Safety Design Considerations

SAFETY IN DESIGN CONSIDERATION
GET TRAINING MATERIAL
Prepared by CNS 2007-08

SAFETY IN DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
OBJECTIVES
Properly designed facilities are essential to process safety in refining of hydrocarbons.
Process and design ,engineers must provide these facilities so they can be safely operated by personnel
following normal operating methods and procedures.
This design guide discusses some of the more important design considerations for process safety when
building and/or modifying refining facilities.
INTRODUCTION
Process safety in oil refineries depends on four main factors:
1. How a unit is designed 2. How it is constructed 3. How it is operated4. How it is maintained
Just as it is virtually impossible to build facilities that are fool-proof in the hands of improperly trained
operators, it is also impossible to safely operate equipment that is basically faulty in design. Thus,
process and design engineers must provide properly designed facilities that can be safely operated by
following normal operating procedures.
Failure to recognize and eliminate hazardous situations has resulted in serious injuries to personnel, and
costly damage to key facilities (See Photo -1.)
While most hazardous operating situations can be avoided in the design state with little or no extra cost,
occasionally some hazards are just too expensive to eliminate. In resolving such.
cases, the seriousness of the hazard, odds against the occurrence of an accident, and the consequences
if it does occur must all be considered. Particularly where relatively large expenditures are required to
avoid possible difficulty, the cost versus risk must be evaluated in order to arrive at a practical as w ell as
economical solution.

VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
Prepared by CNS
Photo - 1 2007-08
Investigation revealed that an additional block valve in the charge line (valve
B in Figure1) had been installed during the shutdown to provide double
block valves for safety in maintenance work.
However, no one realized that the second valve also created an un-drained
water pocket. The water that was trapped in this caused the pressure surge
when it suddenly vaporized as it mixed with hot oil from the bottom of the
tower.
Aside from illustrating t.he damaging effects of small amounts of water in
vacuum towers, this incident demonstrates the need for careful analysis of
all physical changes, even minor ones, to existing process unit.. In this case,
the addition of a single valve for maintenance safety created a hazardous
startup condition.

• The tower temperature was raised to 500 deg F with water trapped between valves
“A” and ”B”.
• Valve “A” was opened and allowed hot oil to mix with the water which flashed steam
and upset the trays.
• The location of valve “C” connection prevented draining.

MASSIVE EXPLOSION AT THE OIL STORAGE…
WATER IN THE BOTTOM OF TANK
Photo 2
In some cases, water is introduced into heated oil or vapor at uniform and
carefully regulated rates. These operations include catalytic polymerization,
where water is carefully admitted into the system by proportioning pumps,
catalyst regenerators, where quench water is provided, desalters, where
water is used to facilitate salt removal, and some light ends streams, where
water is injected for corrosion control. In all cases, the amount 'of water used
must be closely controlled.
Large quantities of steam condensate should not be discharged to sewers,
because sewers are not usually designed to handle hot liquids. Further,
condensate will heat and vaporize most light hydrocarbons present in
sewers, thereby creating tile danger of an explosion.
Water in Storage Tanks
It is quite common find water in the bottom of storage tanks.However, water
in the bottom of a tank of hot oil 1s .8 serious potential hazard. Even when
the tank is normally operated well below the vaporization temperature of
water, there is always the possibility of accidental heating through failure of
temperature controls or insufficient cooling of feed to the tank.
Violent foaming action, caused by vaporization of water, may result in 'boll

overs' of the tank.
The. vaporization of light hydrocarbons in stocks of wide boiling range can
a!so cause bollover.
To prevent tank bollovers due to vaporization of accumulated water,
storage tank, temperatures should not exceed 200ºF, and adequate, run-
down line and tank heater temperature controls must be provided steam
supply lines to tank heaters should be equipped with positive shutoff valves
that will automatically close when the tank temperature reaches a
predetermined set point.

Disposal of Waste Gases

Waste gases should not be discharged directly into furnace fire boxes.
Simply venting to fireboxes through open-end ducts of existing burners
creates serious explosion hazards because the waste gas may continue
to flow after furnace shutdown. Waste of sour gases from equipment
such as sour water strippers and vacuum tower eductors can be burned
safely if the precautions listed below are carefully observed.
1. A liquid seal or equivalent flame-arresting equipment must be provided in
the waste gas line.
2. The waste gas must pass through a knockout drum, equipped with a
high level alarm, to prevent liquid slugs from entering the furnace.
3. Waste gas piping, downstream of the knockout drum, must be equipped
with a continuous steam or inert gas purge to prevent flashback.

