be disseminated worldwide by the
SGMMA-LDT-Q message series. For this first inven
tory, activities will provide, in lot number sequence,
all lots which have expired or will expire prior to 31
December 1982. Activities will no longer submit
individual requests for potency extension for the subject
1tem.
Hand-Generated Flashlights Being Evaluated
Aircrew cold climate survival kits, as originally
issued, contained a hand-generated flashlight as a
component. The original flashlight was found to be
inadequate during service test when used in Arctic/cold
17
PEARLS
regions and was removed from the kit. The new type
A-9 hand-generated flashlight appears to be an improve
ment over the original issue and the new flashlight
will be reevaluated when received by Natick Labora
tories. We will keep you posted on the findings and
results. PEARL thanks you for your interest in
promoting ALSE.
Unsuitable Earplugs
It recently came to our attention that the following
medical materiel should be disposed of in accordance
with para 3-46, AR 40-61, under provisions of para
2-28, AR 735-11 as unsuitable for issue and use:
NSN NOMENCLATURE
eye piece outserts installed. A face shield or protective
mask alone will not provide the required level of $5
protection. These items must be employed together
in order to achieve adequate protection. Personnel
involved in handling duds or hangfires must also wear
eye protection as specified above.
Helmet, SPH-4 Spares For MK-896A Headset
Microphone
Reference is made to the March issue of the Aviation
Digest PEARL article which alerted the field to avail
ability of the new earphones. The following parts are
now available for requisitioning in accordance with
TM 11-5965-279-13 and P, published 15 February
1981:

6515-00-442–4818 Regular, International SOURCE OF

Orange, Triple Flange SUPPLY (RIC) NOMENCLATURE NSN
24S, NOTE: SAILS ABX
S9E Kit, Cord Assembly 5965-00-177-2897
81QD606 thru 81Q0610
6515-00-442-4821 Small, Green, Triple N32 Swivel Assembly 8475-00-117-4538
Flange, 24S, SAILS ABX
81Q0611 thru 81Q0616 S9I Screw, Machine 5305-00-616-8543

6515-00-467-0092 Large, Blue, Triple

S9I Washer, Lock 5310-00-579–5554
Flange, 24S, SAILS ABX
8100617 thru 81O 0620
S9E Plate, Jack Holder 5340-01-007–8366

MANUFACTURER, CONTRACT/ LOT NO. B16 Microphone, Dynamic 5965-01-094-6574

PLASMED, INC. CC7A/AIC
DLA 120-78-D-4439
S9E Earphone, H-143A/AIC 5965-01-094-6602
DLA 120-80–C-4505
DLA 120-80–C-4507
B16 Boom Assembly 5965-01-094-6573
DLA 120-80–C-5393
DLA 120-80-M FB72 All Lots
B16 Cable Assembly Microphone 5965-01-094-6572
NOTE: This information will be confirmed in DA. SB 8-75 series. S9I Grommet, Earcup 5325-01-096-1189

S9I Grommet, Helmet 5325-01-096-1190

Protection From Riot Control Grenades
Although this is another one of those “grey” areas,
it is of such significant importance that we are including
it in PEARL in order to get the widest dissemination
possible. Riot control hand grenades, M47E3 (1330
G922) and M4823 (1330-G932) red smoke grenade
were recently released from suspension and restricted
to training use only. These grenades do not meet
safety guidelines relative to eye injury; therefore,
extraordinary safety precautions are necessary. Training
exercises employing these items should be conducted
only when targeted personnel are wearing full face
protection. The following eye protection is recom
mended as an interim measure. Face shield, plastic,
riot control, NSN 4240-00-412-0512, see Appendix F,
FM 19-15, and protective mask, M17/M17A1 with
The above data has been coordinated with CECOM,
Ft. Monmouth, NJ. Points of contact are:
CECOM – Mr. B. Bluford, ATTN: DRSEL-LE-EA
3, AUTOVON 992-3812
Army Support Activity—Ms. G. Lyles, ATTN:
STSAP-SC, AUTOVON 444-2537
DRCPO-ALSE—Mr. Tommy Vaughn, ATTN:
DRCPO-ALSE, AUTOVON 693-3307
Correction to June 1982 PEARL'S on page 37:
Under the heading SPH-4Helmet, Repair of Compo
ments, the NSNs for Earcup Cushion Inserts were
incorrect. The correct NSNs are 8040-01-023-417.3
and 8040-01-023-4172.

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 314-263-3307

18 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 REPORTING FINAL
Late/NewsFromArmyAviation Activities
Air Medal Awarded. Captain John J. Weeden,
Chief Warrant Officer, CW4, Ronald R. Boyle,
Staff Sergeant Walter E. Lessard and Staff Ser
geant James E. Holub of the 397th Medical
Detachment, New Hampshire National Guard,
Concord, have received the Air Medal for a rescue
mission they flew in January. Governor Hugh J.
Gallen made the presentations at a July ceremony.
Receipt of the Air Medal is particularly signifi
cant during peacetime because it is normally
awarded in connection with conflict or operations
against an armed enemy.
The four Guardsmen and their UH-1 Huey heli
copter were dispatched to search for two ice
climbers who had been reported missing on Mount
Washington, an area marked in the winter by
high winds and unpredictable weather.
When the hikers were located, their rescue
was effected by the Army Aviation crew. While
CPT Weeden and CW4 Boyle, as pilot and copilot,
hovered the aircraft over the treetops in the face
of 30 to 40 mile-per-hour winds and blowing
snow, SSG Holub was lowered to the ground
where he put first one and then the second injured
hiker on a litter. SSG Lessard operated the lift to
bring them into the helicopter. At one point, he
SEPTEMBER 1982
had to move outside the Huey and stand on the
skids, using his feet to manipulate the lines in
order to keep the litter from tilting.
At the awards ceremony, Gov. Gallen said,
“The courage and compassion these men exhib
ited during the extremely dangerous rescue
mission last winter is an example to us all. They
are a credit to the National Guard . . . ."
FROM KOREA
Fast Refuelers. Two units of the 17th Aviation
Group (Combat) have developed helicopter
refueling systems that have cut normal set-up
time by more than 90 percent: one for the UH-1
Huey by the 128th Aviation Company, 52d Aviation
Battalion, Camp Page, and one for the CH-47
Chinook from the 271st Aviation Company, 19th
Aviation Battalion, Camp Humphreys.
Using elements of the forward area refueling
equipment, which are normally deployed to the
field separately and then set up, the quick reaction
systems are set up and palletized before deploy
ment, cutting field set-up time from the normal
45 minutes to less than 3 minutes.
Using a 600-gallon tank, the Huey system can
refuel three aircraft in about 6 minutes, adding 2
First Graduates. Chief War
rant Officer, CW3, Michael E.
Mullenix, left, and Captain Robert
E. Payne, right, are the first Army
National Guard aviators to grad
uate from the Eastern ARNG Avia
tion Training Site, Ft. Indiantown
Gap, PA. With them is Major Gen
eral Richard M. Scott. Pennsylvania
Adjutant General. Both graduates
attended the facility's 2-week U-21
aviator qualification course. They
are assigned to the Texas National
Guard's Army Aviation Support
Facility in Austin. (Bob Foster, PAO,
AG's Office)
19

- Branch, Hanchey Division, Department of Flight
Tank Zapper. An anti
tank missile streaks from
its launch tube during qual
ification tests of a mast
mounted sight version of
the airborne TOW missile
system developed by
Hughes Aircraft Company.
The system is mounted on
a Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,
500MD Defender, as a
result of a joint effort be
tween the two companies.
2O
T
-
-
-
-
-
-
- The promotion of aviation safety is one of the
-
Equipped with the sight,
the helicopter can hide
behind hills and trees to
scout for targets. Once a
target is spotted, the gun
ner can fire a TOW missile,
exposing only the sight to
enemy detection during
the entire operation. Suc
cessful firing tests have
been conducted recently
in the United States and
Sweden
hours of flying time for each helicopter. The
Chinook system, with two 500-gallon collapsible
drums, refuels both tanks of a CH-47 in about 10
minutes, adding 3 hours' flying time. Both systems
are carried to forward areas by slingloading under
a Chinook.
Constraints placed on Army Aviation operations
in Korea by the lack of refueling points and the
inaccessibility of many remote field locations
were the catalyst that spurred the development
of the palletized configurations, according to
Master Sergeant James Neal of the 52d Aviation
Battalion. (EUSA PAO)
FROM FORT RUCKER
Daedalion Award. Members of the AeroScout
Training, completed more than 17,051 accident
free flying hours during fiscal year 1981. That
record has earned them the Daedalian Foun
dation's Army Aviation Safety Trophy for Aviation
Training Bases, meaning the Aeroscout Branch
has been adjudged to be the TRADOC aviation
unit with the best flight safety record and aircraft
accident prevention program for the cited period.
Captain John M. Curran, branch commander,
accepted the trophy from Brigadier General Chris
O. Divich, commandant of the Air Force Reserve
Officers' Training Corps, Maxwell Air Force Base,
AL. Also sharing in the acceptance were former
branch commanders Major Robert K. Jorgensen
and Captain Bruce G. McKenty.
primary missions of the Daedalian Foundation, a
nonprofit organization formed in 1934 and named
after the character in Greek mythology who ac
complished the first heavier-than-air flight.
Graduation Speaker. Air Force Major General
William J. Mall Jr., commander, Aerospace Rescue
and Recovery Service, Scott Air Force Base, IL,
was guest speaker for the recent graduation of
79 rotary wing aviator students.
“Safety is the prime responsibility of crewmem
bers, and the greatest single drain on aviator
resources is the lack of aircrew discipline," he
told the newly rated helicopter pilots. He added,
"It's your duty to adhere to proper aircrew
discipline. True loyalty and crew coordination
require speaking up at the first sign of trouble."
(USAAVNC PAO)
Blades Needed. If anyone has blades for any
Army helicopter that is not in the current inventory,
the Army Aviation Museum needs them. Call
Commercial 205-255-4507 or AUTOVON 558
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
4507—or write the Army Aviation Museum, P.O.
Box H, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362. The currator will
arrange for shipment of the blades.
New Field Manual. FM 1-230, “Meterology for
Army Aviators," will be printed and distributed to
the field in the near future. It will supersede FM First One. Warrant Offi
cer, WO1, Janet M. Flow
1-30 which was published in 1976. ers is the first black female
The new publication will provide Army Aviation to graduate from the 9
personnel with the general meteorology principles month Warrant Officer Ro
needed to plan and coordinate daily operations tary Wing Aviator Course
and will also be useful as a supplemental text at Ft. Rucker, AL. She
received her helicopter
and reference. It is divided into four parts: weather pilot's rating in August; and
principles and theory; weather hazards; polar, her first assignment as an
subpolar and tropical weather, and weather flight Army aviator is with the
planning. The two-column format will feature many 227th Aviation Battalion,
full-color illustrations. (Brown, DTD, x-7113) 1st Cavalry Division, Ft.
Hood, TX

FROM TEXAS
Historical Data Needed. Many aircraft compo
nents received at the Corpus ChristiArmy Depot
for repair are not accompanied by the necessary
historical records. That costs additional manhours
and money to reclassify items and place them in
special storage and to initiate reports of discrepancy.
Records should be placed in the container's
record receptable. If there is not such a receptacle,
then records must be put in the container and it
labeled to reflect the record's location.
Sending the historical records in a secure man
ner will get the item into the repair cycle and
back to the unit in much less time.
(SDSCC-QQA)

FROM MARYLAND

Workshop. A Military Hearing Conservation

Workshop for personnel responsible for the imple
mentation and maintenance of hearing conserva
tion programs will be conducted 17 to 21 January
1983 by the Army Environmental Hygiene Agency
in Edgewood.
The course outline includes the following areas:
physics of Sound, anatomy and physiology of the
hearing mechanism, physiological effects of noise,
noise measurement and analysis, hearing pro
tective devices, engineering control of noise and The original framed colored drawing of the 1st Avia
tion Brigade crest is now in brigade headquarters at Ft.
audiometric techniques. Rucker, AL, where it is admired by the unit's commander,
For enrollment, contact Ms. Donley, Training Colonel David J. Allen. The drawing was sent to the Army
Section, commercial 301-671-4158 or AUTOVON Aviation Center by the officer who had it designed, Lieutenant
584-4158. For more workshop information, con General George P. Seneff (Retired). As a brigadier general,
he was the first commander of the 1st Aviation Brigade from
tact the Hearing Conservation Branch, Bio May 1966 to September 1967
Acoustics Division (HSHB-OB), USAEHA, Aber
deen Proving Ground, MD 21010, commercial
301-671-3797 or 3829, or AUTOVON 594-3797/
3829. (HSHB-OB)

SEPTEMBER 1982 21
 RSI Report
AN INDEPTH description of the Army's
rationalization, standardization and interoperabil
ity (RSI) program was presented in the Sep
tember 1981 issue of the Aviation Digest Since
that time, several articles entitled the RSI Report
have appeared. These articles have highlighted
the accomplishments of international working
parties/groups that are of interest to helicopter
USBITS,
Unfortunately, when standardization agree
ments (STANAGs) and quadripartite standardi
zation agreements (CSTAGs) are ratified, aviation
units have little, if any, immediate exposure to
these agreements. The normal procedure is for
each Training and Doctrine Command school/
center to incorporate the contents of each
document into their proponent literature. Several
years may pass before the terms of the agree
ment become the standing operational proce
dure for an aviation unit. In an attempt to famil
arize aviation units with the contents of standardi
H zation agreements, the Aviation Digest will
print selected STANAGs and OSTAGs. The first
such agreement is STANAG 3532, Transport
of Troops by Helicopter.
Units which are subject to this agreement
are encouraged to validate the content of the
STANAG. If there are terms that the United
| States cannot accept, recommended changes
should be submitted.
To ensure interoperability among national
forces, it is incumbent upon all nations to adhere
to the terms of each agreement. The results
will be an effective fighting force that will deter
aggression by a hostile nation.
| STANAG 3532-Transport of Troops by Heli
copter
1. Aim: The aim of this agreement is to establish
standard procedures in order to facilitate the
transport of troops or their personal equipment
in helicopters.
2. Agreement: Participating nations agree that
–– the procedures established below will apply
when troops or their personal equipment are
carried in transport helicopters.
3. Definitions: The following terms and defini
tions are used for the purpose of the agreement:
• Chalk Number: The number given to a
complete load and to the transporting carrier
(AAP-6). Where used in this STANAG, the term
refers to aircraft loads.
• Crewman: A member of the helicopter
crew who travels in the cargo/passenger com
partment in certain helicopters. His duties include
taking charge of the chalk troops from emplaning
to deplaning.
| • Ready Position: A designated place where
a helicopter load of troops and/or equipment
wait for pick-up. Normally this is between the 9
o'clock and the 3 o'clock position in the forward
sector in visual contact with the pilot at approxi
mately 30 metres (100 feet).
L. L. Jºo. o o o |- sº dº.
• Aircraft commander: The aircrewmemº
ber designated by a competent authority as
being in command of an aircraft and responsible
for its safe operation and accomplishment of
the assigned mission. -
• Chalk Commander: The commander of
all troops embarked under one chalk number.
4. Types of Helicopters: These procedures
are designed to be used with all types of transport
helicopters engaged intactical operations. The
procedures only apply to helicopters which nor
mally transport troops. When other helicopters
are used to carry troops, the troops must be
specially briefed.
5. Preparation of Helicopters: If the operation
requires, a suitable deplaning rope or other
lowering device will befitted. For lowering stores
a light line longer than the deplaning rope, with
a hook attached for the rapid attachment and
detachment of loads will be fitted.
It is desirable to provide intercom and externa
radio facilities at the chalk commander's position
In assault missions, the troop seats may be
removed but safety belts must remain fitted or
safety ropes fastened to the floor tie-down rings.
6. Preparatory Briefing and Action: To facili.
tate the planning and preparation of helicopter
operations, standard operating procedures jointly
approved by senior commanders are to be devel
oped for both normal and short time reaction
operations. For specific operations, the air and
ground forces are to exchange information which
should include the following:
• Time of pick up.
Total number of troops to be lifted.
Point of departure.
Destination.
Requirement for backloading.
• Operational data such as map references
organization and marking of loading and landing
points, communications, preparation of schecº
ules and alternate schedules, survival equipment
refueling and logistic support.
• Intelligence data-enemy positions, etc.
• Requirements of helicopter unit for suppor
personnel, etc., at departure point and des.
tination.
• Request for air/helicopter escort, fire
support, command and control aircraft, etc.
• Action to be taken in the event of downed
aircraft.
• Aircraft type, number of aircraft available
and allowable load.
• Method of movement.
• Special airspace control measures.
• Lighting requirements for night operations.
• Diagram or sketch of seating arrangement
of lift aircraft.
7. Actions by Helicopter Unit:
• Coordinate with the supported force.
• Ensure that supervision is provided to the

sº ºpported force during loading, tie-down and
º off-loading of personnel and materiel whenever
possible.
• Establish timely liaison with the supported
unit to provide for movement planning to include
aircraft availability, allowable cabin/cargo load
(ACL), special loading instructions, and the re
striction on the use of chalk radio equipment in
The aircraft.
• Provide necessary survival equipment
including life jackets where necessary.
• Give a preflight briefing on emergency
procedures to include location and use of all
emergency equipment and exits.
• Brief aircrews, to include mission, weather,
enemy ground situation and air defense threat,
route of flight, communication procedures,
method of movement, instrument flight rules/
regulations (IFR) breakup and recovery proce
dures, downed aircraft procedures and night
lighting requirements.
8. Actions by Supported Unit:
• Allocate chalk numbers to troops.
• Brief troops on the following points (assisted
where necessary by helicopter unit): 1) The
emplaning location of the helicopters for each
chalk number. 2) The dangers inherent in
operating in the close proximity of helicopters
on the ground. 3) The necessity for weapons to
be on safe and without a round in the chamber,
and for them to be carried so as to avoid damage
to the helicopter. 4) The removal or folding of
radio antennae in order to avoid damage to the
rotor blades. 5) Safety and emergency proce
dures. 6). The aircraft commander has final
authority on all matters pertaining to the safe
operation of the aircraft. 7) Troops will not throw
items nor fire from the aircraft unless specifically
authorized to do so by the aircraft commander.
• Station the troops in the ready position at
Tº designated time.
• Ensure that the helicopter unit commander
is briefed on the supported unit's mission.
9. Emplanement: The responsibilities of the
tº chalk commander, on receipt of the signal to
emplane (see Annex A), are:
• To lead his troops to the helicopter.
• To station himself near the door or ramp
and assist his troops to emplane.
• To direct his troops to the correct position
in the helicopter, if no crewman is present, and
- ANNEX A
| Expº ANE “Thumbs up by pilot or crewman
Intercom or tap pilot
|) Intercom and or 2 short bell rings, or red light “ON”
Intercom and or short ring, or green light “ON”
Thuillup by chalk commander or his designated
TROOPS CLEAR in Lº, a nºive
UN
to emplane last of all, closing and locking
the door where applicable.
L/
• To ensure that safety harnesses/belts are
secured and then to notify the crewman or
pilot.
10. In-Flight Procedure: It is the responsibility
of the pilot in command to ensure that communi
cation is established with the chalk commander.
On approaching the landing point, the chalk
commander should be informed of the heli
copter's heading on touchdown and any other
pertinent information that will change the troops
preflight briefing, e.g., the exact position of the
landing point.
11. Deplanement: -
• On approaching the landing point the pilot
is to signal "standby" (see Annex A) and ensure
that the chalk commander is informed of any
deplanement hazards.
• On receipt of the deplane signal (see Annex
A) the troops are to release harnesses/belts
and follow the chalk commander out of the
helicopter. º
• The chalk commander or his designated
representative is to give the "troops clear" signal
to the pilot or the crewman (see Annex A).
• When deplaning, especially on a slope, the
chalk commander must ensure that his troops
keep clear of the rotor blades by moving down
slope from the helicopter.
• In carrier deck operations, the deplaning
troops will be led off in a safe direction by a
Flight Deck Guide.
12. Deplaning From The Hover:lt may some
times be necessary for troops to deplane by
jumping out from a low hower, or by using ropes,
adders or other devices from greater heights.
In such cases, troops must be specially briefed
and trained. (See STANAG 3630-Emplaning
and Deplaning at the High Hover.)
13. Night Procedures: The night signals are
shown in Annex A.
14. Implementation of the Agreement: This
STANAG is considered to be implemented when
a nation has issued the necessary orders/instruc
tions to the forces concerned putting the
procedures detailed in this agreement into effect.
If this article has generated any questions or
requirements please contact Mr. Rush Wicker
by writing: Commander, U.S. Army Aviation
Center, ATTN: ATZO-D-CC, Ft. Rucker, AL36362.
SIGNALS
NIGHT
One flash of flashlight or emplaining
light by pilot or crewman
Same as day
Same as day
ºr his dº nºn-tº iºnº-rº mºnºr ºn lºt ºn tºº.
 4. The correct method of indicating a satisfac
torily completed “maintenance operational
check” in conjunction with the corrective
action taken entry in block 18 of DA Form
2408-13 is:
A. MOC OK 19 Jul 82
B. MOC completed 19 Jul 82
C. MOC accomplished 19 Jul 82
E

. Under which of the following conditions

would you be required to perform a limited
test flight?
A. Flight control linkage bolts replaced
Aeronautical Equipment Maintenance
B. Engine replaced
Management Policies And Procedures
C. Nonadjustable flight control linkage
(TM 55-1500–328-25) reinstalled

. Inspection/services/calibration of compo
CW4 Kurt J. Porter nents on a calendar basis such as first-aid
CW3 Robert W. Lunau kits, weight and balance and aircraft inven
Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization tory, etc., are considered to be what type
U.S. Army Transportation Center inspection?
Fort Eustis, VA
A. Phased inspection
B. Acceptance inspection
C. Special inspection
. How are maintenance test flights cate
gorized?
. Which of the following is the correct entry
A. Intermediate and operational on DA Form 2408-13 showing satisfac
B. Periodic and major tory completion of a test flight?
C. General and limited A. Test flight OK
B. Test flight completed 1100 hr 19 Jan
82
. How are maintenance test flights num C. Aircraft test flown and released 19
bered on the DA Form 2408-13? Jan 82
A. They are not numbered
B. Consecutively
C. They are given a letter designation . Under which of the following conditions
would a general test flight be required?
A maintenance test flight is defined as: A
A. Following replacement of a flight con
trol activator
flight for which the primary mission is to
determine . . . B. When accepting an aircraft for a ferry
mission
A. Limitations C. Airworthiness
C. When a major repair has been per
B. Capabilities formed on basic structure

24 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 9. What status symbol would be entered on 10. Under which of the following circumstances
the DA Form 2408-13 when an aircraft's may inspection intervals be exceeded?
intermediate, periodic or phased inspection
is due? A. When conducting
B. When flving VIP a ferry mission
4 ºvy x 3. {{ 3* - en ying S
A. Red x. C. Red (X) C. Actual operational emergency
B. Red “–

oI-Z eled 'O ‘OI qZ-9 eled ‘a 8 9-Z eled 'O 9 8-9 eled 'V b 5G-9 eled v z
ol-Z eled V '6 qG-6 eled a "L 92-9 eled a 'g qL-9 eled 'O 'g QI-8 eled 'O "I SHEIMSNV

Command Selections DeLoach, a Master Army Aviator, who arrived from

Headquarters, MILPERCEN, announced the names the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell
of officers selected for lieutenant colonel-level com AFB, AL. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Adams, formerly
mand assignments in fiscal year 1983. The following commander of the 2d Combat Aviation Battalion,
officers have been named to command aviation related Korea, is now chief of the Aviation Management
battalions and squadrons in SC 15: Branch.
Special MILPERCEN Selection Board
Aviation Troop Commands A special MILPERCEN Selection Board convened
Johnnie B. Hitt Bruce P. Mauldin to consider 37 warrant officer aviator applicants for
Charles H. Webb Bill G. Murphy active duty as an exception to the “10/20" policy. Of
William A. Hall Floyd E. Edwards the 37 applicants, 14 were selected. These officers
Edwin H. Henry Robert N. Siegle need to apply for new aviation service orders in
Robert E. Oakley Robert D. Kerr
Kenneth Chien
accordance with AR 600-105, para 3-3 E.
Byron W. Smith
Michael G. Ball Tommie A. McFarlin Unauthorized Use of Drugs and Alcohol Abuse by
Billy J. Miller Roy E. Chambers Aviators
James M. Butler Gerald L. Crews A recent MILPERCEN msg dated 141345Z Jun 82,
William D. Loftin
highlights the requirements of AR 600-105, “Aviation
Service of Rated Army Aviators,” as it applies to
Key Personnel Changes required actions against aviators who have been
Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Vandel reported in identified as using unauthorized drugs or as alcohol
July as chief, Aviation Plans/Programs Branch. A abusers. The purpose of the message is to seek aviation
Senior Army Aviator, he most recently served as commanders' compliance with these requirements
chief, Education and Training Branch at Military which include:
Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). Major Michael K. • Imposing a nonmedical suspension
Jennings, Aviation Management Officer for Specialty • Referring the case to a flying evaluation board
Code (SC) 71 in Aviation Plans/Programs Branch, • Notifying the flight surgeon
departed in June to attend Command and General • Referring the aviator to the drug and alcohol
Staff College. His replacement is Major Samuel L. abuse program.

SEPTEMBER 1982 25
 U.S. ARMY

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization

REPORT TO THE FIELD AVIATION

STANDARDI1AIION

Commanders at all levels implement the U.S. Army

U.S. Army Aviation Aviation Standardization Program through aviation
standardization committees. It is through the activities
Standardization Program of these committees that the goal of the U.S. Army
IN 1972, THE Chief of Staff of the Army, alarmed Aviation Standardization Program is achieved.
at the number of accidents and their associated loss The first standardization committee level is the
of materiel and human resources, tasked the Army installation and area aviation standardization com
staff to implement a centrally managed worldwide mittee. These committees supervise and coordinate
Army Aviation Standardization Program with a goal the command implementation of the U.S. Army
to improve unit readiness, aviation safety and profes Aviation Standardization Program and provide the
sionalism by using standard procedures and techniques. commander a continuous assessment of the program's
The Department of the Army (DA) Deputy Chief of status. The chairman of this committee is the instal
Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) has respon lation/area aviation officer.
sibility for this program which is managed by the U.S. The next committee level is the major command
Army Aviation Policy Committee. and numbered armies aviation standardization com
The U.S. Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC), Ft. mittee. These committees monitor the implementation
Rucker, AL, is the proponent for the U.S. Army of the U.S. Army Aviation Standardization Program.
Aviation Standardization Program. In this capacity, They provide the command a continuing assessment
USAAVNC serves as the DA preparing agency for of the program. Subordinate installation/area aviation
applicable Army Aviation regulations and flight training officers, who are chairmen of their respective instal
and standardization literature. USAAVNC also con lation/area standardization committees, serve as voting
ducts an active assistance and evaluation program for members of these committees.
aviation training. This consists of flight standardization The last and highest committee level is the U.S.
teams which assess the flight standardization and Army Aviation Policy Committee. The committee
proficiency of aviators, unit trainers (UTs), instructor consists of the following voting members:
pilots (IPs), standardization instructor pilots (SIPs), • Deputy Director of Requirements and Army
instrument flight examiners (IFEs) and maintenance Aviation Officer, ODCSOPS (executive chair
test pilots throughout the man)
Army. These teams serve • Director, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardi
ACTIVE COMPONENT
Aviation Standardization
as an extension of DCSOPS. zation, USAAVNC (executive secretary)
Committee Hierarchy
When evaluating units • Representatives from each MACOM and aviation
within major Army com element
mands (MACOMs) in con The U.S. Army Aviation Policy Committee recom
U.S. Army Aviation tinental United States, the mends general policy for implementation of the U.S.
Policy Committee results are provided as Army Aviation Standardization Program. It reviews
y input to the MACOMeval activities of subordinate aviation standardization com
uation report. Annually, mittees and proposals affecting the capability of com
MACOM Awiation this information is con manders to perform missions with aviation assets.
Standardization Committees solidated and a report is The executive chairman, in coordination with the
submitted through the committee secretary, presents reports of Army Aviation
y MACOM to the DA Avia
Policy Committee meetings to the DCSOPS. From
Instullution Aviation ºº º
lnen nute es
these reports the DCSOPS forwards recommendations
-— — at

Stundardization Committee MACOMs are given an to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Appropriate Army
staff agencies are tasked by the Chief of Staff to
y annual evaluation and the implement those recommendations approved by the
Unit Commander report is submitted through chairman.
Standardization the MACOM to the DA
This multilevel committee system is designed to
Instructor Pilot Aviation Officer.
provide problem solving groups composed of the best

26 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

{} qualified individuals to deal with aviation problems at
each command level. Normally, when problems are
identified by individual aviators, UTs, IPs, SIPs or
IFEs at the flight line level, they are presented to the
installation and area aviation standardization committee
secretary in writing. The committee secretary will
forward the issue to members of the committee in
sufficient time (usually a minimum of 30 days) to
allow each member to research and develop recom
mendations prior to the next scheduled meeting.
These committees are required to meet at least semi
annually. When the committee meets, normally a
1-day general assembly of all members, all issues
received by the secretary in time for proper staffing
will be placed on the agenda. Any interested member
may discuss an issue and make recommendations. All
recommendations will be voted upon by the member
ship. Those recommendations approved by a majority
vote will be forwarded to the commander authorized
to convene the committee, for his approval and imple
mentation if approved. If the recommendation exceeds
the authority or capability of the commander authorized
to convene the committee, he may elect to forward
the issue to the next higher committee.
Issues submitted to the major command and num
bered armies aviation committees are processed in
much the same manner as those of the installation
and area aviation standardization committees. However,
this committee only meets annually. It is divided into
specialized work groups, i.e., safety, flight standards,
to discuss appropriate issues. After all issues have
been addressed by work groups, the members meet in
general assembly. In this assembly, the issues and the
work group's recommendations are presented to all
members for formal resolution. Recommendations of
this committee are forwarded to the commanders
authorized to convene the committee for approval.
Copies of the approved recommendations must be
given to each subordinate aviation standardization
committee. Those issues not resolved by the major
command aviation standardization committees are
forwarded to the U.S. Army Aviation Policy Committee
for final resolution.
The U.S. Army Aviation Policy Committee meets
annually in conjunction with the U.S. Army Aviation
Training Symposium. The voting members meet in a
week-long session. During this meeting, the first 2%
days are devoted to intensive work group discussions
which develop recommendations for each unresolved
issue. Following the work group activity, the policy
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL
SEPTEMBER 1982
U.S. Army Aviation
Policy Committee
y
FORSCOM Awiation
Stundardization Committee
Y
CONUSA Aviation
Standardization Committee
• “ - “** * * *
y y
Siute Aviation ARCOM/G0COM Aviation
Standardization Committee Standardization Committee
y
Unit Commander Unit Communder
Stundardization Stundardization
Instructor Pilot Instructor Pilot
RESERVE COMPONENT Aviation Standardization Committee
Hierarchy
committee voting members meet in formal session to
vote on all issues presented for resolution. Recom
mendations approved by this committee are forwarded
to the DCSOPS and the Chief of Staff. Upon approval
by the Chief of Staff, appropriate Army agencies are
tasked to implement the recommendations.
In 1981, 78 issues reached the U.S. Army Aviation
Policy Committee. Issues such as tactical instrument
checkrides and aircrew training manual task require
ments were addressed. Unique to last year's policy
committee meeting was the release of a messsage
after the meeting to all commands effecting the
immediate implementation of resolved issues. Those
issues unresolved were tasked by the Chief of Staff
for accomplishment. It should be evident that any
issue that begins at the flight line and reaches the
Chief of Staff has been thoroughly dealt with along
the way. At each level, a serious attempt is made to
resolve the issue. If, however, the issue cannot be
resolved, it is forwarded promptly to the next higher
committee. In this channel, an issue can originate at
the lowest level, be addressed by experts at every
command level and be implemented as a new policy
or as a change to an existing policy in less than 1 year.
This year's U.S. Army Aviation Policy Committee
is scheduled to meet 15 through 19 November 1982 at
Ft. Rucker, AL. *4
36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and feave a message
27
 \})3 level head º
intelligent
mind
...A
alſºWD determined stare

strong shoulders

º good heart -
willing to help
professional
backbone
\ new aviators

dependable
stature

experienced seat
º
&º highly skilled
hands
of the pants -

F.W.
-
sturdy stance

feet planted firmly

on the ground
(when not in flight)

U.S. ARMY AVIATION InigEST

28
 A Lieutenont's Guide to the
AVIATION WARRANT OFFICER

First Lieutenant Ronald M. Buffkin

B Company
501st Aviation Battalion (Combat)
APO New York

INCE I'VE BEEN a commissioned avia
tor, I've developed a great deal of respect for aviation
warrant officers. These men and women are truly the
backbone of professionalism in our aviation units. In
addition to doing most of the flying, they are required
to spend the majority of their careers in aviation
wherein they possess a wealth of experience. I can say
I've learned a lot about aviation from most of the
warrants in my unit.
There was, however, a serious lack of formal
education and training in Officer Candidate School
(OCS), my basic course and the initial entry rotary
wing (IERW) course about the special breed of soldier
known as the aviation warrant officer (AWO). Most
precommissioning programs including Reserve Officers'
Training Corps, the United States Military Academy
and OCS offer little about the roles and functions of
warrants, much less the AWO. Like most every level
Specialty 15 aviator I attended a combat arms branch
basic course which was great training for being an
Infantry platoon leader, but poor preparation for my
first job as a combat aviation unit section leader. This
condition will become more typical as additional newly
commissioned aviators come into Army Aviation and
also with the restructuring of our combat aviation
units.
The present IERW course produces fine aviators
but contains little time to devote to teaching lieutenants
and captains how to fight with and lead their aviation
units. Army Aviation has some of the most sophisticated
fighting equipment of any combat arm and its combat
soldier, the AWO, is probably the most highly trained,
technically capable fighter in the world. These skilled
soldiers demand good, effective leadership. Filling a
leadership position in an aviation unit poses unique
challenges for the commissioned aviator. As Army
Aviation develops into a viable fighting force on the
modern battlefield, time and effort will have to be
spent training newly commissioned aviators how to
train, lead and go to combat with aviation units. Until
that time, officers new to Army Aviation will have to
learn about AWOs on the job.
While it's true that good officers can command
respect and lead effectively in any environment, they
can still benefit from knowledge about the nature of
the soldiers they will lead. AWOs are a valuable asset
to Army Aviation and their retention in the future
will be affected by the quality of leadership they see
from their chain of command as well as the degree of
concern they get from those junior leaders with whom
they come into contact with daily. The following is
intended as a primer for those lieutenants who will
soon find themselves as section or platoon leaders in
aviation units. This guideis based on my observations
in a combat aviation unit and perhaps will aid in
understanding the AWO.
A “Mister" Is Not A “Chief." Even though my
Officer's Guide says that the warrant officer is addressed
as “Mister” or “Miss" or “Chief" as appropriate, the
AWO does not prefer to be called Chief. It's a small

SEPTEMBER 1982 29

AVIATION
WARRANT
OFFICER
continued
point but the AWOs use this formality to distinguish
themselves from their nonrated contemporaries. I
first learned of this quirk at Ft. Rucker, AL, and it has
since proved to be a universal maxim for the AWOs.
Rely On Their Expertise. Because of the amount of
time AWOs spend in aviation, they have the potential
to become veritable experts in Army Aviation. They
can become skilled in the “nuts-and-bolts” of the
business to a greater degree than can commissioned
aviators. Most experienced senior warrants are more
than willing to help a new aviator. They will not
expect you to know everything, but they will expect
you to ask them if you need help.
Never Discuss Pay Or Privileges. With the passage
of the 1982 Military Pay Bill, the inequality of flight
pay, which has long been a sore spot with the AWO,
has been corrected. Still, career recognition and other
differences between the commissioned and warrant
aviator structure continue to be sources of irritation.
I've learned that talk of who gets more pay or
opportunities for schooling can only make for friction
between the AWO and commissioned aviators. As a
leader, the commissioned aviator cannot afford to
participate in discussions of this type.
Treat Them As Officers. My TAC (training and
counseling) officer used to say, “An officer is an
officer is an officer.” This means that AWOs are
extended the same privileges and respect as commis
sioned officers. To allow anything less is to detract
from the important role the AWOs play in the Army.
Their warrant from the Secretary of the Army makes
their status as equals clear.
Be A Leader. Commissioned aviators are leaders.
It is not unusual for second lieutenants to be AMCs
(airmission commanders) for a multiaircraft tactical
mission. Even though they may not have the flying
experience level of the CW2s and CW3s in their
flight, they are in the position of leadership. Your
30
warrants will expect and demand that you lead by
example and make the type of quality decisions º
necessary to ensure safety and mission accomplishment.
Develop Teamwork. Like all combat units, aviation
sections and platoons are bonded by teamwork. To
function as an effective member of the combat arms,
aviation teams and sections have to be cohesive fighting
elements. It's easy to lose sight of this considering the
amount of individual training needed to keep aviators
proficient. In addition, having different levels of experi
ence tends to keep the unit from operating as a team.
Train like a team, fight like a team, win like a team!
Set The Example Of Professionalism. In Flying.
Because the development of commissioned aviators
is directed toward a different goal than is that of the
AWOs, you may find yourself away from the stick
more than you'd like. Remember that you're still an
aviator and expected to keep informed and qualified.
The quickest way to lose the respect of a CW3 or
CW4 is to allow flight in very marginal weather or to
otherwise disregard aviation safety.
Senior Warrants Tend To Stagnate. I thought I
might have been wrong on this one, but after talking
with other lieutenants in my unit, I know I'm not. The
challenge is for aviation leaders to provide the kind of
training and leadership that will stimulate the senior
warrants to give their maximum effort. There's much
to be learned from senior warrants—allow them to
share the benefits of their experience with others.
Leadership requires practical application between
the leader and those that are led. The right combination
plus competence with the tools of the trade (in our
case, helicopters) will produce positive results.
What works with infantry and tankers may not be
effective with the AWOs. While the future leaders in
Army Aviation have their first exposure to the AWOs
when they report to their units, they don't need to rely
on trial and error to develop the skills of leading
them. A possible solution could be the addition of
blocks of instruction to precommissioning programs,
branch basic courses and/or IERW courses that deal
with the role of the AWOs in aviation organizations.
The Aviation Center could also develop a correspon
dence program that deals with employment and
leadership of combataviation units. This self-contained
instruction would be aimed at newly commissioned
aviators to provide them with an introduction to what
they can expect in their new units. Perhaps even the
Warrant Officer Career College, with its vast amount
of talent and experience, could be tasked with defining
the skills needed in junior aviation leaders. In any
case, if Army Aviation is truly expected to develop
into an effective member of the combat arms, our
combat leaders should be given the same preparation
toward aviation that the other combat arms provide
their lieutenants. g-t
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 -_º
Forty years of ARMY Aviation
*ARMED HELICOPTERS
Richard K. Tierney Editor, Aviation Digest
“Vanderpool’s Fools”
| rigadier General Carl I. Hutton,
A commander of the Aviation School
at Camp Rucker, AL, in 1956, was
<2| aware of various armed helicop
ter experiments that had been conducted in
the Army since the Korean War.
In 1953, the 24th Infantry Division had
experimented with a makeshift grenade
launcher on an H-13 Sioux. Also, the Ballis
tics Research Laboratory at Aberdeen Prov
ing Ground, MD, unsuccessfully worked with
2-inch rockets fired from 5-foot tubes mounted
on an XH-32 Hiller. Then, a Sky Cavalry
experiment was included in Exercise Sage
brush in 1955, with an unfavorable after
action report written by nonaviation
evaluators.
SEPTEMBER 1982
Discouraged at the reports he was receiving
about armed helicopter experiments, General
Hutton decided to take matters into his own
hands. In June 1956, he asked Colonel Jay D.
Vanderpool to take on a special project of
building and testing weapons systems to be
used on helicopters.
Although not an aviator, Colonel Vander
pool accepted the challenge with much
enthusiasm because he had formed ideas
about arming helicopters from his experien
ces in World War II and Korea. He started
with weapons left over from the unsuccessful
“Project Able Buster” which had concen
trated on arming fixed wing aircraft and only
briefly considered helicopters before discount
ing them as “poor performers."
The basis for General Hutton's actions was
a training memorandum from General
31
FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION “Vanderpool's Fools”
Officers
CPT Stanley E. Ballentyne LT George F. Blanchard CWO John L. Lawlor
CPT Ernest L. Boswell LT Thames M. Economos CWO Cecil W. Williams
CPT Charles W. Jones LT Robert A. Jones CWO Thearon M. Cross
CPT John R. Ford LT Robert R. Chedester CWO James D. Lombard
CPT Howard A. Huntsman CWO Charles L. Brameier CWO Lawrence C. Hammond
CPT John D. Roberts CW0 Clarence J. Carter
Enlisted Men
MSG L.0. McDonald SGT J.C. Johnson PFC R.P. Somerville
MSG W.J. Quinn SGT H.M. Mills PFC H. Wyatt, Jr.
SFC J.M. Bingham SGT L.L. Prine PVT R.E. Abbott
SFC W.C. Cooper SGT E.E. Spaichler PVT W.E. Coursey
SFC J.H. Gladson CPL K. Gombooz PVT A.C. Fordyce
SFC W. Jenkins CPL 0.H. Haughey PVT J.W. Garrett
SFC J. Rosado-Rodriquez CPL G.L. Roberts PVT H.E. Hill
SFC M.R. Sherrer SP3 J.J. Graham PWT F.A. Johns
SFC P.J. Soublet SP3 E. Harris PVT. S.H. Kmiec
SFC A. Thompson SP3 A.E. Mason PWT E.J. Konzelman
SFC E. Vasquez SP3 M.C. Overman PVT D.G. Lewis
SFC F.E. Weedom PFC C.W. Ayers PWT R.J. Long
SP1 L.H. Weeks PFC J.E. Davis PVT. M.R. Mendoza
SGT A.B. Andrews PFC J.B. Elliott PVT D. Porter
SGT R.E. Coker PFC C.J. Gahn PVT A.J. Rogers
SGT R. Gates PFC M.R. McCully PVT J.H. Spivey
SGT L. Hopkins PFC R. Ricks PVT W.D. Watson
Brigadier General Carl I. Hutton

Willard Wyman, commander of the Conti
nental Army Command, directing the devel
opment of a highly mobile task force. In an
exchange of correpondence, General Hutton
obtained permission from General Wyman to
proceed with his experiments with existing
helicopters. As Colonel Vanderpool observed,
“General Wyman did not tell us to use armed
helicopters, but neither did he tell us not to.”
Colonel Vanderpool started out with a few
helicopters, a few rockets and no gunsights.
His biggest asset was a group of people
(including wives) who believed in the armed
helicopter and who were willing to give up
their evenings and weekends to go about the
business of arming the helicopter. They often
had working lunches and midnight snacks
that the wives prepared. Both General Hutton
and Colonel Vanderpool shared the hours—
and lunches or snacks. Those pioneers were
called “fools,” but before long they were
reverently called “Vanderpool's Fools”—and
it became a distinct honor to be a member of
this select group.
General Hutton commanded the Aviation
School until June 1957. He was succeeded by
Major General Bogardus S. Cairns who was
killed in an H-13 crash in December 1958. He
was followed by Major General Ernest F.
Easterbrook who commanded from June 1959
to March 1961. Both of these men continued
developmental work on Army helicopters with
the same enthusiasm as General Hutton, the
man who many consider to be the “father of
the armed helicopters.”
A few months before he left Fort Rucker,
General Hutton directed on 5 March 1957
that a Sky Cavalry Platoon (Provisional) be
organized. By 8 July the unit, dubbed “Sky
Cav,” was operating with 11 officers, 16
enlisted and 10 helicopters.
To eliminate confusion over the many types
of “Sky Cavalry” that existed, the unit was
redesignated Aerial Combat Reconnaissance
Platoon, Provisional (Experimental).The pro
visional was dropped 24 March 1958 and the
unit was reorganized as the 7292d Aerial
Combat Reconnaissance Company. Through
out most of these name changes the unit was
generally referred to as ACR Company, even
after 25 March 1959 when it was redesignated
the 8305th Aerial Combat Reconnaissance
Company.
No matter what the name was, the quality
remained the same as the ACR Company
developed and refined nap-of-the-earth flight
and gunnery techniques and tactics. ACR
also continued to improve and build new gun
kits.
The ACR Company conducted numerous
demonstrations of the firepower and tactics
of its H-13s mounted with 30 caliber machine
guns, and of the H-19s, H-21s and H-34s
firing 2.75 and 4.5 inch rockets in support of

32 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


transport helicopters carrying troops into
“combat areas.”
On 27 March 1957, ACR left Fort Rucker to
give the first offpost glimpse of its emerging
airmobile tactics doctrine. Its members con
ducted exercises before the Armor Associ
ation at Fort Knox, KY, they impressed mem
bers of an industrial symposium at Fort
Benning, GA, and they conducted their most
significant demonstration on Army Avi
ation's birthday, 6 June 1957, before an Army
Aviation-Industrial Symposium at Fort
Rucker. They also traveled to Aberdeen, MD,
for the Ordnance Association Conference
and even participated in exercises as far
away as Fort Bliss, TX.
Captain Stanley Ballentine was the first
commander of the original ACR Company.
Subsequent ACR commanders were Major
Frank G. Brown, Captain Harry E. Archer,
Major Carrol M. Cook Jr., Major Philip D.
Jones, Major Robert M. Shoemaker and Cap
tain Robert E. Oberg.
Some of the ACR Company members were
dubbed with nicknames that reflected their
specialties. CWO Lawrence C. Hammond
was “Chief Piddler,” CWO Clarence J. Carter
was “ChiefScrounger,” Captain W.F. Gurley
was “Chief Operator,” and CWO James D.
Lombard was “Chief Inventor.”
SEPTEMBER 1982
- ". An ACR Company CH-34
ºs- " "… Choctaw armed with 4.5 inch
º - rockets and a .50 caliber
machinegun.
- s ſº
* - ſº
--~~~~
“Vanderpool's Fools” worked without for
mal research and development assistance, or
evaluators other than themselves. They
scrounged equipment from salvage yards
and were happy to receive “hand-me-down”
armament parts from the Air Force, Navy
and Marine Corps. They worked in the post
machine shop at first, but soon set up a shop
of their own at Tiger Port, an onbase heliport
at Fort Rucker. Anyone who had a helicopter
armament idea could have it built and tested.
Many of their ideas evolved into standard
helicopter armament systems.
The outstanding work of the ACR Company
was recognized throughout the Army and
was chiefly responsible for the development
of armament systems and airmobile tactics
in Army units around the world. By late 1962,
the Army's airmobile/armed helicopter pro
gram had reached a point where it was ready
to be tested in an air assault division. Plans
called for the ACR Company and its expertise
to be a part of the nucleus of a test division.
On 24 September 1962, the 8305th ACR
Company became Troop D (Air) 17th Cavalry.
Troop D then was moved to Fort Benning,
GA, where in 1963 it became part of the 3d
Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 11th Air
Assault Division (Test). Later Troop D was
redesignated Troop A and the 3/17th Cavalry
33
FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
became 1/9 Cavalry and was deployed to
Vietnam as part of the 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile).
Armywide Growth
As the ACR Company grew at Fort Rucker,
it began to receive assistance from the Com
bat Developments Office and the Army Avi
ation Test Board (today known as the
Developmental Test Activity) which in 1961
organized an Armament Branch to test heli
copter weapons systems. On the training
side, the Aviation School formed an Arma
ment Division in its Department of Tactics to
assistin the training of students in armament
subjects and to work on the development of
armament systems.
In 1962, the Office of the Project Manager
for Aircraft Weaponization was created under
the newly organized Army Materiel Com
mand in Washington. Lieutenant Colonel
Nelson L. Lindstrand Jr. was first project
manager and was charged with bringing all
of the helicopter armament programs under
one roof. He assumed responsibility for ad
ministering the ACR Company-originated
XM-1 and XM-1E1 30 caliber machinegun
systems and initiating the follow-on XM-2
system. But Colonel Lindstrand's office also
had many other helicopter armament pro
grams from throughout the Army to direct.
ACR Company's tactical exercises resulted
in an order from the commanding general of
the Continental Army Command in 1959 to
the Armor School to develop an Aerial Recon
naissance and Security Troop (ARST). The
ARST, patterned after the ACR Company,
was formed in January 1960 at Fort Benning
as a test unit of the 2d Infantry Division. It
underwent testing and training at Fort
Stewart, GA, and in Europe during “Exercise
Winter Shield I.” ARST was an unqualified
success, performing the traditional armored
cavalry mission. In 1962, as the Army divi
sion was reorganized into the ROAD concept,
34
the air cavalry troop was made organic to the
division's armored cavalry squadron.
In addition to developing ARST, the Armor
School's 64th Transportation Company ex
perimented with 2.75-inch and 4.5-inch rock
ets on the CH-34 Choctaw.
The commanding general of U.S. Army
Europe was impressed with the ACR Com
pany experiments at Fort Rucker and directed
the Seventh Army commander to integrate
the armed helicopter into certain units. The
task was given to Brigadier General Hutton
who had just been reassigned to Europe from
the Aviation School. Several of “Vanderpool's
Fools” who had been transferred to Europe
(and were already working on weapons sys
tems) went to work and developed the Seventh
Army armament kits. Each infantry division
in the Seventh Army was issued kits and
their instructor pilots received special train
ing in their use.
Major General Herbert B. Powell, an Army
aviator who commanded Fort Benning's In
fantry Center, was impressed with the work
of the ACR Company. In July 1957, he asked
Major William A. Howell to conduct some
experiments in arming helicopters. CWO
James E. Ervin Jr., was made project man
ager and rounded up a crew to help him. After
obtaining machineguns and equipment from
Fort Rucker, and with the help of Sikorsky
representatives, the group unveiled the
world's most heavily armed helicopter, a CH
34. It was armed with two AN-M 20 mm
machineguns, two 50 caliber aerial machine
guns, four 30 caliber aerial machineguns, two
pods of 20 2.75-inch rockets each, two 5-inch
high velocity aerial rockets, two additional
30 caliber aerial machineguns in the left-side
aft windows, and one 50 caliber machinegun
in the cargo door. The aircraft underwent
experiments, but numerous technical prob
lems caused it to eventually fade from the
SCene.
As the air cavalry troops came into exist
ence in the ROAD divisions, additional exper
imental gun kits were developed. One of the
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 most successful was the “Old Ironsides” ma Battery (Provisional) in May 1963. It was in
chinegun kit, developed under the supervision tended for that battery to be equipped with
of Lieutenant Colonel John C. Hughes, com UH-1Bs armed with the XM-3 system (2.75
mander of the 501st Aviation Battalion of the inch rockets). But the system was not avail
1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, TX. “Old able and the CH-34 with its 4.5-inch rockets
Ironsides” consisted of a twin 30 caliber was used instead.
machinegun system and was mounted on the Those in the Army today who are charged
OH-13. Twin 30 caliber machineguns also with the development of our modern arma
were installed on the battalion's troop ment systems such as the TOW (tube
carrying UH-1Bs. Other kits designed and launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) mis
built included 50 caliber M-2 and M-3 kits for sile, the HELLFIRE and the Stinger, are
the UH-1B and the Womack Kit, named for facing many of the same obstacles experien
its designer CWO Clemuel H. Womack. It ced by “Vanderpool's Fools.” But they have
included twin 30 caliber machineguns and inherited the spirit and dedication that the
two 2.75-inch launcher pods of 24 rockets ACR Company members had, as evidenced
each. by the improved AH-1S fully modernized
The UTT became the United States’ first Cobra and the emergence of the AH-64
armed helicopter company when it was acti Apache attack helicopter. They have the grit,
vated in Okinawa 25 July 1962. It was de and are succeeding in developing the aircraft,
ployed in October 1962 under the command of weapons and tactics with which Army Avi
Lieutenant Robert Runkle to Thailand and ation can, as a member of the combat arms,
then Vietnam to fly escort for lift helicopters destroy the enemy and his armor in the
(see PartIII:COMBAT, Vietnam).CWOClarence AirLand Battle.
Carter, a former member of the ACR Com
pany, developed most of the original helicop
ter armament systems for the UTT. In
The Old Ironsides Kit consisted of two .30
Vietnam, Major Luther Loller and CWO caliber machineguns on an OH-13.
Cleatus Heck developed larger weapons sys
tems for the UTT. CWO Womack (who had
been with the 1st Armored Division) joined
the UTT and was responsible for an improved
* 2.75-inch rocket launcher for the UH-1, a
smoke tank and a modified M-6 quad ma
chinegun system that was the forerunner of
the M-16 kit (a 2.75-inch pod added to the M-6
machineguns).
The Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK,
organized the Committee for Aerial Artillery
Test and Evaluation in March 1963. Its first
project was a CH-34 armed with one 10-tube
4.5-inch rocket pod on each side. It was placed
on line with artillery pieces in May 1963 as
part of one of Fort Sill's famous firepower
exercises. The results were impressive as the
single CH-34 delivered the same firepower as
a battalion of 105 mm Howitzers. This led to
the organization of the first Aerial Artillery

SEPTEMBER 1982 35

Major General John W.
Woodmansee Jr.
Commanding General
2d Armored Division
Fort Hood, TX
Panel Chairman
During the conduct of the AASPR, MG
Woodmansee was deputy commanding
general, V Corps, United States Army
Europe
36
Army
Aviation
Systems
Review32
Organization And
Force Structure Panel
Tie ORGANIZATION and
Force Structure Panel (figure 1)
addressed five major issues (figure
2) which were derived from the find
ings of the Army Aviation Mission
Area Analysis (AAMAA) and analy
sis of the aviation organizations of
1986 as applied to the total Army
analysis (TAA-88) force structure.
The first issue con
sidered was the fact
that the current CONUS
*&ows (continental United
States) vs. OCONUS
(outside continental
United States) aircraft distribution
program is, in some cases, not sup
portable. In order to maintain the
current personnel assignment phi
losophy of 3-year stabilized CONUS
Tal Il
tours, the CONUS base must contain
sufficient aviation force structure
to provide for stable tours in both w
CONUS and OCONUS. In a long
tour area, such as Europe, Hawaii,
Alaska and Panama, the CONUS
base must contain roughly one
mechanic or pilot to support each
one that is forward deployed. For
short tour areas such as Korea, we
need to have three people in the
CONUS base to support each one
stationed overseas. If the CONUS
base cannot support the OCONUS
distribution, we must overtrain, hand
manage and accept personnel turbu
lence in the affected aviation officer,
warrant officer and enlisted special
ties. This has an obvious impact on
morale, stability, unit cohesion and
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 personnel retention. Failure to solve
the distribution issue may result in MG WOODMANSEE DCG, V CORPS, USAREUR
an imbalance in 12 of the 24 enlisted (Chairman)
aviation military occupational spec MG ANSON CHIEF, FORCE MOD, HODA
ialties (MOSs). We simply must solve MG ARTER CG, MILPERCEN, HODA -
the distribution issue.
Opportunities available to address MG ELTON CG, 9TH ID (HTTB), FORSCOM º
this issue include: maintain Alaskan MG FRENCH CG, SSC, TRADOC .*

medium lift helicopter companies BG TUTTLE DIR, FORCE MGT, HODA r

in the active force; cancel plans to
increase stationing of aircraft over
seas; and expedite self-deployability
and strategic airlift plans for selected
aircraft, particularly scout and attack.
Issue two referring
`--_ back to issue one, ad
-º-, dressed the point that
jº** scout aircraft distribu
AIR
decisions on attack and
tion are further compli
cated by the fact that currently pro
gramed attack and scout airframes
will not support the TAA-88 force
structure. More airframes should
be programed for future procure
ment. If this is not possible, the
panel offered the following as op
tions to alleviate this problem:
• Reducing some requirements
LTC MACWILLIE DCD-FD, USAAVNC, TRADOC
FIGURE 1: Organization and Force Structure Panel
dimension of firepower and maneu
ver, as well as combat service sup
port to the combined arms team. • CONUS VERSUS OCONUS
We cannot expect our NATO (North —AIRCRAFT DISTRIBUTION
Atlantic Treaty Organization) rein |MBALANCE
forcing divisions to be trained, or • SUPPORTING THE FORCE
ganized and equipped to execute
—AIRFRAMES ARE
this doctrine, and then fall in on
POMCUS of their ground equip INADEQUATE FOR TAA 88
ment and fight without their aviation. • WRS AND POMCUS
There is no reason to expect the —ABSENCE OF AIRCRAFT
home station aviation assets of our
• SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
current POMCUS divisions to be
—AVIATION MANNING IS
with them in the initial battles. In
addition to the absence of aviation INADEQUATE

and deferring procurement of some
aircraft
• Inactivating reserve compo
nent units
• Deferring activation of planned
regular force units and
• Procuring UH-60 Black Hawks
and AH-1 Cobras in lieu of some
is additional AH-64 Apaches for a
high-low mix of attack aircraft.
While issues one and
two concerned the de
WR velopment of station
*~s ing and acquisition
strategies to support
the Army, issue three
addressed the absence of aircraft
in war reserve stock (WRS) and
prepositioning of materiel config
ured to unit sets (POMCUS). Our
AirLand Battle doctrine for the
future requires extensive use of
aviation assets. The cavalry brigade
(air attack) within each division and
extensive aviation resources at corps
under Army 86 add a significant
from the reinforcing divisions, the
aviation assets of the forward sta
tioned units will suffer a propor
tionate amount of combat damage
and attrition. If our commanders
are to retain the combat effective
ness afforded them by aviation
forces, they must be provided re
placements for their battle losses.
Although we have long recognized
the need to replace attrited ground
combat systems and have developed
an acquisition strategy which pro
vides replacements from war reserve
stocks, we do not have a similar
acquisition strategy for aviation
systems. Consequently, we have no
replacement for our attrited avia
tion assets.
In short, the absence of WRS
and POMCUS stocks means that
the six NATO reinforcing divisions
cannot expect to have their combat
aviation forces with them during
initial combat (figure 3). Neither
are there provisions for immediate
- - WARTIME FLYING HOURS
º:
—CURRENT PROGRAM IS
INADEQUATE
FIGURE 2: Panel issues
war reserves of aircraft to match
the ground system reconstitution
capability. These considerations are
based on the regulatory restrictions
of AR 710-1 and SB 700-40 which
preclude aircraft being placed in
either war reserve Stock or POMCUS.
In order to solve this problem,
the panel's opportunities for solution
again included exploiting self-de
ployability for the AH-64, CH-47
Chinook, UH-60 and requiring that
all future aircraft be self-deployable.
Next, the tests currently being con
ducted in Europe to determine if
aircraft can tolerate extended stor
age should be continued. Finally,
since Army Aviation is a combat
arm and vital to the execution of

