PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES
32. ) Almelor vs. RTC of Las Pinas
GR 179620- August 26, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and
respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were
married on January 29, 1989 and had three
children. Manuel and Leonida are both
medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist
and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven
(11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a
petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to
annul their marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. Leonida that
in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of
a perfect husband and father but this was not
the case in his private life. At home,
Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous,
easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way
of imposing discipline on their children was
the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.
Leonida complained that this was in stark
contrast to the alleged lavish affection
Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged
that her husband has concealed from her his
homosexuality. She caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for a male caller.
She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession. And
she saw Manuel kissed another man on the
lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.
When she confronted Manuel, he denied
everything. At this point, Leonida took her
children and left their conjugal abode. Since
then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a
clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim. She testified that she
conducted evaluative interviews and a
battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She
also had a one-time interview with Manuel
and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel
is psychologically incapacitated and such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it
existed even before the marriage and
appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered
that the true cause of Leonida’s hostility
against him was their professional rivalry.
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on
the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of
the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the
two can be declared as null and void due to
fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of
his homosexuality.
HELD:
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper
ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se. Evidently, no
sufficient proof was presented to
substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to
Leonida at the time of their marriage. The
lower court considered the public perception
of Manuel’s sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and
interpreted it against his sexuality. Even
granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the
complaint or anywhere in the case was it
alleged and proven that Manuel hid such
sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s
consent had been vitiated by such.
LEGAL SEPARATION
33.) Bugayong vs Ginez
GR L-10033- December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Petitioner, a US Navy serviceman, began
receiving letters informing him of the
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife, the
respondent. He admitted that respondent
even informed him by letter that a certain
Eliong kissed her.
Petitioner, then, sought for his wife and
when the two met, they both proceeded to a
certain house where they stayed and lived
for 2 nights and 1 day. Then they repaired to
the petitioner’s house and again passed the
night therein as husband and wife. On the
following day, petitioner tried to verify from
his wife the truth of the information he
received that she had committed adultery.
But respondent, instead of answering the
query, merely packed up and left, which the
petitioner took as confirmation of the acts of
infidelity imputed on his wife. Petitioner
went to Ilocos “to soothe his wounded
feelings.”
Petitioner, then, filed for legal separation
against his wife, who in turn filed a motion
to dismiss on ground of condonation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is condonation of the
acts of the wife by the husband.
RULING:
Yes. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence,
there is condonation to the alleged adultery
on the part of the husband.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that
legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot by either
of them. Collusion between the parties to
obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
Further, single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
sufficient to constitute condonation, and
where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation.
Moreover, pursuant to foreign jurisprudence,
a divorce suit will not be granted for
adultery where the parties continue to live
together after it was known or there is sexual
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
intercourse after knowledge of adultery or
sleeping together for a single night.
Since the parties have stayed together as
husband and wife for more than two nights
after the knowledge of wife’s infidelity,
condonation is established.
34.) Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
GR. L-30977- January 31, 1972
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio... they had lived together as
husband and wife... continuously until 1943
when her husband abandoned her, that they
had no child; that they acquired properties
during their marriage; and that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319
Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March
1949. She... prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which, among
others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of
his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and
special defenses, and, along with several
other claims involving money and other
properties, counterclaimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his...
marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for
legal separation"[1] on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the petition for legal separation
was filed beyond the one-year period
provided for in Article 102 of the Civil
Code;... and that the death of Carmen abated
the action for legal separation.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order
under review, dismissing the case.[2] In the
body of the order, the court stated that the
motion to dismiss and the motion for
substitution had to be resolved on the
question of whether or not... the plaintiff's
cause of action has survived, which the court
resolved in the negative.
Although the defendant below, the herein
respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed
counterclaims, he did not pursue them after
the court below dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Does the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action? If it does, will abatement
also apply if the action involves property
rights?
RULING:
An action for legal separation which
involves nothing more than the bed-and-
board separation of the spouses (there being
no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is
purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100,
by allowing only... the innocent spouse (and
no one else) to claim legal separation; and in
its Article 108, by providing that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or
abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered.
Being... personal in character, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes
the death of the action itself actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no
need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved.
"Marriage is a personal relation or status,
created under the sanction of law, and an
action for divorce is a proceeding brought
for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of
that relation. The action is one of a personal
nature. In the absence of a statute to the...
contrary, the death of one of the parties to
such action abates the action, for the reason
that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and
deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over
the persons of the parties to the action and of
the... subject-matter of the action itself.
The same rule is true of causes of action and
suits for separation and maintenance
A review of the resulting changes in
property relations between spouses shows
that they are solely the effect of the decree
of legal separation; hence, they can not
survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs
prior to the decree. On this point, Article
106 of the
Civil Code provides:
"(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or
the absolute conjugal community of
property shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but the offending spouse shall have no right
to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, without prejudice
to the provisions... of article 176;
From this article it is apparent that the right
to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains (or of the absolute community of
property), the loss of right by the offending
spouse to any share of the profits earned by
the partnership or community, or his...
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from
the innocent spouse as well as the revocation
of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one,
are all rights and disabilities that, by the
very terms of the Civil Code article, are
vested... exclusively in the persons of the
spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible.
A further reason why an action for legal
separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects
of a decree of separation, their source being
the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come... into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected... consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee
Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio
of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and
academic upon the death of the latter, and
there could be no further interest in
continuing... the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned
union.
35.) Ong vs. Ong
GR 153206- October 23, 2006
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been
married for more than 20 years when Lucita
filed a complaint for Legal separation under
Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
Lucita alleged that since their third year
of marriage, her husband William subjected
her to physical violence like slapping,
kicking and pulling her hair and bang her
head against the
concrete wall.and been violent towards their
three children. He would scold them using
his belt buckle to beat them. One day after a
violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita
on several different parts of her body,
pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave
the house which she did.
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive
behavior were corroborated by her sister
Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom
Lucita consulted the day after she left her
conjugal home also testified about her
injuries.
The trial court granted Lucitas petition for
legal separation which the CA affirmed
William then filed this petition for review on
certiorari
-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s
allegations and that he never inflicted
physical harm on her or their children.
REPORT THIS AD
-He also argued that the real motive of
Lucita and her family in filing the complaint
is to deprive him of his control and
ownership over his conjugal properties with
Lucita.
-That the CA overlooked some facts of the
case which warrant an exception to the
general rule that questions of fact cannot be
the subject for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies
of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor
Dr. ElinZano since their testimonies are
tainted with relationship and fraud
and since Lucita abandoned the family
home she has also given a ground for legal
separation and therefore should NOT- be
granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of
The family code – Where both parties
have given ground for legal separation
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucita Ong should be
granted a decree on legal separation
HELD:
The claim that the real motive of Lucita
in filing the case is for her family to take
control of the conjugal properties is absurd.