SCHEME INDICATING SAFE BURNING OF GASES

4. Waste gases must be introduced through a separate burner that is used

only for waste gas disposal.
5. A separate pilot and pilot gas system that is not associated with the
regular furnace pilot gas system must be provided for each waste gas
burner.
6. Waste gases must have an alternate means of disposal when the
furnace is shut down.
Discharge to a conveniently located flare is the most desirable method of
waste gas disposal. A flame-failure alarm must be provided for furnace
burners and flare pilots in the waste gas contains a toxic material, such
as hydrogen sulfide.
Toxic or Reactive Chemicals
Many activities and treating chemicals used in refining processes are
toxic and toxic and under curtain conditions, some may even react
violently with themselves. Fireproofing, sprinkler systems, turret nozzles,

and hydrants must be considered for installations where
excessive heat input through external fire or other means
can be hazardous.
Piping, storage and processing equipment for toxic
chemicals, such as chlorine gas, acids, caustic and lead
compounds must be specifically designed to prevent
leakage and spills. Since many of these chemicals are
corrosive, alloys, linings or other special materials may be
necessary.
Adequate personnel safety devices, such as safety
showers, eye wash fountains, and fresh air equipment,
must be provided in all areas where toxic chemicals are
used. Use of a flushing agent in the showers, such as
kerosene for removal of tetraethyl lead may be necessary
because some of the chemicals which can be absorbed
through the skin cannot be washed away with water.
Connections for chemical cleaning of piping and
equipment should be carefully located so that the disposal
of cleaning chemicals does not constitute a hazard. SAFETY SHOWER

Handling of light ends
Skill and knowledge are required for the safe handling of all hydrocarbons
whether at the well head, in the refinery, or at the service station. However,
the lower boiling hydrocarbons, known as light ends, have proved to be
particularly hazardous. Pure hydrocarbons or hydrocarbon mixtures having
a Reid vapor pressure (RVP) of at least 18 psi, such as butene, propone,
ethane, methane, liquefied petroleum gas (LP-Gas), natural gas and fuel
gas, are usually classified as light ends.
Most light ends will vaporize rapidly at room temperature and pressure. For
this reason, they are more difficult to contain than heavier hydrocarbons
and are more hazardous if allowed to escape. The low viscosity of light
ends also aggravates leakage and sealing problems. Similar problems are
encountered with heavy hydrocarbons at high temperature because they
act like light ends.

Handling light ends in the liquid

state requires confinement under
pressure, reduction in temperature,
or both. If a liquid light ends leaks
from a container,it will quickly
vaporize, mix with air, and almost
certainly form a flammable mixture.
This is a serious explosion and fire

hazard because most light and
vapors are heavier than air and will
spread along the ground where
there are many sources of ignition.

Adequate Utility and Auxiliary Connections
Adequate and properly located vent, drain, purge, steamout, pumpout and
water-wash connections must be provided in the initial design. When these
seemingly minor items are overlooked, operators are forced to improvise
during operation. The results can be very hazardous.
Water and steam purging connections on piping, vessels and equipment

should be temporary unless they serve as part of the process. These
connections must be separated from the supply headers by atleast two steel
valves, one a check valve, and should be disconnected and blinded when not
in use.
To prevent undesirable liquid pockets, drains must be installed at low points

in lines, vessels, and equipment.

Vessels drains and all other connections to closed drain systems must be
double blocked, I.e. two block valves with a bleeder or ‘talltale’ between them.
To assure proper elimination of air and gases,vents must be installed at high
points and all other locations where vapor may be trapped. Drains, vents, and
bleeders should be blinded or plugged when not in use.
Water drainage from vessels in light ends service can be complicated by the
refrigeration effect of light hydrocarbon stocks that vaporize at atmospheric
pressure. An ice plug, formed by this refrigeration effect,can prevent proper
valve closure.Hazardous vapors will be released when the ice melts, if the
valve is not plugged or blinded.

PRESSURE PROTECTION
Various API and ASME codes recognise this hazard and recommend the use of
interlocks to eliminate this possibility. API RP 520 (Pressure Relieving Systems for
Refinery Services - Part II : Section 4 - Isolation Valve Requirements) and API RP 14E (Design and
Installation of Offshore Production Platform Piping Systems - Para.5.8.b [2] - Relief Device Piping)
specifically recommend interlocks in this situation to ensure that (over)pressure protection of the
vessel is not
compromised. These recommendations are also in accordance with the requirements of ASME –
Section VIII - Appendix M.
Fitting a valve interlock to the upstream and downstream isolating valves on each safety relief valve
(PSV) will ensure these recommendations are implemented.
Whether onshore or offshore,

maintenance procedures to Safety Relief
Systems on live plant cause concern in
ensuring that an open path to relief is
maintained at all times during the work
exercise.

Twin PSV Changeover Sequence

It should be noted this interlock arrangement further ensures that the higher pressure rated inlet block valve V2 is
closed before its corresponding lower pressure rated outlet block valve (V1). Conversely, this key interlock
arrangement would also ensure opening of low pressure outlet block valves before opening of high pressure inlet
block valves.