SEPTEMBER 1982 37
 ..- -- *, *s, *, *- - - - - - -e--- *** **** * * * * * * * *
addition to providing a means of
filling Active Army sustainment
units. IRR personnel resources pro
vide a recruiting base for Guard
º and Reserve units.
The panel's opportunities for
. FIGHT solution provide the basis for pro
;
: NATO
i.
REINFORCE WITHOUT
ARMY
AVIATION
3) ceeding with the AAPRSO imple
mentation plan. HQDA should ap
prove the AAPRSO implementa
tion methodology of using Reserve
. A.
Component sustainment units and
º A. direct Forces Command to conduct
: 3.
º p an evaluation of the methodology
an
-g
using the divisional attack battalion
: N0 AVIATION IN POMCUS . structure discussed in our example.
º s’ Additionally, Training and Doctrine
*
'*
*** ** * * *- : *-*. -- a---------, *.*** *** **** ***** ***** * * * s:-
º Command and the Aviation Center
should continue to develop the
FIGURE 3: Combined Arms Employment -
implementation plan for the Army;
and as information becomes avail
able from the new MACRIT study
our AirLand doctrine, the panel purpose of the study was to deter and Combat Service Support Mis
proposes that the Army revise its mine the required ratio of pilots to sion Area Analysis (CSSMAA),
regulations and develop an aviation aircraft seats and the number of sustainment units will be revised to
acquisition strategy which includes maintenance personnel to conduct incorporate maintenance personnel
war reserve stocks. sustained operations in a mid-intensity requirements. Obviously adjust
In addition to the air European conflict. In August 1981, ments to the training base will be
craft distribution and HQDA validated the pilot-to-seat required to support implementation.
acquisition difficulties ratios; however, the recommenda The fifth and final
for supporting the pro tions on maintenance personnel re issue addressed war
gramed force, the panel quirements were deferred by HQDA time flying rates which
MANNING addressed issue "four pending receipt of data from the are the basis of logis
which was that the manning in to new Manpower Authorization Cri tical planning and sup
day's aviation units is inadequate teria (MACRIT) study. The result port for aviation. In
for the conduct of sustained oper ing aircrew ratios in figure 4 are order to exploit the capabilities of
ations. We are the only service in derived from different unit and our enhanced units and the combat
the Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft mission profiles. Application potential of our aircraft, the wartime
in which the requirements for pilots of these ratios to the Army Aviation flying hour program must be in
are based on a one-to-one pilot-to force structure will increase aviator creased. Flying hour rates are critical
aircraft seat ratio. All other services requirements by about 30 percent to force structuring as well as logis
have a greater ratio based upon air or 3,750; of these, about 300 will be tical support. Logistical support for
craft type and mission profile. For Active Army requirements to sup aviation is currently based on the
example, the minimum aircrew for port the AH-64. To meet these re flight hour requirements shown in
U.S. Air Force HH-53 and HH-3 quirements with minimal increase the left column of figure 5, the
aircraft is 1.50 and 1.25 pilots per in Active Army strength, the Avia current DA-approved rates in hours
seat respectively and the U.S. Marine tion Center is designing table of per day. The AAMAA support basis
Corps computes AH-1.J require organization and equipment (TOE) in terms of flying hour rates is shown
ments at 1.2 pilots per seat. sustainment units. Sustainment units in the right column. The CH-47
To address this issue, Headquar for selected active Army Aviation hours are taken from the AAPRSO
ters, Department of the Army units can be filled from Active study. These rates will be updated
(HQDA) directed the U.S. Army Army, National Guard, Army Re by the CSSMAA now underway.
Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL, serve and Individual Ready Reserve However, approval of these flight
to conduct the Army Aviation Per (IRR) personnel resources. Guard hours will generate additional costs
sonnel Requirements for Sustained and Reserve aviation units provide at the wholesale level in depot stock
Operations (AAPRSO) study. The sustainment for their own units, in ages and in stockage of authorized

38 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 --
º
º
* ** = ** * ****s-----ºº-ºº ºsºsºsº ºn-º-º-º-º:
stockage list/prescribed load list at
the retail level, while class III/V
(petroleum and solid fuels/ammuni
tion) stockages will also be increased ºr . º CSAC UH-1 1.42
at both levels.
: UH-60 1.36
Adoption of the AAMAA flight º SCOUT 1.42
hours will provide commanders i ACT AH-1S 1.33 MHC CH-47C 1.14
increased logistical support for com
bat surges and enable them to § AH-64 1.29 CH-47D 1.13 A
exploit more fully the capabilities - SCOUT 1.80 S
of their aviation assets. These hours
*s DAC UH-1
FAAO
1.29
1.42 UH-1 1.45
p
R
will be used for the CSSMAA, which AERO
will define increased aviation logis
tical and maintenance requirements. º orse an AMBulance UH-60 149 :
Furthermore, a Middle East war º *** - - - - - sº-ºrº º º sº." --- ****** *º-ºr-º- ºr ºu. ****º
game should be conducted for the FIGURE 4: AAPRSO Aircrew Ratio
rapid deployment forces to validate
the flying hours required to sup ºzººsºº" -ºº-º- ºr--- ºw-tº º º
port that mission; and a maintenance
manpower logistic analysis should DA. APPROVED
be conducted for all aircraft to refine 3. AR 570-2 AAMAA
maintenance requirements to sup º OBSERVATION 2.27 3.21
port the force structure. * SCOUT 2.27 3.35
That concludes the five issues
which required significant DA at
. FAAO SCOUT 2.27 6.42

tention and revision. Additionally, * AH-1S 2.17 3.69

the panel offered the following * AH-64 - 3.69

observations. Since these issues were
developed based upon the TAA-88
force structure of 5 corps and 26
divisions, it is important to recognize
that, as the TAA process continues,
aviation requirements will increase
proportionately. The issues ad
dressing aircraft shortfalls, war
reserve stocks and POMCUS
require timely resolution to pre
pare for future Army goals. The
recently implemented DA warrant
officer retention initiatives, along
with increased training rates, have
begun to improve the warrant officer
retention problem and aviator short
fall. These initiatives must be con
tinued because the projected loss
of warrant officers to retirement
increases significantly beginning in
FY 1985. Full implementation of
the DA career management field
(CMF) 67 study recommendations
should correct the grade structure
imbalances, improve personnel man
agement and increase retention
within this career management field.
The recent scrub of the heavy
division 86 organization resulted in
º UH-1H
* EH-1
t UH-1 V
* UH-60A
* CH-47C
º CH-47D
• * * * * * * * ******** *******º-ººººººº
FIGURE 5: Wartime Flying Hour Requirements
removing doorgunners from the
TOEs and placing these positions
in augmentation documents. Door
gunners provide self-protection for
utility and medium helicopters.
Therefore, these positions should
be included in sustainment units
for our high priority organizations
instead of augmentation TOEs.
Additionally, doorgunners should
have a CMF 67 MOS to provide
additional maintenance capability
to those organizations. And last but
not least, the medium helicopter
company (MHC) and the trans
portation aircraft maintenance com
pany (TAMC) are not structured in
accordance with Army 86 method
ology. The Army 86 studies empha
2.63 5.93 A
2.63 5.00 A
2.63 - §
2.53 4.89 R
1.93 3.53* s
- 3.50” *
“AAPRSO STUDY
sized smaller company-sized organi
zations which could be effectively
commanded by captains as company
commanders. Both the MHC and
TAMC are commanded by majors
and have in excess of 250 personnel
in each organization. The panel
recommended that the U.S. Army
Transportation School, Ft. Eustis,
VA, restructure these units using
the Army 86 methodology, ºr—
NOTE: My sincere appreciation to LTC
Steve MacWillie, Chief, Organization and
Force Structure Branch of the Directorate
of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Avia
tion Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, and CPT (P)
Josef Reinsprecht as well as the panel
members for their contributions.

SEPTEMBER 1982 39
7ilot
Error,
Error
Staff Sergeant (P) William C. Hawkins
Pilot error is not a term that pi
lots, civilian or military, take kindly to. We have
attended various, demanding courses of instruc
tion both on the ground and in the air that have
culminated in our becoming “pilots.” We feel
that when a member of our “select group" has
been indicted by the term “pilot error" it questions
the capabilities and attitudes of all of us. We feel
that it is a phrase that investigators sometimes
use when they can't ascertain the “true" cause.
Mishap investigation is a wide and extremely
complex field. The findings of a great many
investigations are frequently, by necessity, tenta
tive. “The probable cause..." is the most frequent
term. This is true in the field of hardware, but it is
even more true in the field of “liveware"—that is,
in that a high proportion of mishaps are reportedly
caused by pilot error.
The human factor in flying safety has been
closely studied in the last 20 or 30 years and the
findings have greatly increased flying safety. But,
a great number of mishaps are still attributed to
pilot error, a finding per se that cannot lead to
prevention. Pilots are human; and judgment will
continue to play a part until we make machines
40
and outline procedures that
eliminate the propensity for
human responses based on judgment.
This fact cannot, however, be used as an excuse.
We must continue to strive for error-free flying,
and we need to identify and correct all factors
that cause us to make these errors.
Everyone has heard the old saying, “If God
had wanted man to fly He would have given him
wings.” Well, He didn't give us the physical
structure to fly, but He did give us the next best
thing—the human intellect and capability to
advance our technology to the point where we
developed and manufactured our own wings.
The sky is a relatively new environment to
man. On 17 December 1903 man first made
practical use of his manufactured wings. The
length of that first powered flight was 540 feet
and lasted about 12 seconds; it was a successful
attempt to make use of this vast three-dimensional
potential—and remain alive! Since the day of the
first Wright Flyer, our aircraft have grown larger,
they fly higher, faster and farther.
In the more than 79 years since that first
successful flight, our technology has advanced
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 “We can pull and haul and push and lift and drive,
We can print and plough and weave and heat and light,
We can run and race and swim and fly and dive,
We can see and hear and count and read and write.
º º º º

“But remember, please, the Law by which we live,

We are not built to comprehend a lie,
We can neither love nor pity nor forgive.
If you make a slip in handling us you die!"

Rudyard Kipling
*The Secret of the Machines”

illustration by Dave Deitrick

to the point where we can carry, in comfort, 300
passengers from New York to San Francisco, at
speeds exceeding 500 miles per hour. Aircraft
can, by the use of highly sophisticated onboard
computers and navigational equipment, literally
fly themselves from takeoff to landing. But, for
every advancement that has been made, more
challenging problems of aviation safety have
evolved. The early accident rate was phenomenal.
* During the two World Wars, 60 percent or more
of all air casualties were attributed to accidents,
not to enemy action. Engines failed, airplanes
collided and we had few reliable instruments;
pilots had little training and often became lost or
disoriented. It was becoming increasingly obvious
that people were not “born to fly" but we certainly
were not about to admit it. We had entered into a
new environment and fully intended to take
advantage of its almost limitless possibilities.
The pilot's environment is a special one; his
responsibility as pilot in charge is awesome. The
pivotal point of an aircraft is the pilot, around
whom everything else rotates. Before climbing
into an aircraft the pilot has received and inter
preted a weather briefing, filed a flight plan, briefed
his crew and passengers, computed weight and
balance, and thoroughly checked the aircraft for
deficiencies. In fact, the pilot has signed for
everything and everyone onboard. Once he takes
off, he releases all those he has left behind of
any further responsibility. He is solely responsible
to make immediate, precise and accurate judg
ments every second of the flight. If there is to be
a human error accident, he is the one who will
most certainly make the mistake. Even more
certain is the fact that he will also take the blame.
Every time the pilot flies he must feel the weight
of this responsibility and understand the factors
involved.
There are a great many elements involved with
the pilot and his selected profession. First, the
process for his selection and training to become
a pilot have left many other candidates by the
wayside. Prior to selection he is checked for
physical conditioning and his physiological and
psychological makeup. The standards set for the
aviator far exceed those of most other professions.
His training is extremely intense and difficult.
Once he qualifies as an aviator his performance
and condition are continually monitored.

SEPTEMBER 1982 41
 Pilot crºcr
On first meeting him, few people would guess
his profession. Only around his “own kind" does
he open up and then the conversation will more
than likely be about flying. In personality he is
apt to be an intuitive extrovert. That is to say he
will not analyze himself or his motives, but he will
be extremely critical of and go over and over in
his mind any minor mistake he may make while
flying. The aviator will normally be of above
average stability and possess more than the
average amount of common sense. He will be
careful, conscientious and, in all probability, “over
cautious." He will remain aware of the possibility
of accidents, and that his whole existence is the
need to avoid them.
The cockpit is the pilot's office from the time
he straps in—he becomes the principal, with one
or more crewmembers to assist him. He assumes
immediate and full responsibility for an expensive
aircraft and X number of passengers and crew
and the successful completion of the assigned
mission.
He now has to start making very important
decisions on which the safety of all people onboard
will be dependent. Some decisions can be made
at an almost leisurely pace such as is the weather
good enough to maintain minimums or is the
aircraft serviceable? The majority of his decision
making, however, takes place in the air and he
no longer has the option to make leisurely
decisions. Most have to be made immediately.
Some are even made a matter of conditioned
reflex by hours and hours of repetitious training
as in emergencies such as fire, engine failure or
other hardware failures. An example is the in
stinctive reaction of a heiicopter pilot who sud
42
denly and unexpectedly loses engine rpm to
reduce collective pitch to maintain rotor rpm and
then to identify the reason for loss of engine
rpm. These decisions have to be made and made
correctly if a safe flight is to be accomplished.
These decisions can never be postponed as some
can in a ground job. There are few professions
where such a series of decisions must be made
correctly and often instantaneously. The end result
of making the wrong decision can be disasterous.
Decisionmaking is known to be stressful and with
the rapid advance in aviation technology, far more
stressful factors have been brought into play.
Aircraft today are larger and increasingly
complex. The advances in aviation human en
gineering have been fantastic, but with increased
aircraft complexity the modern pilot is under more
stress than ever. Through use of current tech
nology we have the capability to greatly reduce
stress and pilot workload, if we're willing to accept
the additional cost. *
In his “office” the pilot may spend several
hundred hours a year. Considering the stresses
that are imposed on its principal occupant, it
would be expected that a great deal of care should
be used in the design of the cockpit. The seats
should be comfortable and easily adjustable. The
instruments should be arranged in an array making
them easy to read and interpret. All controls,
levers, knobs, dials and switches should be
arranged logically and their functions should be
positive, easy to operate and guarded against
their inadvertently being put in the wrong position.
The operating environment of most aircraft
leaves a lot to be desired. The pilot has to fit
himself among a myriad of switches, controls,
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
levers and dials—and adjust himself as best he
can. Modern aircraft contain hundreds of gauges
and switches and their positions and functions
have to be nearly committed to memory. To the
layman, this mass of equipment is unfathomable,
but to the pilot they are old and familiar friends.
Instruments can, however, be misread. For ex
ample, in 1972 a commercial DC-9 crashed during
an approach to the Charlotte, NC, airport. The
captain and copilot both misread their altimeters
by 1,000 feet! They thought they were at 1,650
feet but were actually at 650 feet, well below
published minimum obstacle clearance altitude
for that portion of the approach.
of the impact of these elements can accomplish
nothing less than improve our flying safety and
make us better professionals; the end result being
safer, more efficient service to those we in aviation
Support. agº-4
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
SSG (P) Hawkins is currently serving as the noncommissioned
officer in charge, Lowe Division, Department of Flight Training
at the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL. He has
been involved in aviation safety in every assignment since
1976. He is also a civilian pilot with about 1,000 hours of
experience. He has served overseas tour in Vietnam, Germany
and Korea.

The number of aircraft a pilot is rated in is also

a factor. Habit patterns learned in one aircraft
may be transferred subconsciously to another.
These “habit pattern transfers” most often end in
immediate recognition and correction but some
times they end with tragic results.
Habit pattern transfer accidents are greatly
reduced by the extensive training involved when
transitioning from one aircraft to another, plus
the use of checklists, continuation training and
currency requirements that are imposed after
initial aircraft qualification is accomplished. No The following Hotline numbers can be called on official
other profession has anything similar to the business after duty hours. They will be updated and
reprinted here periodically for your convenience. If your
continued training, retraining and checks ex agency has a Hotline it would like included, please send it
perienced by the pilot throughout his career. to Aviation Digest, P.O.Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL36362.
Only about one-third of all so called pilot error AUTOVON Commercial
accidents can be attributed to lack of professional Aviation
skill. Two-thirds are more likely due to ordinary Ft. Rucker, AL 558–6487 205-255-6487

human failings in a highly stressful situation Engineer

requiring immediate response. These human Ft. Belvoir, VA 354-3646 703-664-3646
failures can be attributed to:
Field Artillery
Ft. Sill, OK - ARTEP 639-2064 405-351-5004
peer pressure Redleg 639–4020 405-351-4020

the desire to please Infantry

StreSS Ft. Benning, GA - ARTEP 835–4759 404-545–4759

personal problems Intelligence

Ft. Huachuca, AZ 879–318.5 602-538–318.5
misleading visual cues Training 879-3609 602-538-3609
“get-home-itis"
Missile & Munitions
fatigue Redstone Arsenal, AL 746–6627 205-876–6627
and many other variables.
Ordnance (Help Line)
Aberdeen Proving Gnd, MD 283-4357 301-273-4357
The purpose of this article is not to attempt a
Quartermaster
total explanation or to offer excuses for human Ft. Lee, WA 637-3787 803–734-3757
error accidents. Machinery can fail and most
Signal
certainly humans can fail, and either one or a Ft. Gordon, GA 780–7777 4C4-731-7777

combination of both can result in tragedy. The Transportation

purpose is to remind us of the many human aspects Ft. Eustis, VA 927-3571 804–878–357.1
involved in flying. Our knowledge and realization

SEPTEMBER 1982 43
 VIEWS FROM READERS
Editor:
Request reprinted copies of the follow
ing articles on NBC defense:
• “Chemical Protective Clothing,”
October 1980.
• “Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
Training and Development,” August
1981.
• “Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
Decontamination Problems,” October
1981.
• “Chemical Agents, First Aid and
Long-Term Effects,” December 1981.
Request any other articles on NBC
defense in your current files.
CPT Michael Parker
Command Chemical Officer
4th Transportation Command
APO New York
Editor:
Reference: Aviation Digest April 1982,
“Heliborne Electronic Warfare System”
written by COLRobert S. Fairweather
Jr.
As a tactical electronic warfare officer
and an aviator flying “GUARDRAIL
V,” I read with great enthusiasm COL
Fairweather's article on HEWS. Without
a doubt the potential for such a system
could be a tremendous force multiplier
while providing much needed protection
for aircrews. As also stated in the article
the Air Force is actively involved in
EW supporting roles. Equally akin to
the “Wild Weasel" is the EF-111, an
airborne jamming system that protects
and screens penetrating fighter bombers.
A system envisioned by COL Fair
weather would provide a tremendous
advantage on the battlefield.
Having been in the EW business for
several years has given me great respect
for what electronic warfare can accom
plish. I am still surprised that more
emphasis is not placed in this area. In
many exercises I have participated in,
Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
44
EW units have had to be stopped or
greatly reduced as it disrupted the
exercise. When communication is dis
rupted and command posts dislocated,
great confusion and frustration occurs.
Anytime units must operate out of the
normal mode of operation their ability
to conduct their mission is greatly re
duced. The Soviets are extremely suscep
tible to an EW threat. Jam the radar on
the ZSU-23-4 and we have greatly
reduced its ability. Jam command,
control and communications (C3) and
we arrive with the fourth “C," confusion.
Another “plus" for the HEWS concept
is the survivability of the jammer. The
Soviet determination to eliminate tactical
jammers is well known. The only hope
for our ground tactical jammers is short
burst rapidly moving jamming. The value
of having airborne jamming capability
has been proven by both the Quick Fix
and CEFIRM Leader platforms. The
next logical step is to miniaturize and
expand these capabilities to provide
standoff, handoff, multiple role airborne
jammers as envisioned by COL Fair
weather.
There is one more major concept I
would like to see added to HEWS and
that is supportability. I am a strong
believer in delivering EW capabilities
to the tactical commander as it is a
powerful weapon. However, supporting
electronic warfare operations is a person
nel and logistical nightmare. The low
density demand for personnel and
equipment is a constant strain for all
tactical electronic warfare units. Cur
rently, I doubt that a division could
support a system such as HEWS. To
support this system, equipment and per
sonnel should be identified prior to
fielding. In order to have an effective
airborne EW platform the receiving
organization must be prepared to receive
the system and thus be able to support
it. In other words have personnel,
equipment and logistical support on
hand prior to receiving any new EW
system.
The HEWS concept is exciting to
think about. Such a system is a necessity
and would greatly enhance combat
operations... “Jam It!”
CPT Thomas K. Beaty
Flight Operations Officer
330th Electronic Warfare Co. (FWD)
APO New York
Editor:
I am interested in the Aviation Digest
and would like to know its annual sub
scription fee in Canadian dollars, if
possible.
As a Canadian citizen I have been
specializing in military strategy and
technology over the past 20 years in
North America. Your early reply will
be appreciated.
Leo Y. Liu, Ph.D.
Chairman & Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Brandon University
Brandon, Manitoba, Canada
• To subscribe from outside the
United States, it is necessary to send a
check in U.S. dollars drawn on a U.S.
bank in Canada, in the U.S., or any
U.S. possession, to Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC 20402.
Editor:
Request a copy of publication “Aero
medical Evacuation”—4 parts by LTC
David Lam, M.D.
Patricia L. Luttrell
Federal Aviation Administration
Air Route Traffic Control Center
Longmont, CO
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
Lost Communications: Filing Fact Or Fiction
CW4 Peter C. McHugh
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
A \N NUALAVIATOR proficiency and readiness
test completion includes the evaluation of aviator
ability to cope with failure of communications and
equipment during IMC. Despite dramatic advances
in technology and increased reliability, the suggestion
that “lost comm” implies loss of navigational ability
focuses much training to this potential emergency.
Attention is directed to inconsistencies between Federal
Regulations, DOD FLIP and Army flight plans during
such evaluation and training.
Lost comm procedures in DOD FLIP Flight Infor
mation Handbook (FIH), section A, paragraph 4,
paraphrase FAA instructions in FAR 91.127. The
FIH amplifies the methodology of making the descent
from en route altitude, but as the FAR requires,
“Begin descent from the en route altitude upon reaching
the fix from which the approach begins, but not before
... the estimated time of arrival, shown on the flight
plan, as amended with ATC.” There is a common
misconception that amending ETA with ATC is always
: precipitated by the pilot. DD Form 175, Military Flight
Plan, does not have an ETA entry despite references
to the contrary. An ETA only exists after the flight
movement message is transmitted (AR95-11), and for
every IFR flight that does not launch precisely on the
proposed departure time, an amended ETA exists
with ATC. It is possible that differences of 3 to 10
minutes or more could exist between actual ETA and
that perceived by the pilot.
Until January 1982, this discrepancy was compounded
by a significant difference between civil and military
computation of estimated time en route (ETE). FAR
91-83 requires that the flight plan include “the point
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
of departure, the point of first intended landing and
the elapsed time until over that point.” DOD FLIP
GP4-2, item 15, prior to January 1982, described ETE
as “time from takeoff to the last fix shown in the route
of flight.” The last fix shown (item 13), of course, was
the IAF for the intended approach. Since some IAFs
are geographically separated from the supported air
field by extended distances (40 + NM), a 90-knot air
craft's transmitted ETA (in no wind) grossly misrep
resented actual time of arrival (ATA) to the FAA.
The fact that many of the Army's IAFs are not
stored in the FAA computer system caused flight
plan rejection and further exaggerated the disparity
of ETE definition. This, coupled with the questionable
value of divergence from the FAR by compliance
with the FLIP GP, precipitated changes reflected in
items 13 and 15. Item 21 will reflect these changes to
show distance from “point of departure to the desti
nation aerodrome via the planned route of flight.”
While the Air Force continues to exercise its prerogative
to establish procedures for its own assets, the Army
and Navy flight plans are now compatible with FAA
expectations and current civil filing practices.
Using these procedures, an Army aircraft under
lost comm will normally arrive at the IAF before the
amended ETA, thus necessitating holding. FIH4a(1)(e)4
provides that “if more than one approach fix is available,
the pilot may choose the one most appropriate for the
situation, as ATC protects airspace at all of them.”
Aeronautical Services Office (ASO) suggests that
aviators consider selecting the IAF closest geographi
cally to the destination when lost comm is of primary
consideration. This will minimize the time lapse between
ETA, ATA and time at which descent can begin.
The FLIPs often contain wording which becomes
the subject of lively conversation and debate. Comm
Cards providing comments, recommended rewording
and phone number for follow up are earnestly solicited.
ASO is Army Aviation's access to the DOD FLIP.
1 4.

2 5

3. º
11.FUEL (GALs, or les. 12.OIL ſouarts N 15-serviced

Total
in N APu BY
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Replaces Edition of 1...anº, AND MAINTENANCE

-----------used For use of this form, see TM-38-750; the
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º - W º

VººDºº

SUPPLY

i
 OCTOBER 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 10

Yºr Yº Yºr
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Charles E. Teeter
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 Army Aviation Systems Program Review '82—The

Training Panel, MG John R. Galvin
9 Army Aviation Systems Program Review '82—The
Materiel Panel, MG James P. Maloney
14 Views From Readers
15 ACTAAT: Laser Hazards
16 Tactical Air Traffic Control Training—Not A Blind
Approach, LTC A. E. Hervey Jr.
19 NBC Survival—A Matter Of Attitude,
CW3 Ernest D. Kingsley
20 DES Report To The Field: Mission Planning For Night
Flight Operations
22 Aviation Personnel Notes: CMF 67 Update,
CPT Charles N. Avery
24 PEARL'S
27 Tower Talk:Tower Operation, Mr. Ronald B. Jackson
28 Forty Years Of Army Aviation, Part 5: Policies And
Organizations, Richard K. Tierney
36 Reporting Final
38 USAAEFA Tests Help Ensure Readiness,
Betty J. Goodson
42 Where's The Foreign Clearance Guide?
CW4 Thomas A. Story
Inside Back Cover: ATC Action Line: Parachutist
Vs. Aircraft, Mr. Robert Cole
Back Cover: Preparing for Winter, CPT Gregory J. Honorable John O. Marshir
Beauvais and Miss Megan Lohmann Secretary of the Army
Cover: The last two articles of the 1982 Army Avia Richard K. Tierney
page 38 tion Systems Program Review (AASPR) series, Editor
“The Training Panel" and “The Materiel Panel,"
begin on pages 3 and 9

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, US Army Aviation Center.
Views expressed herein are not necessarily triose of the Department of the Army
nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise speci
fied. Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise indicated.
Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct
communication is authorized to Editor. U.S. Army Aviation Digest. P O Drawer P.
Fort Rucker, AL 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army. 10 September 1982, in accordance with Army Regulation
31O-1
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1. Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR. AG
Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore. MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription rates
are $26 OO domestic aro $32.50 overseas
 Accident FREE IN '83–As they rest here in
their Oversized type, the expression is meaning
less, just words, a powerless collection of letters
and numerals. But if we will just adopt them as
our personal slogan, if each and every unit, if
each and every crewmember in Army Aviation
will launch their own individual crusade against
accidents, then we can be free of crippling, killing,
destroying needless aviation mishaps in fiscal
year 1983—and all the years to come!
General John A. Wickham Jr., our vice chief of
staff, shares our great concern about the FY 1982
aviation accident rate and has pointed out a
number of things we should do to reverse the
trend. In a recent message, he has directed that
“a systematic search for safety hazards in all
areas of aviation safety and at all levels of
command" be conducted and that “causes of all
accidents, not just Class A accidents,” be ex
amined. He points out that more than 70 percent
of all aviation accidents involved human error.
Eighty percent of those errors were directly
attributable to the flight crews while some were
traced to a Commander's lack of proper Supervision.
Some actions that can and must be taken now
by commanders, General Wickham writes, are
the separation of marginal enlisted personnel,
the use of flight evaluation board procedures to
police the warrants and the officers, the use of
the UCMJ for flagrant violations of Army flight
-
regulations, a crackdown on crewmembers who
abuse alcohol and drugs, and an increase in avia
tion safety awareness to involve division and
|
installation commanders.
General Wickham said, “I want to emphasize
that Our Safety analysis concludes it is not, repeat,
not tough training or increased NOE flying that is
causing accidents. . . . Further, the cause cannot
be placed at the door of inexperienced aviators.
The profile of the average pilot who had an
accident is 4.3 years' aviation experience and
1,300 hours.
"All of us share responsibility for the high invest
ment in our crews, maintenance system, and
costly equipment. Thus, we are all involved with
aviation safety. Your active interest and solid
participation is essential if we are to reverse the
upward trend in aviation accidents."
OCTOBER 1982
While General Wickham's message is specifical
ly addressed to the MACOM commanders, his
thoughts are directly applicable to all of us because
safety is a personal matter.
Safety has to be a cumulative effort made up
of each person's contribution. We cannot afford
to march to a different drummer! We all have to
be dedicated to making ACCIDENT FREE IN '83
a living slogan, not just a group of words.
All of the foregoing is not to slight the excellent
articles contained in this Digest. You'll enjoy Major
General John R. Galvin's report on “The Training
Panel" and Major General James P. Maloney's
on “The Materiel Panel" as the last two parts of
our Aviation Systems Program Review coverage.
And you'll learn more about the aviation mainte
nance career management field in “CMF 67 Up
date" by Captain Charles N. Avery and about
essential knowledge that will enable you to live
through chemical warfare in “NBC Survival—A
Matter of Attitude" by Chief Warrant Officer, CW3,
Ernest D. Kingsley. Finally, we have part 5 of our
Army Aviation history series by Mr. DickTierney,
longtime editor of the Digest. This series has
been quite popular with our readers and gives a
splendid audit trail from 1942 to 1982. So read
On, you will enjoy and learn from this issue and
those of future months.
And remember to personally be ACCIDENT
FREE IN ‘831
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
Army
Aviation
Systems
Program
Review32
The articles on pages 3 and 9
conclude the Aviation Digest's *>
coverage of the 1982 Army
Aviation Systems Program
Review. The first article in the
series, an overview about the
development of Army Aviation,
appeared in the June issue.
July's article covered concepts,
doctrine and tactics and
September's discussed
organization and force structure.
Copies of any of this series can
be obtained by writing to Editor,
P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL
36.362.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

,The Major General John R. Galvin
Commanding General
Training 24th Infantry Division
Fort Stewart, GA
Panel Panel Chairman

Tº: PANEL (figure 1) exam

ined the training of U.S. Army
Aviation forces in the context
of the combined arms team in the
AirLand Battle and discussed, in
vestigated and evaluated deficiencies
in aviation training as determined
by the Army Aviation Mission Area
Analysis (AAMAA). It identified
24 overall aviation training defi
ciencies, of which 11 major defi
ciencies were referred to the panel.
In the course of its investigation,
the panel accepted, collated, refer
red or rejected specific issues to
arrive at five issues most in need of
further resolution (figure 2).
Institutional
Training Base
While addressing the training
issues individually, it became clear
that the deficiencies are, at least in
part, the result of a much larger
and more all-encompassing training
as those associated with flying, it is
impossible to train and to create
the training publications that are
required for aviation—except by
farming them out to one of the
branch schools. Consequently, the
quality of training suffers from a
lack of complete integration of flight
training, tactical unit, and individual
training and training literature.
Figure 3 depicts the very impor
tant interplay which takes place
between the students in the basic
course (but more especially in the
advanced course) and the cadre of
instructors. The student comes to
school bringing experience from
field units and hands-on expertise.
In the communication process be
tween instructor and student, the
instructor benefits from the student
and the student from the instructor.
FIGURE 1: TRAINING PANEL
This is fundamental to the very
practical reasons which underlie the
necessity of the long duration basic
and advanced courses at any school
rather than simply a series of short
training experiences such as pre
command, refresher or other rela
tively short courses that specialize
in a particular skill such as flying.
This is especially true of the ad
vanced course, which is the basis
and heart of all of our branch
schools. Without the branch ad
vanced courses we would not have
a well-rounded cadre or the neces
sary plant and facilities or the ability
to plan, budget and provide the
administration that is so necessary
to our schools.
The rationale for any combat arm
of the Army is keyed to a principal
tactical system (which, in the case

problem within Army Aviation. In

order to place the Training Panel
issues and proposed solutions in
MG GALVIN
(CHAIRMAN)
CG, 24th ID, FORSCOM ©
perspective, a discussion of this MG PENDLETON DIR, J-3, REDCOM
slarger problem is needed to under.
stand the manner in which the panel
addressed individual issues.
At any of the branch schools there
is a direct tie-in between the training
BG MOLINELLI
BG SUNELL
COL O'NEIL
COL ESTES
ACTING DUSD (TWP), USDRE
CG, USATSC, TRADOC
ACTING DOT, DCSOPS, DA
DTD, USAAVNC, TRADOC
;
which takes place at the basic and
advanced courses and the creation
and continual evaluation of training FIGURE 2: TRAINING PANEL ISSUES
literature. Subject matter experts
who write the bulk of the training
COMMISSIONED OFFICER AVIATOR TRAINING
material are also instructors. In
• INTEGRATION OF ARMYAVIATION INTO COMBINED ARMS
addition, they normally contribute
TRAINING
to combat development and doc
trinal matters. If, as at present, there • TRAINING DEVICE DEVELOPMENT
is not an institutional base within • RANGE ADEQUACY FOR TRAINING
aviation and a corps of instructors SPECIAL ELECTRONIC MISSION AIRCRAFT TRAINING
teaching tactical, materiel, logistical
and administrative subjects, as well

OCTOBER 1982
 FIGURE 3: TRAINING BASE INTERPLAY
of Army Aviation, is the helicopter).
In a broader sense, Army Aviation
accentuates the dimension of verti
cal space and the critical aspect of
time on the battlefield (figure 4).
Just as the tank has required special
ized skills and new tactics, weapon
systems such as aeroscout, attack
and assault helicopters have unique
characteristics which require special
ized skills and unlike the tank also
require a three-dimensional (omni
directional) tactical approach to fire
and maneuver. To meet this need
in the past we have tried to train
assault helicopter unit officers—
since they move infantry—at the
Infantry School. Likewise, attack
helicopter unit officers—since they
had a cavalry relationship to begin
with—continue to be trained at the
Armor School and so forth. So we
have fractionalized a tactical area
which, by its nature, should be
consolidated in a single arm. It is
quite apparent today that aviation
cannot be managed by any single
one of the other arms. That is the
primary reason it has been broken
up into instruction at several places.
Yet, Army Aviation is a combat
arm alongside Infantry, Armor,
*For a detailed discussion of weapons systems comparisons, watch
for an upcoming article, "The Best Weapon. WISAWIS
FIGURE 4: BATTLEFIELD DIMENSIONS
Artillery and others. It possesses
the platforms for fire and maneuver
in the same kind of combination
that is possessed by the other combat
arms. Just as each combat arm has
certain unique characteristics, avia
tion has the vertical dimension in
which it is able to employ its purely
tactical weapon systems in the same
ground envelope as the other com
bat arms with the same principles
of firepower and mobility and the
same requirements for command,
control, communication and training.”
Army Air
Corps/Dual
Qualification
Many critics of an aviation branch
draw the analogy to earlier days
when the Army Air Corps “drifted
away” from the Army and became
the Air Force. This analogy may
not be as solid as it once seemed.
The Air Force was created because
in addition to tactical requirements
for air support there was an over
riding strategic requirement. Army
Aviation, on the other hand, is
entirely tactical and (with the excep
tion of such actions as self-deploy
ment for selected aircraft) it is of
no strategic consequence, although
it can add significantly to the internal
Army strategic and deterrent capa
bilities. As General John W. Vessey
Jr., now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, has stated, Army Aviation
trains ground troops who fly their
fighting vehicles and operate in the
ground environment as a combat
arm of the Army alongside the
ground maneuver arms. An old
philosophy says that aviators, if they
are good soldiers, should be able to
operate in one of the other branches
as well as in aviation. There are s,
many examples today of successful
officers who have done precisely
that, and quite often they are the
proponents of the present system
which divides aviators among the
carrier branches. However, the
increasing technological challenge
of aviation has made it more and
more difficult for officers to master
their professional requirements un
der the double burden of two, and
in some cases three, branch respon
sibilities. Those aviator officers who
have attained high rank today began
their careers at a time when Army
Aviation was infinitely smaller in
size and much more limited in scope
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 and when “training” was essentially
commercial flight instruction. The
Army of the late 1950s and early
1960s allowed officers to spend a
good deal of time at company grade
levels where they had the oppor
tunity to command—and to learn—
in both aviation and ground units.
Careers at company grade move
more quickly now, and the dual
ground-aviation command pattern
is rarely possible. There is also little
time in officer careers to allow
service and personal development
both in the air and on the ground.
The scope of aviation has grown in
terms of technology and mission.
An aviator now has to learn more—
and keep learning more—in order
to stay current. We all should recog
nize that the world of Army Aviation
has changed, that what might have
been valid 20 years ago is no longer
necessarily so, and that biased anal
ogies tend to break down under the
scrutiny of logic. The bottom line
is that an attack helicopter pilot
today is performing many more
complex things than did an L-19
(O-1) Bird Dog pilot or an OH-13
Sioux pilot just a few years ago.
Aviation
Branch
School
All of this is inextricably related
to the question of aviation training.
Suppose we look at what an aviation
: º school could do. It could concen
trate aviation doctrine and tactical
training in one place instead of in
several schools. Aviation doctrinal
and training requirements can be
prioritized by a single proponent
(the school), and the resources
necessary to produce this material
can be more simply and accurately
budgeted and justified. As has been
pointed out, it is almost impossible
to produce high quality instruction
without a permanent cadre and
student body that stays together long
enough to constitute an appropriate
environment for learning. Very few,
if any, of the serious training prob
lems of Army Aviation can be ad
OCTOBER 1982
dressed until we solve the problem
of the lack of a single aviation insti
tutional base, and this seems directly
related to the question of an aviation
branch.
In the past, training voids have
been readily identified and various
Army branches and agencies moved
to address them. Progress has been
made to improve Army Aviation
training and the closely related areas
of doctrine, tactics, organizations,
force structure and materiel manage
ment. The participating branches
and agencies have performed as well
as could be expected. Yet the sophis
tication of the equipment and atten
dant tactical employment continue
to make quantum leaps. The com
plexity of the battlefield grows geo
metrically, and Army Aviation's
ability to keep pace today, with the
realities dictated by an extremely
challenging wartime environment,
falters under management by a
system of diffused responsibility.
With that perspective, the five train
ing issues and opportunities follow:
… The firstissueaddres
sed commissioned offi
...] Sºr aviator training.
#j-
Eighty-five percent
the commissioned avia
of
tors are accessed directly into the
service. As Specialty Code 15 avia
tors, they attend a designated carrier
branch basic course (that is, Ben
ning, Knox, Sillor Bliss), then move
to Ft. Rucker for flight training.
This is followed by an assignment
which is normally dependent upon
the type aircraft qualification. Ad
vanced course attendance is more
than likely at the same location as
the individual's basic course. What
is lacking here is that aviators are
not being trained by an aviation
school cadre to lead and fight in
aviation units. Flight training for
both commissioned and warrant
officers is technically or function
ally oriented; that is, they learn how
to fly the aircraft. The officer basic
and advanced courses currently
teach attendees how to operate in
one of the branches.
When speaking of training com
missioned aviators, a related ques
tion arises: “What about aviation
warrant officers and their training?”
Although issue one, as stated, deals
only with the commissioned officer
aviator training, a few words about
the aviation warrant officer are
appropriate. Aviation warrant offi
cers also need tactics and combined
arms training to some extent. Al
though aviation warrant officers now
have an institutional base in terms
of basic course (the warrant officer
development phase within the Initial
Entry Rotary Wing Course) and
advanced course (the Aviation War
rant Officer Advanced Course), the
tactics and combined arms training
necessary to ensure successful em
ployment of Army Aviation in the
combined arms team are lacking in
that instruction. The resolution of
commissioned aviator training can
reasonably be expected to have a
favorable impact on resolving similar
problems for the aviation warrant
officer, but additional efforts to shore
up this training will be required.
Figure 5 lists but a few of the
things aviators are not being taught.
These and other areas are currently
under analysis by the U.S. Army
Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL,
and a refined task list of what
aviators should be taught is being
developed to improve future aviator
training. Together, the Infantry and
Armor Centers are designing avia
tion tracks for future implementa
tion in their respective officer basic
and advanced courses. We are un
sure at this juncture of the degree
to which this will fill the total aviator
training void, but it should help.
The Training Panel recognized a
number of problems in aviation
training that seem connected direct
ly to the lack of an institutional
base, or a heart—a home–for avia
tion individual and collective train
ing. Therefore, the recommended
solutions the panel proposed are
based on the long-term assumption
that the Army should establish an
aviation training institution with

• LEADERSHIPTRAINING— NOT AVIATION UNIT SPECIFIC
OFFICER & WARRANT OFFICER INTENSIVE
ATYPICAL ENLISTED PROFILE
• AVIATION UNIT MANAGEMENT
FLYING HOUR PROGRAM
AVIATION UNIT TRAINING
• TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AVIATION
AN ADD-ON'
NOT FULLY DEVELOPED
FIGURE 5: VOIDS–AVIATOR TRAINING
aviation basic and advanced courses
for commissioned officer aviators
and appropriate parallel training for
warrant officer aviators. Decisions
to reach this goal need not be ir
reversible but should be geared to
near-term and mid-term time frames.
This is to say, an evolutionary rather
than revolutionary approach is the
desired course. In the early phases,
aviation doctrine and organization
proponency can be aggregated at
the aviation institution. Proponency
for all training can follow as the
institution is prepared to accept it.
In the 1982 to 1984 time frame,
review of education and training of
officers to determine company
grade, field grade and warrant
officer aviator tasks should continue;
efforts to shore up carrier branch
basic and advanced courses with
aviation tracks should be intensified
to ensure early implementation; the
Initial Entry Rotary Wing program
of instruction should be realigned
to teach more combined arms and
aviation unit tactics and leadership
subjects; and, finally, milestones and
the resources required to establish
an aviation basic and advanced
course at the Aviation Center should
be established under an aviation
branch with appropriate central pro
ponency.
No less far-reaching
><>º the first issue,
-- the second—combined
COMBINED ARMs
arms training–involved
the core of an officer's
education. However, current train
tº
; training the combined arms team
ing programs and literature have
not adequately integrated avia
tion. Specifically, the proponent
branch officer basic and advanced
courses do not adequately develop
the application of aviation. The
Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leav
enworth, KS, recognizing this need,
is progressing through a 3-year
curriculum modification program
to ensure that the Command and
General Staff Course fully addresses
all elements of combat power.
As a stopgap measure, 19 aviation
shared tasks (figure 6) have been
developed and are being incor
porated into branch basic and ad
vanced courses. These are tasks
which all officers should know how
to perform. Since our original analy
sis of this area in 1979, training
center commanders have assisted
immeasurably by increasing their
instruction in aviation subjects up
to fourfold.
In a separate but related effort,
the Combined Arms Center re
cently completed a combined arms
sufficiency study to determine in a
systematic fashion which subjects
should be identified as combined
arms subjects and what constitutes
a sufficient level of proficiency in
these subjects for company grade
officers.
Among more than 160 areas
evaluated in this study, Army Avia
tion was one of eight subject areas
where the sufficiency level indicated
inadequate attention was being
given. Additionally, most of the
other areas (figure 7) are not of the
same category of importance as
aviation. Although progress con
tinues to be made to shore up this
training void, the Training Panel
questioned whether we are moving
far enough and fast enough in
to fully capitalize on and employ
Army Aviation. The initial lack of
aviation unit training facilities at
the National Training Center was
symptomatic of this deficiency, and
those facilities are being modified
to include aviation forces (by direc
tion of General Vessey during the
AASPR-82). How we train is how
we will fight; so the opportunities
to solve this deficiency rest in
intelligent application of aviation
in combined arms scenarios and
consistent employment of aviation
as an integral part of the combined
armS team.
The third issue con
cerned training device
development. Histori
* \_ cally, training devices,
§§§vićEs especially flight simu
lators, have routinely been intro
duced several years after the aircraft
was fielded. So development pro
grams have not been sufficiently
responsive to support the intro
duction of new aircraft systems.
Additionally, initial design of training
devices often has not accurately
represented the functions of rep
licated aircraft systems. Although
the Army's goal is to field training
devices concomitantly with the
prime system, we have not been
able to accomplish this. But the
following actions could rectify train
ing device development deficiencies:
• Earlier interface between train
ing developers and other life cycle
management participants.
• Update and consolidate life
cycle systems management model
and training device publications.
• Fund training devices (less flight
simulators) with the same priority
as the parent aircraft and designate
the prime systems project manager
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
responsible for their development.
• Establish a method for more
intensive management of the flight
ë
simulator program.
• And, finally, fund the Aviation
Training Research Simulator (ATRS) §:
| ntelligence - Military
project. Threat Patrºlling Oºi is
Issue four examined Background / in Urban
Terrain
range adequacy for
training. Given the Combined Arms
A. INTING training the Army is re Insufficiency
ANGES quired to conduct, this . Z. Q ARMY
issue concerns the adequacy of the Engineer N AVIATION Å
various kinds of training ranges. Operations
Force modernization (new combat Training S
vehicles, combined arms interface) Electronic
requirements have placed new de Warfare Management É
mands on commanders who must
provide for the greatly increased
capabilities of weapons and support
systems. In aviation's case, this FIGURE 6
means new considerations must be
made for the establishment of train
ing ranges for the AH-1S fully mod
{6}
wº
ernized Cobra, the AH-64 Apache
General
with its HELLFIRE missile and laser
designator, and the AHIPScout with Awiation *m.
its laser designator. Specifically, our
ranges need to be more realistic in
N 19
Awiation
yºu:
design and usage and meet these
minimum requirements for a mod
ern, well-designed range:
• The targets should realistically
Sº,
Aviation
appear, move and respond to fire. \ Training
Aviation
• The effect of exposure to enemy
fire must be accurately assessed.
• Our forces should be able to
maneuver and fire as they would in
combat.
L0gistics {3}. .
Army Awiation
Reçonnaissance
and Surveillance
;
• Casualty assessment of both
forces must be immediate. FIGURE 7
• Weapons characteristics must
be duplicated realistically on the trains its pilots to get their first few plexes (MPRC) for simultaneous
range. realistic wartime sorties under their live-fire exercises for all members
Obviously, neither an engagement belts in order to be better prepared of the Army's combined arms team.
simulation range nor a live-fire range for war. This is “Red Flag.” Additionally, an engagement sim
alone will satisfy all of these require Opportunities to address this issue ulation system is required to fill the
ments. The U.S. Air Force recog involve U.S. Army Training and other range requirements for real
nized this deficiency years ago. Its Doctrine Command's (TRADOC's) time, force on force and casualty
study of aircraft losses over North Directorate for Army Ammunition, assessment. The Multiple Integrated
Vietnam reflected that 80 percent Ranges and Targets (DAART) Laser Engagement System (MILES)
of the losses were experienced dur which was recently formed to re technology now in the field will
ing the first 10 sorties. Therefore, a spond to the Army's live-fire range provide a good capability for local
training complex was developed at needs. DAART has proposed a training, especially when the Air
Reno, NV, where the Air Force system of multipurpose range com to-Ground Engagement System

OCTOBER 1982
(AGES) is fielded next July to pro consolidation efforts and develop helicopters and we may overlook
vide aviation simulation. However, ment of a generic special electronic the enormous potential of a fully º
the Aviation Center has both training mission aircraft. rounded airmobile force.
and testing requirements; yet Ft. To realize the full potential of
Rucker is not large enough to ac Aviation Army Aviation, the panel felt that
commodate an MPRC. So, because Branch centralization and an institutional
of unique aviation requirements, Centralization base for Army Aviation cannot but
more sophisticated options such as In reviewing the major training help improve not only Army Avia
the technology of the Mobile Auto issues the panel recognized a larger tion training but also the Army's
mated Field Instrumentation System problem in Army Aviation training force modernization efforts, mobili
should be investigated as well as that seems connected to a lack of zation planning and overall combat
MILES and the possibility of an an institutional base where basic readiness. The Army has been creep
abbreviated MPRC. and advanced courses exist to meld ing up on this problem for a number
The fifth and last train aviation training for aviators, much of years and the Training Panel
ing issue is related to the same as is currently done for bracketed this fundamental issue.
Special Electronics Mis Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air A logical approach to solve this
$ [M] sion Aircraft (SEMA) Defense Artillery and Engineer evolutionary problem is one of
training. This issue is officers (figure 8). The panel felt continued evolution where aviation
an illustration of the concerns ex that the best way to teach aviators doctrine, tactics, organization and
pressed earlier regarding fragmen about aviation and its combined force structure, followed by train
tation of aviation responsibilities. arms application is to do it where ing, are centralized over time. Deci
Special electronic mission aircraft the collective experiences of the sions made to achieve that end are
are unique in that they employ combat arms can be brought to not irreversible but must be based
tactics, techniques and equipment gether, where instructors can be on a commitment to a long-term
requiring skills which currently are come true training and doctrinal assumption that a need exists for
not taught in their entirety either in experts in three-dimensional aspects centralization of aviation branch
flight school or at the U.S. Army of the AirLand Battle and pass that proponency. cº-º
Intelligence Center, Ft. Huachuca, on to future students. We must
AZ. We are doing well with the continue to think of Army Aviation NOTE: My sincere appreciation to COL
Frank Estes, director, Directorate of Train
basic pilot training and across the and airmobility as being all-inclu
ing Developments, U.S. Army Aviation
board in OV-1 Mohawk training but sive of the three dimensions and Center, LTC John Deryck; LTC Jerry
are far behind on the other SEMA other battlefield functions of com
Kemp, LTC Glenn Allen; MAJ Al Davis,
systems because most of the SEMA bat; otherwise we will never develop MAJ Josef Reinsprecht; and, of course,
aviators are being trained on the the full possibilities of our attack the panel members for their contributions.
job by others who were also trained
on the job.
The panel recommended that a FIGURE 8
training course be developed, re
sourced and implemented at Ft.
Huachuca for SEMA aviators. The
wº
course should teach the SEMA
systems and the combined arms
aspects of SEMA employment, while
the Aviation Center will continue to
conduct basic aircraft qualification
for the immediate future. Further,
-
TRADOC's ongoing efforts to deter
mine the degree of consolidation
of special electronic mission air
craft and systems training should
continue and possibly parallel the
existing system for medical aviation
training. We are moving in the right
direction through increased com
munication and coordination be
tween the two centers, TRADOC

