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INTRODUCTION
It would seem that the psychology of ual perceiver is concerned. Perception is
perception should have something useful to viewed as not merely dealing with informa-
contribute to landscape aesthetics. Certainly tion about the environment, but at the same
students of landscape aesthetics make assump- time yielding information about what the
tions about the nature of perception. While possibilities are as far as human purposes
certain of these favorite assumptions are are concerned. In addition to Gibson's con-
probably false, there was a time when it was tribution to this topic, this emphasis on
not obvious that the psychology of perception the function an object or environment might
had anything better to offer. Fortunately, serve for the perceiver has also appeared
a number of recent developments sheds consid- in the work of Gregory (1969) and S. Kaplan
erable light on the significance and function- (1975).
ing of the aesthetic reaction to landscapes.
One can go a step farther than the per-
From the perspective of landscape ception of affordances per se. As Charles-
aesthetics, perhaps the single most salient worth (1976) has pointed out, a species has
theme in recent work in perception is what not only to be able to recognize the sorts of
Gibson (1977) has labeled "affordances." An environments it functions well in, it has to
affordance refers to what a perceived object prefer them. Animals have to like the sort
or scene has to offer as far as the individ- of settings in which they thrive. Ideally
they would not have to learn such an inclina-
tion. It could be costly for an animal to
1/ spend years barely subsisting in unsatisfactory
Submitted to the National Conference on environments in order to learn that such
Applied Techniques for Analysis and Manage- environments were in fact unsatisfactory.
ment of the Visual Resource, Incline Village, And to the extent that erroneously choosing
Nevada, April 23-25, 1979. certain environments could be a fatal error,
such a bias would ideally be innate and immedi-
2/
Professor of Psychology and of Computer and ate. Hence, one can view preference as an
Communication Sciences, University of Michigan, outcome of a complex process that includes
Ann Arbor, Michigan. perceiving things and spaces and reacting in
241
terms of their potential usefulness and idiosyncratic. Neither are they debasing;
supportiveness. In this perspective many of the rules that preference follows
aesthetics must, at least to some degree, turn out to have correlates in the classic
reflect the functional appropriateness of aesthetic and landscape architecture liter-
spaces and things. ature. At the same time their divergences
are thought-provoking and instructive.
It should be noted, however, that this
view of preference as an expression of bias To summarize the ground covered so far,
towards adaptively suitable environments has recent work on perception views the percep-
no necessary connection to what is currently tual process as inextricably connected with
functional. What was functional during the human purposes, and perhaps with human pref-
evolution of the species is presumably what erences as well. Preference, in turn, is a
would be preferred, quite independent of what far better-behaved measure than is often
might be functional today. feared. The remainder of the paper is based
on the premise that preference judgments are
not antithetical to aesthetics. Rather, they
SOME COMMENTS ON PREFERENCE are seen as providing a powerful tool for
understanding the patterns underlying what
In the context of an evolutionary per-
we consider aesthetic. Such judgments may
spective, it is hardly surprising that human
also point to the underlying significance
preference would have some relationship to
of the aesthetic in the larger human scheme
those environments in which survival would be
of things.
more likely. This context, however, does not
appear to be characteristic of discussions
of landscape preference. As a matter of
MAKING SENSE AND INVOLVEMENT
fact, a significant number of students of
landscape aesthetics views preference with
If people's reactions to things and
alarm, or at the very least, distaste.
spaces depend on people's purposes, then
There are many who feel that preference
understanding preference requires that we
judgments are bound to be arbitrary,
first understand what these purposes are.
idiosyncratic at best, and perhaps even ran-
Since different people pursue different pur-
dom. In part the distrust of preference
poses, and since the same individual will
judgments probably stems from the fear that
pursue different purposes at different times,
aesthetics will be debased by stooping to
an analysis in terms of purpose might appear
a popular consensus. Hidden in this fear
to be at best unpromising. Fortunately for
is a profound irony. It implies that there
both science and practice, however, human
is no basic consistency, no underlying
purposes are by no means totally scattered
pattern characteristic of preference judgments.
and idiosyncratic. In fact our research on
Without such an underlying basis, however,
preference has over the years repeatedly
aesthetics becomes trivialized. If aesthetics
pointed to two underlying purposes which
is not an expression of some basic and under-
people are concerned with throughout their
lying aspect of the human mind, then it is
waking hours. These two purposes probably
hard to see why it is of more than passing
had an important impact on the long-term
significance. It is reduced to mere decor-
survival potential of the individual. Their
ation as opposed to being something with
pervasive influence seems appropriate since
pervasive importance. In the concern to
they are necessarily vital to any specific
preserve aesthetics untarnished, it makes
purposes an individual may choose to pursue.
it at the same time inconsequential.