COROSION AND EROSION
Unanticipated corrosion can cause material failure

which may result in serious damage to valuable
equipment and even loss of life. Since many
processing streams contain corrosive element,
additional wall thickness, corrosion-resistant
materials, corrosion inhibitors, or other means of
protection are used to lengthen equipment life.
LINERS AND WEARING SURFACES
Metal, enamel, epoxy resin, and fiberglass coatings

and liners are often used for corrosion protection.
Stainless steel cladding, lead liners, or refractory Valve removed from pipe line
showing erosion on the disc
linings may be required in very corrosive services.
In services where the flowing medium contains

abrasive material, erosion can cause serious
problems. This is especially true for equipment in
catalyst or slurry service.
As erosion is usually most severe at points of high velocity and changes in
direction, proper system layout can minimize many erosion problems.
Refractory lining or hard surfacing should be used to provide wearing
surfaces where erosion is expected.
DEAD-END SECTIONS IN PIPING AND EQUIPMENT
Corrosion is usually very high in locations where the flowing medium

becomes stagnant. Even in non-corrosive service, condensation will
accelerate corrosion in these dead-end locations. Dead-end sections in
piping, such as caps and blind flanges, should be avoided wherever is
possible. Particular attention should be given to seldom used line, such as
startup lines and bypasses, to assure that they are completely drainable.
USE OF SCREWED ALLOY PIPING PLUGS
Solid screwed piping plugs, made of an alloy suitable for this service,
should be provided for all trapped openings which will not be seal-welded.

Carbon steel plugs are used in carbon steel seal-welded connections, such
as test vents in piping, because there is less change of weld cracking and
no need for post-weld heat treatment.
CORROSION INHIBITORS
It may be necessary; to inject chemicals, such as ammonia into process

streams to combat corrosion by forming protective films, neutralizing
harmful agents, or controlling acidity. Both the corrosion inhibitor and the
point of injection must be carefully selected.
An aqueous phase should be present for most inhibitors to be effective. In

fact, the addition of ammonia may even accelerate corrosion by the
deposition of ammonium chloride in piping and equipment operating above
the dew point of water.

ADEQUACY OF CORROSION PROTECTION
Materials selection, corrosion allowances, liners and wearing surfaces must

be thoroughly checked to make sure that each refinery facility is adequately
protected against both on stream and off stream corrosion. Since corrosion
rates are affected by many factors, such as stream composition, temperature
and pressure, corrosion probes and non destructive equipment measuring
techniques to determine the rate of corrosion should be considered for
processing systems.
In most cases, protection against external corrosion is as important an

internal corrosion protection. Underground pipe should be protected against
stray current corrosion and corrosive agents, such as slag, cinders, and
wood, in fill material. Contact of dissimilar metals that can cause corrosion
through galvanic action must be avoided.

Chemical piping requires special precautions and materials. Each case

should be extensively reviewed for proper materials selection. For
example, stress relieved carbon steel or other materials that will resist
caustic embrittlement cracking must be used in piping and equipment
containing caustic solutions.
ELECTRICAL
Electrical hazards-sparks and arcs that start fires and shocks that injure or
cause fatalities-can be greatly reduced by good design.

AREA CLASSIFICATION
The National Electrical Code (NEC) classifies refinery areas that have
been made hazardous by the presence of flammable gases or vapors and
states the type of equipment that is safe for use in each.
Locations which contain or many contain the usual flammable refinery

gases or vapors is sufficient quantities to produce ignitable or explosive
mixtures are called Class I, Group D, Division 1 or Division 2 locations.
Areas that are always considered hazardous because gases or vapors are
usually present are classified as Division 1 locations. Areas that are rarely
hazardous because gases or vapors are present only as the result of an
accident of abnormal operation fall into the Division 2 category.
The NEC requires all electrical equipment in Division 1 locations to be

explosion-proof. In Division 2 locations, only equipment which sparks or
arcs during normal operation must have special enclosures, which can be
either explosion-proof, hermetically sealed, or filled with oil.

Design engineers must know the area classification and must be sure that all
electrical equipment in each area meets NEC requirements.
STATIC ELECTRICITY
The principal hazard of static electricity is ignition by spark discharge.

Two static hazards may result when refined hydrocarbon liquids are pumped
into tanks. The first, which is the chance of a spark discharge from the shell
of an ungrounded container (such as a tank truck) to earth, can be eliminated
by grounding. The second and most dangerous,which cannot be removed by
grounding, is the sparking that can occur on the liquid surface. However, the
chance of surface sparking will disappear after a period of time called
‘relaxation time’ which is usually a matter of seconds but may range up to
hours.

Loading facilities can be designed to minimize the hazards of static
electricity by careful attention to the following:
1. Install adequate facilities for grounding.