OCTOBER 1982

* The
Materiel
Panel
Dº THE conduct of the
AASPR-82 at the U.S. Army
Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL,
the Materiel Panel examined Army
Aviation materiel systems and
proposed opportunities for solutions
to correct deficiencies, to the senior
leadership of the Army.
The Materiel Panel (figure 1)
membership comprised a thorough
mixture of expertise from Head
quarters, Department of the Army
(HQDA), U.S. Army Materiel
Development and Readiness Com
mand (DARCOM), U.S. Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC). The panel
was in consensus on the issues. This
is noteworthy because by far the
greatest number of deficiencies (56
of 77 identified) by the Army Avia
tion Mission Area Analysis (AAMAA)
were in the generic area of materiel
and encompasses the entire realm of
* aviation—from high dollar major
systems to those small, relatively
inexpensive items of individual air
crew equipment. The panel review
ed each of the 56 AAMAA materiel
deficiencies; isolated the most im
portant; placed them in our order
of priority; and presented, to the
review chairman, opportunities for
corrective action. Despite the need
for programs such as those for the
UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-47D Chi
nook, AH-64 Apache and AHIP
Scout—the large and visible things—
there are other issues equally as
important. Important in the sense
that they will enable our aircraft
and aircrews to survive and fight
OCTOBER 1982
Major General James P. Maloney
Commanding General
U.S. Army Air Defense Center
Fort Bliss, TX
During the conduct of the AASPR-82,
Major General Maloney was director,
Weapons Systems, Headquarters, De
partment of the Army
again another day and to conduct
sustained combat.
(page 3 of this issue).
The first issue con
Tºº
The panel felt six of these were cerns aircraft surviva
critical to our aviation battlefield lſº bility equipment (ASE).
capability and selected them for *TTW" Since the early 1970s,
elevation to the review forum (figure ASE the purpose of ASE has
2). We will discuss each of them in been to enhance our combat ef
turn—the issues, their related sub fectiveness by reducing or elimi
issues and the panel's recommended nating the enemy's ability to detect,
solutions oriented to the near (cur hit, damage or destroy our aircraft
rent to 1983), mid (1984 to 1988) and forcing the burden of counter
and far (1989 and beyond) terms. measures upon the enemy. Though
The panel's recommended oppor the ASE program has been aggres
tunities for solution will be, except sive, funding shortfalls have limited
where specifically noted, couched procurement of available systems
in terms of a required capability. required for three categories of
Therefore, costing will not be discus ASE—signature reduction, crew
sed, only the need for a capability warning and countermeasure sys
will be articulated. Furthermore, it FIGURE 1:
was not the panel's intention to PANEl cóMPosition
subvert the TRADOC priorities
program but rather to single out
and draw attention to six generic
MG MALONEY ODCSRDA y
issues critical to Army Aviation's • MG BAGNAL 101ST ABN
DIV
battlefield capability. It will be up
to the Army community and acqui • MG KONOPNICKI TSARCOM
sition system to determine priorities • MG MOORE MICOM
and the best hardware item to fill • MG STEVENS AVRADCOM
the stated and approved user's need. • MR. CRIBBINS ODCSLOG
One furtherpoint, as we evolve to a
COL BURNETT USAAVNC
truly concept-based requirements
system, it becomes increasingly
important that we have a central FIGURE 2: PANEL ISSUES Ş
thrust to aviation concepts, doctrine º
and training so that resulting aviation • Aircraft Survivability Equipment
materiel and user representation are • Aviation Life Support Fauipment
not fragmented among the com • Fleet Obsolescence
bined arms. In this regard, the
Materiel Panel supported LTG Jack
V. Mackmull's Concepts, Doctrine
and Tactics Panel (July 1982 Avia
tion Digest) and MG John R.
• Class IIIA and VA Sustainability
• Desert Operations
• Air-to-Air and Air Defense Sup
pression Weapons
;
Galvin's Training Panel initiatives
tems. Opportunities for solution to
the obvious problem of signature
reduction include—in the near-term,
applying an infrared reducing poly
urethane paint that is capable of
being decontaminated; in the mid
term, geographically compatible
infrared paints as well as hot metal
plus plume suppressors for instal
lation on all attack, scout and utility
helicopters are required; far-term
developments promise infrared
paints which will further enhance
our nuclear, biological and chemical
(NBC) decontamination process.
With regard to crew warning,
current audio and visual signals
require interpretation by the pilot
to determine the threat type, direc
tion, range and location and appro
priate countermeasures. As a result,
crew workload approaches satura
tion. Additionally, we need extended
frequency coverage. Opportunities
in crew warning start with a near
term product improvement to add
a lightweight, digital processor.
Midterm fixes call for extending
frequency coverage for both radar
and laser detection systems and a
new continuous wave radar warning
system fully integrated with the
digital processor that would provide
directional information for attack
and scout aircraft. Additionally,
radar frequency interferometers to
provide highly accurate threat iden
tification and location information,
as well as to automatically transfer
that information to the onboard
weapon systems, are worthy of
continued support. In the far-term,
electro-optical and acoustical warn
ing systems will provide even more
accurate threat detection and loca
tion information.
The final aircraft survivability
deficiency is countermeasures—that
is, active measures taken to reduce
our own detectability. Present radar
jammers do not cover the millimeter
wave spectrum, and current infrared
jammers work in a limited frequency
spectrum. Recent demonstrations
have shown chaff may be effective
against new radar threats, but air
10
DARCOM LONG-RANGE RDA PLAN
• NEEDS RECOGNIZED
RESEARCH PROGRESSING
MORE FUNDING AND HIGHER PRIORITY NEEDS TO BE
APPLIED TO ASE, ESPECIALLY TO LASER PROTECTION
FOR ONBOARD SENSORS AND OPTICS
FIGURE 3: AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT
craft optimization studies are con
tinuing. There is no countermeasure
for enemy antitank guided missiles
directed at Army helicopters and
no laser protection for sensors and
optics. Opportunities include instal
lation of available radar and infrared
jammers on all aircraft that can be
expected to be employed in, and
forward of, the main battle area.
Beyond that, install “HAVE QUICK"
on all Army aircraft and product
improvement jammers and missile
detectors to extend their frequency
band coverage. See figure 3 for the
panel's ASE findings.
The second major is
@ sue dealt with by the
Materiel Panel was
ALESE aviation life support
equipment (ALSE). A
great deal of our current ALSE is
either not designed specifically for
aircrew use or for use with our
current aircraft and, thus, is not
compatible with aircrew task per
formance. To effectively deal with
those shortcomings, the panel had
to address these major subissues.
First, protection of the eyes from
high intensity light sources such as
lasers and nuclear bursts exists in
industry and other services, but the
challenge is to provide protection
to Army aircrews and then only
when needed. Solutions endorsed
by the panel are incremental and
progressive—in the near-term, we
must use those items currently avail
able from industry and the Air Force
despite the limitations involved;
midterm efforts should be directed
toward compatibility among the
various devices; with far-term devel
tº
;
opment of both laser and nuclear
flashblindness protection into a
single device worn by the aircrew.
Ultimately, we should transition this
protection into an integral part of
the aircraft that protects the aircrew
as well as sensors and optics worn
by the aircrew.
The chemical protective equip
ment subissue is very much related.
Overboots all but eliminate pedal
feedback and become easily en
tangled on aircraft parts; gloves are
bulky and reduce tactility; and the
overgarment contributes to heat
stress, hampers movement and is
flammable. The current protective
mask, the M-24, has many defi
ciencies. Its replacement, the XM
33, was expected to be a great
improvement, but testing by the
Infantry and Aviation Boards indi
cate it is not. As a result, pro
curement of the XM-33 is uncertain.
Solutions involve a series of product
improvements through the midterm,
culminating in an advanced tech
nology aircrew ensemble.
A general shortcoming of all cur
rent equipment is its incompatibility
among ALSE components and with
aircrew tasks. This shortcoming is
even more dramatic when NBC
protective clothing is used. This is
due, in large part, to the fact that
there are more than 1,800 ALSE
line items with life cycle manage
ment fragmented among 22 com
mands and agencies. The substance
of the third subissue is the need for
a task-based, total system designed
to interface with the aircraft, pro
tect against the threat and envir
onment and facilitate aircrew task
performance. The vehicle for de
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 radios. For the near-term, oppor
DARCOM LONG-RANGE RDA PROGRAM
• HIGHER PRIORITY NEEDED
tº Å tunities necessitate continued use
of present survival radios and emer
• FUNDING INADEQUATE IN NEAR-TERM gency locator transmitters for air
• FUNDING ADEQUATE IN MIDTERM ; craft operating in remote areas.
Then, for the midterm, develop both
• LASER PROTECTION PROGRAMs FOR SENSORS AND OPTIcs a secure advanced survival radio
WORN BY AIRCREW NOT FULLY DEFINED OR FUNDED
capable of crash activation and a
FIGURE 4: AVIATION LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT companion direction-finding person
nel locator system with incorpo
ration of those features and capa
velopment of this total system is achieve a true airborne look-ahead bilities in advanced onboard avionics
soon to be an approved letter of capability mounted either on an in the far-term. Additionally, we
agreement for an aircrew life support airframe or remotely piloted vehicle. should examine the capability and
system integrated battlefield or Addressing contamination protec responsiveness of airborne intelli
ALSSIB. We now recognize the tion while on the ground, perhaps a gence gathering platforms to per
man/machine interface requirement single, lightweight protective blanket form in a supporting role.
and must manage both productim combining contamination resistance, The final subissue to aviation life
provements and new development infrared signature reduction and support is flight data recorders,
of ALSE as intensively as if they camouflage would suffice. perhaps better known as flight and
were part of the aircraft systems The sixth subissue to aviation life maintenance information systems.
package. In the far-term, aircrew support pertains to decontamination. The advantage to be gained is
life support systems must be integral Present aircraft paints, canopies, the prevention of aircraft and crew
to the airframe and, to close the gaskets, avionics and other compo losses through improved accident
loop, we must take steps to centrally nents absorb agents, making them investigation and maintenance tech
manage ALSE. virtually impossible to decontami niques. The panel recommended
The fourth ALSE subissue, again nate. There is no system fielded that flight data recorders should
NBC-related, is critical because Army that will decontaminate the inte eventually be installed on all Army
aviators are particularly susceptible rior, especially avionics, or exterior aircraft. However, priority for devel
to incapacitating chemical agents. of an aircraft, nor do we have a way opment should be given to advanced
Even extremely low levels of nerve of determining that a surface is clean aircraft systems because current
agents can cause miosis and extreme and safe to handle once it has been commercial transport flight data
pain on visual focusing. There are decontaminated. Evolving solutions recorders do not meet the Army's
no fielded pretreatments in the Army are many. Basically, we must pick criteria for small, lightweight units.
and the various proposed pretreat those generic systems which can be The panel's ALSE findings are
ments cause more problems than applied to aviation, developing as contained in figure 4.
they solve. While there are no readily few aviation-specific systems as OLD Referring to the Or
apparent solutions to this issue, con necessary. The key is to use chemical
tinued efforts are worthwhile since agent-resistant paints and coatings ganization Force Struc
the potential payoff is so high. The and, ultimately, design our future ture Panel Issue regard
medical community sees no signifi aircraft to be inherently resistant LE ing total aircraft inven
cant breakthrough for the next 10 to contamination. tory shortfalls as they
years. The seventh aviation life support affect force structure, the Mate
The fifth subissue was that of subissue is search and rescue. The riel Panel expanded on that as its
avoiding contamination. That is, Army cannot, as required by current third issue, namely fleet obso
current systems do not allow our directives, conduct combat search lescence. Specifically, the issue is
aircrews to look ahead and to detect and rescue missions in support of operational and tactical obsoles
contamination before entering a its own operations nor can the Air cence, combat effectiveness, sur
given area, and we lack the means Force, as it has readily admitted, vivability, and, last but by no means
to protect our aircraft from contami because of limited manpower and least, economic and logistic sup
nation while on the ground. If fully resources. Currently, downed Army portability costs in the future for a
funded in the near-term, aviation aircrews can be located only by fleet of nearly 9,000 aircraft. We
specific solutions begin to appear visual or voice communications are flying UH-1 Huey aircraft that
in the midterm. Based on technology because onboard avionics do not reach 20 years of age this year and
from evolving ground detection provide a direction-finding system special electronic mission aircraft
systems, we would eventually for existing or proposed survival (SEMA) and CH-47s that are older

OCTOBER 1982 11

INTEGRATED SUPPORTABILITY
BATTLE CAPABILITY
MISSION CAPABILITY
LIGHT FAMILY
OF HELICOPTERS
ANTIARMOR
ATTACK CAPABILITY INTEGRAL
LIFE SUPPORT
FIGURE 5: FLEET OBSOLESCENCE SOLUTION
still. Theoretically, if we began this
year to develop replacement air
craft, based on a feasible production
rate of 120 aircraft per system per
year starting in mid-1990s, we can
still expect to be flying our current
fleet well past the year 2000. We
must start thinking, now, about how
we are going to replace these air
craft. The far-term solution is de
velopment of the light helicopter
family (LHX) which will use com
mon dynamic components for scout,
attack, utility and light observation
aircraft. This single solution will, in
itself, eliminate many deficiencies
associated with fleet obsolescence
(figure 5).
The fleet is becoming obsolescent
while, at the same time, the increas
ing Soviet helicopter threat, coupled
with our own evolving missions such
as helicopter air-to-air combat
(HATAC) and across FLOT (front
line of own troops) operations,
aggravate this situation. One can
easily see that we must improve
our current fleet in the near-to-mid
term while concurrently bringing
on the LHX and SEMA-X to meet
requirements of the future bat
tlefield.
12
ë cally, the Concepts Analysis Agency
WULNERABILITY
PAYLOAD
CREW WORKL0AD ; The final class IIIA/VA sustain
The fourth major is
In A sue considered by the
* "º panel concerned com
bat availability and sus
SUPPLY tainability of aviation
specific POL (class IIIA) and avia
tion-specific ammunition (class VA).
The deficiency was divided into the
following subissues:
The first subissue is class IIIA
availability and interoperability. The
high consumption of aviation POL
(petroleum, oils and lubricants) by
the current fleet will contribute to
class IIIA availability problems
across the entire battlefield. Fur
thermore, interoperability of Army
systems with Navy, Air Force and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) is lacking. Opportunities
for solution include improving spe
cific fuel consumption of current
engines as well as new fuel efficient
engines, multifuel engines, non
petroleum/nonfossil fuels and modi
fying the AH-1 Cobra, UH-1 and
OH-58 Kiowa helicopters to accept
the standard NATO fuel connector.
The second subissue is class VA
availability for attack helicopters—
the AH-1S and AH-64. The panel's
recommendations for the class VA
availability problem fall into the
near-to-midterm time frame. Specifi
and TRADOC should determine if
more realistic firing rates for the
AH-1 and AH-64 are warranted. The
panel also suggested that HELLFIRE
and multipurpose submunition pro
duction and procurement should
be increased and that research,
development and procurement for
smoke and illumination warheads
for the 2.75 inch rocket should be
funded.
ability subissue addresses the current
shortage of logistical assets to re
supply aviation with class IIIA/VA
on the AirLand Battlefield. The
current HQDA flying-hour rate of
2.33 hours per day is too low and
results in units having insufficient
class IIIA and VA to meet mission
needs. Experience has shown that
aviation units are required to fly at
a higher flying-hour rate during
realistic training or field exercises,
causing local commanders to im
provise in order to get the job done.
Local fixes such as borrowing fuel
trucks from noncommitted units and
stockpiling fuel in permanent field
locations may not be available in
wartime. The addition of ammuni
tion increases the complexity of the
problem since resupply is seldom
practiced during training. To sub
stantiate these concerns, U.S. Army,
Europe has upgraded the flying-hour
rate for its attack helicopters to 4
hours per aircraft per day and pro
vides 5,000-gallon supply and trans
port tankers out of POMCUS (pre
positioning of materiel configured
to unit sets) to carry the additional
fuel. Furthermore, the 1977 Bulk
Petroleum Study conducted by the
U.S. Army Logistics Center, Ft. Lee,
VA, also recommended a 4-hour
planning factor for all aircraft. Army
86 studies, specifically those for the
Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) or
CBAA, have recommended 4.8 fly
ing hours per aircraft per day for
operations in a heavy division. Final
ly, the AAMAA recommended 4.15
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
hours per day. The only currently ons for installation on Army air
desirable or feasible way of providing craft. The 20 and 30 mm weapon
sufficient class IIIA/VA is by means systems onboard attack helicopters
of ground transportation. Conse are limited in range, accuracy and
quently, the CBAA's recently ap lethality. Therefore, scout and attack
• DARCOM LONG-RANGE
proved class IIIA/VA concept calls helicopters must rely on the already RDA PLAN
for organic ground vehicles to move heavily burdened combined arms
HEADED IN RIGHT DIRECTION
class VA from corps ammunition of Air Defense, Artillery and Air
supply points, division ammunition Force tactical aircraft to provide • NEEDS HAVE BEEN RECOG
transfer points or brigade trains, necessary enemy air defense and NIZED

and class IIIA from fuel system Hind suppression. • FUNDING IS REQUIRED
supply points to each respective First, for an air-to-air weapon in
battalion support area or forward the near-term, current systems must
arming and refueling points. Op be used (despite their limitations), FIGURE 6: CLASS IIIA ANDVA
portunities to correct the current and to make up the difference SUSTAINABILITY
shortage of class IIIA/VA organic HATAC aircrew training becomes
resupply vehicles call, first, for imperative. The midterm proposal
validation of the concept as doctrine; is to upgrade existing scout and
implementation of the Army 86 attack fleet weapons systems for
aviation organization; and finally, air-to-air use.
acquisition of the appropriate equip The second subissue is the air
ment. See figure 6 for the panel's defense suppression weapon. The DARCOM LONG-RANGE
RDA PLAN
class IIIA/VA findings. key opportunity is to develop a
HEADED IN RIGHT DIRECTION
& The fifth major issue system based on the Stinger missile.
§ addressed by the Ma Concurrently, exploration for far • BIGGEST FUNDING SHORT

__º|''< teriel Panel was that term opportunities for specifically FALLS IN FY 84 to FY 86 A
- g- of aviation's limited abil designed air defense suppression • APPROVED PRODUCT IM- A
ity to operate, maintain systems should be pursued (figure 8). PROVEMENTSSHOULD BE S
and sustain in a desert environment. Again, as with all six issues and APPLIED FIRST TO RD-JTF P
Following through on “Operation respective subissues, the panel's DESIGNATED AVIATION R
UNITS
Bright Star" findings, HQDA tasked feeling was that DARCOM is pro
DARCOM, TRADOC and FORS ceeding in the right direction in its
COM to develop ways to enhance research efforts; however, adequate
helicopter operations and sustain funding is missing. FIGURE 7: DESERT
ability in a desert environment. U.S. These, then, are the issues whose OPERATIONS
Army Aviation Research and Devel resolution will improve the capability
opment Command has become the for Army aircraft and aircrews to
lead agency in this effort and al survive and fight again another day.
though the majority of the key defi Seemingly small, they have been
ciencies already had a productim overshadowed by success on the
provement program in being, or larger and more visible aviation • DARCOM LONG-RANGE
development, or will be corrected programs. However, they were felt RDA PLAN
by some other program, the evolv to be so critical to the battlefield HEADED IN RIGHT DIRECTION
ing concern is the majority of im capability of our aviation forces that • EXPEDITE REOUIRED OPER
provements are unfunded. The panel's endorsement by the Materiel Panel ATIONAL CAPABILITY ON
recommendations were: productim was considered to be paramount DAIR-TO-AIR WEAPON
provements should be funded while, for timely resolution.
simultaneously, better maintenance
and training methods to protect
equipment against sand should be
*-* DAIR DEFENSE SUPPRES
SION WEAPON
• FUNDING REQU, FED
i
developed (figure 7).
The final major is
NOTE: My sincere appreciation to COL
sue addressed by the Clark A. Burnett, director, Directorate of FIGURE 3: Air:-TC-AIR AND AIR
* == Materiel Panel was that
Combat Developments, U.S. Army Avia DEFENSE SUPPRESSION
of air-to-air and air de tion Center; MAJ Josef Reinsprecht and WEAPON
weapows ſense suppression weap the panel members for their contributions.

OCTOBER 1982 13
 VIEWS FROM READERS
Editor:
If you feel the attached “ten command
ments” are of value, feel free to publish.
TEN COMMANDMENTS OF
AVIATION SAFETY
1. Know your personal limits and the limita
tions of your crew.
2. Know your aircraft and its performance
limitations.
3. Know your plan–carefully preflight, pre
pare performance charts, conduct hover
checks—and fly your plan.
4. Know proper loading for anticipated flight
conditions.
5. Know normal mission parameters and
avoid marginal operations.
6. Know the wind and avoid low-level down
wind operations.
7. Know your pilot in command authority
and don't be pressured or rushed.
8. Know and be ever wary of weather.
9. Know and obey established directives.
10. Know the joy of professionalism—think
safety and fly safely!
CW3 Ray L. Christopher
441st Medical Detachment (HELAMB)
Kentucky National Guard
Editor:
I am Training Squadron SEVEN'S
Ground Safety Petty Officer, AD1
Harley R. “FRENCHY" Boudreaux.
While clearing my department head's
desk recently, I came across a few old
issues of your fine magazine, United
States Army Aviation Digest, and would
like to have VT-7 Safety Office put on
your distribution list. We here in VT-7
14
are concerned with teaching naval avia
tors and would like to see the Army
Aviation's view of safety.
AD1 H.R. “FRENCHY" Boudreaux
Naval Air Station
Meridian, MS
• Navy and Marine units should submit
requests for the Aviation Digest to:
Director, Navy Publications and Printing
Services, Building 157-3 ATTN: Dis
tribution Branch, Washington Navy
Yard, Washington, DC.
Editor:
Please send the following articles on
nuclear, biological and chemical warfare
that appeared in past issues of Aviation
Digest:
“Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Train
ing and Development” (August 1981
issue).
“Nuclear, Biological, Chemical De
contamination Problems” (October 1981
issue).
2LT Brian D. Tutt
4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry
6th Cavalry Brigade (AC)
Ft. Hood, TX
Editor:
AMO supposedly stands for aviation
medical officer, but we in the business
of fixing aircraft call a flight surgeon
very seldom and to us an aircraft
maintenance officer is an AMO.
I was breezing through my in-box
and came upon an Aviation Digest article
(Aviation Personnel Notes, November
1981, page 39) that caused me some
concern. The same concern an AMO
would have with a grounding safety-of
flight message handed to him as he
closed the “barn” for Friday night's happy
hour! I read it over and over again with
greater and greater frustration. There
wasn't any “typo" errors but I kept
looking for one. Department of the Army
(DA) has decided to give my career
field a new name and some new jobs to
go with it.
The “New Title for Specialty Code
71" piece explains in two hundred words
or less that my career field, from hence
forth, will be called Aviation Logistics.
It explains that this title “. . . more
appropriately describes the SC 71 in a
multifaceted logistical role . . .” and,
furthermore, “. . . more accurately
portrays... my capabilities as opposed
to continuing the perception that SC
71 is only aircraft maintenance.” Well
gentlemen, that sure blew my “con
tinuing perception.”
I've been an AMO for 10 years
whether assigned that job or not. I've
worked as a TC detachment commander
(now the aviation unit maintenance
(AVUM) direct support section leader),
service platoon leader, direct support
repair platoon leader, aviation inter
mediate maintenance (AVIM) pro
duction control officer and battalion
AMO. That's where the “nuts and bolts”
of aircraft maintenance management
has been. I've also worked the “other
side of the fence” as a battalion S-4. But
it didn't take an S-4 job to teach me
about “... property books, dining facility
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 management, procurement of all classes
of supply and an expanded area of
property accountability.”
It has been my “continuing per
ception” that property book hand re
ceipts belonging to AMOs are as large
as most considering what comprises
AVUM/AVIM toolsets, kits and outfits.
Regarding property accountability, show
me an AMO who hasn't signed a cash
collection voucher, statement of charges
or a report of survey and I'll show you
an AMO who hasn't fixed many aircraft
for very long. Also, Class IX (Air) is not
the only class of supply that keeps aircraft
flying. And, as far as dining facility
management goes, AMOs usually have
to “cut the cake” given to them and
then “eat it, too.” But, my point is,
these are only part-time tasks of an
AMO.
An AMO worth his daily status report
is a professional soldier managing more
resources (people, property, time and
money) than anyone in any given aviation
unit, less the commander. He's the
production control, quality control and
tech supply officer for the commander.
He's the scheduled, unscheduled and
preventive aircraft maintenance officer
who keeps the operations officer in
business. He's the “platoon daddy” to a
bunch of young men and women who
don't understand why they can't get an
overnight pass after marching, in what
they hoped was, their last “pass in review.”
I have observed AMOs in my career
field adapt to many changes. With the
Baltimore and St. Louis Publication Cen
ters “pumping” out constant changes
(they obviously are speculating on timber
futures), Force Development activities
constantly modifying missions and tables
of organization and equipment, and
every new commander who wants to
see his unit operate in the field for
himself, the AMO without “contem
porary technical skills” is well below
the flow chart.
The AMO is responsible to his fellow
aviators to stay on top of all “it.” He's
responsible to his professional mainte
nance technicians and NCOs to be the
“heat shield" (General E. C. Meyer,
military letter with no subject/title, 9
October 1980) for as much of “it”
as he can. And now, DA says he must
professionally compete with dining
facility managers! Which aviation com
mander out there wants his next AMO
to report for duty after a 3-year assign
ment as a battalion S-4? You'll get what
you ask for!
I would like to see the AMO continue
to be the specialized professional that
he's trained to be. If career progression
reduces 71A (fixing aircraft) opportun
ities, let those most “fit” survive. There
are plenty of other specialty codes that
have opportunities for officers as they
advance. Let the 71A do his “thing”
and give the property books and mess
halls to the SC 92.
CPT Robert A. Caverly
AVRADCOM
St. Louis, MO
Editor:
The Office of Air Force History is
preparing a comprehensive history of
airpower in the United States, which
will cover the 75-year period since the
acquisition of the first military aircraft.
This volume will be richly illustrated
with photos which will come from de
positories as well as private collections.
If anyone wishes to share with the
Office of Air Force History any holding
which can be used in this publication,
please contact:
Lawrence J. Paszek, Senior Editor
Office of Air Force History
Bldg 5681, Bolling Air Force Base
Washington, DC 20332
(Tel: (202) 767-4548)

Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362

º CGºśā)N
Aviation Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team

LASER HAZARDS
ISSUE: More and more combat equipment has laser
capabilities. Use of this equipment in training poses
serious potential safety hazards to troop vision. Where
can guidance concerning safety and training policies
be obtained?
COMMENT: AR 385-63 is the best reference on
these safety requirements. This document is presently
undergoing revision. Revision to chapters 19 and 20,
which deal with laser safety, are in final coordination
between TRADOC and the Environmental Health
Agency.
• Other documents that may be useful concerning
training with lasers are AR40-46 and TB Med 279, 30
May 1975.
• TRADOC point of contact for these three docu
ments is Mr. Warren Leary, Safety Officer, AUTOVON
680-3930. Environmental Health Agency POC is Mr.
Wes Marshall, AUTOVON 584-3468/.3932. Local guid
ance in USAREUR can be obtained from Mr. Bob
Brown, Safety Officer at Grafenwoehr. (Directorate
of Training Developments)

OCTOBER 1982
 Tapiiſial air traffiſ.
Elliſul traillinſ
ſilt a lilillſ allrºath
E FFECTIVE USE Of the combat
power of Army aviation-day
or night and in all types of
weather—is a major concern for
the combined arms team on the
modern battlefield. Tactical air
traffic control (ATC) is an important
segment of this capability, for it
allows combat aviation units to move
about the battlefield rapidly and
safely to deliver their ordnance
under marginal weather conditions.
Like most other military tasks,
good training that refines ATC pro
cedures and develops the cockpit
confidence necessary to accomplish
this mission is the key. But training
in today's Army is expensive, espec
ially when you are talking about
large numbers of aircraft and per
sonnel. Building ATC training into
already scheduled exercises increas
es training opportunities without an
additional expense of aviation unit
resources, fuel or flying hours.
REFORGER '81's FTX “Certain
Encounter,” a U.S. V Corps spon
sored exercise, provided an oppor
tunity for the 5th Signal Command's
59th Air Traffic Control Battalion
to put together a large-scale, realistic
16
Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Hervey Jr.
National War College
Washington, DC
scenario that resulted in some effec
tive ATC training. They learned
that successful joint Army/Air Force
ATC training during a major exer
cise requires prior planning, intense
effort and more than a little sales
manship. However, it pays big divid
ends in the development of joint
doctrine, training experience and
aviator proficiency and confidence.
Elements of six aviation battal
ions provided the largest number
of Army aircraft used in REFORGER
within the past few years, and more
than 70,000 ground troops provided
additional realism. Nearly 5,000 square
miles of airspace were temporarily
restricted down to ground level for
military use during the exercise. This
allowed low-level instrumented ap
proaches and landings at tactical
airfields during marginal weather.
Standard air routes were established,
complete with deployed radio navi
gation beacons.
Army ATC personnel were collo
cated at the U.S. Air Force control
and reporting post (CRP), provid
ing face-to-face contact with the
“other guy" in the sky, and resulting
in even better joint training and
Jº ITISTRIT CITIET
cooperation.
For this particular exercise, Gies
sen Airfield was equipped by V
Corps engineers with steel matting
for heavier aircraft, and this area
was used to simulate the deployed
Corps airfield. It was a rewarding
experience when the first C-130
aircraft turned final onto a ground
controlled approach given by an
Army radar controller. Visibility was
down to one mile with light rain
and fog, yet critical supplies were
getting into a forward airhead. After
landing, armor convoys were re
fueled and returned to the battle—an
example of an ATC platoon in its
forward mission posture.
Several other actions were taken
to prepare for “Certain Encounter”
and ensure that maximum training
resulted:
• Standardized phrases and terms
had been developed within the unit
over a period of several years. This
not only provided more positive
control but also resulted in reduced
electronic transmission signatures.
• Based on this experience, a
Controllers Procedures Guide was
developed as a common source from
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
which all controllers could execute
standard ATC procedures. (Dis
tributed to platoon level, the guide
also serves as an excellent manual
for individual training.)
• The aviation community was
briefed on the procedures in advance
through a set of locally produced
video tapes and again at each pre
brief prior to a mission.
Many lessons were learned as a
result of organizing and executing
the ATC training. Some general tips
on putting together the ATC seg
ment of a training exercise are given
in the table below. Other lessons
learned were:
• Access to the flight paths was
not always available. That great big
sky suddenly became very crowded
and factors such as mission urgency
and separation criteria determined
1. Begin by establishing instrument
and adverse weather flight capa
bility as an exercise objective. (This
will alert the staff to what's going
on later when support is needed at
corps or division level.)
2. Obtain exercise restricted air
space from local airspace author
ities for the entire exercise area.
This must be done months ahead
usually. Use of airspace inside mili
tary prohibited areas must also be
coordinated on reservations with
local commanders.
3. Obtain written permission from
civil aviation authorities for entry
and exit points to exercise airspace
which can then be operated under
instrument conditions and control
led by military controllers. This will
add to exercise realism and con
venience.
4. Plan and design communications
to support airspace coordination
to make rapid aircraft handoffs
under instrument conditions into
and out of the exercise area and
OCTOBER 1982
who went where and when.
• During an extended exercise
period equipment breaks down. A
good maintenance program and
spare equipment (both beacons and
radars) helped keep the control
system on the air.
• Existing peacetime constraints
can be overcome when they are
properly identified. For example,
some of the available aircraft were
not certified for instrument flights,
and others were temporarily re
stricted for maintenance reasons.
Identification of the fact and prior
planning allowed maximum use of
the limited number of aviation assets
that could participate in the tactical
instrument system.
• Probably the most satisfying
lesson was that the system worked.
Under conditions of rain and fog,
ATC EXERCISE PLANNING
“The HOW TO”
within the exercise area. Usually,
communications to support this will
include at least one leased line to
the regional civil ATC control
authority for exit and entry exercise
restricted airspace (necessary for
peacetime training and emergency
contingencies).
5. Plan and design preferred Army
air routes and tactical approaches
to support the exercise, using FM
1-5, Instrument Flying for Army Avia
tors, FM 1-60 (now FM 1-103) and
FM 100-42, covering joint airspace
operations. Conduct ground and air
reconnaissance of ATC sites, landing
zones and approach paths.
6. Coordinate and meet with corps
or division airspace management
elements, air defense units, and Air
Force control and reporting post
personnel to work out training scen
arios, letters of agreement as speci
fied in doctrine and collocation of
Army/Air Force ATC units to exe
cute realtime airspace management
operations.
Army and Air Force aircraft flew
training missions in the exercise area.
Tactical instruments could be flown
by aircraft during the exercise on
routes at 500 feet above obstacles.
More than 400 of the 10,000 re
corded Army movements were con
ducted under instrument flight rules.
The net result of the exercise
was that total combined training
does work. The individual and col
lective skills of the air traffic control
lers and the pilots were greatly in
creased. The full power of Army
and Air Force aviation was used on
the training field, safely and effic
iently, under adverse weather con
ditions. Working together, Army
and Air Force aviators and airspace
managers can make it happen. And
when marginal weather moves in,
it won't leave us all with a blind
approach. -º-
7. Prepare and distribute exercise
documents, to include inserts to
Army and Air Force operations
orders, aviator procedure guides,
training audiovisual tapes, safety
briefings, inserts to CEOIs (com
munications electronic operating
instructions), and controller docu
ments to execute earlier planned
routes of approaches.
8. ATC units flight check routes,
approaches and procedures, then
clear the routes and approaches for
instrument flight through the avia
tion operations officers.
9. Keep an active listening post to
aviation users to correct problems
that develop, upgrade the capability
to flow with the changing exercise
scenario (jump airfields or use sup
plementary instrument letdown or
departure sites if needed) and pro
vide complementary services to
division/corps aviation units for
conduct of airmobile operations.
Tactical ATC is only useful if it is
used. It must be responsive.
17
 HOW TO GET THE

Aviation/DIGEST
The U.S. Army Aviation Digest is an official Department of the Army publication.

Active Army
Official distribution is handled by The Adjutant General. Active Army, National Guard and
Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution should request both initial issue and revisions
to accounts by submitting DA Form 12-5. Detailed instructions for preparing 12-5 can be
found on the back of the form. Submit the completed 12-5 to:
Commander
USA AG Publications Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220
National Guard units not on pinpoint distribution should submit their request through their
State adjutant general.

Navy and Marine Corps

Submit your request to:
Director, Navy Publications and Printing Service Management Office
Building 157-3
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374

Air Force
Use local Air Force funds and submit request for paid subscriptions as outlined in the last
paragraph below.

Coast Guard
Units submit your request to:
Commandant (G-OSR-2/32)
U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters
Washington, DC 20593

Official distribution is not made to civilian organizations. However, the Aviation Digest
maintains a limited number of exchange subscriptions for other technical publications.
Request for an exchange should be made by letter, enclosing a copy of the publication
proposed to be exchanged, to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Fort
Rucker, AL 36362.

Paid subscriptions for the Aviation Digest are available from:

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402
Annual subscription rates are $26.00 domestic and $32.50 overseas.

18 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

NBC Survival–
A Matter Of Attitude
Wies A TASK is especially difficult, many of
us just ignore it, hoping it will go away. Unfortunately,
that too often is the attitude of Army Aviation people
with regard to preparing for chemical warfare. If
there is any reason to doubt that, take a survey of
your unit training hours and categorize them into
basic areas of emphasis: Considering that we expect
to fight most of the time and fly all of the time in
MOPP4 (maximum mission oriented protective pos.
ture), there is surprisingly little training time devoted
to it. We need to recognize how deadly the chemical
threat is and improve our readiness to deal with it!
It is rather difficult to relate to a lethal dose of
nerve agent without some description; so consider
that a droplet, about 2 milligrams, can cause death if
absorbed into the body. That quantity is labeled
LD-50, or the lethal dose for 50 percent of the troops,
though it will vary from agent to agent. To apply this
to a real-life situation, consider that a 10-milligram
per cubic meter (of air) concentration of agent is
realistically expected over a large percentage of the
battlefield. Unprotected exposure to that concentration
for 6 seconds will cause miosis (contraction of the
pupils) with attendant loss of depth perception and
possible pain upon focusing. That is considered to be
an incapacitating dose for aviators, although it may
not be for ground personnel.
The current antidote is atropine which can increase
your chances of surviving exposure to the agent.
However, the recommended dosage of three injections
of the antidote can also cause an aviator's vision to be
temporarily degraded to the point that he cannot fly.
Knowing that an antidote is available does not mean
we can afford to be unprotected in a nuclear, biological
and chemical (NBC) environment!
What can you do?–Talk it up in your unit. Set an
example by being current on the latest NBC poop.
The Aviation Digest issues of August, October and
December 1981 had articles important to a basic
OCTOBER 1982
understanding of your
area of responsibility in NBC.
Spend 15 minutes reading the
dash 10 to the M-24 NBC protec
tive mask (TM 3-4240-280-10). Get
into the MOPP gear and fly in the
entire ensemble for 2 hours, making
that part of the 6-hour drill. This must be
done in accordance with the safety rules given
in the appropriate aircrew training manual. Talk to
your NBC officer and noncommissioned officer about
giving a class to bring your unit up to speed on the
threat and the capability to deal with it. Another good
reference source will be the new ALSE (aviation life
support equipment) manual (FM 1-302) that is to be
published early next year; it has a very complete NBC
section. Watch for it.
There is a lot of command emphasis on the threat
of chemical warfare. Research is being done, training
is being modified and gear is being obtained. But all
of that does not relieve you of your individual respon
sibility to be prepared. The following comment from
the article, “Nuclear, Biological, Chemical–Chemical
Agents, First Aid and Long-Term Effects,” in the
December 1981 Aviation Digest pretty well sums it all
up: “After considering the symptoms of even sublethal
doses of chemical agents, and some of the drastic
long-term effects, it is obvious that aviators must
avoid the slightest exposure to chemical agents....”
That avoidance is possible—if you have the proper
attitude about preparing for it. º
CW3 Ernest D. Kingsley
B Company, 214th Battalion
9th Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack)
9th Infantry Division
Fort Lewis, WA
19
 U.S. ARMY

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization

REPORT TO THE FIELD AVIATION

STANDARDIIATION

is used for the objective phase of the mission. It

Mission Planning For should be used for the navigation and operation within
the objective area.
Night Flight Operations 2. Aerial Photos, Terrain Boards, Sand Tables: These
are visual aids listed in FM 1-204 as invaluable aids for
WITH THE INCREASED emphasis on training NVG operations.
during the hours of darkness, aviators must under General Route and Aircraft Checkpoint (ACP) Plan
stand the limitations and requirements for night ning Considerations.
flight operations. The success of any operation depends 1. Route Planning: The route to and from the objective
on the amount of training and mission planning prior area must be tactically sound but not so difficult as to
to the mission, but mission planning and training are deter successful navigation. Below are general rules
critical when the operation is to be conducted at night. of NVG route selection.
It is important to acknowledge the fact that planning a. Avoid brightly lit areas, roads and cities.
for any tactical mission (day or night, training or real b. Avoid planning routes near navigation aids or
world) requires detailed information, extensive plan airports due to the hazards associated with other
ning and total coordination. The details must include aviation operations and to avoid detection by radar
all available information about the mission, enemy, oriented on these facilities.
terrain and weather, troops available, space and time c. Large north-south valleys may be negotiated on
limitation. With these details, maps and aerial photos the lighted side or dark (shadow) side depending on
can be gathered and hazards and weather information the threat and terrain.
collected. In addition, any special equipment and/or d. Plan to negotiate narrow valleys and passes east
preparation of equipment can be determined. Armed west so that the terrain will be lit and shadows avoided.
with this information, planning can begin. e. Never plan a route that heads directly into a low
To assist aviators in night flight mission planning, angle rising or descending moon. Alter course as
the following excerpts are from the draft night flight necessary to fly a zig-zag course when left with no
manual, FM 1-204. other choice.
Mission Planning: Maps and Visual Aids FIGURE 1
1. Maps: Assemble as many different maps of the
area as possible (a minimum of three different scale
maps is required).
course line -> Kj cities &
a. 1:250,000; the best map in this scale is the joint º,0ſ - irports
operations graphic (JOG-A). The 1:250,000 scale map nº rouds [ſi] wºn. *A.
is the primary map for planning and flying the en
route portion of the mission. The scale permits a secondary roads ---- | towers AM
relatively small map, uncluttered with extraneous
information, and when prepared properly, is night power lines m bridges F.
vision goggle (NVG) compatible.
b. 1:500,000; recommend the tactical pilotage chart major rivers sº: ſº
(TPC) or VFR (visual flight rules) sectionals. This
"...i.
map is updated more frequently than the JOGs and bodies of water ºt E. dry washes ºs::
provides accurate information on major towers, beacons
and powerlines.
c. 1:50,000; standard tactical map is used to locate 7
small rivers
or irº ** * turgets -A-
and confirm unique map features and to transfer
them to the JOG. It displays, in more detail, those [8] railroad trucks + º phase lines ---->
areas which may be difficult to interpret on the JOG.
Any en route landing or holding areas can be accurately
plotted and studied on this map. In addition, this map * † : ]º
20 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

f. Avoid planning route segments requiring heading
changes of more than 60 degrees.
g. Always select intermediate reference points, in
addition to checkpoints (CPs), along each leg of the
route for course confirmation and timing. The lower
the ambient light, the more reference points should
be used.
h. If possible, plan to cross major roads and rail
roads at large angles (e.g., 90 degrees) in order to
reduce exposure time.
i. If it is impossible to avoid flights near population
centers or flights near major roads, plan to maintain
at least cruise airspeeds in order to minimize exposure
time.
j. When computing times, distances and headings
for the route, always compute the same information
from barriers and prominent map features. This will
greatly aid in reestablishing the flight on course if a
CP is missed or the flight becomes misoriented.
k. Plan the times at which you should cross promi
nent intersecting features (roads, rivers, railroads) to
facilitate timing and navigation.
l. Always anticipate wires associated with all roads,
towers and buildings in open fields.
m. Always plan alternate routes and bypasses in
event the primary route is blocked due to weather,
enemy compromise, etc.
2. ACP Planning: After a general route has been
determined to the objective area, select ACPs and
checkpoints to control movement along the route.
Study the CPs carefully, using all available maps and
photographs. Below are general rules for NVG check
point selection:
a. CPs should be unique, natural or manmade
features which are detectable at a distance; not visible
only when flying directly overhead.
b. CPs should contrast with surrounding terrain.
c. Avoid selecting CPs near towns as the town
invariably grows and may alter or make detection of
the checkpoint difficult.
d. CPs should not be in the vicinity of bright lights.
e. CPs should always be confirmed by an adjacent
prominent feature along the route to alert the pilot
that the CP is approaching.
f. Always consider and determine the moon angle.
g. Checkpoints should be at least 5 nautical miles
(NM) apart and no more than 20 NM apart.
h. Always select prominent barriers near CPs,
especially where a turn is planned.
i. The first and last checkpoints of a route are the
most important. An easily identifiable feature must
be used even if the flight route must be altered.
Checkpoints should be about 5 kilometers (km) from
the takeoff point and objective respectively to ensure
absolute, positive location and timing. Final leg should
be less than 8 km from the objective to preclude com
OCTOBER 1982
Route cards are constructed with
the same basic criteria as the
(NVG) navigation cards and dis
play all essential information for
each particular leg of the route.
1. Route cards are constructed
one for each leg of the flight and
one for the objective area, FARP,
holding area, takeoff point, LZ
and area of operations (for air
cav and attk helicopters oper
ations).
2. Route cards must be made to
Scale and as accurately as pos
sible.
3. Completed route cards should
be placed in plastic envelopes
EXAMPLE 5"x8" EN ROUTE
of corresponding size, secured
with metal rings and hung in the CARD (SHOULD BE TO
vicinity of the aircraft instrument SCALE AS MUCH AS
panel or pilot kneeboards. POSSIBLE)
FIGURE 2: NIGHT VISION GOGGLES EN ROUTE CARDS
promise of the mission and to ensure timing.
j. Verify MSL (mean sea level) altitude of check
points.
k. All contingency landing zones must have a CP
associated with the final approach leg.
1. Use one map per mission—never attempt to use
the same map for a different mission in the same area.
m. Mark contour lines at 500-foot intervals. Do not
mark contour lines in relatively flat terrain as it leads
to confusion.
Note: When the JOG is completed, prepare the tactical
map in the same manner—for use in the objective
area and/or when flying NOE.
These mission planning excerpts from the draft
night flight manual, FM 1-204, will assist units in night
flight planning. Extensive planning will not result in
satisfactory mission accomplishment unless a complete
and detailed briefing is conducted. Every person
involved in the mission must know what is going to
happen—including the alternate plans. Then, before
starting the mission, some form of rehearsal should
be conducted. Time may permit only a map and dis
cussion rehearsal but a rehearsal should be conducted.
This information on mission planning and NVG
map preparation has been compiled from field unit
standing operating procedures and training programs
and is being included in the new FM 1-204. We realize
that we don't have all the information possible
concerning NVG flight mission planning; therefore,
if you have a useful method of map preparation or
ideas on NVG navigation let us know. ***
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance Write to us at Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center. ATIN A T20 f S, Ft Rucker, AL
36362 or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message
21
 AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES

HEREVISION of Career Management Field (CMF

67) Aviation Maintenance (see article “Aviation
Maintenance” September 1981) is rapidly approaching
fruition. Many of the long-needed solutions to the
nagging problems within our training, force structure
CM F 67 and personnel management system involving aviation
maintenance are already being applied with very
positive results. The revision recognizes and has or |

UPDATE shortly will correct many problems which you are

forced to deal with on a daily basis as supervisors,
commanders, aviators and mechanics.
Captain Charles N. Avery One such solution already partially applied is the
Organization and Force Development Division improved “DOER” programs of maintenance instruc
Directorate of Combat Developments tion. While fully revised courses will not be taught
U.S. Army Transportation School
Fort Eustis, VA
until October 1983, the portions of the various military
occupational specialty (MOS) courses which have
been converted to this format have produced markedly

C M F 67
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22 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

= improved graduates, a fact which is borne out by the ferences and desires. Be mindful, however, because
positive comments we have received from you in the the total needs of the Army also will be considered as
* field. Another example of the positive approach this part of the equation. Let me interject at this point that
revision is taking can be seen in recent actions taken only about 15 percent of the 18,000 people included
|- by Department of the Army concerning migration of in CMF 67 will require reclassification to the new
- supervisory level personnel from nonaviation MOSs aviation MOS created by this revision. In the first few
into CMF 67. This migration is no longer permitted months of 1983, you will have the opportunity to state
0. and these actions will ensure that our supervisors your opinions and desires directly to those who will
3. have the prerequisite technical skills and experience accomplish the reclassification action. All personnel
lºt. to meet the challenge of their demanding and important will be aligned with the new MOS structure before
ſº positions. 1984.
"... Action to effect the transition to the MOS structure The positive benefits of this program, to you the
3'," pictured below started last month. A briefing team soldier and supervisor in the field, are substantial and
Wºr from U.S. Army Transportation School and Military include an increased promotion potential without
is ſt Personnel Center already has or will soon visit your having to leave the aviation field or a job in which you
3. area and explain the entire CMF revision to include are “darn good.” Training will allow you to tackle the
º MOS structure, promotion potential and other related tough job which faces you.
items of interest. This team will also brief you on the There are many other improvements contained in
º: methodologies which will be used in determining how this program which will greatly enhance your daily
lº you as an individual fit into this CMF and MOS struc- efforts to keep Army Aviation “Above The Best.”
ſt ture. Without boring you with a great many details, Your untiring support of the aviation mission and
in this process will include the serious consideration of continuing support of this program are recognized
7: your experience and background, your commander's and appreciated by all members of the aviation
h and first sergeant's recommendations and your pre- community. agº-4

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• SERVICE SCHOOL POI IRMINºt

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SUBSIijul Abilii) NUNt

OCTOBER 1982 23
 PEARLS
Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown
Water Purification Iodine Tablet Serviceability Testing
Reference CDRUSAMMA, Ft. Detrick, MD,
SGMMA-LOT message, the Defense Personnel Sup
port Center advised that the following medical material
was tested and found to be suitable for issue and use
provided the unit has a good wax closure and shows
no signs of physical deterioration. A retest date of 2
years has been established for the following material:
national stock number (NSN) 6850-00-985-7166, water
purification tablet, iodine, 8MG, 50S, Wisconsin
Pharmacal, all lots manufactured April 1979 through
and including December 1980; retest date is December
1984. Note: Cite DPSC Project Number 0820229SL as
authority for extension of expiration/retest date. This
information will be confirmed in DA. SB-8-75 Series.
Activities will destroy the medical material identi
fied below in accordance with paragraph 3-48, AR
40-61, under provisions of paragraph 2-10, AR735-11,
as unsuitable for issue and use: NSN 6850-00-985-7166,
water purification tablet, iodine, 8MG, 50S, Van Brode
Milling Company, all lots manufactured prior to and
including December 1971. The medical material failed
serviceability testing conducted by the Food and Drug
Administration. This information will be confirmed
in DA SB-8-75 Series. Action officer for this office is
Mr. Ed Daughety, AUTOVON 693-3307.
Aviators' Breathing Oxygen
Know your Military Specifications, Military Stan
dards and Federal Specifications when it comes to
aviators' breathing oxygen. The following pertinent
information was excerpted from the aforementioned
data. This is an effort to clarify standards and container
markings. Some precautions are included which may
help eliminate the possibility of servicing an aircraft
system with other than aviators' breathing oxygen.
Oxygen for aircraft use is stored or contained in
three forms—gaseous, liquid or chemical. The liquid
Oxygen system is used in some military aircraft (not
Army), chemical in some large aircraft (Army uses
Chlorate Solid State in some instances) but most
general aviation aircraft use the gaseous oxygen system
as does the Army. This article relates to gaseous
aviators' breathing oxygen.
24
Gaseous oxygen is colorless, odorless, tasteless and
about 1.1 times as heavy as air. Oxygen can exist as a
solid, liquid or gas, depending upon the temperature
and pressure to which it has been subjected.
Oxygen is a very reactive material, combining with
most of the chemical elements. The union of oxygen
with another substance is known as oxidation. Ex
tremely rapid or spontaneous oxidation is known as
combustion. While oxygen is noncombustible in itself,
it strongly and rapidly accelerates the combustion
of all flammable materials—some to an explosive
degree.
Aviators' breathing oxygen comes in cylinders painted
green with a white 2 to 2-1/2 inch wide band, 9 to 11
inches below the collar and stenciled or tagged as
such. Inspect to ensure there is no evidence of grease
or oil on the valves or the cylinders. (Hands, clothing
and tools must be free of oil, grease and dirt when
working with oxygen equipment. Traces of these
organic materials near compressed oxygen may result
in spontaneous combustion, explosions and/or fire.)
Before servicing any aircraft, consult the specific
aircraft maintenance manual to determine the proper
type of servicing equipment to be used. Aircraft should
not be serviced with oxygen during fueling, defueling
or other maintenance work which could provide a
source of ignition. Oxygen servicing of aircraft should
be accomplished outside hangars.
In summary–aviators' breathing oxygen going into
aircraft oxygen systems should meet the purity and
moisture specifications as contained in Military
Specification MIL-0-27210; purity–99.5 percent by
volume (minimum); moisture–0.005 milligrams per
liter of gas maximum.
DO:
• Check that only “aviators' breathing oxygen” is
going into aircraft systems.
• Reject oxygen that has an abnormal odor (good
oxygen is odorless).
• Follow applicable instructions regarding charging,
purging and maintenance of aircraft oxygen
systems.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Pam McLemore
DO NOT:
• Use oil or grease around oxygen systems.
• Expose oxygen containers to high temperatures.
• Confuse aviators' breathing oxygen with “hos
pital/medical” oxygen. The latter is pure enough
for breathing but the moisture content is usually
higher which could freeze and plug the lines and
valves of an aircraft oxygen system.)
Credit is given to Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration and Flight Standards
National Field Office for this article. Point of contact
for further information is Mr. Tommy Vaughn,
AUTOVON 693-3307.
Fitting Of Protective Masks
Presently fielded protective masks will not provide
an adequate fit (protective seal) for some individuals.
For personnel who cannot achieve an adequate seal,
modification of the protective mask is required.
OCTOBER 1982
photo by Tom Greene
Modification of protective masks is accomplished
at U.S. Army ARRCOM (Armament Materiel Readi
ness Command). Requests to get mask modified for
hard to fit personnel should be sent to Commander,
U.S. Army ARRCOM, ATTN: DRSAR-MAO-NC,
Rock Island, IL 61299.
When issued, all protective masks should be inspected
for serviceability per operator's technical manual (TM)
and tested for adequate protective seal on individuals
by means of the ISOAMYL Acetate (banana oil) test.
This test will be included in the latest revisions to
operator's TM for M17, M24 and M25 masks. The
test is accomplished as follows:
a. Obtain a container of ISOAMYL Acetate (NSN
6810-00-123-7047), a pint bottle reagent grade and a
supply of cotton tipped swabs.
b. Since ISOAMYL Acetate is highly flammable,
conduct test in a well ventilated area, away from
ignition sources.
c. Personnel must be masked before opening the
bottle of ISOAMYL Acetate. The mask should be
25
PEARLS
donned in accordance with procedure in operator's
TM. If personnel detect odorjust before masking, the
test is worthless.
d. Dip a cotton swab into the bottle and squeeze
out excess liquid by pressing swab against inside of
bottleneck.
e. Ask individual if he detects an odor different
from normal smell of mask.
f. While the mask is worn instruct the subject to
breathe deeply, pass the swab slowly around the edge
of the facepiece, the eyepieces and the voicemitter;
do not touch the swab to the mask.
g. Hold the swab for a short time at the canister/
filter inlets and in front of the voicemitter diaphram
and outlet valve.
h. Next, instruct the individual to tilt his head back
and turn his head from side to side. Pass the swab
under the chin at the edge of the mask facepiece
while individual is doing movement.
i. Next, instruct the individual to press his palms
firmly over inlet valves, but not so hard that the face
piece is distorted causing loss of face seal. Individual
must breathe in to create a vacuum and collapse the
facepiece. While the wearer of mask momentarily
holds the vacuum on the mask facepiece, pass the
swab around the eyepieces.
j. If the ISOAMYL Acetate odor is detected by the
wearer, then either the mask is defective or the mask
does not have an adequate seal or does not fit. Leakage
of odor around the edge of the mask indicates either a
poor fit or improper adjustment of head harness straps.
If the leakage is present after adjusting the straps, the
mask is the improper size.
k. After the test, and if no odor was detected,
allow the individual tested to unmask and smell the
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 314-263-3307
26
swab to assure that his sense of smell is not defective.
Personnel who have been issued modified protective
masks should be instructed to regularly check the
glued seam, where the periphery is attached to the
facepiece, for signs of deterioration. A banana oil test
should be used to supplement this inspection.
Points of contact for further information are:
ARRCOM Maintenance, DRSAR-MAO-NC, J.
Jackson, AUTOVON 793-4713; ARRCOM Safety,
DRSAR-SF, J. Pessagno, AUTOVON 793-6989; and
DRCPO-ALSE, Ed Daughety, AUTOVON693-3307.
Compass Problems
The PEARL article on page 36 of the June 1982
Aviation Digest described problems with the MC-1
compass, NSN 6605-00-515-5637. The aforementioned
compass was for interim use only and has now been
replaced with the correct compass, NSN 6605-00-151
5337 (lensatic compass). We have taken action to
have the SRU-21/P Supply Catalogue updated to list
the correct compass. Point of contact for further
information is Mr. Ed Daughety, AUTOVON 693-3307.
Fishing Kit
Fishing kit, NSN 7810-00-558-2685, managed by
General Services Administration, has been replaced
by fishing kit, NSN 4220-00-244-0764, managed by
S9C, Defense Construction Supply Center, Columbus,
OH 43215. Both of these fishing kits were procured in
accordance with MIL-F-6218C (ASG). The S9C item
manager of the kit is Ms. Cynthia Stokes, AUTOVON
850-3090. Action officer for this project is Mr. Ed
Daughety, AUTOVON 693-3307. <º-
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 4. When describing to traffic the location of vehicles
on or near the movement area you should use:
A. A manner which will assist the pilot in recog
nizing them
B. The clock system
C. An understandable system
D. None of the above

. The position of an aircraft maybe determined

by what means prior to issuing taxiing instruc
tions?
A. The controller C. Airport surface detection
B. The pilot equipment
D. All of the above

. A local controller may use a certified tower radar

display to issue radar traffic advisories.
TOWER OPERATION A. True B. False

(FAAH 7110.65c) 7. Under what condition may a pilot's request to

conduct an unusual maneuver be approved by
Mr. Ronald B. Jackson the controller?
Directorate of Training Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center A. Qnywhen an emergency exists which requires
- - -

Fort Rucker, AL this maneuver

B. Essential to the performance of flight
1. An air traffic controller may approve a pilot's D º by a local regulation
C. Requi -

request to cross the airport traffic area (ATA) or . Special circumstances

exceed the ATA speed limit, if traffic condition 8. Controllers are responsible for the anticipation
permits, but may not approve a speed in excess of the presence of wake turbulence and the
of:
issuance of cautionary advisories:
§ :: 5º knots d A. When the aircraft is classified as “heavy”
- no May not approve evia- B. When any aircraft has landed/departed from
tion withoutwritten approval that runway within a specified time

2. Federal Aviation Regulation 91.70 permits C. Not responsible

speeds in excess of the maximum authorized D. None of the above
in the ATA under what conditions?
- --- 9. When describing braking action to the pilot you
A. Required by normal military procedures should include the words good, fair, poor or
B. Required by the airplane flight manual nil and:
C. Recommended by the airplane flight manual A. The type of obstruction such as ice, water,
D. All of the above SnOW

. If a runway is closed or unsafe and, after being B. §: . information required unless con
told, the pilot persists in a request to use that Oiler deems necessary
y - - - C. Mu-Meter reading if controller deems neces.
closed/unsafe runway, what is the first action a 9.
controller would take? say -

A. Quote the notice to airmen applying to the
runway
B. If the pilot insists allow the operation
C. Advise the operations section
D. File a Form 2696 on the pilot's action
D. Aircraft type or vehicle that made the report
10. Descriptive terms should be used to describe a
portion of the runway/taxiway that contains
restriction in braking action.
A. True B. False

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 This concludes the history series; copies are available on request.

FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION

Richard K. Tierney
Editor, Aviation Digest

Part 5.
POLICIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS

Roles and Missions

º
º Wº fter World War II the Army Air
§A \;5||
sº § itsForces
al
movedofrapidly
concepts to air
strategic develop
war,
H while the plea from the Army
Ground Forces for aviation support was
largely ignored. This resulted in open dis
agreements between commanders of the
Army Ground Forces and those of the Army
Air Forces.
Finally, on 26 July 1947, Congress passed
the National Security Act of 1947 which
created a separate United States Air Force.
The act however allowed the Army under
Title 10, U.S. Code to retain its organic
aviation in the presentation of the land battle.
Disputes erupted almost immediately over
which missions Army aircraft could or could
not perform. The Air Force wished to limit
Army Aviation to its World War II status, but
at the same time did not provide or move to
develop the aviation support Army command
ers so urgently needed. Consequently, those
commanders turned to Army Aviation which
had clearly demonstrated its ground support
potential in World War II.
As heated, and often passionate, misunder
standings grew, the Army and Air Force
representatives met in 1949 to try to iron out
their differences. The two parties agreed to
limit the weight of Army fixed wing aircraft
to 2,500 pounds and helicopters 3,500 to 4,000
pounds.
The outbreak of the Korean Warresulted in
sharp differences with the Air Force over
roles and missions as Army Aviation oper
ations spread rapidly in the areas of medical
evacuation and, to a lesser degree, in the

28 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 movement of supplies and troops by air in the major concern to the Air Force. Finally on 6
combat zone. To head off further disputes, April 1966, the Army and Air Force agreed
Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter that the Caribou (and its follow-on CV-7A
met with Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Buffalo) would be transferred to the Air
Jr., to clarify roles and missions. On 2 October Force. In turn the Air Force agreed, “To
1951, they signed a Memorandum of Under relinquish all claims for helicopters and
standing, allowing Army Aviation to support follow-on rotary wing aircraft which are de
Army requirements in the conduct of land signed and operated for intratheater move
operations without infringing upon the func ment, fire support, supply, and resupply of
tions assigned to the Air Force. It also drop Army forces....” Thus the Army's claim to
ped the aircraft weight limitations that had development of the helicopter—including the
been imposed in 1949. armed helicopter—was clearly a matter of
While the 1951 memorandum has been record.
called the “Magna Charta of Army Aviation,”
it nevertheless was not a panacea. The Air
Force was to provide (among other functions) Warrant Officer Aviators
assault transport and troop carrier airlift.
That brought about another impasse when While warrant officers have been around
the Army, contending that the Air Force was the Army since 1918, the Army's first aviation
not providing sufficient airlift in the combat warrant officers did not receive their wings
area, sought to organize its own helicopter until December 1951. They became the first
transport battalions. The result was a new Army Aviation warrant officer aviators in
Memorandum of Understanding, signed 4 combat, flying H-19s with the 6th Transporta
November 1952. tion Company (Helicopter) in Korea in 1953.
The new agreement restored the weight Following the Korean War, momentum began
limitation on fixed wing (boosting it to 5,000 to build for a stepped-up aviation warrant
pounds) but not on helicopters. The bottom officer program. The Chief of Transportation
line of the new memorandum left the Army in 1954 recommended using warrant officer
dependent on the Air Force for close air
support, reconnaissance and tactical trans
port to and from the combat zone. But the
Army was able to expand its horizons in the The Army accepts its first 3 AC-1 (CV-2)
Caribou during ceremonies on 8 October
development of Army Aviation within the 1959 at the de Havilland plant.
combat zone. (In 1956, the Department of
Defense imposed a 20,000 pound weight limit
on helicopters, but permitted the Army to
request specific exceptions to that
limitation.)
By 1960, the Army had received Department
of Defense exceptions to the weight limitation
on fixed wing aircraft in order to procure the
OV-1 Mohawk, a twin-turbine powered recon
naissance plane, and the CV-2 Caribou, a
twin-engineSTOL (short takeoff and landing)
transport that filled the gap between heavy
cargo helicopters and the Air Force's C-130.
The existence of these two airplanes was a

- OCTOBER 1982
FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
aviators on a larger scale and the Army
began accepting applications at Fort Rucker,
AL, for training enlisted soldiers as warrant
officer candidates. The first of those were
graduated at Fort Rucker on 30 April 1955.
Meanwhile the Continental Army Com
mand (CONARC) completed a study of train
ing warrant officer pilots to be used in flying
positions that did not require command and
leadership. The CONARC recommendation
was approved, and the first class of warrant
officer candidates began training at Fort
Wolters, TX, in November 1956.
The warrant officer program got off to a
shaky start, but it received solid support at
theoutset from severalArmy leaders in Washing
ton, especially Major General Hamilton H.
Howze, the Director of Army Aviation.
The War in Vietnam brought a rapid in
crease in the training of aviation warrant
officers. Between July 1966 and July 1970,
the Army's aviation warrant officer popula
tion jumped from 2,960 to more than 12,000.
In 1966, a career program for aviation
warrant officers was developed to include an
advanced course for experienced CW2s and
CW3s and a senior course for CW3s and
junior CW4s. But by the mid-1970s the Army
was becoming alarmed over the declining
retention rate of its aviation warrant officers.
In 1979, the U.S. Army Research Institute at
the direction of the U.S. Army Military Per
sonnel Center (MILPERCEN), and in con
junction with the Aviation Center, conducted
extensive research to discover why the reten
tion rate was sliding and what could be done
aboutit. By 1980, the principal factors affecting
aviation warrant officer retention were
isolated.
Aviation warrant officer incentive pay
equalization with most of the commissioned
officers was the leading dissatisfier. Quick
action by MILPERCEN and the Department
of the Army, in conjunction with the Depart
ment of Defense, resulted in the passage by
Congress of the Jepsen-Exxon Military Pay
Bill which became law in October 1981 and
30
resolved the incentive pay imbalance which
had existed for many years.
Army Aviation at DA
At the Department of the Army staff level,
the first Army Aviation organization was
established 21 April 1954 as the Army Avi
ation Branch, Organization and Training
Division, in the Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-3. After a comprehensive review of
the Army Aviation program it was decided to
upgrade the Army Aviation Branch and on 1
February 1955 a separate Army Aviation
Division was created in G-3. It called for a
general officer position which was not filled.
But on 3 January 1956, the division was
further reorganized and a Directorate of
Army Aviation was established with Major
General Hamilton H. Howze as the first
Director of Army Aviation. The directorate
continued until a major Army reorganization
disestablished the office in 1974 when Brig
adier General James H. Merryman was
director.
Slightly more than 1 year later, however,
the position of Deputy Director of Require
ments and Army Aviation Officer was estab
lished in the office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS)
at the Department of the Army. Brigadier
General Charles E. Canedy was the first to
fill the position in August 1975.
In the ensuing years, high level Army
Aviation offices were opened throughout the
Department of the Army. In addition to the
Requirements Directorate in ODCSOPS, the
following staff agencies were deeply involved
with Army Aviation by the start of 1982:
• The Training Directorate in ODCSOPS
• The Aviation Systems Division, Weapons
Systems Directorate in the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Devel
opment and Acquisition (ODCSRADA)
• The Aviation Logistics Office in the Office
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
(ODCSLOG)
• ODCSPER (Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel) which was responsi
ble for (1) plans, policies and programs
relating to Army Aviation in
MILPERCEN; (2) management of Active
and Reserve Componentaviation policies,
and (3) the Army Aviation safety and
accident prevention program.
• The Army Medical Department's
(AMEDD) Army Aviation program in the
Office of the Surgeon General.
• And in MILPERCEN, a separate office
was responsible for the career manage
ment and assignment of Army aviators.
Rogers Board
By 1960, the Army set about formulating a
unified airmobile program. On 15 January
1960, the Army Chief of Staffordered the estab
lishment of the Army Aircraft Requirements
Review Board. It was nicknamed the Rogers
Board after its chairman, Lieutenant General
Gordon B. Rogers, the deputy commanding
general of the Continental Army Command.
The Rogers Board was tasked to recom
mend a course of action to meet the require
ments of Army Aviation for the period 1960 to
1970. On 10 March 1960, the board's recom
mendations and conclusions were submitted
to the Department of the Army. Some of the
highlights of its recommendations were: A
design competition to develop a light observa
tion helicopter to replace the L-19 (O-1), H-13
and H-23; a priority development of the UH-1;
and a phaseout of the L-20 (U-6), H-19, H-21
and H-34. It recommended the procurement
of the HC-1 (CH-47) and AC-1 (CV-2) and the
elimination of the U-1A and H-37. Also, the
AO-1 (OV-1) would be obtained to bolster the
Army's surveillance capabilities.
Prompted by a memorandum from Major
General Hamilton H. Howze, the Rogers
Board also recommended a study to determine
OCTOBER 1982
Directors of Army Aviation
Major General Hamilton H. Howze Jan 56 -
Brigadier General Ernest F. Easterbrook Dec 57
Major General Clifton F. von Kann Jul 59 -
Brigadier General Delk M. Oden Oct 61 -
Colonel Robert H. Schultz Apr 63 -
Brigadier General John J. Tolson III Jun 63 -
Colonel George P. Seneff Jr. Mar 65 -
Colonel Delbert L. Bristol Mar 66 -
Major General Robert R. Williams May 66 -
Brigadier General Edwin L. Powell Jr. Oct 67 -
Colonel Jack W. Hemingway Jun 69
Major General John L. Klingenhagen Sep 69 -
Colonel Jack W. Hemingway Dec 69
Major General Allen M. Burdett Jr. Feb 70 -
Major General William J. Maddox Jr Oct 70 -
Brigadier General James H. Merryman Sep 73 -
Army Aviation Officers
Brigadier General Charles E. Canedy Aug 75 - Jul 78
Brigadier General Carl H. McNair Jr. Jul 78 - Aug 29
Brigadier General Richard D. Kenyon Aug 79 - Jun 81
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Jul 81 - Current
the feasibility of air fighting units and their
armament
The Rogers Board was followed by a Rogers
Committee on Army Aviation to determine
how to expand the training requirements
needed to support the recommendations of
the board. However, the work of the board
and committee was overtaken by the swiftly
changing events in Southeast Asia and the
accompanying surge in the growth of Army
Aviation. But, the Rogers Board and Commit
tee together had laid the solid foundation
that enabled the Army to rapidly develop its
Army Aviation combat units and aviation
training programs.
Howze Board
In the early 1960s, the Department of De
fense turned to Army Aviation and its heli
31
FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
copters to bolster the tactical mobility of the
Army's ground forces. At the request of Secre
tary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Army
Tactical Mobility Requirements (Howze)
Board was formed in 1962. It consisted of a
select group of Army officers who understood
the airmobile capabilities offered by Army
Aviation and was headed by General
Hamilton H. Howze. Studies and tests by the
board proved that Army aircraft could pro
vide the airmobility needed to increase the
combat effectiveness of the ground forces.
As a result of the Howze Board recommen
dations, the Army formed the 11th Air Assault
Division (Test) under the command of Major
General Harry W.O. Kinnard at Fort Benning,
GA. It also established the 10th AirTransport
Brigade to support the division. The evalu
ation group was headed by Brigadier General
Robert R. Williams, who had been a member
of the Class Before One. The Howze Board
also recommended the formation of an air
cavalry combat brigade, but unfortunately that
was postponed.
The 11th Air Assault Division tests were
extensive and an unqualified success that
resulted in the establishment on 1 July 1965
of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). It
was truly airmobile in that it could move one
third of its combat elements simultaneously
in its own aircraft. The new division was
authorized 15,787 soldiers, 434 aircraft and
1,600 ground vehicles.
Some changes were made in the 1st Cav as
compared to the 11th Air Assault Division.
The 1st Cav Division artillery's Little John
Battalion was dropped, as was the battalion
of armed OV-1 Mohawks. Six OV-1s remained
for reconnaissance and surveillance
missions.
Another change was the addition of a full
brigade capable of parachute operations (giv
ing the 1st Cav two more battalions). The
10th AirTransport Brigade was deleted, how
ever the organic aviation group was retained.
The 1st Cav deployed to Vietnam in August
1965 and was soon engaged in heavy combat.
32
An 11th Air Assault Division (T) CH-47
Chinook during test to slingload all types
of equipment to support the ground soldier.
After Vietnam
After the Vietnam War, plans were made to
reorganize one of the Army's airmobile di
visions in conjunction with an overall draw
down that would reduce the Army to only 13
active divisions. The future of Army Aviation
looked bleak.
One of the voices raised to orient Army
Aviation thinking to fighting and surviving
in a heavy combat environment was that of
Major General William J. Maddox Jr., from
his position as Director of Army Aviation
in 1970. He urgently appealed through maga
zine articles, speeches and personal visits to
people of all ranks in Army Aviation, and to
others associated with Army Aviation, that
they stop thinking in terms of Vietnam tactics
and start training and planning to fight in
the nap-of-the-earth (NOE) in order to survive
and win on the high intensity battlefield.
Meanwhile, the TOW missile was used in
Vietnam on UH-1C helicopters to successfully
attack North Vietnamese tanks. The fact
that Army helicopters had destroyed 10 en
emy tanks and reversed a North Vietnamese
breakthrough was made known on Capitol
Hill in Washington, DC, where members of
key Congressional Committees were greatly
impressed.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Early in the 1970s, Army Aviation trainers
and planners began working feverishly to
develop NOE tactics, aircraft and support
hardware that could survive and fight around
the-clock and in adverse weather on a
European-type, high intensity battlefield.
Numerous tests and studies were conducted.
Some of the more prominent include:
• MASSTER (Modern Army Selected Sys
tems Test, Evaluation and Review) which
was organized at Fort Hood, TX, in 1971
to study and test the role and capabil
ities of Army Aviation, as well as other
modern systems in the high threat en
vironment of a mid-intensity war.
• 2d Air Cavalry Combat Brigade
(ACCB) which was to use its helicopters,
in conjunction with the combined arms
team, to find and kill armor and mech
anized forces. It was redesignated the 6th
Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) in Febru
ary 1975. The 6th, in the role of the user,
worked closely with the people of
MASSTER, which was the tester that
evaluated the worth of the ACCB in a
mid-intensity conflict.
• Pass in Review (Priority Aircraft Subsys
tem. Suitability Intensive Review) was a
special study group established in April
1975 at Fort Rucker by the Training and
Doctrine Command. Its mission was to
determine the configuration of the AH-1
Cobra for the 1980s.
Another event, the Army's procurement of
the SFTS (Synthetic Flight Training Sys
tems), helped Army Aviation in the 1970s to
improve the proficiency of its aviators and
has resulted in large savings in training
costs and time. The first UH-1 Huey prototype
simulator was received at Fort Rucker in
November 1971. Following a testing period it
was accepted in April 1972. The UH-1FS
(flight simulator) was followed by the CH
47FS Chinook, the AH-1FS Cobra and the
UH-60FS Black Hawk.
OCTOBER 1982
MAST Operations
Although not related to tactics and training
for combat on the high threat battlefield,
Army Aviation's stature in the public eye
was greatly enhanced in the 1970s by the
MAST (Military Assistance To Safety and
Traffic) program. It was born in July 1970
and by its 10th anniversary its helicopters
and crews were the modern “Angels of
Mercy.” They have flown more than 18,500
missions and have been responsible for saving
thousands of lives by quickly flying injured
people to medical facilities.
In addition to the events mentioned above,
the Army, in the 1960s, conducted two signifi
cant studies called ARCSA, which is an
acronym meaning Aviation Requirements
for the Combat Structure of the Army. The
purpose was to draw on the experiences and
lessons learned in Southeast Asia in order to
define the justifications for building addi
tional Army Aviation into the Army
Structure.
ARCSA I, which began 31 December 1964,
was based on hypothesis. It cited the need to
build more airmobility into the Army and
was approved by the Army Chief of Staff in
July 1965 and by the secretary of the Army a
month later. The result was a Chief of Staff
memorandum, dated 22 August 1966, that
created the ARCSA II Study Group. ARCSA
II, based on hard battlefield experience, was
completed in March 1967 and provided re
vised aviation requirements for the fiscal
year 1968 to 1972 timeframe.
By the mid-1970s, the people of Army Avi
ation had developed a confidence in their
aircraft and equipment and their ability to
fight and win on the high threat battlefield.
All they needed was a plan for the future, and
that was about to be developed by a high level
study group that would be convened at Fort
Rucker.
33
FORTY YEARS OF ARMY AVIATION
ARCSA III
In January 1976, the ARCSA III study
group was formed at the Aviation Center at
Fort Rucker, AL. Specifically, the ARCSA III
group was charged with determining the
aviation requirement to equip the Active
Army and its Reserve Components to fightin
a high air defense threat environment from
1977 to 1986. Lieutenant General Frank A.
Camm, deputy commander of the Training
and Doctrine Command, was the chairman.
The ARCSA III recommendations were
briefed on 15 February 1977 to the Army
Chief of Staff who approved them for imple
mentation. Their primary thrust was to re
duce the number of nondivisional separate
aviation units and make the aviation units
organic to division and corps structures. The
rationale was that since the units fight pri
marily with divisions and corps, they should
belong primarily to divisions and corps.
Emphasis was placed on upgrading the
attack helicopters with an increase of aerial
antiarmor capabilities in the divisions. The
group also accented the need for air cavalry
in the divisions and for the support of a scout
helicopter. Since an advanced scout helicop
ter was not in sight, it was decided that a
UH-1H Huey should be equipped with a
target acquisition and designation system.
The utility tactical transport aircraft system
(UTTAS) would receive an increased logisti
cal role. It was felt the UTTAS could perform
some missions better than the larger CH-47D
modernized Chinook.
The ARCSA III study was exceptionally
comprehensive and touched all aviation areas
of the Army's combat and combat support
forces, as well as training base requirements.
In effect, it streamlined Army Aviation and
laid the groundwork to beef up mobility and
firepower in the divisions and corps with
aviation assets.
34
Army Studies 86 And The ACAB
In 1978 to 1980, the Army conducted an
intensive and wide-ranging analysis of its
force structure in order to meet the numeri
cally superior and increasingly sophisticated
threat of the next decade. It is intended to
design innovative ground and aviation tac
tics and organizations that could take advan
tage of the firepower of new advanced weap
ons systems and increased mobility offered
by improvements to Army Aviation's fleet of
aircraft.
The studies included Light Division 86
which would integrate emerging high tech
nology into a light division that could be
deployed swiftly with the increased firepower
and battlefield mobility needed to success
fully engage an enemy in combat anywhere
in the world.
The Heavy Division 86 Study was aimed at
developing an Army division that would
successfully engage in heavy and sustained
combat. It, too, will incorporate modern weap
ons systems and increased mobility provided
by Army Aviation.
Army Studies 86 also includes the Corps 86
Study (started October 1979) and the Eche
lons Above Corps (EAC) 86 study (begun in
December 1979).
Perhaps the most exciting and innovative
aspect of the Army 86 Studies is the concept
of organizing the “something old-something
new” air cavalry attack brigade (ACAB)
concept. The “something old” can be traced
to the Howze Board (Army Tactical Mobility
Requirements Board) which in 1960 had rec
ommended the formation and testing of an
air cavalry combat brigade (ACCB). The
“something new” comes from the Army 86
Studies which substituted the word “attack”
for “combat” and proposed an air cavalry
attack brigade for both the light and heavy
divisions. In comparison to previous aviation
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

organizations, the ACAB, according to study
group reports, provides the division added
“combat power, improved tactical flexibility
enhancements in command and control.”
The ACAB sprang to life under the name of
the 9th Cavalry Brigade(Air Attack) (CBAA),
in March 1981 at Fort Lewis, WA, under the
command of Colonel Thomas H. Harvey Jr.
It is organic to the 9th Infantry Division and
committed to the test plan developed by the
High Technology Test Bed/Group in conjunc
tion with the Combined Arms Test Activity
of Fort Hood, TX. Operational testing of the
9th CBAA got underway in February 1982.
Combat Arms Membership
In the midst of planning and implementing
Army Studies 86, another study group in 1977
began examining the personnel management
of Army Aviation. Its work resulted in a
revised commissioned aviation career pattern
which was approved by the Army Chief of
Staff and announced in 1979. It marked
perhaps the most significant milestone in
Army Aviation history when Specialty Code
15 (Army Aviation) was designated a combat
arms specialty. Almost immediately, the
Army implemented a comprehensive program
OCTOBER 1982
Scout the battlefield and have the attacking
force ready—the OH-58 Kiowa (right) and
the AH-1 Cobra represent those two
fundamentals of defensive operations in the
9th CEAA. - -
to “meet Army Aviation requirements and
fulfill individual career aspiration.” Key to
this was the organizational concept of the
CBAA which offered viable career patterns
for Army aviators. It contained a logical
aviation grade structure from section through
brigade level. Thus, Army Aviation's com
mand structure was aligned not only with the
other combat arms members, but also with
the aviation elements of the other military
services. It called for lieutenant colonels to
command battalions/squadrons, captains to
command companies, lieutenants to com
mand platoons and warrant officers to
command sections.
Today
Army Aviation career patterns are being
refined and implemented. The hardware is
greatly improved, and increasingly better
aircraft and equipment are rapidly being
developed and delivered. The training pro
grams are viable and becoming more mean
ingful as Army Aviation functions as a
member of the combined arms. The people of
Army Aviation are continually dedicated to
accomplishing their missions in a profes
sional manner. It all spells success. Such is
Army Aviation today—Above The Best.
35

REPORTING
FINAL
Late/NewsFromArmy Aviation Activities
FROM WASHINGTON
Test Pilot Selection. The next engineering test
pilot selection board will be held in January, and
the deadline for new applications to be received
at MILPERCEN is 15 December. For information
on requirements, see the Aviation Personnel
Notes in next month's Aviation Digest. Or call
the Aviation Plans and Programs Branch, MILPER
CEN, AUTOVON 221-8156/8157 or commercial
2O2-325-8156/8157.
FROM FORT LEWIS
Smile, You're on Cobra Camera. Three AH-1
Cobras of Company A, 214th Attack Helicopter
Battalion, 9th Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack), carried
video camera systems during recent field exer
cises to test the system's value in providing a
record for post-flight review of training engage
ments. The equipment was installed by personnel
from the Combat Development Experimentation
Command, Ft. Hunter-Liggett, CA.
A cable connected the video camera that was
placed in the gun camera mount below the TOW
sight with the recorder that was in the space
normally filled by the ammunition box. The system
made a video recording of everything the TOW
saw, recorded radio communications in the air
craft, and provided a timer for the gunner to use
in computing elapsed flight time for the TOW
missile.
Results of the test proved the system's value
to pilot and gunner training, according to battalion
officials. The major drawbacks of the equipment's
weight and bulk have since been overcome in a
lighter, more compact system. It has all the record
ing equipment located behind the pilot's seat,
and the new design also has an onboard monitor
that eliminates the need for an external system
to review tracking engagements.
(Barry Dowell, 9th PAO)
FROM VIRGINIA
Army to Get Confiscated Aircraft. Under a
program initiated by the Fixed Wing Readiness
36
Project Office, Army Troop Support and Aviation
Materiel Readiness Command, St. Louis, MO,
aircraft seized by federal law enforcement agen
cies because of illegal use will be given to the
Army free of charge.
These non-Army aircraft are welcome because
many fixed wing planes operated by the Army,
Army Reserve and National Guard are long
overdue for replacement, with some being nearly
30 years old. The average cost of replacing one
plane exceeds $1 million.
A unit that receives a confiscated aircraft will
be responsible for upgrading and maintaining it
to Federal Aviation Administration and Army
standards. (DARNEWS)
In the Sidekick VI exercise of the 59th ATC Battalion from
Schwaebisch Hall, West Germany, SP5 David Christman
|
keeps tuned to incoming traffic at the AN/TSQ-70A mobile
Control tower
FROM GERMANY
ATC Exercise. In May the 59th Air Traffic Control
Battalion headquartered at Schwaebisch Hall,
West Germany, conducted Sidekick VI, an exer
cise to establish an air route structure between
the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels military training
areas in eastern West Germany. In connection
with that, the government of the Federal Republic
of Germany agreed for participating helicopters
to fly "in the clouds" along a tactical route structure
400 feet above the highest obstacle. That per
mission was a first for any NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) military and was given on a
trial basis to determine the feasibility of estab
lishing a permanent ATC/aviation training area
between Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels.
The flight coordination centers and airfield
towers recorded 553 aircraft movements during
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Captain Jessica Garfola Wright preflights a CH-54 Tarhe helicopter
before taking her checkride at Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA. She is the first
woman qualified to fly the free world's largest helicopter
the 8-day exercise, and there were 81 radar
approaches to the two tactical airfields.
Two GRETA (Ground Radar Emitter Training
for Aviators) devices from the 7th Army Training
Command were used to simulate Soviet air
defense radar emitters in the Hohenfels area.
The combination of GRETA and the ATC route
structure provided another “first" for Army ATC
and added a new level of realism to the exercise
for pilots and controllers.
(Mullady, 5th Signal Cmd PAO)
FROM PENINSYLVANIA
|#º|
CH-54 Pilot. Captain Jessica Garfola Wright,
operations officer with the Pennsylvania Army
National Guard's 1028th Transportation Company,
is the first woman Army aviator to become fully
qualified to fly the CH-54 Tarhe helicopter.
“It's a dream I've had for several years,” CPT
Wright commented after she received her check
ride in the world's largest helicopter in Ft. Indian
town Gap.
She is also the only woman aviator in the Army
rated as a CH-47 Chinook pilot, having earned
that in April 1979, and is the only woman aviator
in the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.
CPT Wright was graduated from flight school
in March 1978 and has sinced logged more than
500 hours in rotary winged aircraft.
(Foster, PA DEPT MIL AFFAIRS)
FROM FORT RUCKER
Museum News. Cash and pledges now in the
Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc., fund
drive total $856,000, marking what officials calla
"slow but steady" progress toward the $2.5 million
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
needed to begin construction on the new museum.
Of the total received, $70,407 has come from
the Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.,
unions and the Northrop Management Club.
Northrop is the only firm which has authorized
payroll deductions as a method for employees to
make pledges to the museum.
To date, letters mailed to more than 9,000
members of the Army Aviation Association of
America, asking for a $40 contribution to com
memorate the 40th anniversary of Army Aviation,
have netted $22,000.
Tax-deductible gifts from everyone interested
in the preservation of Army Aviation's history are
welcomed. The Museum Foundation office is in
Building 6203 at Ft. Rucker, telephone is 598
2508, and the mailing address is P.O. Box H, Ft.
Rucker, AL 36362. cº-º
Ten members of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard
and an active duty Army advisor who works with them are
new recipients of Master Army Aviator Badges. Presentations
were made in August by Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.,
commander, Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, at a
ceremony in Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA, that was also attended
by Colonel John J. Stanko, chief, NGB Aviation Division.
Pictured are, left to right, first row: CW2 George Breslin, CW3
Harry Smith Jr., CW4 Reed Zellers and CW4 Richard Crosley;
second row: CW4 David Schweinsburg, CW3 Quentin Wenrich,
MAJ Marlo Meola and advisor MAJ John Pennypacker; third
row: COL Stanko, CW2 Edwin Fitler, CW4Wally Royles, MAJ
Simon Miller Jr. and MG McNair
 An environment for icing tests is pro
vided by the Helicopter icing Spray
System mounted on a CH-47 Chinook
helicopter (right). A UH-60 Black Hawk
provides chase and photo support as a
Sikorsky S-76 flies in the artificial
ice cloud

photos by Lu Chavez

- U.5. Army Aviation

Engineering flight Activity
USAAEFATESTs
/ HELPENSURE
READINESS
Betty J. Goodson, Staff Writer

RMY AVIATORS expect their machines
to perform as needed for mission accom
plishment. That's a justified expectation,
and its realization is due in large part to some friends
those aviators may not even know about. The users'
friends are the people, about 50 military and 100
civilians, who work at the U.S. Army Aviation Engineer
ing Flight Activity (USAAEFA), Edwards Air Force
Base, CA, under the command of Colonel Lewis J.
McConnell, as a subordinate activity of the U.S. Army
Aviation Research and Development Command
(AVRADCOM), St. Louis, MO.
Their primary mission is to conduct airworthiness
qualification flight tests of changes to aircraft and
related equipment already in the inventory or of ad
vanced concepts being examined for military appli
cation. Tests can be either engineering or experimental;
and Lieutenant Colonel Grady W. Wilson, chief of
the Flight Test Directorate (FTD),” provided the follow
ing definition of those: “An engineering flight test is a
technical, quantitative test that repeats a flight con
dition that has already been flown by someone else.
See page 41

Facilities used by the Army Aviation Engineering Flight Test Activity at Edwards Air Force Base, CA
T- -
 The experimental is envelope expansion; nobody has
been there before.” The majority of the activity's
work, he noted, is within the engineering area in
order “to verify contractor data.”
Whatever the type of test, all of the projects are
designed to provide information on how well the
Army's performance requirements are met by the
tested equipment. The gathering of that data is a vital
part, Colonel McConnell said.
He explained: “We have just recently acquired a
Real-Time Data Acquisition and Processing System
(RDAPS) that gives us the latest in the state of the art
of collecting, analyzing and producing the data needed
for a test program. With this system, which was designed
to our specifications and is one-of-a-kind, the engineer
will be getting real-time readout on anything he wants
to know about an aircraft in a test flight. That ensures
the predetermined test profile is met, and it also in
creases a test's safety factor because if something is
going wrong it is known immediately. Too, the RDAPS
saves time. We don't have to wait for information to
be run through the computer before we know whether
the desired results were obtained or the test has to be
reflown.”
Another advantage of the RDAPS, according to
Mr. T. L. Lynch who heads the Data Systems Direc
torate, is its transportability. It is housed in a van that
can be moved to any of various USAAEFA test sites
in southern California.
The sites Mr. Lynch referred to are all within 200
miles of Edwards and provide altitude variations from
below sea level to 12,500 feet. The ability to check
aircraft flying characteristics at such a variety of alti
tudes so close to home base is a primary reason for
USAAEFA being located at Edwards. California con
ditions are not favorable, however, for one part of the
activity's work, the artificial icing tests. For that,
crews go north to St. Paul, MN, where they use another
*, one-of-a-kind piece of equipment, the HISS (Helicop
ter Icing Spray System).
First used in 1973, the HISS is a hydraulically raised
and lowered arrangement of pipes that hangs under a
CH-47C Chinook helicopter. Inside the aircraft is an
1,800-gallon water tank together with lines which
send that water down to nozzles on the pipes. At the
nozzles, pressurized bleed air from the engines atomizes
the water into minute droplets which turn into ice
when the HISS is being operated in freezing conditions.
The ice cloud closely approximates icing conditions
found in nature. The test aircraft flies behind and
below the CH-47 Chinook and in the ice cloud to
determine where and how quickly the ice will accrete
and how it will affect the aircraft's handling charac
teristics.
Improvement of the icemaker is an ongoing pro
ject, LTC Wilson noted. A second-generation boom
OCTOBER 1982
is now being used, and the ultimate goal is to have one
that will produce an ice cloud large enough to cover
the entire test aircraft. The present cloud is about 8
feet thick, meaning the rotor or the fuselage can be
iced, but not both at the same time.
Some other work done in the two FTD Engineering
Flight Test Divisions, headed by Mr. J. N. Johnson
and Mr. D. F. Macpherson Jr., also concerns icing.
One of those projects is the testing of a composition
rubber boot installed on the main rotor blades of a
UH-1 Huey. The concept is that if ice buildup begins,
air will be blown into the boot to expand it and shed
the ice, Mr. Johnson explained. The test being con
ducted at Edwards is to establish an operational flight
envelope with the pneumatic boots installed. After
that is done, the pneumatic boots will be tested behind
the HISS. If proven successful, it is theorized the
boot could be used on other helicopters.
The only Army helicopters with deicing equipment,
according to Mr. Johnson, are the UH-60 Black Hawk
and the AH-64 Apache. Tests of that equipment on
the latter aircraft were done earlier this year, and he
described how they were conducted:
“We used the Climatic Laboratory at Eglin Air
Force Base, FL, for various temperature checks, some
of which involved the deicing equipment. In sequence,
the hangar temperatures were set at 70 degrees, -25
degrees, -50 degrees, 125 degrees and 70 degrees.
Two simulated flights (the aircraft was bolted to the
hangar floor)—encompassing engine runup, taxi, hover,
climb, cruise, descent and landing—were made at
each temperature. After the work at Eglin was finished,
the Apache was flown in a C-5 to St. Paul for inflight
tests of its deicing equipment, both behind the HISS
and in the natural environment.”
From those and all of its other tests, the activity will
report to AVRADCOM any problems that are found.
When corrections or modifications are made the testing
procedure will be repeated.
“We do not check subsystem performance,” Mr.
Johnson said. “On a weapon system, for instance, we
do not test whether it will hit what it is aimed at; we
want to know the effects its firing will have on the air
craft. Does it affect the handling qualities? If it is
installed externally, will it cause drag?”
Another use of data compiled by USAAEFA when
it tests prototypes is to help government source selection
boards choose between competitors. That is important,
Mr. Macpherson said, because an aircraft isn't perfect
when it is selected. Rather, the choice is based on
tests of a prototype that has invariably encountered
some problems; then consideration is given to the
contractor's method of solving those problems.
USAAEFA also provides input for the operator's
manual of a new aircraft. Mr. Macpherson commented
on that use:
39

photo by Lu Chavez
“The preliminary manual is based on calculations
from the contractor as to what the aircraft's per
formance will be. The data we provide, which is
based on flight testing, is used to amend the operator's
manual as needed.
“For instance, after the preliminary evaluation on
the production fixes the contractor had made for the
UH-60, we did an airworthiness and flight characteristics
test. Information on the aircraft's performance and
handling qualities derived from that test necessitated
some changes to the operator's manual. A specific
item we were involved with was an expansion of the
Black Hawk's gross weight and center of gravity
envelope in order to accommodate a ferry range
extension kit. As a result, the gross weight was increased
by 2,000 pounds and the center of gravity was moved
about 5 inches farther forward. In turn, those changes
called for additional testing to determine what control
margins were available in the new configuration.”
In all, USAAEFA test pilots flew about 400 hours
to gather information on the Black Hawk. Multiply
that by other aircraft and/or components being checked
and the need for an outstanding maintenance shop is
apparent. That's the kind Mr. T. R. Kenngott operates
for the activity.
40
The AH-64 Apache
is one of two Army
helicopters that has
deicing equipment
(the other is the
UH-60 Black Hawk).
That equipment was
thoroughly evaluated
on the Apache proto
type (YAH-64), in
cluding cold and hot
weather environmen
tal tests at Eglin Air
Force Base, FL (far
left), and inflight icing
tests at St. Paul, MN
He pointed out that the Supply and Maintenance
Directorate's outstanding reputation has been achieved
by its personnel who have an average experience
level of 19 years. They give the directorate the skills
necessary to perform unit, intermediate and depot
maintenance. In addition to that, their work includes
making modifications, installing instruments and then
maintaining those during the test program.
The supply portion of the directorate's name covers
what Mr. Kenngott described as a “real logistical
problem which requires the stocking of about 10,000
line items to support as many as 19 aircraft in eight
different models.”
One instrument that had to be positioned by the
maintenance people was a stall indicator for the OV-1
Mohawk. Lieutenant Colonel Robert N. Ward,” head
of the FTD's Integrated Systems Test Division, said
the testing of that will be accomplished in cooperation
with NASA's (National Aeronautics and Space Ad
ministration) Ames Research Center.
He described the indicator as he saw it on a Cessna
402 airplane: “It had two vertical columns, one for
the indicated airspeed and the other for the predicted
stall speed for that aircraft. The latter speed was
arrived at by the indicator's computation of several
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
conditions, such as the aircraft's weight, longitudinal
stick position, and acceleration. The concept is that a
stall occurs if the two columns become even.
“As I flew it in the 402, it looked pretty good. There
are some problems because it is a complicated system
in that it has to know a lot of things about the airplane
to predict a stall speed. If this system works, we think
it will save lives and airplanes, particularly with the
OV-1 because it has poor natural stall warning charac
teristics.”
USAAEFA also works with NASA on other projects
—for instance, the XV-15. Major (P) Ronald B. Car
penter,” an activity test pilot, is the only military avia
tor qualified to fly that experimental aircraft.
Major Don Underwood is another test pilot who is
the only one checked out in an experimental craft
that shares the tilt characteristic of the XV-15's rotor
system, except in this case the whole vehicle tilts. It is
the Williams Aerial System Platform II, affectionately
known as WASP II.
An outgrowth of the rocket belts of the late 1950s,
the WASP II is intended to meet a recognized need
for a vehicle to be used by a nonaviation operator for
surveillance, reconnaissance and courier missions. It
is powered by a derivative of the cruise missile engine
that is mounted inclined 15 degrees to the vertical
with a twist-grip, motorcycle throttle for the right
hand and a twist-grip, yaw or directional control handle
for the left hand. It is kinesthetically controlled in
pitch and roll by body motion.
“It is a very precarious type of flying,” he said.
“You are standing aboard a platform; and whatever
nuance of motion you impart to the vehicle is
immediately accepted as a commanded response,
and it will automatically diverge in that direction.
Operating it can be equated to standing on top of a
greased marble!”
How did Major Underwood happen to be selected
to work with the WASP II? (“Everybody ought to
have a project like this at least once in a lifetime,” he
vowed.) One way is through competition with the
other 16 USAAEFA test pilots, according to Major
Michael V. Stratton.
Several of the tests he has participated in had to do
with the OH-58 Kiowa, specifically, the composite
tail boom, fuel conservation measures, and a Rockwell
Mast-Mounted Sight equipped OH-58C. He also has
been instrumental in coordinating the support given
by Army Aviation to the space shuttle landings (see
the Digest, January 1982, page 22, for an account of
the second landing of Columbia).
Does he like his job? “Very definitely. In fact, if I
could stay here until it is time for me to retire, I
would. The work is interesting and challenging. I get
to use my flying experience and my civilian education
(master's in aeronautical engineering), and I don't
OCTOBER 1982
believe I could do that anywhere else in the Army, at
least not on something I would enjoy so much.”
Major Stratton noted that getting such a position is
not easy. A high degree of motivation is required to
compete for a space and then to successfully complete
the Navy's test pilot school at Patuxent River, MD.
Lieutenant Colonel Wilson agreed that it is an
extremely competitive field, but that very fact pays
off for the Army Aviation user because those named
as test pilots are “the cream of the crop" (see Digest,
April 1982, page 34, for the names of persons recently
selected for the program).
He added, “There is a very tight Society of Experi
mental Test Pilots, only about 1,200 members world
wide. Most members are graduates of an accredited
test pilot school, and there are only four such schools
in the free world. In addition to the Navy's, the
British and French each have one and the Air Force
has one here at Edwards. The only one with a rotary
wing curriculum is the Navy's, and the Army gets a
quota of nine each year for it.
“The question of dual rating for Army test pilot
candidates is a problem. Our rotary-wing-only aviators
are somewhat behind the power curve because much
of the initial portion of the course is based on fixed
wing theory. They are going to have to fly some of
those airplanes at the test pilot school, including a jet.
“Then, after helicopter pilots graduate they are
limited because they can't fly a fixed wing chase nor a
fixed wing program if one comes along. We really
need potential test pilots to be dual rated.”
To help prepare for the training, USAAEFA conducts
an 8-week course for those selected for the test pilot
program. Taught by Mr. Sean Roberts, a graduate of
the Empire Test Pilot School and an experimental
test pilot, the course is designed to refresh the aviators
on the rigors of an academic environment, with specific
attention to subjects like calculus, differential equations,
aerodynamics and flight test techniques.
From all of this it is readily evident that Army
Aviation users' friends who are assigned to the Army
Aviation Engineering Flight Activity at Edwards Air
Force Base did not get there by being slackers. That
applies to every person, civilian and military, who
works for the activity, Colonel McConnell said.
So a word to all Army Aviation crewmembers: The
next time you fly a mission in your aircraft and it
functions just as you need it to, think kind thoughts
about your friends at USAAEFA. They'll appreciate it!
*USAAEFA personnel changes since this article was written
are noted: LTC Ward now heads the Flight Test Directorate;
Major Carpenter is chief of the FTD's Integrated Systems
Test Division; and LTC Wilson has been reassigned to the
Army Aeromechanics Laboratory, Ames Research Center,
Moffett Field, CA.
41
 Cºrmy cºviation in 24atin Człmerica
This is the sixth article about Army Aviation in Panama. The final article, “Dustoff Panama,” will be published in November

->
| | | | N There's the
V ->
foreign Clearance
A.Tº º º
W
B º
arº
4/uide >
CW4 Thomas A. Story
«s A. Assistant Adjutant
210th Combat Aviation Battalion
193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)
Howard AFB, Panama

éſ. WHAT’S THIS STAIN on the Venezuela, at 17,000 feet while wait ties. The C-12A has contract main
Foreign Clearance Guide?” ing for an ILS (instrument landing tenance, with a Beechcraft “tech
“That's just jalapeno dip." system) to Maiquetia International, rep” assigned to Panama for that
“Huh?” with a British Concorde SST below purpose. Crewchief duties and serv
“Yeah, Mike had it laying on his and a Boeing 747somewhere above. icing come from the fixed wing
coffee table when he had a party But my wife interrupted me and I section.
the other night. Invited a bunch of missed most of that. I only caught Fixed wing flying in Panama is
civilians and nonaviators and was part of the next lie: something about unique. Nearly all missions are out
trying to impress them with how taxiing-in and being parked between of-country international flights. Most
international he is; spilled the same Air Cubana and a Soviet Aeroflot are at least 3 hours in duration and
stuff on his passport, too.” airliner. It's hard to hear when your may require overflights of numerous
“You guys were supposed to have wife has you in a “hammerlock" countries. For instance, a flight to
been there but you had to RON with one hand and has a salad fork Guatemala City requires going
(remain overnight) in San Jose, Costa in the other, 'stabbing’ you in the through the airspace of Costa Rica,
Rica or Lima, Peru or San Juan, posterior. Come to think of it, that's Nicaragua and El Salvador; even
Puerto Rico. Can't remember." when I kicked over the jalapeno that, however, does not make it as
dip." difficult to prepare for as one to,
"Rip, you and Ray would have say, Guyana. A flight to Guatemala
enjoyed it. Mike really spread it on The fixed wing section, Head requires a diplomatic flight clear
thick. I was standing behind his quarters and Headquarters Detach ance from the host country for
couch with my arm around this good ment, 210th Combat Aviation Battal landing, and it normally takes about
looking thing, dodging glares from ion, has a U-21 Ute and a C-12A 3 days to obtain that. Overflight
my wife and listening to all those Huron, with four warrant officer clearance is not a requirement of
good lies. He really needed help pilots. It also has an E-7 and four the other countries.
with the lies. There was something enlisted soldiers for the U-21's main Numerous other countries' re
about being stacked up over Caracas, tenance, service and crewchief du quirements make it more difficult

42 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

# to obtain proper authorization.
Guyana, as the example I used
previously, requires 12 days, exclu-
sive of weekends and holidays, to
process the diplomatic clearance,
and involves flights through Colom-
bian and Venezuelan airspace, coun-
tries which also require overflight
diplomatic clearance. Because of
these restrictions, missions are some-
times scratched or delayed.
The Foreign Clearance Guide is
practically our bible for initial flight
planning. When we are alerted for
a mission to a country we have not
flown to before or in the past several
months, one of the first things we
check is the Foreign Clearance
Guide to find out what is required
to enter that country's airspace, as
well as any countries we may have
to overfly. Of course, checks of those
countries we most often fly to are a
routine part of our pre-mission
planning. The preplanning also
includes checking the charts for any
islands along our flight route. Some
islands may be several hundred miles
from the country that governs them.
For example, a flight to Key West,
FL, takes you to San Andreas Island.
This is Colombian territory. How-
ever, a diplomatic flight clearance
is not required as we fly a 10 DME
* (distance measuring equipment) arc
around Colombian airspace; but
other airways may go directly over
an island and require clearance.
Along these same diplomatic lines
is the need to obtain visas, as re-
quired, for official passports. Many
visas are good for only 30 days, or
one entry, so we are constantly
updating crewmembers' passports
to maintain currency. Sometimes
this seems to be a near impossible
task as 3 duty days are required for
% -ºº-ºº:
OCTOBER 1982
the Adjutant General Passport and
Visa Section to obtain each visa
from the respective embassy. When
there are back-to-back missions, day
after day, we must closely monitor
who is eligible to go on a particular
flight. Intransit flights, as a general
rule, don't require crewmembers
to have visas; but immigration
authorities in some host countries
do not always abide by that rule.
While we have not encountered any
great problems other than incon-
venience, experience has taught us
to go prepared.
There is also a requirement for
at least one crewmember to possess
a Federal Aviation Administration
pilot's license. Experience gained
from an Air Force C-130 crew taught
us this when it took U.S. ambas-
sadorial intervention to allow the
aircraft commander to file his flight
plan and depart one particular coun-
try—but only after encountering
several hours' delay.
Most of what I've related so far
has involved some of the political
and diplomatic problems encounter-
ed that are normally dealt with
before departing Howard Air Force
Base, Panama. Sometimes, however,
there are obstacles upon arrival in
a particular country or while trying
to depart a visited country. Good
common sense as well as a courteous
and gracious attitude to the officials
and citizens of the host nation usually
overcome these problems. We are
the guests, and we abide by their
rules as long as it does not affect
our flight safety.
Pre-mission planning, worldwide,
is paramount to a safe and success-
ful mission. We here in Panama are
no exception. Because we take off
at sea level and either fly oceanic
routes or over mountainous terrain,
we meticulously check our flight
planning and make progressive
checks during the course of the
flight. Navigational aids, en route
weather, communications and even
approach charts are many times
incorrect or nonexistent. In Central
America, navigational aids and com
munications are fairly good. A very
high frequency omnidirectional
range (VOR) or nondirectional radio
beacon (NDB) may not be received
until you're within 25 miles or less
of a station—and radar is only
located in a couple of countries.
Central American Control (CEN
AMER) located in Honduras, is the
controlling agency between Panama
and Mexico for QNH (pressure type
altimeter with a QNH setting indica
ting altitude above mean sea level)
flights. CENAMER has fairly good
radio equipment and repeater sta
tions for flight following, and with
Albrook Airways located at Albrook
AFS, Panama, you can normally
flight follow on high frequency (HF)
throughout Central America, most
of the Caribbean and much of the
South American Pacific coast. How
ever, once you get south of Guay
aquil, Ecuador, en route to La Paz,
Bolivia, or Lima, Peru, you may
have to start calling different air
ports along the way hoping for an
English speaking tower operator.
Upon departing Panama, en route
weather forecasts are practically
nonexistent and are usually good
for only the local area. Of course,
when leaving an international airport
you will have a weather service,
but the forecasts and weather re
ported en route are not always
reliable. We check satellite photos
and charts for en route weather if
43

they are available, but often we have
to forecast much of our en route
data. Usually our destination's
weather forecast is fairly reliable,
but we always plan for an alternate
airport and choose the best one
available.
Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs),
additions, deletions or corrections
to en route charts and flight infor
mation publications (FLIPs) are
sometimes slow in reaching Depart
ment of Defense (DOD). A good
example is Airway UA1 from Puerto
Limon to San Jose, Costa Rica. The
minimum en route altitude (MEA)
is 14,000 feet because of a 12,000
plus-foot volcano directly on the
centerline. However, the last two
DOD en route charts show the MEA
at 8,000 feet. CENAMER won't
approve clearances for below 14,000
feet until it hands you over to El
Coco Approach which, in turn, will
clear you to 8,000 feet for initial
approach altitude when you are only
within 14 DME of the final approach
fix. But mistakes can be made, even
by controlling agencies; and an
actual IMC (instrument meteoro
logical condition) flight allowed to
go through at or below 12,000 feet
would terminate short of its desti
nation. To counter these potential
disasters, we use as many measures
as possible to ensure a safe flight.
We have Jeppsen charts for back
up. We talk to Defense Attache
Offices (DAO). Many of the U.S.
Embassies in Latin America have a
C-12 assigned to their DAO missions
with U.S. Army, Air Force or Navy
pilots who are more familiar with
their particular region than we are.
They are, therefore, a valuable
source for en route and destination
information.
44
Equally important, however, is
that we talk to each other, keep our
eyes open and ensure that infor
mation gained is passed on to each
pilot. We also rotate crews for flight
checks to a destination and try not
to schedule two pilots on the same
mission unless one of them has been
to the destination airport.
Okay, about now you readers are
saying to yourself, “We go into
airports that none of our pilots have
been into before. What's so unique
about these hotshots in Panama?”
Nothing, when it's an international
airport. The approach plates, navi
gational aids and communications
are all good. What if it's not an
international airport but a foreign
military airfield, or one in the middle
of the jungle, or mountains with a
World War II generator supplying
the power to these less-than-modern
facilities? That's where the problems
associated with getting your airplane
safely on the ground occur.
We carry some very important
passengers who have to reach their
destinations, and our job is to ensure
they arrive there safely and on time.
Getting all available information for
the en route legs, destination and
alternate is paramount in providing
for either a successful mission or a
safe, aborted landing. Believe it or
not, this may include the knowledge
that you'll need to make a low pass
to run the cows off the grass and
mud runway; and the DC-3 pilot
you were talking to at your takeoff
airport may be able to give you that
information.
Chief Warrant Officer, CW4
Ripperda, the boss of our outfit—
also the guy who pulled the chocks
at Kitty Hawk and taught General
Doolittle's navigators how to find
º
|
Tokyo by dead reckoning—says it
is about like flying in the 1930s.
Fortunately, we still have guys like
him around who can draw on years
of vast flying experience to make
sure we can handle the job of deliver
ing our airplane and cargo safely to
its destination. We have an enviable
safety and mission accomplishment
record. Each of us is satisfied with
our job. We visit a lot of countries
in an area larger than the continental
United States, fly to Caribbean
islands where U.S. presidents spend
their vacations and British royalty
honeymoon—and we also get paid
to do something we really enjoy.
But, just as important, we get to
represent U.S. Army Aviation as
true professionals and ambassadors
of goodwill throughout our Latin
American neighboring countries.
“Hey, Rip! What if these forecast
winds to Barbados are wrong? What
else can we use as an alternate?”
wn
“Keep looking, you'llfigure it out.
“Well, I could use Grenada, but
they're Communist.”
“Maybe Surinam? No, they just
had a coup and might lock us up. I
got it! We'll land in Caracas and
refuel, then we can make it back to
Caracas if we need to.”
“You got a dip clearance for land
ing in Venezuela?"
“No, overflight only, why?”
“Do you want to declare an emer
gency so you can land to refuel?"
“No.”
“Well, you better send a new
message outfor landing permission,
or keep looking for other alternates.
I don't know, Story, we might make
a pilot out of you yet."
“Darned old crochety CW4s.
Where's that Foreign Clearance
Guide? Wy
:
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
Parachutist
VS
Aircraft
Mr. Robert Cole
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
THERE ARENUMEROUS parachutists competing
with aircraft for simultaneous use of airspace yet
really, there is no competition. If anyone wins it will
be the aircraft.
Pilots and controllers alike have a responsibility for
the safety of these lone falling objects. Regulations
may vary slightly with the geographical area (Federal
Aviation Administration jurisdiction vs. host country);
therefore, pilots and controllers should be familiar
with Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), Part 105,
U.S. Army regulations and host country regulations if
applicable. The following is a partial extract of FAR
Part 105:
Para 105.25 Information required, and
notice of cancellation or postponement of
jump.
(a) Each person requesting an authoriza
tion under Para 105.19 or Para 105.21, and
each person submitting a notice under Para
105.23, must include the followinginformation
(on an individual orgroup basis) in thatrequest
or notice:
(1) The date and time jumping will begin.
(2) The size of the jump zone expressed
in nautical mile radius around the target.
(3) The location of the center of the jump
º zone in relation to
(i) The nearest VOR facility in terms of
the VOR radialon which it is located, and its
distance in nautical miles from the VOR facility
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
when that facility is 30 nautical miles or less
from the drop zone target; or
(ii) The nearest airport, town, or city de
picted on the appropriate Coast and Geodetic
Survey WAC orSectional Aeronautical Chart,
when the nearest VOR facility is more than
30 nautical miles from the dropzone target.
(4) The altitudes above the surface at which
jumping will take place.
(5) The duration of the intended jump.
(6) The name, address, and telephone
number of the person requesting the author
ization or giving notice.
(7) The identification of the aircraft to be
used.
(8) The radio frequencies, if any, avail
able in the aircraft.
(b) Each person requesting an authori
zation under Para 105.19 or Para 105.21,
and each person submitting a notice under
Para 105.23, must promptly notify the FAA
air traffic control facility or FAA flight service
station from which it requested authorization
or which it notified, if the proposed or
scheduled jumping activity is canceled or
postponed.
Today parachutists are descending free fall from
great altitudes and the skyways are crowded with
aircraft. These two conditions must be considered
when piloting or clearing aircraft for a paradrop.
Investigations of recent accidents found that parachut
ists were exiting aircraft at high altitudes (ARTCC
airspace) and falling into hazardous activity within an
airfield's terminal airspace.
We as pilots and controllers must assure that para
chutists and aircraft are provided the highest margin
of safety possible. This may best be accomplished by
being certain all necessary coordinations have been
accomplished and that all airspace from the sky divers'
aircraft to the ground belongs to the parachutist only.
 Captain Gregory J. Beauvais
Aviation Materiel Management Officer

Miss Megan Lohmann

Inventory Management Specialist
U.S. Army Troop Support and
Aviation Materiel Readiness Command
St. Louis, MO

: EFORE THEfrigid blasts of wintersendland

and water temperatures plummeling, Army Avid
tion crewmembers need to ensure their wordrobe
includes a Ventile Anfiexposure Suit that can be
obtained from Commander, TSARCOM (B17), ATIN:
DRSTS-STSM, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO
63420, AUTOVON 693-3342.
The CWU-16P is a quick-donning type, one-size
fits-all suit used primarily as an emergency life
support item for aircraft passengers. The CWU
24P and its soon-to-be-ovailable replacement.
the CWU-21A/Pcomes in 12 sizes and is a constant
wear type mode to go understandard flying clothes.
The CWU-24P and CWU-21A/P assembly consists
of an outer garment, including rubber socks, and
an inner liner.
Mode of a ventile foubric that is moisture voºr
permeable, the outer garment breathes without
artificial circulation when it is dry. When wet, the
fibers swell about 70 percent, making the gament
watertight. After drying, the garment breathes
again. The rubbersocks are ordered in the individ
udiuser'ssize ond then are permanently cemented -

to the suit by qualified ALSE personnel.

SIZE cwu-24P CWU-21A/P Two innerliners are ovoilable: one mode of cohon
8475-00-423–9090 8475-04-094-8919 fabric covered with nylon netting that is a spacer
2 8475-00-123-909A 8475-04-094-8924 garment to be used over regulation underclothes.
3 8475-00-423–9094 8475-04-094-8926 and one mode of nylon fiberswoven loosely enough
4 8475-00-423–9095 8475-04-094-8927 to be transparent and formed into awaffle effect.
5 8475-00-423–9096 8475-04-094-8923 providing greater air and ventilating space. The
6 8475-00-423–9097 8475-04-094-8924 atter is lined with light cotton material to give
7 8475-00-423–9098 8475-04-094-8925 comfort next to the skin.
8 8475-00-423–9099 8475-04-099–6892 Maintenance and other information on the anti
9 8475-00-423–9400 8475-04-094-8920
MO 8475-00-423–9404 8475-04-095–2394
exposuresult will be published soon in the joint Air
8475-00-123-9102 8475-04-094-8922
Force/Army manual, T.O. 14P3-5-81/TM 10-8475
8475-00-423–9403 8475-04-095-1823
200-42. For required use of the suit, refer to AR
95-1 (15 Nov 30), page 3-6, paragraphs 3-265(2)(d)
and 3-26c.
unrep sºmes agº. ! NOVEMBER 1982

VA. On LG-ST -

Joint AirAttackleam
NOVEMEER 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 11
§
=!
Yºr Yº Yºr F. Y
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Charles E. Teeter
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 JAAT, A Present Concept, MAJ William J. Filippini and

CPT David S. Prewitt
8 More Flight Hours/Less Fuel Dollars, COL Lewis J.
McConnell and MAJ Gary T. Downs
12 PEARL'S
14 Professionalism And The FY 82 Aircraft Accident Record
18 Cobra Survival Kit
21 Readers' Survey
25 Hangar Talk: FM 1-5, Instrument Flying And Navigation
For Army Aviators, CW2 (P) Gary R. Weiland
26 DES Report To The Field: Stress=Reduced Vigilance=
Accidents
27 ACTAAT: Crew Rest
28 Aviation Personnel Notes: New Army Engineering
Test Pilots; Command And Staff College Selection
Procedures
30 Views From Readers
32 Reporting Final
35 Threat: How Do You Spell Threat? CPT (P) Dale L.
º&
Radtke
- º
→
38
40
Dustoff Panama, MAJ Bruce G. Furbish ;
ºsº
Noise Abatement And Flying Neighborly,
COL John H. Boysen
Inside Back Cover: ATC Action Line: More On
The Near Midair Problem, Mr. Kenneth S. Arnold
iº:
Honorable John O. Marsh Ji
Cover: JAAT—what it is, its capabilities and the Secretary of the Army
roles of Army Aviation in the JAAT; see page 2. Richard K. Tierney
Illustration by Paul Fretts Editor

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U S Army unless otherwise speci
fied. Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise indicated
Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct
communication is authorized to Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P O Drawer P.
Fort Rucker, AL 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army, 10 September 1982, in accordance with Army Regulation
3.10-1.
Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system
as outlined in AR 310-1. Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR. AG
Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore. MD 21220. For any
change in distribution requirements, initiate a revised DA Form 12-5
National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distribution also should
submit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests through
their state adjutant general
Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Annual subscription rates
are $26.00 domestic ard $32,50 overseas
 H.
* =VE RYTHING you always wanted to know
about a Joint Air Attack Team and were too busy
to ask is contained in "JAAT—A Present Concept,"
* this month's lead article.
Major William J. Filippini and Captain David S.
Prewitt identify a JAAT as a force that enables
the ground commander to engage "enemy forces
beyond the range of other antitank weapons."
They give a detailed explanation of how the team
is formed and how it is used in battle. This is a
most informative article about a topic we all need
to become more conversant with.
Colonel Lewis J. McConnell and Major Gary T.
Downs also address a subject that needs additional
attention. In “More Flight Hours/Less Fuel Dol
lars," they reiterate some well-known but oft
neglected ideas about fuel-saving ways to operate
our aircraft. “The need is evident—and the
numbers show that only a 5 percent savings
through conservation will result in a significant
increase in available flying hours for the same
money," they write, adding that every Army aviator
needs to acquire a renewed fuel conservation
consciousness. Living evidence of the fact that
fuel conservation can and does work is the
experience here at the Aviation Center in fiscal
year 1982 where 2,345,662 gallons of fuel were
saved through strict conservation measures. As
reported in an earlier Digest, we have been able
to reduce our fuel required by 9.96 percent per
flying hour by the application of fuel saving initia
tives.
And like fuel conservation which is only good
commonsense, it never ceases to amaze me how
much our very sophisticated business of flying,
of operating high-technology equipment in every
conceivable environment, depends on the use
of just plain old commonsense. That is especially
true in our striving to be ACCIDENT FREE IN
'83. For instance, in this issue's “DES Report to
the Field," Some elementary procedures are
outlined as to how accidents may be avoided
through increased vigilance during stressful
operating conditions. The point is, many of those
conditions could be alleviated by simply paying
proper attention to commonsense procedures!
An especially good article that contains more
essential information for us is Colonel John H.
Boysen's "Noise Abatement and Flying Neigh
borly." Colonel Boysen, a veteran aviator, des
cribes the emphasis that is being put on the
reduction of helicopter noise by civilian industry
NOVEMBER 1982
and aviation organizations such as the FAA. Closer
to home, he describes procedures (again simple
commonsense ones!) that Army aviators can follow
to cut the noise level of their machines. As Colonel
Boysen concludes, “Everyone needs to pull
together to accomplish this. All of us who share
the sky must share responsibility for noise abate
ment." We at Ft. Rucker work diligently at this in
harmony with our neighbors here in south Ala
bama. I'm sure that your unit has equally valid
concerns about your neighbors, so "fly neigh
borly."
Just as we sometimes need to change our
modus operandi in order to save fuel or make
less noise, so changes are often necessary to
improve the career patterns of Army Aviation
people. "Aviation Personnel Notes" enlightens
us about new selection procedures for the Com
mand and Staff College. That column also contains
some information on the Army Aviation Engine
ering Test Pilot Program, a super challenging
program that begins with test pilot school at
Patuxent River Naval Air Station.
All in all, there is good reading from cover to
cover in this Aviation Digest. Read on and give
us your feedback On its content. Your views are
of utmost importance to help us ensure the
magazine meets your needs. This issue incorp
Orates a Special Survey form SO that you can "tell
it to the Editor." Take the time to complete
and return the tear-Out Survey and you will help
us to truly make this "your" magazine for the
entire aviation team.
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 Major William J. Filippini Captain David S. Prewitt”
Command, Staff and Doctrine Department Commander
Armor Aviation Instruction Branch 11th Company, 1st Battalion
U.S. Army Armor School 1st Aviation Brigade
Fort Knox, KY Fort Rucker, AL
*Captain Prewitt was assigned as operations officer for the Aeroscout
Branch, Department of Flight Training, U.S. Army Aviation Center,
Ft. Rucker, when he coauthored this article

--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

APresentConcept
HE AEROSCOUT, already a part of the combined arms
team, plays a big role in accomplishing the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command's major mission areas in
the AirLand Battle (close combat, fire support, air defense, communi
cations, command and control, intelligence/electronic warfare,
combat support/mine warfare and combat service support).
Much has been written recently concerning the AirLand Battle;
therefore, this article isolates one major aspect of the close combat
mission, the Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT). It addresses the compo
nents of a JAAT, its capabilities and the role of Army Aviation
assets involved in a JAAT.