Lucita left because of her husband’s
repeated physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct. That the physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct were brought to
bear upon Lucita have been duly
established. He can derive no personal gain
from pushing for the financial interests of
her family at the expense of her marriage
of 20 years and the companionship of
her husband and children
The assessment of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses is given great
respect. Relationship alone is not enough to
discredit and label a witness’ testimony as
biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses
Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed
and straightforward testimonies the court
finds that their testimonies are not tainted
with bias.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
The abandonment referred to by the Family In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US,
Code is abandonment without justifiable he stayed with her wife for about 5 months
cause for more than one year. Lucita left in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and
William due to his abusive conduct, such
Lin, alleged that during this time their
does not constitute abandonment
contemplated in the said provision mother overdose Potenciano which caused
the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February
1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
PETITION DENIED:
guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age,
Lucita should be granted a decree of legal frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
separation
judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
March 1999, petitioner filed with CA
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of his husband alleging that the
respondents refused her demands to see and
36.) Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio-Bildner visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano
GR 139789- May 12, 2000 from returning to Antipolo.

FACTS: ISSUE:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas
age, possessed extensive property valued at corpus should be issued.
millions of pesos. For many year, he was
the Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. He was married with HELD:
Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
years and begotten 6 children namely
of illegal confinement or detention, or by
Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant),
which the rightful custody of a person is
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen.
withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
They separated from bed and board in 1972.
justify the grant for such petition, the
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he
restraint of liberty must an illegal and
was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
involuntary deprivation of freedom of
Baguio Country Club when he was in
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must
Baguio City. On the other hand, the
be actual and effective not merely nominal
petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
or moral.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
Evidence showed that there was no actual
and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify
issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter
was 86 years of age and under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to
discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may
not be the subject of visitation rights against
his free choice. Otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of
a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that
the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter
beyond judicial authority and cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other process.
37.) Valino vs. Adriano et.al
GR 182894- April 22, 2014
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano... married respondent
Rosario Adriano... on November 15, 1955.
The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and
Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters,
Rosario, Victoria and
Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter,
Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario,
however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later,
Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his
clients, until they decided to live together as
husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide...
financial support to Rosario and their
children
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute
emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the
United States spending Christmas with her
children. As none of the family members
was around, Valino took it upon herself to
shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for
Atty. Adriano. When
Rosario learned about the death of her
husband, she immediately called Valino and
requested that she delay the interment for a
few days but her request was not heeded.
The remains of Atty. Adriano were then
interred at the mausoleum of the family of
Valino at the Manila
Memorial Park. Respondents were not able
to attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the
chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano
before he was buried... respondents
commenced suit against Valino
In her defense, Valino countered that
Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been
separated for more than twenty (20) years
before he courted her.
Although they... were living together,
Valino admitted that he never forgot his
obligation to support the respondents.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of
respondents for lack of merit as well as the
counterclaim of Valino after it found them
to have not been sufficiently proven.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
the trial court concluded that Rosario did not
show love and care for him.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision and directed Valino to have
the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the
expense of respondents.
In reaching said determination, the CA
explained that Rosario, being the legal wife,
was entitled to the custody of the remains of
her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of
the New Civil Code in relation to Article
199 of the Family Code, it was the
considered view of the... appellate court that
the law gave the surviving spouse not only
the duty but also the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of her husband.
For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to
such right on the ground of her subsisting
marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of
the... latter's death, notwithstanding their 30-
year separation in fact.
ISSUE
he lone legal issue in this petition is who
between Rosario and Valino is entitled to
the remains of Atty. Adriano.
RULING:
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to
what is now Article 199[6] of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements
for the deceased.
it is undeniable that the law simply confines
the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family
to the exclusion of one's common law
partner.
While it is true that our laws do not just
brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they
produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, authority
exists in case law to the effect that such
form of co-ownership... requires that the
man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the
law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The
fact that she was living separately from her
husband and was in the United States when
he died has no... controlling significance. To
say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or
renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right
and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral
arrangements, like any other... right, will not
be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent to that end.
it cannot be surmised that just because
Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband
when she died, she had already renounced
her right to do so.
Should there be any doubt as to the true
intent of the deceased, the law favors the
legitimate family.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
38.) Domingo vs. Sps. Molino
GR 200274- April 20, 2016
FACTS:
he spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo
bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac,
consisting of a one-half undivided portion
over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed
money from the respondent spouses Genaro
and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). On
September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora's
death
, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to
the spouses Molina to answer for his debts.
The sale to the spouses Molina was
annotated at the OCT of the subject property
In 1986, Anastacio died.
In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's
interest was registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967... and
transferred the entire one-half undivided
portion of the land to the spouses Molina.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio
and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against
the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.
Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the
subject property to the spouses Molina to
serve as collateral for the money that
Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not
have validly sold the interest over the
subject property without Flora's consent, as
Flora was already dead at the time of the
sale.
Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina
must have falsified the document
transferring Anastacio and Flora's one-half
undivided interest over the land. Finally,
Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject
property from the time of Anastacio's death
up to the time he filed the Complaint.
Melecio presented the testimonies of the
Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of
Tarlac, and of Melecio's nephew, George
Domingo (George).
The Records Officer testified that he could
not locate the instrument that documents the
transfer of the subject property ownership
from Anastacio to the spouses Molina. The
Records Officer also testified that the
alleged sale was annotated at the time when
Genaro Molina's brother was the Register of
Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac.
George, on the other hand, testified that he
has been living on the subject property
owned by Anastacio since 1986. George
testified, however, that aside from himself,
there were also four other occupants on the
subject property, namely Jaime Garlitos,
Linda Sicangco, Serafio Sicangco and
Manuel Ramos.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio
surrendered the title to the subject property
to answer for his debts and told the spouses
Molina that they already own half of the
land. The spouses Molina have been in
possession of the subject property before the
title was registered under their names and
have religiously paid the property's real
estate taxes.
The spouses Molina also asserted that
Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he
accompanied Anastacio several times to
borrow money. The last loan was even used
to pay for Melecio's wedding. Finally, the
spouses Molina asserted that Melecio built
his nipa hut on the subject property only in
1999, without their knowledge and consent.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
The spouses Molina presented Jaime
Garlitos (Jaime) as their sole witness and
who is one of the occupants of the subject
lot.Jaime testified that Elena Molina
permitted him to build a house on the
subject property in 1993. Jaime, together
with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing
trees on the subject property and gave
portions of their harvest to Elena Molina
without any complaint from Melecio. Jaime
further testified that Melecio never lived on
the subject property and that only George
Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses
Molina, has a hut on the property.
Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during
the pendency of the case and were
substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio
Molina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of a conjugal
property to the spouses Molina without
Flora's consent is valid and legal
RULING:
Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed
property to the spouses Molina is void
without Flora's consent.We do not find
Melecio's argument meritorious.Anastacio
and Flora's conjugal partnership was
dissolved upon Flora's death.
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora
Domingo married before the Family Code's
effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their
property relation is a conjugal partnership.
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and
Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon
death of a spouse and prohibits any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property prior to the conjugal partnership
liquidation,... Article 130. Upon the
termination of the marriage by death, the
conjugal partnership property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.If no
judicial settlement proceeding is instituted,
the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. If
upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void. x x x
While Article 130 of the Family Code
provides that any disposition involving the
conjugal property without prior liquidation
of the partnership shall be void, this rule
does not apply since the provisions of the
Family Code shall be "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
An implied co-ownership among Flora's
heirs governed the conjugal properties
pending liquidation and partition.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Flora's surviving heirs, including
Anastacio, with respect to Flora's share of
the conjugal partnership until final
liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the
other hand, owns one-half of the original
conjugal partnership properties as his share,
but this is an undivided interest.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-
ownership provides:Article 493. Each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim
title to any specific portion of the conjugal
properties without an actual partition being
first done either by agreement or by judicial
decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right
to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of
the subject property to the extent of
Anastacio's interest.
At the time of the sale, Anastacio's
undivided interest in the conjugal properties
consisted of: (1) one-half of the entire
conjugal properties; and (2) his share as
Flora's heir on the conjugal properties.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners. Consequently, Anastactio's sale to
the spouses Molina without the consent of
the other co-owners was not totally void, for
Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof were
thereby effectively transferred, making the
spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject
property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.
Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the
conjugal properties, including the subject
property, is an action for partition under
Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As
held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr.,
"it is now settled that the appropriate
recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the
entire property as well as in a sale merely of
the undivided shares of some of the co-
owners is an action for PARTITION under
Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."
39.) PNB vs. Garcia, et.al.
GR 182839- June 2, 2014
FACTS:
Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) acquired a parcel
of residential land with all its improvements
located in in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela
registered under his name with a TCT No.
T-44422 during his marriage with Ligaya
Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.
The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya
produced the following children: Nora, Jose
Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all surnamed Garcia,
who are the respondents in the present case.
Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and
Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained
a loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine
National Bank (petitioner bank), initially for
P150,000.00. The loan was secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over their property
covered by TCT No. 177585. The spouses
Garcia increased their loan to P220,000.00
and eventually to P600,000.00. As security
for the increased loan, they offered their
property covered by TCT No. 75324 and the
subject property covered by TCT No. T-
44422.
Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses
Garcia by offering the subject property as
additional collateral security for the latters
increased loan. For this purpose, Jose Sr.
executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs)
expressly authorizing the Spouses Garcia to
apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from
the petitioner bank, and to convey and
transfer the subject property by way of
mortgage. Jose Sr. also executedan
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and
the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
both inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All of
these transactions, however, were without
the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s
children.
On maturity of the loan on April 20,
1994,the spouses Garcia failed to pay their
loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated
demands.
Respondents filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against the spouses
Garcia and the petitioner bank. They
claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage was null and void as to
respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and
Jimmy as they were not parties to the
contract.
The respondents alleged that the subject
property was a conjugal property of Jose Sr.
and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they
acquired the subject property during their
marriage; that upon Ligayas death, Jose Sr.,
together with his children Nora, Jose Jr.,
Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became owners
pro indiviso of the subject property; that the
real estate mortgage executed by Jose
Sr.could not bind his children as they did not
give their consent or approval to the
encumbrance; and that the real estate
mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since
he never benefitted from the loan.
In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged
that Jose Sr. was indebted to them in the
amount of P133,800.00. To settle this
indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give
the subject property as additional security
for their (the Garcias) loan to the petitioner
bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand,
claimed that the mortgage was made in good
faith and for value, and maintained that the
respondents complaint stated no cause of
action against it.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack
of cause of action. The court held that the
subject property was a conjugal property
since it was acquired by Jose Sr. during his
marriage with his now deceased wife. As a
conjugal property, it is presumed that upon
the death of his spouse, one-half of the
property passed on to Jose Sr., while the
other half went to Jose and his children as
co-owners and as forced heirs of his
deceased spouse. Without the consent of the
children, the trial court ruled that the
conjugal property could only be transferred
or encumbered to the extent of Jose Sr.s
share in the conjugal partnership, plus his
share as an heir in the other half pertaining
to the estate of his deceased spouse.
The RTC nevertheless declared that by
virtue of the SPA executed by Nora, Jose Jr.,
Bobby and Jimmy in this suit, they are
already estopped from questioning the
mortgage and from alleging lack of consent
or knowledge in the transaction. It held Jose
Sr. liable as an accommodation party and
upheld the petitioner banks right to collect
the debt.
The CA upheld the trial courts finding that
the subject property was conjugal, but
reversed and set aside its ruling in so far as it
declared valid and binding the Amendment
of Real Estate Mortgage between the
petitioner bank, on one hand, and the
spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on the other
hand, with respect to respondents Nora, Jose
Jr., Bobby and Jimmy. Relying on the
Courts ruling inNufable v. Nufable, 369
Phil. 135, the CA ruled that the
encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire
conjugal property, without his childrens
conformity, was null and void because a
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
mere part owner could not alienate the
shares of the other co-owners.
The CA also declared that the conjugal
property could only be liable to the extent of
Jose Sr.'s shares; Jose Sr.s acts could not
affect his children's pro-indiviso shares in
the subject property. It disagreed with the
trial courts estoppel theory and held that
their execution of the SPA should not be
construed as acquiescence to the mortgage
transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr.
could not escape liability from the mortgage
since he voluntarily bound himself as the
Spouses Garcia's accommodation
mortgagor.
ISSUE:
Did the CA decide the case erroneously?
HELD:
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
their property relations were governed by
the conjugal partnership of gains as provided
under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
Because of the petitioner banks failure to
rebut the allegation that the subject property
was acquired during the formers marriage to
Ligaya, the legal presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property, in line with
Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this
property. Proof of the subject propertys
acquisition during the subsistence of
marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative. Go v. Yamane, 522
Phil. 653, 663 (2006).