2. For refined products other than gasoline, provide filling systems that
can be operated at low flow rates (three feet per second is safe) until
loading spouts are submerged. A low flow rate greatly reduces the
generation of static electricity.
3. For refined product loading, provide loading spouts that will stay on the
compartment bottom during loading. Spouts should have deflectors to
minimize splash and spray and help counter reaction force. Asphalts,
including cutbacks, have no static problem and should be loaded with
short spouts.
4. Provide air-jet, steam-jet, or other education equipment for protection
against switch-loading accidents. This equipment is used to free tank
compartments or rich, low flash point vapors, before loading high flash
point products. Switch loading is currently responsible for nine out of

Ten loading rack truck fires because (1) the high flash point product absorbs
some of the rich low flash point vapors, creating an explosive mixture in the
compartment, and (2) the high flash point is an excellent static generator.
Loading facilities shall be designed to minimum static hazardous attention by
providing proper grounding.
LIGHTNING
Lightning is a frequent hazard to electric power lines, structures, and

flammable liquid storage. A typical lightning stroke may release-for a few
millionths of a second –energy at the rate of a trillion horsepower. Objects
can be shielded from lightning by overhead ground wires, rod, or masts
which create a zone of protection.
Direct lightning strokes can ignite flammable contents of cone-roof tanks

unless the tanks are protected by bonding the internal supporting members
to the roof at not more than 10-foot intervals.

• on April 5, 2005, just after 7pm, lightning struck
a crude oil storage tank located in Patoka,
Illinois. The tank is part of a facility that can Oil Storage Tank Fire in Patoka, Illinois
store an estimated 11 million barrels of crude
in 64 tanks. Posted: 04-07-2005
Updated: 06-14-2007 12:02:48 PM
• The tank, which measured 150 feet wide by 62

feet tall, was in the process of being taken out
of service for maintenance. At the time of the
lighting strike, the tank only had an estimated
400 barrels of product in it.
• Cooling the tank proved to be difficult because

of high winds and the fact that firefighters had
restricted entry into the containment area.
Because of the small amount of product in the
tank, the floating roof was some six feet above
the crude level and created a large vapor
space and the potential for an additional
explosion.
• A normal operation would have been to pump

crude back into the tank and reduce the vapor
space, but because of the existing plan for
maintenance, that simply was not an option.
• Normally, these tanks have an external
connection for firefighters to inject foam to the
roof of the tank, but because of the pending
maintenance, it also was not in operation.
Floating roof tanks with seal hangers in the vapor space may be ignited
directly when bound charges on the roof are released by discharge of a
nearby storm cloud (lightning stroke). These tanks can be protected by (1)
bonding the roof to the seal shoes at 10-foot intervals, (2) use of insulating
sections in the hanger linkages, (3) covering sharp points on hungers with
insulating material and (4) installing short jumpers around each pinned
hanger joint.
INSTALLATION
Electrical apparatus should be grounded for protection for both personnel
and equipment.
It is important for personal safety to use extension lamps operating as 12

volts or less when going inside a metal enclosure such as a tank or a
vessel. Equivalent personal protection is provided by 120 Volt portable
lights equipped with ground-fault circuit interrupts, as the GFI will trip the
circuit when current (4 to 6 milliamps) flows from the protected circuit to
ground. Do not use this system where flammable liquids and/or varpors
may be present.
EMERGENCY POWER
The process unit design should provide for automatic switching of emergency
lights, critical valves and critical instruments to an alternate source of power if
the normal source fails.
FIRE AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT
Adequate fire and safety equipment, readily accessible for immediate use in
any emergency, must be provided in all refinery areas.
TURRET NOZZLES, HYDRANTS AND OTHER PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Turret nozzles should be located so that they can be quickly and effectively
operated with minimum manpower. An adequate number of fire hydrants
should be installed in locations that will allow the most efficient use during a
fire or other emergency that requires large quantities of water.

Fire water sprays, hose reels, steam for smothering, purging, and cooling,
heat-actuated devices, fire extinguishers, fire alarms, and telephone should
be installed as necessary for protection of furnaces, pumps, stacks,
buildings, vessels and other equipment.
Each unit must be provided with proper and conveniently located emergency
personnel protection equipment, such as fire blankets, self-contained
breathing equipment, safety showers and eye wash fountains.
ESCAPE ROUTES
Generally, an alternate escape route should be provided from all elevated

equipment and platforms. If this is not feasible for tall towers bridging to an
adjacent tower or structure may be justifiable, if the towers need to be
climbed frequently.

Stairways and ladders should be located entirely on the outside of
structures wherever possible.
All buildings and enclosures, except small storage or equipment areas that
are rarely entered by personnel, must have at least two exits.
NOISE LEVEL
Excessive noise can prevent alarms and other sounding devices from
being heard and may even cause permanent damage to the human
ear. To keep noise levels within tolerable limits, all items of noise
producing equipment should be investigated to see if special
precautions are necessary.
1. Silencers or other sound attenuation devices should be considered for

flue gas stacks, vents and other outlets discharging to the atmosphere;
injection nozzles; jets; and sound-producing restrictions in piping.