What is a JAAT’’ enemy armored formations, com

A Joint Air Attack Team is a
combination of U.S. Army scout
and attack helicopters and U.S. Air
Force close air support (CAS) air
craft (normally A-10s) operating
together to attack high priority,
lucrative targets. The JAAT nor
mally operates in concert with U.S.
Army field artillery, mortars, air
defense artillery, naval gunfire and
ground maneuver forces against
mand vehicles and enemy air defense
weapons systems. A JAAT capital
izes on the maneuverability and
firepower of the attack helicopter
and CAS aircraft to engage and
destroy the threat that is affecting
or will affect the close-in battle.
Throughout any JAAT operation
there are key elements that enhance
the effectiveness of the team.
• The first element, and maybe
the most important, is the infor
Air Battle Captain is designated by the atta
helicopter COmpany COmmander for each attaº
team. The air battle captain normally directs emplo
ment of his team from a Scouthelicopter. He is tº
ground Commander's Subordinate for directing tº
attackheliCOpter teamandſOfC00ſdination of atta:
helicopters and close air support aircraft whº
WOrking the Same taſget aſſay.
Air Liaison Office (AL0) is the Senior Air Force
officer at each Tactical Air Control Party (TACP
He advises the Army Commander on all aspects tº

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


the employment of tactical airpower to include
tactical airlift, tactical ſeconnaissance, battlefield
interdiction and close air Support. He Serves as the
focal pointſor Air Force C00ſdinationinjointaiſ/ground
operations and assists in the planning for tactical
air support of ground Operations. The AL0 Super
wises the activities of TACP personnel and is
responsible for all subordinate TACPs.
Attack Helicopter Team is a combination of U.S.
Amy attack helicopters and Observation helicopters
Commanded by an air battle Captain.
NOVEMBER 1982
* …
Close Air Support (CAS) is provided to ground
forces by tactical aircraft Such as the A-10, A-7, F
4 and F-16.
ContactPoint (CP) is a point wheſe CAS aircraft
and a FAC establish radio contact.
Forward Air Controller (FAC) is a U.S. Air FOſCe
Officer who provides for COOIdination and Control of
ClOS6 air Support aircraftemployed in jointaiſ/gſOUnd
Operations.
Indirect Fires are those Systems, i.e., field artillery,
mortar and navalgunfire deliveredatatarget which
cannot be seen by the gunner.
Initial Point (IP) is a point from which the final
attack run-in is made.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) refers
to any action which destroys, degrades of Obscures
enemy surface air defenses for a period of time to
enhance the effectiveness of friendly air operations.

mation flow between the ground
maneuver commander, the air battle
captain (ABC), the forward air
controller (FAC) and the fire support
coordination officer. The exchange
of “real time" information optimizes
the effectiveness of the JAAT and
assists in providing the ground
maneuver commander a verbal
threat update (figure 1).
• A second element that is es
sential for a successful operation is
the employment tactics of each
major JAAT element. Both the ABC
and the CAS flight leader employ
their respective elements according
to each service's proven tactical
doctrine. This does not suggest that
we have two separate elements
fighting two entirely different battles,
but rather considers the difference
in speed, maneuverability and weap
ons systems between the attack
helicopter and the CAS aircraft.
• A third key element of a JAAT
operation is augmenting the team
with available indirect fire support.
The addition of indirect fire weapons
systems allows the team to focus its
efforts on destroying the threat
rather than having to perform sup
pression of enemy air defense
(SEAD) tasks in conjunction with
maneuvers against other threat
weapons systems. It is recognized
that indirect fire weapons systems
will not always be available and that
the team may have to perform its
own SEAD; however, every effort
should be made to integrate the
indirect fire systems into the JAAT
missions.
JAAT and the Ground Maneuver
Commander
The integration of JAAT into the
battle can provide the ground
maneuver commander with a force
capable of engaging enemy forces
beyond the range of other antitank
weapons. The ABC, FAC and scout
pilots can adjust indirect fire beyond
the range of ground observed fires
thus allowing for continuous pres
sure on the enemy forces. The speed
Ç.d
*
FM1
Controller
- (Anu)
FM2
º
º
FIGURE 1:
Communications
and flexibility of the team may be
used to counter airmobile or air
landed insertions in friendly rear
areas. The JAAT is capable of
conducting independent operations
forward of the FLOT (forward line
of own troops) when other suitable
options have been exhausted.
All in all, no matter what the
tactical scenario, the JAAT can
delay, disrupt and destroy enemy
formations, help stop enemy pene
trations and provide the ground
maneuver commander with vital
intelligence about enemy strengths,
dispositions, composition and
locations.
Up to this point, we have focused
on the make-up and capabilities of
the JAAT, but the real issue is how
to bring together the AH-1 Cobra
helicopter and the A-10 Warthog
aircraft to form a JAAT2
How a JAAT is Formed
The CAS assets for a JAAT are
brought together through one or
more of the following:
• Preplanned CAS
*
*
(**)
Commander _º- Grºund
Maneuver
**
If$0) v_ºut.
_**
Air-to-Air
(*
Air-to-Ground
• Immediate CAS requests
• Battlefield opportunities.
The preplanning for JAAT assets is
normally accomplished through the
same decisionmaking process that
is used to identify preplanned CAS
sorties; e.g., to support counter
attacks, place antiarmor fires into
lucrative engagement areas and
support other tactical contingencies.
The ground commander has the
overall responsibility for the plan
ning, coordination and employment
of the JAAT; therefore, the ground &s
commander is the primary initiator.
The request for JAAT assets also
may be spontaneous in regards to
the specific target, location and time.
The preplanned or immediate CAS
sorties and attack helicopters may
be diverted to attack appropriate
targets of opportunity.
The actual formation of a JAAT
begins when the commander initi
ates the request for CAS aircraft
and, if necessary, attack helicopters
through normal request channels.
As the request is submitted through
the close air support request chan
nel, for CAS aircraft, and through
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

operations channels to the division
G-3, one item should be entered on
both requests, “JAAT.” The inclusion
of JAAT in the mission request alerts
the air support operations center
that A-10 aircraft are preferred while
also alerting the G-3 that attack
helicopters are desired to form a
JAAT.
Conduct of a JAAT
Let's say that the JAAT is ap
proved and the assets are available.
*Now what happens? As stated earli
er, the ground maneuver com
mander has the overall responsibility
for planning, coordination and em
ployment of the JAAT. However,
the ABC and FAC initiate the neces
sary coordination as early as pos
sible. For preplanned operations the
opportunity may exist to coordinate
such items as flight corridors, in
direct fire support, call signs, fre
quencies, etc. When immediate air
requests or battlefield opportunities
initiate the formation of the JAAT,
prior coordination may not take
place. When this happens, the ABC
and FAC or A-10 flight leader will
NOVEMBER 1982
-- Al-------
coordinate on a common frequency
(see figure 2). As a minimum the A
10 flight leader will pass to the FAC
or ABC in the FAC's absence, the
following:
• Call sign/mission number
• Ordnance available
• Loiter time.
The FAC or ABC will pass the
following information to the A-10
flight leader:
• Target location (coordinates or
geographic reference)
• Initial point (IP)
• Heading and distance from the
IP or contact point to the target
• Target description
• Air defense artillery (ADA) or
air threat
• Position and activities of attack
helicopters
• Location of friendly elements
• Restrictions (artillery firings, etc.)
• Additional information as nec
essary (inbound calls, departure
calls, etc.).
If conditions do not permit a full
target briefing, as a minimum, the
A-10 flight leader needs target loca
tion and description.
-
FIGURE 2:
Communications Plan
No matter what the circumstances
are surrounding the formation of
the JAAT, one person must direct
the “total team effort.” Since the
ABC should be keenly aware of the
ground and air tactical plan and
can maintain continuous contact
with enemy and friendly elements,
he is the logical director/coordinator
of the joint effort. He does not
dictate attack methods but rather
coordinates the air attack upon the
enemy in consonance with the
ground scheme of maneuver.
The attack is now in progress.
The ABC and scout helicopter pilots
are employing indirect fires to slow
the enemy threat, suppress his ADA,
canalize and button up his armored
forces. The A-10 flight leader has
exchanged the pertinent information
with the FAC and the ABC and is
turning toward the IP. What employ
ment techniques are we likely to
see? We use three employment
techniques (figure 3, next page):
sector, sequential and combined
attacks. The actual technique or
combination of techniques selected
depends upon the situation, time
and space available.
 Sector Attack: During a sector
attack the area of operation, to
include the target and avenues of
approach, is sectored by the FAC
and ABC (figure 3). Each element
of the JAAT is allocated a specific
operating sector. With the target
area divided into distinct sections
the two groups can work autono
mously within their assigned sectors
while still providing each other
mutual support. In this way the team
can saturate the target area. Further,
sector attack can reduce the prob
lems associated with aircraft coordi
nation, ordnance fan and fragmen
tation clearance and can function
with reduced communications dur
ing periods of extensive communi
cations jamming.
Sequential Attack: The second
basic option open to the team is to
attack the target using a sequential
employment plan. This option is
applicable when the target area is
small and the attack avenues are
limited. This situation may preclude
all members of the attack team from
engaging the target simultaneously.
In this case, each element is assigned
the target area for a specified period
of time—5 minutes for example.
During that period they work inde
pendently to destroy the target. The
A-10s and attack helicopters con
tinue to sequence in and out of the
target area until the target is destroy
ed or fuel or ordnance dictate an
egress. This option works well when
the A-10s enter the battle and engage
the targets as the attack helicopters
maneuver to new firing positions.
The attack helicopters then engage
the target as the A-10s momentarily
exit the target area thereby providing
mutual support for each other and
constant pressure on the enemy.
SEQUENTIAL ATTACK
Combined Attack: If the situation
warrants, the elements of the team
can attack the target simultaneously *
using the same basic attack avenues.
Coordination requirements are more
critical with this combined attack.
The inbound call is used to sequence
the individual attacks. The optimum
situation occurs when the heli
copters attack as the A-10s ingress
to the target. As the A-10s begin
their attack, the attack helicopters
remask. The attack helicopters
unmask to reinitiate the attack as
the A-10s complete their escape
maneuver and egress. This coordi
nated attack scheme can continue
until the situation dictates a change
or the battle is terminated.

& T. -
>.
• F--- :* -- *...* T.T.: ;
---> - - *-

*: *. -
r
$ºf.: ----------
-- *A:
.*.*.
* * *.
ºS-sº
>S.-.
.*
--> -----
*. rº” ºr

FIGURE 3:
Employment
Techniques

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 The JAAT may employ a decoy
operation with any of the three basic
* employment techniques. By using
one element of the JAAT to decoy
the primary air defense threat, the
other element can often maneuver
to an advantageous attack position
and successfully engage the primary
target or neutralize the threat.
As we place the final TOW (tube
launched, optically-tracked, wire
guided) and Maverick missiles on
the threat and watch the ground
maneuver forces take advantage of
a weakened enemy force, there is a
realization that Army Aviation has
evolved from its fire support role to our approach to the training or
that of an active participant in the conduct of JAAT operations should
AirLand Battle. However, nothing be directed to:
remains the same, our evolution is
continuing. Further doctrine devel U.S. ARMY
Commandant
opment is needed for the conduct
of JAAT operations. Leaders, es United States Army Armor School
pecially in the aviation community, ATTN: ATZK-CSD-A
must seize every opportunity to train Ft. Knox, KY 40121
for JAAT operations. The proce
dures described in this article have U.S. AIR FORCE
been formalized as doctrine in the Commander
Joint Field Manual 17-50-3, which Headquarters, Tactical Air Com
is undergoing staff review. Your mand
suggestions for changing how we ATTN; XPJ-ALPO
fight the JAAT or for improving Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665

Typical JAAT Sequence

1. Army attack assets receive mission
2. ABC finds the threat
3. ABC passes target information to FAC or
the A-10 flight leader
4. Scout team leaders position attack teams
into battle positions/firing positions
5. FAC passes IP, target description, heading/
distance to target and clearance to A-10
flight leader at CP(in FAC's absence, ABC
º gives clearance)
6. A-10 departs IP with call on common fre
Cuency
7. Call is acknowledged by forward air Con
troller or ABC
8. A-10s call inbound prior to bunt (unmask
100 to 300 feet to fire)
9. Artillery and or attack assets are coordi
nated to mark the target for ease in identifi
cation (suppress ADA, slow, canalize and
button up threat)
10. A-10s and Cobras attack the threat
11. JAAT reattacks under direction of ABC
until threat is destroyed or team is relieved
12. A-10s egress to IP/CP
13. Scout team leader repositions/with
draws Cobras as necessary
14. If JAAT is relieved, ABC or Scout team
leader should remain in area to brief new
team
15. Appropriate reports are forwarded (end
of mission, bomb damage assessment,
situation report, etc.)
Note: The above sequence is only one of many
ways the scenario may take place. Imagi
nation, the situation, time and space
including the METT factors (mission,
enemy, troops, terrain/weather) all will
play a role in the actual conduct of JAAT.

NOVEMBER 1982 7

Fromeu ork for on firmu
FUGU COOSEſN/FT|Oſ) [XPOGRFſ)
Colonel Lewis J. McConnell
and
Major Gary T. Downs
|| OW MUCH FUFL do you woste when you fly
your Army helicopter? Do you even think obout it?
Uncle Som poys the bill so you fly it like you've been
troined. Right? Right! We need to redlize, though, that
youdno loctudilypoyforthot fuelond we disopoyin
|\/\Oſ3é
FUGHT
HOURS
U€SS
FUGU
DOLUſºſ?S
tems of training hours ovdiloble due to costs. Whot
we redlly need to poy is—oftention to fuel usogel
Many of us were troined BC (before crunch) ond
that medns that we who dre the instructors toddy
dren't froined to fedch fuel conservotion. It's not thot
we hoven't hod the time ond opportunity becouse
we have hodd fuel problemsince 1973.We just don't
find time to womyoboutfuel conservotion becouse of
cll the other problems.
Well, we should womy
Toddy's obundance will give woy to shortogeogoin
and toddy's moderated prices, olthough high, wil
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 rise ogdin. We need to make needed chonges now
becousefuel conservotionwillbe even more importont
in the future if we are to maintain adequate flying
hour progroms for the more sophisticated diſcroft
being fielded. Those diſcroft will requiremony more
hours for proficiencython previous helicopters, so we
connot cutcostsby reducingflying hours. Wehoveto
moinfoin flying hours or incredse them by reducing
woste ond inefficiency.
Just how much is the Army'sfuel billeochyedſ ond
how much con we sove? Well, in fiscol year 1984,
Army diſcroft burned about 130 million gollons of
| civiction fuels, of d cost of obout $470 million. If we
| were foseto modest sovingsgool of 5 percentinouſ
overall doy-to-doyoperations, which is not unredlistic,
the sovings wouldomountfodbout 6.5milliongollons
| or obout $8.5 million. Thot would fronslote into severol
more much needed flight hours.
There are mony things ovidfors con do to effect
such sovings; procedures which do not require
| socrifices ond do not moke job occomplishment
more difficult, Below dred few idedSwhich ore known
- fuel sovers.
Optimize the number and type aircraft. Use the
most economicol diſcroft for the ossigned mission. If
on OH-58 Kiowd will suffice, don't used UH-1H Huey.
Flight operations should do this oswell to ensure that
only the necessory number of diſcroft dresent on d
mission. It's betterto hove one circraft of grossweight
thon two operating light.
Wołch your fuel somples. It is not necessory to
fokedfullquortfuelsomplejustbecouse the contoiner
will hold thof much; toke only the minimum omount
necessory to ensure there is no contominotion in the
fonks. Also, do not toke somples offeredch refueling
unless the circroft sits for Severd|hours. Contomindnis
settle slowly ond somplestoken too soon only woste
fuel.
Get your clearance before you start. If you're
flying on on IFR (instrument flight rules) flight plan, or
the wedther is morgindl (specid visual flight rules),
get your clearance before you stort the engine. If
ovdiloble, used groundpowerunifiosovethebottery.
however, a good bottery should hove no problem
operating one ſodio os ong ostronsmission is mini
mized. Any pretakeoff requirements which con be
occomplished before storting engines will minimize
wosted fuel.
MO TWIBER 8
Know your procedures and use the checklist.
Perform yourstoriandrun-up requirementsdscuickly
ospossible, while ensuring occuracy. Alockoffomiſidity
with the procedures, or just moving too slowly in
performing them, results in extrafuelwosted. The god
is to get storted flying as quickly os possible.
Keep hovering to the minimum. Hovering is one
of the highestfuel consuming moneuversperformed
indhelicopter. It should be ovoided, inlieu of ground
toxiorjust sitting on the ground, if possible. Wolfing in
line to toke off is inevitoble of times, but every effort
should be mode to ovoid it, becousehovering while
woiting increases fuel consumption drostically. Wheel
ed helicopters should ground fox to the moximum
extent possible.
Keep aircraft weight to a minimum. Comy only
the equipment ond personnel needed on d mission.
Excessequipmentond people odd weight,incredsing
fuel consumption. Inoddition toweight, externdledup
mentsuchdsgun mountsolso oddsdrogond further
incredses fuel consumption. These items should be
removed when not neededondreinstoledosſequired.
Use the optimum airspeed for the mission. If your
mission is one of staying diſborne indnored (loitering)
where enduronce is required, use the dirspeed for
moximum enduronce. This dirspeed con be deter
mined from the performance choſts in the diſcroft
operator's monucl(dosh M0). When flying cross-country,
oirspeed should be os close to thot for moximum
ronge os possible (ſhot diso con be found in the
dosh 40). Since the moximumronge diſspeedin many
coses is quitefost, it moy notbeddvisoble or comfort
obletoflyotthis speed. However,dirspeedshould be
held os close os possible to thofformoximumronge
for the porticulor conditions.
Fly as high as possible with minimum safe rotor
speed. Flying high ond of reduced rotor speed is d
proven fuel sover, soving as much as 50 percent
when flying of optimum conditionsversussed levelof
moximum continuous rotor speed. Mony votidbles
must be considered, such os distance, wind speed,
gross weight, etc., and that is where detailed flight
planning is involved. Obviously this type offlying con
only be done on cross-country type missions, but with
defoiled planning, flying of the optimum (high)olitude
ondotminimum continuous rotorſpn(revolutions per
minute), significant fuel sovings con be redlized.
ened be

TAS
(kt)
Sea Level (15°C)
IAS=90 kt
8,000 lbs gross weight 88
324 Rotor rpm (6,600 engine rpm)
9,500 (−4°C)
IAS=90 kt
8,000 lbs gross weight 107
314 Rotor rpm (6,400 engine rpm)
Fuel Savings = 239 lb or 21.5%
Fuel Consumed-200 NM Cruise-UH-1H (Based on standard day conditions)
When combined with flying of optimum dirspeed, this
is the greatest potentid fuelsoverofoll the techniques
presented. An example of the fuel sovings possible
on d flight with a 200 nduſicol mile (NM) cruise is
shown in the figure.
Plan your descent to minimize power changes.
When preparing to lond, oftempt to occomplish the
descent with onepowerchdngerotherthoncontinuous
power chonges. Reduce power to d descent setting
ondincredse dirspeed, ifpossible, todccomplish the
descent. Aftempt to make the opprooch a constont
power descentos much ds possible. Frequent power
chdnges disturb the steddy operating condition of
the engine resulting in increased fuel consumption.
Also, descending too soon requires leveling off of
higher power settings which incredses fuel con
sumption. With good planning and minimum power
chdnges, d Sofe opproach with minimum fuel con
sumption con be cohieved.
Idle the engine(s) as soon as possible. After
londing, idle the engine(s) os quickly ds possible to
get the 2-minute cool down period going dnd to
reduce fuel consumption. This d!ows plenty of ºrne to
occomplish oll shutdown procedures, mokº q, y radio
10
Total
Cruise Fuel Fuel
Time Flow Used
(min:sec) (Ib/hr) (Ib)
2:16 490 11 14
1:52 468 874
colls, and still shutdown the engines right of 2minutes
offer touchdown. Once ogdin this will limit fuelwosted
by engines running for prolonged periods while on
the ground.
Be careful refueling. Use pressure refuel if ovdiloble
which will eliminote nedriyoll possibility of spilled fuel.
If open port is used, try to minimize spilloge whether
you or the fuel hondler refuels the dircraft. Droin the
excessfuel Out of the nozzle into the tonk Cund not on
the ground. Report ony ledks in refueling equipment
ds soonospossible. The fuel loston the ground during
refueling would probably be enough for several more
flying hours for edch of us every year.
Most of the topics we've Godressed ore Common
sense. Obviously, mony ofthem do notopplyiotocicol
operations in the NOE (nop-of-the-edith) environment,
but some con be opplied to thot type of flight. It's up
to edch of US to do whoſever we con to reduce
unnecessory fuel usdge.
There dre other things which dre being done to
enhance fuel conservotion. Better performance chorts
for the operotor's monudl ore being developed to
dllowedSier defemination of optimum flight conditions.
A hondheld flight planning computer is being evol
udied. Its purpose would beforeduce planning time
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ond dllow greater occuracy, dmd it could diso be
used during the flightforchonging conditions. Progroms
would be mode for edch type of dircroft ond the
computer would do the job now done by the per
formonce chorſs—better, edsier ond quicker. These
programs dre being corried out by the Army Avidiion
Engineering Flight Activityond Army Aviation Resedrch
ond Development Commond ds port of d compre
hensive fuel conservotion program.
AdditionCl Oction thof CCIn be folken includes:
. Upgrode refueling equipment, preferably closed
circuit.
• Revise operator's checklist to stredmline proce
dures dnd require less ground time.
. Install better fuel monitoring instruments dnd use
them to identifydircraft that dreburning excessive
fuel.
• Developond distribute duxilidry fueltonksforlong
ronge operotions.
Those steps wouldenhoncefuel conservoſion without
ddding to the pilot's workload.
All of the ideos presented here will help toward the
ultimofe godl: more troining flight hours for the some
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Colonel Lewis J. McConnell is a Moster Army Avictor
with more than 5,300 hours in fixed and rotary wing
circraft. He was commissioned from infontry Officer
* Condidate School in November 1953 and completed
fixed wing flight training in the first class to graduate
from Ft. Rucker, Al, on 29 January 1955. Colonel
McConnelſ's military schooling includes the
Transportation Advanced Course, Commond and
General Staff College and the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces. During his career he hos commonded
seven Civiction units to include the 178th Assoul!
Support Helicopter Co., 520th Aviation Mointenance
Bn., the 229th Assoul? Helicopter Bn. In Vietnam and the
11th Aviation Group (Combat) in Germany. He served
two fours on the Army Stoff ong won the U.S. Army
Europe Aviation officer before assuming his present
position as commander, U.S. Army Aviation Engineering
Flight Activity, Edwards AFB, CA
NOVEMBER 1982
dollars through fuel conservotion.The needisevident—
Gnd the numbers show that only d 5 percent sovings
through conservoſion will result ind significant increase
in dvdildble flying hours forthe some money. Before it
con work, though, d program must be implemented
Ondfhofmeons the biggestfuel conservotionmeosure
ofoll: G senseofurgencyond dedicationfoconserving
fuel by everyone concerned with Amy Avidfion. In
porticuloſ, commonders need to place the some
degree of emphosis on conservotion medSures thot
they ploce On other dreds such os Sofety, personal
oppedronce, etc.
A Sense of fuel conservotion consciousness on
everyone's port medns the desired results will be
Offdined. agº-4
Note:The Amy Avidiion Center, Ft. Rucker, AL intensified
its efforts to conserve Ovidiion fuel in FY 1979, CInd
progressive sovings hove come from the resulting
ond ongoing energy conservation program. In FY
1982, those sovings dmounted to 2.3 million gollons
ond $2.9 million less than the forgeted use.
Major Gary T. Downs graduated from the U.S. Military
Academy in 1967 and has since served in Vietnam os
weapons platoon commonder in an air covalry
squadron and in Germany as armored cavalry troop
commonder. Subsequently he was assistant professor
of mechanics at the U.S. Militory Academy. He has
completed Ranger School, Rotary Wing Aviator's
Course, infontry Officer's Advanced Course ond the
Commond and General Staff College. He holds a
moster's degree in aerospace engineering from
Georgia Tech and is a distinguished graduate of the
Noval Test Pilot School of Patuxent River, MD. Currently
assigned to the U.S. Army Aviation Engineering Flight
Activity as on experimental test plot, he is flying in
several test programs which include the fuel
conservation effort and the AH-64. He is a Senior Army
Aviator rated in both fixed and rotary wing aircraft.
11
 PEARLS
Personal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

pertinent task objectives, proposing funding resources

and reviewing task level technical performance. Should
you desire to communicate with TACOM on this
matter, please contact LTC (P) Brisker, AUTOVON
786-6386, or by letter to TACOM, ATTN: DRSTA
NR, Warren, MI 48090.

Life Preservers (LPU 2/P and LPU 10/P)

Aviation life support equipment (ALSE) shops that
maintain LPU-2/P and LPU-10/Plife preservers should
refer to a current copy of Air Force Technical Order
(TO) 14S-1-102, “USAF Flotation Equipment,” and
technical manual (TM) 5-4220-202-14 for maintenance
and repair. However, the parts listings in these manuals
list only part numbers rather than NSNs. The following
list gives NSNs and source of supply for LPU repair
parts.
Source of
Elaine Chiboucas photo by Tom Greene Nomenclature Supply U/I NSN
FLU-1/P valve FPZ ea. 4220-00-295–7945
Cell, Flotation, LH FPZ ea. 4220-00-868-92.59
Cell, Flotation, RH FPZ ea. 4220-00-868-9260
Nylon LPU Cloth S9T yd. 8315-00-078-2958
SPH-4 Ear Seals
Gasket, CO, Cylinder S9I ea. 5330-00-018-0792
Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC), Dayton, Gasket, Inflator
OH 45401 (RIC-S9E) has advised that the national Stem Upper S9I ea. 5330-00-018-0793
stock number (NSN) we have been accustomed to Gasket, Inflator
using to order the nonhardening ear seals has been Stem Lower S9I ea. 5330-00-018-0790
deleted (old NSN 5965-00-058-1246) because of two Cylinder, CO, AMDF ea. 4220-00-543–6693
stock numbers being assigned to the same item. You Rubber Cement AMDF kt. 8040-00-262-9062
will now have to Order NSN 5965-00-815-2525 to obtain
Cell Protector AMDF yd. 8305-00-926-1584
the seals, according to Mr. Chuck Freeman of DESC,
AUTOVON 850-5165.
The FLU-1/P valve is used to convert LPU-2/Ps to
LPU-10/Ps. The FLU-1/P valve is a “breathing" valve
TACOM Technical Area Manager For Life Support that replaces the LPU-2/Passembly that uses a clip to
The Tank Automotive Command has recently hold the oral inflation valve in the open position.
appointed LTC (P) Morton S. Brisker as Technical Both assemblies facilitate cell breathing during altitude
Area Manager for Life Support. He is the single focal changes, but the LPU-10/P is much simpler to maintain.
point within TACOM for all matters pertaining to life When you replace the inflation assembly of the LPU
support of crew and passenger personnel for military 2/P with the FLU-1/P valve, redesignate the life pre
vehicles under the TACOM proponency. This desig server as an LPU-10/P.
nation also carries a TACOM research and develop The cells, flotation, left hand and right hand, are for
ment center designated line of authority for developing replacement of nonrepairable cells, as identified in

12 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 TM 5-4220-202-14 and TO 14S-1-102. Repairable cells
will be repaired with nylon LPU cloth and rubber
3. Cement.
Three gaskets are present in the inflation assembly.
Two are on the inflator stem (part of the cell) and the
other gasket is located in the CO, cylinder receptacle.
The cell protector is fabricated to protect the nylon
cell from the metal inflation assembly.
All specific repair procedures can be found in TM
5-4220-202-14 and TO 14S-1-102. All items with a
source of supply (SOS) other than “AMDF,” must be
ordered AOE off-line.
Point of contact for further info, CW2 Gibson,
USAREUR Aviation Safety and Standardization Board,
APONY 09025, AUTOVON 423-1110, Ext 7234-720/545
and Mr. Ed Daughety, from this office, DRCPO
ALSE, AUTOVON 693-3307.
New Life Raft
The new LRU-16/P single person life raft provides
needed thermal protection in a survival situation in
cold water region areas. The raft is a fully inflatable
insulated raft with blow-up floor and spray shield. It
weighs 6% pounds (100 oz) and is 367 cubic inches in
size. Used with retainer 62E4336 or 7036789, the
LRU-16/P packs easily in the OV-1 RSSK. The NSN
is 4220-00-118-6122.
Another new raft that is being made available for
special requirements is the LRU-17/P. This raft is a
take-off from the LRU-16 but without spray shield;
therefore, it can be packed into a smaller package.
Currently, it is available only by special request. The
raft is managed by the USAF as is the LRU-16/P.
Sharing
:*-
Dear Pearl:
I am a young WO1 rated aviator enjoying my new
assignment. My commander recently told me, “YOU
ARE NOW THE ALSE OFFICER FOR THIS TROOP.”
You could have knocked me over with a feather. “But
Major,” I said, “I am only a WO1 recently out of flight
schooland I know little about ALSE"—and as you all
well know, my plea ended there. Previous ALSE off
cers had apparently let things coast. The condition of
our troop's ALSE is very bad. Pearl, being a new “kid”
on the street of ALSE, I need all the information you
can provide such as: How do I order equipment and
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 314-263-3307
NOVEMBER 1982
expired components forsurvival kits/vests, spareparts
for helmets, etc. I need help in setting up a system of
inspection and maintenance procedures for my troop.
Also, I have 40 tropical survival kits for the SRU-21/P
survival vest. How do I inspect, seal and mark them
after they are inspected so I can issue them to aircrew
personnel? How does only one person inspect 45
aviators’ ALSE such as survival kits, survival vests,
hot and cold weather kits, survival radios, strobe
lights, SPH-4 helmets along with the other numerous
ALSE items and still find time for other duties? I have
found out there is much more to ALSE than meets the
eye. Will you please help me?
NAME WITHHELD
Dear Name Withheld:
Believe me, I certainly sympathize with you, but
you are not alone. I receive many letters like this and
it is apparent that others need help too. We in ALSE
have come a long way and all things are not that
gloomy. The tool to help the ALSE community will
be available soon through the newly drafted Army
Regulation AR 95XXXX titled, “U.S. Army Aviation
Life Support Equipment System Program.” In the
meantime, use Training Circular 1-62 (Aviation Life
Support Equipment); this was published more than a
year ago and distributed to the field. It is soon to be
reconstituted into two field manuals (FM), one for
ALSE operations and the other for ALSE inspection,
maintenance, repair and supply; the ALSE pamphlet
published by the DARCOM Project Officer for ALSE
has been out in the field now for more than 5 years
and is under revision with a target publishing date of
December 1982; this same office is developing ALSE
information packets which are to be provided to new
ALSE “experts” and are available for the asking.
An ALSE checklist is available for further assistance
to you in the field. I agree that you need a library of
PEARL and FLIGHTFAX for there are many excellent
articles that have been published which will certainly
give you a firm background in ALSE. The formal
ALSE training school is at the U.S. Army Transportation
School, Ft. Eustis, VA, and they are going all out to
make your “learning" meaningful with a 5-week “hands
on” course. I responded to your letter in this format
to help other ALSE personnel who are in need, hope
it fills the bill!
Sincerely,
PEARL
13
M CCIDENT RATES, number
of destroyed aircraft, and per
centages of human error are
some of the more popular figures
used in aviation safety talks and
publications. While the use of these
numbers is essential in conducting
trend analyses and various statis
tical studies, their full meaning often
seems to get lost in the process.
A good example of numbers that
really mean something is the 59 Class
A aircraft accidents, 58 flight and 1
ground, and 46 Army fatalities
for FY 82. (Taking into account
all persons killed in Army air
craft accidents, the number of
fatalities in FY 82 is 86.) These are
notjust numbers out of a computer.
They are dead people and destroyed
or heavily damaged aircraft. Their
loss has affected the overall readiness
Colonel Joseph R. Koehler
Commander
U.S. Army Safety Center
14
of the Army, the number of replace
ment aircrewmembers required
from the training command, the
morale of their units, and the lives
of their families. These 59 Class A
accidents have cost the Army $60
million . . . enough to put 38 new
Cobras on the flight line. And this
figure is expected to increase when
all data is in.
The Class A rate for FY 82 is 3.7
per 100,000 flying hours. This is the
worst record since FY 73, when 64
Class A accidents and 74 fatalities
were recorded.
Over the 4 years from FY 78
through 81, the Army averaged 42
Class A aircraft accidents each year.
FY 80 was the best safety record in
Army aviation history. Thirty-eight
Class A accidents were recorded
that year, with a Class A accident
rate of 2.4. Flying hours for the 5
years through FY 82 were relatively
constant, averaging about 1.5 million
each year.
Fixed wing aircraft make up 6
percent of the total aircraft inventory
and account for 12 percent of the
total flying hours. Over the past 5
years, fixed wing aircraft have ac
counted for 7 percent of the total
Class A accidents. Rotary wing
aircraft make up 94 percent of the
total Army aircraft inventory and
account for 88 percent of the flying
hours each year. Breaking out rotary
wing aircraft into categories reveals
the following:
• Utility helicopters make up half
of the rotary wing fleet. They have
accounted for 45 percent of the
Class A accidents over the past 5
years.
• Observation helicopters, which
make up 31 percent of the rotary
wing fleet, have accounted for 26
percent of the Class A accidents
over the past 5 years.
• Attack helicopters, making up
13 percent of the rotary wing fleet,
have accounted for 15 percent of
the Class A accidents.
• Cargo helicopters make up 6
percent of the rotary wing fleet.
They have accounted for 7 percent
of the Class A accidents.
Year in and year out, analysis of
accident data continues to identify
human error as the most persistent
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
cause of aircraft accidents. Errors
made by flight crews, flight com
manders, mission commanders, and
unit commanders accounted for 65
percent of the definite cause factors
in all Class A aircraft accidents—and
70 percent of all Class A, B and C
accidents—over the past 5 years.
Environmental factors accounted
for 18 percent and materiel failure
or malfunction accounted for 17
percent.
Forty-two of the 59 Class A acci
dents for FY 82 involved crew or
supervisory error as a definite cause
NOVEMBER 1982
factor. This number will probably
go higher when all investigations
are complete.
The predominant flight crew er
rors were faulty judgment, violation
of regulations/flight discipline, fail
ure to follow established procedures,
inattention to tasks, and pilot
induced loss of control. Following
are typical examples of these crew
errors.
Faulty judgment
A UH-1 pilot made an approach
into a “hot” mortar position without
clearance. The mortars were firing
almost directly below the aircraft,
and the pilot took evasive action by
banking to the right. While in the
turn, he applied additional collective
pitch which resulted in rotor and
engine rpm bleed-down. The UH-1
settled into the trees and crashed.
The aircraft was destroyed and the
five occupants were injured.
Violation of regulations
While practicing confined area
operations, an OH-6 pilot set up a
final approach, with no intent to
land, to an area he knew was not
authorized for confined area prac
tice. His aircraft hit two power cables
and crashed. The pilot violated
regulations and established pro
cedures by flying below 500 feet
agl, by not doing a high recon, and
by not identifying a forced landing
area.
Failure to follow procedures
The pilot of an AH-1, when con
fronted with an in-flight control
malfunction, misinterpreted the
aircraft actions as being caused by
a main transmission mount failure.
When the aircraft suddenly lurched
and rolled, the pilot made incorrect
flight control inputs. During the roll,
the main rotor bladeshit the ground
15
and the aircraft crashed, killing one The aircraft, near the critical limits instructor pilot qualifications. Fol
occupant and injuring the other. of tail rotor control, went into an lowing are examples of costly super
Inattention uncontrollable spin and crashed. visory errors.
An OH-58 pilot descended from The aircraft was destroyed and the Failure to provide adequate unit
800 feet agl to about 200 feet over a three occupants were injured. training
lake. As the pilot passed one of the Supervisory erroris also a persis An OH-58 was being operated
boats on the lake, he waved to the tent cause factor in a large per under conditions known to be con
occupants in the boat. He was look centage of aircraft accidents. Pre ducive to loss of tail rotor effec
ing to the right front of the aircraft dominant supervisory errors in FY tiveness. When the pilot attempted
and did not notice that he was 82 Class A accidents were failure a tight right turn while 20 feet above
continuing to descend. The aircraft to provide adequate unit training, treetops, the aircraftspun and crash
hit the water at an airspeed of about failure to correct actions of subordi ed into the trees, killing one occu
90 knots. Both occupants of the nates, failure to provide adequate pant and injuring the other two.
aircraft sustained major injuries.
Pilot-induced loss of control
The pilot of an OH-58, during a
tactical service mission, induced a
loss of tail rotor control. When the
aircraft yawed right as it cleared
the tops of some trees, the pilot
reacted with control inputs which
caused aggravated control flight.

Attack
15%

Observation
26%

Class A Accident Distribution by Aircraft System

FY 78-82

16 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

instructed in the loss of tail rotor
effectiveness during his transition
into the OH-58 and was not know
ledgeable of prevention or recovery
procedures.
Failure to correct actions of sub
ordinates
After dropping off supplies at a
field location, a UH-1 proceeded
down a river at 50 feet and 90 knots.
The aircraft hit wires and crashed.
Three occupants were killed and
six were injured. The acting troop
commander was one of the six
Environmental
18%
Materiel
17%
Cause Factor Distribution of Class A Accidents
FY 78-82
NOVEMBER 1982
passengers on board the aircraft.
Failure to provide adequate guid
ance
Four AH-1s were flying toward a
pass. When the flight leader an
nounced over his radio that the
weather was deteriorating and he
didn't think they would make it
through the pass, the platoon leader,
who was copilot of the trail aircraft,
urged him to go a little further. The
flight leader continued on, entered
clouds, and became disoriented.
Control was lost and the aircraft
crashed into the side of a hill, injuring
the two occupants.
Failure to insure IP qualifications
An IP and pilot were on a UH-1
high altitude training mission in
mountainous terrain. The IP had
no hands-on mountain flight train
ing and no mountain flying experi
ence in more than 6 years. On short
final, the pilot was unable to maintain
directional control, and the aircraft
began to turn to the right. The pilot
tried to fly out of the turn instead of
landing as required by the operators
manual. Flight control inputs were
ineffective and the aircraft crashed.
The qualifications of the IP who
was conducting the high altitude
mountain training were not checked
prior to the training.
The safety problem is a people
problem
The sharp increase in Class A
accidents in FY 82 is not the result
of more demanding operations, nor
is it peculiar to any particular aircraft
system or level of aircrew experi
ence. The accidents span the entire
fleet of aircraft and are spread across
the entire range of aviator experi
ence levels.
The safety problem in Army avia
tion today is clearly a people prob
lem which can be corrected. Human
error accidents can be reduced or
even eliminated if commanders and
supervisors get, and stay, actively
involved with routine day-to-day
flight operations.
Every person in the chain of
command must establish an atmos
phere within their organization that
leaves no doubt that all hands are
expected to prepare themselves
professionally and execute their
missions with integrity and discipline.
There can be no approval of corner
cutting in the name of expediency.
It is a proven fact that most people
will perform the way they are ex
pected to perform. If commanders
demand professionalism, sound air
manship, and flight discipline, they
will get it.
Professionalism is the most es
sential safety ingredient. Any job
done professionally is inherently
safe. But if there is no profession
alism, there is no safety.
17
 £I.
COBRR
3 SURVIVAL
( "'
*"º "º
A. ingenuity is a byword that often
applies to Army Aviation people. Two who have laid
claim to it are Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, John P.
Goodrich and Chief Warrant Officer, CW2, Bryan D.
McClendon.
Both are AH-1 Cobra pilots and unit safety officers—
CW2 McClendon for Company C, 229th Attack
Helicopter Battalion, Ft. Campbell, KY, and CW3
Goodrich for Company D, 7th Combat Aviation
Battalion, Ft. Ord, CA.
Their realization that the aircraft they fly has no
space for survival gear, other than what can be stuffed
into the individual's vest, was not unique. That
knowledge is shared, and dreaded, by every Cobra
pilot.
Referring to the lack of gear to use in case of an
accident or forced landing, CW2 McClendon said,
“It is tragic enough to die in combat, but that is the
price for peace. It would be a real heartbreak to have
someone die in peacetime because of a lack of
equipment.”
So in separate and independent efforts, the chief
warrant officers determined to find a solution to the
problem; and they came up with the same ingenious
18
Al º w 8. ſº
idea: for any Cobra (or other aircraft) with a TOW
(tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) con
figuration, use an empty TOW tube as a storage
place!
CW3 Goodrich uses the designator TUSK for his
TOW tube survival kit. Items he placed in the kit for
the Ft. Ord environment are shown in the accompanying
diagram and listing, and the total weight is 38 pounds.
Preparation of the tube is vital, he said: “Wash and
clean the TOW tube, then paint or otherwise seal it.
Next, cut out two aluminum disks to seal the ends of
the tube, coating the disk edges with rubber silicone
to ensure a water-tight fit. Then reinstall the tube's
original flange and flange retaining device, along with
the disks.
“The contents of the TUSK can easily be modified
to meet the requirements of many different operating
environments and missions. Development of a wing
strap device is underway so that the TUSK does not
occupy a space needed for a missile when operating
in a tactical environment.”
CW2 McClendon also agrees that the TOW tube
survival kit will have to be put in another location if a
mission dictates full missile capability.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 The Cobra survival kit, TUSK, designed by CWO John P. Goodrich, Ft. Ord,
CA, is depicted by a diagram showing how items are packed in the TOW tube,
a list of contents with corresponding item numbers, and a picture of those
contents and of CWO Goodrich, left, and SGT Joseph L. Freeman

item
Number Item and Quantity Nsn
(0
1 Expended TOW tube, 1
2_Aluminum disk, 2 Local manufacture
3. Tarpaulin, 1 8340-00-485-3012
Hat, sun, 1 84.15-00-270-0229

Beg, drinking waterstorage. 8465-00-485-3034

(0
4–Air Force Manual AFM) 64-5-1
5 Toolkit, survival, 1 8465-00-973-4807

8–Candle, 4 6260-00-840-5578
7 First aid kit
Zip lock plastic bag, 1 8105-00-837-7755
Bandage, gauze, compressed, 3 × 6 yards, 1 651O-OO-200-3-185
First aid kit, eye dressing. 1 6545-OO-853-6309
Bandage, muslin, compressed, 37 x 37 x 52.1 6510-00-201-1755
Dressing, first aid, field, 4 x 7, 1 651O-00-159-4883
Provine iodine solution, 1 6505-00-91.4-3593
Water purification tablets, iodine, 1 6850-00-985-7166
Ammonia inhalant ampuſ, 3 6505-00-106-0875
Bottle, safety cap
Bandage, 18
Chapstick, hot weather, 1 tube
Gauze, petrolatum, 1 pkg.
Preparation, sunburn preventive, 1 bottle
5TPāſāghūTETESTIEST
9 Accessory packet
Zip lock plastic bag. 1
Plastic spoon, 1
Matches (nonsafety). 1
Pocket knife, 1
Waterproof match box, 1
Wire, nonelectrical, 20 ft.
Can opener, 1
Whistle, ball, plastic, 1
6530-00-112-01-60
6510-00-913-7909
6508-OO-116-1473
6510-00-202-0750
84.15-00-938-6231

81.05-00-837-7755
7340-00-170-837-4
9920-00-985-6891
51-10-00-162-2205
8465-00-265-49.25
95.25-00-596-3498

8465-00-254-8803
:
(3)
Aluminum foil, 6 × 3 ft., 1
10 Food packet, survival, 6 8970-00-082-5665
11 Headnet, insect, 1 84.15-00-935-3130
12 Trioxane fuel, compressed, 3 911.0-00-263-9865
13 Water, canned drinking, 12 8960-00-243-2103
14 Kit, fishing tackle, 1 78.10-00-558-2685
15 Signal, distress, day/night, 2 1370-00-309-5028
Zip lock plastic bags (for distress signals), 2 8105-oo-837-7755

NOVEMBER 1982 19
 Clockwise from top right: (1) CWO Bryan D. McClendon, Ft. Campbell,
KY, points to the survival kit he designed for the AH-1 Cobra, or any
aircraft that has a TOW configuration. (2) The contents of the survival
kit are adequate for two aviators. (3) The security bolt can be removed
with a pocket knife. (4) It only takes about 30 seconds to get the
contents out of the tube. (5) Even the items in the rear of the tube are
easily accessible with the pull cord

photos by William H. Maki

The only structural change his invention requires
for the TOW tube cannister is the removal of the
electrical wiring connector from inside the tube.
He said, “Each survival kit is numbered so that
control can be kept over it for inspection and mainte
nance. The tube is secured on the helicopter by simply
placing a lock on the missile arming lever. That lock
is removed before flight and the key kept in the
logbook along with the door key. Securing the tube
also relieves the crew from carrying it to and from the
aircraft.” (This is the same method used by CW3
Goodrich to secure the TUSK.)
The packing list for CW2 McClendon's survival kit
includes two blankets, two ponchos and liners, knife,
candles, chemical lights, nylon rope, copper wire, C
rations and an opener, plastic bags, trioxane fuel
tablets, matches and PRC-90 batteries.
Both inventors said the kits have been carried on
Cobras in their respective units on training missions
and that pilots have unanimously agreed the kit's
presence adds to their peace of mind.
Action is underway within AVRADCOM to address
all Army helicopter survival kit needs. Until the bright
day arrives when the new module is available, however,
two Army aviators have offered a workable interim
solution.
They invite inquiries. CW3 Goodrich can be reached
at AUTOVON 929-3008/4680 and CW2 McClendon
at AUTOVON 635-6801/2364. *—”
Editor's Note: The Digest appreciates the willingness of CW3
John P. Goodrich and CW2 Bryan D. McClendon to have
articles they had submitted to the Digest published in this
combined form.

20 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 U.S. Army AVIATION DIGEST

The purpose of this survey is to provide data that will

enable us to improve the Digest to better help you in your
profession—Army Aviation. Participation is voluntary and
anonymity is preserved. After completion, fold page as
indicated, staple and mail postage free.

Attention unit commanders:

We would appreciate your distributing as
many copies of this as possible. They may
be returned in a franked envelope.
Please circle the letter for the appropriate response Make only one choice. Please answer every question.

1. I am 8. I usually get/see a copy through:

A. Enlisted E. Contract Civilian A. Direct mail E. From friend
B. Warrant Officer F. Other B. In office distribution F. In dayroom
C. Commissioned Officer C. In library G. Rarely see a copy
D. Department of the Army, Navy, Air Force, D. Visit to HQ or staff office
Civilian

9. Overall, I believe information in the Digest is:

2. My numerical grade is: A. Very useful C. Slightly useful
(Examples: E-3/W-3/0-3 = C, E-7/O-7/GS-7 = G; B. Moderately useful D. Not at all useful
GS-12 = L)
A. 1 G. 7 M. 13 10. How often have you used the Digest as a source
B. 2 H. 8 N. 14 document for policy/information papers, briefings/
C. 3 I. 9 O. 15 or higher reports?
D. 4 J. 10 P. Does not apply A. Frequently D. Never
E. 5 K. 11 B. Sometimes E. N/A, I don't prepare
F. 6 L. 12 C. Seldom those documents

3. The highest level of education I have completed: 11. I feel enough problem-solving articles are published:
A. Less than high school A. Yes B. No

B. High school diploma or GED

C. Some college 12. Overall, material in the Digest is meaningful to me.
D. Bachelor's Degree (4-year degree) A. Yes B. No
E. More than a Bachelor's Degree

For questions 13 through 15, circle the letter which

4. My total flying hours (present or former aviators/ indicates y
vour evaluation of the following:
9.
crewmembers): Excellent Good Average Poor
A. 0 to 199 D. 2,000 to 2,999 13. artwork A B C D

B. 200 to 999 E. 3,000 plus 14. charts and graphs A B C D

C. 1,000 to 1,999 F. Does not apply 15. photography A B C D

16. I prefer that acronyms be identified:

A. The first time used in the story
5. Number of Digest issues I have seen in the past year: (as is done now)
A. None C. 4 to 6 E. 10 to 12 B. By an acronym key for each story
B. 1 to 3 D. 7 to 9 C. Both A & B if there are more than
10 acronyms
D. Acronym keys should not be used

6. Number of issues I have seen in the past 3 months: 17. My primary job is:
A. None C. 2 A. Aviation Command J. Armor
B. 1 D. 3 or more B. Signal K. Infantry
C. Pilot L. Artillery
7. How soon after publication do you see a copy? D. ºº t t ilot
Pilo M - intelgence
-

(Digest is usually mailed the last week of publication E. ety Officer N. Transportation
month): F. Maintenance O. QM
A. Same month C. Two months later G. Arc - P. AD
B. One month later D. Three or more H. Logistics Q. Other:
months later I. Personnel
For questions 18through 30, please circle the appropriate letter to indicate how much of the following articles you have read:

Remember Don't
Seeing but Remember
All Most Scan Didn't Read Seeing
18. Center Commander's Introduction to the Issue A B C D E
19. DES Report to the Field A B C D E
20. Views from Readers A B C D E

21. Threat A B C D E
22. PEARLS A B C D E
23. ATC Action Line A B C D E

24. Personnel Notes A B C D E

25. Hangar Talk A B C D E
26. Helicopter Aerial Combat Week A B C D E

27. Army Aviation Systems Program Review '82 A B C D E

28. Forty Years of Army Aviation, Grasshoppers A B C D E
29. Victory in Air-to-Air Combat, the Marine Corps Way A B C D E

30. From Routine to Near Disaster A B C D E

w

For each of the following statements about the Digest, circle the letter which indicates your agreement or disagreement:

Strongly Strongly
Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Disagree
31. It is interesting A B C D E
32. It is informative A B C D E
33. Appearance meets high standards A B C D E

34. It has helped increase my professional knowledge A B C D E

35. It stimulates thought and new ideas A B C D E
36. Authors are knowledgeable experts in their profession A B C D E

37. It is easy for me to read A B C D E

Which two of the topic areas listed below would you most like to see (see more articles): (letter only)

38. Most

39. Next

A. Threat G. Training M. Accidents

B. Standardization H. Armament N. Combat Experience
C. ATC I. Avionics O. Flying Experience
D. Aviation History J. Instrument Flying P. Medical
E. Major Unit Missions K. Maintenance Q. Research/Development
F. Doctrine and Tactics L. Weather R. Safety

Which two of the topic areas from the list above would you least like to see (see fewer articles): (letter only)

40. Least

41. Next — Your comments next page.

Xomments:

fold

Commander
U.S. Army Aviation Center
ATTN: ATZO-ES-AD POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
Fort Rucker, AL 36362 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
- DOD 314
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRivate use $300

Editor
U.S. Army Aviation Digest
P.O. Drawer P
Fort Rucker, AL 36362

&
 . The turn and slip indicator aids the pilot in
controlling the pitch attitude of an aircraft.
a. True b. False

While taxiing for takeoff, transponders will be

operated in what position?
a. Off c. Low

b. Standby d. Normal

. Pressure altitude is the height above mean sea

level.
a. True b. False

“Hangar Talk" is a quiz containing questions based on . Calibrated airspeed is indicated airspeed comected
publications applicable to ArmyAviation. The answers are at
for error due to air density (altitude and tem
the bottom of the page. If you did not do well, perhaps you
should get out the publication and look it over.
perature).
a. True b. False

FM 1-5, . In a slip, the rate of turn is too fast for the angle
of bank.
Instrument Flying a. True b. False

And Navigation For . If the glass face of the vertical speed indicator is
broken, instrument indications will be reversed.
Army Aviators a. True b. False

. If the airiscolder than the standard temperature

CW2 (P) Gary R. Weiland for the flight altitude, the aircraft will be lower
Directorate of Training Developments than the altimeter indicates.
U.S. Army Aviation Center a. True b. False
Fort Rucker, AL

. Where available, runway visual range (RVR) is

the controlling visibility for straight-in landings
1. If the difference between the indicated altitude
from an instrument approach.
a. True b. False
and the known elevation does not exceed how
many feet, an aircraft's altimeter is considered
reliable for flight.
a. 30 c. 70
10. range
RVR will always be greater thananaviator'sslant
visibility.
b. 50 d. 100 a. True b. False

OI-IZ eled ‘q ‘OI qLZ-2 eled “e ‘L q98-2 eled ‘q ‘b’ (2) eze-Z eled ‘o "I
OI-IZ eled “e 6 (2)3LZ-2 eled ‘q ‘9 38L-22 eled ‘q '8
eIS-2 eled “e 8 q99-2 eled ‘q ‘g II-9 eled ‘q ‘z SHEIWSNW