Registration of a property alone in the name
of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired.Tarrosa v. De Leon,
G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009. The
registration of the property is not conclusive
evidence of the exclusive ownership of the
husband or the wife. Although the property
appears to be registered in the name of the
husband, it has the inherent character of
conjugal property if it was acquired for
valuable consideration during marriage.It
retains its conjugal nature. xxx
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21,
1987, the conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved and terminated
pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code,
and the successional rights of her heirs vest,
as provided under Article 777 of the Civil
Code, which states that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was
converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership between the surviving spouse, on
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased,
on the other. This resulting ordinary co-
ownership among the heirs is governed by
Article 493 of the Civil Code.
Under this provision, each co-owner has the
full ownership of his part or share in the co-
ownership and may, therefore, alienate,
assign or mortgage it except when personal
rights are involved. Should a co-owner
alienate or mortgage the co-owned property
itself, the alienation or mortgage shall
remain valid but only to the extent of the
portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.Aguirre v. CA, G.R. No. 122249,
January 29, 2004
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
As correctly emphasized by the trial court,
Jose Sr.s right in the subject property
islimited only to his share in the conjugal
partnership as well as his share as an heir on
the other half of the estate which is his
deceased spouses share. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract is void insofar as it
extends to the undivided shares of his
children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy)
because they did not give their consent to
the transaction.
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the
entire property without his co-owners
consent is not necessarily void in its entirety.
The right of the petitioner bank as
mortgagee is limited though only to the
portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in
the event of a division and liquidation of the
subject property. AFFIRMED.
40.) Tan vs. Andrade, et.al.
GR 171904- August 7, 2013
FACTS:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the
registered owner of four parcels of land
known as Lots 17, 18, 19, and 20[5] situated
in Cebu City (subject properties) which she
mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed
by one Simon[6] Diu (Simon).[7] When the
redemption period was about to expire,
Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan
(Bobby) who agreed to redeem the subject
properties.[8] Thereafter, Rosario sold the
same to Bobby and her son, Proceso
Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for P100,000.00
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale[9] dated April 29, 1983 (subject deed of
sale). On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr.
executed a Deed of Assignment,[10] ceding
unto Bobby his rights and interests over the
subject properties in consideration of
P50,000.00. The Deed of Assignment was
signed by, among others, Henry Andrade
(Henry), one of Rosario's sons, as
instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the
aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby
extended an Option to Buy[11] the subject
properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the
latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31,
1984 to purchase the same for the sum of
P310,000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do
so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over
the subject properties, and the
TCTs[12] therefor were issued in his name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosario's children,
namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew,
Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph (all surnamed
Andrade), Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A.
Santiago (Andrades), filed a
complaint[13] for reconveyance and
annulment of deeds of conveyance and
damages against Bobby before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 20969. In
their complaint, they alleged that the
transaction between Rosario and Bobby
(subject transaction) was not one of sale but
was actually an equitable mortgage which
was entered into to secure Rosario's
indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed
that since the subject properties were
inherited by them from their father, Proceso
Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject
properties were conjugal in nature, and thus,
Rosario had no right to dispose of their
respective shares therein. In this light, they
argued that they remained as co-owners of
the subject properties together with Bobby,
despite the issuance of the TCTs in his
name.
In his defense, Bobby contended that the
subject properties were solely owned by
Rosario per the TCTs issued in her
name[14] and that he had validly acquired the
same upon Proceso, Jr.'s failure to exercise
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
his option to buy back the subject
properties.[15] He also interposed the
defenses of prescription and laches against
the Andrades.[16]
The RTC Ruling
On April 6, 2001, the RTC rendered a
Judgment[17] dismissing the Andrades'
complaint.
It ruled that the subject transaction was
a bona fide sale and not an equitable
mortgage as can be gleaned from its terms
and conditions, noting further that the
subject deed of sale was not even questioned
by the Andrades at the time of its execution.
As Proceso, Jr. failed to exercise his option
to buy back the subject properties, the titles
thereto were validly consolidated in Bobby's
favor, resulting to the issuance of TCTs in
his name which are deemed to be conclusive
proof of his ownership thereto.[18] As
regards the nature of the subject properties,
the RTC found that they "appeared to be the
exclusive properties of Rosario."[19] Finally,
it found that the Andrades' claim over the
subject properties had already prescribed
and that laches had already set in.[20]
Dissatisfied, the Andrades elevated the
matter on appeal.
The CA Ruling
On July 26, 2005, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision[21] upholding in part the
RTC's ruling.
It found that the subject deed of sale was
indeed what it purports to be, i.e., a bona
fide contract of sale. In this accord, it denied
the Andrades' claim that the subject
transaction was an equitable mortgage since
their allegation that the purchase price was
unusually low was left unsupported by any
evidence. Also, their averment that they
have been in continuous possession of the
subject properties was belied by the
testimony of Andrew Andrade (Andrew)
who stated that Bobby was already in
possession of the same. [22]
Nevertheless, the CA ruled that the subject
properties belong to the conjugal partnership
of Rosario and her late husband, Proceso,
Sr., and thus, she co-owned the same
together with her children, the
Andrades.[23] In this respect, the sale was
valid only with respect to Rosario's pro-
indiviso share in the subject properties and it
cannot prejudice the share of the Andrades
since they did not consent to the sale.[24] In
effect, a resulting trust was created between
Bobby and the Andrades[25] and, as such,
prescription and/or laches has yet to set in so
as to bar them from instituting the instant
case.[26] Accordingly, the CA ordered Bobby
to reconvey to the Andrades their share in
the subject properties.[27]
In view of the CA's pronouncement, the
parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. For the Andrades' part, they
sought the reconsideration of the CA's
finding as to its characterization of the
subject transaction as one of sale, insisting
that it is actually an equitable
mortgage.[28] As for Bobby's part, he
maintained that the sale should have covered
the entirety of the subject properties and not
only Rosario's pro-indiviso share.[29] Both
motions for reconsideration were, however,
denied by the CA in a Resolution[30] dated
March 3, 2006.
Hence, the present consolidated petitions.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
ISSUES:
The present controversy revolves around the
CA's characterization of the subject
properties as well as of the subject
transaction between Rosario and Bobby.
In G.R. No. 172017, the Andrades submit
that the CA erred in ruling that the subject
transaction is in the nature of a sale, while in
G.R. No. 171904, Bobby contends that the
CA erred in ruling that the subject properties
are conjugal in nature.
RULING:
A. Characterization of the subject
transaction.
Settled is the rule that when the trial court's
factual findings have been affirmed by the
CA, said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon the Court, and may no
longer be reviewed on Rule 45
petitions.[31] While there exists exceptions to
this rule such as when the CA's and RTC's
findings are in conflict with each
other[32] the Court observes that none applies
with respect to the ruling that the subject
transaction was one of sale and not an
equitable mortgage. Records readily reveal
that both the RTC and the CA observed that
there is no clear and convincing evidence to
show that the parties agreed upon a
mortgage. Hence, absent any glaring error
therein or any other compelling reason to
hold otherwise, this finding should now be
deemed as conclusive and perforce must
stand. As echoed in the case of Ampo v.