2. Burner installations should be designed to limit noise to a safe level.
3. Permissible noise levels should be specified for large items of rotating
equipment such as compressors, turbines, air cooler fans, motors and
motor-gear installations.
EQUIPMENT GUARDS
Guards and covers must be provided for rotating shafts, couplings, fly
wheels and other equipment with exposed moving parts, fragile equipment
such as sensitive instruments should be installed in protective enclosures.
Electrical startup push button stations should be equipped with mechanical
guards to prevent accidental operation.
REMOTE SHUTDOWN DEVICES
If access to important areas on process units can be blocked during a fire

or other serious emergency, vital equipment must have remote shut down

devices must be fire proofed in areas where they could be damaged by
fire. Further critical equipment should be designed to fail-safe as discussed
in another paper.
PUMP AND MANIFOLD AREAS
Fire and safety equipment for major pump manifold areas should be as
complete as that for processing areas. Relief valves with vent lines
discharging a safe distance away should be installed on all headers that
can be over pressured. Turret nozzles and remotely controlled foam lines
should also be considered for manifold areas.

FOUNDATIONS, BUILDINGS, STRUCTURES AND STACKS
Soil and Foundations:-
Allowable soil bearing loads for new facilities should be established only after
the soil at the proposed site has been investigated. In addition, at least one
test boring should be made at the foundation site for each major tower or
other tall structure, particularly if there is history of uneven settlement or
other uncertain soil conditions in the vicinity. All test borings should be
plotted in their entirety. Where soil conditions require the use of piling, it may
be necessary to drive test piles for load tests.
The bearing plane of major footings should not be higher than the invert
elevation of nearby sewers or piping, unless special precautions, such as
encasement in concrete, are taken to prevent washouts or unstable bearing
conditions. Foundations for pumps, compressors and other machinery which
produce vibration require special attention.

Foundations must be designed to be stable under all conditions of loading
(Figure ) including wind (hurricane forces where applicable), vibration, test
conditions, platforms, piping and bundle pulling. Normally, vessel
foundations should be designed so that the vessel can be water filled.
Structures :-
Structures must be designed for all loading conditions that may be

encountered, including wind, vibration, testing and fireproofing. Particular
attention should be given to critical support and bracing components and
connections and to the overturning safety factors on tall structures.

Stacks :-
Distance from hazardous equipment, prevailing wind direction and terrain must
all be considered when determining safe flare and blow-down stack locations.
Flare stacks must be high enough to prevent flame from acting as a source of
ignition for any other possible flammable mixtures in the area of the flare. In
general, knockout drums should be installed ahead of all blow-down stacks
and flares. Air should be kept out of all collecting lines, flare headers, and flare
stacks. Purge gas of water seals are used for this purpose.
FURNACE AIR PREHEATER SYSTEM SAFETY
Air preheat systems for fired heaters must be designed to allow the heater to
operate on natural draft in the event of fan failures, air preheater failures, etc.
Stack dampers and emergency air doors and their operators must be designed
to be absolutely reliable. If either of these dampers done not open in an
emergency transition to natural draft operation, the fire box can run fuel rich.
This may result in a serious explosion.

The instrumentation system, which allows the fired heater to return to natural
draft operation in an emergency must be very reliable. Process
measurements which actuate transfer to natural draft on fuel shutdown shall
be taken from their own process taps and be isolated from other
measurements.
FIRED REBOILERS
In most cases the precautions necessary for furnaces are applicable for fired
reboilers. Fired reboilers must be located at a safe distance from the
processing area.
AIR REHEATERS
Some processes, such as fluid catalytic cracking, use preheated air for
startup. Since this requires the introduction of a flammable mixture into the air
heater, special precautions and equipment are required. Igniters must be
designed to give positive ignition, as ignition failure may produce an explosive
mixture in the heater even in processing equipment.
Air heater outlets should be equipped with high temperature alarms to prevent
damage from overheating.
Heat Exchangers
All areas in heat exchangers must be drainable. Exchangers with diagonal

tube-side baffles should be avoided, if possible, as this arrangement usually
allows water to be trapped in some of the tubes. A drain or weep hole must be
provided in all undrainable partitions. Drains should also be provided in bonnet
low points on floating heat exchangers, as water trapped here may contact hot
oil during startup.
Although air-cooled exchangers are economical in some services, they should

be carefully considered before being used to cool heavy products. With the
many parallel paths, tubes with low flow tend to be plugged by viscous
material. Double pipe coolers and even multiple tube-pass shell and tube
exchangers may also be subject to this problem in similar services.

COOLING TOWERS
Cooling towers mush have adequate fire protection

because they are usually built of flammable materials.
Height of size of the tower, proximity to an ignition
source, or relative importance to refinery operations
may justify special fire protection. Nonflammable
materials or sprinkler systems can probably be justified
if cooling towers are exposed to a continuous hazard,
such as a nearby furnace. Turret nozzles, fire hydrants
and hose reels will usually provide sufficient fire
protection for most cooling tower installations.
WATER POCKETS
Pockets must be avoided in all piping and equipment

where water can accumulate and (1) contact hot oil and
flash to steam, (2) freeze and cause rupture (3) mix
with acid or caustic and cause corrosion or generate
excessive heat or (4) cause operating problems.
Dead-end sections as they tend to trap water and

accelerate corrosion shall be avoided.