We have come to call these persisting
If indeed aesthetics had no deep under-
purposes "making sense" and " involvement "
lying significance for our species, then one
(R. Kaplan 1977). Making sense refers to the
would expect preference judgments to vary '
concern to comprehend, to keep one s bearings,
randomly from one person to the next. But
to understand what is going on in the imme-
this is not a matter of opinion; it is an
diate here and now, and often in some larger
empirically testable hypothesis. This
world as well. Involvement refers to the
conjecture, as well as the others implicit
concern to figure out, to learn, to be stimu-
in the rejection of preference is not only
lated. At first glance these two purposes
testable; it has been tested many times.
may seem to be contradictory, or at least at
These fears receive no support from many
opposite ends of a continuum. But upon closer
studies. (For a discussion of a number of
examination this turns out to be a misconcep-
such studies see S. Kaplan 1979.) Preference
tion. Certainly there are environments that
judgments are neither random nor highly
one can comprehend and at the same time be
242
stimulated by. Likewise, there are environ- unfolds before them. The idea of the visual
ments that offer neither possibility. In array is easiest to think of in terms of a
fact, all, combinations are possible; knowing photograph of any given landscape. The pat-
that an environment makes sense tells one tern of light and dark on the photograph, the
nothing about whether it will be involving or organization of this "picture plane," consti-
not. tutes the basis of this level of analysis.
While our realization of the centrality As the surface of a photograph can have
of these two purposes arose in the context much or little to look at, scenes can vary
of research on preference, there are sound in involvement at this level of analysis.
theoretical grounds for believing that they Comparably, the pattern of information on the
would be necessary to the survival of an surface of a photograph can be easier or
information-based organism. There are also harder to organize, constituting the "making
parallels in the psychological literature -- sense" aspect of the visual array. Let us
order, security, closure, and the like on examine each of these components in somewhat
the one hand, and curiosity, challenge, stim- greater detail.
ulation, and so on, on the other. (Limita-
tions of space permit only a brief mention Complexity is the "involvement" component
of these themes here; for a more extensive at this surface level of analysis. Perhaps
"
discussion see Kaplan and Kaplan 1978). more appropriately referred to as "diversity
or "richness," this component was at one time
If making sense and involvement are thought to be the sole or at least the pri-
indeed pervasive purposes for humans, then mary determinant of aesthetic reactions in
environments that support these purposes general. Loosely speaking it reflects how
should be preferred. "Support" here refers much is "going on" in a particular scene, how
to whatever an environment might afford that much there is to look at. If there is very
makes that particular purpose more likely to little going on -- as, for example, a scene
be pursued to a successful conclusion. For consisting of an undifferentiated open field
making sense this refers to the perceived with horizon in the background -- then pref-
structure of the environment. It takes in erence is likely to be low.
anything that would make the environment
easier to create a map of, easier to charac- Coherence is the "making sense" component
terize, to summarize to oneself. It involves at this surface level of analysis. It includes
those affordances that increase one's sense those factors which make the picture plane
of comprehension. easier to organize, to comprehend, to struc-
ture. Coherence is strengthened by anything
For involvement, on the other hand, the which makes it easier to organize the patterns
supportive environment is one rich in possi- of light and dark into a manageable number of
bility. In a sense, the affordances for major objects and/or areas. These include
involvement entail the raw materials for repeated elements and smooth textures that
thinking about and coming to understand. The identify a "region" or area of the picture
issue here is having what is required to be plane. Readily identifiable components aid
challenged, to have to call on one's capaci- in giving a sense of coherence. It is also
ties in order to process the information suc- important that a change in texture or bright-
cessfully. Thus a poem or a landscape that ness in the visual array is associated with
is "simple-minded" or "obvious" fails to offer something important going on in the scene.
affordance for involvement. (It should be In other words, something that draws one's
noted that the "raw material" that challenges attention within the scene should turn out
one's capacities need not actually be present; to be an important object or a boundary
it constitutes an effective challenge even if between regions or some other significant
it is only implied or suggested.) property. If what draws one's attention and
what is worth looking at turn out to be dif-
ferent, then the scene lacks coherence.