NOVEMBER 1982 25

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization
REPORT TO THE FIELD
V IGILANT, vigilance: 1. to watch, 2. staying watchful
and alert to danger or trouble.
Vigilance is required in different degrees in almost
everything we do. In aviation there are degrees of vigilance
depending on what mode of flight you are in. On takeoffs
and landings where a high degree of precision is required
vigilance must be higher; once cruise flight is achieved
then vigilance is usually reduced depending on the type
mission being conducted.
Research has shown that a constant high level of
vigilance cannot be maintained. Declines in performance
during the working day are found in all types of work. In
the type of vigilance required in aviation, inspection and
monitoring tasks, the level of vigilance may decline
within 20 minutes after the start of the mission. This
decline in watchfulness will continue in a steady downward
trend with only small upturns after rest breaks, such as
lunch, and then continue downward until the end of the
mission period.
In aviation we would like to assume that we are fully
alert all the time that we are behind the controls. However,
as mentioned earlier, a large amount of scientific research
shows that it is not possible for a person to remain totally
alert over an extended period of time. This is due to
fatigue and stress.
An aviator who must maintain constant vigilance is
understress. The longer this vigilance must be maintained,
the more stress the individual must deal with. The more
26
U.S. ARMY
AVIATION
STANDARDIIATION
2.
stress the individual must face the less vigilant he will
become—a vicious circle. It has been proven that as
monotony, fatigue and stress on the job increase, and
vigilance declines, the number of errors that are made is
greater and the rate of accidents increases.
How can we in aviation overcome the vicious cycle of
stress=reduced vigilance=accidents? There are several
ways, but here we will name only a few:
• Crewrest—allowing your aircrews to obtain the
maximum amount of rest between missions in order to
reduce fatigue and stress. This is especially important
during field training, in harsh environmental conditions,
prolonged terrain flight training and Night Hawk-night
vision goggles training.
• Planning—allow enough time to plan missions as
completely as possible. If a great deal of mission planning
must be done after the crew is airborne, the stress level is
increased and at least part of the crew's vigilance is
taken away from the control of the aircraft.
• Emotional/Personnel Problems—trouble in the
aviator's family, conflicts in the chain of command or
other problems create a great deal of stress. They are
often hard to identify and, again, distract the crew from
flying the aircraft. Aviators should be observed for such
problems at all times and immediate action taken to
either get the problemsolved or at least discussed before
the next mission.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 • Complete-the-Mission—stress level usually will be
high during any operation. It will especially be high
:
during operations conducted in marginal weather condi
tions, night vision goggles and terrain flight operations.
The perception by the aircrews that these missions must
be accomplished “at all cost” causes additional stress
that might be acceptable in wartime but not during
daily peacetime operations.
DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL
CGºiâ)N
A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
CREW REST
* ISSUE: Many operational aviators feel that any crew
rest policy should have rigidly enforced standards.
Commanders should establish the policy locally, but
both ground and aviation commanders should be
required by AR 95-1 to waiver, in writing, any crew
required to over fly the policy. Crew rest consider
ations need to be incorporated into all Pre-command
Courses.
COMMENT: Establishment of a crew rest policy
with rigid requirements would not be realistic. Large
variances in the stamina, and recuperative power of
individuals require any policy based on consideration
of a fatigue-time relationship to be extremely broad,
MOVEMBER 1982
This discussion could go on and on in the same manner,
restating what seem to be commonsense approaches to
reducing stress in our aircrews. Often these commonsense
approaches are overlooked because the aircrews or their
leaders are too busy planning for the big mission, but
overlooking the obvious small details that are causing
many of our aviation accidents. Stress=reduced
vigilance=accidents. *-A
36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message
if it is to cover all personnel. In this case the policy
becomes meaningless and amounts to little more
than a reminder in the general vein of “don’t work
your people too hard.”
Any policy not addressing the great disparity in
human endurance leaves vulnerable those individuals
on the extremities of the scale. In this case, the
policy, if rigidly followed, creates more problems
than it solves.
Most people recognize that there is a fatigue level
beyond which a pilot cannot effectively perform.
The unit commander, following general guidance, is
the individual best qualified to make decisions regarding
individual work and flight assignments.
(Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization)
27
 AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES
New Army Engineering
Test Pilots
ON 11 JUNE 1982, Class Number 81 was graduated
from the Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent
River, MD. Congratulations to the Army graduates:
Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, Hugh Lammons, Captain
Robert MacMullin and Major Bill Leonard. We also
have three students in Class 82. They will graduate in
December.
The October 1981 Aviation Digest contained an
excellent article outlining the Army Aviation Engineer
ing and Flight Testing Program. Here is some additional
information by way of an update.
The program is a doorway to challenging assign
ments and unique opportunities in the aviation research
and development area. The competition for selection
is keen and the program itself is 13 months of rigorous
academic and flight training.
Test Pilot Program Prerequisites. Active duty Army
aviators in the grade of major and below may apply.
• Must hold pilot status code 1 and either Specialty
Code 15,67J, 71, or military occupational specialty
100 series.
• Must be dual rated with a minimum of 1,000
hours military flight time.
• Must possess a current instrument certificate.
• Must be a competent swimmer.
• Must have completed college algebra, physics
and calculus with above average grades.
• Experience in complex aircraft such as the CH
47 Chinook, UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-64 Apache
or OV-1 Mohawk is highly desirable.
Selection and Training. Selection of Army aviators
for participation in the program is made by an annual
Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), Officer
Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) board.
Board members are drawn from:
• U.S. Army Aviation Engineering Flight Activity
(USAAEFA)
• U.S. Army Aviation Development Test Activity
(USAADTA)
• U.S. Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS)
• OPMD Combat Arms Division
28
• OPMD Combat Service Support Division
• OPMD Warrant Officer Division.
Only those applications of officers who are recom
mended by their respective career divisions are
considered. Once selected, and prior to attending
NTPS, officers are sent TDY (temporary duty) to the
Army Test Pilot Orientation Course at USAAEFA,
Edwards Air Force Base, CA. This 8-week course is
designed to provide academic and flight refresher
training. Academic subjects include college math
through calculus, physics, aerodynamics, mechanics
and technical report writing. Flight orientation includes
high altitude environmental training, flight test tech
niques and familiarization in a number of aircraft
used at NTPS. NTPS classes begin semiannually, in
January and July. The Army's training quota is nine
per year; however, the number of officers trained is a
function of requirements. Upon successful completion
of the NTPS, graduates are assigned to the U.S. Army
Aviation Research and Development Command or
USAADTA, Ft. Rucker, AL, as engineering test pilots.
Board Schedule. The next OPMD Engineering Test
Pilot Selection Board will convene in January 1983.
Department of the Army Circular 351-83, “Army Avia
tion Engineering Test Pilot Program,” has been revised
and the new one should reach the field this month. It
provides further general information as well as detailed
application procedures. Those readers whose applica
tions have been held for future boards must update
their application not later than 15 December 1982,
which is also the administrative cut-off date for new
applications.
Further information is available at the Aviation
Plans/Programs Branch, USAMILPERCEN, ATTN:
DAPC-OPA-V, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA
22332; AUTOVON 221-8156/7/8 or commercial (202)
325-8156/7/8. Tºº-f
Editor's note: The Aviation Digest regrets the recent death of
CW3 Hugh Lammons.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
º:
Command And Staff College
Selection Procedures
ON 19 AUGUST 1982, the Chief of Staff approved
modifications to the Command and Staff College
(CSC) selection system effective with the 1982 selection
board that met earlier this month. The principal change
is that zones of eligibility for consideration and selection
for CSC attendance is now captain (P) through less
than 14 years of service (YOS).
In 1980 the CSC selection system was changed to
allow CSC selection and attendance of captains not
yet selected for major. That was implemented in
response to Department of Defense guidance for full
tour stability and the review of education and training
for officers (RETO) study recommendations. The
combination of those factors required that officers
complete staff training before their 12th YOS and
have been at their previous duty station for 36 months
before attending school. The eligibility zone for the
1981 selection board was changed to 8 to 11 YOS.
Subsequent action to implement Combined Arms
and Services Staff School (CAS3), coupled with a
policy for early selection/attendance at CSC, resulted
in assignment congestion for company grade officers
* and limited the time available for developmental
assignment.
Since the planned attendance at CAS3 for 100
percent of the officer corps supported the RETO
recommendation for staff training before 12 YOS, it
was determined that changing the zone of eligibility
for CSC selection to captain (P) through less than 14
YOS would alleviate assignment congestion and would
add time for professional development and use of
company grade officers. This change also recognizes
CSC as a school which orients on preparation of
officers for field grade duties. Previously programed
at 9 through 14 YOS, attendance will now normally
occur in 10 through 15 YOS. Other features of the
new CSC selection system are:
• Elimination of the separate screen board. The
modified zone of eligibility reduced the eligible
NOVEMBER 1982
population and negated the need for a screen board.
The records of all eligible officers will be reviewed by
the CSC selection board with a general officer as
president.
• Elimination of the use of an alternate list. The
board will select a fixed number of officers who will
be scheduled to attend CSC in accordance with (IAW)
stability guidance, operational requirements and annual
seats available. Replacement students will be selected
from principal selectees IAW slating guidance.
• Stability criterion remains at completion of a
normal tour (up to 36 months onstation). This will
result in some officers being deferred for not more
than 2 years.
Year groups (YG68-75) affected by the former
selection system were considered and selected under
a rigid year group quota system. That system was
considered appropriate because a large eligible
population was competing for a fixed number of CSC
allocations (14,000 officers vs. 1,000 allocations). Eligible
populations for this year's board were smaller, and
will be for all future selection boards, and therefore
will receive a higher proportion of CSC allocations
than under the past system. In order to preserve year
group equity, selection boards will receive guidance
on the minimum number of officers who should be
selected from each year group on an annual basis.
This year the eligible population consisted of all captains
(P) and serving majors through year group 68, minus
previous selectees, attendees or declinees. Future
boards will only consider officers who have less than
14 years active federal commissioned service.
In the future, each year group will be considered
for CSC during a 4-year eligibility period. Strength
projections indicate that at least 50 percent of an
eligible year group can now expect to attend resident
CSC instruction; the former system allowed only 40
to 45 percent of the eligible population. Nonselectees
by 14 YOS won't be considered for resident CSC.
29
 VIEWS FROM READERS
Editor:
Request the enclosed listing of Mis
souri ARNG aviation facilities and units
be published in the U.S. Army Aviation
Digest.
Jefferson City
Army Aviation Support Facility
(Airfield Operations)
1717 Industrial Drive
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Comm: (314) 751-2321 Ext 237/238
AV: 631-3730
867th Medical Detachment
1717 Industrial Drive
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Comm; (314) 751-2321 Ext 277
AV: 631-3730 Ext 277
868th Medical Detachment
1717 Industrial Drive
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Comm; (314) 751-2321 Ext 277
AV: 631-3730 Ext 277
Det 1, HHC, 135th Engineer Group
1717 Industrial Drive
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Comm; (314) 751-2321 Ext 277
AV: 631-3730 Ext 277
Warrensburg
Army Aviation Support Facility
(Airfield Operations)
P.O. Box 5088
Whiteman AFB, MO 65305
Comm: (816) 687-3612
AV: 975-3612
30
Company D, 38th Aviation Battalion
(ATK HEL)
P.O. Box 290
Warrensburg, MO 64093
Comm; (816) 747-6211
Springfield
Army Aviation Flight Activity
(Airfield Operations)
Route 6, Box 385, Regional Airport
Springfield, MO 65803
Comm; (417) 862-8552
AVCRAD (1107th) (-Det 1)
1400 N. Fremont
Springfield, MO 65802
Comm; (417) 869-2501/2513
Det 1, AVCRAD (1107th)
Route 7
Lebanon, MO 65536
Comm; (417) 532-4381
HHD, 142d Transportation Battalion
(Aircraft Maintenance)
1400 N. Fremont
Springfield, MO 65802
Comm; (417) 869-6341
1106th Trans Co (AVIM) (-Det 1)
1400 N. Fremont
Springfield, MO 65802
Comm; (417) 869-6341
Det 1, 1106th Trans Co (AVIM)
409 W. Locust Street
Aurora, MO 65605
Comm; (417) 678-3568
COL Willard L. Bean
State Aviation Officer
Missouri National Guard
Editor:
Request the enclosed listing of Army
Aviation National Guard units from the
State of Washington be published in
the U.S. Army Aviation Digest.
Tacoma (Gray AAF)
Attack Helicopter Troop (-), 116th AC
Camp Murray
Tacoma, WA 98.430
Comm: (206) 964-6410
AV: 355-74.10
Seattle
81st Inf Bde, Avn Section
1601 West Armory Way
Seattle, WA 981 3.
Comm; (206) 464-6161
AV: 941-3496
Spokane
841st Med Det (AA)
P.O. Box 19069
Spokane Int'l Airport
Spokane, WA 992.19
Comm; (509) 458-5405
AV: 820-7405
LTC Timothy M. Flynn
State Army Aviation Officer
Washington National Guard
• The Aviation Digest has carried
listings of Army Aviation National Guard
units in Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Min
nesota, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin. Also,
a list of Reserve units, by state, is avail
able. The Digest will be happy to pub
lish listings of other National Guard
units not previously printed.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Editor:
I recently saw the second article in
- the series “Forty Years of Army Avia
tion” and would like a copy of the
complete series. I served as an air
observer in World War II, liaison pilot
in 1945, Army aviator in 1950 and senior
Army aviator in 1954. I was retired in
1961 and have continued to work for
the Army (including active duty from
1966 to 1968 as an Army aviator).
Additionally, is there a way to get a
Master Army Aviator rating now that
the instrument/weather minimums have
been reduced?
James W. Abbett
Lawton, OK
• There are no provisions for people
who retired before 1 June 1981 to obtain
a retroactive Master Army Aviator
rating.
Editor:
Please add the Little Rock District,
Army Corps of Engineers, to your
mailing list.
Karen K. Johnson
Assistant PAO
Little Rock District
Corps of Engineers
Little Rock, AR
• Distribution of the Aviation Digestis
handled through pinpoint distribution.
It will be necessary for you to submit
DA Form 12-5 in accordance with
instructions on that form to start receiv
ing the magazine.
~,
Editor:
In reference to the article, “The
MICOM Pledge: A Good Weapon
Today, A Better One Tomorrow," which
appeared in the May 1981 issue of the
Aviation Digest. It was rather discon
certing to see the fruits of our efforts
presented in a manner which did not
acknowledge those of us responsible
for the original concept and develop
ment of the mast-mounted sight (MMS).
While every word in the paragraph on
Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362
NOVEMBER 1982
the MMS is true, the facts are that this
project began at Frankford Arsenal,
PA, in 1976 and was transferred to the
U.S. Army Armament Research and
Development Command (ARRADCOM)
along with the personnel, following the
closing of Frankford.
The pictured MMS was developed
solely at ARRADCOM and in the opin
ion of the undersigned the omission of
these facts imply otherwise.
Kennard Raisner, Project Engineer
Thomas W. Peters, Engineer
Anthony LaCosta, Engineer
James A. Connolly, Test Engineer
U.S. Army Armament Research and
Development Command
Dover, NJ
Editor:
The June article by BG Ford, “Grass
hoppers,” was one of the best written
pieces I have seen in your magazine. In
addition to the high quality writing skill
he displayed in portraying the birth of
Army Aviation, another theme is describ
ed which is still current—40 years later.
It is important to extract from his
excellent article the fact that Army
Aviation owes its existence to branch
proponency.
As BG Ford describes, it was vitally
important that the capabilities of the
aviation machine be tied directly to the
mission of artillery in order to ensure
responsive fires. To do this, the aviation
capability had to be decentralized away
from the Army Air Corps—“the tradi
tional operator in the flying domain"—
and down to the artillery units. The
training by BG Ford, the close working
relationship with the artillery units and
total mission orientation proved to be
successful.
Today, however, we again find a
centralization of aviation capabilities
away from the branch and mission users
of its capabilities. As he described 41
years ago, aviation is now “allotted to
subordinate units on a mission-by-mission
basis from centralized assets.” We have
pilots and an aviation specialty. We
have a steady questioning of mission
proponency. The child which broke
away 40 years ago is growing to be
more like the parent he broke away
from. Where is the BG Ford to break
the “holt" that is being made now?
MAJ William V. Chiaramonte
U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency
Bethesda, MD
Editor:
I read Betty J. Goodson's article
“Victory in Air-to-Air Combat, the
Marine Corps Way" with great interest
in the July 1982 issue of U.S. Army
Aviation Digest.
In the 1969/70 timeframe, Air Test
and Evaluation Squadron Four (VX-4)
at NAS Point Mugu, CA, conducted a
Joint USN/USA evaluation, called “Pro
ject Strawman," of fighter airplanes vs.
helicopters. The USA Cobra helicopters
were from Ft. Ord, CA, and led by a
Major Hirch (sic). As chief projects
officer at VX-4, I led the fighter team.
A joint report was written and is probably
buried somewhere at VX-4 or OPTE
VFOR. (Too bad we have to continue
reinventing the wheel.)
In any case, the conclusions were
the same as those noted by Major
Goodwin and Major Wojtasck (page
6/7). If the helicopter pilot sees the
fighter, then there is little chance of
the fighter getting a solid (guns or
missiles) shot. We concluded that the
helicopter could easily evade (read-keep
out of the fighter's weapons envelope),
hide, or in many cases, get a high
deflection passing shot at the fighter.
We also noted that if the helicopter
pilot had an AIM-9 (series) weapon
(launcher on skids) available, he could:
(1) get a valid shot; (2) scare hell out of
the fighter; (3) scare hell out of himself;
(4) all of the above.
One of the side “bennies” of “Straw
man” was the fighter (F-4/F-8), Cobra
cross training. Both teams gained great
respect for the other guy's capabilities
and problems by flying in the other's
machine.
CPT F. S. Teague, USN
Chief, Current Operations
CINCPAC
Camp H. M. Smith, HI
31

REPORTING FINAL
Late/NewsFromArmyAviation Activities
FROM FORT RUCKER
New publications. Two new field manuals are
expected to be available in early 1983: FM
1-301, “Aeromedical Training for Flight Person
nel," superseding TC 1-20; and FM 1-202, “Envir
onmental Flight,” superseding TCs 1-10, 1-12
and 1-13.
FM 1-301 will provide aircrewmembers with
information on effects of the flight environment
and will assist commanders and flight surgeons
in conducting aeromedical training. Topics cover
ed in the manual include altitude physiology,
oxygen equipment and cabin pressurization,
G-forces, stress and fatigue, toxic hazards, tem
perature extremes, noise, vision problems and
Spatial disorientation illusions.
FM 1-202 will help crewmembers complete
missions under such varying environmental
conditions as desert, jungle, mountain and cold
weather. Topics included are human and environ
mental factors, flying techniques, survival infor
mation and a recommended training program for
each addressed environment.
(DTD POC: 1-301, Campbell, AV 558-7113;
1-202, Sharpe, AV 558-3801)
Winning Writer. Raymond P. Johnson, an air
safety specialist with the Army Safety Center
since 1963, won the Aviation Digest monthly
writing award in July for his article "When Will
We Learn About Mountain Flying?”
Mr. Johnson, who was an Army aviator from
1942 to 1962, said his purpose was to tell aviators
Some of the lessons they must learn to fly safely
at high altitudes.
“I hope the article helps; some instructor pilots
have told me I've probably saved some lives,"
Mr. Johnson said. (USAAVNC PAO)
32
|
-
,-
=
A New Way to Fly. Some AH-1S Cobra pilots
are being taught to fly their helicopters, from lift
off to touchdown, while under the hood and unable
to see outside the cockpit by natural means.
They are participants in the Apache Flight
Training Infrared Piloting System (AFTIPS) Assess
ment Program being conducted by the Army
Aviation Board. It is designed to be used to
determine the adequacy of the planned training
program for the AFTIPS, which is scheduled to
be incorporated on the AH-64.
The system includes a helmet display unit that
allows the pilot to see a video image of the outside
world as interpreted by infrared radiation. The
image can be seen only with the right eye, leaving
the wearer's left eye free to view instruments
and other objects inside the cockpit.
(Kontos, AVN BD)
Annual Conference. The third annual Army Avia
tion Policy Committee Meeting/Training Sym
posium was held 15 to 19 November with about
150 representatives of all major Army commands
and Department of the Army staff agencies attend
Ing.
They were welcomed to the U.S. Army Aviation
Center by its commander, Major General Carl H.
McNair Jr. The Training Symposium began Mon
day morning and ended at noon Wednesday,
and the Policy Committee convened Wednesday
afternoon and adjourned Friday noon.
Opening remarks for the two separate but
interfacing Conferences were made by Brigadier
General John M. Kirk, director of training, Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, Department of the Army. He said his
objective is to get the time, money, people and
equipment needed to enable aviation training to
be as effective as possible. “An area that needs
special attention" he said, “is training resource
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 “Ghostriders.” Aviators of D Company, 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion at Ft. Rucker, AL,
take off for Camp Blanding, FL, for a week of annual gunnery training. There were 17 AH-1S
Cobras used in the training exercise, as well as 8 OH-58 Kiowas and 3 UH-1 Hueys. The exercise
was the first time an attack helicopter unit had undergone that type of training, using the entire
company at Blanding for team qualification
º
management, which will make training at all levels
º easier than it is today."
º Keynote speaker was Lieutenant General Julius
W. Becton Jr., deputy commander for training,
Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Mon
roe, VA. Army Aviation's place as an essential
multiplier of combat power for the combined
arms team was further ensured, he noted, by the
outcome of the Army Aviation Systems Program
Review held at Ft. Rucker in March 1982.
|-
“The scope and the force of the training issue
of the SPR go right to the heart of the Army's
capability to win the next war, and the whole
force structure will be improved as the result of
recommendations flowing from the SPR," he said.
General Becton added that issues resolved in
the November conferences will also strengthen
Army Aviation's ability to meet the challenges of
the AirLand Battle concept.
"We need to focus on the things we do well,"
was the theme Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker
used for his remarks at the beginning of the
Policy Committee meeting. As the Army Aviation
officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, Department of the Army,
he is the committee's executive chairman. Two
of the elements he talked about were the sympo
sium and committee conferences which provide
a forum whereby an issue raised by a person
anywhere in Army Aviation can reach a Depart
ment of the Army committee, and the standard
ization network that starts at DA level and has
tentacles down to every unit.
Future issues of the Aviation Digest will carry
detailed coverage on the conferences.
FROM TEXAS
Get Your Bearings Here. Since manufacturers
have curtailed the production of aircraft bearings,
reclamation has become highly profitable, con
NOVEMBER 1982
sidering that many helicopter bearings average
about $800 each and prices have jumped as
much as 300 to 400 percent in one quarter. That's
what makes the work done by the bearing re
clamation facility at the Corpus ChristiArmy Depot
so valuable. Currently, the facility handles about
500 different types of bearings used in helicopter
engines, transmissions, rotor heads and control
systems.
In addition to saving money, the reclamation
saves time. It reduces the 40 or more month
delivery dates for new bearings to a timeframe
that provides bearings for aircraft maintenance
so that engine and transmission overhaul sched
ules can be met. (TSARCOM PAO)
FROM WASHINGTON
Military History Chief. A Master Army Aviatoris
now acting chief of military history for the De
partment of the Army. Colonel Olen D. Thornton
was appointed to that position 1 October.
More Cobras Ordered. The U.S. Army has
awarded Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Fort Worth,
an $18 million contract for 12 AH-1S Cobras with
deliveries to take place from November 1984 to
February 1985. (Tipton, Bell PR)
FROM CANADA
Volcanic Ash Tracking. From research done
on potential accidents caused when two com
mercial airlines had to make forced landings
because of ingestion of volcanic ash from erup
tions of Mt. Galunggung in Java, the International
Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, has deter
33
mined that new procedures to track clouds of
volcanic ash are needed.
ICAO learned that the U.S. National Oceano
graphic and Atmospheric Administration was able
to monitor the ash cloud, using both geostationary
and polar-orbiting satellites.
Information has also been received that Austral
ian scientists have developed a method that might
be useful in such tracking. Tracking stations in
that country are said to be receiving data from
one of the United States' satellites; and then
through a painstaking computer-based automated
discrimination process, clouds of ash can be seen
at high altitudes where they usually are invisible
Training Display Unit is Evaluated. As the pilot of an AH-1S
Cobra, CW4 Stu Park is ready for a training flight using the
new helmet display unit that is part of the Apache Flight
Training Infrared Piloting System (AFTIPS). The training system
consists of the helmet and the special infrared electronics
to conventional weather satellites.
As a follow-up, the development of a stan
*
dardized procedural warning system associated
with volcanic eruptions is currently under discus
Sion at ICAO. Immediately following a volcanic
eruption near airways, the issuance of warnings
can best be handled by local authorities and
would most likely have to be based on obser
vations from the ground or from aircraft. Subse
quent tracking of ash clouds would be of inter
national concern, and monitoring could be done
in flight by aircraft observations and from weather
satellites. (ICAO PAO)
onboard a modified Cobra and is geared to teach all phases
of current flight procedures to the pilot who is inside an
enclosed canopy. Twenty-four aviators at Ft. Rucker, AL, are
participating in the Army Aviation Board's assessment of the
proposed program of instruction using the new system
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
.
REAT
How Do You Spell Threat?
F YOU ASK THE typical Army aviator, “How do
you spell THREAT” the answer will probably be,
“small arms.” However, in a nonnuclear, nonchemi
cal European scenario during normal everyday oper
ations, this will not be the case if you, the aviator,
make a full assessment of the battlefield environment
and use current tactics and doctrine accordingly.
To do this assessment of the battlefield environment,
and thus prioritize the threat to you during your
specific flight, your preflight planning must include
an analysis of the enemy situation, intentions and
capabilities. To assist in this effort, the Threat Branch,
U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, has
identified below the prioritized list of systems posing
a threat to U.S. Army helicopters in forward areas in a
nonnuclear, nonchemical European scenario. This is
a generalized list, as the threat may change considerably
in any specific situation. It also assumes the crew/air
craft is using current tactics, is equipped with oper
ational aircraft survivability equipment (e.g., APR-39
radar warning receiver) and can read a map correctly.
It should not be confused with a list of target priorities
which would be mission dependent.
• Regimental air defense systems (ZSU-23-4, SA-9
and follow-on SA-13, SA-7 and follow-on SA-14).
• Attack helicopters (Hind/Hip).
NOVEMBER 1982
Captain (P) Dale L. Radtke
Threat Branch
Directorate of Combat Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
• Artillery (e.g., SP-122, SP-152, BM-21 multiple
rocket launcher).
• Divisional air defense systems (SA-6, SA-8, SA-11).
• Tanks (12.7 AA MG and main tank gun).
• Armored personnel carriers (BMP with 73 mm
gun or 30 mm cannon and SAGGER/SPIGOT
ATGM, BMD and BTR with 14.5 antiaircraft
machinegun).
• Fixed wing ground attack aircraft.
• Small arms.
Regimental air defense systems were chosen as the
greatest threat because they can all use passive detection
techniques to acquire a hovering helicopter, giving
pilots no notice until the round or missile is en route
to their positions, and because they have the range
capability to acquire and shoot at a detected helicopter
hovering at our doctrinal stand-off range. These systems
are also present in large numbers near the forward
line of own troops (FLOT). Since a ZSU-23-4 can
acquire and fire optically (passive) or using the gun
dish radar system (active), a ZSU-23-4 battery will
probably operate with a mix of the two operating
modes, unless visibility is restricted.
Attack helicopters were selected second because
of the large number of Hind and armed Hip helicopters
that will be in the forward area (parity with United
35
States in any brigade area) and because their mobility,
long-range antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and
forward employment will place them well within range
of U.S. attack and scout helicopters. While the
armament carried, and the mission assignments of
the Soviet attack helicopters are not optimized for
air-to-air combat, they certainly have the capability
to fire on a hovering helicopter as if it were a ground
target. The U.S. Army Aviation Center position is
that these “chance” encounters will occur to such an
extent that air-to-air engagements will become a routine
part of the Army Aviation mission.
Artillery was chosen third because of the likelihood
of helicopters being located in the vicinity of vast
amounts of artillery impacting around ground units
(wrong place at the right time). It is not our contention
that artillery will routinely be called in on helicopter
firing positions, but that helicopters attempting to
find firing positions to place effective long-range ATGM
fire on Soviet systems will, of necessity, often find
themselves near (within 500 meters) friendly ground
troops. It is also possible that Soviet artillery forward
observers may call for artillery upon detected helicopter
firing positions when those helicopters do not move
to alternate positions as soon as they should (e.g.,
delaying to fire one more missile).
The threat posed by radar-acquired, radar-guided
surface-to-air missiles at division level will vary greatly
with the type of system present in your sector and
with its ability to acquire a hovering helicopter. Whereas
an SA-6 battery probably will not be able to acquire a
hovering helicopter unless it is hovering 30 feet above
the trees and skylined, an SA-11 battery will be able
to lock-on at a lower altitude in more ground clutter.
With U.S. Air Force fixed wing aircraft as their greatest
priority target, it is questionable to assume a divisional
air defense battery will fire a missile at a hovering
helicopter that only needs to descend 10 to 20 feet to
break radar lock-on when given warning by an APR-39.
Soviet tank crews train to fire their 12.7mm antiair
craft machinegun at a helicopter when the target is
within range (1,500 meters) and to use their main gun
if the helicopter is beyond that range. A tank crew
will fire whatever round is loaded in the gun tube as
the automatic loader cannot easily extract a shell
from the tube. Tanks conducting an assault normally
will be concentrating on their immediate objective
and the ground forces on it, so the probability of them
detecting hovering helicopters beyond 2,000 meters
will be very low. BMP and BTR vehicles will have
about the same potential for detecting helicopters
36
but will be less of a threat because of range limitations.
Fixed wing ground attack aircraft have the potential
t
to shoot down helicopters; however, their low level,
high speed ingress/egress flight profiles near the FLOT
allow little or no flexibility and reaction time for
targets of opportunity. A greater threat would be
posed by a ground controller who detects a line of
attack helicopters in firing positions along a ridgeline
and diverts inbound aircraft to attack the ridgeline.
Small arms were assessed as the least threat because
riflemen and gunners will not be able to acquire
helicopters at doctrinal standoff ranges and will rarely
dismount their carriers during offensive actions.
In the following situations the weapons systems dis
cussed will become a more (or less) effective threat as
depicted.
Nuclear: In a nuclear environment, nuclear weapons
will be the greatest threat but should equally degrade
the performance of all Soviet ground systems by forcing
them to button up. Small arms and the SA-7/14 teams
will remain in their vehicles during offensive operations
and will be no threat.
Chemical: In a chemical environment, systems with
chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) protective
systems allow the crew to function normally (without
mask or CBR suit). The BMP, BMD, T-64, T-72, 122
mm howitzer, 152 mm howitzer and Hind can all
function normally except buttoned up in a CBR environ
ment. In contrast, older systems such as the ZSU-23-4
and T-62 have overpressurization systems that only
protect the crew from radiation. Dismounted personnel
firing small arms or an SA-7/14 would have to sight
through their mask eyepieces and their performance
would probably be reduced.
Night: In a night environment, weapon systems
that do not have radar, thermal sighting systems such
as forward looking infrared radar (FLIR), or long
range night vision devices will be seriously reduced
threats. Any night vision devices that operate near
the 1-micron range may be able to “see” any active
laser rangefinders in their field of vision and, therefore,
detect the source.
Heavy Smoke/Obscurants: In the vast smoke screens
the Soviets will use during an assault, the IR (infrared)
degrading smoke will cause more ZSUs to operate in
the radar mode and the Hinds will maneuver around
it, causing both to be increased threats. Systems with
optical acquisition only (SA-7/14, SA-9/13, small arms)
will be severely restricted and even systems with thermal
acquisition systems (tanks and BMPs) will be degraded
in effectiveness.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 LEGEND

- decreased threat

+ increased threat
- - - o
º º
º Ø -
39 .<9
-
&
o
º
-
&
o
O no significant change Sº º S& Sº cº & & º cº
& / sº Z & Z & Z & Z & & / Sº Z *
ZSU-23-4 || O O + + - O -

SA-9/13| O - - + O - O -

SA-7/14 || – || – - + O - + +
HIND| O + + + O º O

artilleryl O O O O - O - º -

SA-6/8/11| O - O O + - - º -

tanks I – O + - º + - + O
BMP/BTR) — O + - O + - + O

ground attack aircraft| O O - O - O + O O

small arms! - - - - + O + + +

Cross FLOT: During any cross-FLOT operations,
helicopters will be much more susceptible to small
arms and regimental/divisional air defense systems.
Chance encounters with Hinds will be more likely,
but exposure to hostile artillery and fixed wing ground
attack aircraft would be unlikely.
Heavy Jamming: In a heavy jamming environment,
º -
regimental and divisional air defense systems will be
degraded by radar and communications jamming.
Tank and BMP companies will normally assign platoons
to assist in the air defense of our forces under these
circumstances.
Rear Area: During flights in our rear area, attacks
from Soviet fighters or ground attack aircraft would
be more likely, and small arms fire from infiltrators or
insurgents would be possible but unlikely.
Defense: In a situation where the Soviets are in a
defensive posture—for example, a frontline regiment
Recon Units: In a covering force area when Soviet
reconnaissance units are preceding their main forces,
these recon units will frequently dismount personnel;
small arms and SA-7/14s could, again, be a major
threat. Divisional and regimental air defense units are
usually not present with recon units, but additional
SA-7/14 teams could easily be attached to them. The
volume of artillery normally associated with an assault
would not be present, so artillery, as a threat, would
be greatly reduced.
Assessing the threat to SEMA (special electronic
mission aircraft) is much less complicated and, except
for nuclear and chemical environments, should always
remain—
1. SA-4/12.
2. Fighter/ground attack aircraft.
3. SS21/SCUD nuclear, chemical or ICM attack
on base airfield facility. -

in a hasty defense because of heavy attrition, awaiting 4. SA-6/11.

passage of another regiment—the SA-7/14 teams and
small arms will be dismounted and could be the greatest
threat. Unbuttoned tanks and BMPs would be assigned
defensive sectors and could easily detect and engage
hovering helicopters as they pop up.
5. Small arms/SA-7/14 (infiltration teams).
You, the aviator, will have to assess not only what
weapons systems oppose you in the battle and where
they are, but also what battlefield environmental factors
will/won't enhance ability to acquire and kill you.

NOVEMBER 1982 37
 Cºrmy cxviation in 24atin Człmerica
VIATION'S NEWEST team member in Panama
is the U.S. Army medical department activity's
(MEDDAC) Air Ambulance Section, “Ditch Dustoff.”
With the implementation of the Panama Canal
Treaty of 1979, the Army assumed responsibility for
health care within the former Panama Canal Zone.
To discharge this responsibility, an air ambulance
section was organized, primarily to provide an aerial
link between the two major treatment facilities, Coco
Solo Army Hospital on the Atlantic side of the isthmus
and Gorgas Army Hospital on the Pacific side.
Colocated with the 210th Aviation at Howard Air
Force Base on the west bank (Pacific terminus) of the
Panama Canal, this aviation section has a three-fold
mission responsibility. Foremost is its aeromedical
evacuation of casualties from jungle field sites and
the interhospital transfer of patients between MEDDAC's
Training in all types of terrain and
all types of equipment keeps the
air ambulance unit's personnel
sharp
photo by SSG Charlie Drake
38
two major treatment facilities. In addition, the unit
transports essential medical personnel, whole blood,
biologicals and other medical supplies.
Like most air ambulance units, Dustoff Panama
has a four-man crew on standby at the airfield 24
hours a day, and it is because of this responsiveness
that they also serve as crash rescue support to Howard
AFB.
This unit's organization and mission are truly unique
for several reasons. It is one of only two Department
of the Army air ambulance units worldwide which are
also under the command and control of a medical
treatment facility.
With its geographic location on the 40-mile wide
Isthmus of Panama, the section is also able to boast
that it is the only Army unit with aeromedical evacuation
duties ranging from the Atlantic to Pacific oceans.
ustoff
7amāma
Major Bruce G. Furbish"
Plans, Operations and Training Officer
Letterman Army Hospital
Presidio of San Francisco
*Major Furbish was assigned as chief, Air
Ambulance Section, MEDDAC, Panama, when
he wrote this article
º

ºv - - ſº -
The possibility of removing a casualty from watercraft is real
in Panama. Crews from the Gorgas Army Hospital air ambulance
unit practice this tricky maneuver over a 1097th Transportation
Company (MED BOAT) LCM on the Chagres River near Ft.
Sherman, Panama
The makeup of the supported population provides
another distinction not commonly found in most air
º ambulance units. As its primary mission the unit pro
vides aeromedical evacuation to not only all Depart
ment of Defense elements of the U.S. Southern
Command, but also to a large number of civilian
Panama Canal Commission employees. Secondary to
this support and similar in concept to the MAST
(Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic) program,
the unit is also frequently involved in search and
rescue support, as well as humanitarian missions for
the host country, Panama. These missions range from
the extraction of injured sailors by rescue hoist from
ships in waters adjacent to the Panama Canal to a
mission of mercy flight to a small village deep within
the Darienjungle of Panama to rescue a young woman
with prenatal complications.
During the past year the unit flew 620 missions—an
average of 52 per month—in support of its various
missions. Viewed alone this may not seem impressive,
however, these statistics were compiled with only
three assigned UH-1 VHuey aircraft on a Flying Hour
Program that totaled 992 hours. This equates to 330
hours per airframe and could well make it the busiest
air ambulance unit in the Army today.
Statistics like these are not easily obtained without
a maintenance section that is responsive to mission
requirements. Often working long hours, the unit's
maintenance section has ensured the availability of a
minimum of two standby aircraft at any given time.
The maintenance section can take pride in the fact
NOVEMBER 1982
that the section has never missed a medical evacuation
(medevac) due to a maintenance-related problem.
Supporting such a diverse mission load requires
medical aids who are highly trained and able to work
under pressure with no physician supervision. To
prepare medics for these challenges, candidates are :
required to be Emergency Medical Technicians,
complete the Advanced Cardiac Life Support Course,
and receive extensive training in the labor and delivery
wards of Gorgas Army Hospital.
As with all aviation in Panama, the requirements
for safe operations in a tropical environment pose
special challenges to the pilots. From the suddenness
of a heavy tropical rain shower to the total darkness
of the jungle at night, pilots of air ambulance flights
must be highly trained and confident to handle the
mission. To cope with these special mission require
ments, a high premium is placed on night, instrument
and high performance hoist proficiency.
Comprehensive ground school classes are conducted
weekly complemented by regularly scheduled Night
Hawk and instrument flight periods. Additionally, the
aviators are annually sent to Ft. Benning, GA, for 20
hours of SFTS (synthetic flight training simulator)
refresher training culminating in the renewal of their
instrument flight tickets.
To familiarize aviators with the flight physiology,
meteorology, aircraft performance and control tech
niques associated with high altitude operations, aviators
annually conduct training in the 10,000 to 12,000 foot
high mountains near San Jose, Costa Rica. The product
of these training programs is aviators capable of
planning flights and safely operating their aircraft
over terrain as diverse as the hilly triple canopy jungle
of the region, the vast open water areas surrounding
the Panama Canal or the rugged mountainous areas
of western Panama and much of Central and South
America. Although the youngest of the Army's aero
medical evacuation units, the daily routine of long,
tedious hours of standby punctuated by the shrill
alert of the mission and a call for help is well known
by all who serve with “Dustoff.” Our air ambulance
section proudly joins the long list of medevac units
worldwide dedicated to providing a rapid and responsive
evacuation link for all U.S. Armed Forces and Allied
elements whom they serve. º->
39

%
...'... º º
º... º:::::::::::::::
HIS ITEM in the Flight Infor
mation Bulletin is one of a
growing number of procedures
which are being published and prac
ticed at Army Aviation facilities to
put into action the noise abatement
procedures being pressed by the
“Fly Neighborly Program.”
The Fly Neighborly Program is
the vehicle by which the helicopter
industry is trying to improve the
environment by removing, or at least
reducing, objectionable sound. All
of us who fly have learned to live
with noise and sometimes we take
it for granted. Due to the growing
voice of state and local governments,
special interest groups and citizens,
the civilian helicopter industry has
begun to take an earnest interest
because restrictions imposed to
reduce helicopter noise—higher
flight altitudes, route control and
sound limits—would ultimately ad
versely impinge upon industry's
growth.”
At its February 1982 convention
at Las Vegas, NV, the Helicopter
Association International (HAI)
proposed a plan to reduce noise
levels associated with helicopters
through source design, engineering
and piloting techniques. Design
engineering to reduce acoustic sig
nature hopefully will be realized in
the future as manufacturers find
new ways to muffle sounds, diffuse
noise and reduce vibrations. In the
%
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ſ". ſº
near term, adaptation of sensible
piloting techniques can contribute
to elimination of noises and vibra
tions. This just means that we who
fly helicopters must avoid flight
envelopes which produce annoying
noise. I hope to show you how in
this article.
As military pilots, you and I have
always been concerned as much as
the civilian firms about helicopter
noise, although the reasons for
concern may have been different.
We, of course, are aware of the
need for good public relations,
because we live and work very
closely with—indeed side by side—
civilian communities. Our unit per
sonnel and our families are subject
to the same conditions as “those
civilians.”
On the other hand, from a purely
military sense of the word, we need
to reduce detectability on the battle
field as a contribution to surviv
ability. Also, the Army is sensitive
to the effects that noise and the
vibration associated with it have on
the health and job efficiency of the
soldier. We know that noise attenu
ation reduces fatigue and noise can
provide anxiety, hearing loss and
other health problems.
The intensity of noise is directly
related to the loudness of the source
and its proximity to the recipient
(“victim"). Within the realm of Army
Aviation, noise factors include en
--- -- tº
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.../
temſ |
º
T
| WTTW
|||\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
|| || W \W
gines, gearboxes, air turbulence,
power tools, weapons and even the
rushing sounds of the radios. The
characteristics of our modern mili
tary operations with helicopters—
flying lower and slower—exacerbate
noise but remain necessary to ac
complish our mission. These charac
teristics are:
• We must train as we intend to
fight, which includes multi
aircraft formations.
• We must train to fight day and
night.
• Sophisticated enemy detection
and acquisition systems drive
us to low levels (nap-of-the-earth)
in order to survive. This re
quires slower speeds.
• Adverse weather forces us to
lower altitudes, even on ad
ministrative flights.
• Training and normal operations
often require us to fly 7 days a
week.
From the point of view of civilians
or other personnel who are not
directly involved in the maneuvers
at hand—like weekend vacationers
—you can imagine the reaction to
one or more noisy helicopters slap
ping through the rainy night air.
The Federal Aviation Adminis
tration's (FAA's) concern about
noise abatement has prompted con
sideration of regulatory action. On
19 July 1979, the FAA issued Notice
of Proposed Rule Making No. 79
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 ſº - Z ſ
|||||
|||||||||
13 which proposed noise standards
for helicopters considered for certi
fication in the normal, transport and
restricted categories. It also pro
posed to prohibit certain changes
in type designs of helicopters that
might increase their noise levels
beyond prescribed limits. This notice
was withdrawn on 25 November
1981, however, after review indi
cated that relatively small indicated
benefits of noise reduction would
be far outweighed by the potential
costs. Still in force, however, is the
Noise Control Act of 1972, which
requires that noise reduction design
features which are “within economic
reasonableness and technological
practicality,” beincorporated in each
newly certificated helicopter model.
These design considerations include
an environmental assessment report
and require that external noise
measurements be made during de
velopment and benefits of design
technology are incorporated.
The International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has adopted
noise abatement standards and
recommended practices in its publi
cation on environmental protection.”
From the development point of
view, we must remain cognizant of
this requirement and move to im
prove the ways we can use tech
nology to serve our needs. From
the practical point of view, we must
NOVEMBER 1982
endeavor to reduce noise in all the
ways we know.
What are some of the character
istics of noise that affect us? As you
will see, knowing a little about this
will enable you to defend yourself
and others against harmful effects
or the annoyance of noise. Figure 1
illustrates sound level in decibels
(dB) and typical sounds.
In a series of publications, C. R.
Cox of Bell Helicopter Textron
provides pertinent data of great use
to the pilot in understanding noise
and its effects on the environment.
In these pamphlets, he recommends
procedures to reduce the adverse
effects of noise when operating light'
and medium sized helicopters. Here
are some highlights.
FIGURE 2: trend of helicopter
noise levels
100
Tº
a-
90
º -
I 80
:=
70 2,000
-
5,000
gross weight, pounds
DECIBEL
threshold of pain
º
a- airplane at 10 feet
120
e-hammering ea steel plate 3 feet away
•- riveting machine 40 feet away
e— tracter trailer starting up 50 feel swa
•— sermal automobile hera 20 feet away
*— subway 200 feet away
80 *- loud radie music in heme
•- slenegraphie office seuads
•- helicºpter 400 feel sway
•— average conversation 3 feet away
70 e— ºverage tºy threst sounds
DECIBELS
FIGURE 1: overall sound levels
Adapted from proposed City Code of Ordinance,
Department of Health, Houston, TX, Chap V, Sect I,
Noise Rules, Levels, Recommendations, not dated, p. 63.
[a] piston powered helicopter
at 250 feel
_turbine powered helicºpter
at 250 feel
diesel locomotive
at 100 feel
truck or motorcycle
at 100 feet
10,000 20,000 30,000
41
 maximum slap
perceptible slap_ seatinuous lap *
slap boundaryſm. slap boundary
+500 . ... +500 - - - -

Rate of Climb Rate ºf climb

e et per minute] [feet per minute)

0 0 - -

Rate of Descent
[feet per minute) - |

–500 (d. Rate of Descent

-500
-
` -

(feet per minute]

-1000
20 40 60 80 100 120
-1000 | 20
-

40 60 80
| |
100
|
120
|
140
Airspeed Airspeed
(knots) (knots)

FIGURE 3: noisy flight operations, light helicopters FIGURE 4: noisy flight operations, medium helicopters

intermittently when it encounters of descent. Then execute a normal

Sounce o/ Sound wind gusts or if you transition rapidly flare and landing.
The noise level of a helicopter is from one condition to another. Departure. You can limit the total
of course, a function of the .e
and Elimination of the most offensive area of exposure by using a high
tvde of ower
lant. Turbine pow- sounds can be accomplished by rate of climb and making a very
ºd .. h tºS are
uieter .an avoiding the slap region. Some other smooth transition to forward flight.
iston.ed ones wº
unmuffled pointers to reduce the sound are: Maneuver. Avoid rapid, high g
º ..xhausts and produce sounds Avoid overflight of populated areas turns. Perform maneuvers smoothly.
ºlouder than . vehicles (if you must fly over them, maintain A suggested technique to avoid
(figure 2) cruise airspeed of about 95 knots) blade slap is shown in figure 5.
Blade siap occurs in the light heli- and fly at highest practical altitude.
copter typically during partial power
descent, when a blade intersects its *.ia/ºt
*::::: Ahocedured Mode 44atement Ahocedured
own vortex
blade, suchsystem
as in or that of another
formation flight. {o. elicop tend /* Medium 24elicoptema
In the medium helicopter, this modu- Approach and Landing. When In medium helicopters such as
lated sound occurs during high speed commencing an approach in light the UH-1, the main rotor slaps to
forward flight normally at airspeeds helicopters such as the OH-58, some degree between 10 and about
of more than 100knots, during slow follow one of these two procedures: 85 knots, where it slaps almost con- tº
flight and during turns. Figure 3 Establish a rate of descent of at tinuously. At other airspeeds, it slaps
illustrates blade slap regions of the least 500 fpm before reducing air intermittently. Maximum slap occurs
Bell Model 206A (OH-58 Kiowa speed, then reduce airspeed while during partial power descents—at
type) as a function of airspeed, rate increasing rate of descent to at least airspeeds between 60 and 80 knots
of climb and rate of descent and 800 fpm; or, hold rate of descent to and rates of descent between 200
shows where you can expect this less than 200 fpm while reducing and 400 fpm.
sound. Note that maximum blade airspeed to about 55 knots, then At airspeeds above about 100
slap occurs between 65 and 80knots increase rate of descent. knots, blade slap intensifies, and it
and at rates of descent between 300 At an airspeed between 50 and may not be readily apparent to the
and 600 feet per minute (fpm). 75 knots, set up your glide path crew because the sound propagates
Figure 4 illustrates the bounds of while maintaining a rate of descent forward of the helicopter instead
“slap" in the helicopter Bell models of 800 fpm or greater. If the main of spreading.
204B, 205A and 212 (UH-1 Huey rotor tends to slap, increase the Blade slap also occurs during
type). The “slap boundary" can be rate of descent. When approaching constant speed turns, if turn rates
larger because the main rotor may the flare, reduce airspeed to below are too high due to blade interaction
slap outside of the zone illustrated 60 knots before decreasing the rate with the rotor wake. Figure 6 shows

42 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 continuous slap
slap boundarya, slap boundarym.
+500 2.5
Rate of Climb
f
| feet per minute)
-
left Turm 2.0

G-Force
0 sº- 1.5

Rate of Descent
[feet per minute) N Aſ
–500
N Pº 1.5
flare and N (Y º: º-

landing \ to º: 2.0

-
1000 | approach glide slepe 2.5
20 40 60 80 100 120 20 40
Airspeed Airspeed
(knots) (knots)

FIGURE 5: noise abatement flight technique, light helicopters FIGURE 6: noisy maneuvers, medium helicopters

that continuous slap occurs in turns
which exceed 1.5g with airspeeds
between about 50 and 90 knots in a
left turn and between about 40 and
110 knots in a right turn. The crew
can hear this noise easily and learn
to avoid these thresholds by adjust
ing power or the severity of the
maneuver.
Mode #44atement Ahocedured
Specifically ſo, the 2%ue,
The same ideas for noise atten
uation listed above for the light
helicopters generally apply to the
Huey except for approach and
landing.
When commencing an approach,
begin the descent at least 200 fpm
before reducing airspeed, then re
duce airspeed while increasing rate
of descent to about 800 fpm. This
gives a slightly steeper approach
angle like a semiautorotation and a
smaller exposure “footprint” on the
ground (figure 7).
At a convenient airspeed between
50 and 80 knots, set up your ap
proach glide path while maintaining
the fpm rate of descent. If the main
rotor begins to “slap,” increase the
rate of descent. Approaching the
flare, reduce airspeed to below 50
knots before decreasing the rate of
descent. Then execute a normal
flare and landing.
The suggested noise abatement
flight technique illustrated in figure
8 will help you to avoid the “noise
Humid days associated with low
cloud cover and low winds increase
sound propagation. When these con
ditions exist—particularly when
there is fog, drizzle or light snow—
use noise abatement procedures.
As a step toward immediately
alleviating some of the noise prob
lems through piloting techniques,
HAI's plan suggests a four-element
program. As you can visualize, each
of these points is directly applicable
to the Army's modus operandi.
• Increase pilot knowledge and
awareness and concern for environ

FIGURE 7: ground noise-exposure footprint

normal approach

noise abatement approach

NOVEMBER 1982 43

moise-abatement approach -
its ºf clini "ſ T -
[feet per minute) ºl
att
It p
-500 H Sº
att
bet
Rate of Descent
(feet per minute) º -
* |
20 40
FIGURE 8: noise abatement flight technique, medium helicopters
mental improvement.
• Emphasize noise reduction.
• Issue and become familiar with
publications which provide noise
abatement information, power set
tings, and flight maneuvers and
techniques.
• Condition our aviators to prac
tice “good neighbor" flying.
Some common noise attenuation
methods are literally right at the
fingertips of every helicopter pilot.
We can reduce the length of hover
ing and proximity to buildings or
personnel. Hovering requires higher
power settings and consequently
causes higher noise levels. Avoid
low level flying except in authorized
areas.
%light Coenationa Planning
• Develop discrete routes, ap
proaches and approach procedures
focusing on minimum exposure.
• Enforce the rules.
Auélic Kluaneme44
• Join with civilian organizations
to promote good neighbor practices.
• Seek public acceptance by de
veloping community awareness of
the benefits of Army helicopters
and the need to fly as we do. Be
concerned about community
problems.
When Brigadier General Ellis D.
Parker, Army Aviation officer at
normal approach –
slap boundary Dal
- |cruise
ºS I.
– There is no reason that we cannot
| X: - Tººl .
E- approach
60 80 100
|slºe
120 140
Airspeed
(knots)
HQDA, was commander of 17th
Aviation Group in Korea, he dis
patched teams of people to measure
decibel levels from which he regu
lated routes of helicopters. Although
some of your noisier routes may
remain, the populace will accept it
more readily if you take the time
and exert the courtesy to show them
some consideration. This association
will provide a foundation upon
which to deal with serious complaints.
Anozaam Adminiatalion
• Work with local planners and
cooperate to make heliport facilities,
operating hours and flight routes as
compatible as possible with the local
surroundings.
• Develop for each helicopter
type (and model) the appropriate
piloting techniques to reduce noise.
• HAI will continue to adminis
ter the Fly Neighborly Program in
cluding collection and distribution
of program information.
Given this semitechnical infor
mation along with the theory that
noise abatement makes sense, what
can we as aviators and unit com
manders do to make it work for us?
Here are some thoughts. If reduction
of noise can reduce acoustical de
tection of us by the enemy, then
let's practice it! And, let's keep our
neighbors—both military and civil
ian– happy by practicing noise
abatement. Do this by careful flight
planning and developing noise abate
ment routes and procedures wher
ever you operate. Educate these
neighbors as to why and where you
have to fly, consider their requests
for relief and cooperate as much as
possible.
continue to operate business as
usual, train to be ready to fight and
respect the consciousness of those
around us—particularly when we
are some of “those” affected by our
helicopters. Everyone needs to pull
together to accomplish this. All of
us who share the sky must share
responsibility for noise abatement.
FOOTNOTES
1. DA Tech Bulletin TB AVN 1-1 157.
“Army Aviation Flight Information
Bulletin," HQDA, 2 March 1982, p. 8.
2. “Fly Neighborly Program (Draft),"
Helicopter Association International,
8 February 1982.
3. ICAO International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Environ
mental Protection, Annex 16, Volume
I (Aircraft Noise), first edition—1981.
4. C. R. Cox, Flying Neighborly–How
to Operate the Light Helicopter More
Quietly, Bell Helicopter Textron, un
dated.
5. C. R. Cox, Flying Neighborly–How
to Operate the Medium Helicopter
More Quietly, Bell Helicopter Textron,
undated.
6. C. R. Cox, Ibid.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Colonel Boysen was assigned to Head
quarters, Department of the Army in
Combat Division, Requirements Direc
torate, ODCSOPS (DAMO-ROD), when
he wrote this article. He represented
HQDA at the February 1982 Helicopter
Association International Convention. This
article is adapted in part from his speech
to that forum. The author is a Master
Army Aviator. He acknowledges assis
tance from Mr. C. R. Cox of Bell Helicopter
Textron in editing the article for technical
accuracy. Colonel Boysen is now assigned
as security plans and operations officer,
Headquarters, 13th Support Command,
III Corps, Ft. Hood, TX.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 U.S.Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
More On The Near
Midair Problem
Mr. Kenneth S. Arnold
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity
Aeronautical Services Office
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA
JOSEPH PAUL Goebbels, the notorious Nazi propa
gandist once said, “If something is repeated often
enough, people will soon begin to believe it.”
Using Dr. Goebbels' premise, and at the risk of
sounding repetitious, this short discussion is again
aimed at the near midair collision menace. It is done
so with the hope that all aviators will soon be convinced
that as long as VFR and IFR traffic are permitted in
the airspace, only they are in a position to really do
anything more about the problem. Collision avoidance
systems are only aids to the eyeballs and work on the
same see and be seen concept.
It all comes down to this. The highest level of pilot
vigilance must be maintained to avoid midair collisions,
regardless of the airspace in which operations are
being conducted and regardless of the air traffic control
services being used. No pilot should permit himself or
herself to be lulled into a false sense of security by
ATC procedures that cannot necessarily guarantee
separation under visual meteorological conditions.
Reports show that many pilots under radar control
believe they will be advised of traffic which represents
a potential conflict—and behave accordingly. They
tend to relax their visual scan for other traffic until
warned of its presence. When warned of a conflicting
aircraft, they tend to look for it to the exclusion of
within cockpit tasks and scanning for other unreported
traffic.
Obviously, prohibitions against uncontrolled aircraft
in terminal control areas are not entirely effective. A
study of near midair collisions reported to the Federal
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
Aviation Administration indicated that of half the
near midairs in terminal control areas one of the
aircraft involved was not known to or controlled by
ATC. Any interpretation of near midair collision data
within TCAs must take this into account. Intruders in
TCAs are a random element in a system designed to
provide maximum orderliness in high density terminal
areas.
Air traffic controllers cannot inform pilots of traffic
that is not visible on their radar scopes, nor can they
provide separation from such traffic. It is plain that at
least some pilots receiving Stage III services believe
that they will be told about all traffic that represents a
threat, yet controllers can handle traffic only with
regard to threats they can see. With respect to
participation in Stage III services in terminal radar
service areas, the FAA has stated that 80 to 90 percent
of VFR aircraft avail themselves of such services.
Yet, FAA and military data indicate that almost two
thirds of near midair collisions in TRSAs involve a
nonparticipating aircraft. Clearly then, the risk of a
near midair collision is disproportionately high for
the aircraft that does not participate in Stage III
services.
One is thus faced with a situation in which pilots
may expect more from the ATC system than it can
deliver, and in which controllers may be expected to
provide more information than their equipment gives
them. Whether this problem exists because of misunder
standings, lack of pilot education or the implied promise
of Stage III procedures is not fully understood, but
the data available indicate that it does exist.
Those pilots, who do not understand the limitations
of terminal radar and of the controllers who use it as
their primary source of information, must be taught.
Many aircraft in TRSAs, and some of the intruders in
TCAs, are not transponder-equipped. Such aircraft
are often not visible to controllers. These aircraft,
and many others near TCA boundaries, represent a
threat detectable only by the pilot, and then only if he
or she is looking for them! *-A
"suspect malfunction" won't hack
it. . .
Describe it in simpleterms—it's
not a writing contest: (you tell)
what happened during (flight
condition: taxi, T.O., climb, de
scent, cruise, hover IGE/OGE,
practice autorotation, steep right/
left bank turn) while (power con
dition: applying power, decreas
ing power, maintaining—torque
reading/ 9% power/ in. Hg (3)
_RPM). Saw engine instrument
readings rise, drop, fluctuate
from to : lost electrical
(or erratic) power to instru
ments/radios/lights. Smelled
Smoke, acid, electric wires.
Noises heard—one/many/con
tinuous, hollow, solid, muffled,
loud, soft, knock, chatter, purring,
shrill, or none at all.) Felt flight
controls respond, not respond,
mushy, positive, opposite to com
mand.
Be specific—give the mainte
nance crew all the data you re
member so that they can fully
correct the malfunction. Let's
help ourselves to be Accident
Free In 83.
 tº-º-º-
-

RECEven
Fºog 933
C.S.U. LIBRARIES

DECEMBER 1982
 "suspect malful
it. . .
Describe it in
not a writing C
what happene
condition: taxi
scent, cruise,
practice autoro
left bank turn)"
dition: applying
ing power, mai
reading/_%p
_RPM). Saw.
readings rise
from to
(or erratic) pov
ments/radios/
smoke, acid,
Noises heard
tinuous, hollo
loud, soft, knoc
shrill, or none
controls respo
mushy, positive
mand.
Be specific
nance crew al
member so th
correct the m
help ourselve
Free In 83.
 Lenº
Recºver
Fºº & 1983
O.G.U., LIERARIES

DECEMBER 1982

-
DECEMBER 1982 e VOLUME 28 e NUMBER 12
§
=/
Yºr Yº Yº º ¥
Brigadier General Ellis D. Parker Major General Carl H. McNair Jr. Brigadier General Charles E. Teeter
Army Aviation Officer Commander Deputy Commander
ODCSOPS, Headquarters, U.S. Army Aviation Center U.S. Army Aviation Center
Department of the Army Fort Rucker, Alabama Fort Rucker, Alabama

2 LHX: The Conceptual Formulation of Why, What And

When, MG Carl H. McNair Jr.
6 LHX In The AirLand Battle 2000, CPT (P) Fred Brown
9 LHX: Keeping Pace With Technology, Mr. Donald R.
Artis Jr.
13 Sweet Dreams And Flying Machines, MAJ Michael L.
Brittingham
17 DES Report To The Field: DES Standardization Flight
Evaluation Results, FY 1982
18 PEARL'S
20 RSI Report, Mr. Rush Wicker
22 The Harsh Lessons Of FY 82, COLJoseph R. Koehler
25 Who Needs It Anyway, CW3 William W. Shawn
27 ACTAAT: WO1 IPs?
28 Views From Readers
29 1982 ATC Awards
30 Reporting Final
32 Aviation Personnel Notes: Project Manager Develop
ment Program; Five-Year Promotion Plan
33 ACTAAT: National Guard ATC Quotas
34 OH-58 Power Droop, LTC Donald E. S. Merritt and Mr.
Charles C. Cioffi
40 ATC Action Line: “But I DID Check NOTAMs!"
Honorable John O. Marsh Jr
MAJ Philip W. Richard Secretary of the Army
Inside Back Cover: 1983 Annual Writ
Richard K. Tierney
Cover: As the Soviets proliferate the battlefield with more Editor
and more helicopters, the chances of encountering our
helicopters becomes stronger and stronger—and the result
will be air-to-air combat. On the cover an LHX destroys a
Hind. Illustration by S. Beland

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide
information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft
accident prevention, training, maintenance, operations, research and development,
aviation medicine and other related data
The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly
under the supervision of the Commanding General, US Army Aviation Center
Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
nor the US Army Aviation Center Photos are U S Army unless otherwise speci
fied Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless
otherwise stated Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest
and to the author unless otherwise indicated
Articles photos and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited Direct
communication is authorized to Editor. U.S Army Aviation Digest, P O Drawer P.
Fort Rucker, AL 36362 Manuscripts returned upon request
This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General Headquarters
Department of the Army, 10 September 1982, in accordance with Army Regulation
3.10-1.
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Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the
Digest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S
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are $26 OO domestic arc, 332.50 overseas
 º This issue rings out the old year and brings in
the new—and a good year it has been for Army
Aviation. Our 40th Birthday, delivery of Black
Hawks and fully modernized Cobras to Europe,
delivery of the first production CH-47D to the
ſº training base, initiation of AH-64 production,
installation of CH-47 simulators at Fort Campbell,
Fort Hood and in Europe, completion of a most
comprehensive Mission Area Analysis, the qua
* drennial Army Aviation Systems Program Review,
test of the first Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) and
many other significant milestones came our way.
But, on the horizon for 1983 are many more
equally challenging and rewarding events for
Army Aviation. In the concepts and hardware
areas, the Light Helicopter Family (LHX) promises
to be one of the biggest and this issue focuses on
that new generation of Army Aviation systems
for the 1990s.
It is my privilege to introduce the subject and
describe the LHX conceptual formulation. In turn,
Captain (P) Fred Brown discusses the support
the LHX provides in the eight functional areas of
the AirLand Battle 2000 concept. Mr. Donald R.
Artis Jr., of AVRADCOM relates some of the
technologies being considered to make the LHX
an “affordable, effective weapon system...."—Then
Major Michael L. Brittingham takes an imaginative
look at the success of the LHX in a battle Some
where “east of Dresden." First, however, he makes
a strong case for the necessity of the proposed
family of light, versatile helicopters by telling the
story of a battle where our present generation of
helicopters, without improvements, might not fare
so well against superior enemy aircraft.
* But even with LHX in the offing, we must
continue to do better with what we have and
improve thereon. And constant improvements
are a part of that effort. One of those is reported
on by Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. S. Merritt
and Charles C. Cioffi in “OH-58 Power Droop."
They list an investigative panel's findings and
recommendations of ways to eliminate the phe
nomenon “which manifests itself in the form of a
power turbine droop" and is definitely not a
desirable condition for our aeroscout aircraft.
A prime contribution to the overall profes
sionalism of our aviation force is made by the
DES flight standardization teams' evaluations. A
briefback on their work in FY 1982 is contained
in the “DES Report to the Field." You should be
DECEMBER 1982
interested in the summary “health check” of
aviation everywhere.
And just as standardization is vital to Army
Aviation, so is safety—and survival. We must
ensure that our units and our people are prepared
with the necessary emergency equipment. Three
pilots had theirs and they lived through an
accident, as Chief Warrant Officer, CW3 William
W. Shawn relates in “Who Needs It Anyway?"
While survival equipment must be available,
proper care and caution on the part of each Army
Aviation team member may alleviate the need
for it. Colonel Joseph R. Koehler, U. S. Army
Safety Center commander, makes some apt and
timely safety observations in “The Harsh Lessons
of FY 82.” He writes, in part, about actions
commanders can take to encourage—and en
force—the level of self-discipline we all must
practice to be ACCIDENT FREE IN '83. During
this, the final quarter of 1982, it has become
readily apparent that the entire chain of command
has turned to and applied the safe flying practices
for which Army Aviation has long been recognized.
Keep up the visibility and restore the credibility
to our splendid aviation safety initiatives.
So, to each and all, a hearty well-done for 1982
and a challenge to do even better in 1983 on all
fronts—personnel, operations, maintenance,
training, safety and readiness. We owe it to our
Army and our profession.
Merry Christmas to all and to all a good flight!!
Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.
Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center
Fort Rucker, AL
 sº-" ºr====
-- -

-
- _–

Light Helicopter

Conceptual Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.