Provide drainage for idle process lines, such as bypasses, startup lines and
piping to spare pumps.
Piping must be designed for ease of drainage during both startup and normal
operation. Adequate means to check for water accumulation during operation,
such as valved drains at low points and boots on accumulator drums shall be
provided.
Blow-down lines shall slope away from the unit and toward blow down drums.
Compressor suction lines shall have slope toward suction knockout drums,
where this is not practical, suction lines shall be as short as possible, free from
pockets, insulated and steam traced. Avoid pockets in vacuum lines because
normal water drainage through open valves will introduce air unless special
precautions are taken. Slope shall be provided horizontal vacuum transfer line
generously.

Piping systems shall be designed with adequate connections for cleaning and
water flushing prior to start up.
Piping Materials
Although carbon steel is the most commonly used piping material, correct
materials for each particular service must be determined for both normal
and emergency conditions.
Special alloys, liners, or coatings may be necessary
(1) in corrosive or erosive services,
(2) where very high or low temperatures are expected, or
(3) when unusual operating conditions are anticipated.

Malleable, nodular, and cast iron materials should not be used for piping and
components in hydrocarbon or toxic services. These materials, which are
brittle and have a low melting point, will frequently fail during a fire from
excessive heat or contact with water. Generally, copper, aluminium and their
alloys should not be used for piping in hydrocarbon service.
To protect personnel and minimize the possibility of equipment damage, vents

should discharge at a safe height above grade, above operating platforms, and
away from furnaces.
PLOT PLANS AND EQUIPMENT SPACING
Spacing between Units:-
The spacing of process units within refineries requires careful consideration.

Access for firefighting and firefighting equipment is of prime importance.

The grade elevation of a unit should be high enough to prevent the spread of
fires by the low of spilled oil from nearby facilities. Usually, units should be
located above adjacent land areas and below encircling access roads which
also serve as dikes or fire walls.
Drainage ditches, roadways and pipe alloys should be laid out to prevent the
transfer of fire between refinery areas. Trenches, sumps or other below-grade
pockets where flammable vapors are prone to collect should be eliminated.
Spacing within Units
Safety, economy, operability and ease of maintenance must all be considered

in selecting a location for each item of equipment on a process unit.
Furnaces, stacks and blow-down vents should be located in the safest place
with respect to other hazardous equipment, prevailing wind, grade and
personnel areas.

The ends of horizontal vessels should not face control rooms or other
personnel areas. Also hydrants and turret nozzles should not be located at the
ends of, or in line with the ends of, horizontal vessels.
Process units should be designed so that there is no need to lift heavy pieces
of equipment over operating lines or equipment.
The safety of operating and maintenance personnel is of prime importance.

The personnel area (control room) should be separated from the ignition
(furnace) and process areas.
STORAGE FACILITIES
The extensive facilities required for safe storage of the many hydrocarbons
and chemicals used in a petroleum refinery must be carefully designed.
Liquids are usually stored at atmospheric pressure in either cone or floating-
roof tanks, depending on the amount of vaporization expected. Heavier gases,
such as propane and butane, are often stored under pressure as liquids in
spheres or drums.


Light products, such as methane and ethane, are usually stored as gases,
either at atmospheric pressure in gas holders or under pressure in vessels.
Underground caverns, refrigerated tanks and spheroids may be used for
storage of some products.
Adequate fire protection must be provided for all storage facilities. Foam
systems or portable foam-handling equipment should be provided for cone-
roof tanks when the flash point of the contents is below 120°F.
Gas blanketing may be necessary when low vapor pressure stocks are stored
in vessels with a vapor space. However, for large tanks, a floating roof will
probably be more economical than blanketing.
Filling lines should discharge near the bottom of storage tanks to eliminate the
free fall of liquid and thereby reduce the generation of static electricity.
Many storage tanks accumulate a layer of water below the oil. So that oil-not
water is pumped from the tank, suction nozzles should be designed so that the
inlet section is above the water level in the tank bottom, particularly where the
tank supplies process units or other equipment sensitive to water.
To prevent tank boilover from vaporization of accumulated water, oil should be
stored at temperature below 200°F. If higher storage temperatures are
necessary, high temperature alarms should be installed in run-down lines to
warn operators of potential boilover conditions.
Generally, pressure storage vessels, such as spheres and spheroids should

be kept under positive pressure, even though the vapor pressures of some
stored liquids at reduced temperatures are less than atmospheric. Where low
temperatures may exist for long periods, some method of admitting an inert
gas, such as nitrogen to the vapor space should be provided to prevent air
leakage into the vacuum created by the reduced ambient temperatures. In any
case, air must not be allowed to enter. Although the amount of air admitted at
any one time may be small, subsequent temperature cycling will concentrate
the oxygen and cause the development of an explosive mixture in the vapor
space.

Storage vessels must be equipped with adequate water drain lines and valves
that are potential from freezing. Frozen drains can (1) rupture (2) prevent
drainage of water, and (3) cause loss of stock when the ice melts. Non freeze
type drains are preferred. No external means of freeze protection is needed
because the water is drained away from all valves and piping exposed to
freezing temperatures.
VESSELS AND TRAYS
Design :-
Pressure vessels shall be designed in accordance with applicable codes,

specifications, state laws and regulations. Design pressure and temperatures
shall be selected to protect against the worst combination of conditions that
can be reasonably expected.