THE VISUAL ARRAY
People can only hold a certain amount of
In reacting to the visual environment,
information in what is called their "working
people seem to relate to the information they
memory" at one time. Research on this phenom-
pick up in two quite different ways. They
enon suggests that this limit in capacity is
react both to the visual array, the two-dimen-
best understood in terms of a certain number.
sional pattern, as if the environment in front
of major units of information or "chunks."
of them were a flat picture, as well as to
Thus, rather than being able to remember a
the three-dimensional pattern of space that
certain number of individual details or facts,
243
people seem to be able to hold on to a few assumed that we were referring to surprise
distinct larger groupings of information. or novelty. But "novelty" implies that one
The current evidence suggests that most people is perceiving something new, and a scene
are able to hold approximately five such high in mystery may have nothing new present
chunks or units in their working memory at (and conversely, a novel object present in
once (Mandler 1967). the scene in no way assures mystery.) Like-
wise "surprise" implies the presence of some-
It follows from this that anything in thing unexpected. Mystery involves not the
the scene which helps divide it into approx- presence of new information, but its promise.
imately five major units will aid the compre- Mystery embodies the attraction of the bend
hension process. The various factors that in the road, the view partially obscured by
contribute to coherence all tend to do this. foliage, the temptation to follow the path,
The greater the complexity of a scene, the "just a little farther. " While the "promise
more structure is required to organize it in of more information" captures the essential
this way, or in other words, for it to be flavor of this concept, there is actually
coherent as well. more to it than that.
244
this component "refuge," emphasizing being erence, considered in terms of the visual
able to see without being seen, from an array and in terms of three--dimensional space,
informational perspective safety encompasses can be summarized by a 2 x 2 matrix:
considerably more than this. This broad
conception of safety closely parallels the Level of
"
making sense " side of our framework; we Interpretation Making Sense Involvement
"
have chosen the term legibility" to refer
to the possibility of making sense within The Visual Coherence Complexity
a three-dimensional space. Array
245
the possibilities for what one could look at, have seen, that perception and interpretation
and hence, in a sense, increases the uncertainty. are inseparable. The perceptual process is
But the structure is not thereby decreased. itself influenced by all those cultural,
experiential, and individual factors that
Likewise there may be much suggested or are supposed to underlie interpretation.
implied by the scene as being available but
beyond one ' s present view. Here too, there A similar approach has been to create
is an increase in uncertainty that in no way variables for people to judge that are
contradicts or undermines whatever structure "objective," so as to get around the subjec-
"
the scene possesses. tivity of preference. Sometimes the objec-
tivity" is achieved by having people rate
Readers familiar with an earlier version scenes in terms of landscape features rather
of this matrix (S. Kaplan 1975) might find than in terms of preference. Agreement using
the current configuration a bit disorienting such a procedure has not, however, been par-
at first glance. Note, however, that three ticularly impressive (R. Kaplan 1975). This
of the four constructs (complexity, coherence, is perhaps not surprising. People make judg-
and mystery) have remained the same and have ments of preference quickly and easily. By
the same relationship to each other. The contrast, judgment of the presence or absence
major additions, the making sense/involvement of certain landscape features may seem to
distinction and the two levels of interpre- many people to be unnatural or forced. Un-
tation, have a number of advantages over like preference, it is not a judgment they
their predecessors, both intuitively and make frequently and intuitively.
theoretically.
There is thus the temptation to dispense
with ordinary people altogether, to rely on
SOME COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS selected judges to make the ratings. And
often what they are asked to do is to make
Idiosyncrasy in Perception "assessments of aesthetics" rather than to
rate the scenes for preference. From a
There is a great deal of concern and
psychological perspective the distinction
confusion over the problem of idiosyncrasy
between these two kinds of judgments is dif-
in perception; it becomes particularly acute
ficult to justify.
when the issue of preference is included.
After all, everyone knows how much taste
Although perceptions are not all the
differs from one person to the next. And if
same, there are some remarkable communalities,
taste is purely personal, or if not personal,
perhaps in part because of our common evolu-
at the whim of culture, then decisions on
tionary heritage. And while there are indeed
preference will be at best arbitrary.
certain cultural differences, these may involve
differential emphasis on the components of
This concern, while understandable
preference discussed earlier. Some of the
enough, is misguided. Perception, and pref-
most reliable differences between groups as
erence for that matter, are no more variable
far as preference is concerned turn out,
than any other aspect of human experience
interestingly enough, to be between experts
and human behavior. As with everything else
and everyone else (R. Kaplan 1973; Anderson
there is regularity and there is variability.
1978). This makes good sense psychologically.