Formulation Commander
U.S. Army Aviation Center
of: What Fort Rucker, AL

and ©

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 DURING THE WAR Between
the States, that famous cavalryman
Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford
Forest, the Grey Ghost, was asked
how to win a battle. His answer:
“Git thar fustest with the mostest.”
In other words, mobility.
History is replete with examples
of military victories where getting
there first with the most was the
key to victory. Mobility always has
been, is now and will continue to
be for the foreseeable future the
key to victory, especially when a
force is fighting outnumbered or
over hostile terrain, such as occurred
in Vietnam. Aviation has been the
Army's leader in mobility throughout
the past two decades. The UH-1
Huey, the AH-1 Cobra and the OH
58 Kiowa provide the greatest mobil
ity and are the backbone of Army
Aviation. These aircraft, represent
ing 1950s' technology, will continue
to be the fleet workhorses for some
time to come; however, they are
rapidly becoming obsolete and will
soon require replacement. Some are
being phased out now with the
UH-60 Black Hawk, AH-64 Apache
and AHIP, which is an improved
OH-58 that can fill the immediate
scout role. But these replacement
aircraft will not be procured in suf
ficient numbers, and we will con
tinue to fall short of meeting force
structure requirements. How, and
with what, do we replace these aging
* birds? A possible answer is the Light
Helicopter Family, referred to as
the LHX. The U.S. Army Aviation
Center, along with our mission pro
ponents, is involved in the con
ceptual formulation stage of devel
opment for the LHX.
Why LHX3
The first and foremost reason for
an LHX is a necessary response to
the threat. The threat is real. In
addition to superior numbers in
every category of equipment, the
Soviets have made significant in
creases in the quality of their equip
ment. Of particular concern are
DECEMBER 1982
recent indications by intelligence
sources of a growing fleet of Mi-24
Hind attack helicopters. This in
crease is seen by many as a move to
counter the effectiveness of U.S.
antitank helicopters, as well as to
attack our armored forces. With
the proliferation of Soviet heli
copters on the battlefield, it is certain
that helicopter air-to-air combat will
occur. Just as we use the attack
helicopter to counter the Soviets'
tank advantage, the Soviets may be
trying to checkmate our attack heli
copters with their attack helicopters.
Equally critical are projections on
fielding of threat directed-energy
weapons such as lasers, electro
magnetic pulse (EMP), microwave
and particle beam weapons.
The second reason for the LHX
surfaced during our recently com
pleted Army Aviation Mission Area
Analysis (AAMAA), which analyzed
aviation's ability to perform its
mission against an advanced threat
force. In accomplishing the analysis,
the AAMAA identified 77 defici
encies in Army Aviation. One is
the problem of an aging aircraft
fleet. During the Army Aviation
Systems Program Review last March,
this deficiency was redefined as fleet
obsolescence, which more accur
ately describes the problem. After
all, age in and of itself is not sufficient
reason to replace a fleet. The fact
is we do not have a historical base
from which to measure how long,
in terms of age, the current fleet
will last. Figure 1 portrays the magni
tude of the problem we face. Do
not be misled by the term “average
age." Today we are flying UH-1s
that are more than 20 years old.
The problem is much more than it
appears. We are faced with replacing
these aircraft over a protracted
period of time. Theoretically, if we
start to develop replacements this
year, it will be the mid-1990s before
we actually begin to field aircraft.
Based on a theoretical production
rate of 120 aircraft per year starting
in 1995, it will take about 50 years
to replace the fleet. At that rate, we
may find ourselves flying Hueys and
Cobras that are 40 to 50 years old.
The deficiency, fleet obsolescnce,
is much more than just a question
of age. These are 1950s' technology
aircraft which were, for the most
part, procured in the 1960s and early
1970s. The issue is operational and
tactical obsolescence, combat ef
fectiveness, survivability and, finally,
future economic and logistic sup
portability costs.
Avionics in the current fleet pro
vides an example of problems en
countered in capability, survivabil
ity and supportability. Today's radios
are products of late 1960s' tech
nology which has been overtaken
by miniaturization of electronics.
Spare parts are either cost prohibi
tive or no longer available. Support
ability analyses indicate that our
current generation of radios will be
economically unsupportable by the
late 1980s or 1990s. In the recent
past, the electronics industry has
made major advances about every
5 years. Given this technological
momentum, even a 10-year service
life expectation may be optimistic.
Additionally, our radios have a mean
time between failure of less than
500 hours, and none have electronic
counter-countermeasures capability
or protection from lasers or EMP.
Avionics is not the only problem
area. The current fleet also suffers
similar problems in engine, trans
mission and rotor systems. All piece
meal efforts at product improvement
are going to be extremely expensive
with marginal improvements in
capability, survivability and sup
portability.
FIGURE 1: Fleet Obsolescence
Average Age
System in 1982 |in 2000
UH-1H Iroquois 12 30
AH-1 Cobra 10 28
OH-58 Kiowa 10 28
OH-6 Cayuse 14 32

The third reason for LHX revolves
around future missions and how we
plan to wage war. The AirLand
Battle 2000 concept is our planning
tool for the outyears. This tool
focuses 20 to 40 years into the future
to guide materiel, organizational,
doctrinal and training requirements.
Figure 2 provides the focus for
technology in our future materiel
developments and acquisition. The
problem of fleet obsolescence is
aggravated by the increasing Soviet
helicopter threat, coupled with our
own evolving missions such as air
to-air combat and across forward
line of own troops operations.
What Is LHX'?
The LHX is envisioned as a new
development aerial platform capable
of performing vertical lift missions
in the AirLand Battle of 1995 and
beyond. LHX will capitalize on the
concept of commonality by using
engines, rotors, drive trains and other
common dynamic components to
fill requirements for scout, light
attack, light utility and observation
aircraft. Although requirements are
not yet clearly defined, the LHX is
envisioned to be smaller in size than
the AH-1 and UH-1, but larger than
the OH-58. Mission gross weight is
expected to be 6,000 to 8,000 pounds.
The LHX will be simple to oper
ate, yet of necessity it will probably
be a technologically complex aerial
platform. A primary developmental
goal is reduction of pilot workload.
FIGURE 2: Focus for technology in the
AirLand Battle 2000 close combat
• Family of Vehicles Similarly Equipped
• EMP/EW Hardened
• Lightweight Vehicles, Smaller Crews
• 24-Hour/All-Weather Operations
• Dual/Triple Capable Weapons
s:
O
total
1980 1985 1990 1995
FIGURE 3: Fleet Obsolescence — Attack Helicopters
The LHX may employ a one-pilot
cockpit. If so, it will be highly
automated, which brings us to an
equally important goal of the pro
gram. The aircraft must be easily
maintained and logistically support
able. The concept of a family of
aircraft using common dynamics
should assist greatly in reaching this
goal.
LHX is envisioned as a high per
formance, high capability system.
High performance, however, does
not necessarily imply high speed.
The jury is still out on the speed
issue. We are investigating the value
of speed to determine what speed
really does for usin terms of produc
tivity and survivability. Survivability
must be integrated into our next
generation of aircraft, not merely
strapped on as is the case of our
current aircraft survivability equip
ment.
With the current interest in self
deployability, we are actively in
vestigating the need for self-deploy
ment in all future systems. Self
deployability is a goal of the LHX
program, but not a requirement at
this time. The challenge to be over
come is the weight of the aircraft.
required
2000 2005 2010 2015
An aircraft in the 6,000- to 8,000
pound class is somewhat restricted
in the amount of fuel it can carry.
LHX may have 3.5 hours' fuel in
onboard tanks, and it will have new
fuel-efficient engines. With the addi
tion of fuel pods on external stores
stations, self-deployment becomes
a real possibility. Even if self-deploy
able, LHX must be small enough to
be easily transported in aircraft of
the C-141 or future cargo-class
aircraft.
Two versions of the LHX are
envisioned. Remember that the
aircraft will have common engines,
rotors, drive trains, core avionics
and other common subsystems. One
version may be the scout/attack,
or SCAT. The SCAT will have multi
mission versatility that will permit
it to be tailored rapidly to perform
in either the scout or attack role.
Having this capability would enable
commanders to configure their units
as missions dictate and would give
them a flexibility they have never
known before.
A second version is the LHX
utility and observation variant. This
aircraft also would have multimission
versatility, and with minimal alter
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

required
2
- º I Even though the UH-1 fleet is rapidly
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
FIGURE 4: Fleet Obsolescence – Scout Helicopters
total utility helicopters required
UH-1
PHASE OUT
LHX UTILITY
u Uſ -
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
FIGURE 5: Fleet Obsolescence – Utility Helicopters
º lescence and evolving mission re
ations the utility version could be must start thinking now about how
used in the light observation role. we are going to fill the force and
replace those older aircraft. Dis
When Do We Need LHX3. counting the UH-1 M gunships in
To determine when we need the National Guard, we are short
LHX, we must look at what we cur attack helicopters today. The
rently have in the fleet and what we AH-64 will lessen the severity of
have planned. The plan for the this problem but will not solve it.
attack helicopter fleet is shown in The LHX SCAT will begin replacing
figure 3. Currently, the attack heli the older aircraft in the mid-1990s.
copter fleet is composed of a mix of In the scout category (figure 4),
AH-1 and UH-1M gunships. We we currently meet the authorized
DECEMBER 1982
acquisition objective (AAO) with a
mix of OH-58C, OH-58A and
OH-6A Cayuse aircraft; however,
the OH-58C is only marginally scout
capable and the OH-58A and
OH-6A are unsuitable as scouts. The
Army Helicopter Improvement Pro
gram (AHIP) aeroscout will improve
the situation somewhat; but a con
strained budget will not allow signif
icant improvement in the scout
picture in the near to midterm.
In the utility category (figure 5),
we currently meet the AAO with a
mix of UH-1H and UH-60 aircraft.
As we field the Black Hawk, we will
continue to reduce the UH-1 inven
tory at a 15-for-23 exchange rate.
becoming obsolete and unsupport
able, we are going to have Hueys
around well into the 21st century.
Initial operational capability of the
LHX will be in the mid-1990s; but
at a theoretical production rate of
10 per month (120 per year), we
will not wash out the Hueys until
about 2015. Some of these aircraft
will be approaching 50 years of
service about then.
As noted earlier, we are in the
concept formulation stage of devel
opment in this program. Over the
next few months we will publish a
series of articles, all of a conceptual
nature. Your response to these
articles and input to this vital step
in the developmental process is
encouraged. We feel that the far
term solution to the threat, obso
quirements is development of the
LHX. This single solution will, in
itself, eliminate most of the materiel
deficiencies identified in the
AAMAA.
LHX presents us with an oppor
tunity to develop a system using
the total systems approach to devel
opment. We can meet the threat
challenge, solve the fleet obsoles
cence problem and win the AirLand
Battle of the future. To be successful,
the LHX program must begin now
with concept formulation and we
must field both versions of the LHX
prior to the year 2000. -
 * - Nº.
Fºx º, &
-
:= -

G2 Captain (P) Fred Brown

LHX in Concepts and Studies Division
Directorate of Combat Developments
U.S. Army Aviation Center -

©
Fort Rucker, AL

the AirLand The AIRLAND BATTLE of the future will

require a style of waging war in which agility, decep
tion and maneuver are the keys to success. We must

Battle 2000 present the enemy with a succession of unexpected

tactical situations faster than he can react. This battle,
which is extended by tactical necessity far into the
enemy's rear areas, requires highly mobile firepower
—intensive maneuver forces capable of fighting and
surviving in the presence of conventional, nuclear,
biological, chemical and tactical electronic devices.
In order to fight this extended battle, we must
maneuver our forces rapidly to strike deep into the
enemy's rear echelons. Aviation's inherent mobility

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

and firepower potential provide commanders with a
force capable of sustaining the rapid, decisive action
demanded. The advanced concepts emerging from
the continuing evolution of the AirLand Battle require
a parallel evolution of Army Aviation.
Exploiting significant advances in technology will
enable Army Aviation to support the AirLand Battle
2000 concepts and will significantly improve capabil
ities in the performance of the traditional attack and
aeroscout missions.
In order for Army Aviation to support more fully
the operational concepts of AirLand Battle 2000, a
new fleet of light vertical takeoff and landing aircraft
is required. The helicopter technology associated with
the Light Helicopter Family (LHX) will provide the
commander with enhanced aviation capabilities in
the following critical areas: greater endurance;
increased dash speed; adverse weather, day/night
nap-of-the-earth (NOE) capability; electronic counter
countermeasures (ECCM) including electro-optical,
radar, acoustical and infrared (IR); electronic counter
measure (ECM) resistant navigation and communi
cations; nuclear, biological and chemical hardening
and crew protection; strategic mobility; increased
maintainability; advanced target acquisition systems;
and enhanced weaponry. The LHX will be able to
take advantage of emerging technological gains in
aeromechanics, propulsion, structures, aviation elec
tronics, weapons, countermeasures, mission support
equipment and systems integration.
In the AirLand Battle 2000 concept, Army Aviation
is integral to all forces and battlefield functions.
Aviation elements include manned aerial elements
and unmanned aerial elements. This article shows
how the LHX supports the manned aerial aspects of
the AirLand Battle.
The very nature of Army Aviation in the year 2000
allows it to lend support to both levels of war. In
support of the strategic level, aviation is able to self
deploy and be rapidly deployed, while possessing the
ability to collect intelligence in depth. At the oper
ational level, aviation, as a form of maneuver, provides
firepower, mobility, mass action and the capability to
operate independently for AirLand Battle force com
manders.
The mission of Army Aviation in the year 2000
pervades all mission areas and all battlefield tasks.
Army Aviation must rapidly deploy; find, fix and
destroy enemy ground and aerial forces using fire and
maneuver; conduct reconnaissance operations; con
duct airmobile and aerial logistic operations; provide
DECEMBER 1982
command, control and communications; provide field
artillery aerial observer platforms; provide aerial mine
dispensing and engineering support; and enhance the
intelligence and electronic warfare capability of the
AirLand Force (ALF). The LHX, by the nature of its
capabilities, supports all of these mission areas.
Aviation equipment for the AirLand Battle of the
year 2000 will have a multifuel capability, be simple
to operate and maintain, easy to decontaminate, and
capitalize on the component replacement theory
rather than the fix-it theory. Robotics, automation,
miniaturization and microelectronic technologies will
enable aerial platforms to accomplish more tasks
more efficiently and by refinement of the man
machine interface (one-man cockpit) assure economy
of personnel with an increase in capability. The LHX
will be designed with all of these requirements in
mind.
The AirLand Battle 2000 concept is divided into
eight functional areas. Those functional areas are
close combat; command and control; fire support;
air defense; intelligence and electronic warfare;
communications; combat support, engineer and mine
warfare; and combat service support. As mentioned,
the LHX will support each of these functional areas.
Close Combat is predicated on the maneuver of
highly mobile, mission sufficient combat forces. The
battlefield is organized in depth, extends full circle
and orients on the enemy. Seizing the initiative to
conduct offensive action is the key. Army Aviation, a
maneuver element, as part of close combat forces,
extends the capability of AirLand Battle force com
manders in all close combat functions.
The LHX accomplishes this task by enabling com
manders to perform the following tasks:
• See deep
• Move fast to strike
Quickly seize the initiative
Finish the tactical operation
Exploit success
Begin the fight again
Decentralize execution
Target critical nodes.
The LHX supports ALF commanders by adding to
their command and control (C’) capability. Con
figured as a special electronics mission platform, the
LHX provides commanders with the ability to see
deep into the area of interest. When configured with
special data distribution devices it could provide a
mobile platform to collect and disseminate infor
mation on both the enemy and friendly situations.

With this same equipment, it provides a retransmis
sion platform for communication with subordinate
elements. As aeroscouts for field artillery aerial
observer platforms, the LHX provides an excellent
means by which to rapidly and efficiently acquire and
engage targets. As a troop carrier it is capable of
rapidly repositioning forces on the battlefield.
The ability of Army Aviation to move rapidly about
the battlefield unrestricted by terrain provides ALF
commanders' fire support efforts the flexibility re
quired to attack enemy targets that other weapon
platforms cannot detect, engage or respond to in
time. This mobility also allows ALF commanders to
employ their antiarmor-capable aerial platforms
against the enemy's second echelon forces. The LHX
in the attack role provides the ALF with weapons
systems capable of destroying armored and infantry
forces. In the observation role, the LHX provides an
excellent platform for the aerial observers to adjust
all-means of fire support.
Army Aviation significantly enhances the functions
of air defense on the AirLand Battle 2000 battlefield.
Combat configured LHX can engage enemy aircraft
with air-to-air weapons. They also can be employed
to destroy enemy air defense weapons in a suppression
of enemy air defense (SEAD) role. As observation
platforms, the LHX, using onboard sensors, can detect
and report movement of enemy air elements. As a
transport aircraft, the LHX can quickly reposition air
defense assets to counter air raids or to fill voids in
friendly air defense coverage.
Army Aviation, as an integral part of the intelli
gence and electronic warfare (IEW) effort, provides
the aerial platforms and battlefield mobility required
to support AirLand Battle force commanders' tactical
IEW requirements. This tactical IEW support falls
into two general categories:
• Commanders' information needs. This area
consists of the situation and target development
processes necessary to support commanders' battle
field objectives. The LHX supports this category by
providing an aerial platform capable of carrying
sophisticated sensor packages with the ability to
provide detailed terrain and weather information
enabling the command to see and understand the
battlefield better. It also supports commanders'
information needs by detecting, identifying and
locating enemy units and activities.
• Commanders' operational needs. This IEW
support consists of OPSEC (operations security) and
electronic warfare (EW). The LHX supports this
category by providing OPSEC support platforms to
identify friendly vulnerabilities as seen by the enemy,
assess enemy capabilities to exploit these vulnerabil
ities and provide a platform for deception and
jamming systems.
Army Aviation supports the communications oper
ations of ALF commanders by providing aerial
platforms for the transmission and reception of radio,
video display and data communications. The LHX
supports this functional area in several ways. Its design
provides electromagnetic pulse (EMP) hardening and
ECM resistant communication for uninterrupted
capability. It provides for radio relay during deep
attacks. It provides for rapid transport of communi
cations support systems and it provides for time sensi
tive courier service.
Army Aviation provides increased capabilities in
all the areas of combat support, engineer and mine
warfare. LHX supports this functional area by pro
viding ALF commanders the mobility to rapidly
bypass obstacles. It also is capable of dispensing scatter
able mines, which prevent the enemy use of avenues
of approach but do not restrict friendly use. It provides
a platform for dispensing wide area obscurants or for
decontamination of large areas with aerially delivered
sprays and foam.
Army Aviation enhances the combat service sup
port efforts of the AirLand Battle force by providing
highly flexible, rapid means to transport personnel
and materiel anywhere on the battlefield. Army
Aviation's inherent responsiveness makes it the ideal
medium to move critical items of support to the user
in the shortest time. The LHX will aid in this area by
providing movement of all types of support over the
battlefield. It provides long-range over-the-shore
transport of supplies. As a transport aircraft it can
provide for the reconstruction of forces by reposit
ioning uncommitted elements.
The LHX will be the most versatile vehicle on the
AirLand Battlefield of the year 2000. It will not only
provide ALF commanders with a significant combat
multiplier, but will give them a flexibility they have
never enjoyed before. LHX is the Army's high mobility
combat vehicle of the future. − -
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Its UNFORTUNATE, but the
old phrase “you're not getting older,
you're getting better" fails to hold
true for aircraft. Much of the current

*::Fine Pace fleet of light helicopters is fast ap

proaching operational and tactical
obsolescence, and will soon become
economically and logistically un
supportable, and unsurvivable. Al
wit though procured in the 1960s and
early 1970s, the fleet represents
Technology 1950s' technology. New and evolv
ing tactical missions associated with
the Airland Battle 2000 concept and
an increasingly sophisticated threat
Mr. Donald R. Artis Jr., DAC serve to speed up the aging process.
Aviation Systems Division These evolving missions, such as
Directorate for Development Engineering Acquisition helicopter air-to-air combat and
Headquarters, DARCOM deep attack operations, require
Alexandria, VA technology and performance far
superior to that of the current fleet.
The Light Helicopter Family (LHX)
Glossary—Page 12 will use currently evolving tech
nologies to field high performance

DECEMBER 1982

ºxesckºº"
wº: helicopter
Rotor Systems Research Aircraft
compound helicopters
FIGURE 1: Typical LHXVTOL configuration candidates
rotorcraft for the mid-1990s and
beyond.
Some of the candidate configur
ations under consideration for the
LHX are shown in figure 1. They
range from a pure helicopter, the
UH-60 Black Hawk, to vectored
thrust, AV-8 (or XV-6A) Harrier,
to achieve a vertical takeoff and
landing (VTOL) capability. U.S.
Materiel Development and Readi
ness Command (DARCOM), as the
materiel developer, will select the
exact configuration based on numer
ous studies and trade-offs with re
spect to standardization, surviva
bility, productivity, maintainability
and performance.
10
xv-15
tiit rotor x-19
tilt propellers
xc-142
tilt wing
The technologies that will be
discussed in this article can be seen
in figure 2. The user's interest in
these technologies relates more to
the operational payoffs that can be
achieved by their use than in the
technology itself. U.S. Army Train
ing and Doctrine Command (TRA
DOC), as the user, describes in
general terms what operational
characteristics are required in a
particular end item. DARCOM
translates these required parameters
into a piece of equipment, using
technologies it feels would best fill
the requirement.
• The Advanced Composite Air
frame Program (ACAP) is a tech
xw-5A
fan in wing
-
XV-4A
jet ejector
xv-6A (Av-8) Harrier
vectored thrust
nological effort that will demon
strate the advancements achievable
through the application of fibrous
composite materials, such as Kevlar,
and advanced design concepts to
the design of primary and secondary
airframe structure. Program goals
include demonstration of compli
ance with the crashworthiness re
quirements of MIL-STD-1290 and
improvements in reliability, main
tainability, vulnerability, safety and
survivability while achieving a 17
percent reduction in airframe pro
duction costs and a 22 percent reduc
tion in airframe weight when com
pared to a baseline metal airframe.
The ACAP has the potential to
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 HIGH SPEED ROTOR - ITR
WEAPONS
COMPOSITE FUSELAGE - ACAP
achieve laser burn-through resis
tance and be ballistic damage toler
ant. It offers the materiel developer
the opportunity to build low radar
cross-section airframes at reduced
costs over conventional metal de
signs. It is highly probable that
reduced support costs also can be
achieved. This is a desirable feature
of any system or technology, as
operational and support costs over
the life cycle generally far outweigh
the original costs of the system.
• With respect to weapons and
weapons-related technology, weap
onization studies are underway to
determine weapons suited for both
scout/attack (SCAT) and utility/
observation aircraft. Some of the
specific systems or capabilities that
may be used on the LHX include
the helicopter automatic targeting
system (HATS) which can be used
in conjunction with electro-optical
remote view systems to increase
target acquisition performance of
airborne observers while decreas
ing aircraft exposure time. To im
prove operations in adverse weather,
fire control/acquisition radar (HA
WFCAR); helicopter adverse wea
ther target servicing system (HAW
DECEMBER 1982
ENGINES - ATDE/800 SHP
LIGHT WEIGHT TRANSMISSION
FIGURE 2: LHX related technologies
TSS); and helicopter adverse wea
ther target acquisition and dest
ruction system (HAWTADS). Other
areas of interest include precision
aiming techniques, target sensing
armament systems and enhance
ment of identification friend or foe
(IFF) capabilities. Weapons such
as turreted lightweight cannons,
hypervelocity missiles and unguided
rockets, air-to-air missiles and direct
ed energy weapons are potential
candidates for the LHX. Fiber-optic
guided missiles (FOGM) will allow
the gunner to be in full control of
the missile from launch to impact.
The helicopter acoustic receiver
system (HEARS) has the potential
to provide the crew with early
cueing, direction of possible targets
and classification of targets in any
weather condition. Infrared ac
quisition and guidance is provided
in forward looking infrared radar
(FLIR) and focal plane array tech
nology. Ultimately the weapons and
target acquisition capability placed
on the LHX will be a joint decision
by both the materiel and combat
developers. Studies are ongoing now
to make just such determinations.
The results of the completed studies
will be used in the preparation of
the requirements documents for the
LHX.
• The Integrated Digital Avionics
System (IDAS) will incorporate a
digital architecture approach to the
design of avionics systems using
modular design and MIL-STD-1553
standard interface. This technology
will use integrated control and dis
plays and automation to reduce crew
workload, weight and life-cycle cost.
The user's interest in this technology
is in the inherent mission flexibility
and in the improved logistic support
ability it offers in that electronic
subsystems (radios, sensors, etc.)
can be installed and/or changed
individually (plug in-plug out)
without having to change the whole
system.
• The Advanced Digital Optical
Control System (ADOCS) uses a
fly-by-light flight control capability
that offers significant improvements
over a dual-mechanical system in
handling qualities, reliability, avail
ability and maintainability (RAM)
and combat damage repairability,
while decreasing weight and life
cycle costs. The materiel developer
estimates that improvements in those
areas will range from two to eight
times better than a dual-mechanical
11
flight control system. This tech
nology can offer survivability im
provements through electromag
netic pulse (EMP) hardening, re
dundancy and reduction in multiple
hit to kill probability. It can also
offer pilot workload reduction
through stability augmentation and
handling qualities that may be need
ed for air-to-air engagements and
nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight.
• The Integrated Technology
Rotor Program (ITRP) will demon
strate a reduction in RAM related
failures (discrepancies should be
fewer due to a reduced parts count
and higher fatigue life of this ap
proach compared to conventional
designs) and a reduction in support
costs through fewer line items to
support and longer servicing inter
vals. In addition, survivability should
be enhanced due to higher ballistic
tolerance, and handling qualities
should be improved due to the incor
poration of more complex airfoil
shapes to achieve improvements in
control responsiveness.
GLOSSARY
ABC advancing blade concept
ACAP advanced composite airframe pro
gram
ADOCS advanced digital/optical control
system
ATDE advanced technology demonstrator
engine (800 shaft horsepower)
DARCOM U.S. Army Materiel Development
and Readiness Command
FLIR forward looking infrared radar
FOGM fiber optic guided missile
HATS helicopter automatic targeting
system
HAWFCAR helicopter adverse weather fire con
trol/acquisition radar
HAWTADS helicopter adverse weather target
acquisition and destruction system
HAWTSS helicopter adverse weather target
servicing system
12
• The Advanced Technology
Engine (ATE) is an 800 shaft horse
power (SHP) engine which, in a
dual configuration, is in the power
class most likely required for the
LHX. The program goals for this
power plant include a 25 percent
reduction in fuel consumption to
enhance range and endurance, im
proved survivability through judic
ious placement of components,
redundancy, hardening and reduced
support cost requirements through
modular design and improved RAM
characteristics over engines of a
comparable power class. Improved
RAM will also enhance operational
availability.
There are a number of additional
related drive train/flight handling
technologies or capabilities that are
of interest to the user. These include
the no tail rotor (NOTAR) which
eliminates the need for a tail rotor,
adaptive fuel controls to improve
engine responsiveness to aircraft
maneuvering, drag reduction pro
grams and integrated drive trains
HEARS helicopter acoustic receiver system
IDAS integrated digital avionics system
IFF identification friend or foe
ITRP integrated technology rotor program
LHX Light Helicopter Family
NOE nap-of-the-earth
NOTAR no tail rotor
PAT precision aiming technique
RAM reliability, availability and maintain
ability
SCAT scout/attack
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command
VTOL vertical takeoff and landing
EMP electromagnetic pulse
MIL STD runilitary standards
which improve the main transmis
sion and the drive train gears (be
tween the engine and the main trans
mission) to allow the power turbine
to enter the main transmission direct
ly without a speed reduction. These
capabilities and others will be as
sessed by the materiel developer
(DARCOM) for application to the
LHX. The combat developer (TRA
DOC) will participate in those assess
ments and influence their outcome
by the preparation of the LHX
requirement document(s) and by
maintaining a close working relation
ship with the materiel developer so
that there is minimal confusion con
cerning what is needed versus what
can be delivered.
The technologies listed in this
article are but a few of those being
considered for the LHX. The LHX
program is a well thought-out, co
ordinated, development effort using
the best minds and the latest tech
nology available to field an afford
able, effective weapon system fo
the Army of tomorrow. …lº-f
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
When he wrote this article, Mr. Artis
was a research and development coordi
nator with the Materiel Developments
Division, Directorate of Combat Devel
opments, U.S. Army Aviation Center,
Ft. Rucker, AL. He has worked for the
TRADOC System Manager for the
Attack Helicopter; the Applied Tech
nology Laboratory at Ft. Eustis, VA;
and the Project Manager for the Black
Hawk. His current assignment began
in July 1982. He is Weapon Systems
Manager for the Attack Helicopter.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Sweet Dreams and
Flying Machines
For IN–ME, standing over STRANGER (Shrugging): Have
Major Michael L. Brittingham to one corner of the DTOC. A it your way, buddy. I just thought
Office of TRADOC System Manager. stranger, a surly-looking man wear you might be interested in this one
Attack Helicopter
U.S. Army Aviation Center ing a Mickey Spillane trenchcoat, ... a little sports job... racing stripes,
Fort Rucker, AL dark glasses and a floppy hat pulled mag wheels...look at those lines'
Bogart-style down over the top half This 'll be a classic'
of his face, materializes from no ME: Beat it! I'm not interested!
where, elbows his way past the Luft STRANGER: Or this hot little
waffe LNO and taps me on the number. . .
GLOSSARY shoulder. . . ME: Out! (Reaching for my .38)
ANS American News Service STRANGER: Psst! Hey, buddy! STRANGER: 300 knots top—in
DTOC Divisional Technical Operations Center Wanna buy a helicopter? level flight, climb perf. . .
G gravity ME: Buzz off, creep.
HE high explosive STRANGER (Insistently grabbing
IR infrared at my sleeve): I think you'll like
LAPES low altitude parachute extraction system what I got here. (He pulls one side
LHX Light Helicopter Family
of his trench coat open, and there,
LNO liaison officer
mm millimeter
neatly arrayed on the lining, are
NAV navigation
dozens of tiny helicopters, gleaming
six commanding officer
with reflected light from the Cole
PCS permanent change of station man overhead.)
RAW radar warning ME (Indignant): You sleazeball!
RDF Rapid Deployment Force What do you think I am? Get away
RPM revolutions per minute from me! (I jerk my arm away.)

DECEMBER 1982 13
 ME (I pull back the hammer):
I'm going to count to three . . . .
STRANGER: Climb performance
better than 4,000 feet per minute
(talking faster now), maneuverable
from minus 1.5 to plus 5 Gs, goes
from 0 to 200 knots faster than a
commie can cry comrade! And . . .
(he winks lewdly) it's fully aerobatic.
Me (Lowering the .38): Did you
say minus 1.5 Gs?
STRANGER (Lowering his voice
to a whisper and moving close to
me): That's what I said, buddy, 1.5
negative, and it can dive at up to
450 knots, stop on a ruble and give
you 86 kopecks change.
ME(My resolve gone now): Fully
aerobatic, huh? (I think I drooled
just a little.) When can you deliver?
STRANGER (Reaching into the
inside pocket of his coat and remov
ing a legal-looking document): Title,
tags, dealerprep and fully integrated
weapons system included. (I smile
weakly, whimpering. He hands me
a pen.) Right there by the X. I can
have this baby for you in, oh, say, 6
or 7 years, OK?
ME (Scratching at the X with the
pen): Did you say you'd work a
good trade for a clean, late-model
AH-12
STRANGER (Opening the other
side of his coat): An AH-1, you say?
Buddy, I got AH-1s and AH-1s and
more AH-1s, but . . . I'll see what I
can do . . .
Fade out . . .
And I usually wake up chuckling.
Because it wasn't so very long ago
that I was a junior grade staff officer,
putting my two cents' worth into
the Army's efforts to buy a new
helicopter. LHX—that's what they
called the program back then, but
you know all about that . . . how
one common basic airframe pro
vided the foundation for a whole
family of helicopters—attack, Scout,
14
utility, pursuit... Oh, yeh! I almost
forgot the growing pains Army
Aviation went through before we
finally got a “high performance"
helicopter. But when you're an over
the-hill, hip-pocket-order-recall-just
til-the-war's-over lieutenant colonel,
the memory isn't always so sharp.
There was a lot of excitement in
Army Aviation back in the eighties,
particularly in attack aviation. The
AH-64 Apache, our basic work
horse tank-killer, was in the throes
of birth. And what a glorious, noisy
birth it was! Opposition was ram
pant, in spite of the fact that every
test and training exercise showed
the AH-64 Apache to be even dead
lier to enemy armor than advertised.
And when the nay-sayers had had
their day, and the Apache was safely
in production, there were a lot of
us who felt content with the premise
that if Army Aviation could kill tanks
at will on the battlefield, the ultimate
role for attack aviation would be
realized.
You know the rest, too, I suppose
—how a Soviet-sponsored Afghan
Iranian “incursion” across Southern
Iraq (supposedly at the behest of
the radical Kuwaiti “government”
in exile) precipitated shipping the
RDF posthaste to secure and defend
the Kuwaiti oil fields. There had
only been one serious attack mount
ed by the bad guys before reason
prevailed and negotiation restored
the shaky boundaries, but that one
had been enough. Just 4 days after
arriving in theater, both attack
helicopter battalions found them
selves committed to stop the major
bad-guy attack along the Al Basrah
Umm Qasr axis. They handled the
lead elements easily; in fact, the
first echelon regiment was reduced
to smoldering, twisted junk, and
there we were, full of spit and
vinegar, launching a full battalion
(18 Apaches), thrusting deep to meet
and destroy the second echelon
regiment as it moved down from
the foothills north of Dezful. Seems,
though, that the bad guys had other
ideas. Their Hind-Gs and our Apac
hes had arrived days before at a
position of mutual respect, each of
us having weaponsalmost adequate
to blow the other away, and clearly
adequate to make us both very, very
thoughtful about “mixing it up” in a
free-for-all. We were just about
evenly matched in performance and
firepower, and the name of our game
was live to fight another day, and
theirs must have been the same.
Encounters between us were rare,
and it was hard to tell who was the
most cautious. But that day, they
had other ideas.
Our scout screen had just cleared
a low rise in the desert floor when
the command net erupted in a flurry:
“Bogies, ten o'clock, I count six . . .
seven, eight...” “I see nine.” “What
are they?" And about then the air
ahead of us began to sprout oily
balls of smoke (about where the
scouts were), and the command net
got real quiet. My RAW gear was
lit up like a Christmas tree (I'm
sure everybody else's was too), and
our fire control radars were going
bonkers, so we switched on our own
music, and went full visual ... just
in time to see these 8 or 9 (I swear it
looked like 20) funny looking heli
copters closing from our left front.
The lights flashing under their noses
weren't NAV lights, either, and while
I only took one or two hits high
through the canopy (I was glad they
weren't HE), the bad guys left three
of us down and out after they blew
through the first time. Holy cow,
they were fast! They were there,
then they were gone, and three of
us were down.
Who were those guys, anyway?
What were they? About that time, I
guess, the “six” decided that discre
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
-
“It was kinda like eight
cats in a two-cat bag,..."
tion and valor were relative and
ordered a one-eighty, head for home
and let's talk this over . . . just in
time to turn nose-on to the bad
guys who had turned back in (I
supposed) to finish us off. This time,
though, we hardly hesitated—we
scattered like we were the citizens
of Pamplona and they were the bulls
as they blew through us one more
time. Hah! Missed us, you bums!
And there we were, headed in 15
different directions, and it all went
downhill from there. Brother, as
the saying goes, you ain't seen nothin'
yet.
The debriefing later revealed
almost a consensus that the evil
intruders had two engines, two seats
and funny looking rotor blades. But
whatever they were, they were
quick. Have you ever seen flies
around a watermelon on the picnic
bench? Well, we were the water
melon. Among the confusion I saw
Mad Dog Hawkins and Dutch Hol
DECEMBER 1982
--
-
--
- …"
--~ *
land, heading for home at top speed
(and then some), casually overtaken
by three of the bad guys and, poof!
Mad Dog was a ball of fire and
Dutch was on his way down, oscil
lating badly. I made a mental note
to be sure and get Mad Dog's little
black book out of his duffel before
I turned in his stuff, and punched
memory/present loc on my NAV
box just in case somebody might
have a chance to come back for
Dutch. Then I heard the squall in
my earphones, “three-four, check
Six!”
Somewhere from the cobwebs
came a distant memory, “You can
always do something worse than
turn into the bogey,” so that's what
I did. Or at least that's what I tried.
I think I was about halfway around
when I heard my front-seater over
the intercom, “Holy (expletive de
leted)!” And just then, a small smok
ing telephone pole flashed through
my peripheral field of view. (I later
º: -
--
_º
A.
* *
º
concluded that my turn had pro
bably broken lock-on of some kind
of IR missile.) Two new holes ap
peared in the canopy, and I tightened
my turn, or at least I tried to. (It
was a great day for nice tries.) My
Apache shuddered and shook and
started to fall out of the sky, my
RPM warning came on, and I spent
a second or two getting things under
control. I finished at a very shaky
hover, which probably saved my
tail, cause the bad guy had overshot,
and my front-seater had him in sight
turning back in. I hoped he was
alone. I guess he was. Anyway, my
front-seater tossed some 30 mm his
way while I did a variation of St.
Vitus' dance trying to deny the bad
guy a good gun solution; his tracers
just floated up, and by, thank God,
and here we went again. Variations
on the same theme went on for
about 10 minutes, I guess. All I was
doing was annoying him, and it was
almost all I could do to check the
15

rest of the “fight,” and call bogies
for my buddies now and then. He
just wouldn't leave me alone long
enough for me to build some forward
speed and enough energy to do
anything but duck. I did get one
missile off at a bad guy who had
somehow been spit out of the con
fusion, but I didn't have time to
watch for the fireball. I must have
had more holes than a swiss cheese,
and my caution/warning panels
looked like a Christmas tree, when
the bad guys broke it off and bugged
out. (Fuel state, I guessed. But if
the spooks could find out where
they came from that should tell us
something about their endurance
capability.) And we regrouped, or
at least we tried to. Nine of us were
still in the air. The “six” was down
with five others, plus the three we'd
lost at first contact, and an as yet
undetermined number of scouts
were in varying stages of destruction
below. A line from an old song came
to mind, “Sweet dreams and flying
machines in pieces on the ground.”
We still had a real problem. Our
original plan had called for us to
refuel once en route, from bladders
that had been LAPES'd in the pre
vious night. From where we were,
getting home was going to be very
dicey, considering the 10 or 15
minutes of max performance con
fusion we had just put ourselves
through. And knowing that those
things were out there made further
progress on our as-filed route even
less desirable, so we headed home
and hoped for the best.
The Cav came out later and
picked up the survivors. Three
aircraft were recoverable, and the
rest of us almost made it home before
we ran out of fuel. So there we sat,
dismounted, waiting for the war to
do something around us. As it turned
out, the cease-fire went into effect
at sundown that night, and the next
16
** **
morning we were ignominiously
craned onto lowboys and trucked—
trucked, mind you—back to the
rear! Three days later, the United
Nations' cease-fire monitors found
Dutch, cooling his heels in the
Harem tent of some two-bit Bedouin
chieftain who had a fondness for
Anglo-Saxons that he'd picked up
from his granddaddy who had fought
with T. S. Lawrence. But the Swedish
military police just couldn't swallow
“Dutch of Arabia,” so back he came.
C'est la guerre.
Our recovery teams also brought
back one of the bad guy helicopters
(the only one down, it turned out).
Sometime after our debrief we found
out that they were ... well, different.
I won't bore you with the technical
stuff, but the “spooks” finally con
firmed that we hadn't been eating
mushrooms when we reported heli
copters flying at speeds of 300knots
or better, and doing things that no
self-respecting helicopter ought to
do. And we felt a little better, but
not much.
A few months later, over coffee
during an informal debrief back in
the States with some high-level intel
types, I was nonchalantly told, “Well,
we thought they might have some
thing like that, but we never could
confirm it as a real threat.”
I suppressed the urge to tear that
guy's tonsils out, finished my coffee
and left. I had a plane to catch later
that afternoon, PCS to some place
called Fort Tusi, NV, for instructor
duty. (See “The Attack Helicopter
School and Center of the Future,”
by Colonel David L. Funk, April
1982 Aviation Digest.) I could sure
uSe a rest.
You know how it went from
there—how we built and bought
the LHX – pursuit, at least as good
as (and we thought, of course, just
a touch better than) those surprising
beasts that just plain caught us with
our pants down. Butlet me tell you,
that's what I call development of
new system requirements the hard
way. And if any of you vodka-swilling
copterjocks with the funny-sounding
names are reading this . . .
Wait ’til next time.
DRESDEN (ANS). The allied com
mand reported early this morning
that elements of the American 57th
Attack Helicopter Division scored
a major victory in continued heavy
fighting with retreating Warsaw Pact
forces. While escorting the main
body of yet another leapfrog air/land
assault deep into enemy-held terri
tory, the heavily armed, highly
maneuverable PH-90 advanced
fighter helicopters completely de
stroyed the elite Soviet 4th Guards
Attack Helicopter Regiment as it
attempted to intercept and disrupt
the allied advance. American losses
were termed “negligible.” Shortly
after the massive air battle, when
asked by combat correspondents
to describe the engagement, one of
the 57th pilots, CW3 Frances Xavier
“Wolf" Kranski, of Toledo, OH,
replied, “It was kinda like eight cats
in a two-cat bag, but those guys
never had a chance. We were all
over them like a dirty shirt. We
outshot, out-turned and outran them
all day long. That PH-90 is one
helluva fine fighting machine.”
All is reported quiet tonight east
of Dresden. -
Coming next month:
[]. “Army Aviation's Entry into
The Future: The LHX,” by
COL Bob Fairweather
[] “Why Not An LHX?" by Mr.
Joe Cribbins
[]. “Army Aviation Training Of
The Future," by LTC Glenn
Allen
[] “Concepts For LHXCockpits,”
by LTC Russell Smith
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 U.S. ARMY

Directorate of Evaluation/Standardization

REPORT TO THE FIELD AVIATION

SIANDARDI1ATION

DES Standardization Flight Evaluation Results, FY 1982

DEs FLIGHT standardization teams conducted 2,605
standardization evaluations worldwide in fiscal year
1982. These evaluations included 2,103 no-notice flight
evaluations of major Army commands, 53 U.S. Army
Aviation Center evaluations and 449 oral-only eval
uations. DES teams vary in size from about a dozen
members, when evaluating major commands with
numerous subordinate organizations such as USAREUR,
to a single member when augmenting selected FORS
COM Aviation Resources Management Survey Teams.
The range in percentages and the pass/fail rates of
the commands are the indicators of aviation capabilities
as they relate to missions and resources available to
the commands. Where the missions of the commands
have a high degree of commonality, the results tend
to be similar, as in the case of FORSCOM, WESTCOM,
EUSA and USAREUR. Other factors must still be
considered as affecting the results of the evaluations,
and comparisons would not necessarily produce valid
results. However, the results do offer the commands
the opportunity to assess their aviation programs in
light of their missions, and changes or adjustments to
the direction of the programs can be more effectively
implemented.
The accompanying figure indicates the results of
all DES flight evaluations by aircraft type.
The results indicated in the figure should be used
with caution. The better-than-usual results of the CH
47 and “other" types of aircraft should not be considered
as an indication of aviator superiority in these types.
Other factors must be considered. As an example, the
UH-1 Huey, OH-58 Kiowa and AH-1 Cobra are
evaluated with considerable emphasis on tactical
scenarios, nap-of-the-earth and Night Hawk/night vision
goggles operations, while the CH-47 Chinook and
“other" are not evaluated in these modes. Another
factor to be considered is the fact that CH-47 and
“other" units do not, generally, receive first assignment
aviators as part of their personnel complement.
The results shown in the figure can be useful to
commands and commanders for planning purposes.
As an example, the results by aircraft can be used in
forecasting aviator proficiency requirements or setting
of goals for subordinate units. º

Results By Aircraft GLOSSARY

DES Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization

AIRCRAFT SAT 3, SAT UNSAT Y. UNSAT TOTAL EUSA Eighth U.S. Army
FORSCOM Forces Command
UH-1 7OO 85.9 115 14.1 815
OH-58 355 81.1 USAREUR U.S. Army, Europe
83 18.9 438
WESTCOM U.S. Western Command
AH-1 190 81.9 42 18.1 232
CH-47 149 93.7 10 06.3 159
OTHER 402 87.6 57 12.4 459

1,796 85.4 307 14.6 2,103

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention 36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205
on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander, 255-3504. After duty hours call Ft. Rucker Hot Line, AUTOVON
U.S. Army Aviation Center, ATTN:ATZQ-ES, Ft. Rucker, AL 558-6487 or 205-255-6487 and leave a message

DECEMBER 1982 17

Kim Aguilera photo by Tom Greene
Magnesium Batteries
This is another one of those “gray” areas but we are
passing it on to you via PEARL. A recent Communi
cations and Electronics Command (CECOM) safety
advisory message was transmitted to the field but in
the event you have not seen it we summarize it herewith:
Magnesium batteries are not disposed of in the proper
manner in all cases. These batteries are hazardous
material and should be turned in to your local defense
property disposal office (DPDO). All future procure
ments of magnesium batteries will be labeled with the
proper disposal instructions. For batteries already
manufactured and in use, the disposal instructions
are as follows: Do not throw away or dispose of as
trash; turn in to the DPDO for disposal. Point of
contact for CECOM is Susan Hill, AUTOVON 992
4437 or Commercial (201) 532-4437.
Aviator Sunglasses
In response to the many requests for replacement
parts for the aviator sunglasses we did some research
18
and came up with the following: National stock number
(NSN)6540-00-926-9013 temples only (gold) has been
deleted and replaced by: (1) NSN 6540-01-099-2321
(bayonet type). This is the complete eyeglass frame in
a dull chrome color. (2) NSN 6540-01-096-4496 (cable
type). This is also the complete eyeglass frame with
the curved adjustable earpiece. These may be ordered
from RIC-S9M-DPSC (Defense Personnel Supply
Center), Director of Medical Materiel, 2800 South
20th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101. Point of contact
for this office is Mr. Tommy Vaughn, DRCPO-ALSE,
AUTOVON 693-3307.
Questions on ALSE
Dear PEARL, I have been working in aviation life
support equipment (ALSE) for about 9 months and
have found many questions about the field left un
answered. I am submitting some of these questions in
hopes that I might finally find an answer.
My first questions are about the SPH-4 helmet. I
have discovered many helmets that have had the
elongated hole used to mount the microphone boom
rounded out. This causes the boom to keep moving
and a slight damage to the helmet shell. What is the
status of the helmet? Is it still considered serviceable
or is it condemned due to damage to the shell?Second,
how deeply can the shell be scratched before it is
considered unserviceable? Also, when I remove the
liner from some shells they appear to be very thin, the
shell that is, sometimes to the point I can see light
through them. What is the status of these helmets? I
have heard that there is a new ALSE supplement to
AR 91-1. If so, what are its provisions and when will it
be out?
Why is all the information on life support equipment
so scattered? Why not write a set of manuals similar
to aircraft manuals to include parts manuals? I am
having trouble receiving replacement items for my
survival kits; is there a total shortage of these items in
the supply system or is it just Europe?
I have many more questions but these are my major
ones. I will be waiting for your answer with great
anticipation. (SGT Steven F. Klauk, ALSE NCOIC,
C Company 8th CAB, 8th INF DIV, APO NY)
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 Dear SGT Klauk: Due to your numerous questions
we decided to share them and our answers with the
f
entire ALSE community.
In reference to your questions on the SPH-4 helmet:
• If the elongated hole used to mount the micro
phone boom is rounded out to the extent that the
microphone boom can no longer be securely
fastened to the helmet shell, the helmet should
be disposed of.
• Surface or paint scratches in the helmet do not
constitute a major defect and should not render
the helmet unserviceable. However, any scratch,
which in your judgment is deep enough to weaken
the shell, should be cause for disposal of the
helmet.
• Current specifications state that the crown area
of the helmet shell shall be a minimum thickness
of .080 inches. If the helmets that you have appear
to be very thin, to the point that they would not
afford much physical protection for the pilot, it is
recommended that you submit a quality deficiency
report (QDR) to HQ TSARCOM, DRSTS-MCFT,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120,
identifying the helmet with the appropriate
contract number. You are further advised that
Defense Personnel Supply Center, the manager
of the helmet, dispatched a worldwide message.
This message advised all users of the SPH-4 helmet
that if they have helmets manufactured by
AQUAIR on contract number DLA-100-80-C-
2226, they should be reported to DPSC for full
credit. This recall was based on excessively thin
helmet shells.
The new aviation life support equipment system
program regulation AR 95-XX encompasses all that
is in AR 95-1 pertaining to ALSE plus more exacting
guidelines in the life support area. It should be out to
the field in 4 to 6 months. In the meantime you should
rely on AR 95-1 and TC 1-62 as your guidelines.
Concerning life support manuals we agree with
your idea and this is our ultimate goal. There are
presently two manuals in draft, one concerning ALSE
maintenance and repair and the other concerning
ALSE operations.
With the fielding of the new ALSE regulation the
proper command influence will be placed on ALSE.
This will allow the correct demand data input to the
supply computer which will then allow you to order
your supplies with a stockage on hand so you won't
always get a “due out.” Until this occurs, however, we
===
If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear, write PEARL, DARCOM, ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE,
4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-3307 or Commercial 314-263-3307
DECEMBER 1982
will just have to make do with the present system.
I know things sound rather bleak, but don't get
discouraged—things are taking off in life support and
we want you to be there to see it happen.
Improper Safety Ties
Another of the military services has again reported
improper safety ties on LPU aircrew life preservers.
Prior to the next flight using LPU aircrew life preservers,
operating activities should inspect their preservers to
ensure they have the proper safety ties. We strongly
recommend that users review the technical orders,
NAVAIRs (Navy manuals) and technical manuals for
the proper safety ties. We do not know how this
happened but we find that where adequate trained
personnel are assigned we have less of a chance of
this “revolting" discovery. Point of contact for this
office is Mr. Ed Daughety, DRCPO-ALSE, AUTOVON
693-3307.
Fire Extinguishers
Dear PEARL, we would appreciate your help in
resolving a problem concerning fire extinguishers.
TM55-1500-204-25/1, paragraph 1-67(1)(f) is quoted:
“Station a crewmember, equipped with a 50-pound
carbon dioxide or equivalent fire extinguisher, in
view of operator and to one side near rear of engine
being started, to observe for fire and fire hazards such
as fuel from overflow lines, etc., and to observe for
chock slippage. This same crewmember will make
periodic visual checks for fuel and oil leakage and
other irregular conditions.”
Our question is this: What is considered an equiva
lent fire extinguisher? We have been told that the 16
pound Halon type extinguisher is considered an
equivalent. And also the 7% pound dry chemical
extinguisher accomplishes almost the same as the 50
pound. What can we legally use?
Your question must perplex others too, and although
this is another one of those gray areas, we will try to
give the information needed. According to our experts
here, you are correct on one point. The 16-pound
Halon type extinguisher is the only authorized equiva
lent to the 50-pound CO, extinguisher. It is managed
by the Air Force, NSN 4210-01-092-3263LS, and should
be ordered off-line. The Halon extinguisher is noncor
rosive to the aircraft and thus does not damage it. The
7%-pound dry chemical extinguisher should not be
used as it is corrosive to aircraft engines. Point of
contact is 1LT Greta Weaver, DRCPO-ALSE, AUTO
VON 693-3307. *-A
19
 RSI Report
AN INDEPTH description of the Army's ration
alization, standardization and interoperability
program was presented in the September 1981
| issue of the Aviation Digest. Since that time,
several articles entitled the RSI Report have
appeared. These articles have highlighted the
accomplishments of international working par
ties/groups that are of interest to helicopter
USBIS.
Unfortunately, when standardizatiºn agree
ments (STANAGs) and quadripartite standard
ization agreements (OSTAGs) are ratified,
aviation units have little, if any, immediate
exposure to these agreements. The normal
procedure is for each Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) school/center to incor
H porate the contents of each document into their
proponent literature. Several years may pass
before the terms of the agreement become the
standing operational procedure for an aviation
unit. In an attempt to familiarize aviation units
with the contents of standardization agree
ments, the Aviation Digest will print selected
| STANAGs and OSTAGS. The most recent
agreement to be ratified by the nations is
STANAG 2861, Procedures in the Event of
Downed Helicopters.
Units which are subject to this agreement
are encouraged to validate the content of the
STANAG. As a signator to this agreement the
U.S. Army is required to abide by the terms of
the agreement. If there are terms of the agree
ment which should be amended, recommended
changes can be submitted. These proposals
will be discussed at the next meeting of the
–– Helicopter Interservice Working Party (HISWP).
To ensure interoperability among national
forces, it is incumbant upon all nations to ad
here to the terms of each agreement. The
results will be an effective fighting force that
will deter aggression by a hostile nation.
STANAG 2861 – Procedures in The Event
Of Downed Helicopters
1. Aim: The aim of this agreement is to stan
dardize the immediate action and priorities in
the event of a downed helicopter during an
operational mission.
2. Agreement: Participating nations agree to
| adopt the procedures set out below.
3. Genera: This agreement is intended to
provide a common procedure for the recovery
security or destruction of downed helicopters
In combat operations recovery of downed
helicopters and crews is secondary to mission
accomplishment by the whole force.
4. Procedures: The procedures to be follow
ed in the event of a forced or crash landing will
depend on the intensity of the threat and
organic capability of the aerial force. The
proximity to the line of contact will dictate the
amount of time which is available to recover
the crew and helicopter and the threat under
which the recovery may be attempted. The
organic capabilities of the aerial force will
dictate whether recovery can be attempted.
5. Premission Planning: Prior to departing
on a combat air operation, the air-mission com:
mander will brief the aircrews on the downed
aircraft procedures. Information that will be
discussed includes:
a. The location of rendezvous points for
downed aircrews.
b. Procedures for providing assistance for
downed aircraft.
Identification, search and rescue pro
cedures.
Identify on-call supporting units that will
provide aircraft recovery and security for
the downed aircraft.
6 Actions and procedures in The Evento
A Downed Helicopter:
a. Low threat area
(1) In this area the commander of the
aviation unit should:
(a) Immediately determine the extent
of damage/injuries through direct
communication or reconnoitering.
(b) Notify controlling headquarters of
situation and request assistance
as required.
(c) If capable, evacuate injured per
sonnel.
(d) Continue mission.
(2) When possible, the aircraft command
er of the downed helicopter should
(a) Remove/secure/destroy critical
items, such as classified material
weapons, ammunition and any
other sensitive equipment.
(b) Administer first aid, as necessary.
us. ARMY Aviation DiGEST

(c) Contact the aviation unit com
mander on the emergency radio.
(d) Assist in the recovery operation
from the ground.
b. High threat area
(1) When possible, the aviation unit com
mander should:
(a) Determine extent of damage/in
juries through direct communica
tion, or, if time and mission allow,
direct reconnaissance.
(b) Report situation to appropriate
authority and request assistance
if appropriate to battle situation.
(c) If able, evacuate injured, if not
request ground force assistance.
(d) If the flow of the battle allows and
mission is not degraded, evacuate
all personnel when able.
(e) Continue mission.
(2) The aircraft commander of the downed
helicopter should:
(a) Accomplish those tasks in para
graph 6.a.(2)(a) through (d) above.
(b) Secure immediate area around
sº
aircraft.
(c) Prepare aircraft for destruction on
lsº
order.
sº
(d) Move personnel to rendezvous
point or nearest friendly unit when
ºf:
ordered.
C. Across the forward Ine of own
troops (FLOT)
sº
(1) The aviation unit commander must
preplan, as much as possible, actions
º to be taken in the event of downed
helicopters.
º During a mission the aviation unit com
gº mander will, if able:
sº (a) Determine casualties from down
ed helicopters.
(b) Record location.
(c) Notify controlling headquarters
and/or nearest ground force, but
only when such communication is
permitted or feasible.
(d) in event crew is unable to destroy
helicopter, arrange for destruction.
(e) Attempt evacuation of personnel
ONLY if it does not hamper mis
DECEMBER 1982
ZN
\\|V
sion accomplishment and will not
unnecessarily endanger more air
craft.
(f) In all cases, continue mission.
(3) During a mission across the FLOT, the
aircraft commander of the downed
helicopter will, if able:
(a) Report situation to commander.
(b) Evacuate aircraft and, unless
otherwise ordered, destroy it and
all sensitive equipment.
(c) When advised by rescue person
nel, move to nearby landing point.
(d) If not immediately evacuated, pro
ceed to preplanned pickup spot or
follow preplanned escape and
evasion plan.
7. Actions By The Owning Unit: The control
ling headquarters of the downed helicopter
should be prepared to accomplish the following
actions upon notification if the tactical situation
permits:
a. Arrange for appropriate forces to provide
security for the downed aircrew and heli
copter.
b. Dispatch recovery personnel and equip
ment required to recover the helicopter.
c. Initiate rescue operations for recovery of
the downed aircrew.
d. When aircraft cannot be recovered.
authorize the aircraft to be destroyed.
8. Reports: Reports on downed helicopter
situations must be concise and accurate.
a. Identification
b. Location
c. Personnel injured, personnel able to con
tinue mission
Estimate of aircraft damage (total, major.
minor)
Existence of evidence of chemical con
tamination
Enemy situation, to include the air defense
artillery threat
g. Accessibility to downed helicopter
h. Intentions
If this article has generated any questions or
requirements please contact Mr. Rush Wicker
by writing: Commander, U.S. Army Aviation
Center, ATTN: ATZO-D-CC, Ft. Rucker, AL
36.362.