Drainability:-
Vessels must be completely drainable. Areas
where liquid pockets can form, such as at
intermediate heads on dual or multiple section
towers, shall be avoided.
Knockout Drums:-
Knockout drums should be installed in all streams

where liquid entrainment is undesirable or
hazardous, such as in the gas to a compressor,
blow-down stack, or flare stack.
Venting:-
Vessel top outlets should be located at high points
to permit purging with steam, inert gas, or water.
Additional vent connections must be provided at all
pockets where oil or vapor can be trapped during
purging operations.
Vents for vessels that are washed or purged with
water must be large enough to prevent the
development of a vacuum when draining.
Most vessels should be equipped with vents large enough to permit adequate
air circulation for personnel during inspection and maintenance work.
Internals:-
Vessel internals must be designed for drainability. Large horizontal baffles

should be avoided in towers, if possible, because they may become distorted
and trap water. If process considerations prevent these baffles from being
sloped, weep holes and stiffeners to prevent distortion must be provided.
Tray sections must be provided with weep holes or other positive means for
draining. The bottom tray in each tower should be carefully checked for
excessive drainability which may cause operational difficulties.
Vacuum Systems:-
Equipment must not be subject to pressures or vacuums greater than those for
which it is designed. This applies to equipment of all sizes from pressure
gauges to complete tower and vessel systems.

Steam ejectors for vacuum systems in hydrocarbon service must have
facilities for prevention of air contamination if the steam supply fails. Drains
and vents in vacuum systems should be minimized since each one is a
possible source of air contamination. To prevent the possibility of air
contamination through open bleeders or utility stations, steam of vacuum-
producing equipment should be supplied directly from steam mains without
any intermediate connections.
WASTE DISPOSAL
Safety demands the practice of good housekeeping in refineries. Refuse and

debris must be promptly removed to avoid the creation of obstructions, fuel
sources, and tripping hazards. Facilities must be designed to promote good
housekeeping.
Unit process sewers should be gravity type systems that normally receive
surface run-off water, oily water streams, pump gland cooling water, wash
water, and all other streams containing oils and chemicals.

Some refineries use two systems: (1) a dry oil system that handles relatively
water-free oil drainage and (2) a water system that handles surface drainage
and other relatively oil-free streams.
Trapped or sealed drains should be provided for all paved areas on units.
Each process unit sewer should have a compartmented gas trap, with gas-
tight manways and proper vents, located at or beyond the unit limits.
Flammable mixtures are difficult to avoid in sewers, and it is almost impossible

to eliminate all sources of ignition. Thus, gas-tight systems must be used.
Avoid the discharge of steam, hot condensate, or other hot material directly to
the sewer system because any oil in the sewer probably will be vaporized.
Where practical, facilities and equipment should be provided within the
process unit to recover hydrocarbon drainage and slop oil.

PUMPS AND COMPRESSORS
In general, pumps, compressors and other items of special equipment should

be provided with valved vent and drain connections. Where drains are
impractical, facilities or procedures for water removal, such as (1)
displacement by circulation, (2) gradual heating during startup, (3) dry gas
purging, or (4) high velocity gas purging, must be provided.
The following design practices should be considered for most pump,

compressor and associated equipment installations:
1.Generally use pumps and compressors that are completely drainable with a
minimum number of drains.
If equipment cannot be drained, it must be designed to be flushed, I.e. all

undesirable liquids or gases can be removed by flushing.

Pumps with many separate drains should be avoided in hydrocarbon service
because a large number of drains presents an even greater hazard from
plugging, dead-end corrosion, and inaccessibility.
Pump and compressor driver governors should fail safe whenever possible to
avoid total reliance on overspeed trips, provide positive shutoff trip valves for
turbine drivers.
Avoid labyrinth seals or eductors on compressors handling flammable gases if

air can be drawn into the gas system. Vents on gas compressor suction lines,
and all other connections that may provide a source or air contamination,
should be avoided. Generally, pump suction lines in hydrocarbon service
should not be allowed to operate at pressure below atmospheric. When this is
impossible, as in the case of pumps that take suction from vacuum towers and
some storage tanks, special precautions must be taken to prevent air leakage
into the system.

ENGINEERING SAFETY CHECK LIST
Many safety engineering ideas have been discussed in this article. To make
sure that most of them are available for quick reference, the following
simplified check list has been developed. Each new project, large or small,
should be checked against this list at least twice – at the start of design and at
the completion of design.
a. General :-
1. Provide thorough operating instructions.

2.Define the safe operating limits of the unit.
3.Carefully analyze all physical changes to existing processing equipment.
4.Provide adequate and properly located utility and auxiliary connections.
5.Locate drains at low points and vents at high points.
6.Use special precautions when handling toxic or reactive chemicals.
7.Recognize that inert gas may not remain inert if it can pick up hydrocarbons
or oxygen.