CA:[33]
x x x Factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and
not reviewable by this Court and they carry
even more weight when the Court of
Appeals affirms the factual findings of the
trial court, and in the absence of any
showing that the findings complained of are
totally devoid of support in the evidence on
record, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand.[34]
Consequently, the Andrades' petition
in G.R. No. 172017 must therefore be
denied.
B. Characterization of the subject
properties.
With respect to the nature of the subject
properties, the courts a quo were at variance
such that the RTC, on the one hand, ruled
that the said properties were exclusive
properties of Rosario,[35] while the CA, on
the other hand, pronounced that they are
conjugal in nature.[36] In this regard, the
consequent course of action would be for the
Court to conduct a re-examination of the
evidence if only to determine which among
the two is correct, [37] as an exception to the
proscription in Rule 45 petitions.
Pertinent to the resolution of this second
issue is Article 160 of the Civil
Code[38] which states that "[a]ll property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife." For this presumption to apply, the
party invoking the same must, however,
preliminarily prove that the property was
indeed acquired during the marriage. As
held in Go v. Yamane:[39]
x x x As a condition sine qua non for the
operation of [Article 160] in favor of the
conjugal partnership, the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
presumption may be rebutted only with
strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence. There must be strict proof of the
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.[40] (Citations omitted)
Corollarily, as decreed in Valdez v.
CA,[41] the presumption under Article 160
cannot be made to apply where there is no
showing as to when the property alleged to
be conjugal was acquired:
x x x The issuance of the title in the name
solely of one spouse is not determinative of
the conjugal nature of the property, since
there is no showing that it was acquired
during the marriage of the Spouses Carlos
Valdez, Sr. and Josefina L. Valdez. The
presumption under Article 160 of the New
Civil Code, that property acquired during
marriage is conjugal, does not apply where
there is no showing as to when the property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The
presumption cannot prevail when the title is
in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Moreover, when the property is registered in
the name of only one spouse and there is no
showing as to when the property was
acquired by same spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs
exclusively to the said spouse.
In this case, there is no evidence to indicate
when the property was acquired by
petitioner Josefina. Thus, we agree with
petitioner Josefina's declaration in the deed
of absolute sale she executed in favor of the
respondent that she was the absolute and
sole owner of the property. x x x.[42]
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal
partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latter's death on August
7, 1978[43] while the transfer certificates of
title over the subject properties were issued
on September 28, 1979 and solely in the
name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal
age, widow, Filipino."[44] Other than their
bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by
the Andrades to establish that the subject
properties were procured during the
coverture of their parents or that the same
were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover,
Rosario's declaration that she is the absolute
owner of the disputed parcels of land in the
subject deed of sale[45] was not disputed by
her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the
same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents,
the Court upholds the RTC's finding[46] that
the subject properties were exclusive or sole
properties of Rosario.
Besides, the Court observes that laches had
already set in, thereby precluding the
Andrades from pursuing their claim. Case
law defines laches as the "failure to assert a
right for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it."[47]
Records disclose that the Andrades took 14
years before filing their complaint for
reconveyance in 1997. The argument that
they did not know about the subject
transaction is clearly belied by the facts on
record. It is undisputed that Proceso, Jr. was
a co-vendee in the subject deed of
sale,[48] while Henry was an instrumental
witness to the Deed of Assignment[49] and
Option to Buy[50] both dated July 26, 1983.
Likewise, Rosario's sons, Proceso, Jr. and
Andrew, did not question the execution of
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
the subject deed of sale made by their
mother to Bobby.[51] These incidents can but
only lead to the conclusion that they were
well-aware of the subject transaction and yet
only pursued their claim 14 years after the
sale was executed.
Due to the above-stated reasons, Bobby's
petition in G.R. No. 171904 is hereby
granted.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
(a) GRANTS the petition of Bobby Tan in
G.R. No. 171904; and (b) DENIES the
petition of Grace Andrade, Charity A.
Santiago, Henry Andrade, Andrew Andrade,
Jasmin Blaza, Miriam Rose Andrade, and
Joseph Andrade in G.R. No. 172017.
Accordingly, the Decision dated July 26,
2005 and Resolution dated March 3, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71987 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the April 6, 2001 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19 in Civil Case No. CEB 20969
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
41.) PNB vs. Venancio Reyes
GR 212483- October 5, 2016
FACTS:
Three parcels of land owned by spouses
Lilia and Venancio Reyes were mortgaged
to Philippine National Bank to secure a loan.
When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the
loan obligations, Philippine National Bank
foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.
Venancio assailed the validity of the real
estate mortgage and claimed that his wife
undertook the loan and the mortgage without
his consent and his signature was falsified
on the promissory notes and the mortgage.
He averred that
since the three (3) lots involved were
conjugal properties, the mortgage
constituted over them was void. The Trial
Court ordered the annulment of the real
estate mortgage and directed Lilia to
reimburse PNB.
Aggrieved, Philippine National Bank
appealed to the Court of Appeals. It was
denied. A Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied.
In this petition, the PNB insists that the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
ruling of the trial court. It argues that the
real estate mortgage is valid, that the
conjugal partnership should be held liable
for the loan, and that respondent Venancio
C. Reyes, Jr.’s cause of action should be
deemed barred by laches.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring the real estate mortgage void;
2. Whether the conjugal partnership can be
held liable for the loan contracted
unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes
3. Whether respondent is guilty of laches
and his claim is now barred by estoppel.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
RULING:
1. No, the Court of Appeals did not err in its
ruling. It committed no reversible error in
affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court that the real estate mortgage over the
conjugal properties is void for want of
consent from respondent. The Family Code
is clear: the written consent of the spouse
who did not encumber the property is
necessary before any disposition or
encumbrance of a conjugal property can be
valid.
2. Yes, the conjugal partnership can be held
liable. The lower courts may have declared
the mortgage void, but the principal
obligation is not affected. It remains valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that the loan
was used as additional working capital for
respondent’s printing business. As held in
Ayala Investment, since the loaned money is
used in the husband’s business, there is a
presumption that it redounded to the benefit
of the family; hence, the conjugal
partnership may be held liable for the loan
amount.
3. No, the respondent is not guilty of laches.
Laches does not apply where the delay is
within the period prescribed by law.
fails to convince that respondent slept on his
right.