"Our FY 32 aircraft accident rate is the worst since
FY 73. It is time to pull up our socks."
General John A. Wickham Jr.
URAIRCRAFT accident
record for fiscal year 82 is
now history—a record
that will leave an indelible scar on
all Army aviators for years to
come. In FY 82, we managed to
kill 46 Army personnel and 40
non-Army personnel, injure 95
crewmembers and passengers,
and destroy 48 aircraft, at a cost
to the Army of more than $62
million.
Human error on the part of
aircrews and supervisors was the
root cause of the sharp increase
in Class A aircraft accidents in
fiscal 82. A review of Army
aircraft accident experience over
the past 5 years—FY 78 through
82—shows that 71 percent of all
Class A, B and C accidents
22
The harsh
lessOnS
Of FY 82&s
Colonel Joseph R. Koehler
Commander
U.S. Army Safety Center 4
_
-
involved human error.
Environmental factors accounted
for 15 percent and materiel 14
percent.
A breakout of the human error
cause factors shows that flight
crew error accounted for 80
percent of all human error
mishaps; supervisory errors, 10
percent; ground crew, 5 percent;
and other personnel, such as air
traffic controllers, 5 percent.
Contrary to popular belief, it is
not the young inexperienced
aviator fresh out of flight school
who is causing the crew error
problem. Statistically speaking, it
is the relatively experienced
aviator, the captain or CW2 who
has been out of flight school for
about 6 years and has about 1,000
£º
total flight hours.
Also, it is not the high-risk NOE
flight operations causing the
recent rise in accidents. In fiscal
82, only five of the flight crew f
error accidents were the result of
operating in the NOE mode. It is
the single-ship mission that is
causing the problem—aviators
operating out of home base, on
their own, without supervision.
The recent increase in aircraft
accidents can be linked to a
breakdown in flight discipline on
the part of individual aviators
and a tendency toward
complacency on the part of
certain commanders.
A breakout of the top five
aircraft system problems over the
past 5 fiscal years which caused
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
the human error accidents shows
that psychological factors; that is,
motivation, attention, judgment
and overconfidence, accounted
for 40 percent of the accidents.
Inadequate unit training ranked
second, accounting for 13
percent. Inadequate written
guidelines, equipment design and
maintenance accounted for the
remaining 18 percent of the
human error accidents.
What this says is that more than
half–53 percent—of the system
problems causing our human
error accidents are at a level
which is directly influenced and
controlled by the commander.
The Safety Center can do
something about system
inadequacies, such as written
guidelines, equipment design and
maintenance; but we must look to
commanders for the correction of
substandard aircrew performance
and inadequate unit training.
Powerful tools
Commanders have several
contemporary concepts, doctrine main rotor blades hit the top of a
and tactics. tree, control was lost, and the
Now, let me review for you a aircraft crashed into a rock cliff.
few of the more flagrant Result: destroyed aircraft, five
violations of flight discipline fatalities, and $1,428,000 in losses.
and/or supervisory deficiencies. • A pilot flew his UH-1H
• A UH-1V pilot picked up an helicopter at cruise airspeed
injured civilian and departed for about 100 feet above a bay. The
the hospital. He flew down a river aircraft hit two wires which
with high cliffs on each side. The severed the tail rotor drive shaft.
aircraft completed a steep right The pilot flew the aircraft about
turn and then rolled into a steep one-half mile to the shore and
left turn. The combination of high tried to make an emergency
airspeed and steep banks resulted landing. He allowed airspeed to
in the aircraft losing altitude. The dissipate to the point that the air
14 Human Error Accidents
All Aircraft
12 -
É
- 2 H_T
10
##
ge P.
8
# - 6-
#3 - 4 -
3
- 2 -

powerful tools to use to reduce 0

crew accidents.
78 79 80 81 82
• Improve upon direct Fiscal Years
supervision of all flight operations
through personal involvement.
• Renew your emphasis on
discipline of aircrews and require
them to operate the aircraft Rotary Wing Accidents by Phase
according to regulations and 50- of Operation
established procedures.
• Record unsafe acts and vio # FY78 THRU FY32
lations of regulations and relieve # 40
aviators from flying duty for flight
discipline infractions. 33
O
: ; 30
• Enforce and give visibility to
the crackdown on aviation §§* 20.
personnel abusing alcohol and &5
drugs. E
• Make aviation training and # 10
safety a matter of personal > NOE
involvement and high priority. It -- 0 - - | | - | |
is a proven fact that whenever a Inflight Landing º stationary Taxi takeof.
well-run unit training program is
in effect, the accident rate is low. Phase of Operation
• Ensure that units conduct Accidents 362 254 48 9. 52
missions within the boundaries of

DECEMBER 1982 23
craft went into a spin and crashed commander to provide the
on the shoreline. Prior to this additional training or upgrade the
accident, the pilot had been pilot's knowledge of emergency
placed before an FEB on one procedures. Result: destroyed
occasion and reprimanded on aircraft, one major injury, and
another for unauthorized low $620,700 in losses.
level flight. Result: destroyed • An OH-58 pilot picked up
aircraft, three major injuries, one some passengers from a field site
minor injury, and $949,000 in and climbed to about 85 to 90
losses. feet agl. The speed of the aircraft
was estimated to be faster than a
hover and slower than normal
cruise. The pilot made a tight
right turn, and the aircraft began
to spin to the right. After spinning
about six times, the aircraft
crashed into trees. This accident We can certainly do better than
was caused by inadequate tail this, and we must. In a nutshell,
rotor thrust for flight conditions there is no excuse for doing the
and gross weight and by the pilot dumb things that we did in FY 82.
performing a maneuver And it's the responsibility of every
conducive to loss of tail rotor ef commander, aviator, crew chief,
fectiveness. The loss of tail rotor maintenance person, traffic
effectiveness was not covered by controller—to name just a few—
the instructor pilot during the to put a stop to this kind of
• A UH-1 pilot failed to make pilot's transition into the OH-58. horrible record. It can be done
sure the left side engine cowling The pilot had completed his OH and you can do it if you'll just
was secure. The cowling came off 58 transition training just two remember what you were taught
during flight and hit the tail rotor. weeks before this accident. during training and fly the way
The tail rotor blades and hub
Result: destroyed aircraft, one you were taught to fly. As
assembly separated from the General McNair has stated: “Let’s
aircraft. The pilot entered autoro fatality, three major injuries, and
tation and the UH-1 landed hard.
$483,000 in losses. be accident free in 83.” <º-
The pilot failed to recognize the
loss of tail rotor thrust and
reacted to a nonexistent engine CLASSA AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
failure. He did not try to regain
powered flight and began an FY AH1 | UH1 | UH60 || CH47 || OH58 || OH6 || OV1
autorotative deceleration at 125 78 4 25 + 0 7 3 2
to 150 feet instead of 75 feet in 79 5 12 0 5 9 0 2
accordance with the operator's ACCIDENTS | 80 5 13 0 4 12 0 2
manual. Approximately 7 months 81 7 19 2 2 9 1 1
before this accident, an IP had 82 10 24 4 2 13 3 2
recommended the pilot receive
additional training in simulated 78 5.23 || 3.39 + O 2.41 || 10.14 || 9.33
antitorque procedures. Two 79 5.96 || 1.64 0 9.71 || 3.15 0 9.26
months later the pilot failed a RATE 80 5.57 | 1.67 0 7.72 || 4.26 0 9.39
written exam on emergency 81 7.04 || 2.32 || 5.93 || 3.52 || 3.06 || 2.67 || 5.05
procedures. About a month and a 82 9.21 || 3.26 || 8.07 || 3.63 || 4.46 || 9.08 || 11.08
half before this accident, the pilot
was involved in a minor accident PERCENT 78 5 51 + 4 20 2 1
in which he demonstrated faulty GF 79 6 51 1 4 20 2 1
judgment. It was determined at TOTAL 80 6 51 1 3 18 2 1
that time that he needed FLYING 81 6 50 2 4 18 2 1
additional supervised flight HøURS 82 7 47 3 4 19 2 1
training and counseling. No
action was taken by the unit *UH6O NOT IN INVENTORY

24 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 The accident discussed by the author and shown below occurred
substantially as described. The crew of the aircraft consisted
of John, a unit instructor pilot, flying the aircraft as copilot
in the left seat; Bill, the pilot, navigating from the right
seat; and Don, the flight's instructor pilot in the "jump seat"
behind the radio console. The author was not aboard the aircraft,
but describes the flight first from the copilot's point of view,
and then later from the instructor pilot's to reflect their
actions and reactions to the events of the flight

CW3 William W. Shawn

ARNG Multi-Media Training Group
Fort Rucker, AL

WHO)
NEEDS IT
ANY WAYº

l, WAS A COLD clear day with patches of

white remaining from a recent snowfall. As I flew
* from the left seat, Bill served as pilot and navigator
from the right seat. Don, the instructor pilot (IP) for
the flight, monitored everything closely from the “jump
seat” behind the radio console. The 30-minute flight
to the training area had been uneventful, and we were
now halfway through the nap-of-the-earth (NOE) route.
To this point everything had gone like clockwork, but
presently Bill's face reflected questioning and doubt.
As he looked back and forth from his map to the
terrain our IP realized he was unsure of our position.
“All right Bill, do you know exactly where you are?”
asked Don from behind us. “I think so. We should be
just about here, just before this small creek on the
map.” “Well, look closely at the terrain around you
and verify if that's true.” After scanning the area
again and looking at his map, Bill realized he had
directed me up the wrong draw. “OK, now that you
know where you are, just return to the course and
start again.”
Although the old aviation saying, “hours and hours
of boredom, broken by moments of stark terror,”
may not be as applicable to helicopter pilots as to
fixed wingers, and especially not during NOE flight,
in just seconds the last part of that old saying would
be appropriate to the three of us.
Midway through a right pedal turn, 10 feet above
the trees, a sickening shudder shook the UH-1M Huey
airframe. “You better get this aircraft on the ground
now!" Don shouted from the jump seat, but all I could
see below me were trees. A clear area was not far
away so I applied cyclic to reach it. At almost the
same time a loud bang came from the rear of the
aircraft followed by the nose pitching down, a right
roll and a rapid spin to the right. “Tail rotor failure!"
shouted Bill. The pedals had no effect, so I rolled the
throttle off and applied aft cyclic to level the aircraft.

DECEMBER 1982 25

WHO
NEEDS IT
ANYWAY?
continued
“My God, we're still spinning,” I thought as I pulled
collective to cushion us into the trees.
All I could see outside the cockpit was a blur of
limbs and patches of white and brown. An extremely
noselow attitude still existed, and I instinctively threw
my head back as I saw a tree aiming for my windshield.
My next memory was of the crew from the safety and
control (S&C) aircraft assisting me from the ground. I
also remember asking Don if he was all right as he was
loaded on the aircraft but remember nothing more
until I saw the nurses above me in the hospital
emergency room.
Although John's memory of the crash is limited, he
was conscious when the sounds of breaking limbs,
bending metal and shattering plexiglass ceased in the
bottom of an 8-foot deep, dry creek bed. All three
crewmembers were trapped in the aircraft when it
came to rest on its right side. In the pilot seat, Bill was
totally pinned and unable to move. His right knee was
pressed against his chin; his helmet was trapped between
the cabin roof and his seat; his right arm was pinned
by his body against the seat; and the hood of his
winter jacket was caught between the seat and the
airframe. In the jump seat, Don's left leg was trapped
between the copilot's seat and the center console.
The aircraft was so compressed on its right side,
however, that he could place his right foot on the
ground outside the cargo door. John was the least
pinned of all and was the first one to exit through
what once was the left windshield. The fact that all
three Guardsmen survived the crash is somewhat of a
miracle when the almost total destruction of the cabin
area was considered.
The lapses of memory by the copilot apparently
resulted from a blow to the head by the tree approaching
his windshield. Bill, the pilot, also experienced a memory
loss due to a concussion. To describe the crew's
actions on the ground, the following events are as
recalled by the IP.
26
Suddenly everything was quiet except for the engine
running at flight idle. Bill's helmet was wedged between
his seat and the cabin roof, so he unsnapped his chin
strap and pulled out of it. John was mumbling and
asking for help, and blood was dripping from his face.
Someone took the PRC-90 from John's vest; but since -
it wouldn't work, it was laid aside in the cockpit. I
then started trying to free my left leg that was pinned
against the center console. The engine now began
coasting down from fuel starvation, but the glaring
master caution and segment lights indicated the battery
was still on. The smell of JP-4 filled the air, and all of
us became concerned about the possibility of a fire
erupting. We tried to turn the battery switch off, but
the overhead console could not be found! Bill was
still trapped by his pinned flight jacket hood, and he
asked me to cut it off with my survival knife. With
that done he could move a bit in his seat.
By now John had freed himself and we lifted his
seat off of my leg. John then exited through what once
was his windshield, and Bill and I followed. Our first
concern was to get away from the aircraft in case of
fire. John, who had suffered a broken leg, was helped
up the small hill we were on by Bill—while I, having
also suffered a broken leg, began scooting backwards
on my hands dragging my leg behind me. I soon felt
Bill grab my jacket and start pulling me to where John
was sitting.
I then tried to make contact with the S&C bird with
our second survival radio. Having no success, I
directed Bill to go higher on the hill and try the radio
from there. The S&C aircraft had not seen us crash
and was searching for us in the general area. Due to
the wreckage blending in with the ground and almost
being hidden in the creek bed, we could hardly
recognize it ourselves from the ground. Bill was able
to establish contact with the second ship and began
directing it toward us. I carried an MK-13 flare with
me, and I ignited its red smoke end when I heard the
S&C bird. I also took the combat casualty blanket
from my vest and laid it out with the international
orange side facing up. The crew of the S&C first saw
my smoke, and then my blanket and then began
circling for an approach. In a short time the crew
chief, who was an emergency medical technician,
was administering to our injuries as we flew to medical
facilities.
As this article is written, one of the three crew
members has returned to full flight status, with the
remaining two expected to regain that status in the
future. It is obvious from the copilot's and instructor's
statements that their situation was rather grim as they
lay on their sides in the cockpit. Everyone had been
violently thrown about the aircraft during its descent
and impact with the dry creek bed. Each aviator was
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 flying, as they should have been, with their helmet's
clear visor down. Each helmet received severe blows
from the cockpit environment, and in the case of the
copilot's, probable contact with a tree. Although each
helmet shell was gouged and broken, all three visors
remained intact. The copilot credits his visor with
saving his sight, for although it was flattened against
his face and broke his sunglasses (the source of blood
seen dripping in the cockpit), without it his injury
would undoubtedly have been worse.
Had any of the helmets' retention systems failed,
resulting in a helmet loss, the outcome would un
doubtedly have been tragic. Ironically enough, an
aviation life support equipment (ALSE) specialist had
rebuilt one of the helmets just weeks earlier and had
made a recommended modification to two of the
three chin-strap assemblies. We know from this crash
that the helmets did their jobs, but what about the
other life support equipment carried by the aviators?
Without a survival knife the pilot would have been
held firm in his seat by the hood of his winter flight
jacket. He had the small pocketknife that comes with
the survival vest, but he was unable to reach it with his
free hand and had to depend on his instructor and his
knife.
Remember the first PRC-90 that didn't work? In
fact it did work, but the selector switch had been
placed in the beacon mode, so no transmissions could
be made. Two civil aircraft received the beacon and
began “homing” to the site after the S&C aircraft had
evacuated the men. So well hidden was the aircraft in
CODºñº)N
º
A viction Center Training An alysis and Assistance ſecºn
W01 IP?
ISSUE: Several personnel stated that they had heard
of a new program through which warrant officers
(WO1) could become instructor pilots (IPs). They
were interested in this program and would like to
know more about it.
COMMENT: There is no “new” program perse through
which WOls can become IPs; however, there is nothing
restricting a WO1 from becoming an IP. The same
DECEMBER 1982
the creek bed that even though the aircraft navigated
to the crash scene, they could not spot the wreckage
below them for hours.
This fact points out the importance of the smoke
released by the instructor (though not an item
normally carried by crews), which was first seen by
the S&C crew, and then the casualty blanket which
pinpointed their position. The second PRC-90 radio
also worked as it was designed to and allowed
communications to be established between the crew
and the S&C aircraft. All of the survival equipment
that aviators are required by regulations to have, to
be maintained and to be worn, performed as intended
on this flight.
The title of this article is “Who Needs It Anyway....”
The answer is you do if you ever fly as a crewmember.
You may have been on flight status for years, just as
these three aviators, and have never needed or used it
before. But just like them, you may need it on the very
next flight you take. Do you have the equipment you
are supposed to have? Is it checked out and properly
maintained? Do you wear the survival vest as it is
designed to be worn, or do you leave it lying in the
cargo compartment in your helmet bag or hanging on
your seat back? (None of the men in the crash above
could find their helmet bags after the crash.) If you
answered any of these with a “no,” then you probably
believe “Who Needs It Anyway..." is a valid statement.
In that case it's a shame you can't talk to the pilots you
just read about, for I know you'll never convince
them! <-->
guidelines in AR 95-1, paragraph 6-12, are applied to
everyone regardless of rank. It is also possible for
warrant officer candidates who show outstanding
abilities to be selected to remain at Ft. Rucker and
become “turnaround" IPs. They must first obtain 500
hours in the appropriate aircraft by conducting local
support missions. This is the same program offered to
commissioned officers. (Directorate of Training and
Doctrine)
27
 VIEWS FROM READERS

Editor: Editor: I Am A Professional

I collect helicopters on postage stamps Enclosed please find a “creed" that I
for display and exhibition. Would be wrote about 1 year ago to hopefully I know I am a Professional because Tve
interested in contacting any philatelists inspire the 68G10 students that I instruct. been taught by those who will accept nothing
with same hobby. Being an instructor at Ft. Eustis for less.
MAJ Jack R. Treutle the past couple of years, I now feel that
47 Saint Cloud Street there is a need to let individuals know I have been given the fundamentals, and by
how important each of their particular using those fundamentals correctly, I will become
aviation related skills are and the need more proficient as time goes on; but even
for them to maintain the highest possible now, I am a professional
degree of professionalism when applying
those skills. When working on aircraft. I will always know
The branch of the Transportation when ſm right because I have the integrity and
School that I am assigned to recently the honesty to admit that I don't know and to
had 3,000 copies of this creed printed seek out the comect manuals for the answers—
to enable each student to have a copy even after a nonprofessional tells me “how
Editor:
upon graduation, along with the diploma. they used to do it.”
Please forward me one copy of Major If you feel that this creed meets the
William C. Wood's article “Operational standards of your magazine, I would be Yea, Tm a professional, and as long as I
Aspects of Stress and Fatigue" which honored to have you share it with your work on aircraft, I will remain one; because I
appeared in the September 1976 issue entire readership through publicaiton. know that I am partly responsible to every
of the Aviation Digest. Thank you for your time and consid crewmember who will ever fly on that aircraft
Thank you very much. eration.
CPT Thomas P. Finley, USAF SSG Robert P. Bertrand As a professional, I have pride in my work,
Andrews AFB, MD 2d STF & FAC Co. and a satisfaction in knowing that my skill is an
U.S. Army Transportation School important and integral part of aviation, because
Editor: Ft. Eustis, VA 23604 I AM APROFESSIONAL
Could you please help me gather
information on helicopter air-to-air
combat tactics? I've read “Cobra Vs.
Hind” and “Smart Guys Win" and am
very interested in learning more about
the actual fighting tactics.
I enjoyed your air-to-air articles and
I hope more emphasis will be placed on
this crucial new aspect of helicopter
use. I am very happy to see the Army
starting to realize the importance of
air-to-air combat and the utilization and
development of helicopters for this
important role in battle.
SGT Michael L. Casmey
47th Aviation Battalion
Minnesota Army National Guard
-

Articles from the Aviation Digest re

quested in these letters have been mailed.
Readers can obtain copies of material
printed in any issue by writing to Fditor,
U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Drawer % 74%. A /reed: a ////e more cºsárow?
P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

Maintenance Specialist of the YearVisses
Ronald L. Kondo of the 244th ATC Company (Forward), Camp
Morse, Korea. His recommendation for the award stated
that the ground controlled approach radar at his site
had been out of service for a long time, and he effected
the necessary repair soon after his arrival in April 1981.
He was also recognized for establishing a fully
integrated program to test the entire system on the site
rather than just individual components

presented by the U.S. Army Communications

Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Controller of the Year'Vis spa Anthony w cooper.

He was selected for his duty with the 244th ATC Company
(Forward), Camp Morse, Korea. The controller was
assigned there after his graduation from ATC school at
Ft. Rucker, AL, in April 1981 and served with the 244th
until June 1982 when he moved to the 16th ATC
Battalion, Ft. Hood,Tx. SP4 Cooper was cited for his
willingness and ability to take on additional duties and
successfully complete the extra work

Facility of the Year/\ is the 7th signal commands

Army Radar Approach Control Facility, Ft. Sill, OK. Its
chief is James Damron and it has 32 controllers and 10
maintainers. The facility was extensively involved with
civil aviation during the Federal Aviation
Administration's controller strike, while at the same time
It was meeting increased military aviation radar
requirements

Best Tactical PlatoonDº a new award, was won

by the 1st Platoon (Airborne), 245th Air Traffic Control
Company (Forward), 58th ATC Battalion (Corps), Ft.
Bragg, NC. SSGT Steven K. Faucette, foreground, and
SP5 David Robinson are members of the unit. One
basis for the award was the work of the platoon's
ground controlled approach section during Bold Eagle
82 at Eglin Air Force Base, FL, when more than 30 -

GCAs were done with heavily loaded Air Force C-130

aircraft into an unlighted tactical airfield at night with SN
minimum flying weather -
 -
REPORTING FINAL
Late NewsFromArmyAviation Activities
FROM FORT EUSTIS
Contributions Recognized. Three employees
of the Army Aviation Research and Development
Command's Applied Technology Laboratory were
recently honored for their outstanding work in
1982.
Paul Chesser, an aerospace engineer, received
the Director's Award for Technological Achieve
ment for his evaluation of the required engine
performance of a 5,000-shaft horsepower class
demonstrator engine based on desired airframe
operation capability.
Hilda E. Fowler's work as a contract specialist
earned her the Director's Award for Exceptional
Service in the area of precontract and contract
administration.
Thomas G. Mangrum Sr. received the Director's
Award for General Excellence for his dedicated
efforts and leadership abilities as chief of the
Calibration Laboratory.
Director's Awards in various areas for outstanding contri
butions in 1982 were presented at a recent Applied Technology
Laboratory (ATL) banquet at Ft. Eustis, VA. Participants were,
left to right, Major General Story C. Stevens, commander,
AVRADCOM; Hilda E. Fowler, Exceptional Service award;
Dr. Jay R. Sculley, assistant secretary of the Army for research,
development and acquisition, guest speaker; Thomas G.
Mangrum Sr., General Excellence award; Paul Chesser,
Technological Achievement award; and Colonel Emmett F.
Knight, director of ATL
30
Contracts Awarded. Contracts recently awarded
by the Applied Technology Laboratory include:
• Boeing Vertol Co. will fabricate redesigned
gearing for the heavy lift helicopter (HLH),
assemble and test the combiner transmission
and evaluate this transmission in terms of its
contribution to the lift capability of the HLH-28
months, $2,840,000.
• A manual showing how to inspect and repair
combat damage to Black Hawk helicopter air
frames is being developed by Sikorsky Aircraft,
United Technologies—25 months, $490,700.
• Sikorsky Aircraft will conduct a test program
to demonstrate the capability of a tandem 2–
hook external cargo system on the Black Hawk
helicopter in place of the current single-hook
system—5 months, $106,700.
• Bell Helicopter Textron will develop a
helicopter external load acquisition system that
can visually acquire a load during foul weather
and night conditions; the contract contains an
option for making and testing a prototype sys
tem—17 months, $370,188.
(Jerry Irvine, ATL PAO)
FROM FORT RUCKER
Safe Aviators. Certificates of Achievement have
been presented to 188 Army aviators for their
accident-free flying records:
CW2 Garland R. Crabtree of Lowe Division has
flown 2,000 hours without an accident.
Certificates for 1,500 hours went to CPT Phillip
L. Wade and CW3 Stephen V. Rauch, Hanchey
Division; 1LT Mason M. Colbert, CW3s Brian R.
Swenson, Glen W. Drew Jr., John A. Jordan,
Thomas E. Martin and William D. Booth, and
CW2s Roger Boyd, Gerald LaCross, Robert V.
Weichmann, Walter N. Brooks and Hal W. Raber,
Lowe Division; and CW2 Francis A. Rawden, 1st
Aviation Brigade.
Sixty-seven aviators received 1,000-hour Safety
certificates, and 106 were cited for 500 hours.
Annual Writing Award. The Army Aviation Digest
Writer of the Year Award for the period July 1981
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 to June 1982 has been won by Colonel James W.
Lloyd of Ft. Rucker.
* His article "Who's Going to Teach Aviators
How to Fight?" was winner of the monthly award
in February 1982. In it, he wrote that the initial
entry flight training program gives students more
than-adequate instructions on how to fly but not
on how to fight. With Army Aviation an accession
Specialty and a combat arm, the need for its
personnel to be trained to appreciate the com
plexity of Combined arms operations is urgent,
he said.
Colonel Lloyd received an Aviation Digest
Certificate of Achievement and a hand calculator.
The latter was given by the Bogardus S. Cairns
Chapter, Association of the U. S. Army. That
organization also awards an engraved pen to
each month's winner.
Certificates of Achievement were forwarded
to the contest's second and third place winners:
CW4 Richard A. Davis, Ft. Hood, TX, “Helicop
ters—the Soviet View," January 1982; and BG
William W. Ford (Ret.), “Grasshoppers," June 1982.
(USAAVNC PAO)
Mike's Course Ends. The gunnery instructor
pilot course which provided specialized training
using the Vietnam-era UH-1M (Mike) Huey gun
ship has been phased out.
It originated in the 1960s as a 16-day course
and was designed to provide active, National
Guard and foreign instructor pilots with the
techniques of fire and methods of instruction
taught in initial gunnery training.
The Army deactiviated the course for the active
component in 1970 and 1 year later ceased to
use the UH-1 M in the field. The course continued,
however, for the NG and foreign IPs.
* More than 10,000 The former commander of Flight 3,
"Mike" was armed with the M-5 grenade launch
ing subsystem mounted on the nose and the M
21, a seven-count folding fin aerial rocket pod
and minigun, on each side. Its combat mission
was to provide suppressive fire for friendly troop
advancements, according to CW3 Charles S.
Decker, course ||P.
With the retirement of the two UH-1 M Huey
gunships at Ft. Rucker, the few still in the Army
inventory now all belong to National Guard units
that will continue to use the aircraft.
(USAAVNC PAO)
FROM MARYLAND
Unique Simulator Use. Most helicopter simu
lators are used for pilot training, but there is one
DECEMBER 1982
Colonel James W. Lloyd center, shows Major General Carl H.
McNair Jr. the calculator he received from the Bogardus S.
Cairns Chapter, Association of the U.S. Army, Ft. Rucker, AL,
for being selected as the Army Aviation Digest Writer of the
Year. The presentation was made by Nick Saad, right, chapter
president. General McNair, Ft. Rucker's commander, also
gave Colonel Lloyd an Aviation Digest Certificate of Achieve
ment
at Aberdeen Proving Ground that is used to
Conduct experiments on Controls and displays. It
belongs to the Human Engineering Laboratory
(HEL), the Army's lead laboratory for studies of
how man interacts with machine.
Bill De Bellis, a laboratory engineer, explained:
“In order to fly, a pilot needs to know certain
information that is given to him in different forms
on the instrument panel. We see how he reacts
to the information and to the way it is supplied."
One project soon to be undertaken with the
simulator involves experiments with a second
generation single controller that will allow the
pilot to operate the helicopter with one hand and
possibly without the use of the feet, according to
Mr. De Bellis. HEL will be looking at pilot reactions
to such things as angle placement and switch
and button manipulation of the controller.
Other future projects for the simulator include
experimentation of pilot interactive video displays
and eventually some voice interaction controls.
(APGPAO)
Contact/Night Qualification Branch, Lowe Division, Ft. Rucker,
AL, CPT Houston A. Yarbrough, left and the present commander,
CPT Michael R. Bozeman, read the Army Aviation Center
Certificate of Achievement presented the flight recently in
recognition of its flying 10,777 accident-free hours in the
past 12 months. CPT Yarbrough, who commanded the flight
for the entire period, is now commander of 60th Company,
6th Battalion, 1st Aviation Brigade
 AVIATION PERSONNELNOTES
Project Manager
Development Program
THE OBJECTIVE of the Project Manager Develop
ment Program (PMDP) is to identify and develop
qualified commissioned officers to support future
requirements for project managers and other senior
officers within materiel acquisition activities in the
Department of Defense.
Since December 1973, the field of materiel acquis
ition, and specifically project management, has been
under intense review within the Army. At that time,
the Secretary of the Army established the Army
Materiel Acquisition Review Committee (AMARC)
to conduct a comprehensive review of the Army's
entire materiel acquisition process. In February 1974,
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel directed the
commander, Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN)
to establish a Project Manager Development Office
within the Officer Personnel Management Directorate
(OPMD). Initial development of the PMDP began in
March 1974. Continued development was directed in
the approved AMARC implementing plan in May
1974. The PMDP has evolved as a formalized profes
sional development program within the Officer
Personnel Management System (OPMS).
Policies and procedures for PMDP are prescribed
in Chapter 54, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet
600-3, “Officer Professional Development and Utili
zation.” Unlike an OPMS specialty, which is a distinct
grouping of similar positions in which officers receive
professional development, the PMDP encompasses a
variety of positions in a number of specialties. Positions
for the development of officers in the PMDP are
found in project manager offices, Headquarters, U.S.
Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
and its subordinate commands; DA staff; and other
activities involved in materiel acquisition management.
The PMDP is applicable to all commissioned officers
serving in the grade of captain through colonel on
active duty managed under OPMD.
32
Eligibility criteria for participation in the PMDP
are:
• Be in the grade of captain through colonel.
• Have completed the advanced course level of
military schooling.
• Have completed 6 years of active federal commis
sioned service (AFCS).
• Officers possessing more than 10 years AFCS at
the time of application must either possess a specialty
related to one of the principal project management
functions (i.e., research and development, operations
research/systems analysis, procurement, logistics, etc.)
or have experience related to project management.
• Have the following educational background:
Military schooling. Military schooling appropriate
to grade and length of service; this includes Command
and General Staff College or equivalent for field
grade officers and advanced course attendance for
company grade officers.
Civil schooling. Baccalaureate or higher degree.
The degree preferably should be in one of the following
fields:
—Management
—Engineering
–Physical Sciences.
Possession of any other baccalaureate degree is
sufficient if the officer has received project manager
related civilian or military training or has had qualifying
materiel acquisition experience.
• Have, by manner of performance, demonstrated
a high level of intelligence, initiative, imagination,
judgment and potential for development as a project
manager.
• Indicate a desire to participate in the program.
• Have at least 6 years of active service remaining
upon entry into the program.
Assignments of PMDP members may include normal
specialty development positions, duties in all phases
of project management, and high level staff positions
relating to project management, development and
acquisition.
Educational and training opportunities for officers
in the PMDP include both military and civilian
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
 schooling. Interspecialty training includes:
• The Program Management Course (19 weeks)
** at the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC).
Ft. Belvoir, VA.
• Training with industry (1 year).
• Short courses offered by DSMC, Army Logistics
Management Center and other military schools in
research and development, management, procurement,
logistics and project management.
For further information, contact MILPERCEN,
DAPC-OPA-C; telephone: AUTOVON 221-0250/51
or Commercial 202-325-0250/51.
Five-Year
Promotion
Plan
CURRENTLY IN effect is the 5-year promotion plan
for the years 1982 through 1986. The purpose of this
long-range promotion plan is to facilitate general force
structure and management planning. The plan is
applicable to field grade officers (major through
colonel). The 5-year plan helps monitor the Officer
Personnel Management System and incorporates the
promotion objectives of the DOPMA legislation
effective 15 September 1981.
The 5-year plan projects future promotions of officers
by their year groups. Year group refers to those “due
course” officers who have never received a primary
CGººſſ)N
A viction Center Training Analysis and Assistance Team
NATIONAL GUARD ATC QUOTAS
ISSUE: Training personnel are dissatisfied with the
fiscal year (FY) 1983 school quotas for the air traffic
control (ATC) tower operator (93H) and radar
controller (93J) courses. They were informed that
only two slots would be available for the 93J course
and none available for the 93H course for the entire
National Guard during FY 1983. These quotas were
unacceptable to meet mission requirements.
COMMENT: Quotas for ATC courses should not be
a problem within the National Guard. Coordination
DECEMBER 1982
zone passover or selection for early promotion.
Eligibility years are shown below for both the primary
and below the zones during this 5-year period. Year
group designations may be used for planning, but are
not official until updated and approved annually by
the Chief of Staff, Army.
Due to the size of year groups 1973 through 1976,
two selection boards may be required in fiscal year
1985 to maintain the required officer population in
the grade of major. Another alternative might be a
single 2-year group board. 2:-
FIVE YEAR
PROMOTION PLAN
YEAR GROUP BEING
BOARD CONSIDERED TO
YEAR ZONE MAJ LTC
82 PZ 72 67
* See last paragraph of article
with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) indicates the
quotas stated in the issue are incorrect. The NGB is
responsible for coordinating all quotas for nonprior
service personnel into military occupational specialty
(MOS) 93H and 93J. Quotas are established by an
automated system using authorized, current fill,
projected vacancies and projected accessions. States
do not have to request allocations. FY 1983 quotas
show 42 slots (nonprior service) for MOS 93J and 15
slots for 93H. All inservice allocations for the National
Guard are handled by Edgewood Arsenal. Units should
request slots based on anticipated requirements.
33
 Lieutenant Colonel Donald E. S. Merritt
Readiness Project Officer
Scout/Observation Helicopters
Directorate for Systems Management
USATSARCOM
St. Louis, MO

Mr. Charles C. Cioffi

Chief, Rotary Wing Branch
Aircraft Systems Engineering Division
Directorate for Systems Engineering and Development
USAAVRADCOM
St. Louis, MO

34 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 OH-58 KIOWA AIRCRAFT
have been experiencing a phenom
enon since 1975 which manifests
itself in the form of a power turbine
droop. The incidents are generally
losses of power turbine (N,) revo
lutions per minute (rpm). In many
º of these cases, the incidents cannot
be duplicated by maintenance per
sonnel while troubleshooting after
the in-flight occurrence.
During January 1975 through
March 1981, there were 159 occur
rences of power droop. In an effort
to correct this phenomenon, 10
safety-of-flight/maintenance advi
sory messages were issued to the
field. In light of the continuing phe
nomenon, it was evident that none
of these fixes had corrected the
problem.
In view of this, the commander
of U.S. Army Troop Support and
Aviation Materiel Readiness Com
DECEMBER 1982
mand (TSARCOM) requested the
commander of U.S. Army Aviation
Research and Development Com
mand (AVRADCOM) to assemble
a team with appropriate technical
expertise to review this problem and
to arrive at a solution. A group was
formed in September 1981, called
the OH-58 Power Droop Panel,
composed primarily of members of
AVRADCOM; TSARCOM; mem
bers of various laboratories; United
States Army Depot, Corpus Christi
(CCAD); Ft. Rucker, AL, represen
tatives from the Aviation Center
and the U.S. Army Safety Center;
and contractor representatives from
Bell Helicopter (airframe), Detroit
Diesel Allison (engine) and Bendix
(fuel control and governor).
A final report was published in
February 1982 which summarized
the investigation and gave con
clusions and recommendations. A
few of the major conclusions were:
• There was no single cause found.
• The hardware and technical
documentation had not been
kept current with correspond
ing changes from the commer
cial fleet.
• The aircraft had marginal tail
rotor control and the OH-58A
had marginal engine power.
• The maintenance procedures
and training needed improve
ment.
The Power Droop Panel adopted
the following definitions in order
to accurately address the topic of
power droop:
Droop: The loss of N, to a point
where safe operation of the heli
copter as defined in the oper
ator's manual cannot be main
tained.
Power Loss: The loss of N. rpm
to a point as to trigger low rotor
35

warning horn so that further flight
is not possible.
Flame Out: The complete loss of
power with no indication of TOT
(turbine outlet temperature).
It was interesting to note that the
reported mishaps covered a rather
broad range of suspected causes,
with no particular item standing out
as a singular cause; the suspected
causes are shown in figure 1.
During the review of these 159
cases, an attempt was made to
identify the portion of the flight
regime in which the loss of rpm
occurred. The results are shown in
figure 2.
Engine and component investi
gations were performed at CCAD
on equipment from four different
geographical locations where power
droops had occurred during the
existence of the Power Droop Panel.
There was no one item identified in
these investigations which would
have conclusively caused the re
ported power droop.
During testing of an OH-58C, in
an attempt to determine the cause
of its power droop, it was found
that rapid collective inputs could
cause transient droop to as low as
97 percent N. Recovery would occur
in 3 to 5 seconds, which is a normal
rate of response for this control
system.
It was concluded that the existing
limits, in Army manuals, on transient
droop would cause the OH-58 to be
landed and unscheduled mainte
nance to be performed. The allow
able limits in the Army manuals on
power droop were considered con
fusing and also a potential cause of
an unwarranted power droop write
up. A message was sent to the users
defining a normal N, power droop
(Maintenance Mandatory Message
OH-58-81-08).
In addition, the OH-58A Main
tenance Test Flight (MTF) manual
was revised and a new MTF manual
was prepared for the OH-58C. In
cluded in these manuals were proce
dures to accomplish an engine per
formance check to determine that
the aircraft system performs in
accordance with the performance
charts in the operator's manuals.
The OH-58 is powered by the
T63 series engine which is classified
as a gas-turbine engine. In a gas
turbine engine, the gas combustion
process is continuous, and this
energy is absorbed by four turbine
stages. The turbines extract the gas
energy and convert it into mechan
ical energy as shaft horsepower.
Inlet air is brought in through
the intake section of the engine to
the compressor section. The com
pressor produces the required air
pressure rise and accelerates the
air to the combustion section. On
this engine the N. rpm (gas producer)
varies directly with output power;
if output power increases, N. rpm
increases and the converse. The air
pumped by the compressor is routed
to the combustor section where the
air is burned with the fuel to develop
the engine power (figure 3).
The hot gases are then directed
to the turbine section where they
drive the gas producer (N1) turbine
and power turbine (N,). The N,
turbine rotor is used to develop the
horsepower required by the com
pressor rotor. The N, turbine shaft
is coupled to the power turbine gear
train which provides the driving
force for the helicopter.

FIGURE 2
FIGURE 1 OH-58 Mishaps from January 1975 to
OH-58 Mishaps from January 1975 to March 1981 March 1981 where there was a loss of
where there was a loss of rpm (by cause) rpm (By Flight Regime)

SUSPECTED CAUSE 75 76 || 77 || 78 || 79 |80 ITOTALS I

-T-
}, NO. OF
FLIGHT OCCU
Double Check Valve: - REGIME RENCES
Sticking/clogged failed other 7 || 8 || 2 || 1 || – 23 1.4% Cruise 42
Loose Air Lines 3 5 || 1 5 17 1.1% Climb 11

Governor. Hovering 10
Failed/Suspected/Other 9 || 2 || 1 1 || 3 || 18 34 21% Take-off and/or hovering
Fuel Control: to take-off 25
Adjustment/Failed/Other 1 I 3 || 2 || 1 || 2 5 14 9% Approach to landing 13

Linear Actuator: Initial flight regime not 30

Failed/Defective/Other 3 || 1 || – || – || – || 2 6 4% Stated

Contaminated Fuel 3 l 2 | – || – || – || 1 6 4% (SOURCE: USASC PRAM Printout,

- dated 31 March 1981)
Could Not Find Problem, or
Could Not Duplicate Problem 7 5 || 2 || 13 40 25%
Other 6 2 || 1 7 || 19 || 12%
40 28 12 || 14 || 9 || 56 159
-

(SOURCE: USASC PRAM Printout, dated 31 March 1981)

36 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 2
*2
2. combustion
out-r cº---

z
gas producer
compressor case—º turbine support

N compressor discharge
-
- air-tube
compressor zºº
front support
º º D. INLET air
accessory gearbox
L compressed air
- combustion Gases
- ExHaust Gases

FIGURE 3: Air flow and combustion

The T63 engine power output is
maintained by controlling the gas
producer (N1) speed. (The gas pro
ducer drives the compressor which
pumps air to the combustor.) N,
speed levels are maintained by a
power turbine (N,) fuel governor
which senses N, speed. The operator
selects N, speed and the power
º
required to maintain this speed is
automatically maintained by the N2
governor action on metered fuel
flow to the combustor. The N2
governor requirements are sched
uled by the N, governor lever; the
N, governor schedules N, speed to
changing power outputs to maintain
the required output shaft speed.
The basic parts of the fuel system
which are necessary to control
engine power output are:
Throttle—collective stick twist
grip.
Droop compensator.
Governor rpm switch: pilot's N,
“beep” switch.
Gas producer fuel control.
Power turbine governor.
Fuel pump and fuel filter.
Fuel nozzle.
Fuel for the engine is supplied by
an engine-driven fuel pump from
the OH-58 fuel system. The fuel
pump is gear driven and delivers
fuel to the gas producer fuel control;
excess fuel is bypassed back to the
pump. The fuel control delivers
metered fuel to the fuel nozzle,
where it is sprayed into the com
bustion lines, mixed with air and
burned (figure 4).
The power-turbine governor is
used for speed governing of the
power-turbine rotor; the N, fuel
control and the N, governor are
connected together by two pneu
matic lines.
A schematic of the T63 fuel con
trol system is shown in figure 5.
This system is a pneumatic system
and was selected due to its original
simplicity; however, as time evolved,
its complexity grew in order to
overcome operating problems.
The fuel metering system in this
pneumatic system, as described in

DECEMBER 1982 37
 E Po BYPASS FUEl PR REGULATED AIR PRESSURE
Pi PUMP DiSCHARGE FUEL - Po compressor Discharge pressure fuel outlet
P2 METERED Fuel § PG | Gover Nor ResET PREssure
º
PG Governor PREssure Lpx Acceleration sellows pressure min. flow
l;
cutoff a stop head
PA AMBIENT PREssure ZPy Governor servo PREssure valve Hº adjustment

*Sºl
FC inlets
metering valv
governor bypass valve
bellows
| sº fuel

air valve
check valve
- f Fo
accumulator
accel bellows relief valve

gov. reset assembly P. fuel inlet

p.f.
governor max. flow stop
lever governor lever
# min. flow stop

P
X
flyweights N
§sº idle speed J º
rz
stop
- ſ POWER speed
+: TURBINE GAs Producer ºf
FUEL CONTROL ETE
enrichment
ever
- - GOVERNOR

FIGURE 4: Fuel control schematic

grossly simplified manner, operates
as follows:
The engine-driven fuel pump
supplies fuel to a fuel metering valve
which controls the rate of fuel to
the fuel nozzle inside the combustor.
Compressor discharge pressure
(Pc) is routed through an orifice to
a bellows and flyweight control in
both the N, fuel control and the N,
governor.
The bellows located in the N.
fuel control moves to control the
fuel metering valve to control the
fuel flow to the fuel nozzle in the
combustor.
The flyweights of the N, fuel con
trol and the N, governor are gear
driven. As the set speed is changed
either the N, or N, flyweight will
move and change the Pe pressure
to the bellows; this will change the
setting of the fuel metering valve
and vary flow to the fuel nozzle.
Obviously, the system operation
is somewhat more complicated;
however, the intent is to show that
since fuel flow and thus horsepower
output is controlled ultimately by a
pneumatic system, it is extremely
important that the integrity of the
air lines system be maintained and
that no leaks be permitted.
The OH-58 Power Droop Panel
did encounter many instances where
power droops and power losses
occurred and they were attributable
to air leaks in the system. Referring
to the fuel control system schematic,
it is apparent that air leaks in the
pneumatic circuitry cannot be toler
ated. Visual inspection made by
checking the torque of interconnect
ing nuts in the lines cannot locate
air leaks, as has been proven count
less times. The only reliable check
for air leaks is by a pneumatic
circuitry system pressure check as
described in the technical manuals.
In summary of the 26 major con
clusions of the OH-58 Power Droop
Panel, the most singular item which
was perplexing is that no single cause
of power droop could be identified.
In response to certain Power
Droop Panel recommendations, a
controlled verification program will
be undertaken at Ft. Rucker, AL,
using a group of helicopters with
certain modifications installed. The
modifications are as follows:
• Airframe Mounted Fuel Filter:
A more effective fuel filtration
system to prevent fuel contamination
to the engine.
• Throttle Friction Clamp: A
nylatron clamp added to the base
of the collective stick to prevent
inadvertent throttle roll-off.
• Throttle Friction Sleeve: A
nylatron sleeve added to the push
pull controls to more uniformly
control system friction.
• Fuel Line Clamp: Modification
to the fuel line inside the fuel tank
from a clamped arrangement to a

38 U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

 N
sºSNSNº. Nº

double check valve

&Ssº
º

S.sº Ǻ -

Š
*
S
P accumulator
S POWER
TURBINE

y 7
º/gas producer
**śfuel control
-Tº lever
K& compressor discharge
pressure PC
NGovernor
º

Nº 3.
FUEl Nözzle -
~
- -

GAs ProduceRN
FUEL CONTROL
2×2 ->
power
º furbine
©
fuel inlet º governor
lever

ºº ell-º
2 Po BºPASS Fuel * PR REGULATED AIR PRESSure
~ | lº FUEL PUMP
Pi Puw P DiSCHARGE Fuel - Po compressor Discharge Pressure #"U AND FILTER
P2 were Red Fuel N PG | Governor RESET PRESSure
\
= PG Governor Pressure ſº

=-after filter pressure tap

filter cover 2.
before filter pressure tap

FIGURE 5: Fuel system schematic

screw-on type connection to prevent
air leaks.
• Droop Compensator Lever:
Add a new lever at the N2 actuator
with an additional hole to allow for
more movement of the governor
control to provide more droop
compensation.
• Auto Relite Kit: Add a new
relite box with improved timing.
This is not related to the droop
problem but could provide a safety
device in case of a flameout.
• Fuel Control: Update to the
latest commercial configuration.
• Power Turbine Governor: Up
date to the latest commercial con
figuration including the latest spring
drive and a 4 percent higher setting
to compensate for wear and hyster
esis in service.
• PC Filter: Add to the OH-58A
aircraft series; continue develop
ment of a more effective filter.
It should be noted the above items
are not listed in any order of priority.
After the field evaluation of the
installed modifications has been
satisfactorily completed, action will
be taken to obtain funding to retrofit
these improvements in the OH-58
fleet.
Continuing actions will include
the following:
• Investigate the feasibility of
providing a leak test set for the
pneumatic circuitry.
• Investigate the practicality of
crush-type washers in the pneumatic
circuitry to obtain a more effective
airtight system, or some other meth
od of obtaining an effective airtight
system.
• Review the technical manuals and
overhaul manuals and update and revise
where required.
• Investigate possibility and prac
ticability of providing a training team
and/or training films to provide
engine rigging and maintenance
data.
• Conduct an engineering investi
gation and analysis of the spin
phenomenon in the OH-58 (in
process), update the flight manuals
where required.
• Implement a program to recom
mend replacement of the T63-A-700
engine in the OH-58A with the
T63-A-720 series engine.
• Continue to monitor all field
reported failures of power droops
and power losses, and perform an
analytical investigation on selected
items in an attempt to further define
this phenomenon.
The major conclusion of the
OH-58 Power Droop Panel was that
with incorporation of all the above
mentioned improvements the pos
sibility of future recurrence of the
power droop incidents would be
reduced to a minimum. TSARCOM
and AVRADCOM are engaged in
long-term solutions to assure the
Army is provided with the most safe
and operationally capable aircraft
that technology can provide.

DECEMBER 1982 39
 U.S. Army Communications Command
ATC ACTIONLINE
“But I DID Check
NOTAMs!”
Major Philip W. Richard
Chief, Priority Air Transport Division
Ft. George G. Meade, MD
". . . don't understand where all those chutes came
from. Guess that danglin' guy I hit was killed too. I
wonder if any of my crew lived? Wonder who'll tell
Bonnie that I won't be home for supper... not ever?
Saint Peter, . . . Sir, I did check NOTAMs! Honest!”
How thorough is your NOTAM check? Did you
know that nearly every day there are Army parachute
operations conducted by military aircraft on Army
installations (frequently on seldom-used Army air
fields), and that this information is never published in
the military NOTAM system? It's NOTAM information,
sure, but it's only published in the FAA local NOTAM
file. Why? Parachute operations, both military and
civil, don't fit the criteria for inclusion in either the
Air Force NOTAM system or the FAA NOTAM D
System. So where does that leave you and your flight
planning? Could be on the odoriferous end of the
proverbial stick if you're not real careful. Of course,
the first paragraph is fictitious... but it nearly wasn't!
Read on.
Let's say you're planning an IFR flight from Any
where, USA, to Blackstone, VA. If you only use L-22
or L-27 en route charts to plan your arrival then you
won't notice the little parachute symbol next to the
aerodrome on the Washington Sectional. But you
avoid “strike one” by reading the small print in the
Readers are encouraged to address matters concerning air traffic control to:
Director, USAATCA Aeronautical Services Office, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22314
IFR-S. Aha! Extensive parachute operations. And look
here—tower only operates in the summer months. Nosweat.
You check NOTAMs at base ops, like you always do, and
find that the tower is closed but there's nothing about a
paradrop. Ho, ho and away you go. Next stop, Blackstone.
Strike One!
Tower is closed, but there's a base ops frequency.
Unfortunately, either you don't have FM, or it doesn't
work, or his doesn't work, or for whatever reason you
can't talk to base ops. No problem, right? After all,
this is just another uncontrolled airport—don't have
to talk to ops. Strike two!
You didn't come all this way for nothing, so you
glance to the northeast of the airfield to look for the
DZ. Don't see anything. Good! Short final for the
east-west runway. “Gear,” “flaps,” “chutes,"... 'chutes!?
Strike three, you're out!
That DZ isn't northeast of the field, it's on the field.
In fact, it's the north-south intersecting runway. And
this doesn't have to be Blackstone; it could be any
number of similar operations at Redstone, White Sands,
Camp Roberts or anywhere in between. It could be
LAPES, HALO, heavy drop, air show, equipment
demo, ordnance disposal, you name it. The point is,
an awful lot of hazardous happenings don't make it to
the base ops NOTAM file.
To avoid strike one, call flight service and ask
specifically for local NOTAMs for your destination.
If you just ask for NOTAMs, you'll likely get only
NOTAM D material. That won't help much because
only certain FAA NOTAM D information is included
in the Air Force NOTAM System that's on file at base
ops. Also, local NOTAMs are only distributed to
flight service stations within about 200 miles of the
affected installation. So, if you're filing to Blackstone,
VA, from Atlanta, GA, you'll have to phone Washing
ton, Danville or Newport News FSS. If phone lines
are scarce, you can do this by radio before arrival . . .
but, somehow, DO IT! It could save your hide!
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

ARMY AVIATION is undergoing the most dynamic
changes in training and doctrine in its 40-year history.
Through training symposiums and program reviews, the
aviation community is striving to resolve questions and
issues having great impact on procedures and training. One
question presented during the 1981 Training Symposium
was, “What is the value of the Army Aviation Annual
Written Examination (AAAWE)?” After much discussion,
the Policy Committee made the following three recommen
dations to determine the Annual Writ's value:
(1) DA task TRADOC to evaluate the writ's value by
conducting a trial on a select test population consisting of
aviators from one or two installations and exempting them
from taking the Annual Written Examination. Later, the
Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES), Ft.
Rucker, AL, would evaluate the performance of the test
group.
(2) Drop the 4-hour time limit requirement to complete
the AAAWE, and allow all the time needed.
(3) DA task TRADOC to analyze the requirement for
the annual writ based on information gathered by the test
group.
A plan was developed to complete the necessary actions.
After reviewing aviation records, it was determined the
analysis of the Annual Writ could be conducted at Ft.
Rucker by comparing scores of DES no-notice checkrides,
scores on the Annual Writ, and annual contact rides and
dates. The results of this analysis were presented at the
1982 Training Symposium. Meanwhile the 1983 Annual
Writ was sent to units in November 1982 with a format
essentially the same as last year's Annual Writ.
To satisfy the written component of the Annual Aviator
Proficiency and Readiness Test (AAPART), successful
completion of the examination is required during the 90
day period preceding the last day of your birth month.
Army Regulation 95-1 specifies procedures for both taking
the exam and for failures. The process of keying exami
nations to the aircrew training manuals (ATMs) began in
1977 and is being continually refined. Each exam consists
of 50 multiple-choice questions and is oriented to the tasks
and combat missions in the respective ATMs, allowing
questions to be directed to your mission and aircraft. This
helps avoid irrelevant and general-nature questions. The
writ has evolved from a single booklet with 100 questions in
1953 to the current publication of four versions for each
aircraft type. The test is now applicable to overall mission
requirements.
YU.S. Government Printing Office: 1982–546-037/9
The exam consists of the exam booklet, reference data
booklets (RDBs) and the exam notice. The exam booklet
contains instructions, the exam questions, performance,
and weight and balance charts. In some versions, weather
forecasts and notices to airmen (NOTAMs) for instrument
flight questions are included. To keep the exam challenging,
yet reduce RDB research time, questions are in groups
which often begin with a NOTE that includes the reference
manual title. In that group, questions are taken sequentially
from the reference.
The AAAWE actually is 24 separate exams. There are
four versions for each aircraft type for which an ATM is
published. They are:
• Observation Helicopter (OH-58, OH-6)
• Utility Helicopter (UH-1, UH-60)
• Attack Helicopter (AH-1)
• Cargo Helicopter (CH-47, CH-54)
• Surveillance Airplane (OV-1)
• Utility Airplane (U-21)
A T-42 version is being developed for utility airplane
pilots and will be distributed to Test Control Officers
(TCOs) after complete verification. Of the four versions in
each ATM category, two are based on the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations and two are written to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) flight
rules for aviators operating in Europe. Your unit TCO will
administer either the FAA or ICAO versions, based on
your unit's location.
Your TCO should issue the exam notice. It describes the
exam, lists references and gives hints for studying and
taking the exam. The TCO will also issue AR 95-1, AR 95-5
and En Route Low Altitude Charts. You may bring your
dead-reckoning computer and an electronic calculator. An
operator's manual for the appropriate aircraft is desirable,
since most performance charts reproduced in the exam are
without instructions or explanations for their use. Volume I
of the RDB contains extracts of flight information publi
cations (FLIPs) for FAA exam versions and is unchanged.
Volume II has been reprinted for 1983 and contains indexed
extracts of field manuals, training circulars, regulations and
other appropriate publications.
The AAAWE is an excellent evaluation tool. TCOs
should analyze local examination results and provide
information, as desired, to commanders.
When an aviator has missed several questions in one
subject area (e.g., instruments, threat, or weight and
balance), it may indicate a need for further individual
training. If several aviators show a particular weakness,
further unit training may be needed. Commanders should
be innovative in using results to improve individual and unit
proficiency.
The U.S. Army Aviation Center welcomes your com
ments and constructive criticism. Please provide feedback
to Commander, USAAVNC, ATTN: ATZQ-TD-TAD
TL)(AAAWE), Ft. Rucker, AL36362, or call us at AUTOVON
558-5412/5318. Good luck!
 Send Us Your Caption
The only requirement for it to be carried with
your name is that it be functionally related to
safety, tactics, maintenance, flight or some
other aspect of aviation. Mail captions and
yourname to Editor, U.S.Army Aviation Digest
P. O. Drawer P, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362.
--★ →
， ， ， -， -， ）
， ，\（~~~~， №\
 The Ohio State Univers

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