As with anything else identifying and under-
There is now substantial evidence that
standing that regularity is crucial to
experts perceive differently than do other
appropriate policy and decision-making. It
people (S. Kaplan 1977; Posner 1973). This
has been the purpose of this paper to identify
is restricted to their area of expertise and
some of these regularities and to suggest some
in fact constitutes an important facet of
ways in which they might be understood.
their expertise. But the fact remains that
experts, often without realizing it, do not
While idiosyncrasy per se turns out to
see their part of the world the way anyone
be not that much of a problem either theoret-
else sees it. While experts are invaluable
ically or empirically, some of the ways pro-
resources when used appropriately, they are
posed to deal with it have created new prob-
a dubious source of "objective" judgment as
lems that are rather more serious. One
to what people care about in the landscape.
reaction involves relegating all the varia-
bility to some post-perceptual process. Thus
it is asserted that "perception is the same
What is REALLY Important in Landscape
for all people while interpretations vary."
The difficulty with this solution is, as we
There have been numerous efforts to
246
identify the crucial aspects of the human Secondly, these four factors do not even
reaction to landscape, to get to the heart provide an adequate sampling of the key proper-
of the matter, as it were. One such approach ties of the picture plane. They are heavily
is both impressive in its directness and dis- weighted toward visual contours and toward
turbing in its implications. This approach discreteness. Recent work on visual function-
is based on ferreting out the unique. It is ing suggests that a far more global kind of
argued that the more unusual the scenery, processing may be at least as important,
the more valuable it is. This is essentially especially as far as spaces to walk in are
an economic argument, relying exclusively on concerned. An ancient component of the human
scarcity. While it is undoubtedly true in visual system that has been referred to as
some limited sense, it is equally false in a the "location processing system" (S. Kaplan
larger sense and certainly a caricature of 1970) is so closely tied to the capacity to
the multiplicity of factors influencing wander through three-dimensional space that
preference. it has also been identified as the system that
makes possible "ambient vision" (Trevarthen
People's reaction to nature is an example 1978). For this system the size and rough
of a noneconomic need (see Hendee and Stankey spatial arrangement of elements on the picture
1973, Kaplan and Kaplan 1978). It is not plane interact with texture to provide a
something to be exchanged for something else, global overview of the situation. To the
but an intrinsic reaction. People value even extent that this system plays a role in pref-
rather common instances of nature (Kaplan, erence, it will be necessary to take a fresh
Kaplan and Wendt 1972, R. Kaplan 1978). At look at the factors that are most salient at
the same time certain rare, nonnatural ele- the level of the picture plane.
ments (a unique statue, for example) are not
valued at all.
This paper has dealt with a variety of
There is a sense in which uniqueness is factors that play a role in human preference
valued. That is when a place has a distinc- for landscapes. It has also attempted to deal
tiveness, a "sense of place," that makes it with some widely held misconceptions about
possible to know where one is whenever one preference and about perception as well. But
visits that place. This is a rather special the purpose of the paper is not to propose a
meaning of "uniqueness" that has little new set of factors to take the place of a
relation to the visual scarcity interpreta- traditional set. Rather the purpose is to
tion. describe a different way of thinking about
people, a new way of conceptualizing what
Another derivative of the uniqueness idea goes on in people's heads when they react
that might be worth studying is the uniqueness to a landscape or other environment. What
of a place in terms of access. Thus the only I would like to propose is a functional
park one can get to for lunch within walking approach, a view of what people are trying
distance of downtown is unique in an important to do. When people view a landscape they
way although not in the traditional sense of are making a judgment, however intuitive and
"
unique content." unconscious this process may be. This judg-
ment concerns the sorts of experiences they
Another influential scheme for landscape would have, the ease of locomoting, of moving,
analysis focuses on the four factors of form, of exploring, in a word of functioning, in
line, color, and texture. This approach con- the environment they are viewing.
flicts with the realities of human perception
in a number of respects.
LITERATURE CITED
First, these properties tend to empha-
size the two-dimensional picture plane. Anderson, Eddie
Clearly this is not irrelevant to landscapes; 1978. Visual resource assessment: Local
they too can be analyzed as a visual array. perceptions of familiar natural envi-
But much more importantly a landscape is ronments. Doctoral dissertation.
a three-dimensional space. Since a substan- University of Michigan.
tial portion of the human response to land-
scape turns out to depend upon the sort of Appleton, J.
space involved, and the way the individual 1975. The experience of landscape. 292
envisions locomoting in that space, any p. Wiley, London.
approach which emphasizes the picture plane
is bound to miss much of what matters most to
people in landscapes.
247
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