42.) Pelayo vs. Perez
GR 141323- June 8, 2005
FACTS:
David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed a deed of sale and transferred
to Melki Perez two parcel of agricultural
lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose
signature is eligible witnesses such
execution of deed.
Loreza signed only on the third page in the
space provided for witnesses, as such, Perez
application was denied.
Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and
should pages of the deed of sale but she
refused. He then filed a complaint for
specific performance against the Pelayo
spouses.
The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground for lack of marital consent as
provided by art166 of the Civil Code.

As found by the trial court, records show

that upon learning about the mortgage,
respondent immediately informed the bank ISSUE:
about his forged signature. He filed the
Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Whether or not the deed of sale was null and
Sale and Real Estate Mortgage against viol for lack of marital consent.
petitioner within the prescribed period to
redeem a mortgaged property; and since
respondent filed the Complaint for
Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real HELD:
Estate Mortgage within the period of
redemption prescribed by law, petitioner Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of
the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
11, 1988 when the deed in question was
executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not
make the contract viol of initio but Merely
violable. Said provisions of law provide:
Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a
non compass mentis or a spedthriff, or is
under civil interdiction or is confined in a
lepresarium, the husband connot alienate or
encumber any real property not the
Longugal property w/o the wife’s consent. It
she refuses nreasonable to give her consent,
the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art 173. The wife may during the marriage
and w/in 10 years the transaction
questioned, ask the court for the annulment
of any contract of the husband w/c tends to
defraud her or impair interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right she her heir, after the
dissolution of the marriage may demand the
value of property fraudulently alienated by
the husband.
PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS
WITHOUT MARRIAGE
43.) Agapay vs. Palang
GR 116668- July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with
Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to
work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. Their only child Herminia was
born in May 1950. The trial court found
evident that as early as 1957, Miguel
attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good in 1972, he
refused to lived with Carlina and stayed
alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a
subsequent marriage with 19 year old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months
earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at Binalonan
Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same
place was likewise purchased. On the other
hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed
of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of
land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced
a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s
complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died.
Carlina and her daughter instituted this case
for recovery of ownership and possession
with damages against petitioner. They
sought to get back the land and the house
and lot located at Binalonan allegedly
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation
with petitioner. The lower court dismissed
the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
ISSUE:
Whether the agricultural land and the house
and lot should be awarded in favor of
Erlinda Agapay.
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973,
was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
However, their marriage is void because of
the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only
the properties acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution shall
be owned by them in proportion to their
respective contributions. It is required that
there be an actual contribution. If actual
contribution is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she
was engaged in the business of buy and sell
and had a sari-sari store. However, she
failed to persuade the court that she actually
contributed money to but the subjected
riceland. When the land was acquired, she
was only around 20 years old compared to
Miguel who was already 64 years old and a
pensioner of the US Government.
Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic
how she could have contributed the P3,750
as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis
to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as
correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased and
Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina
previously agreed to donate their conjugal
property in favor of Herminia. Separation of
property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment
when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment
resulted from the compromise was not
specifically for separation of property and
should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty
Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed
of conveyance for the property revealed the
falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought
such property for P20,000 when she was 22
years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel
provided the money for the purchase price
and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed
as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda
was properly a donation and which was
clearly void and inexistent by express
provision of the law because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation.
Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition
against donation between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
44.) Barrido vs. Nonato
GR 176492- October 20, 2014
THE FAMILY
45.) Alvarez vs. Ramirez
GR 143439- October 14, 2005
FACTS:
Susan Ramirez filed a criminal case for
arson against her brother-in-law Maximo
Alvarez. The prosecution called to the
witness stand its first witness Esperanza
Alvarez, sister of Susan and wife of
Maximo. Esperanza testified but when she
showed uncontrolled emotions, the trial
judge to suspended the proceedings.
Subsequently, Maximo, through counsel,
filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification. The trial court issued the
questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza,
prompting Susan to file a petition for
Certiorari before the CA. The CA nullified
the order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Can Esperanza testify against her husband in
the arson case?
HELD:
Yes. The offense of arson attributed to
petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation between him and his wife
Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him,
eradicates all the major aspects of marital
life such as trust, confidence, respect and
love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals:
The act of private respondent in setting fire
to the house of his sister-in-law Susan
Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife
was there, and in fact with the alleged intent
of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien
to the harmony and confidences of marital
relation which the disqualification primarily
seeks to protect. The criminal act
complained of had the effect of directly and
vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It
underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained
that there is no more harmony, peace or
tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme
Court has held that in such a case, identity
is non-existent. In such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life
which the law aims to protect are nothing
but ideals which through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
(People v. Castaneda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus,
there is no longer any reason to apply the
Marital Disqualification Rule.
It should be stressed that as shown by the
records, prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner
and his wife was already strained. In fact,
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
they were separated de facto almost six
months before the incident. Indeed, the
evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between
petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an
interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the
State, being interested in laying the truth
before the courts so that the guilty may be
punished and the innocent exonerated, must
have the right to offer the direct testimony of
Esperanza, even against the objection of the
accused, because it was the latter himself
who gave rise to its necessity (Alvarez vs.
Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14,
2005)
46.) Hiyas Savings & Loan Bank vs
Acuna
GR 154132- August 31, 2006
FACTS:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno
(private respondent) filed with the RTC of
Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his
wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and
Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending that he did not secure any loan
from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute
any contract of mortgage in its favor; that
his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas
and the spouses Owe, who were the ones
that benefited from the loan, made it appear
that he signed the contract of mortgage; that
he could not have executed the said contract
because he was then working abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not HIYAS SAVINGS and
LOAN BANK, INC. can invoke Article 151
of the Family Code.
HELD:
No. The Court has ruled that the requirement
under Article 151 of the Family Code is
applicable only in cases which are
exclusively between or among members of
the same family, it necessarily follows that
the same may be invoked only by a party
who is a member of that same family, as
provided for by Article 150 of the Family
Code.
THE FAMILY HOME
47.) Eulogio, et.al. vs. Bell, Sr., et.al
GR 186322- July 8, 2015
FACTS:
(the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children
of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and
Rogelia Calingasan-Bell... sought the
annulment of the contract of sale executed
by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter
residential house and lot, as well as the
cancellation of the title obtained by
petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but
declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in
the amount of PI million plus 12% interest
per annum.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
CA... affirmed
Spouses Bell later brought the case to this
Court to question their liability to petitioners
in the amount of P1 million plus interest.
The Court, however, dismissed... their
Petition for failure to show any reversible
error committed by the CA.
the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a
result of which respondents' property... was
levied on execution.
Upon motion by respondents, the trial court,
on 31
August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ
of execution on the ground that the property
was a family home.
Petitioners filed a Motion... of the lifting of
the writ of execution.
Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code,
they posited that the current market value of
the property exceeded the statutory limit of
P300,000 considering that it was located in a
commercial... area, and that Spouses Bell
had even sold it to them for P1 million.
The RTC... set the case for hearing to
determine the present value of the family
home... and directed the commissioners to
canvass prospective buyers of their house
and lot.
respondents filed a Petition... before the
CA... the CA rendered its Decision granting
respondents' Petition for Certiorari... the CA
found that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the execution
sale of the subject family home after finding
that its present value exceeded the statutory
limit. The basis for the valuation of a family
home under Article 160,... according to the
appellate court, is its actual value at the time
of its constitution and not the market/present
value; therefore, the trial court's order was
contrary to law.
ISSUE:
whether respondents' family home may be
sold on execution under Article 160 of the
Family Code.
RULING:
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on
execution under Article 160 of the Family
Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt
from execution as expressly provided for in
Article 153 of the Family Code.
It has been said that the family home is a
real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment.
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution;
and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and others
who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose
claims is not among those mentioned in
Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor,
and he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the family home is actually worth more
than the maximum amount fixed in Article
157, he may apply to the court... which
rendered the judgment for an order directing
the sale of the property under execution. The
court shall so order if it finds that the actual
value of the family home exceeds the
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
maximum amount allowed by law as of the
time of its constitution. If the increased
actual value... exceeds the maximum
allowed in Article 157 and results from
subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home, by the owner
or owners of the property, or by any of the
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure
shall apply.
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the
family home shall not exceed, at the time of
its constitution, the amount of three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and two
hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or
such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by...
law.
Any subsequent improvement or
enlargement of the family home by the
persons constituting it, its owners, or any of
its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment
provided the following conditions obtain: (a)
the actual value of the property at... the time
of its constitution has been determined to
fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result
in an increase in its value exceeding the
statutory limit.[45] Otherwise, the family
home can be the subject of a... forced sale,
and any amount above the statutory limit is
applicable to the obligations under Articles
155 and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of
respondents' family home under Article 160,
petitioners needed to establish these facts:
(1) there was an increase in its actual value;
(2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by
the persons constituting... the family home,
its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3)
the increased actual value exceeded the
maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of
those facts was alleged - much less proven -
by petitioners. The sole evidence presented
was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had
already determined with finality that the
contract was null, and that the actual
transaction was an... equitable mortgage.
48.) Patricio vs. Dario III
GR 170829- November 20, 2006
FACTS:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc
Dario and private respondent Marcelino G.
Dario III.
Among the properties he left was a parcel of
land with a residential house and a... pre-
school building built thereon... petitioner,
Marcelino Marc and private respondent,
extrajudicially settled the estate of
Marcelino V. Dario.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc
formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership.
Private respondent refused to partition the
property hence petitioner and Marcelino
Marc instituted an action for... partition
before the Regional Trial Court... the trial
court ordered the partition of the subject
property in the following manner: Perla G.
Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6;
and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
The trial court also ordered the sale of the
property by... public auction wherein all
parties concerned may put up their bids. In
case of failure, the subject property should
be distributed accordingly in the aforestated
manner.[4]... upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by... private
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
respondent... the appellate court partially
reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision.
the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner
and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It
held that the... family home should continue
despite the death of one or both spouses as
long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof.
The heirs could not partition the property
unless the court found compelling reasons to
rule otherwise. The appellate court also held
that the minor son of... private respondent,
who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V.
Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.
ISSUES:
The sole issue is whether partition of the
family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on
the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV, the minor son of private respondent, can
be considered as a beneficiary under Article
154 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The law explicitly provides that occupancy
of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must
be actual.
something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is... presumptive or
constructive.
the property may be occupied by the
"beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of
the Family Code, which may include the in-
laws where the family home is... constituted
jointly by the husband and wife.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates
who are the beneficiaries of a family home:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship
be legitimate or... illegitimate, who are
living in the family home and who depend
upon the head of the family for legal
support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home,
three requisites must concur: (1) they must
be among the relationships enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in
the family home; and (3) they are dependent
for legal support upon the head of the
family.
If there is no more beneficiary left at the
time of death, we believe the family home
will be dissolved or cease, because there is
no more reason for its existence. If there are
beneficiaries who survive living in the
family home,... it will continue for ten years,
unless at the expiration of the ten years,
there is still a minor beneficiary, in which
case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code
may thus be expressed in this wise: If there
are beneficiaries who survive and are living
in the family home, it will continue for 10
years, unless at the expiration of 10 years,
there is still a minor beneficiary, in which
case the... family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.
The term "descendants" contemplates all
descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great
grandchildren of the spouses who constitute
a family home.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is
also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino
V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
the son of private respondent and grandson
of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has
been... living in the family home... within 10
years from the death of the decedent, hence,
he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support
from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him.
The liability for legal support falls primarily
on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents,
especially his... father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation
of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in
their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent
on legal support not from his grandmother,
but from his father.
Thus, despite residing in the family home
and his being a descendant of Marcelino V.
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV
cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated... under Article 154
49.) Arriola vs Arriola
GR 177703- January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is
survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor
Arriola (respondent), his son with his first
wife, and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife
and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola
(petitioners). On February 16, 2004, the
RTC rendered a decision ordering the
partition of the parcel of land left by the
decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his
heir John, Vilma and Anthony in equal
shares of one-third each without prejudice to
the rights of creditors or mortgagees
thereon, if any. However, the parties failed
to agree on how to divide the property and
so the respondent proposed to sell it through
public auction. The petitioners initially
agreed but refused to include in the auction
the house standing on the subject land
because it is a family home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is a family
home.
RULING:
Yes. The subject house is a family home that
it cannot be sold through public auction.
Based on Article 152, the Family Home,
constituted jointly by the husband and wife
or any an unmarried head of the family is
the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is
situated.
Article 153, the Family Home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. From
the time of its constitution and so long as
any beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by
law.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
Article 159, the Family Home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is
a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reason.
Applying these concepts, the subject house
as well as the specific portion of the subject
land on which it stands is deemed
constituted as a family home by the
deceased and the petitioner Vilma from the
moment that began occupying the same as a
family residence 20 years back. Therefor the
house cannot be forced to sale by the
respondent because family home is exempt on
such sale.
50.) Spouses De Mesa vs. Spouses Acero
GR 185064- January 16, 2012
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land situated at No.
3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes
Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which was formerly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M)
issued by the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered...
under Araceli's name.
The petitioners jointly purchased the subject
property on April 17, 1984 while they were
still merely cohabiting before their marriage.
A house was later constructed on the subject
property, which the petitioners thereafter
occupied as their family home... after they
got married sometime in January 1987.