8. Consider the refrigeration effect when draining equipment in light ends
services.
9. Consider an alternate source of cooling water.
10. Consider key interlocked valves for critical systems.
11. Review automatic startup and shutdown equipment and procedures for
possible booby traps.
12. Avoid the discharge of large quantities of steam to the atmosphere or to
sewers.
13. Eliminate pockets in equipment where dissolved air (oxygen) may be
released and concentrated.
14. Eliminate pockets where water can accumulate.
15. Prevent air leakage into vacuum equipment and systems.
16. Do not mix air or oxygen with hydrocarbons except under rigorously
controlled conditions.
17. Do not use pure oxygen in treating operations.
18. Do not pipe or store liquid oxygen in buildings.
19. Do not mix reactive chemicals with hydrocarbons.
20. Do not allow uncontrolled amounts of water to be mixed with hot oil.

b. Corrosion :-
1. Provide adequate corrosion protection.

2. Use alloy plugs.
3. Install sentry holes in piping.
4. Protect underground objects from corrosive agents in fill material.
5. Consider corrosion probes.
6. Consider corrosion inhibitors.
7. Consider an aqueous phase for inhibitors.
8. Consider the operating limits for steel in hydrogen service.
9. Consider cathodic protection for control of stray current corrosion.
10. Consider protective coatings and linings.
11. Avoid dead ends in piping and equipment.
c. Erosion:-
1. Provide adequate erosion protection.

2. Consider protective linings.
3. Avoid the use of wet steam.

D. Electrical:-
1. Provide adequate explosion-proof equipment.

2. Provide grounding facilities.
3. Provide adequate clearance between conduit and hot piping or equipment.
4. Provide emergency power sources.
5. Provide 32 volt outlets for extension lamp use inside metal enclosure.
6. Use approved type loading spout deflectors.
7. Recognise the limitations of conduit seals.
8. Consider eductors for evacuating hazardous vapors from shipping
containers.
9. Consider lightning protection.
10. Minimize the generation of static electricity in hazardous areas,
11. Minimize sparks and arcs from stray currents.
12. Eliminate sparks and arcs in hazardous areas.
13. Do not use belt driven equipment in hazardous areas.

E. Safety and Fire Protection:-
1. Provide adequate fire protection devices and equipment.

2. Provide adequate personnel protection equipment, such as fire blankets,
safety showers and respiratory equipment.
3. Provide alternate escape routes.
4. Provide guards for protection of both personnel and fragile equipment.
5. Provide guards for motor start-stop push buttons.
6. Provide adequate bumping posts for dead-end rail-road tankages.
7. Consider automatic water deluge systems.
8. Consider remote shutdown devices.
9. Consider bridging between closely spaced towers on fired units.
10. Avoid stairway landings that cause escape traffic to pass through process
unit structures.
11. Avoid equipment that produces excessive noise.

Safety Design Considerations

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Safety Design Considerations

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SAFETY IN DESIGN CONSIDERATION

GET TRAINING MATERIAL

Prepared by CNS 2007-08

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Violent foaming action, caused by vaporization of water, may result in 'boll

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Disposal of Waste Gases

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4. Waste gases must be introduced through a separate burner that is used

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Handling of light ends

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Handling light ends in the liquid

This is a serious explosion and fire

Prepared by CNS 2007-08

Adequate Utility and Auxiliary Connections

Water and steam purging connections on piping, vessels and equipment

To prevent undesirable liquid pockets, drains must be installed at low points

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Whether onshore or offshore,

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Twin PSV Changeover Sequence

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Unanticipated corrosion can cause material failure

LINERS AND WEARING SURFACES

Metal, enamel, epoxy resin, and fiberglass coatings

In services where the flowing medium contains

DEAD-END SECTIONS IN PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

Corrosion is usually very high in locations where the flowing medium

USE OF SCREWED ALLOY PIPING PLUGS

Prepared by CNS 2007-08

It may be necessary; to inject chemicals, such as ammonia into process

An aqueous phase should be present for most inhibitors to be effective. In

Prepared by CNS 2007-08

Materials selection, corrosion allowances, liners and wearing surfaces must

In most cases, protection against external corrosion is as important an

Prepared by CNS 2007-08

Chemical piping requires special precautions and materials. Each case

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Locations which contain or many contain the usual flammable refinery

The NEC requires all electrical equipment in Division 1 locations to be

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The principal hazard of static electricity is ignition by spark discharge.

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1. Install adequate facilities for grounding.

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Lightning is a frequent hazard to electric power lines, structures, and

Direct lightning strokes can ignite flammable contents of cone-roof tanks

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• The tank, which measured 150 feet wide by 62

• Cooling the tank proved to be difficult because

• A normal operation would have been to pump

It is important for personal safety to use extension lamps operating as 12

FIRE AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT

TURRET NOZZLES, HYDRANTS AND OTHER PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

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Generally, an alternate escape route should be provided from all elevated

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1. Silencers or other sound attenuation devices should be considered for