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli
obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
(Claudio) in the amount of P100,000.00,
which was secured by a mortgage over the
subject property. As payment, Araceli issued
a check drawn against China Banking
Corporation payable to Claudio.
When the check was presented for payment,
it was dishonored as the account from which
it was drawn had already been closed. The
petitioners failed to heed Claudio's
subsequent demand for payment.
Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with
the Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan
a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners.
On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a
Decision... acquitting the petitioners but
ordering them to pay Claudio the amount of
P100,000.00 with legal interest from date of
demand until fully paid.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was
issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte
(Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject
property. On March 9, 1994, the subject
property was sold on public auction; Claudio
was the highest bidder and the
corresponding certificate of sale was...
issued to him.
Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased
the subject property to the petitioners and a
certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly
rent of P5,500.00. However, the petitioners
and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the
rent and as of October 3, 1998, their total...
accountabilities to Claudio amounted to
P170,500.00.
Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals
due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina Acero
(Rufina) (collectively referred to as Spouses
Acero) filed a complaint for ejectment with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against the petitioners
and Juanito. In their... defense, the
petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
no right over the subject property. The
petitioners deny that they are mere lessors;
on the contrary, they are the lawful owners
of the subject property and, thus cannot be
evicted therefrom.
ISSUE:
whether the lower courts erred in refusing to
cancel Claudio's Torrens title TCT No. T-
221755 (M) over the subject property.
RULING:
Anent the second issue, this Court finds that
the CA did not err in dismissing the
petitioners' complaint for nullification of
TCT No. T-221755 (M).
The subject property is a family home.
The petitioners maintain that the subject
property is a family home and, accordingly,
the sale thereof on execution was a nullity.
For the family home to be exempt from
execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege.Hence,
two sets of... rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before
the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under Articles 225,
229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code.
Judicial... constitution of the family home
requires the filing of a verified petition
before the courts and the registration of the
court's order with the Registry of Deeds of
the area where the property is
located.Meanwhile, extrajudicial
constitution is governed by Articles 240 to
242 of... the Civil Code and involves the
execution of a public instrument which must
also be registered with the Registry
ofProperty.Failure to comply with either one
of these two modes of constitution will bar a
judgment debtor from availing of the
privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no
need to constitute extrajudicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective
from the timeit was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its... beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the
family home should belong to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution
must have beenwithconsent of the other, and
its valuemustnotexceed certain amounts...
depending upon the area where it is located.
Further, the debts incurred for which the
exemption does not apply as provided under
Art. 155 for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988.
The foregoing rules on constitution of
family homes, for purposes of exemption
from execution, could be summarized as
follows:
First, family residences constructed before
the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a
family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from... execution;
Second, family residences constructed after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides... therein;
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
Third, family residences which were not
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation
of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits... accorded to a family home under
the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family
residence sometime in January 1987. There
was no showing, however, that the same was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the
Family Code took effect... on August 3,
1988, the subject property became a family
home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The
petitioners were thus correct in asserting that
the subject property was a family home.
We now rule that claims for exemption from
execution of properties under Section 12 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be
presented before its sale on execution by the
sheriff.
Having failed to set up and prove to the
sheriff the supposed exemption of the
subject property before the sale thereof at
public auction, the petitioners now are
barred from raising the same. Failure to do
so estop them from later claiming the said
exemption.
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol
of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during one's
lifetime
It is likewise without dispute that the family
home, from the time of its constitution and
so long as any of its... beneficiaries actually
resides therein, is generally exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment.
The family home is a real right, which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.
However, this right can be waived or be
barred by laches by the failure to set up
and... prove the status of the property as a
family home at the time of the levy or a
reasonable time thereafter.
In this case, it is undisputed that the
petitioners allowed a considerable time to
lapse before claiming that the subject
property is a family home and its exemption
from execution and forced sale under the
Family Code. The petitioners allowed the
subject property to be levied... upon and the
public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed
from the time the subject property was sold
until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to
Claudio and, later, Araceli's Torrens title
was cancelled and a new one issued under
Claudio's name, still, the petitioner
remained... silent. In fact, it was only after
the respondents filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4)
years from the time of the auction sale, that
the petitioners claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt
from execution.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners'
negligence or omission to assert their right
within a reasonable time gives rise to the
presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the
exemption under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal... right, it is incumbent
upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the
same within the prescribed period and it is
not the sheriff's duty to presume or raise the
status of the subject property as a family
home.
The petitioners' negligence or omission
renders their present assertion doubtful; it
appears that it is a mere afterthought and
artifice that cannot be countenanced without
doing the respondents injustice and
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
depriving the fruits of the judgment award in
their favor. Simple... justice and fairness and
equitable considerations demand that
Claudio's title to the property be respected.
Equity dictates that the petitioners are made
to suffer the consequences of their
unexplained negligence.
51,) Equitable PCIB, Inc. vs. OJ-Mack
Trading Inc., et.al.
GR 165950- August 11, 2010
52.) Ramos, et. al . vs. Pangilinan, et. al.
GR 185920- July 20, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc.,
a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos
(Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners.
The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the respondents’ back-
wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay. The
decision became final and executory so a
writ of execution was issued which the
Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC)
implemented by levying a property in
Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the
family home, hence, exempt from execution
to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and
the company moved to quash the writ of
execution. Respondents argued that it is not
the family home there being another one in
Antipolo and that the Pandacan address
is actually the business address. The motion
was denied and the appeal was likewise
denied by the NLRC. Ramos and the
company appealed to the Court of
Appeals during the pendency of which
Ramos died and was substituted by herein
petitioners.
The appellate court, in denying petitioners’
appeal, held that the Pandacan property was
not exempted from execution, for while
“Article 153 of the Family Code
provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence, it did
not mean that the article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan
property was valid
HELD:
YES.
The general rule is that the family home is a
real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over
the dwelling place and the land on which it
is situated, which confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special
cases.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS- Legal Separation Case Digests
(Arts. 32-52)
For the family home to be exempt from the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting
execution, distinction must be made as to the family home cannot apply thereby
what law applies based on when it was making the levy upon the Pandacan property
constituted and what requirements must be valid.
complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence,
two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before

the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under Articles 225,
229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code.
Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is
governed by Articles 240 to 242..

On the other hand, for family homes

constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no
need to constitute extra judicially or
judicially, and the exemption is effective
from the time it was constituted and lasts as
long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the
family home should belong to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution
must have been with consent of the other,
and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the
family home is made answerable must have
been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both
instances, the claim for exemption must be
proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim

that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they
must comply with the procedure mandated
by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was
judicially or extra judicially constituted as